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BALANCING THE EMERGENT

DRAGON WITH
THE RISING SUN:

Dr. RENATO C. DE CASTRO


BALANCING THE EMERGENT
DRAGON WITH
THE RISING SUN:
FROM THE
AQUINO TO THE DUTERTE
ADMINISTRATION
Dr. RENATO C. DE CASTRO
Copyright 2017 by Albert Del Rosario Institute
for Strategic and International Studies

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Stratbase ADR Institute
The Stratbase Albert del Rosario Institute (ADRi) is an independent international
and strategic research organization with the principal goal of addressing the issues
affecting the Philippines and East Asia.

Victor Andres Dindo C. Manhit


President, Stratbase-Albert del Rosario Institute (ADRi)

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Ambassador Albert del Rosario
was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as
Philippine Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006.

Manuel V. Pangilinan
is CEO and managing director of First Pacific Company Limited. He is also the chairman of
MPIC, PLDT, Meralco, and Smart Communications, among others.

Edgardo G. Lacson
is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He
was the former president of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines.

Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez


is the president of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines since 2004. He is also the vice
president for Industry of the PCCI.

Ernest Z. Bower
is senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS). He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA), and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.

Renato C. de Castro, Ph. D


is a full professor of international studies at De La Salle University Manila (DLSU). He
holds the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies.

Judge Raul C. Pangalangan, Ph. D


is a judge of the International Criminal Court. He was previously a dean of the University of
the Philippines College of Law and publisher of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Epictetus E. Patalinghug, Ph. D


is a professor emeritus at the Cesar E.A. Virata School of Business, University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman.

Francisco A. Magno, Ph. D


is the executive director of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance and President of
the Philippine Political Science Association. He is a professor of political science at DLSU.

Carlos Primo C. David, Ph. D


is a professor of Geology and Environmental Science in UP Diliman. He heads the Philippine
Council for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and Development.
CONTENTS

Executive Summary viii

Introduction 1
The Sino-Japanese Rivalry 3
The Philippines-China and
Philippines-Japan Relationships
7

The Philippines Balances China while Engaging Japan
In light of increasing incidents in the South China Sea, the
Philippine government aimed to boost its internal defense
capabilities while working with partners 12
The Lowest Point in Philippines-China Relations:
The Scarborough Shoal Standoff 15

The Philippines Files a Case against China,


and its Aftermath 18

Fostering a Philippines-Japan Security Partnership


The Philippines has to leverage its alliances and defense engagements
with foreign militaries to rectify the deplorable state of its military
capability and effectively respond to security threats 20
Japan as Ballast to the Philippines Pivot to China?
In contrast to other partners, Japan takes a different approach
to its relations with the Philippines 22

Japans Counter-Balancing Strategy


on China: A Losing Cause? 24
Conclusion 27
Recommendations 28
References 30
Acknowledgements

About the Author



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As China became assertive in its maritime claims in the South and East China Seas,
the Philippines aligned its diplomatic and security policies with Japan. Confronted
with an expansionist China, the Philippines and Japan forged a security partnership
as a matter of course. As part of this partnership, there have been several high-level
political and security consultations between Filipino and Japanese political leaders,
ranking defense officials, and high-level military officers. The Philippine Coast Guard
and the Philippine Navy have benefited from Japanese-backed assets (vessels and
aircraft) and enhanced training.
Although the election of President Rodrigo R. Duterte as the 16th president of the
Philippines has led to changes in the Philippines policy toward China and the United
States, President Duterte has maintained his predecessors security engagement with
Japan. As with former President Benigno S. Aquino III, President Duterte counts on
Japan to be a counterweight to China as he pursues his foreign policy goals, particularly
in addressing Chinas prominent position in the South China Sea disputes.
Nevertheless, alarmed by the possible deterioration in Philippine-US security
relations, Japan perseveres with its nuanced or unique approach in dealing with the
Philippines. Conscious that a deterioration in Philippines-US relations will only
benefit China, Japan is strengthening its relations with the Duterte Administration
through periodic consultations and by strengthening the Philippine Navys and Coast
Guards maritime domain awareness capabilities.
This, in turn, has provided the Philippines with the opportunity to continue its
approach of playing one dragon against another, as the two East Asian powers geo-
strategic rivalry evolves and expands in maritime Southeast Asia. President Duterte
is relying on Japan as a diplomatic and economic leverage vis--vis China as he
pursues rapprochement. He is aware of the necessity of strengthening the Philippines
diplomatic and economic relations with Japan even as the country explores an
economic alliance with China.
Unfortunately, his current pronouncements and actions may indicate that his
administration is turning to China at the expense of his countrys security partnership
with Japan. This is manifested, as one example, by his declarations that the Philippines
cannot do anything about Chinese constructions of artificial islands and military
facilities on the land features in the South China Sea. President Dutertes policy of
appeasement coupled with the fostering of closer Philippines-China economic
relations may remove Japan from its counter-balancing role.
In conclusion, the study contends that the Philippines should avoid making any
statements and initiating any action that signify it is swinging to any one of these
two regional powers. It should pursue a policy of equi-balancing with both regional
powers. In applying this strategy, the Philippines should promote diplomatic linkages
and economic activities with these two competing major powers to a level whereby it
is able to influence their policies yet insulate itself from undue and excessive influence
from either Japan or China.

viii
Balancing the Emergent Dragon
with the Rising Sun:
From the Aquino to
the Duterte Administration
RENATO C. DE CASTRO, PH.D

P resident Rodrigo Roa Dutertes state visit to Beijing in mid-October 2016 caused
several analysts and observers to conclude that the Philippines had parted from
its treaty ally, the United States, and pivoted to its main antagonist in the South
China Sea dispute, China. While in Beijing, he announced his separation from the
US and declared that he had realigned with China, as the two countries had agreed
to resolve their dispute in the South China Sea through bilateral negotiations. This
event was immediately viewed as a diplomatic victory for China, that would enable
it to consolidate its growing political clout in East Asia.
After his visit to Beijing, however, President Duterte visited Tokyo. There,
he discussed with Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe how Japan could help the
Philippines strengthen the capabilities of its coast guard and navy. Specifically, he
sought Japans help in capacity-building and in providing additional patrol vessels
for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The two leaders discussed Japans support
in infrastructure development, especially in terms of harnessing Japanese expertise
in developing a high-quality and modern public transportation system. President
Duterte also engaged PM Abe in a discussion on greater politico-social and
defense cooperation between their two countries, particularly in maritime domain
awareness and security. Both two leaders then reaffirmed the importance of the
stronger ties between Japan and the Philippines in promoting the peace, stability
and maritime security of the region.
1
2 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

During his visit, President Duterte witnessed the signing of the Exchange of
Notes on Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the provision of
two large patrol vessels for the PCG. These vessels are in addition to the 10 patrol
vessels that Tokyo is in the process of delivering. Significantly, Japan has also
begun to provide the Philippines with military equipment and training. President
Duterte also saw the signing of the Memorandum of Implementation and Letter
of Arrangement for the transfer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)s
TC-90 training aircraft and maritime reconnaissance planes for the Philippine
Navy (PN). President Duterte also hinted that the Philippines could conduct naval
exercises with Japan, but he repeated that there would be no more joint exercises
with the United States.
The most significant accomplishment of Dutertes working visit to Japan,
however, was the signing of the 26th October 2016 Japan-Philippine Joint
Statement. It commits both countries to the maintenance of the freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which hosts the sea lanes vital for
global economic activity.
By visiting Beijing and then Tokyo, President Duterte is following the footsteps
of former President Benigno Aquino in dealing with these two competing regional
powers. Confronted by an expansionist China in the South China Sea, then
President Aquino fostered a security partnership with Japan. This partnership
consisted primarily of political and security consultations between Filipino and
Japanese political leaders, ranking defense officials, and high-level military officers.
Both Philippine presidents took into account Japans counter-balancing behavior
to Chinas emergence, which is rooted both in Japanese perception of aggressive
Chinese behavior and the changing balance of military power in East Asia in
Chinas favor.1
This study examines how former President Aquino and President Duterte
counted on Japan to be a counterweight to China as they pursued their respective
foreign policy goals in addressing a major regional concernChinas emergence in
the South China Sea dispute. It addresses this main problem: Examining the foreign
policies of the Aquino and the Duterte Administrations, how has the Philippines
banked on Japan as a balancer to an emergent China? It also explores the following
related issues:
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 3

1) What is the origin of contemporary Sino-Japanese rivalry in maritime


Southeast Asia?
2) What are these countries respective strategies in maritime Southeast
Asia?
3) What specific events made the two Philippine presidents apply this
diplomatic strategy of balancing an emergent China with Japan?
4) How effective is this diplomatic strategy?
5) What is the future of this diplomatic strategy of relying on Japan as a
counter-weight to an emergent and assertive China relative to the South
China Sea dispute?

