The Nature of Human and Social World for Marx, Weber, and Durkheim: A Hermeneutic

Analysis
Author(s): Navid Mohseni
Source: Michigan Sociological Review, No. 8 (Fall, 1994), pp. 84-94
Published by: Michigan Sociological Association
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MichiganSociologicalReview,No. 8, Fall 1994.

The NatureofHumanand Social WorldforMarx,Weber,and

Durkheim:A HermeneuticAnalysis
Navid Mohseni
HamlineUniversity

Abstract

This articleexaminesthenatureof "socialreality"intheworksofMarx,Weber,and

Durkheim byreferring to thefundamentalquestionwhicheachthinkerwas posing.In
doingso, thearticlediscussesthenotionsof laborin Marx'swork,social factsin
Durkheim's, and ideal-typesin Weber's.The articleconcludeswithsuggestionsfor
synthesizing theseworks. It that
argues a successful is if
synthesis possibleonly it
incorporates thefundamental posedbyMarx,Weber,andDurkheim.
questions

Introduction

Thepurposeofthisarticleis multi-faceted. First,itattemptsto showwhatKarlMarx,

EmileDurkheim, andMaxWeberconsider tobe thenature ofsocialphenomena andthesocial
world.Second,itexplainsthatsuchan attempt is possibleonlyifdiscussedwithreferenceto
thespecific
questions addressed in each. it
Third, discusses the of
possibility synthesizingthese
theories.
Myconcern is topointoutthatthenature ofsocialrealityforeachofthesethinkers, is
understandableonlyinreference tothebasicquestion(s) whicheachwas posingatthetimeof
thetheory's origin.Also, itis in thiscontextthat thenature canbe deduced
ofsocialreality
from thesebasicquestions.
Itisnotthepurpose ofthispapertocompare themethods orthemethodologies adopted
bythese because
thinkers, this by would
itself constitute another The
article. inthis
discussion
article
canmake,however, suchcomparisons andanalysespossible.In fact,themostimportant
goal of thisarticleis to demonstrate thewayin whichthesetheories can be comparedand
synthesized.I willarguethatsuchcomparisons areenlightening onlywhen theyaredonewith
regardtothebasicquestions eachtheorist faces.

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 MethodofAnalysis

Nineteenth century Western Europewaspoundedby pivotalforcesoftransformation.

Politics,education,religion,communication science,art, and social life were being
revolutionized. Thefuture was inflatedwithpromises whichwereinterpreted bothpositively
andnegatively, withanticipation andapprehension. Max Weberwasnotoptimistic aboutthe
natureofthesepromises.He didnotsee hopeinthefuture, andforhimtheconditions atthat
timewerenotideal. His concern washowWestern Europe had come to sucha stage.
In contrast to Weber,EmileDurkheim and Karl Marx did notview conditions as
disconsolate.Durkheim evaluatedthempositively and saw themas emancipatory forthe
majority ofpeople. Atthesametime,forhimtheerawas transitory. LikeDurkheim, Marx
believed infreedom forthemasses,buthedidnotbelievethatitwouldbe possibleintheway
eventsweretakingplace. Forhim,therewas a needforactiveinvolvement oftheoppressed
massesinorderto achievefreedom fromtheexploitation ofcapitalist conditions.
Marx,Durkheim, andWebereachwerestruggling to provideanswersfortheirown
questions. Thequestion forWeberwas,"Howis modern capitalismpossibleinthewayittook
place in theWest?" For Durkheim: "How is the of
unity societypossible?"AndforMarx:
"Howis freedom possible?" Itis withreference
to these questionsthatI willattempt to interpret
whateachthinker defined as socialphenomenon.
Myreading ofMarx,Weber,andDurkheim is a wayofmaking whatis implicit
explicit
intheir works.Itinvokesfroma massofdetailsthelogicalstructure anddevelopment oftheir
arguments through the use of hermeneutical analysis. The way I have selected the basic
questionsthatunderline theirtheories was notjust byliterary finding themin theirworks.
Rather, I havetried
tostructure theirworkswithin theirbasicquestions andtoexplainhowthe
works arecomprehensible within theseframes.Ofcourse,thisis nottheonlywayto interpret
their
works.Infact, according tohermeneuticalanalysisa textdoesnothavea uniquemeaning
(essence)andthatallreadings aremattersofinterpretation. However, thisdoesnotimplythat
anyinterpretation is correct.On thecontrary, thetestforan interpretation is to see ifitcan
makesenseofalltheelements ofa text.Thetestofmyinterpretation wouldbe theframework
of thesebasic questions-dotheyassist in makingall the arguments of thesethinkers
meaningful? Ifso,I havesucceededinmytask.Thesequestions willbe explained onlyinthe
context oftheontology ofthesetheories.

