G.R. No. 129807 December 9, 2005 letter, petitioner claimed that this amount was computed Engr.

hat this amount was computed Engr. Carlos V. Reyes (Engr. Reyes) revealed that electric
based on the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to meter number 47019 was not registering any electric
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.
1988. consumption at light load and, when it was tested at full load,
CRISTINA OPEA and TEOFILO RAMOS, JR., Respondents.
the same only recorded a 27.57% consumption.
Respondents asserted in their complaint that these demands
DECISION
by petitioner were without proper and correct basis as they On the other hand, the examination of electric meter number
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: had paid all their electric bills for the period 1983 to 1988. 1587 indicated that its murray seal was no longer attached
1
They also stated that the charges for unbilled electric thereto and had been substituted with an unauthorized lead
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the consumption could have emanated from fraudulent seal and the government seal which should be attached to
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35114 dated 29 May 1997 manipulations executed by petitioner itself. said electric meter was already missing. The inspection team
affirming, with modification, the decision 2 of the Regional Trial also noticed that said electric meters second and third dials
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, in Civil Case No. 19,648- Respondents, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs from from the right were misaligned. Just like electric meter
89 declaring as null and void the documents presented by the trial court: number 47019, Engr. Reyes also subjected electric meter
petitioner with regard to respondents unbilled consumption. number 1587 to a test which revealed that it was not
a) Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order before notice
The records establish the following facts: and a writ of preliminary injunction, directing the defendants registering any electric consumption at light load and
or any person acting for and in its behalf to desist and refrain recorded only 33.53% of electricity utilized at full load.
In their complaint filed on 19 July 1989 before the RTC of from doing any act that would disconnect the electrical light
Davao City, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that connection at plaintiffs house and office, and also desist in As the two electric meters in question were already
petitioner Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), defendant enforcing the so-called "Computations" referred to. inaccurate, Engr. Reyes and petitioner decided to remove
below, is a franchise holder authorized to operate an electric them and had them individually wrapped, sealed, and brought
and power plant in Davao City. Respondents, on the other b) Order the defendants to adjust correctly or calibrate the to petitioners office for safekeeping.
hand, are petitioners customers as electric meter nos. 47019 electric meters by competent men or persons. Pursuant to the procedure adopted by petitioner in cases of
and 1587 were attached to respondent Teofilo Ramos, Jr.s meter tampering, respondents were required to make a
c) To declare null and void the documents (Annexes "C" to "C-
(respondent Ramos, Jr.) office and residence, respectively. deposit for the repair and replacement of the two electric
*" and "G" to "G-*") denoted as "Computation of Tampered
Under the agreement between respondents, respondent meters. The amount of deposit required in this case was
Meter".
Ramos, Jr. was supposed to pay the electric bills to petitioner pegged at P4,000.00 for each account which was paid by
although both electric meters were under the account name d) Order the payment of moral and exemplary damages in the respondent Ramos, Jr. on 19 September 1988. With this
of his mother-in-law, respondent Cristina Opea (respondent amounts of P 200,000.00 and P 50,000.00 respectively. payment, petitioner immediately installed "good meters" at
Opea). respondents residence and office.
e) Direct defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the amount
Sometime in 1988, petitioner, through its fieldmen or of P 2,000.00 as initial expenses in the preparation and filing Everything seemed back to normal following the replacement
inspection team, examined the electric meter in respondent of the complaint; and to further pay the amount of the allegedly tampered electric meters on 19 September
Ramos, Jr.s office allegedly in response to a report of an of P 33,477.86 in concept of attorneys fee. 1988. Problem, however, arose anew when in January 1989,
alleged "broken Davao Light seal." As a consequence of said respondents received from petitioner an electric bill charging
f) To make the preliminary injunction final.
inspection, both electric meters were removed and eventually them with the amount of P7,894.99 for account number 510-
replaced. Respondents purportedly observed that their PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other relief that may be just 4019 prompting respondents to file a complaint with
electric consumption a few months after the installation of the and proper in the premises.6 petitioner. On verification, it was discovered that electric
replacement meters were relatively similar with their usage meter number 7168 which replaced electric meter number
as recorded by the previous electric meters. Thus, they were Traversing the allegations 7
of the complaint, petitioner
47019 erroneously recorded respondents electric
taken aback when petitioner charged them the amount declared in its answer that at the time of the institution of consumption beginning November 1989. Accordingly,
of P 7,894.99 for one billing month. After they complained this suit, petitioner continuously supplied electrical services to respondents January electric bill was revised to
about this excessive amount, petitioner made an adjustment respondents pursuant to the service contracts it entered into only P5,625.55 and credit memorandum no. 38711 dated 07
and subsequently reduced said electric bill to P5,625.55 with respondent Opea. One of these service contracts was
February 198911 was issued in favor of respondents.
which respondents paid under protest. dated 30 May 19778 under account number 510-4019 with
meter number 47019. The other service contract was dated On or about 17 March 1989, petitioners customer relations
On 17 May 1989, petitioner wrote respondent Opea charging 07 November 19509 under account number 510-4020 with department received a letter-complaint from Konsumo
her P84,398.76 for the alleged unbilled electric consumption meter number 1587. Dabaw regarding respondents recomputed electric bill for
of respondent Ramos, Jr.s office from September 1983 to account number 510-4019. Petitioner thereafter conducted
September 1988.3 The amount was allegedly arrived at based On 16 September 1988, petitioners representatives, together another verification of electric meter number 7168 and it was
on the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988. with an energy regulation analyst of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) and a photographer, went to respondents office then discovered that said meter was running backwards, and
On 17 June 1989, petitioner sent another letter 4 to respondent building and residential house to examine and test the that no error was committed by petitioner in respondents
Opea reiterating its demand for the payment of the unbilled electric meters installed thereat. The examination and testing meter reading on 14 January 1989. Accordingly, petitioner
electric consumption. This time, the letter contained a threat of electric meter number 47019 was allegedly witnessed by sent a letter12 to Konsumo Dabaw explaining this matter and
that respondents failure to settle their obligation within ten respondent Ramos, Jr.s employee named Myrna Galagar on 30 March 1989, petitioner replaced electric meter number
days would compel petitioner to take the necessary legal (Galagar). In the case of electric meter number 1587, Joy 7168 with electric meter number 24305.
action before the proper court and would result in the Perucho (Perucho),10 another employee of respondent Ramos, In the third week of June 1989, petitioner adjusted
immediate disconnection of the electric supply to Jr., purportedly observed the procedure. respondents December 1988 to May 1989 electric bills based
respondents. on the latters monthly consumption as registered by electric
According to petitioner, the examination of electric meter
On 23 June 1989, petitioner again wrote respondent Opea number 47019 showed that petitioners murray seal, meter number 24305 and taking into consideration credit
demanding the amount of P49,512.63 allegedly representing otherwise known as the outer seal, was already broken while memorandum no. 3887.
the amount of unbilled electric consumption of respondent the government seal or inner seal was deformed. In addition,
Ramos, Jr.s residence.5 As was stated in the 17 May 1989 the meter testing conducted by the ERB regulation analyst

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 1 of 18

Petitioner likewise claimed in its answer that respondents
unbilled consumption amounting to P84,398.76 relative to
account number 510-401913 and P49,512.63 for account
number 510-402014 covered the period September 1983 to
September 1988 and was based on the highest registration of
the electric meter for each account - 1,047 kilowatthours for
account number 510-401915 and 963 kilowatthours in the
case of account number 510-4020.16The amounts claimed as
unbilled consumption, however, merely represented
petitioners initial bargaining position with respondents in the
hope that the latter would come clean and submit proof as to
when they had the electric meters tampered and made
additions to their connected load.