The Sino-Japanese Rivalry

A remarkable development in contemporary East Asia is Chinas emergence as


a global economic power. In less than three decades, China has transformed its
command and slow-growing autarkic economy into a dynamic market-driven
one that has become the worlds most formidable exporting juggernaut. The
country achieved regional power and influence after taking a proactive role in the
recovery of ailing East Asian economies during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
Simultaneously, regional trade flourished because of the huge Chinese market for
industrial components, raw materials, food, and other consumer exports. In those
years, Chinas gross domestic product (GDP) outperformed the other East Asian
economic miracles. The Chinese economy has grown, on the average, by about 10
percent a year over the last 15 years.2
Chinas political, economic, and strategic capabilities in East Asia converged as
Japans economic power was waning. Japans wellspring of regional influence and
leadershipits economybecame a debilitating problem when its real estate and
stock markets crashed in 1993. The burst of the Japanese economic bubble was
marked by a rapid decline in the prices of real estate and other financial assets.
The Japanese banking sector collapsed as a result of keeping bad loans extended
in the 1980s and backed by inflated real estate prices. These economic woes
4 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

triggered a decade-long recession in Japan. With a stagnant economy, Japan could


not maintain, much less expand, its regional interests and influence. Its overseas
investments declined, and ODA shrank.
While Japan was hamstrung by an underperforming economy, a somewhat
discredited and paralyzed bureaucracy, and an unstable political system, China
efficiently modernized its economy and quickly integrated itself into the regional
system, where it established a very influential role. As the Japanese economy
went into a deep recession, Chinas economy experienced a dramatic expansion.
Furthermore, the unprecedented economic integration of Hong Kong, China
and Taiwan fueled speculations of a possible Greater China Economic Area and
consequently, Chinese economic domination of East Asia.3
These developments coincided with numerous strategic/diplomatic events that
soured Sino-Japanese ties and undermined Japans domestic political foundations
for a cooperative relationship with China.4 Among these were: the Chinese
military modernization that could threaten Japan; the escalation of Chinese
maritime research activities in the waters claimed by Japan as part of its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ); increased Chinese naval undertakings in the East China
Sea; the dispatch of Chinese intelligence-gathering vessels to circumnavigate Japan
in 2000; and Japans decision to participate in the Bush Administrations plan to
establish a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) System in Northeast Asia.5 In addition,
Japanese defense officials expressed their concerns about the increasing presence
and activities of Chinese warships within and outside Japanese territorial waters as
well as the possibility that China might use force against Taiwan.6 These episodes
consequently made Sino-Japanese relations highly volatile.7
The tension in Sino-Japanese relations eased after the exchange of visits of the two
countries heads of states in 2006 and 2007. However, this dtente was a short-lived,
for there remained factors that could suddenly rock the two countries relationship.8
These include: the lingering animosity between Chinese and Japanese societies;9
China and Japans persistent territorial disputes; fierce economic competition
(the Chinese economy thrives, while the Japanese economy stagnates); and the
intrinsic political dynamics during a change of leadership in either or both of these
countries.10 This underlying tension in 21st century Sino-Japanese relations was
unleashed by their territorial row over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
China has also expanded its control of the South China Sea. In March 2010,
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 5

China declared the South China Sea as one of its core interests, which indicated
its determination to assert its rights over the disputed areas. By 2010, top-level
Chinese officials had abandoned their moderate public posture on the South
China Sea dispute, and had instead become increasingly assertive and nationalistic.
They constantly harped on Chinas emergent status, the decline of the US, and
their unceasing claim of sovereignty over the East China and South China Seas.
They depicted China as a reactive and defensive victim of increasing maritime
encroachments by two small powersVietnam and the Philippinesand the
unwarranted meddling of the US.
The Chinese navy backs the official claim that the South China Sea is its
territorial waters. Hence, Vietnamese and Philippine vessels are harassed, detained,
or even fired upon by Chinese patrol craft. These incidents are proof of Chinas
aggressiveness and coercive diplomacy to pressure the two claimant states into
steering clear of the contested area.11 As one analyst observes: despite the talk
of joint cooperation and the general de-escalation, the situation in the Spratlys
remains potentially volatile. China continues to maintain that its sovereignty over
the region is non-negotiablea stance that is unlikely to change, as it would be
too politically uncompromising to its long-held logic of indivisibility.12 This, in
turn, negates Chinas diplomatic and economic efforts to present its emergence as
peaceful and creates wedges between itself and its smaller neighboring states in
Southeast Asia like the Philippines.13
Under Xi Jinpings nationalistic leadership, Beijing asserts its sovereignty
in the South China Sea while offering sweeteners, like the Chinese-led Asian
Infrastructural and Investment Bank (AIIB), to the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) states for their economic development and to promote China-
ASEAN economic interconnectivity. As part of its charm offensive, Beijing has also
sponsored many Confucius Institutes to promote its soft power in Southeast Asia.
Despite professions of friendship with the ASEAN states, Beijing is firm about
its territorial claims. In September 2012, China announced the creation of a new
administrative unit to govern the island groups of the Spratlys, the Paracels, and the
Macclesfield Bank. At the same time, the Central Military Commission (Beijings
most powerful military body) approved the deployments of the Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) to guard these islands. The president of the National Institute of
South China Sea Studies noted that the goal of establishing an army garrison and
6 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

creating an administrative unit in the Paracel islands is to allow Beijing to exercise


sovereignty over all land features inside the South China Sea, including more than
40 islands now illegally occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.14
In October 2014, in his speech at the Indonesian Parliament, President Xi
Jinping proposed to establish a China-ASEAN community with a common destiny
that will eventually provide a new blueprint for a new 21st century Maritime Silk
Road.15 President Xi proposed the creation of an AIIB to finance China-ASEAN
infrastructure connectivity.16 Xi also proposed a maritime silk road with port
facilities to be funded by the AIIB. By launching these new initiatives, Chinese
leaders are advancing a new agenda for China-ASEAN relations that involved the
familiar themes of closer economic, social, diplomatic and security ties without
compromising on the South China Sea dispute.17
Chinas efforts to foster a common destiny with ASEAN through the Silk Road
and AIIB initiatives, however, have been undermined by the South China Sea
dispute. In 2015, the South China Sea imbroglio remained a source of tension
between China and some ASEAN member states in light of Chinas construction
of outposts in the Spratly islands. During the 26th Summit Meeting of the ASEAN,
the 10 leaders annual communiqu expressed the regional organizations serious
concern on the land reclamation being undertaken in the South China Sea, which
has eroded trust and confidence and may undermine peace, security, and stability
in the South China Sea.18 Immediately, the Chinese foreign ministry expressed
its serious and deep concerns over the communiqu, reiterating Chinas position
that the South China Sea dispute is not a matter between China and ASEAN.19
Although Japan is not a party in the South China Sea disputes, it has paid serious
attention to Chinas efforts in this territorial row. This stemmed from Japans concern
that if China achieves its expansionist agenda in the South China Sea dispute, it will
also adopt a similar objective and strategy in the East China Sea. Hence, Japan
should monitor Chinese actions not only in the waters surrounding that country,
such as the East China Sea and the Western Pacific, but also the South China Sea.20
Observing the coordination between the civilian agencies and the PLA Navy during
the Scarborough Shoal standoff, the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo
warily noted that the (inter-agency) cooperation for protecting Chinas maritime
interests between the PLA and maritime law enforcement agencies is likely to
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 7

strengthen not only in the South China Sea but also in the East China Seas.21 This
observation became prophetic, as less than a month after the Scarborough Shoal
standoff between the Philippines and China, Japan saw its worst nightmare in the
East China Sea become harsh reality.
Japans goal is to maintain the status quo of the South China Sea, a sea that serves
Japans economic and security interests.22 Japan is aware that Chinas expansive
claim in the South China Sea overlaps with the claims of relatively small countries
with limited naval capabilities. Thus, Japan intends to prevent any unilateral actions
that may change the status quo of the South China Sea by supporting these Southeast
Asian countries naval build ups, and by insisting that countries in the region should
cooperate and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).23
Consequently, in 2012, Japan announced that it would, for the first time since
1945, provide non-combat military equipment and supplies to the militaries
of Southeast Asian countries, specifically the Philippines and Vietnam, for the
purpose of building their capacities.24 The Southeast Asian states, in turn, generally
welcomed Japans expanded regional role, as they view Tokyo representing another
option for security cooperation beyond Washington and Beijing.25
Japan finds it expedient to challenge Chinas maritime expansion in the South
China Sea. This caused these two major East Asian powers to pursue competing
policies in maritime Southeast Asia, specifically in their respective positions
and actions on the territorial dispute. This in turn, provides the opportunity for
maritime Southeast Asian states, like the Philippines, to pit one power against the
other, allowing these smaller states room for their diplomatic maneuvers.

The Philippines-China and Philippines-Japan Relationships

Historically, Philippines-China relations have been challenging. Diplomatic


relations between Manila and Beijing were officially established on 9 June 1975
when the two countries signed the Joint Communiqu on the Establishment
of Diplomatic Relations between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the
Republic of the Philippines. Upon signing the communiqu, both sides agreed
8 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

to conduct their relations at the ambassadorial level. In 1986, the mechanism


for bilateral consultations on a number of regional and international issues was
established. High-level visits and exchanges of officials began in the early 1990s.
After almost of a decade of diplomatic exchanges and political consultations,
however, the two countries overall relations had been described as cordial at
the political level and only limitedly successful at the economic level.26 The lack
of rapport in Philippine-China relations could be attributed to the fact that the
relationship had been conducted on the basis of sheer hard-nosed realpolitik.
Manila established diplomatic ties with Beijing in the mid-1970s primarily
because it found it expedient to lessen Chinese support to the local communist
movement and strengthen its non-aligned credentials with the socialist world.
However, these realpolitik motives were constrained by a more overriding strategic
consideration: Manilas view of Beijing as a long-term security challenge. Concern
with Chinas long-term strategic intentions made the Philippines (along with other
ASEAN states like Malaysia and Indonesia) extremely wary of its ability to provide
assistance to the local communist insurgency, increase its naval build-up, and
pursue its irredentist claim in the South China Sea.27 This lingering fear of China,
along with the then prevailing view that Beijing had nothing substantive to offer,
prevented both countries from pursuing comprehensive and close relations.28
The Philippines and Chinas efforts to pursue a smooth and cooperative relations
from the mid-1970s to the second decade of the 21st century have been beset by two
systemic factorsthe South China Sea disputes and the presence of the United
States, a Philippine treaty ally, as a Pacific power. In their bilateral relations, Manila
has been a reactive participant that merely responds to Chinas actions in the South
China Sea and takes advantage of Chinas dynamic relations with the US. Manilas
fear of Chinas expansion into the South China Sea became a reality in the mid-
1990s with the PRCs promulgation of its territorial law claiming a large portion of
the South China Sea in 1992, and Manilas discovery of Chinese construction on
Mischief Reef in 1995.
Manilas concern over Chinese maritime expansion waned in the early 2000s as
Philippines-China economic relations improved dramatically, following the latters
emergence as a major economic power in East Asia. During this period, Beijings
provision of economic largessepart and parcel of its charm offensivewas
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 9