Marx and theQuestionofFreedom

"Thephilosophers
haveonlyinterpreted
theworldinvariousways;thepointis tochange
it,"in orderto makehumansfree,Marxwouldsay. Marxis mainlyconcerned withthe
question:"How is freedom
possible?"In order
to understand
how Marx provides withan
us

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answer,we needto comprehend howhe perceived humans.In theintroduction of German
Ideology,Marxexplainshispremise thatindividuals aretobe understood ina socialcontext
withtheiractivity andthematerial conditions underwhichtheylive(Marx 1977: 160). For
Marx, individuals are notisolated huntersor fishers as theyareforAdamSmithandDavid
Ricardo.Rather, theyare socialindividuals.Marxrejectsthecontract theorists'notionof
humans, i.e.oneswholiveina stateofnature andcomeincontact withfellowhumansthrough
contracts. Marxarguesthateventhisnotionofhumanshas developedonlyinthecontext of
He
society. argues that "thehuman essence is no abstraction inherent in each singleindividual.
In its realityit is theensembleof socialrelations" (Marx 1977:157). The questionthen
becomes, "Ifhumans havethisnotion ofsociety attheir essence,howthenis freedom possible?"
like
Marx, Aristotle, believes thatman is by nature social;unlikeAristotle, he doesnotbelieve
thatman'snature is fixed.Humansmaketheirownnature.How?Marxbelievesitis through
laboractivity. Humansdistinguish themselves fromanimalswhentheybegintoproducetheir
meansof subsistence.Throughinteraction withnature, humanschangebothnatureand
themselves. social
Therefore, reality for Marx is a process dialectical
of change.
1 1
Gould(198 : 15)argues that"totakethissocialreality apartfroma givenhistorical and
socialform is (also)toabstract it." Within thiscontext, forMarx,humansdo nothavea fixed
anddetermined nature.We arefree,anditis through ourlaborthatwe changeourselves.A
corollary, however, is thatifhumansareby definition free,thequestforthepossibility of
freedom is absurd.In orderto overcome thisparadoxical situation,we must comprehend the
natureoffreedom initshistoricalcontext. Butbefore webegintoanalyzethenotionoffreedom
historically,weneedtoknowwhatMarxmeansbyfreedom andbe abletoanswerthequestion
"Whatis thenature offreedom?"
ForThomasHobbes-asan exampleofa Liberalthinker-freedom existswhenthereis
no external constraint uponhuman'swillorwhenindividuals canwillfreely.Gould(1981)
definestheHobbesiannotionof freedom as negativefreedom.She arguesthatMarxalso
treatedfreedom negatively as overcoming external constraints. UnlikeHobbes,freedom for
Marxhowever, is anactivity rather thana state of being. This of
activity overcoming external
constraint "givesrisetoa secondaspectofMarx'sconceptoffreedom whichfreedom takeson
thecharacter ofself-determination" (Gould1981: 108).
Self-determination forMarxis notthesameas forHegel. ForHegel, freedom is the
sameas self-transcendence. The real freedom is possible when the individual with
identifies
something universal andconcrete. InthePhilosophy ofRight,Hegelarguesthatthe individual
is freewhens/herealizesoneselfinthestate.Thus,forHegel,humansbecomefreethrough
theirownconsciousness. ForMarxincontrast, self-realizationis a processinwhichhumans
createthemselves through projecting possibilities that become guidesforactionswherethe
realization ofthesepossibilities leadstoprojection ofnewpossibilities tobe realized(Gould
1981). Thus, for Marx real freedom can be attained through labor, but in orderto realize

