Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and the Environmental Information
Regulations 2004 (EIR) give rights of public access to information held by public
authorities. This is part of a series of guidance notes to help public authorities
understand their obligations and to promote good practice.
This guidance will explain the concept of legal professional privilege (LPP) and
help public authorities understand how to apply the exemption in section 42 of
FOIA or the equivalent exception in regulation 12(5)(b) of the EIR.
Overview
Section 42 sets out an exemption from the right to know for information
protected by LPP. The exemption is qualified, meaning that it is subject to a
public interest test.
LPP covers communications between lawyers and their clients for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice, or documents created by or for lawyers for the
dominant (main) purpose of litigation. LPP can be lost (waived) if the
information is shared with others.
Public interest factors to consider may include whether the advice is still
recent or live, how many people are affected, how much money is at stake,
or a reasonable suspicion of illegality or misrepresentation.
You should use section 42 where you are the client or legal adviser. If you
have obtained information from a third party it will often be easier to use the
section 41 exemption for information provided in confidence instead.
Remember that you do not have to use the exemption. A client can always
choose to waive their LPP and disclose the information in the interests of
transparency.
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If the answer to both questions is yes, you can withhold the information if you
wish, although you should remember that there is no obligation to use the
exemption. As long as you are the client you can always choose to waive your
LPP and disclose the information anyway in the interests of transparency.
Example:
In Fuller v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Justice
(EA/2008/005; 5 August 2008), a person objecting to a
proposed law criminalising possession of certain
pornographic material asked the MoJ for any legal advice
which confirms that the possession can successfully be
prosecuted and that Article 8 does not apply. The Tribunal
decided that the MoJ did not have to confirm or deny whether
it held such advice. Confirmation or denial would reveal the
content of the advice they had received and the public
interest in LPP outweighed the public interest in disclosure.
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For further information on the duty to confirm or deny, see The duty to confirm
or deny: Awareness Guidance 21.
The principles of LPP set out below are also relevant to the Scottish law
concept of confidentiality of communications. However, you are strongly
advised to take additional legal advice on Scottish law where this may apply.
A professional legal adviser for the purposes of LPP could be a solicitor, barrister,
licensed conveyancer or a legal executive holding professional qualifications
recognised by the Institute of Legal Executives (ILEX). It makes no difference
whether the legal adviser is an external lawyer or a professional in-house lawyer
employed by the public authority itself. Even though the position may be different
in European competition law, LPP extends to communications with in-house
lawyers for the purposes of FOIA and the Tribunal has confirmed this in Calland v
Information Commissioner and FSA (EA/2007/0136; 8 August 2008).
There are two categories of LPP: litigation privilege and legal advice privilege.
Litigation privilege
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Information created for another purpose before the litigation was anticipated
may sometimes still be covered if brought together for the purpose of the
litigation. This may be the case if pre-existing documents are relevant to the
case and the lawyer has exercised skill and judgement in selecting and
compiling them, particularly if the selection of documents reveals the trend of
the advice on the case. However, pre-existing documents will not become
privileged just by being passed over to a lawyer.
Although it will be privileged, any information being relied on for the legal action
will still need to be disclosed to other parties to the case under the disclosure
rules of the court. This is separate from FOIA disclosure.
Legal advice privilege may apply whether or not there is any litigation in
prospect. This form of LPP covers a narrower range of information. It will only
cover confidential communications between the client and the lawyer made for
the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice.
The advice itself must concern legal rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies or
otherwise have a relevant legal context. Advice from a lawyer on a purely
financial, operational, public relations or strategic business issue is unlikely to
be privileged, unless the advice was obtained within a legal context for
example, in the context of possible legal remedies on an unfavourable outcome.
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Example:
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the
Bank of England [2004] UKHL 48 concerned advice from the
Bank of Englands lawyers on how to best present evidence
to the Bingham Inquiry into the collapse of BCCI. The inquiry
itself was not a legal process, but the House of Lords found
that advice on presenting a favourable case to the inquiry
was covered by LPP. The relevant legal context here was
whether the Bank had properly discharged its functions under
banking laws, and the potential public law remedies for
challenging any unfavourable findings. It was clearly a legal
function to advise on the presentation of evidence to an
inquiry.
Communications with third parties will not be covered. This may mean that you
need to consider who the client is, as even some of the public authoritys
employees may be considered to be third parties and therefore not covered by
LPP. Depending on the circumstances, the client may include the whole public
authority, one department, or only a small team of officials or employees.