designed to wean the Philippines away from its traditional ally (the United States)
and to draw the country into Chinas economic sphere of influence. Chinas charm
offensive toward the Arroyo Administration failed to achieve its goals, however,
because the Philippines is an entrenched ally of the US and the country was still
deeply suspicious of Chinas territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.29
In contrast with the problematic nature of Philippines-China relations, the
Philippines and Japan have always maintained vibrant economic relations that
have generated close diplomatic ties and, later, a security partnership. Japan is one
of the Philippines most important trade partners and the countrys biggest source
of foreign direct investment.30 According to the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development, Japan is also the Philippines largest ODA provider.31
Since the early 1990s, Filipino and Japanese political leaders and high-ranking
defense officials have conducted goodwill visits and high-level exchanges that
aim to ensure that the vigorous political interactions between the two US allies
are sustained. Through these high-level dialogues and consultations, the two sides
have discussed issues that affect their bilateral relations, such as trade, investments,
official development assistance, labor, immigration, and other consular matters.
The most notable among these high-level exchanges occurred during the 15
September 2001 summit meeting between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. During the summit, the two heads of state
agreed to elevate their relations to a higher level of partnership that would include
the discussion of bilateral, regional and global security concerns. The two leaders
also affirmed the need to hold an annual political-security dialogue.
The two US allies have also discussed bilateral security concerns at a number
of international forums, such as the Nikkei International Conference on the
Future of Asia, the Philippines-Japan Sub-Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN-Japan
Forum, the ASEAN-Japan Summit, and ASEAN Plus Three. The two countries
have also cooperated in strengthening their enforcement capacity in preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.
In February 2005, the Philippines and Japan conducted the First Political-
Military-to-Military Consultation or Political-Security Dialogue. This consultation
is part of Japans overall security relations with the ASEAN countries, which are
aimed at fostering confidence-building measures and exploring possible areas
10 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

of security cooperation.32 During the meeting, Philippine and Japanese defense


officials exchanged views on defense and security policies, developments, and
challenges facing both countries, such as in regional security, North Korea, the
Spratlys, and the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia. In addition, they
looked into the prospect of joint security cooperation, particularly in the areas of
counter-terrorism and maritime security. The two sides agreed that addressing
the threats of terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and other transnational crimes
must be their top priority. Tokyo informed Manila that it would play a more active
role in maintaining peace and stability in the international community.
The Philippine delegation followed up its request for joint maritime security
cooperation to build the Philippines material capabilities, particularly in terms
of providing equipment to and improving the communications infrastructure of
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and to enhance training. Manilas proposed
cooperation would involve Japans provision of equipment and training to the PCG
in counter-terrorism and search-and-rescue operations, as well as civil aviation
training for the personnel of the Philippine Air Transportation Office, which has
created an Office of Transportation Security.33 The countries delegations also
presented other initiatives on aviation security as well as on joint search-and-rescue
operations.34 Interestingly, the two sides also discussed developments regarding
their respective bilateral alliances with the US.35
In May 2005, Japanese Defense Agency Director Yoshinori Ono visited Manila
and raised the prospect of Philippine-Japan cooperation in defense and security
matters, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping and the exchange of cadets
and officers in military academies and institutions.36 He also proposed increased
cooperation in the areas of maritime security, disaster management, and counter-
terrorism training. Director Ono also discussed with then Philippine Defense
Secretary Avelino Cruz the plan to establish a mechanism for an annual political-
security dialogue, and joint military exercises between the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and Japans Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the probable
implications of redeploying American troops from Okinawa to the Japanese
mainland. The two countries also explored their respective positions on the
possibility of redeploying American troops from Japan to the Philippines and the
conduct of joint military exercises.37
In February 2006, the two countries held the 2nd Political-Security Dialogue
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 11

in Tokyo. During the meeting, the two sides reaffirmed their earlier agreement to
focus their security cooperation on disaster preparedness and management, given
the frequent occurrence of natural disasters in the region and Japans expertise in
dealing with them.38 The two countries exchanged views on their visions of an East
Asian Community and accentuated their common thread, i.e., a strong and robust
alliance with the US and the defense-oriented nature of their security policies.39
Tokyo expressed its growing concerns with regard to maritime security and piracy
issues related to capacity-building, information-sharing, and the protection of the
environment by the littoral states in Southeast Asia.
The Philippine delegation, for its part, raised the idea of a Philippine-
Japan strategic partnership in regional ocean governance.40 This would involve
cooperation in addressing mutual concerns relating to regional ocean governance
and maritime safety and security. The Japanese delegation, in turn, showed interest
in the Philippine initiative on Coast Watch South. This scheme is primarily a
maritime situational awareness system aimed at securing the long Philippine coast
line from Palawan to Davao through the installation of a series of radar-capable
watch stations located in strategic areas. Each coast watch station would be provided
with interdiction capabilities through the use of small fast crafts, gunboats, offshore
patrol vessels, and aircraft.41
The Philippine initiative on coastal patrol reflected the growing interest of
Tokyo in the early 21st century to forge an essentially non-military but nevertheless
crucial security link with Manila. Japan has also become actively involved in the
Mindanao peace process as shown by Tokyos deployment of Japanese personnel
in the International Monitoring Team (IMT) tasked to monitor the ceasefire
agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front since 2004.
Consequently, the Philippines has consistently declared that it welcomes Tokyos
increasing political-security role, even as the current government sought to revise
its pacifist constitution to enable the JSDF to become more active in peacekeeping
and other international military roles.42 The two countries armed forces have also
been conducting low-key military-related activities such as table-top exercises and
seminars on defense-related matters of a generally multilateral nature, e.g., United
Nations peacekeeping operations. However, prior to 2012, Tokyo and Manila did not
find the need to sign or even consider a formal agreement on defense cooperation.
12 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

The Philippines Balances China while Engaging Japan

In August 2010, two months after President Benigno S. Aquino III assumed office,
China sent a clearly belligerent signal to the other claimant states (specifically
Vietnam and the Philippines) and to the US that its claim of sovereignty over the
South China Sea and its islands is indisputable. As part of a life-fire exercise in the
South China Sea, the Peoples Liberation Army Navys (PLANs) three major fleets
deployed surface combatants, along with fighter plane strikes and missile launches
against hypothetical long-range targets.43 Altogether, the PLANs shows of force
demonstrated a message of Chinas indisputable sovereignty over the South China
Sea and proof of its rapidly developing capacity to sustain larger naval deployment
deep into this maritime territory. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century,
Chinas myopic nationalism, growing naval prowess, and unilateral actions became
overtly directed against a militarily-weak Southeast Asian countrythe Philippines.
Initially, President Aquino tried to curry favor with an affluent and confident
China. In late 2010, the Philippines joined a 19-state coalition led by China that did
not send any representative to the awarding ceremony for Chinese dissident and
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo. In February 2011, the Philippines figured
in a diplomatic row with Taiwan after it extradited 14 Taiwanese nationals to
China, where they were accused by Beijing of committing electronic fraud against
Chinese nationals. In March 2011, the Aquino Administration approached Beijing
on bended knee and pleaded with Chinese authorities to grant clemency to three
Filipinos sentenced to death for drug-trafficking; they were executed in April 2011.
Consequently, President Aquino realized too late that appeasing China carried the
risk of being singed by an emergent and assertive power.44
On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned
by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct natural gas exploration
in the Reed Bank (also called Recto Bank). The Reed Bank lies 150 kilometers east
of the Spratly Islands and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan.
Stunned by this maritime encounter, which happened within the Philippines EEZ,
the Aquino Administration filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in Manila.
A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented that the Philippines
is (simply) seeking an explanation for the incident. Brushing aside the Philippine
complaint, a Chinese embassy official insisted that China has indisputable
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 13

sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratlys) Islands and their adjacent waters. Beijing
went on to demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it could
conduct oil exploration activities even within the Philippines EEZ. Furthermore,
China badgered the Philippines and other claimant states to recognize Chinas
sovereign claim over the South China Sea.
With these incidents, the Aquino Administration hastened to develop the AFPs
territorial defense capabilities. In June 2011, the executive branch of the Philippine
government and the AFP agreed on a multi-year, multi-billion peso defense spending
upgrade and military build up. In October 2011, DND Secretary Voltaire Gazmin
released the Defense Planning Guidance (2013-2018) restructuring the AFP to
a lean but fully capable armed forces that could confront the challenges to the
countrys territorial integrity and maritime security. It envisions the development
of an effective capability to monitor the Philippines territorial waters and EEZ.45
The Philippines territorial defense goal has been to establish a modest but
comprehensive border protection program. This task is anchored on improving the
surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force
(PAF), the Philippine Navy (PN), and the PCG to cover the countrys territorial
waters and its contiguous and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).46 This objective
requires enhancing the AFPs capabilities, prioritizing its needs, and gradually
restructuring its forces for territorial defense. The long-term goal, according to the
2011 AFPs Strategic Intent, is to maintain a credible deterrent posture against
foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowing
free navigation to prosper.47
In late July 2011, the Philippines brought its case to the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), hoping that the regional organization could convince
China to accept a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea that might
prevent it from building more military outposts on the islets and shoals and from
conducting provocative actions against other claimant states. In April 2012, the
Philippine tried to elicit ASEANs support for its proposal for a creation of a
Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation. This proposal sought for
clarification on the maritime boundary claims in the South China Sea by all parties,
as well as turning disputed areas into special enclaves where disputing parties could
jointly develop projects.48 China opposed this and other moves at the ASEAN level.
Disappointed by ASEANs inability to come up with a binding code of conduct,
14 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