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oneself,humans, mustbe free.Freedombecomesboththepresupposition and theproductof
theself-realization activity.
Freedom forMarxhastwomeanings: itis a capacity,anditis a product.Sinceall people
havethecapacity to laborand,therefore, tochangetheworldandchangethemselves, theyare
free.Thisis a formal meaning offreedom, a freedom initselfinHegelianlanguage.Freedom
becomesconcrete whenthiscapacityis actualized."Marxregardsthefullachievement of
concretefreedom as theresultofa processofhistorical development" (Gould1981). He sees
freedom as developing historically
through different stagesofsocialagingaction.Freedomin
thesenseofthecreative oflaboring
activity ispresent inall stages.ForMarx,freedom becomes
possibleor becomes concrete when itappears as theend or aim of social that
life, is, an end
as
in itself,notforsomeotheraimssuchas wealth.Freedombecomesconcrete whenpeople
overcome bothnaturalconstraintsandsocialdomination. Howis thispossible?In theJewish
Question, Marxarguesthatpeoplemustrecognize theirownforcesas socialforces, organize
them, andthusnolonger separatesocialforcesfrom themselves intheformofpoliticalforces.
Onlywhenthishas beenachievedwillhumanemancipation be completed (Marx1977).

Weberand theMeaningoftheWorld

Weberwas facedwithtwo interconnected problemsas he encountered withthe

development of capitalismandrationalism in all spheresof life. He wantedto explainthe
causesofrationalization andcapitalism intheWestthrough theapplicationofsocialscience.
He alsobelievedthatrationalization hadaffected thescienceitself.His questionthenbecame
"Howis socialsciencepossible?"Weberwas involved ina paradoxical hewanted
situation;
tostudy thegenealogy ofcapitalism, butthisrequired a specificmethodwhichwouldexamine
capitalism Thismethod
"scientifically." itself,
however, was influencedbythedevelopment of
capitalism.
Weberarguesthatthrough theapplication ofscienceto theworld,theworlditselfhas
become meaninglessanddisenchanted. InScienceas a Vocationhe states"who...stillbelieves
thatthefindingsofastronomy, biology,physics, orchemistry couldteachus anythingaboutthe
meaning of theworld? Ifthere is such a meaning, along what roadcouldonecomeuponits
tracks?Ifthenatural sciencesleadto anything inthisway,theyareapttomakethebeliefthat
thereis sucha thingas the'meaning' oftheuniverse dyingoutatitsveryroots"(1958: 142).
Weberarguesthatscienceis claimedtobe freefrom presuppositions,butoneofitsown
presuppositionsis thatwhat is generated by scientific work is important
inthesensethatitis
worth beingknown."Inthis,obviously, arecontained allourproblems.Forthispresupposition
cannot beproven byscientific
means."Thus,iftheworldis meaningless andwhatsciencedoes
cannotbe provenscientifically valuable, how then is science possible?Orwhatshouldbe the
goal ofscience?

