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RUPERTA CANO and JESUS CARLO GERARD VDA DE VIRAY v.

SPS JOSE and


AMELITA USI G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012, Velasco, Jr., J

Facts: Lot 733, registered in the name of Mendoza is the subject of this case. Geodetic Engr
Fajardo prepared the Fajardo Plan, in which Lot 733 was divided into 6 smaller parcels of
differing size dimensions: Lot 733(A-F). Mendoza executed 2 separate deeds of absolute
sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus and the second deed conveying Lot 733-A to
Sps Viray. Vda. de Viray is the surviving spouse of Jesus. Mendoza, Vda. de Mallari and
Sps. Usi, as purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed the 1st Subdivision Agreement (SA)
in accordance with Galang Plan. Then they executed the 2nd SA. The subdivision of Lot
733, per the Galang Plan, and the 2 SAs concluded based on that plan, virtually resulted in
the loss of the identity of what under the Fajardo Plan were Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F. The
Sps. Viray and the late Jesus purchased Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F, respectively, from
Mendoza. As to be expected, the foregoing overlapping transactions involving the same
property or portions thereof spawned several suits and counter-suits.

Issue: Whether or not the sale to Sps Usi constituted as a double sale and therefore
invalid.

Ruling: Yes. The earlier sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F was valid and effective
conveyances. The subsequent transfers to the Sps. Usi of substantially the same portions
of Lot 733 accomplished through the subdivision agreements constitute in effect double
sales of those portions. The Deeds of Absolute Sale of Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F are valid. It
must be noted that the RTC upheld the validity of the separate deeds of absolute sale of
Lots 733-A and 733-F. There can be no question as to the ownership of the Sps. Viray and
Vda. de Viray over the specified and delineated portions of Lot 733 which they purchased
for value from Mendoza. Mendoza, as vendor, was bound to transfer the ownership of
and deliver, as well as warrant, the thing which is the object of the sale. The survey report
of LMB surveyor, Engr. Nicdao, would support a finding of double sale. His report, as
earlier indicated, contained the following key findings: (1) Lot 733-A sold to the Sps. Viray
is within Lot 733-B, the part assigned to Sps. Usi under the division; and (2) Lot 733-F is
almost identical to the combined area of Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen
Mendoza and her children, McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia, and a portion of
Lot 733-C-10 (Galang Plan) adjudicated to Sps. Usi. A double sale situation, which would
call, if necessary, the application of Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, arises when, as
jurisprudence teaches, the following requisites concur: (a) The two (or more) sales
transactions must constitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must
pertain to exactly the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d)
The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each have bought from the very same seller. There is no valid sale from Mendoza to
respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and
transferring the lots in question to respondents. The third element of cause of the
obligation which is established under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code is likewise visibly absent
from the two SAs. The transfer of title to respondents based on said SAs is flawed,
irregular, null and void. Thus the two SAs are not "sales transactions" nor "valid sales"
under Art. 1544 of the Civil Code and, hence, the first essential element under said legal
provision was not satisfied.

SPOUSES FELIPE SOLITARIOS AND JULIA TORDA v. SPOUSES GASTON JAQUE


AND LILIA JAQUE G.R. No. 199852, November 12, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

In determining the nature of a contract, the intention of the parties, as shown by the
surrounding circumstances, must be considered. If the real intention of the parties is that
the transaction shall secure the payment of a loan, then it is presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, under Article 1602(6) of the Civil Code.

Facts: In a complaint, Spouses Jaque alleged that they purchased a lot from Spouses
Solitarios in stages. One-half of the lot was sold to them, and the other half was
mortgaged to them to secure a loan. Spouses Solitarios then agreed to sell the mortgaged
half, but Spouses Jaque allowed the former to retain possession of the lot subject to the
condition that they will deliver a portion of the lots produce. However, Spouses
Solitarios stopped delivering any produce and claimed ownership over the lot. Spouses
Solitarios, on the other hand, alleged that they merely mortgaged the lot to Spouses Jaque
after the latter helped them redeem the land from PNB, with the agreement that they
would pay back the Jacques by delivering to them a portion of the lots produce.
However, Jacque informed Spouses Solitarios that he was taking possession of the lot as
owner, by showing the deeds of sale, REM contract, and a TCT to prove his claim.
Spouses Solitarios contended that these deeds of sale were fictitious and that their
signatures were forged. They also challenged the validity of the TCT through fraud
machinations. RTC declared that what the parties entered into was actually an equitable
mortgage. However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision, and ruled that what
was entered into was a contract of sale.