Also, petitioner asserted in its answer that its letter dated 16
June 198917 giving respondents the period of ten days within
which to settle the matter with petitioner was designed to
bring respondents to the bargaining table for a fair and just
settlement of petitioners claim and that the threatened
actions contained in said letter were never implemented by
petitioner.
Furthermore, based on the summaries of respondents
monthly electric consumption from September 1983 to June
198918 it would appear that the tampering of electric meter
number 47019 occurred between late December 1983 or
early January 1984 when said meter registered only 302
kilowatthours a drastic drop in consumption considering its
recording of 708 kilowatthours for the previous billing period.
As regards electric meter number 1587, its tampering
allegedly occurred sometime in late July or early August 1985
when this electric meter registered only 170 kilowatthours
which was way below its previous recording of 663
kilowatthours for the previous billing period.
In its answer, petitioner moreover presented another method
of computing respondents unbilled consumption which was
arrived at using respondents daily average consumption
registered by the new electric meters and multiplying this by
thirty days. Thus, for account number 510-4019, petitioner
charged respondents the amount of P65,918.13 as of
September 1988 plus 2% monthly surcharge from October
1988 to July 1989 totalling P8,636.12. In addition, this amount
was supposed to carry the 2% monthly surcharge until fully
paid. With respect to account number 510-4020, petitioner
claimed the amount of P28,328.45 for the period August 1985
to September 1988, plus P4,028.74 representing 2% monthly
surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989. Similarly, this
amount would carry the 2% surcharge until fully settled by
respondents.
Ultimately, petitioner prayed that judgment in its favor be
given ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay:
(1) The sum of P74,554.25 as unbilled consumption under
Account No. 510-4019 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up
to July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from
August, 1989 until fully paid.
(2) The sum of P32,357.19 as unbilled consumption under
Account No. 510-4020 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up
to July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from
August, 1989 until fully paid.
(3) The sum of P50,000.00 as damages for attorneys fee and relayed to petitioner by an informant whose identity he
expenses of litigation, plus an additional P30,000.00 should refused to divulge. Moreover, due to the alleged urgency of
there be an appeal or petition for certiorari. the situation, his team could not afford to wait for respondent
Ramos, Jr. to return from Manila; hence, they continued with
(4) The sums of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral
the inspection.
damages and exemplary damages. 19
Petitioner next presented ENGR. REYES on the witness stand.
On 20 July 1989, Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes,
Essentially, he testified that his work involved using standard
considering the nature of the complaint and the urgency of
metering instrument and conducting inspections and
the provisional remedy prayed for, ordered petitioner from
investigations of alleged tampering of electric meters both in
doing any act complained of within twenty days from receipt
residential and commercial buildings.
of said order and scheduled the hearing for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction on 01 August 1989. 20
According to Engr. Reyes, on 16 September 1988, he
inspected two electric meters as evidenced by the reports he
After the pre-trial, the continuous trial of the case proceeded
accomplished and marked as Exhibits "4" and "5" for
in reverse order as agreed upon by the parties in order for
petitioner. Using a standard equipment of his office, he
petitioner, as defendant below, to prove its allegation of
discovered that the two electric meters were not accurately
meter tampering.
registering the electricity consumed by respondent Ramos, Jr.
JOSE ROBERTO A. SARDINIA (Sardinia) testified that at the Particularly, electric meter number 47019 did not record
time material to this case, he was the legal assistant in electric consumption at light load and 27.57% consumption at
petitioners Legal Affairs and Public Relation Department. On full load.24 Similarly, electric meter number 1587 did not
16 September 1988, petitioners system department ordered register any rotation when tested at light load; at full load, it
the conduct of inspection and examination of alleged reflected only a 33.53% accuracy.25
tampered electric meters. Relative to said directive, two
Further, Engr. Reyes corroborated Sardinias testimony that
teams were formed, one of which was headed by Sardinia
the government seal of electric meter number 47019 was
himself. The other members of his team were an instrument
deformed or tampered with. In his report as regards electric
technician from petitioners laboratory department named
meter number 1587, Engr. Reyes shared Sardinias
Alfredo Lucero (Lucero); driver; lineman; photographer; a
observation that its DLPCs seal was deformed while its
representative of the city electrician office; and Engr. Reyes.
government seal was missing.
In the afternoon of said date, his team proceeded to the place
Lucero testified that he was assigned in the laboratory section
where the electric meters in question were installed. There,
of petitioner. He maintained that it was the standard
they were met by respondent Ramos, Jr.s employees Perucho
procedure observed by petitioner that electric meters
and Galagar. Perucho and Galagar informed Sardinia that it
acquired by the latter are tested 26 using a standard testing
was their employer, respondent Ramos, Jr., who actually paid
instrument and thereafter, the meters are turned over to the
the electric bills under the account name of respondent
representatives of the Board of Energy (BOE) 27 who subject
Opea. In addition, Perucho and Galagar told the team that
the meters to their own examination. After the BOE
respondent Ramos, Jr., was in Manila during that time. Despite
establishes the accuracy of an electric meter, it attaches
this information, the inspection team proceeded with their
thereto a seal which is known as the BOE seal. This seal
planned examination of the two electric meters. Engr. Reyes
protects the meter from being opened such that one cannot
conducted the meter testing which was witnessed by Perucho
get into the internal component of an electric meter without
and Galagar. The photographer who accompanied the
breaking the BOE seal. Once an electric meter bearing the
inspection team likewise took photos of the two electric
BOE seal is installed, petitioner attaches to its bottom portion
meters while these were being examined. 21
an outside seal which prevents the meter from being pulled
As part of his duty as the team leader, Sardinia made written out anytime.
reports of the results of the meter testing. According to
In addition, Lucero averred that on 16 September 1988, he
Sardinia, the government seal (inner seal) of the electric
was a member of the inspection team which examined the
meter bearing serial number 47019 was deformed and its
22 electric meters issued under the account name of respondent
DLPC seal (outer seal) was broken. As for electric meter
Opea. As part of the team, it was his task to make a load
number 1587, the inspection revealed that its government
inspection report28 for each electric meter listing therein the
seal was missing while its DLPCs seal was substituted with a
various electrical items connected to every meter.
deformed lead seal which was not the type used by
petitioner.23 Another witness for petitioner was ARSENIO SACAMOS, JR.