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 In ordertounderstand howWeberprovidesus withan answer, we needtounderstand
whatWebermeansbytheword"meaninglessness." ForWeber,theworlddoesnothaveany
intrinsicmeaning. Evenifitdid,itsmeaning couldnotbe discovered byeithersocialornatural
sciences. "Metaphysically, for
then, Weber, the world was meaningless" (Peters1977).
Empirically, however, itcouldhavebeengivenmeaning.Webercontends that"culture is a
finitesegment ofthemeaningless infinity oftheworldprocess,a segment on whichhuman
beings confer and
meaning significance" (Weber, 1949). This is significantbecause itreveals
relationships which areessential to us due to theirconnections with our values. "We cannot
discuss,however, whatis meaningful of a
tous bymeans presuppositionless investigation of
empiricaldata. Rather, perceptions ofitbecomean objectofinvestigation" (Weber1949).
Whatis meaningful forus cannotbe deducedfromany"laws"orfactors becausethereis no
one-to-one correspond between reality andtheobjectofourinquiry. "Onlya smallportion of
existing realityis coveredbyourvalue-conditioned interests, and italone is significantto us"
(Weber1946).
The objectof social science,forWeber,is whatwe attribute to a generalcultural
significance and is meaningful for us. If social objects or social factsarethosewhichare
meaningful forus and,further, ifwecannot provewhatis meaningful apriori,thenis objectivity
possible? Can we explainsocial phenomena objectively?Weberarguesthatabsolute
is
objectivity impossible. "There is no absolutely 'objective'scientific analysisof culture"
(Weber1949). Theframing question then becomes "What is possible?"
In thisjuncture,Weber distinguishes "value-relevance" from"value-judgement."
Through value-relevance, an individual's concrete portion of reality becomesmeaningful and
This
significant. portion can be studied objectively. Weber believes that we should tryto
excludeourvalue-judgements fromourscientific For
inquiry. him, attemptan to understand
andexplainthecultural significance ofindividual eventsis notsubjective totheextent thatit
involvesvalue-relevance, butthisis truefornaturalsciencesas well. "Accordingly, cultural
scienceinvolves'subjective'presupposition in so faras it concernsitselfonlywiththose
components ofreality whichhavesomerelationship, however indirect,toeventstowhichwe
attachcultural Butitobviously
significance... doesnotfollowfromthisresearch inthecultural
sciencescan onlyhaveresultswhichare subjective'; inthesensethattheyarevalidforone
personandnotforanother" (Weber1949).
How is theexplanation ofan individual factpossible,sincea description ofeventhe
smallestportion ofreality canneverbe exhaustive?Weberarguesthatitis possiblethrough
theconstruction ofIdeal-types. Itis inthiscontext that"Ideal-type" shouldviewed,notas a
meremethodological tool,but as a in an
formula resolving ontological impasse.Weberargues
thatIdeal-typeis nota "description of realitybutit aimsto giveunambiguous meansof
expression to sucha description" (Weber1949). Themeaning of"Ideal-type" becomesclear
onlyin referenceto Weber's basic question: "How is the modern capitalism possibleinWestern

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Europeandnotsomewhere else?"
We saw thatthrough theverydevelopment ofcapitalism in all thespheresoflife,the
worldhasbecomedevoidofmeaning. Scienceis notcapableofendowing meaning totheworld.
a
Science,forWeber,is itself problematic issue. The questionis, how do we getoutofthis
dilemma, orhow,doesWeber?Beinginfluenced byRickert, Weberemploys theconceptof
value-relevance whichenableshimtostudythatportion ofthesocialworldwhichis significant
tous. Thus,thenature ofcapitalism anditscausescouldbe studied becausetheyhavemeaning.
But,isthere sucha thing as capitalism reality?Weberwouldanswerno. Itis nothing
in butan
Ideal-type.However, sinceIdeal-type is a mental construct andcannotbe foundempirically in
"it
reality, is a utopia" (Weber 1949). What then is the purpose of Ideal-type? Weber argues
that"theconstruction ofabstract ideal-types recommends itselfnotas an endbutas a means"
(1949). Byemploying Ideal-type we can and
analytically emphatically understand reality.
Nothing, however, is moredangerous thantheassumption thatthe"true"construct and
theessenceofreality areportrayed inIdeal-types. Ideal-types are not true they not
realities; do
operatebehind thepassage of eventsand do notwork themselves out in history.According to
Weber, anyattempt todetermine the"real"andthe"true" meaning ofhistorical conceptsalways
reappears andneversucceedsinachieving itsgoal.
To summarize, Weberviewsonlya portion oftheworld-cultural world-as meaningful.
the of
Through process value-relevance, itis the individual who givesmeaning to theworld.
Withinthiscontext, Weberis able to solvehis problem.He developsa method whichis
objectivewithin themeaningful portion oftheworld.Through theconstruction ofIdeal-types,
he studiescapitalism.But he claimsthatwhatis meaningful forus todaymaynot be
meaningful tomorrow. Hence, what is disclosed or explained scientifically,is notnecessarily
thedisclosure ofthe"truth."