Issue: Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of absolute sale.

Ruling: No. The parties entered into an equitable mortgage, and not a contract of sale.
First, in determining whether a deed of absolute sale in form is a mortgage, the decisive
factor is the intention of the parties, as shown by all the surrounding circumstances.
Moreover, Article 1602 enumerates instances when a contract purporting to be an
absolute sale is presumed to be an equitable mortgage. Article 1602 (6) then provides that
in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation then it is presumed to be an equitable mortgage. This presumption finds
support in the following: (1) the testimony of Jaque and the documents he presented
establish the existence of two loans; and (2) the testimonies of the parties reveal that they
came to an agreement regarding payment terms. The fact that the parties agreed on
payment terms is inconsistent with the claim of Jaque that when Spouses Solitarios
executed the questioned deeds of sale they had no other intention but to transfer
ownership over the lot. Second, the Court held that a purported contract of sale where the
vendor remains in physical possession of the land, as lessee or otherwise, is an indicium
of an equitable mortgage. Retention by the vendor of the possession of the property is
inconsistent with the vendeesacquisition of ownership under a true sale, because in the
latter, the legal title is immediately transferred to the vendee. Lastly, it is further
established that when doubt exists as to the true nature of the parties transaction, courts
must construe such transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, as the
latter involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property. It is contrary
to human experience that a person would easily part with his property after incurring a
debt. Rather, he would first look for means to settle his obligations.

. (Uy vs. Fule, G.R. No. 164961. June 30, 2014)

Upon the death of Conrado Garcia on November 23, 1972, his heirs entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, including the vast track of land. Thereafter, his heirs
caused the registration of the vast track of land. The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) engaged Geodetic Engr. Rolando A. Sales (Engr. Sales) to conduct a survey of the
disputed land. He issued a joint certification to the effect that the disputed land was an
"untitled" property owned by Conrado Garcia.

DAR and the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur respectively issued
emancipation patents (EPs) and original certificates of title (OCTs) covering the disputed
land to the farmers-beneficiaries. In the interim, farmer-beneficiary Mariano Ronda sold
his portion to Chisan Uy who then registered his title. the respondents filed a complaint for
cancellation of titles, quieting of title, recovery of possession, and damages against the DAR Secretary.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondents saying that Uy is not a purchaser in good faith.
On appeal, the CA held that the petitioner, even assuming arguendo, that they had no notice of any
defect in their transferors titles, and the lands sold to them should be included in the DARs Operation
Land Transfer(OLT) program, no valid title could have passed to them because the transfers are void
under PD 27. PD 27 explicitly provides that Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land
Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the
Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other
existing laws and regulations:

Issue: Whether Uy is a purchaser in in good faith.

Held: No. We stated at the start that in determining whether or not a buyer of property is a
purchaser in good faith, he must show that he has bought the property without notice
that some other person had a right to, or interest in, such property, and he should pay a
full and fair price for the same at the time of his purchase, or before he had notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He must believe that the person
from whom he receives the property was the owner and could convey title to the
property, for he cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his
guard and still claim he acted in good faith. . . Consequently, it is not sufficient for him to
insist that he relied on the face of the certificates of title, for he must further show that he
exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the certificates of title. Failure to
exercise such degree of precaution rendered him a buyer in bad faith. It is a well-settled
rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was
no defect in the title of the vendor

Sales Buyer in Good Faith.Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another. It means the freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry. Given this notion of good faith,
therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full
and fair price for the same. As an examination of the records shows, the petitioners were
not innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. Their failure to investigate Sys title
despite the nearly simultaneous transactions on the property that ought to have put them
on inquiry manifested their awareness of the flaw in Sys title. That they did not also
appear to have paid the full price for their share of the property evinced their not having
paid true value (Cusi vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 195825. February 27, 2013).