(Sacamos, Jr.), head of petitioners billing and collection
After the electric meters were tested by Engr. Reyes, Sardinia
department. Sacamos, Jr. stated in the witness stand that he
had them wrapped with manila paper. Sardinias name and
was requested by Atty. Oscar Breva, petitioners counsel, to
signature as well as those of Engr. Reyes and an employee of
prepare a summary of kilowatt consumption for account
respondent Ramos, Jr. were written on the tape used for
numbers 510-4019 and 510-4020. In the case of account
sealing the wrapping paper. Thereafter, the electric meters
number 510-4019, his department collated the material data
were taken to petitioners office.
from September 1983 to June 1989. His analysis of the data
When asked by the court, Sardinia stated that the information established a drastic drop in electric consumption recorded by
regarding the existence of tampered electric meters was electric meter number 47019 commencing in January 1984
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 2 of 18
until September 1988 when the replacement meter registered the two electric meters involved in this case, the inspection consumption, without any factual and legal basis, defendant
a high consumption. team requested her and her former fellow employee Perucho is ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
to observe the meter testing and examination conducted by damages, including exemplary damages, by way of example
As regards account number 510-4020, Sacamos, Jr. averred
the team despite their lack of knowledge about the whole to the public, in the amount of P5,000.00 and cost against
that they gathered the pertinent information from September
procedure. After the testing, she and Perucho signed the defendant.
1983 to June 1989 and data revealed a severe drop in electric
inspection reports prepared by Sardinias team which were
consumption from July 1985 until September 1988 when As a result of this decision, defendants counterclaim, is
marked during the trial as Exhibits "7" and "AA." In addition,
electric meter number 1587 was replaced. denied.37
Galagar stated that during the entire period of her
As the two electric meters were not accurately registering the employment with respondent Ramos, Jr., she never saw The trial court dismissed as without basis petitioners claim
amount of electricity used by respondent Ramos, Jr., anyone tinker with the subject electric meters. that electric meter numbers 1587 and 47019 were tampered
petitioner demanded from the latter payments of unbilled with. The trial court pointed to the fact that petitioners
The second witness presented by respondents was
consumption for the two accounts. For account number 510- evidence and testimonies given by Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and
respondent RAMOS, JR. himself who declared that he learned
4019, he prepared a computation of unbilled consumption of Lucero failed to bolster its position that the subject electric
about the removal of the two electric meters upon his return
respondents indicating that as of 19 September 1988, a total meters were indeed tampered particularly since the identity
from his trip to Manila. Soon thereafter, he went to
unpaid consumption amounting to P65,918.13 for the period of the purported perpetrator of the misdeed was never
petitioners office to clarify what transpired in the afternoon of
January 1984 to September 1988 inclusive of P22,737.49 established by petitioner. Petitioners recalcitrance to reveal
16 September 1988 and was told by Atty. Braganza that the
cumulative surcharge. its confidential source did not also escape the trial courts
inspection team removed the electric meters because they
perceptiveness, thus:
In account number 510-4020, the unbilled consumption were defective. In addition, he was informed that the electric
prepared by their department indicated a total unbilled supply to his residence and his office would be reconnected Indeed, why defendant cannot reveal the identity of the
consumption to be P28,328.45 which includes P8,184.72 in upon his payment of the P2,000.00 deposit for each electric source of its information, as to the defect of the subject
surcharges.29 meter. Respondent Ramos, Jr. also declared in court that he meters, when precisely, it was because of the said
had no participation in the alleged tampering of the electric information, that prompted defendant to inspect and test the
Over the vigorous objection by respondents counsel, the trial meters nor did he cause anyone else to tamper the same.
subject [meters]? There is nothing urgently dangerous to
court received in evidence the updated summary of
protect the identity of said informant because anyway, he or
kilowatthour consumption prepared by Sacamos, Jr.s On cross-examination, respondent Ramos, Jr. admitted that at
she, can be safely protected by defendant and that anyway
department for the period July 1989 to March 1990 of account the time he paid the deposit to petitioner, he was made to
everything was known, so that plaintiff or anybody else,
number 510-4019 as recorded by electric meter number sign a letter dated
cannot do anything to run after the alleged informant. As it
24305.30 A similar summary was prepared for account number 19 September 198835 which, in part, reads:
[turned-out], said information, could have provided
510-4020 as registered by electric meter number 45908
September 19, 1988 sufficiently, a key to [plaintiffs] involvement [to] the alleged
which replaced electric meter number 1587.31
"tampering," . . .38
The Manager
In the course of his testimony, Sacamos, Jr. also explained the
Another point taken against petitioner was its insistence to
processes of computing a consumers actual electric Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
conduct the examination of the electric meters in question
consumption. The first method simply involves computing the
Davao City despite the absence of respondent Ramos, Jr. As the trial
average consumption of electric power while the second
court observed, both Galagar and Perucho did not know
involves calculating the average monthly reading at a certain Dear Sir:
anything about electricity and the procedure undertaken by
period of time after a defective electric meter was replaced.
This has reference to kilowatthour Meter No. 47019/1587 petitioners inspection team. Moreover, the presence of
Petitioner then presented as its witness the head of its under Account Nos. 510-4019/-4020 connected to the respondent Ramos, Jr. could have presented petitioner with
customers relation department in 1983, JOSELITO ORTIZ. Ortiz electrical installation in the name of my mother-in-law the opportunity to confront him on the matter of electric
testified regarding a letter-complaint of respondent Ramos, Jr. CRISTINA OPENA which I understand has been reported to you meter tampering.
coursed through Konsumo Dabaw complaining of the as having been tampered.