the Philippines decided to enhance its security ties with the United Statesthe
countrys longtime strategic allyand, more significantly, to foster a security
partnership with Japan. In mid-June 2011, the Aquino Administration publicly
acknowledged the exigency of US diplomatic and military support. The Philippines
also promoted its security partnership with Japan.
In July 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda met with President Aquino
to bolster security relations between Japan and the Philippines. After President
Aquinos third visit to Japan, Tokyo and Manila held high-level talks on maritime
and oceanic affairs, exchanges between Filipino and Japanese defense and maritime
officials, and Japan began to help with training the 3,500-strong PCG. Moreover,
former President Aquinos efforts to engage Japan as a security partner coincided
with the return of Shinzo Abe as the prime minister in the aftermath of the December
2012 parliamentary election. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into power amidst
an intense territorial row between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands. After
the aforementioned parliamentary election, PM Abe declared that the islands are
the inherent territory of Japan...We own and effectively control them. There is no
room for negotiations about them.49
In the first few months of his term, the Senkaku islands dispute occupied the
center stage of Japan-China relationship, which became extremely strained. PM
Abe continued the policy of his predecessor of not acknowledging the existence of a
dispute over the islands. China responded by increasing the number and frequency
of civilian ships deployed around the islands.50 In the face of heightened tension in
the Senkakus, PM Abe took several significant steps to expand Japanese security
policy. From his point of view, Chinas assertive behavior in East Asia was a source
of grave security concern for Japan.51
The Abe Administration undertook three major security measures that could be
regarded as defensive. During his first few months in office, PM Abe announced an
increase in defense spending, the first in 11 years, and a review of the 2010 National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).52 In October 2013, Japan and the US
convened a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) or 2+2 in Tokyo.
Both sides issued a joint statement reaffirming the importance of the alliance and
announcing a review of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, last updated
in 1997, to reflect the changes in the regional and global security environment.53
The communiqu mentioned several priorities for cooperation, including ballistic
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 15

missile defense; space and cyber defense; joint intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) activities; a dialogue on extended deterrence; joint training
and exercises; the realignment of US forces in Okinawa; and more trilateral and
multilateral security cooperation among US allies in East Asia.54
Finally, Japan launched a multilayered security cooperation on a regional and
global scale, with like-minded countries that included US allies in the region, such
as South Korea and Australia, as well as with US alliance/partner countries whose
coastal territories are critical to Japanese sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs).55
The 2013 National Security Strategy of Japan specifically stated that Japan would
strengthen diplomacy and security cooperation with the concerned states in
ASEAN, to promote the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, not by force,
but in accordance with the rule of law.56 Although the document did not name
specific countries, two states located along Japans SLOCs have ongoing disputes
with China in the South China SeaVietnam and the Philippines.

The Lowest Point in Philippines-China Relations:


The Scarborough Shoal Standoff

The two-month standoff between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal
epitomized an international incident waiting to happen. Prior to the crisis, the
Philippine had sought ASEAN support for its proposal to create a Zone of Peace,
Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation. This proposal aimed to clarify maritime
boundary claims in the South China Sea by all parties, as well as to turn disputed
areas into special enclaves where conflicting parties can jointly develop projects.57
China, however, did not want the issue to be multilateralized, preferring to resolve
the dispute bilaterally.
Furthermore, the delimitation of maritime borders would have involved the
clarification of Chinas ambiguous, questionable, and expansive nine-dash line
claim. Beijing had also taken note of Vietnams and the Philippines proposals
for ASEAN to issue an official position on the South China Sea dispute during
the ASEAN summit in Cambodia in 3-4 April 2012. However, China pressured
the host country to keep the South China Sea dispute out of the summit agenda.
Interestingly, the 9 April 2012 issue of the unofficial Global Times emphatically
16 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

warned the Philippines against underestimating the strength and will-power of


China to defend its territorial integrity.58
On the morning of 10 April, the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar verified the presence
of eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored inside the Scarborough Shoal. Following
the established rules of engagement, the PN ship dispatched a boarding team to
inspect the fishing vessels. Large amounts of illegally collected corals, giant clams,
and live sharks were found inside the compartments of the first fishing vessel
boarded. Before the PN could apprehend the fishing vessels at the shoal, however,
two Chinese marine surveillance vessels arrived and placed themselves between
the arresting Philippine warship and the Chinese fishing boats. The surveillance
vessels not only prevented the arrest of the Chinese fishermen but also informed the
captain of the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar that he had strayed into Chinese territorial
waters.
Clearly, Chinas reaction was a complete turnaround from its previous stance
on maritime encroachments. Firstly, the Chinese patrol vessels prevented the
PN from arresting the fishermen. Secondly, China defied Philippine rights over
the shoal that is only 224 kilometers from the province of Zambales in Luzon
and well within the countrys EEZ. The following day, Manila saw the possibility
of a dangerous face-off with an emergent and assertive China. President Aquino
recalled the BRP Gregorio Del Pilar and sent a smaller coast guard vessel to defuse
the tension. Instead of reciprocating Manilas gesture, Beijing dispatched its most
advanced and latest fishery patrol ship, the Yuzheng-310, to join the two other
civilian patrol vessels already in the shoal. The Xinhua News Agency quoted the
Chinese foreign ministry as saying that the Philippines attempt to carry out so-
called law enforcement activities in the waters of Huangyan Island has infringed
upon Chinas sovereignty, and runs counter to the consensus reached by both sides
on maintaining the peace and stability in the South China Sea.59 The ministry
likewise warned the Philippines not to complicate and escalate the situation.
While Chinese and Philippine patrol vessels were at an impasse at the
Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese Embassy in Manila confirmed that both countries
were engaged in a lengthy and tedious diplomatic negotiation. Again, the Chinese
Embassy articulated the official mantra that the Scarborough Shoal is an integral
part of Chinese territory. It also warned Manila not to take actions that could
irreparably damage Philippines-China relations and affect the stability of the South
China Sea.60
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 17

By the end of April 2012, the Philippines-China negotiations were getting


nowhere. The Chinese embassy accused Manila of negotiating in bad faith and of
distorting the facts during the lengthy and tedious discussions. It also urged the
Philippines to stop illegal activities and leave this area, as it insisted once more
that China has sovereign rights over almost the whole of the South China Sea.
The embassy spokesperson also said that ever since the ancient times, numerous
documents on Chinese history have put down definitely in writing that Huangyan
Island belongs to Chinese territory. Manila, in turn, criticized Chinas aggressive
stance against other claimant states like the Philippines.61 It reminded China that
the responsibility for resolving the standoff in the South China Sea rests not just
with one party but both parties and challenged it to let an external party mediate
the dispute.
In mid-June 2012, the tension in the disputed area eased when the two countries
withdrew their civilian vessels on the pretext of the onset of the typhoon season.
After the Philippines withdrew its lone coast guard vessel from the Scarborough
Shoal, China began consolidating its control over the area. The China Maritime
Surveillance vessels along with the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command
constructed a chain barrier across the mouth of the shoal to block Philippine
access. China has also deployed surveillance vessels to protect the fleet of Chinese
fishing boats operating deep into the Philippines EEZ.
On the sides, Japan played an important but low-key role during the three-
month impasse. In May 2012, three Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF)
surface combatants arrived in Manila for a four-day port call.62 The visit came after
Tokyo announced its plans to provide the Philippines with ten new patrol vessels
to bolster the latters maritime patrol capability. The newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun
linked the ship visit to the ongoing Scarborough Shoal standoff and editorialized
that Japan could not stand by and wait for China and the Philippines to clash
openly.63 It also stressed that it is in Japans national interest to ensure that its
sea-lanes remain safe.64 Interestingly, the JMSDFs ship visit to the Philippines
happened just a few days after the US Navys Virginia-class attack submarine, the
USS North Carolina, made a port call at Subic Bay.
The new JSDF chief of the Joint Staff Office also decided to visit the Philippines
in the midst of the Scarborough standoff.65 A month after the Philippines withdrew
its vessel from the disputed shoal, the Philippines and Japan signed a Statement
18 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

of Intent on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges which indicated that the


two countries would conduct exchanges at all levels of their respective defense
establishments.66 Then Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his
Filipino counterpart, then National Defense Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral
agreement on maritime security. It provides for high-level dialogues between
defense officials and reciprocal visits by the JMSDF Chief of Staff and the PN flag
commander.
A few days later, former Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario
announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the PCG with ten 40-meter boats
as part of Japans ODA to the Philippines by the end of 2012. Newspapers also
reported that two additional bigger vessels were being considered for transfer to
the Philippine government under a grant. These two events marked the beginning
of Japans active involvement in disputes between China and the Southeast Asian
states in the South China Sea.