Sale With Right to Repurchase.A sale with right to repurchase is governed by Article
1601 of the Civil Code, which provides that: Conventional redemption shall take place
when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to
comply with the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been
agreed upon. Conformably with Article 1616, the seller given the right to repurchase
may exercise his right of redemption by paying the buyer: (a) the price of the sale, (b) the
expenses of the contract, (c) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (d) the
necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold (David vs. David, G.R. No. 162365.
January 15, 2014).

PEALOSA vs.

SANTOS, G.R. NO. 133749, August 23, 2001

Respondent insist that the second deed is a complete nullity because a) the consideration
stated in the deed was not paid; b)seller was not present when the deed was notarized;
c) seller did not surrender a copy of the title; d)real estate taxes were not paid. The
elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent which are
present in the second Deed of Sale hence there is already a perfected contract of sale.

FIRST OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. SECURITRON SECURITY


SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015

Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no obligation to make
payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver earnest money to
petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under Art. 1482 of the
Civil Code, there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can speak of earnest
money. Where the parties merely exchanged offers and counter-offers, no contract is
perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such offers. Earnest money applies
to a perfected sale.

MOLDEX RAELTY INC. v. FLORA A. SABERON, G.R. No. 176289. April 8, 2013
The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision developer to register
the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds does not result to
the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The
contract to sell remains valid and subsisting. The intrinsic validity of the contract to sell
is not affected by the developers violation of Section 5 of PD 957.Nevertheless, the
respondent in this case is entitled to 50% refund under the Maceda Law.

SPOUSES DELFIN O. TUMIBAY AND AURORA T. TUMIBA-DECEASED ET AL. v.


SPOUSES MELVIN A. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013
In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the buyer has paid
the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property
prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the seller is entitled
to rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very
object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell. In the case at bar, the court finds
that respondent Rowenas act of transferring the title to the subject land in her name,
without the knowledge and consent of petitioners and despite non-payment of the full
price thereof, constitutes a substantial and fundamental breach of the contract to sell.

PARTIES TO A CONTRACT
OF SALEA. SELLERART 1459
HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES vs SOCCO-BELTRAN, G.R. 176474 November 27, 2008
It was unmistakably stated in the Contract to Sell and made clear to both parties thereto
that the vendor was not yet the owner of the subject property and was merely expecting
to inherit the same. The law specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership
of the property at the time of delivery hence, there was no valid sale from which
ownership of the subject property could have been transferred.

DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG et al., G.R. NO. 159578, February 18, 2009

Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the
action is based on an implied or a constructive trust. However, since respondents'
action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be filed within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.
Respondent's action for reconveyance was not even subject to prescription, since the
deed of sale that was executed in favor of petitioners was null and void because the
seller was not the owner of the land, nor has the authority when she sold it to
petitioners, hence, being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to attack anytime
because an action to declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe.

ART 1505NOOL vs. COURT


OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
116635 July 24, 1997
ANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 120820. August 1, 2000
Facts:
Spouses Santos owned the house and lot in Better Living Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. The landtogether with the house, was mortgaged
with the Rural Bank of Salinas, Inc., to secure a loan of P150K. The bank sent
Rosalinda Santos a letter demanding payment of P16K in unpaid interest and other
charges. Since theSantos couple had no funds, Rosalinda offered to sell the house and
lot to Carmen Caseda. After inspecting thereal property, Carmen and her husband
agreed.Carmen and Rosalinda signed a document, involving the sale of the
house P350K as full amount, P54K asdownpayment. Among other condition set
is that Caseda will pay the balance of the mortgage in the bank, realestate taxes and the
electric and water bills.The Casedas complied with the bank mortgage and the
bills. The Santoses, seeing that the Casedas lacked
them e a n s t o p a y t h e r e m a i n i n g i n s t a l l m e n t s a n d / o r a m o r t i z a t i o n o f t
h e l o a n , r e p o s s e s s e d t h e p r o p e r t y . T h e Santoses then collected the rentals
from the tenants. Carmen approached petitioners and offered to pay
the balance of the purchase price for the house and lot. The parties, however,
could not agree, and the deal couldnot push through because the Santoses wanted
a higher price.Carmen is now praying that the Santoses execute the final deed of
conveyance over the property.
Issue:
WON there was a perfected contract of sale?