Example:
In Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of
the Bank of England (No 5) [2003] EWCA Civ 474, the Court
of Appeal held that the client was the small team of
employees set up to deal with the inquiry, rather than the
whole Bank. Correspondence between lawyers and other
Bank employees or ex-employees was therefore not covered
by legal advice privilege.
The lawyer must also be acting in a professional capacity. LPP would not apply
to informal advice given to an official by a lawyer friend acting in an unofficial
capacity.
Even if the information was privileged, LPP may have been lost (waived) if the
client has shared it with third parties and it has lost its confidential character. If
this is the case, the exemption will not apply.
LPP can be waived inadvertently, and even accidental disclosure will usually
result in a loss of LPP. No intention to waive LPP is required.
Disclosure of only part of the information may still lead to waiver of LPP. This
will only apply if the partial disclosure has been made in the context of litigation,
as you cannot mislead a court by cherry-picking the most favourable parts of
the advice or information and claiming LPP over the rest. However, in
circumstances other than litigation (eg in public debate on an issue) partial
disclosure will not result in waiver of legal advice privilege. The Tribunal
confirmed in FCO v Information Commissioner (EA/2007/0092; 29 April 2008)
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A mere reference to, or a brief summary of, a document will not amount to
waiver. However, if the substantial contents of a document have been disclosed
and are being relied on, then there will have been waiver of the privilege within
the document. There are no hard and fast rules and the decision will inevitably
depend on the specific circumstances of the case.
The information must still be disclosed unless the public interest in maintaining
the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. If the balance of the
public interest is equal, the information should be disclosed. For a general
discussion of the public interest test, see The public interest test: Awareness
Guidance 3.
When considering the balance of the public interest under this exemption, public
authorities should look at the specific context of each case. Factors that may be
relevant depending on the circumstances include those set out below, although
there may also be other relevant case-specific considerations.
The general public interest inherent in the exemption will always be strong due
to the importance of the principle behind LPP: safeguarding openness in all
communications between client and lawyer to ensure access to full and frank
legal advice, which in turn is fundamental to the administration of justice. The
Tribunal recognised this in Bellamy v Information Commissioner
(EA/2005/0023; 4 April 2006), where it said: there is a strong element of public
interest inbuilt into the privilege itself. At least equally strong countervailing
considerations would need to be adduced to override that inbuilt public interest.
The strong public interest in favour of maintaining the exemption may also be
enhanced further, depending on the severity of the harm likely to be suffered by
the holder of the LPP in the particular case.
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For example, the public interest will be particularly strong if the advice is recent
or still live ie still being relied upon or relevant to litigation in prospect. To
disclose legal advice where litigation on the relevant issues is in prospect or
may be likely would be unfair to a public authority. The legal advice would
reveal the basis (and potentially the weaknesses) of the public authoritys case,
while a private opponent not subject to FOIA would not have to reveal their
position.
The public interest may also be particularly strong if the advice is related to
significant personal interests of individuals (as opposed to administrative
issues). This was suggested by the Tribunal in Mersey Tunnel Users
Association v Information Commissioner and Merseytravel (EA/2007/0052; 15
February 2008). Advice relating to personal interests could include advice held
by the Crown Prosecution Service in criminal cases, or advice held by local
authorities in childcare cases.
Given the strong public interest inbuilt into LPP, there will always be an initial
weighting in favour of maintaining the exemption and it has been unusual for the
public interest in disclosure to be strong enough to offset that.
However, the Tribunal stated in Bellamy that, although it may be more difficult to
show the balance lies in favour of disclosure, there is no need for the factors in
favour of disclosure to be exceptional. The exemption is not absolute and you
must always consider whether the public interest in disclosure in a particular
case is strong enough to equal or exceed the public interest in LPP.
The passage of time. Generally speaking, the older the information, the
more likely it is to have served its purpose and the less likely it is to still
be relevant to decision-making or subject to challenges. The passage of
time may therefore favour disclosure, although how much time will vary
depending on the circumstances of the case.
Example:
In Kitchener v Information Commissioner and Derby City
Council (EA/2006/0044; 20 December 2006), advice which
was 6 years old was considered still relatively recent.
However, in the Merseytravel case, advice which was over
10 years old was not recent and this was one factor taken
into account in favour of disclosure.
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harm caused to the holder of the privilege. However, the ICO recognises
that the prospect of litigation can never be completely ruled out and care
will need to be taken to ensure no prejudice is caused to possible future
proceedings.