The Philippines Files a Case against China, and its Aftermath

In January 2013, the Philippines directly confronted Chinese occupation of the


Scarborough Shoal by filing a case against China with the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague. In its Notification and Statement of Claim, the Philippines
asked the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the legal entitlements under the UNCLOS
of the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, and other land features
within the Philippines EEZ. These entitlements are based on the provisions of the
UNCLOS related to rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II,
to an Exclusive Economic Zone under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part
VI.67
China refused to participate in the international mediation and openly
expressed its opposition to the Philippines filing of a case. On 20 February 2013,
the Chinese Ambassador in Manila returned the notice of arbitration to the
Department of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Mr. Hong Lei, Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson in Beijing, branded the filing as factually flawed and
accused Manila of violating the non-binding 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
the Parties in the South China Sea, which provides for ASEAN and China to settle
their maritime disputes among themselves.
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 19

Japan, on the other hand, actively declared its diplomatic backing for the
Philippines. On 23 May 2013, no less than Prime Minister Abe conveyed his
countrys full support for the Philippines decision to elevate its dispute with
China in the South China Sea to The Hague during then Secretary Del Rosarios
two-day official visit to Japan.68 During a visit to Tokyo in December of that year,
President Aquino and PM Abe discussed Chinas establishment of an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.69 President Aquino then briefed
the prime minister on the arbitration case that the Philippines filed against China
in the Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS).70
Japans unconditional diplomatic support to the Philippines was again reiterated
by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida with his talks with Secretary Del Rosario the
following year when the two met during the Foreign Ministers Meeting for the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative in Hiroshima, Japan in April 2014.71
Japans support to the Philippines was also reiterated by Japans Defense Minister
Gen Nakatani when he met former Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin during
the Expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in Malaysia in November 2015.
Minister Nakatani told his Filipino counterpart that Japan believes that aiming for
the peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law helps preserve and
advance the international order.72
From 7 to 13 July 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague held its first hearings
on the Philippines case. China repeatedly declared that it will neither accept nor
participate in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines, and it also
made it clearthrough the publication of its 2014 December Position Paper and in
other official statementsthat, in its view, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction in this
matter.73 Since 2009, however, it has slowly shifted its strategy away from delaying
the resolution of the dispute to one that emphasizes its sovereignty over the
contested waters, to deter other claimant states like the Philippines and Vietnam
from cementing their claims and to negotiate with these small powers from the
position of strength.74 Furthermore, it does not want to extend any legitimacy to
the Tribunal since it holds other instruments of powereconomic, diplomatic, and
strategicthat it could wield to settle the dispute according to its own terms.75
Throughout the two-year proceedings of the Philippines claim on China on
the South China Sea dispute, Japan consistently communicated its unequivocal
20 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

backing to the Philippines approach to peacefully resolve the territorial dispute over
the South China Sea on the basis of international law.76 Tokyos public encouragement
to Manila in its claims against Beijing brought to light Japans determination to
prevent any unilateral action that may change the status quo in the South China Sea
as it insisted that countries in the region cooperate and adhere to the UNCLOS.

Fostering a Philippines-Japan Security Partnership

A few weeks after his return to power, PM Abe sent Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida
on a tour of four countries in the Asia-Pacific to convey Japans growing concern
over Beijings expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. In Manila,
Minister Kishida met with then Philippine Foreign Secretary Del Rosario. They
discussed the difficulties that Chinas neighbors face in defending their positions
vis--vis the East China and South China Sea issues while managing their economic
relations with China.77 The two foreign ministers agreed to work together closely in
enhancing cooperation in maritime security.78 Minister Kishida pledged 10 multi-
role response vessels to the PCG to better patrol Philippine maritime territories.79
He also announced Japans provision of essential communication system equipment
to the PCG for maritime safety.80
On 27 June 2013, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and former
Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin confirmed the continuous exchanges of
information aimed at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on
working together to make US strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.81 To further
defense cooperation, the two security partners undertook these activities:82
reciprocal visits between the Chief of Staff of the JMSDF and the Flag Officer of
the Philippine Navy; the holding of the Japan-Philippines Maritime Chief of Staff
Meeting; port calls in the Philippines of JMSDF vessels; and active participation
in the Pacific Partnership 2012. During the same meeting, then Secretary Gazmin
raised the possibility of allowing the JSDF access to the former American military
bases in the Philippines if Tokyo were interested in such an arrangement.83
In December 2013, then President Aquino discussed with PM Abe in Tokyo
Chinas establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East
China Sea.84 To cap their one-on-one meeting, the two leaders signed an agreement
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 21

on the yen-based soft loans to finance the 10 Japanese patrol boats for the PCG. In
June 2014, President Aquino and PM Abe met again in Tokyo and tackled Chinas
ambition to become a major naval power in East Asia.85 More significantly, former
President Aquino endorsed PM Abes move to expand Japans security role in the
region. Strongly supporting PM Abes initiative to deploy the JSDF in overseas
contingencies, he boldly declared, We believe that nations of goodwill can only
benefit if the Japanese government is empowered to assist others and is allowed
wherewithal to come to the aid of those in need, especially in the area of collective
self-defense.86
During his state visit to Japan in early June 2015, then President Aquino
continued his thorough consultation with PM Abe on peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region.87 The two leaders signed a joint declaration on A Strengthened
Strategic Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and Partnership and
Goals for Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and beyond. They also agreed
to further enhance the strategic partnership between their countries on the basis
of shared principles and goals.88 The document also expressed the two countries
commitment to ensure maritime safety and security and their serious opposition
to unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South China Sea, including
large-scale reclamation and the building of outposts.89 The declaration includes
a detailed action plan for strengthening the two countries strategic partnership.
Among the areas of cooperation in the security realm include the sharing of
information on the security environment and challenges; information exchange
and policy coordination on respective security policies; collaboration on maritime
matters (including maritime domain awareness); humanitarian assistance; and
most importantly, the provision of defense equipment and technology.
With China bent on pursuing its strategic goal of maritime expansion in East
Asia, the Philippines and Japan strategic partnership complements their respective
bilateral alliances with the US. On one hand, the Philippines has to leverage its
alliances and defense engagements with foreign militaries to rectify the deplorable
state of its military capability and effectively respond to security threats.90 On the
other hand, Japan finds it necessary to assist Southeast Asian countries in active
dispute with China in the South China Sea because if Chinas strategic position
improves in relative terms in the South China Sea, then it is likely it would adopt a
similar assertive attitude and actions against Japan in the East China Sea.91
22 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

Japan as Ballast to the Philippines Pivot to China?

The election of President Rodrigo Duterte as the countrys sixteenth president led
to dramatic changes in Philippine foreign policy vis--vis China and the United
States. In contrast to his predecessor, President Duterte is bent on a more pragmatic
or accommodating policy toward Chinas maritime expansion in the South China
Sea. He expressed his openness to engaging Beijing in bilateral negotiations, to
joint development of resources, and to play down the sovereignty issues if China
also stopped insisting on asserting its sovereignty claim in the disputed waters.92 At
the same time, he displayed a more ambivalent, if not hostile, attitude toward the
United States.93
President Duterte pursues a relatively balanced and calibrated policy
characterized by gravitating closer to China while crafting some diplomatic
distance from the Philippines only strategic security ally, the United States. On the
one hand, he declared that he is open to direct bilateral negotiations with China.
President Dutertes foreign secretary, Perfecto Yasay, declared that the relationship
between the two countries (China and the Philippines) was not limited to the
maritime dispute. There were other areas of concern in such fields as investment,
trade, and tourism, and discussing then could open the doors for talks on the
maritime issues.94 On the other hand, President Duterte called for the withdrawal
of American Special Forces who are operating in Mindanao to support the AFPs
counter-terrorism operations.95 He also ordered the PN not to conduct joint patrols
with US Navy in the South China Sea since these activities could be seen by China
as a provocative act, making it more difficult to peacefully resolve the territorial
dispute.96
President Dutertes foreign policy approach unsettled the United States and
Japan, and presumably some countries in ASEAN who see the Philippines
arbitration case against China and its active support for American military presence
in the region as potential game changers in the management of their own relations
with both China and the United States.97 Puzzled by the changes in Philippine
foreign policy, the Japanese government persevered with its nuanced approach
in dealing with the Philippines. A senior Japanese official admitted that while
the Tokyo and Washington share the same goal in the Philippines, Japan takes a
different approach in its relations with the Philippines, as there are some things that
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 23

Manila can only accept when Japan provides them.98 Unlike the US that was taken
aback by President Dutertes anti-American pronouncements, Japan continued its
comprehensive engagement with the Philippines.99
In early August 2016, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida met President
Duterte in Davao City where the two discussed how their two countries can work
together for the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute based on
the 12 July Award to the Philippines, which Japan considers as final and legally
binding to both China and the Philippines. Minister Kishida explained to President
Duterte that enhancing the PCGs and PNs capabilities in maritime security is one
important pillar of his countrys assistance to the Philippines.100 He then informed
President Duterte that Japan intends to move ahead with providing patrol boats
and leasing the PN the JMSDFs training aircraft.101
During the ASEAN summit in Laos, PM Abe held his first meeting with
President Duterte, during which he unveiled Japans plan to provide two 90-meter
patrol vessels in addition to the 10 multi-role vessels that were delivered to the
PCG to boost its search-and-rescue and fisheries protection capabilities.102 These
two large patrol vessels have thicker armor to protect the crews from shells and,
therefore, are likely to be treated as warships. This will be the first time for Japan to
provide this type of large patrol vessels to a country. He also informed his Filipino
counterpart about Japans decision to lend five JMDSFs TC-90 training aircraft
to the Philippines that will be useful for reconnaissance missions, disaster relief
operations and transporting supplies.103
President Duterte responded by expressing his appreciation, and explained
to Prime Minister Abe that these patrol vessels will enable the Philippines to
strengthen patrol in its coastal waters and will enhance the Philippines presence
in its EEZ.104 Aware that strained Philippines-US relations benefit China, Japan is
strengthening its relations with the Duterte Administration. For the Philippines,
keeping its security partnership with Japan intact is necessary because it remains
the countrys most important trading partner, largest investor, and the home of
several thousands of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) whose remittances have
helped boost the local economy.
Prior to his October 2016 working visit to Japan, President Duterte expressed his
willingness to advance defense cooperation between the Philippines and Japan.105
While in Tokyo during his working visit, he showed his Japanese host that his
24 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

resentment of the US does not necessarily extend to American allies, and offered
praise for Japan while reiterating that he would not scale down security cooperation
with Washington.106 President Duterte assured his Japanese host that maritime
cooperation between the Philippines and Japan would continue. According to him,
the Philippines would not abandon Japan in its partnership and security matters
given that (our) common belief that our conflicts and problems with other nations
must be resolved peacefully, in accordance with international law.107
The two leaders witnessed the signing of an agreement for Japan to provide two
large patrol ships for the PCG that will be financed through yen loans.108 They were
also present during the signing of an agreement for Japan to lease the five TC-90
training planes.109 In his joint statement with Prime Minister Abe, President Duterte
agreed [t]hat the Philippines will continue to work closely with Japan on issues of
common concern in the region, and uphold the shared vision of democracy and
adherence to the rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the
South China Sea.110 Probably due to Dutertes conciliatory approach, Japan has
continued its comprehensive engagement with the Philippines.111

Japans Counter-Balancing Strategy on China: A Losing Cause?