As for the amount of unbilled consumption, it was the trial
abnormal reading of the replacement meter for account
courts finding that the procedure adopted by petitioner in
number 510-4019. In his response to said letter-complaint, . . .
computing the amounts being claimed from respondents were
Ortiz wrote separate letters to Konsumo Dabaw32 and to Very truly yours,
"unreliable and highly speculative"39 as the factors considered
respondent Ramos, Jr.33explaining that the erroneous meter
such as average monthly consumption seemed to have been
reading was because the meter installed in lieu of the (SGD)TEOFILO RAMOS, JR.
arbitrarily arrived at.
purported tampered one was registering electric consumption After the trial, the court a quo issued its decision dated 01
backwards. Because of this finding, another electric meter October 199036 the dispositive portion of which reads: Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner elevated its
was installed under account number 510-4019 and a credit case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
adjustment was made on the electric bills under the name of WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of plaintiff, sufficient by modification, the findings of the court a quo, to wit:
respondent Opea. preponderance, to sustain relief in the enforcement of
defendants computation of alleged tampered meters, marked WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, except for
The last witness for petitioner was MANUEL ORIG, vice- as plaintiffs [Annexes] "C," to "C-8" up to "G" and "G-8," the deletion therefrom of the award of moral damages,
president of petitioner who stated in his testimony that finding the evidence of defendant in the reverse order of trial, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, the appealed
petitioner suffered damages because of the filing of this case not sufficient by preponderance of evidence, to warrant judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects.40
by respondents, to wit: moral damages in the amount enforcement of [defendants] so-called unbilled electrical
Petitioner is now before this Court, through the instant
of P20,000.00; exemplary damages amounting to P10,000.00; consumption against plaintiff, the above-documents, are
petition for review, relying upon the following arguments:
attorneys fees of P40,000.00; and litigation expenses declared null and void, without any effect, against plaintiff.
of P10,000.00.34 1. Passage of R.A. No. 783241 vindicates petitioner.
As a consequence of the filing of this case, on account of the
On the other hand, respondents presented for their first trouble, worries, mental agony, suffered by plaintiff due to 2. Broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie
witness GALAGAR. Galagar testified that after the removal of defendants unreasonable imposition of the so-called unbilled evidence of meter-tampering.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 3 of 18

3. Consumption record of respondents show a significant drop On the other hand, Section 4 of the same law lists the In this case, petitioner anchors its claim of meter tampering
in consumption. circumstances which shall establish the prima facie evidence on the result of the examination conducted by its inspection
of illegal use of electricity. Among these are: team. Its witnesses
4. Failure to disclose tipster does not destroy presumption.
(iii) The existence of any wiring connection which affects the Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero - all testified that a plain
5. Concern of the Court of Appeals over possible defect of
normal operation or registration of the electric meter; view of the electric meters in question showed that the inner
electric meters or that the tipster was responsible for the
and outer seals which were supposed to be attached thereto
tampering is misplaced. (iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the
were either deformed, missing, or replaced with ordinary lead
meter, or mutilated, altered, or tampered meter recording
6. Manner of computation of the amount and period of the wire. Furthermore, the meter testing conducted by Engr.
chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph or log;
unbilled consumption (now called differential billing under Reyes revealed that the two electric meters were not
R.A. No. 7832) is legal and reasonable.42 accurately recording the electric consumption of respondents.
Essentially, petitioner raises the issues of: (1) whether the (vi) The mutilation, alteration, reconnection, disconnection, We hold that petitioners evidence is insufficient for us to rule
Court of Appeals erred in not retroactively applying Republic bypassisng or tampering of instruments, transformers, and in its favor.
Act No. 7832 and (2) whether the appellate court erred in not accessories;
While it is true that respondent Ramos, Jr. merely offered a
finding respondents liable for unbilled consumption.
(vii) The destruction of, or attempt to destroy, any integral categorical denial of the accusation hurled against him and
The petition is bereft of merit. accessory of the metering device box which encases an his co-respondent Opea, nevertheless, the records of this
electric meter or its metering accessories; and. . . case present other factors which should tilt the scale of
The law in force at the time of the institution of the present evidence in favor of respondents.
case was Presidential Decree No. 401 or the law Penalizing Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it did
the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone not apply the presumption of meter tampering in this case. It As established by petitioners witnesses Sardinia and Lucero,
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters, argues that the broken, deformed, and missing seals the allegedly tampered electric meters were installed in
and Other Acts. The pertinent portion of this statute provides: are prima facie evidence of meter tampering and, when taken conspicuous portions of respondent Ramos, Jr.s residence and
together with the significant drop in the registered electric office. In his cross-examination Sardinia testified in the
. . . [A]ny person who installs any water, electrical or following manner:
consumption of respondents, establishes that the latter
telephone connection without previous authority from the
clearly benefited from the inaccuracy of electric meters
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila ATTY. CADIENTE:
47019 and 1587. We do not agree.
Electric Company or the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Q - You are familiar with the place of Cristina Opea and/or
Company, as the case may be; tampers and/or uses tampered In the case of United States v. Luling, 43 this Court recognized
Teofilo Ramos?
water or electrical meters or jumpers or other devices "that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute
whereby water or electricity is stolen; steals or pilfers water providing that proof by the state of some material fact or A - I am not really that familiar, but I have seen the place
and/or electric meters or water, electric and/or telephone facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that when I inspected.
wires; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water and/or then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of
Q - It is located along Quezon Boulevard in this city, is that
electrical meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed
correct?
and/or telephone wires, shall, upon conviction, be punished without unlawful intention."44
by prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging A - Yes, sir.
In Jison v. Court of Appeals,45 we declared
from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both. . .
Q - The meter is located also in front of the building facing
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within
On 08 December 1994, Rep. Act No. 7832 otherwise known as Quezon Boulevard?
the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof
the "Anti-electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
in civil case, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting A - Yes, sir.
Pilferage Act of 1994" was approved. Section 2 of this law
of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who
enumerates the acts constitutive of illegal use of electricity, Q - And it is located about 2-1/2 to 3 meters high?
alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
to wit:
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof A - I think, it is higher than that.
SEC. 2. Illegal Use of Electricity. - . . . never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case,
once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the Q - And the place is surrounded by residential houses?
...
duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to A - Yes, sir.