Durkheimand theSolidarityofSociety

ForDurkheim, likeMarxandWeber,socialphenomena or thesocialworldcouldbe

understoodintermsofa basicquestion.Durkheim's is: "Howis theunityofsocietypossible?"
Withinthiscontext, he is notconcerned whether or notsocietyis possible; he takesthe
existence as a given.Rather,
ofsociety heis concernedwithhowl Durkheim believesthatsince
societyexists, alsoexists.Therearelawsandregulations
order thatgovernthesocialworldas
well as thenaturalworld.As physiological phenomena areregulated bylaws,so aresocial
phenomena.
Durkheim deducesfrom theexistenceofsocietytheexistenceofsocialfacts.Thesocial
worldforDurkheim, unlikeforWeber,doesnothavea chaoticnature.Of course,it is not
alwaysstableeither.Societies,likeorganisms,evolve.Through theirevolutionsthereemerge
timeswhich areunstableandtransitory. like
Durkheim, Saint-Simon, believesintheprogress

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ofsociety.Forhimprogress implieshistorical lawsandorder.
Did orderalwaysexist,ordiditcomeintoexistence aftersocietywas formed?In the
latter
case,theexistence oforderandlawsis contingent ontheexistence ofsociety.Therefore,
thequestion:"Howis society possible?" cannot be explained aprioribyassuming theexistence
oflawsororder.Thus,forDurkheim, inorderto assumethatthesocialworldis governed by
lawsandregulations, hemustclaimtheexistence ofsociety unconditionally. Societyhas always
existedandwillcontinue toexist.Therehasnever beenany"stateofnature" (so individuals did
notmakecontracts inorder tomakea society), norhastheexistence ofsocietydepended on its
forindividuals.Durkheim
utility is a staunchcriticofboththecontract andtheutilitarian
theorists. Society,forhim,is notmadeofindividuals; rather, societyis madeofsociety-the
simplest element ofsocietyis herd,notindividual.
According toDurkheim, sincesocietyis morethanindividuals, has alwaysexisted,and
hasanorderly nature,social phenomena which are regulated by laws should be overandabove
individuals.Individuals do notconstruct socialfactsnorgivethemmeaning andsignificance.
Social factsnotonlyarenotmadeby individuals, buttheyalso makeindividuals and are
coercivetoindividuals.Itis theexternality ofsocialfactsthatmakestheirstudyandexplanation
possible. Durkheim, likeSaint-Simon andComtebeforehim,believesthatthrough positive
sciencerather thanmetaphysics we canstudysocialfactspositively andobjectively.So, for
Durkheim unlikeforWeber, categories andconcepts havea one-to-one relationship with"true"
realities.Theyarenotmadeup "Ideal-types," butarerepresentatives ofexternal realties.
InhisessayDualismofHumanNature,Durkheim arguesthat"wehaveevenfounda
basisforconjecturing thatthefondamental andlofty concepts thatwe callcategories areformed
onthemodelofsocialphenomena" (1960:338). Durkheiiris claim is basedon hisbasic premise
that "he (human)actuallyis double." People are made of two contrasting parts:their
individuality-theirbodies-andtheirspiritwhich"comestothemfromsociety."Thisstateof
"transfers
self-consciousness, society intous andconnects us withsomething thatsurpassesus"
(Durkheim, 1960:337). For this
Durkheim, duality of human nature is due to thefactthat
people have always lived in society and not in the state of nature.
Durkheim, unlikeMarxdoes notseekto reconcile ourdualnatureby assumingthat
humans aresocialanimals.Assuming humansare socialanimals, oneimpliesthatthereis no
contradictionbetween humansandsociety.Furthermore, therewillbe noneedto ask "Howis
societypossible"becausehumansandsocietyarein harmony; humansbydefinition livein
society.Durkheim recognizes theduality ofhumansandsociety, bodyandspirit, andstatesthe
veryreason of theirexistence is due to the fact thathumans live in societybut are notinunity
withit. "Wepossessbotha faculty forthinking as individuals anda faculty forthinking in
universalandimpersonal terms. The firstis calledsensitivity and the second reason" (Durkheim
1960:333). Do peoplecometo graspsocialfactsthrough theirsensations or through their
reason?Inresponsetothisquestion, Durkheim arguesagainstbothempiricists andidealists.