Currently, Japan is the only country in the Western alliance with a healthy and
cordial relationship with the Philippines, making it an important countervailing
force to an expected increase in Chinese influence in light of President Dutertes
foreign policy approach.112
In January 2017, PM Abe went on a two-day state visit to Manila as the
Philippines became closer to China while taking a hostile posture towards the two
countries common security partnerthe US. PM Abes visit to the Philippines was
his first stop in a four-nation diplomatic swing as he pressed his efforts to boost
Japans trade and security engagements. Upon his arrival, PM Abe mentioned
that he chose the Philippines as his first destination in his four-country tour to
emphasize the importance of Philippine-Japan bilateral relations.
During his talks with the Philippine president, he pledged 1 Trillion Yen (US$8.7
billion) in ODA that would include government grants and public investments in
infrastructure development. This is Japans bid to strengthen strategic ties with a key
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 25

Southeast Asian state that is on the path of Chinas maritime expansion in the South
China Sea.113 PM Abe emphasized the importance of Japans role in developing
Philippine infrastructure as he announced that Japan will leverage its technology
and know-how to the fullest extent to positively cooperate for the improvement of
Metro Manila and the whole of the Philippines.114 The two leaders then agreed
to form a joint committee that will expedite Japans participation in infrastructure
development in the country.
The two leaders also discussed defense matters as they pledged to deepen
maritime security cooperation between their two countries. PM Abe emphasized
that since both the Philippines and Japan are maritime nations, Japan will support
the Philippines capacity-building in the field of maritime security.115 For his part,
President Duterte expressed hope for the fast-tracked delivery to the Philippines
of patrol vessels already in the pipeline and the acquisition of new boats.116 Both
leaders also reaffirmed their commitments to pursue a peaceful resolution to
the long-standing South China Sea dispute.117 Commenting on the high-profile
visit, an American analyst observed that PM Abes 12-13 January 2017 visit to
the Philippines reflected Japans goal to upset growing Chinese influence in the
geopolitically strategic Southeast Asian country by ensuring the steady flow of
(Japanese) aid and investment to the Philippines.118
On 28 March 2017, the first two former JMSDF Beechcraft King Air TC-90
reconnaissance planes were formally transferred to the Philippine Navy (PN). The
two aircraft augmented the PNs six 40-year old Britten-Norman Islanders that are
used in maritime patrol, surveillance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HADR), and rapid assessment missions. Along with PM Abes pledges of more
grants and investment, the lease of the aircraft was part of Tokyos efforts to assist
the Philippines economically and militarily in order to counter Chinas growing
influence on the Duterte Administration. Observing this pattern in the Philippine
presidents initial foreign policy moves, a political analyst wrote:

Clearly, the Philippines is not pivoting to anyone. It is rebalancing the


region in what appears to be Japan being the fulcrum. With Dutertes deft
move, Japan is now the countervailing force to China in the region. The
Philippines, with its arbitral award, teaches Japan how to flex its muscle
without wringing necksthe trump card was never played and we got win-
win in China and Japan.119
26 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

Unfortunately, current developments point to the administrations complete


pivot to China as shown by its pronouncements and efforts to appease this emergent
East Asian power. In March 2017, President Duterte publicly admitted that the
Philippines cannot stop Chinas reported plan to construct an environmental
monitoring station on the disputed Scarborough Shoal.120 Questioned by a
journalist about his view on the prospect of China building a radar station on
the shoal, President Duterte exposed his appeasement scheme vis--vis Chinese
maritime expansion when he answered: We cannot stop China from doing this
thing. So what do you want me to dodeclare war on China? I can, but well all
lose our military and policemen tomorrow.121 Interestingly, President Duterte
even wants Chinese ships to pass or come and dock in the Philippines as long as
they will not do anything to the Philippine Coast Guard as it patrols the countrys
maritime waters.122
President Dutertes announcement that he would not stop China from building
on a disputed shoal was based on the calculation that appeasing China has its
rewards in the form of US$ 6 Billion dollars in deals including agreement for
agricultural exports to China, and loans for infrastructure projects such as railways
and hydroelectric dams. In March 2017, Chinese Third Vice Premier Wang Yang
visited Davao City and witnessed the exchange of letters between Philippine and
Chinese officials on the feasibility studies on infrastructure projects China will
be financing.123 Mr. Wang visited portions of the proposed Davao Coastline and
Portland Development Project. He was also briefed on the Davao City Expressway
and the Mindanao Railway. He also brought with him a donation for the victims
of the Surigao earthquake. Premier Wang expressed Chinas interest in developing
the various infrastructure projects presented to him while he was in Davao City.124
During Primier Wangs visit to the country, the Philippines and China signed
a six-year economic cooperation agreement.125 It commits China to financing 15
big-ticket infrastructure projects such as the US$ 53.6 Million Chico River Pump
Irrigation, the US$ 374 Million New Centennial Water Source-Kaliwa Dam, and
the South Line of the North-South Railway.126 Not surprisingly, despite warnings
about the long-term strategic implications of Chinas reported plan to construct an
environmental monitoring station on the disputed Scarborough Shoal, President
Duterte was alarmingly resigned to possible building activities in the South China
Sea. Lured by the promise of trade concessions, grants, loans, and investment, the
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 27

Duterte Administration seemed to have succumbed to Beijings official policy that


after several years of disruption caused mainly by non-regional countries (Japan
and the US), the South China Sea has calmed with China and Southeast Asian
countries agreeing to peacefully resolve [their] disputes.127 This development,
unfortunately, will effectively remove Japan from its counter-balancing role on
China in the Duterte Administrations foreign policy.

Conclusion

Historically, Philippines-China relations have been problematic since the


establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976. Despite efforts by both countries
to cooperate on a number of issues, their relations have been affected by the two
countries territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Philippines-Japan relations
have always been dynamic because of the two countries economic relations. Japan
is one of the Philippines most important trade partners, its biggest source of foreign
direct investment, and largest ODA provider. Consequently, the two countries
vibrant economic relations have generated dynamic diplomatic/political relations
and later, a security partnership.
In the second decade of the 21st century, the Philippines aligned its diplomatic
and security policy with Japan as China became assertive in its maritime claims in
the South and East China Seas. Confronted by an expansionist China in the South
and East China Seas, the Philippines and Japan have forged a security partnership
as a matter of course. This partnership consisted primarily of political and security
consultations between Filipino and Japanese political leaders, ranking defense
officials, and high-level military officers.
The election of President Duterte as the 16th president of the Philippines led to
changes in the Philippines policy toward China and the United States. President
Duterte conducted a balanced and calibrated policy characterized by gravitating
closer to China while crafting some diplomatic distance from the Philippines only
strategic security ally, the United States. Alarmed by the possible deterioration in
Philippines-US security relations, Japan perseveres with its nuanced or unique
approach in dealing with the Philippines. Conscious that the deterioration in
Philippines-US relations will only benefit China, Japan is currently strengthening
28 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

its relations with the Duterte Administration by fostering periodic consultations


between the two countries, and strengthening the Philippine Navys and Coast
Guards maritime domain awareness capabilities. This, in turn, provides the
Philippines with the opportunity to continue its approach of playing one dragon
against another as the two East Asian powers geo-strategic rivalry evolves and
expands in maritime Southeast Asia.
Both former President Aquino and current President Duterte have relied on
Japans balancing policy on China in Southeast Asia. They have maintained close
security connections with Japan as they managed their countrys relations with
China. Former President Aquino fostered a security partnership with Japan as he
balanced Chinas maritime expansion in the South China Sea. President Duterte
is relying on Japan as a diplomatic and economic leverage vis--vis China, as he
pursues a rapprochement with this emergent power. He knows the necessity of
strengthening his countrys diplomatic and economic relations with Japan as he
explores an economic alliance with China.
Unfortunately, his current pronouncements and actions indicate that his
administration is turning to China at the expense of his countrys security
partnership with Japan. This is manifested by his declarations that the Philippines
cannot do anything about Chinese constructions of artificial islands and military
facilities on the land features in the South China Sea, and his efforts to foster closer
economic relations with China. President Dutertes policy of appeasement coupled
with the fostering of closer Philippines-China economic relations will effectively
remove Japan from its counter-balancing role in this triangular relationship.

Recommendations

1) Formulation of a foreign policy strategy that will take into account Chinas
maritime expansion into the South China Sea, and Japans counter-balancing role
in Southeast Asia. In formulating any foreign policy strategy, it is necessary to
determine who your ally or friend is, and who your competitor is. In this case,
Japan is the natural ally and friend given its insular geography, its historic rivalry
with China, and by the fact that the Philippines has no territorial dispute with
Japan.
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 29

2) The Philippines should foster greater economic relations with China.


However, the Philippines has to take into account Chinas goal to alter the regional
territorial order, and that it has an existing territorial dispute with this assertive and
emergent power.

3) The Philippines should determine its interest in dealing with each


respective regional power. The Philippines should foster greater security and
economic cooperation with Japan to make it a fulcrum of the countrys foreign
policy. The Philippines should improve its economic relations with China but
should be very wary of fostering security relations because of its territorial dispute.
The Philippine should engage China in confidence-building measures but should
be circumspect in engaging it in other forms of security cooperation like accepting
military assistance and joint military training and exercises.

4) The Philippines should avoid making any statements and initiating any
action that signifies it is swinging to any one of these two regional powers. It
should pursue a policy of equi-balancing with both regional powers. In applying
this strategy, the Philippines should promote diplomatic linkages and economic
activities with these two competing major powers to a level whereby it is able to
influence the major powers policies, yet insulate itself from undue and excessive
influence from both Japan and China.