Held: NO
A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its
essential elements, and not what thecontracting parties call it. Article 1458
expressly obliges the vendor to transfer ownership of the thing sold as anessential
element of a contract of sale. This is because the transfer of ownership in exchange for a
price paid or promised is the very essence of a contract of sale.There was no transfer
of ownership simultaneously with the delivery of the property purportedly
sold. Ther e c o r d s c l e a r l y s h o w t h a t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
C a s e d a s f i r s t t o o k t h e n l o s t p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e disputed house and lot, the
title to the property has remained always in the name of Rosalinda Santos. Althoughthe
parties had agreed that the Casedas would assume the mortgage, all amortization
payments made by CarmenCaseda to the bank were in the name of Rosalinda
Santos. The foregoing circumstances categorically andclearly show that no valid
transfer of ownership was made by the Santoses to the Casedas. Absent this
essentialelement, their agreement cannot be deemed a contract of sale.
It was a contract to sell.
Ownership is reserved by the vendor and is not to pass until full payment of
the purchase price. This we find fully applicable and understandable in this case,
given that the property involvedis a titled realty under mortgage to a bank and would
require notarial and other formalities of law before transfer thereof could be validly
effected.
The CA cannot order rescission.
If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the
condition precedent, he is
enforcing the contract and not rescinding it.
W h e n t h e p e t i t i o n e r s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e repossessed the disputed house and
lot for failure of private respondents to pay the purchase price in full, theywere merely
enforcing the contract and not rescinding it.

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO and SALVADOR A. OROSCO,


Petitioners,

vs.

SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY


ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Simulation of contract, intestate proceeding

FACTS:
Petitioner Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio who died intestate. On his death,
Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two documents by her daughter Emelinda
and her son-in-law Domingo, respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents
were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in 2003, so petitioners claim, that
Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-


Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial, RTC held the annulment of the
subject documents. CA reversed RTCs decision. CA held that the RTC erred in annulling
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners allegation of the existence of the
heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or
intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court
observed that the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a
notarized documentthat has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue on heirship in this case must be raised in a separate
administration or intestate proceedings.
2. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale can be nullified.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that this case falls under the exception of the rule on separate
intestate proceedings.

The general rule is that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding,
not in an independent civil action. However, the Court also ruled that recourse to
administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a
good and compelling reason for such recourse.
The Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as
when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined
during the pre-trial.

Similar to the case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, in the present case, there appears to be
only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritancefrom
Eulalio.

It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special


proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio,
especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that
they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that
petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.

Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the
decedent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that it is apparent from the admissions of respondents and the records of
this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over
the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a
simulated contract.

Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta: In absolute simulation, there is
a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound
by it. The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not
really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitiouscontract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale is simply to facilitate the titling of the subject property, not to transfer
the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner
Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication that
respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase.
Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to
collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership and is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan,
et al.
G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the
others is unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of
Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA),
the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of
title covering the subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-
2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of
the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca,
Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and
Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was
evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the
subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's predecessor-
in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431
prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its
complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents
because the lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot
had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the
name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal
obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a
new one in its name.
After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the
Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause
of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that
what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that
the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against
them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their
consent or authority as his co-heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative value
by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as
it pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as
to the 1/22 share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the
petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve
prescription.

Rulings:
1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents'
shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion
was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey
their shares in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA
on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by
Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack
of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to
their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person
could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless
he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of another
by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to
his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its
being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is
because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and
the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the
thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary


claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine
of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or
successors-in-interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the
contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for there was
nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect
on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from
the absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject
lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the
respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could
deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever.
Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;


and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.

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