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NyeandAshworth arguethat"Durkheim's
thoughtdidnotat anytime,andinanyconsistent
manner,polarizearoundthe hornsof theserespectiveDilemmas"(Nye and Ashworth
1971:133).

Marx,Weber,and Durkheim
Contrasting

In previoussectionsI explainedthenatureof thesocial worldand theindividual

accordingto Marx,Weber,and Durkheim. The social worldforWeberis intrinsically
meaningless andchaotic.Itis onlythrough actsoftheindividual whereitbecomesmeaningful.
Thus,theindividual inWeber's theory occupiesanimportant role. However, thefreedom ofthe
individualis notdiscussed inhistheoiy either as anontology oras a subjectofinquiry.Weber,
unlikeMarx,is notinterested inthepossibility offreedom.He rejectssucha possibility and
ignoresitthrough hismethodological essays on the nature of socialaction. Thus,although the
individualis thesourceofmeaningin Weber'stheory s/heis nototologicallyfree.Weber
argues that we cannot know what is and
significant meaningful through science. Whatis
significantfor us is sociallydetermined. This is how Weber takes back the freedom whichhe
had givento theindividual via meaning-giving acts. Nevertheless, the social world can be
understood, although onlypartially,through understanding themeaning thatindividuals attach
tothesocialworld.Sincewe cannotscientifically the
explain process of value-relevance, our
and
understandingexplanation of thesocialworld is partial.Therefore, Weber would argue that
evenhisownbasicquestion:"Howis modern capitalism possible?"is problematic andcannot
beexplained through socialsciencealthough heconfesses thatitsimportance is historically
and
culturallydetermined.
ForDurkheim as forMarx,thenature ofthesocialworldis notchaoticandmeaningless.
Therearelawsandregularities thatgovernthesocialworld.Influenced bySaint-Simon, both
Durkheim andMarxbelievethatthrough sciencetheselawscanbe discovered.Marxargues
inGerman Ideology, "where speculation ends~inreallife-therereal,positivesciencebegins:
the representation of the practicalprocessof development of men. Emptytalk about
consciousness ceases,andrealknowledge has to takeitsplace. Whenrealityis depicted,
philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses itsmediumof existence"(Marx
1977:165). Durkheim, in a differentway,says "ourprinciple, then,impliesno metaphysical
no
conception, speculation about the fundamental nature of beings"(Durkheim 1938:xiv).
Positivescience,however, has different meanings forDurkheim andMarx. So faras
positivescienceis theantithesis of speculation andmetaphysics, theybothsharethesame
understanding of it. But for Marx,positive science is an activescience ofliberation, whereas
forDurkheim, it is a meansof resignation to naturallaws. This difference can onlybe
understood inthecontext ofeachtheorist's basicquestion. ForMarxthequestionis "Howis
freedom possible?"Durkheim concerns himself with"Howis theunityorsolidarity ofsociety