30 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

1
Andrew L Oros, Japans Security Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017). p. 85.
2
Albert Keidel, Why China Wont Slow Down, Foreign Policy (May/June 2006), p. 68
3
David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (London; New York: Routledge,
2007). p. 109.
4
Mike M. Mochizuki, Terms of Engagement: The US-Japan Alliance and the Rise of China in Beyond
Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Eds) Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 2004). p. 109.
5
Peter Katzenstein, Japanese Security in Perspective, Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External
Dimension (Ed) Peter J. Katzenstein (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).p. 110.
6
Haruhiro Fukui, Japan: Recasting the Post-War Security Concerns Global Security Governance:
Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century (Eds) Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling (London and
New York: Routledge, 2007). p. 225.
7
For an interesting and comprehensive discussion of current incidents that have further generated tensions
between China and Japan see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyos Grand Strategy and the Future of East
Asia (Ithaca; Japan: Cornell University Press, 2007). pp.136-143.
8
Evan S. Mederios, Chinas International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa
Monica CA: Arlington, Virginia: Rand Corporation, 2009). p. 114.
9
Studies by the Japans Cabinet Office and the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences revealed the existence
of nationalist sentiments in both Japanese and Chinese societies that are directed against each others nations.
These nationalist sentiments tend to reinforce each other. They may also get out of control and may trigger mass
protests that could affect the two countries diplomatic relations. These nationalist sentiments on both sides
of Sea of Japan intensified during the Japan and Chinas diplomatic row during the Yasukuni Shrine visits and
Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Island stand-off. See Zheng Yongnian, Nationalism: Dynamics of Domestic Transformation
and International Relations China in China and the New International Order (Eds) Wang Gungwu and Zheng
Yongnian (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2008). pp. 35-36. Also see Jin Qui, The Politics of History and Historical
Memory in China-Japan Relations, Journal of Chinese Political Science 11, 1 (Spring 2006). 25-53.
10
The rapid rise of Yukio Hatayama as the head of the Democratic Party of Japan and Japanese prime
minister and his sudden replacement by Naoto Kato caused a dramatic shift in Japanese foreign policy that
confused China. See Kazuyuki Katayama, Development of Japan-China Relations since 1972, International
Journal of China Studies, 2, 3 (December 2011). p. 659.
11
Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, Managing Rising Tension in the South China Sea, Comparative
Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (September 2011) p. 1.
12
Kailash K. Prasad, An Assessment of the Goals, Drivers and Capabilities of Chinas Modernizing Navy,
The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2012). p. 57.
13
See Edward Wong, As Beijing asserts itself: US Senses an Opening, International Herald Tribune (27
September 2010). pp. 1-3.
14
Perle, China flexes its Muscle to Reassert Sea Claims... p1.
15
Commentary: High Time to Build New Maritime Silk Road, Xinhua News Agency (03 October 2013). p.
1. <http://search.proquest.com/1439253864?accountid=28547>
16
Sutter and Chin-Hao, op. cit. p. 3.
17
Sutter and Chin-Hao, op. cit, p. 2.
18
Chairmans Statement of the 26th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur and Langkawi, 27 April 2015, Our
People, Our Country, Our Vision (26-27 April). p.10.
19
Asia News Monitor, China: Concern Rises over Chinas Territorial Claims as ASEAN Readies Closer
Economic, Asia News Monitor (04 May 2015). p. 1. < http://search.proquest.com/docview/1677455091>
20
National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security 2011 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for
Defense Studies, 2012). p. 26.
21
National Institute of Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2012 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute
for Defense Studies, 2012). p. 20.
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 31

22
Mahar Nirmala, Japans New ASEAN Diplomacy; Strategic Goals, Patterns, and Potential Limitations
under the Abe Administration, International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, 6, 12 (December 2016). p.
952.
23
Ibid.
24
Oros, op. cit. p. 93.
25
Ibid. p. 175.
26
Aileen Baviera, Turning Predicament in to Promise: A Prospective on Philippines-China Relations, in
Comprehensive Engagement: Strategic Issues in Philippines-China Relations (Ed) Aileen Baviera (Quezon City:
Philippine-China Development Resource Center, 2000). p. 23.
27
Abdul Razak Abdullah Baginda, PRC-ASEAN Relations: Strategic and Security Implication, in China
ASEAN Relations: Political, Economic and Ethnic Dimensions (Ed) Theresa Carino (Manila: China Studies
Program, 1991). p. 89.
28
For an interesting account of this lack of mutual interest to each other see Rizal C.K. Yuyitung, Philippine
Perception of the Peoples Republic of China, Ibid., pp. 138-140.
29
Despite intensifying economic relations with China in the first decade of the 21st century, the Arroyo
Administration also strengthened its security ties with the United States. To boost the AFPs counter-terrorist
operation in Mindanao, the Philippine government allowed the American forces to set up semi-permanent
military stations throughout the littorals of Southern Mindanao, and a more permanent facility in Manila. In
March 2006, the Security Engagement Board (SEB), a consultative mechanism to address non-traditional security
concerns in the 21st century was created to complement the Philippine- US Mutual Defense Board (MDB). From
January to September 2010, US Navy ships made 63 routine visits to various Philippine ports, and extended
logistics support to AFP military operations. In early 2008, the Pentagon pledged US$15.5 million to finance
the National Coast Watch System. The project entails the PNs and the Philippine Coast Guards installation of
high-frequency radio equipment and radar stations to ensure the broader protection, effective surveillance, and
management of the countrys maritime domains. Also the Pentagon formulated polices over the long-term period
to cement the USs status as the Philippiness only formal strategic ally. From 2005 to 2006, it took concrete
measures to enhance the AFPs capability to address internal security challenges; to increase the level of American
security and defense assistance and explore new and potential areas for capability-building; and ensure the long-
term readiness and interoperability of US-Philippine forces against external armed threats, which prophetically
would include China in second decade of the 21st century. See Co-Chairs Statement, Philippines-United States
Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, United States Embassy in Manila, 27-28 January 2011. p. 10.
30
Edwin Van Daar, Philippine-Trade Policy and the Philippine Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA),
Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 2 (2011). p. 118
31
Ibid. p. 118.
32
Interview with an anonymous Japanese diplomat, Hotel Dusit, Makati City, 2 November 2006.
33
Office of the Asia-Pacific Affairs, RP-Japan Political-Security Dialogue (Pasay City: Department of Foreign
Affairs, Date Unknown). p. 1.
34
RP-Japan Conclude First Political-Security Dialogue (February 10, 2005). p.1. http://E:\Japan\
Philippines%20%20Gov_ph%20%20News%20%20RP%20and%20Japan%20Concl...
35
Office of the Asia-Pacific Affairs, op. cit. p. 2.
36
Carina I. Roncesvalles and Darwin T. Wee, RP, Japan Agree to Step Up Security Cooperation, Business
World (May 3, 2005). p. S1
37
Ibid. p. S1.
38
Interview with an Anonymous Japanese Diplomat, Dusit Hotel, Makati City, 2 November 2006.
39
Office of the Asia-Pacific Affairs, op. cit. p 2.
40
Ibid. p.2.
41
Ibid. p. 3.
42
GMA welcomes Greater Global Role for Japan, The Manila Times (24 May 2007). p. 1. http://proquest.
umi.com/pqdweb?index=24&did=1276135921&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt...
43
Barry Wain, Chinese Diplomacy off Course, Wall Street Journal, 5 August 2010, p. 13.
32 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

44
Singed by the Dragon; the Philippines Discovers that it doesnt Pay to Appease China, Wall Street Journal
(31 March 2011). p. 1. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=96&did=2307204961&Src...
45
Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013-2018 (Quezon City:
Department of National Defense, 11 October 2011). pp. 11-16.
46
National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security Council,
April 2011). p. 39.
47
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City: Camp
Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.
48
See International Crisis Group, Stirring Up the South China Sea II: Regional Responses Asia Report N
229-24 (July 2012) p. 8.
49
James J., Przystup, Japan-China Relations: Treading Troubled Waters, Comparative Connections: A
Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 2013). p.9. https://csis-prod.s3.amzonaws.com/ssfs-
public/legacy-files/files/publication/1301gjapan_china.pdf
50
Ibid. pp. 7-8.
51
Bhubhindir Singh, The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy,
Asian Policy Number 19 (January 2015). p. 57.
52
Przystup op. cit. p. 9.
53
Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, US-Japan Relations: Big Steps, Big Surprises, Comparative
Connections (January 2014).p. 3.
54
Ibid. p. 8.
55
Yasuhiro Matsuda, Engagement and Hedging: Japans Strategy toward China, SAIS Review, XXXII, No.
2 (Summer-Fall 2012). pp. 116.
56
Government of Japan, The National Security Strategy of Japan (Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister,
December 2013). pp. 60-61.
57
See International Crisis Group, Stirring Up the South China Sea II: Regional Responses Asia Report N
229-(24, July 2012). p. 8.
58
Robert Sutter and Chin-huo Huang, Hu Visits Cambodia as South China Sea Simmers, Comparative
Connections, (May 2012). p. 5. http://csis.org/files/publication/1201china_seasia.pdf
59
Thai News Service Group, China/Philippines: China Seeks Preservation of Over-All Friendly Relations
with Philippines as Tension over Scarborough Shoal Ebbs Momentarily, Asia News Monitor, (12 April 2012). p.1.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/993552886/138B64F7C71082...
60
Thai News Service Group, Philippines/China: China Seeks Preservation of Over-All Friendly Relations
with Philippines as tension Over Scarborough Ebbs Momentarily, Asia News Monitor, and (12 April 2012). p. 2.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/993552866/138B64F7C717082...
61
Philippines/China: No Agreement Reached with Chinese Government on Pull-Out of Philippine
Vessels from Scarborough ShoalDFA, Asia News Monitor, (26 April 2012). p. 1.http://serach.proquest.com.
docview/1009600955/138FC30C1134...
62
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific. Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for Port Call to
Manila, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (26 May 2012). 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1023495212/13A
384763AF48...
63
Ibid. p. 1.
64
Ibid. p. 1.
65
Oros, op. cit. p. 93.
66
Ibid. p. 94.
67
Department of Foreign Affairs, Notification and Statement of Claim to the United Nations Convention of
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitral Tribunal, Manila (22 January 2013). pp. 12-14.
68
Asia News Monitor, Japan/Philippines/China: Japan Backs Philippines Arbitration Initiative vs China
Asia News Monitor (24 May 2013). p. 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1515299668?accountid=28547
69
Jiji Press English News Service, Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on Chinas Air Defense Zone, Jiji Press
English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056?
70
Kwan Weng Kin, Aquino Backs Japans Bid to Widen Defense Role, The Strait Times (25 June 2014). p. 1
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1539737436?accountid=28547
From the Aquino to the Duterte Administration 33