(c) Tamper, install or use a tampered electrical meter, jumper, controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
current reversing transformer, shorting or shunting wire, loop must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, Q - It is also a busy street?
connection or any other device which interferes with the the party having the burden of proof must produce a A - I think.
proper or accurate registry or metering of electric current or preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
otherwise results in its diversion in a manner whereby rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the Q - We said busy, because several trucks, several jeepneys,
electricity is stolen or wasted; weakness of the defendants. The concept of "preponderance several cars and even pedestrian passed the street?
of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or
(d) Damage or destroy an electric meter, equipment, wire, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at A - Yes, sir.
conduit or allow any of them to be so damaged or destroyed bottom, it means probability of truth.46 Q - Would you agree with me, that if somebody opened or
as to interfere with the proper or accurate metering of electric touched the meter, just facing the Quezon Boulevard street,
current; and In other words, the proof of the existence of the prima
this is very visible to people around?
facie evidence is still the burden of the plaintiff. Moreover, as
(e) Knowingly use or receive the direct benefit of electric will be shown later, Rep. Act No. 7832 cannot apply because it A - I dont think, I can agree with you, because the location of
service obtained through any of the acts mentioned in was only approved on 08 December 1994; hence, the general meter is quite higher, considering that this is beyond [reach
subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above. rules on evidence must be applied. of] ordinary people.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 4 of 18

Q - But it can be seen by people around or even by the However, appellants contradicted their own stand when they consumption cannot be calculated with exactitude. Thus,
pedestrian [passing] by? claim that they have their own source which furnished them even Rep. No. 7832 itself provides for five different methods
information regarding the alleged tampering. Appellants of computing the sum of unbilled consumption and two
A - Yes, sir.
witness Jose R. Sardinia in answer to the courts query modes of determining the period of back-billing 52 and that
Q - In fact, even the passing passengers inside the jeep, it cantestified the two methods it employed in determining respondents
be seen? unbilled consumption in this case are now incorporated into
Q - Did the Court understand from you Mr. Sardinia that the
the said legislation. This, petitioner maintains, proves that
A - It can be seen. source of this alleged tampering were submitted to your
there was nothing arbitrary in its determination of the
[field] office confidentially?
Q - In other words, if somebody touches or opens [tinkers] unbilled consumption it seeks from respondents. These
with that meter, it can be easily visible to the people around? A - Yes, Your Honor. techniques involve the use of the highest recorded monthly
consumption within the five-year billing period preceding the
A - I think. 47 Q - As Assistant Legal Officer of the Davao Light, this time of the discovery and employing the highest recorded
confidential matter is not even known to you? monthly consumption within four (4) months after the time of
On the other hand, Luceros cross-examination proceeded 53
thus: A - It was given to me in confidentially (sic) and I am not discovery.
going to divulge it. Petitioners argument fails to convince.
Q - On September 16, 1988, when you went to the place of
plaintiff, you knew that the electric meter was installed Q - Meaning that confidential has something to do with the It is a basic rule in our jurisdiction that laws do not have
outside the residence? business of Davao Light or confidentially in the sources of retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 54 In the
information itself? present case, Rep. Act No. 7832 is bereft of any indication
A - The installation of the meter?
A - Yes, I think, this is confidentially taken in order for the that the legislature intended to give it a retroactive
Q - The meter was outside the residence fronting Boulevard company to protect it safeguard also the person. application. On the contrary, Section 17 of said law clearly
Avenue? provides that it "shall take effect thirty (30) days after its
Q - Meaning you are safeguarding the identity of the publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) national
A - Yes, Sir. informer? papers of general circulation." As the Rep. Act No. 7832
Q - And it is elevated about three meters high from the A - Yes, Your Honor. plainly states its prospective application, we cannot give
ground? credence to petitioners argument that its passage validates
Notwithstanding the fact that appellants have the best or the amounts it imposed on respondents for unbilled
A - I cannot remember. complete evidence entirely within their control, they refused consumption.55
Q - But it is above the ground? to produce or at least, refrained from producing the same.
Thus appellants failed to prove their claim with the best Moreover, petitioner, as a public utility corporation, "has the
A - It is above the ground. evidence obtainable their informer/source. imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection
of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not
Q - Can it be reached by a hand without stepping on a certain On this matter, it has been held that where a party fails to malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair the
object or you have to step on a ladder? present a fact necessary to his case when it is within his defects therein."56
A - I cannot remember. power to do so, it will be presumed that such fact does not
exist. 50 As claimed by petitioner, the sudden "drastic" drop in the
Q - And you admit that Quezon Boulevard is a very busy registered electric consumption commenced sometime in
street whereby trucks, jeeps and several pedestrians pass On this point, petitioner relies heavily on this Courts holding December 1983 or January 1984 for account number 510-
from time to time? in the case of People of the Philippines v. Lopez 51where we 4019 and July 1985 or August 1985 for account number 510-
ruled that the testimony of an informer is not indispensable in 4020.57 Inexplicably, petitioner allowed several years to lapse
A - Yes, Sir.48 view of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of petitioners participated in the "buy-bust" operation. Such reliance is meters involved in this case. Such failure on its part to detect
witnesses, the electric meters were mounted in notable misplaced. the extended unusual pattern in the recorded electric
places within the premises owned by respondent Opea. More In the Lopez case, we held that there was no need for the consumption clearly demonstrates gross negligence on its
than that, the building itself was situated along a busy street prosecution to present the confidential informer as the part and palpable violation of its duty "to make a reasonable
in Davao City. This being the case, it becomes highly poseur-buyer himself positively identified the accused as the and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to
inconceivable that no one witnessed the alleged tampering of one who sold to him one deck of methamphetamine ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to
the subject electric meters considering the surroundings hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then properly relied discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such
58
where they were set up. Indeed, any person tinkering with the on the testimonies of the police officers despite the duties constitutes negligence."
meters could have easily attracted the attention and prosecutions decision not to present the informer. Indeed, it is highly inequitable if we are to allow a public
suspicion of neighbors and passers-by.
In this case, as the testimonies of petitioners witnesses failed utility company to be continuously remiss in its duty and then
Even if this Court indulges petitioner in its claim that it to directly link respondents to the alleged meter tampering, it later on charge the consumer exorbitant amount for the
received a confidential information from an unidentified was essential for petitioner to present, as its witness, the alleged unbilled consumption or differential billing when such
source regarding the claimed meter tampering, still, such supposed informer instead of simply relying on the a situation could have been easily averted. We simply cannot
allegation cannot support a finding against respondents. As testimonies of some members of the inspection team. As the sanction petitioners utter neglect of its duty over a number
aptly observed by the Court of Appeals: records show, the testimonies of Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and of years as this would undoubtedly be detrimental to the
interest of the consuming public.
Appellants (petitioner herein) admit that they have no direct Lucero were bereft of any indication that respondents either
49

evidence to show that appellees (respondents herein) caused tampered or caused the claimed tampering of the electric WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED,
the meter to be tampered, claiming that in cases such as this, meters. and the Court of Appeals decision dated 29 May 1997 in CA-
it is well nigh impossible to secure such kind of evidence Anent the issue of unbilled consumption, petitioner contends G.R. CV No. 35114, affirming with modification the decision of
because it is a clandestine operation. that the amount to be charged to a consumer for unbilled

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 5 of 18

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City in Civil Case
No. 19,648-89, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110015 October 13, 1995
MANILA BAY CLUB CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, MODESTA SABENIANO and MIRIAM
SABENIANO, JUDITH SABENIANO, JOY DENNIS
SABENIANO, et. al., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
After carefully perusing the instant motion for
reconsideration, petitioner's arguments, in sum, dwell on the
focal issues involved in the controversy which have been
passed upon in the Court's July 11, 1995 Decision sought to
be reconsidered. No reasons of significant and compelling
import have been advanced to alter the Court's observation
and conclusion that 1) petitioner's non-designation of private
respondents as beneficiaries of the insurance policies was a
violation of the "insurance clause" amounting to a
"substantial", and not a mere "slight or casual", breach
entitling private respondents to rescind the lease contract,
and 2) the amount of rentals/damages petitioner was bound
to pay was correctly adjudged by respondent Court of Appeals
after slightly modifying the trial court's assessment. The
Court, however, would like to make some additional
disquisitions in response to certain noteworthy contentions
raised by petitioner.