Example:
Previous cases have taken into account the amount of
money involved where the advice in question affected the
use of around 70 million in tunnel toll income (in the
Merseytravel case) or a 1 billion pension fund (in Pugh v
Information Commissioner and Ministry of Defence
(EA/2007/0055; 17 December 2007)).
Example:
In the Merseytravel case, the fact that the decision based on
the advice affected the toll charged to 80,000 drivers every
weekday and could also affect around 1.5 million residents of
local councils was a factor in favour of disclosure. In Pugh
19,500 people were affected by the relevant pension fund.
Conversely, in Gillingham v Information Commissioner
(EA/2007/0028; 26 September 2007) the number of people
using a public footpath was too small to be a significant
factor.
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Example:
Transparency was considered crucial in the Merseytravel
case. On its website, the public authority had claimed a legal
duty to make certain payments, without being able to point to
any statute and instead referring to its legal advice leading
to doubt about the legal position. The Tribunal said that
legitimate and serious questions can readily be asked about
both the power to make the payments and the obligation to
do so. The authoritys published accounts also lacked
transparency which stopped proper scrutiny of its operation.
Taking all these factors into account, there have been relatively few occasions
where the Commissioner or Tribunal have considered that in all the
circumstances the public interest in disclosure was strong enough to order
disclosure:
Example:
The Merseytravel case concerned the disclosure of legal
advice held by the public authority operating the Mersey
Tunnel. When the tunnel started making a profit, the public
authority did not reduce toll charges and started using the
profits to repay local councils (who had met previous losses).
This decision was based on legal advice. The advice was
over 10 years old, although it was still live. The amount of
money at stake was around 70 million, and the decision
affected at least 80,000 people who used the tunnel and paid
the toll charges and 1.5 million residents of the local councils
being repaid. There was, crucially, also a lack of
transparency in the reasons for the decision, and legitimate
doubt over the legal position. In these striking
circumstances, the Tribunal ordered disclosure.
Example:
The Commissioner issued an Enforcement Notice (22 May
2006) requiring disclosure of the Attorney Generals advice
on the legality of the Iraq war. The notice recognised that it
was a highly exceptional case from almost every
perspective. A decision to commit the country to military
action was of particular gravity and magnitude. The invasion
and its legality was also a matter of intense controversy, and
transparency and public understanding of the decision-
making process was important. There were serious questions
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Environmental information
Regulation 12(5)(b) of the EIR sets out an exception to the right to know if the
disclosure of information would adversely affect the course of justice:
12.(5) For the purposes of paragraph 1(a), a public authority may refuse to
disclose information to the extent that its disclosure would adversely
affect
(b) the course of justice, the ability of a person to receive a fair trial or
the ability of a public authority to conduct an inquiry of a criminal or
disciplinary nature.
As with all EIR exceptions, this is subject to the public interest test set out in
regulation 12(1)(b). A public authority can only refuse to disclose the information
if the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in
disclosing the information.
This exception is wider than section 42 but can be used for information covered
by LPP in a similar way to the section 42 FOIA exemption. In the case of
Kirkaldie v the Information Commissioner and Thanet DC (EA/2006/001; 4 July
2006), the Information Tribunal expressed the view that the purpose of the
exception was reasonably clear, stating that it exists in part to ensure that there
should be no disruption to the administration of justice, including the operation
of the courts and no prejudice to the rights of individuals or organisations to a
fair trial. In order to achieve this it covers legal professional privilege, particularly
where a public authority is or is likely to be involved in litigation. The Tribunal
therefore decided that the exception is similar to the exemption. This view was
also upheld in Burgess v the Information Commissioner and Stafford BC
(EA/2006/0091; 7 June 2007).
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Other considerations
If you hold information for which a third party may be able to claim LPP, it may
be easier and more appropriate to consider using the section 41 exemption for
confidential information instead. This is because information obtained from a
third party must have been provided to you in confidence in order to still be
privileged. For more information on how to use the section 41 exemption, see
Information provided in confidence: Awareness Guidance 2.
The section 42 exemption cannot be used for historical records (that is, records
over 30 years old).
More information
This guidance will be reviewed and considered from time to time in line with
new decisions of the Information Commissioner, Tribunal and courts on
freedom of information cases. It is a guide to our general recommended
approach, although individual cases will always be decided on the basis of their
particular circumstances.
If you need any more information about this or any other aspect of freedom of
information, please contact us.
Phone: 08456 30 60 60
01625 54 57 45
Website: www.ico.gov.uk
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