71
The Japan News, Kishiada: Japan Backs Philippine Lawsuit, The Japan News (13 April 2014). p. 1. https://
search.proquest.com/docview/1515299668?accountid=28547
72
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Japan Backs Philippines Use of Arbitration CourtReport, BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific (4 November 2015). p. 1.
73
Permanent Court of Arbitration, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines
versus the Peoples Republic of China) Press Release (The Hague, 12 July 2016). P. 1.
74
See Fravel, M. Taylor, Chinas Strategy in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, 3
(December 2011).292-319. http://search.proquest.com/docview/921618988/accountid=28547
75
Ibid. p.
76
The Japan News, Kishiada: Japan Backs Philippine Lawsuit, The Japan News (13 April 2014). p. 1. https://
search.proquest.com/docview/1515299668?accountid=28547
77
Cris Larano and Jospehine Cuneta, Japan, Philippines Pledge Greater Cooperation, Wall Street Journal
(10 January 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/1268166061?accountid=28547
78
Asia News Monitor, Philippine/Japan: Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation in Maritime Security,
Asia News Monitor (14 January 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1269104724?accountid=28547
79
Ibid. p. 2.
80
Asia News Monitor, op. cit. p. 1.
81
Anonymous, Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (27 June
2013). p. 2. http://search.proquest.com/docview/137173115?accountid=28547
82
Embassy of Japan in Manila, Press Release on the Visit of His Excellency Mr. Itsunori Onodera, Minister
of Defense of Japan to the Philippines, (27 June 2013). p. 1.
83
Ibid. p. 2.
84
Jiji Press English News Service, Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on Chinas Air Defense Zone, Jiji Press
English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056?
85
Gulf News, Aquino and Abe Discuss Maritime Disputes, Gulf News (25 June 2014).p. 1. http://search.
proquest.com/docview/1539577105?accountid=28547
86
Ibid. p. 1.
87
The Philippines News Agency (PNA), Japan Shares Philippines Serious Concern over Chinas Reclamation
Activities in West Philippines Sea, The Philippines News Agency (5 June 2015).p.1. http://search.proquest.com/
docview/1686051792?accountid=28547
88
The Philippines News Agency (PNA),Japan Shares Philippines Serious Concern over Chinas Reclamation
Activities in the West Philippine Sea, The Philippines News Agency (PNA) (05 June 2015). p. 1. http://search.
proquest.com/docview/1686051792?accountid=28547
89
Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A Strengthen Partnership for Advancing the Shared Principles and
Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth in the Region and Beyond (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2015).
90
Rodulfo-Veril, op. cit. p. 135.
91
National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2011, p.26.
92
Aileen Baviera, President Dutertes Foreign Policy Challenges, Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, 2
(2016). p. 203.
93
Sheldon Simon, U.S-Southeast Asian Relations: Augmented Presence, Comparative Connections: A
Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 18, 2 (September 2016). P. 53.
94
Jose Katigbak, Philippines Eyes Talks with China Sans Preconditions, The Philippine Star (18 September
2016). p. 1.
95
David Cagahastian, Malacanang Clarifies Duterte Statement on Kickout of US Troops in Mindanao,
Business Mirror (13 September 2016). p. 2.
96
Katigbak, op. cit. p. 2.
97
Baviera, op. cit. p. 204-205.
98
Alastair Wanklyn and Ayako Mie, Japan Tries to Decode Duterte after Joint US Patrols Halted,
TCA Regional News (15 September 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.comlib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/
docview/1819126061?accountid=28547
99
Wankly and Mie, op. cit. p. 1.
34 Balancing the Emergent Dragon with the Rising Sun:

100
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Kishida Pays Courtesy Call on the President of the
Philippines, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (11 August 2016). p. 2. http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/
page3e_000530.html
101
Ibid. p. 2.
102
The Japan News, Japan to Provide Philippines with 2 Large Patrol Vessels, The Japan News (7
September 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/docview/1816926113/fulltext/
E8A1508CFEE44FE2PQ/42?accountid=28547
103
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (6
September 2016). p. 2. http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page3e_000568.html
104
Ibid. p. 2.
105
Jiji Press English News Service, Duterte Willing To Advance Defense Cooperation with Japan,
Jiji Press English News Service (25 October 2016). p. 1. http://0-search.proquest.comlib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/
docview/1831939351/fulltext/D08500A05DBB4259PQ/362?accountid=28547
106
Mitsuru Obe, Rodrigo Duterte Speaks Smoothingly to Japan: Stronger Economic Ties with longstanding
friend and ally are a Priority, he tells Tokyo Investment Forum, Wall Street Journal (October 26, 2016). p. 1.
http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/printviewfile?accountid=28547
107
Asia News Monitor, Philippines/Japan: Duterte Pushes Stronger Philippines-Economic Ties, Asia News
Monitor (31 October 2016). p. 1.
108
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Japan, Duterte Vow Unity on South China Sea Dispute, BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific, (26 October 2016). http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/printviewlife?accountid=28547
109
Ibid. p. 1.
110
Japan-Philippines Joint Statement (Issued in Tokyo, 26 October 2016). p. 1.
111
Wankly and Mie, op. cit. p. 1.
112
Alastair Wanklyn, Amid Duterte- US Row, Attention Turns to Japan, TCA Regional News (4 October
2016). p. 2. http://0-search.proquest.com.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/printviewfile?accountid=28547
113
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Japan,, Philippines Agree to Enhance Maritime, Security Ties, BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific (12 January 2017). p. 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1857584233?accountid=28547
114
Ibid. p. 1.
115
Catherin Valente, Abe Offers PhP430 B Package, TCA Regional News (13 January 2017). p. 2 https://
search.proquest.com/docview/1857825130?accountid=28547
116
Ibid. p. 2.
117
Asia News Monitor, Japan/Philippines: Duterte, Abe Eye Higher Level of Philippines-Japan Relations,
Asia News Monitor (16 January 2017). p. 2 http://search.proquest.com/dcoview/1858311749?accountid=28547
118
Ralph Jennings, Japan Seeks to Limit China As Abe Visits Philippines, Voice of America News/FIND;
Lanham (13 January 2017). p. 1.
119
Maria Lourdes Tiqua, The Manila Times, Philippines, MA. Lourdes Column, TCA Regional News (1
November 2016). p. 2. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1834035393?accountid-28547
120
Christina Mendez, No One Can Stop China on Panatag-Duterte, The Philippine Star (March 20, 2017).
p. 1
121
The American Interest, Duterte: We Cant Stop China at Scarborough Shoal, The American Interest
(March 21, 2017) p. 1. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/03/20/duterte-we-cant-stop-at-scarborough-
shoal/
122
Mendez, op. cit. p. 2.
123
Philippine News Agency, Chinese Leaders Visit Brightens Realization of Mindanao Railway, 4 Other
Development Projects, Philippines News Agency (March 21, 2017). p. 1. http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/
chinese-leaders-visit-brightens-re...
124
Ibid p. 1.
125
Czeriza Valencia, Philippines, China Sign Development Plan, The Philippine Star (19 March 2017). p. 1.
126
Ibid. p. 2.
127
Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, Beijing Presses Its Advantages, Comparative Connections 13, 3
(September-December 2017) p. 43.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended their support,
cooperation, and commitment in the development of this project. This publication
would not have materialized without their help.
We are fortunate enough to engage with insightful persons from different
sectors, namely: the academe, public and private sectors, as well as civil society
organizations, who have shared their expertise and have actively contributed to
discussions in various fora.
We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres Dindo Manhit, President of
the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and guidance in making this endeavor
possible.
Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for their hard work
and dedication, and for working tirelessly towards the completion of this project:
Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication lay-out and cover
design;
And the rest of the ADRi team headed by Executive Director, Atty. Katrina
Clemente-Lua, Deputy Executive Director for Research, Ms. Angelica Mangahas,
Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma. Claudette Guevara, Senior
Research Associate, Ms. Weslene Uy, Program Associate, Ms. Vanesa Lee, and
External Affairs and Social Media Associate, Ms. Krystyna Dy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Renato Cruz De Castro is a full professor


in the International Studies Department, De La
Salle University, Manila, and holds the Charles Lui
Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies. In
2016, he was a U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright Initiative
Researcher from the Philippines, based in the East-
West Center in Washington. He is an alumnus of
the Daniel Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies in Hawaii, U.S.A.
In 2009, Dr. De Castro became the U.S. State
Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the
Philippines and was based in the Political Science
Department of Arizona State University. He
earned his Ph.D. from the Government and International Studies Department of
the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001, and obtained his
B.A. and two masters degrees from the University of the Philippines.
Professor De Castro has conducted several courses on International Relations
and Security Studies in the National Defense College and Foreign Service Institute.
He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Albert Del Rosario Institute for
Strategic and International Studies (ADR Institute).
A consultant in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the
Aquino Administration, Professor De Castros research interests include Philippine-
U.S. security relations, Philippine defense and foreign policies, U.S. defense and
foreign policies in East Asia, and the international politics of East Asia.
He has written over 80 articles on international relations and security that
have been published in a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the
Philippines, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia, France, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.

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