Anent the issue of the rentals/damages, petitioner avers that
"the Decision awards excessive damages" since "the Decision
of this Honorable Court condemned the petitioner to pay, up
front, the total sum of P12,029,800.00", "a staggering sum by
any calculation . . . that will probably reduce the petitioner to
utter bankruptcy"; It is likewise maintained that private
respondents will be "unjustly enriched" simply because
petitioner failed to present controverting evidence, or rebut
Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony which, according to petitioner, is
mere "speculation".
We need to stress the one decisive fact that petitioner had all
the opportunity at its disposal before the trial court to refute,
with all allowable pieces of evidence it can produce, Mrs.
Sabeniano's testimony or any other evidence of private
respondents, and there is nothing to indicate that petitioner
was ever denied such opportunity/opportunities by the trial
court. The trial court, respondent court and this Court cannot
be faulted for taking private respondents' uncontroverted
evidence below vis-a-vis the monthly rentals on its face value
no matter how "staggering" it may appear for
petitioner's omission to rebut that which would have naturally
invited an immediate, pervasive and stiff opposition from
petitioner created an adverse inference that either the
controverting evidences to be presented by petitioner will
only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence of
private respondents indeed speaks of the truth. And such
adverse inference, recognized and adhered to by courts in
judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of proceedings,
surely is not without basis the rationale and effect of which
rest on sound, logical and practical considerations.
The presumption that a man will do that which tends
to his obvious advantage, if he possesses the means,
supplies a most important test for judging of the
comparative weight of evidence . . . If, on the
supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded, the
party against whom it is made has evidence within his
reach by which he may repel that which is offered to
his prejudice, his omission to do so supplies a strong
presumption that the charge or claim is well founded;
it would be contrary to every principle of reason, and
to all experience of human conduct, to form any other
conclusion. (Starkie on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on
Facts, Vol. I, p. 544).
Where the evidence tends to fix a liability on a party
who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the
facts as they existed and to rebut the inferences which
the proof tends to establish, and he neglects or refuses
to offer such proof, the natural inference is that the
proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would support
the inference against him. (Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Anoka Nat. Bank, 108 Fed. Rep. 482, 486, 47 C.C.A.
454, per Caldwell, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 545.
Emphasis supplied)
It is a well-settled rule that when the
evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes
a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to
produce evidence which from its very nature must
overthrow the case made against him if it is not
founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support
the case of his adversary. (Missouri, etc. R. Co. v.
Elliott, 102 Fed. Rep. 96, 102, 42 C.C.A. 188, per
Caldwell, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 546. Emphasis
supplied)
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having
it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if
proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must
be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.
(Wheeling v. Hawley, 18 W. Va. 472, 476, per
Patterson, J., quoted in Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40
W. Va. 405, 21 S.E. Rep. 1025, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p.
544)
Where the burden is on a party to a suit to prove a
material fact in issue, the failure, without excuse, to
produce an important and necessary witness to such
fact raises the conclusive presumption that such
witness's testimony, if introduced, would be adverse to
the pretensions of such party. (Union Trust Co. v.
McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S.E. Rep. 1025, Moore on
Facts, Vol. I, p. 545).
The rule is that where a party to an issue on trial has
proof in his power which, if produced, would render
material, but doubtful, facts certain, the law presumes
against him if he omits to produce that proof, and
authorizes a jury to resolve all doubts adversely to his
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
defense. (People v. Sharp, 107, N. Y. 427, 465, 14 N.E.
Rep. 319, 342, per Danforth, J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I,
p. 546).
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate
inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the
evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be
affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so,
fails to deny or explain them, they may wall be taken
as admitted with all the effect of the inferences
afforded. (Somers v. McCready, 96 Md. 437, 53 Atl.
Rep. 1117, per Jones, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p.
559)
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge
peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to
divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most
unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers
that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as
claimed by the opposing party. (Societe, etc., v. Allen,
90 Fed. Rep. 815, 817, 33 C.C.A. 282, per Taft, C.J.,
Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561)
The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for
argument's sake, that Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony is
improbable or weak, for it has likewise been said that:
Even if a party's testimony is improbable, the failure of
the opposite party to contradict it, although it was
entirely within his power to do so if it were false, fully
entitles it to belief. (Nutting v. El. R. Co., 21 N.Y. App.
Div. 72, 47 N.Y. Supp. 327, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p.
572)
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the
party against whom it is put in, in not showing by
means within the easy control of that party that the
conclusion drawn from such evidence is untrue.
(Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 678,
681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572)
As weak evidence is often strengthened by failure of
an opposing party to contradict by evidence within his
power, so the trier of facts may infer that testimony in
chief is worth its full face value when the other party is
content to let it stand without cross-examination or
contradiction by other evidence. (Moore on Facts, Vol.
II, p. 1417)
As petitioner seemed willing to admit private respondents'
evidence bearing on the fair rental value without question,
the trial court was well-justified in having done the same
exhibiting, still, due consideration when it reduced the
monthly rental value from P400,000.00 as per Mrs.
Sabeniano's uncontroverted testimony, to P250,000.00. In
answer, therefore, to petitioner's questions, i.e.,
". . . does Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony cease to be
speculation because the petitioner failed to present
'controverting evidence'?", and "The fact that Mrs.
Sabeniano could have testified that she was offered P1
Million, indeed, P10 Million, indeed, P100 Million but would
that, too, 'stand' simply because the petitioner failed to
rebut it?", the Court is compelled, quite regrettably, to
answer in the affirmative.
Page 6 of 18
With regard to petitioner's contention that it "did not raise a
fresh matter on appeal", the Court merely reiterates that
petitioner's invocation of the principles of trust found its way
only for the first time in its "Motion For Reconsideration" of
the respondent court's decision. If well-recognized
jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time
on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be
disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court.