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possible?" For Durkheim, thefreedom of theindividual is nota topicof concernbecause
individuals
donotplayanyroleinhistheory; society is over and againsttheindividual.Itis an
organism whichis independent ofindividualsandhas itsownlawsandorder.He arguesthat
"itdispleaseshumanto renounce theunlimited poweroverthesocialorder, he has so long
attributed
tohimself,andontheother hand,itseems tohimthat,ifcollective forcesreallyexist,
heisnecessarily
obliged to submit to themwithout being ableto modify them...hispowerover
things
reallybeganonlywhenherecognized thattheyhavea nature oftheirown,andresigned
himselftolearning thisnature fromthem"(1938:lviii).
Marxcriticizes sucha notion ofsociety.He argues that"itis aboveall necessaryto avoid
restoring
societyas a fixedabstraction opposedtotheindividual" (Marx1977:91). ForMarx
althoughthereexistlaws andorderin thesocialworld,theyarenotunchangeable.Thisis
exactlyso, becauseMarxdemandsthepossibility ofemancipation. ForMarxas wellas for
Weber,the individual an
occupies important it
role; is the individual who,through laboractivity,
emancipatesselfandchanges theworld.ForWeber,itis theindividual whothrough freeaction
makestheworldmeaningful. ForDurkheim, thesocialworldcanneither be changednorbe
givenmeaning,becauseithasitsownlaws,order, andmeaning. Thus,the"socialworld"is that
whichis "significant"forWeber,thatwhichis "external andconstraining" forDurkheim, and
thatwhichis an "object-for-action" andchangeforMarx.

Conclusion

A meaningful synthesisofMarx,Weber,andDurkheim's theories-either onthelevelof

their
ontology ortheirmethodology-is possible only ifthey are synthesized on theleveloftheir
intrinsicquestions.Furthermore, a comparison of common concepts in the theories is also
possiblewhenregarding thesequestions. Forexample, imagine that there aretwo runners, each
movingtowardsa different destination. Atonepointintimeandplace,theyreacheachother
andpass-juncture point.Anyattempt which triestomakesenseofortoexplainthisjuncture
isolated
point, from thepath and destination of therunners is doomedtofailure.Inthedomain
the
ofsocialscience, juncture pointin this example becomes thecommon conceptsofdifferent
socialaction,
suchas capitalism,
theories, andreligion.Anyattempt tocomparetheseconcepts
insolationfromtheir basicquestions is idleandpotentially misleading. Itbecomesevenmore
problematic when the taskof synthesis of different theories is concerned.
A successfulsynthesisofthesetheories is onewhichanalyzesthemontheleveloftheir
structuralquestionsas wellas on thebasisoftheirmethods andsomeoftheirconcepts.The
reasonwhyParsons' of
synthesis Weber and Durkheim resulted inan incomprehensible "grand
theory," because
is precisely ofhisavoidance in synthesizing these theories on the levelof their
basicquestions.Sucha synthesis shouldstartwiththequestion of "How can societymaintain
itsunity
whilefacing theforces ofcapitalism?"It shouldgo onto ask"Arethesecontradictory

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phenomena?" and"Does rationalism makethesolidarityofsociety possible,orhas ithadthe
oppositeeffect?" An example of a successful is
synthesis the work oftheFrankfurt Critical
Theorists.TheirsynthesisofMarxandWeberbeginswith, "How areboth and
freedom modern
capitalism
concurrentlypossible?"Thatis, "Canpeoplebe emancipated ina worlddominated
by rationalism andcapitalism?" Given the examplesuch as these and basedon thecentral
argument of this it
article, is evident thatwe canstudyand evaluate theworks ofauthorswho
haveattempted eitherto compareorto synthesize theories suchas: GeorgeRitzer'sMultiple
Paradigmand Jrgen Habermases1 Theoryof Communicative Action. Usingthese"basic
questions"as ourguide,we can examine these make
works, connections amongthem,andsee
howandwhentheirinterpretations aresoundandplausible.

Notes

1. It seemstheonlyplace thatWeberdiscussesthepossibility
offreedomunderthedomination of
is
capitalism in "Archiv
Socelwissenchaft
and translated
Sozialpolitik", by and
Greth Mills(1958).

References

Durkheim,E. (1960) The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions.In K.H.
Wolff.

E. (1938) TheRulesofSociologicalMethod.New York:TheFreePress.

Durkheim,

E. (1958) SocialismandSaint-Simon.EditedbyAlvinW. Gouldner,

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