Severino Manotok v.

Heirs of Barque 477 SCRA 339 (2005)

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 | December 12, 2005 | YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J. | Valcos

Doctrine:
A land registered under torrens can be subjected to reconstitution by a
3rd party without prior cancellation if such was not duly issued in the
first place

Facts:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late
Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the
name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that
gutted the Quezon City Hall. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owners duplicate copy, real estate tax receipts, tax
declarations and the Plan covering the property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution,
private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their opposition
thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted
title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the
name of petitioners predecessors-in-interest is spurious.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the
reconstitution on the grounds that the land is already registered in
the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have
required the submission of documents other than the owners
duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and
should have confined himself with the owners duplicate certificate
of title.
On appeal to the CA, the Third Division declared that the LRA
correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or
annulling respondents title.

Issue:
W/N the LRA has the power to declare the reconstitution based solely
on the submitted owners duplicate title

Held:
Yes, the LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have
confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title prior to the
reconstitution. Section 3 of RA No. 26 clearly provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such
of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:

(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they

submitted in support thereof the owners duplicate certificate of
title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the
same should have more than sufficed as sources for the
reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly
mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the
hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law.
Since respondents source of reconstitution is the owners
duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much
less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted plan
appears to be spurious.
By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the
reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and
preference to the owners duplicate certificate of title over the
other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents title is authentic,
genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners title is sham and
spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of
Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain
undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Sajonas v. CA 258 SCRA 79 (1996)

G. R. No. 102377 | July 5, 1996 | TORRES, JR., J. | Valcos

Doctrine:
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and
without qualification limited to 30 days defeats the very purpose for
which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse
claim.

Facts:
 This case involves a cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of
Levy on the Execution from a Certificate of Title covering a parcel of
real property.
The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent
on the TCT of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name
of Sps. Uychocde and Jarin, and was later issued again to the Sps.
Sajonas who purchased the land from the former.
The Sajonas caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on
the Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property. That upon
full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed
of Sale involving the same property to the Sajonas. The deed of
absolute sale was registered almost a year after it was purchased or
on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, defendant-appellant Domingo Pilares filed for collection
of sum of money against Uychocde. Uychocde acknowledged his
monetary obligation to Pilares and entered into a compromise
agreement for its fulfillment.
When Uychocde failed to comply with the agreement, Pilares moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution. The court granted the writ
and ordered the execution and a notice of levy thereof was issued.
The Sps. Sajonas demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution upon Pilares but the latter refused to cause the
cancellation of said annotation.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Sps. Sajonas and
ordered the cancellation of the Notice of Levy.
The CA, however, reversed the trial court's decision, and upheld the
annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title.
According to Pilares, the notice of adverse claim was annotated on
August 27,1984, hence, it will be effective only up to September
26,1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and
effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529. This contention by Pilares
was upheld by the CA.

Issue:
W/N CA erred in upholding the levy on the execution of the title and
holding that the 30-day period for adverse claim under Section 70 of
P.D. 1529 absolute

Held:
Yes, SC cancelled the inscription of the notice of levy on execution on
the TCT issued in favor of the Sps. Sajonas.

The disputed inscription of adverse claim on the TCT was still in

effect on February 12, 1985 when the Sheriff annotated the notice
of levy on execution thereto. That the property sought to be levied
 upon execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or
better than that of the registered owner thereof.
Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor the Sps. Sajonas. And not
to deprive them, who waited a long time to complete payments on
their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by
the inscribed adverse claim.
While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which
conveys or affects the land insofar as third parties are concerned, it
is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a
certificate of title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn
to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the sale.
If the rationale of the law as for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose
force and effect after the lapse of 30 days, then it would not have
been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and
complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If
it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law
would not have required the party in interest to do a useless act.
Annotations of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect
the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by
the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529) and serves a
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the
registered owner thereof