We cannot finally put this case to rest without confronting the
perceived "unusual dispatch" in its resolution the petitioner is
"genuinely disturbed" of consisting in the rendition of the
judgment (July 11, 1995) having been made in six (6) months
from the ponente's appointment to the Court on January 5,
1995. Petitioner amplifies that: 1) ". . . hardly has the ponente
warmed his seat, the case would be decided . . .", and 2) ". . .
when prior to the appointment of the ponente, it took the rest
of the Justices of the Third Division of this Honorable Court
more than a year to deliberate on the Petition, . . . ".
It is the practice of the Court to encourage the speedy
resolution of cases unloaded to a newly-appointed Member,
especially those cases that are already ripe for decision and
in which motions for their early resolution have been filed by
either of the parties concerned, as in this case. This is the
reason why it became imperative to resolve this case at the
soonest possible time and without further delay, lest we be
charged with footdragging on the case thereby putting the
Court in a more objectionable situation.
In fact, the undersigned ponente has come across some of
the maiden decisions of one of petitioner's counsels, Mr.
Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, a distinguished former
magistrate of this Court himself who the undersigned holds in
high-respect, which were disposed of by him in less than six
(6) months from the date of his appointment to the Court on
January 26, 1987. To name a few are: People v. Decierdo, G.R.
No. L-46956, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 496; People v. Saavedra,
G.R. No. L-48738, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610; People v.
Pecato, G.R. No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14; People
v. Ferrera, G.R. No. L-66965, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA
113; Madrigal & Company, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. L-49023
and L-48237, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 355 (Labor
Case); Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Pardo, G.R.
No.
L-55354, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 481; and Del Rosario v.
Hamoy, G.R. No. L-77154, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 719. And
in all honesty, the undersigned ponente regards such prompt
disposition as something commendable, not condemnable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001 On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA)
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on
KAPUNAN, J.: the following grounds:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a
construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District
investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November
25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical
Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced
dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol
de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and
place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie
Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as
carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14 th floor of the
Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform
made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2
meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires
attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain
block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform,
got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and
the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator
core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions
who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death
when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely
inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
[p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning
capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above
is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled
otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official
records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is,
which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore,
may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as
proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This is known as
the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the
general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible
deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule,
therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-
examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the
rule,9 among which are entries in official records. Section 44,
Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing
the work of Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for
admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
Page 7 of 18
 been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites.
Petitioner contends that the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in
question, also testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report,
the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the
trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for
the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained
in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of
the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand
and was available for cross-examination, the portions of
the report which were of his personal knowledge or which
consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not
hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of
the statements of the parties based on their sworn
statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as
the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the
offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may
then be considered as independently relevant
statements which were gathered in the course of the
investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said
that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant,
the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement
may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for
petitioners on his Report and made himself available for
cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report,
insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made
(but not their truth), was effectively removed from the
ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the
official record, considers the matter as an exception to the
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as
explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by
officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties
to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not
done in which testimony is not needed from official
sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting
the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses
in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The
work of administration of government and the interest The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this
of the public having business with officials would alike wise:
suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for
many others, a certain verity is accorded such
documents, which is not extended to private
documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public
officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and,
therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to
be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to
require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major
Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that
case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would
have been ripe for determination, and this Court would
have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report
was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite
was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of
information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official
information," there being no showing that, at the very
least, they were under a duty to give the statements for
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity,
record.
i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available. 22
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the
purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained
therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas
testimony which were of his personal knowledge suffice to
prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator
crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the
morgue,12 making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3
Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of the building the day after the incident 13 and saw
the platform for himself. 14 He observed that the platform was
15 16
crushed and that it was totally damaged. PO3 Villanueva
also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the
chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin
or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3
Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It
is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion.
18
Subject to certain exceptions, the opinion of a witness is
19
generally not admissible.
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face
of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of
the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.20
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed,
and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will
not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that
it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts
or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other
person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality
which caused the injury complained of was under the
control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if those who
had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.21
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and
that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to
rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in
order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief
evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible
to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge
of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or
should know the cause, for any explanation of care
exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of
which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in
that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar
circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was
no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants
negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some
court add to the three prerequisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that
for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear
that the injured party had no knowledge or means of
knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the
party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the
accident.23
Page 8 of 18
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The
present in the case at bar: sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from
leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging
the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was
allowing its use. that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules
working with appellants construction project, resulting to
and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the
his death. The construction site is within the exclusive It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as
protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
control and management of appellant. It has a safety proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
and others who are in complete control of the situation employees, also assails the same statement for being
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs
therein. The circumstances of any accident that would hearsay.
sought relief from this Court.
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and
appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of
inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under
appellee is not in a position to know what caused the remedies, majority of the Court En Banc,31 following the rule
the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness
accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of
applies where evidence is absent or not readily available,
evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the WE now come to the query as to whether or not the
provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit of selection or choice of action between availing
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses themselves of the workers right under the Workmens
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
his own language in writing the affiants statements which Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the
may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x
proof of its due care any more than private respondent can negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may
x x.
use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect
th
No worker is going to fall from the 14 floor of a building petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the the limited compensation under the Workmens
to the basement while performing work in a construction inference or presumption of negligence arising from the Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense regular courts.
for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is relating to the incident.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs.
present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an
its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused
previously availed of the death benefits provided under the injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
the injury is under the exclusive control and management
Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens
of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present.
the deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code. Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
No contributory negligence was attributed to the
against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
also present. All the requisites for the application of the
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, [Underscoring supplied.]
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable
presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in
x x x.24 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
said case to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
despite having availed of the benefits provided under the
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
Workmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the employee or his dependents. The payment of
presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before
accident which befell respondents husband." Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees,
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of
Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims
the doctrine. As stated earlier, the defendants negligence is
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then
presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the
whose benefits are administered by the System or by Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the
other agencies of the government. as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of
allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence the Workmens Compensation Act, provided that:
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x
and, under appropriate circumstances disputable
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by claims were filed under the Workmens Compensation Act
outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation before they learned of the official report of the committee
or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the created to investigate the accident which established the
from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care,
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and
comes into play only after the circumstances for the
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to
application of the doctrine has been established.1wphi1.nt
and other laws because of said injury x x x. then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its October 19, 1967 only x x x.
leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act
allowed recovery under said Act as well as under the Civil

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 9 of 18

 WE hold that although the other petitioners had received circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly
the benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC
my not preclude them from bringing an action before the for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private
regular court because they became cognizant of the fact appellants employees. It was the investigator who respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies
that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the
with the deceased miners only after receiving referred the same to the prosecutors office. This is a benefits from the ECC.
