Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley and Wesleyan University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History
and Theory.
http://www.jstor.org
DAVID INGRAM
3. See H. Blumenberg, Die Legitimatat der Neuzeit (erweiterte und uberarbeitete Neuausgabe)
(Frankfurt,1976);transl.RobertM. Wallaceas TheLegitimacyof the ModernAge (Cambridge,
Mass., 1983)-hereafter abbreviated LM; Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt(Frankfurt, 1975);
transl.RobertM. Wallaceas The Genesisof the CopernicanWorld(Cambridge,Mass., 1987)-
hereafterabbreviatedGCW;and Arbeitam Mythos(Frankfurt,1979);transl.RobertM. Wallace
as Workon Myth (Cambridge,Mass., 1985)-hereafterabbreviatedWM.All citationsand refer-
ences are takenfrom the Englisheditionsunlessspecifiedotherwise.
It may seem odd that a challenge to the legitimacy of the modern age would
come from precisely that corner of historiography which has provided such a
convenient perspective from which to view humanity's progress. Yet the fun-
damental irony animating secularization theories -their tendency to view moder-
nity as culminating an eschatological tradition whose dogmatic claim to authority
it contests and transcends - cuts both ways: these theories can just as easily deny
the age its alleged originality as debunk its presumption of having satisfied the
legitimate demands of its predecessor. This, at artyrate, was how Karl L6with
chose to interpretthe dilemma in his influential book Meaning in History (1949);
the modern faith in inevitable, irreversibleprogress which found penultimate ex-
pression in philosophies of history from Voltaireto Marx would seem to be little
more than a mere repetition of the eschatological hope embodied in the Judeo-
II
5. RobertPippin,"Blumenberg
and the ModernityProblem,"Reviewof Metaphysics40 (1987),
536-537.
6. Ibid., 554-557.
7. Martin Jay, for example, faults The Legitimacy of the Modern Age for neglecting the down
side of rationalself-assertion:the denigrationof a personalhappinesslinkedto the realizationof
theemancipatory goalsof religiousandmythictradition(reviewessay,Historyand Theory24 [19851,
192-196).BernardYackalso seemsto misunderstand the pointof Blumenberg's "defense"of moder-
nity.Thoughhe recognizesthatBlumenberg's "'demonstration of the modernage'does not demon-
he laterarguesthat Blumenberg"isa newand ingeniousdefenderof the En-
strateits desirability,"
lightenmentand its influence"("Mythand Modernity," PoliticalTheory15 [19871,257-259).Jay's
objectionmisconstruesBlumenberg's notionof self-assertionto meannarrowtechnologicaldomi-
nation(see LM, 200 for Blumenberg's disclaimerthat "purposespositedby a technicalwill must
playthe primaryandmotivatingrolefor the technicalprocess")and ignoreswhatBlumenberg later
has to sayaboutthe emancipatoryfunctionof "finalmyths"(see below).Yack,on the otherhand,
failsto see thatBlumenberg's demonstrationof the "necessity"of modernfoundationalismis only
an explanationof its possiblemotivation,not a defenseof its legitimacy.
III
his refusal to view myth as a mere stepping stone on the way toward rational
self-assertion - a position that is entirely consonant with the historicist interpre-
tation hitherto advanced- is severelycompromised by his surprisingacknowledg-
ment that "there is objective progress"and that "history, whatever else it might
be, is also a process of optimization" (WM, 165).
How are we to reconcile these statements, which point so emphatically in the
direction of a metaphysical metasystem, with the historicism of The Legitimacy
of the Modern Age? One way to begin is by noting that the universals in ques-
tion, be they mythic or rationalistic, are symbolic structuresthat arise in response
to one, all-encompassinghuman problem- what Blumenbergcalls "theabsolutism
of reality."The absolutism of reality refers to a limit state, not dissimilar to the
state of nature formerly introduced by social contract theorists, in which "man
came close to not having control of the conditions of his existence and . .. be-
lieved that he simply lacked control of them" (WM, 3-4). Myth mitigates the
threat of anxiety produced by this feeling of helplessness in that it interprets
(names, differentiates,limits), and therebycontrols, what is otherwise an indefinite,
overwhelming power.
Humanity's need for myth is thus coextensive with its need for meaning,
significance and value -a need that, far from being dispelled by rational disen-
chantment of nature, is rather provoked by it. The durability of myth, however,
is not to be attributed to the existence of unchanging mythic archetypes which
provide universal, metaphysical patterns of meaning. Although myth functions
to limit the autonomy of reason -and to that extent serves to mitigate epochal
breaks - its meaning, Blumenberg reminds us, is continually modified in an un-
ending labor of adaptation, thereby rendering futile the Romantic quest for
original semantic contents. The durability of myth must therefore be explained
functionally, in terms of the successful (and legitimate) reoccupation of iden-
tical positions constituting the broader, anthropological system of life. Indeed
Blumenberglikens the manner in which myth withstands the test of time in count-
less receptions to a process of natural selection. 12 So construed, this "Darwinism
of words" affirms but the existence of functional or adaptational universals in
response to the repeated challenge of existential contingency, and is strictly in-
compatible with any teleological fulfillment of an archaic cultural heritage.
Still, it is disturbing that Blumenberg speaks of history as a process of evolu-
12. There are similarities between the reinterpretationof mythological "constants" in the course
of oral transmission and the Rezeptionsasthetik developed by Wolfgang Iser and Hans Jauss under
the influence of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Both Blumenberg and Gadamer agree that the significance
of a given tradition remains inextricably bound to the history of its reception and is therefore not
identical to the original authorial intentions underlying its production. Such reception is akin to
"applying"an authoritativebody of interpretationswhose "truth"or "legitimacy"is rhetoricallycom-
pelling for a given community rather than rationally (or universally) justifiable in a theoretical, or
discursive sense. The difference between Blumenberg's reception theory and that of philosophical
hermeneuticsresidesin the former'sfunctionalism,which conceivesculturalpreservationinstrumentally
andformally (in terms of an identity of adaptivefunctions, not of meanings).See WM, 83-84, 172-174;
and "An Anthropological Approach to Rhetoric," 435-449).
13. WM, 166. The notion of institution derives from Arnold Gehlen's technical use of the term
to designatejust those taken-for-grantedcustoms (institutio) that condition our behavior and thought
preconsciously.
IV