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware standard operating procedure for police investigators
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an
of said violation of government rules and regulations by which appellee may not have even known. This may
election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought explain why no complainant is mentioned in the
and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the
redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her
elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party.
which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit:
The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in nature,
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by
the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to
possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not
premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their
to the lower court for further proceedings. However, have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as
choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the can be inferred from the following statement in said
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a
lower court, the payments made under the Workmens memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant
single wrong.38
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages to Law waived their rights to present controverting
that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring evidence," thus there was no reason for the public The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results
supplied.] prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a
appellants negligence cannot be imputed on appellee claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of
before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under
remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs.
she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper
police investigation report to support her complaint filed deemed to have waived the other.
Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of
could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
the Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint [It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to
sustained by workers in the course of their employment death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation on the part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all
the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the to believe appellees allegation that she learned about material facts upon which they depended. Where one
Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil appellants negligence only after she applied for and lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of that will make this case fall under the exception held in waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a the Floresca ruling.35 given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The
The CA further held that not only was private respondent A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when
exception is where a claimant who has already been paid
ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well: that person knows that a right exists and has adequate
under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the reached only elementary school for her educational Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the
first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.) attainment; that she did not know what damages could be exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under
not know that she may also recover more from the Civil intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
the exception because private respondent was unaware of
Code than from the ECC. x x x.36 evidence.40
petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy private respondent "failed to allege in her complaint that her remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca.
of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address
petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to petitioners contentions.
negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, hear or adjudicate that issue." Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have
"if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for
been ignorant of the facts because as early as November 28,
exception in Floresca: petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as
1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
alleged negligence of appellant as early as November 25, against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its
1990, the date of the police investigators report. The months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore,
appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court
police investigator concerning her personal although there was insufficient evidence against petitioners

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 10 of 18

had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself court for such determination. Should the trial court find that From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was
pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court. its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central
received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the
deducted from the trial court' award of damages. Consistent
facts that led to her husbands death and the rights Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne
with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent
pertaining to a choice of remedies? and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital
double compensation.
bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that
Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed
served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and
in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
petitioners employees, of which private respondent Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by
purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a that he is not the father of the child.
the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca,
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and
it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals continued failing and refusing to give support for the child
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence,
is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the
or violation of government rules and regulations, for that
filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter
G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, failed to file any responsive pleading despite repeated
therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare
nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios
case at bar. Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent. Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative
Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew DECISION
1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on
that her husband died in the elevator crash when on
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the 6
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision 1 of In its Decision dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
November 27, 1990. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was 70125. child;
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for 2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
was not aware of her rights. support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin support of P10,000.00 and further
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky 3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in
Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky
laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal prayed that judgment be rendered: On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of
system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
claim ignorance of this Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
Diaz as his daughter.
choice of remedies. find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life. 7
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with
of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. 42 This may be prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999
support.
deduced from the language of the provision, which, be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo
notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or (c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing in the sum of P100,000.00. Rules of Civil Procedure.8
private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory (d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be maybe just and equitable in the premises.4 Motion for New Trial:
held against her.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed be impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
damages. The records do not indicate the total amount into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time,
private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and
appears from Exhibit "K" 43 that she received P3,581.85 as Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby
initial payment representing the accrued pension from Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. 5 set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, subject to cross-examination by defendant at the
according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio appropriate stage of the proceedings.
total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount cohabited and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted,
she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City. subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer
of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the
subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial Rules of Court.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 11 of 18

 Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite
which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is
hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum
of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999
as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount
of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support
pendente lite during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky
Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of
the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January
the mother may have declared against her legitimacy 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
(Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there
must be physical impossibility for the husband to have During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,
sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court
of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of
Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented
sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that
the husband was outside the country and no evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual
relations with other men on or about the conception of
Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see
Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to
defendant) must have a different father or may be the son
of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in
connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant
also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still
used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin.
Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she
gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that
Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio
Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and
disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant
Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15,
1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should
continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached
majority age.11
Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the
responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted
for decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study
and report as early as 12 July 2002.13
substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, 14 which
motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals. 15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals
held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated December
15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the
issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of
determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its
Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-
appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the
proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and
plaintiffs mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood
testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to
this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the
repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological
father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual
sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We believe that
DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of
settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant
during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in
consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field
of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with
whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased
defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff
minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this
action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for
resolution:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT
FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT
ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR
DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER
FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23,
2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding
the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by
dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory
recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child
of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this
Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third
one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding
the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing.
Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne,
we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the
petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of the
DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the
said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present
case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and
Page 12 of 18
to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made
in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule
in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad identity.25
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husbands having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and
assertions bandied about by the parties to the present
petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics,
and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the
biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire
genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the
same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined.
The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile,
for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an
individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins
that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging
throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the
human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very
DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are provided:
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up.
And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C
or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person
his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are
known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed
in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining the
"polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed
to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques
to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction
fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA
DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number
tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as
the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of
by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence
sample a million times through repeated cycling of a
reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive key
enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in to the resolution of the issue of support for minor
13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals is particularly
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a relevant, thus:
trillion.
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches"
are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint
tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the
evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with
the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the
identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature
of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to
have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child,
it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA
was inherited from the mother. The other half must have
been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he
has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match
that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the
DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. 26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information directly
generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a
person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA from
biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA
testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the
DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples
originates from the same person (direct identification) or if
the biological samples originate from related persons
(kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random match
of two unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
Joanne. Our
27
Page 13 of 18
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of any physical residue of the long dead parent could be testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission
Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or on Elections,31 this Court held:
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R.
being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our
(would) still have to be resolved by such conventional
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or
evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
written, by the putative father."
homicide, the principal evidence for which included would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA test results. x x x. genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. child and any physical residue of the long dead
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 parent could be resorted to."
court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order
SCRA 17]:
by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to It is obvious to the Court that the determination of
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already whether appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of fair and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing.
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the
28
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the
DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a application of any person who has a legal interest in the facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the matter in litigation, thus: hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the
mother and the other from the father. The DNA from case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel (Emphasis supplied.)
on application of any person who has a legal interest in
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties Appeals32:
case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
upon a showing of the following:
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been
courts should apply the results of science when (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
since to reject said results is to deny progress. (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in require confirmation for good reasons;
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R.
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering.
and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining
reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to the case; and paternity.
ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
to establish their profile. integrity of the DNA testing. November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the accused charged petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA SO ORDERED.
with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a samples of his DNA.
complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012
the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other organic material originating from a persons body, even if
scientific evidence to still our doubts." OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., Petitioner, vs. GERONIMO
found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing.
BACOY, Guardian and representing the children,
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, This includes blood,
29
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues,
namely: MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B.
161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where hairs and bones. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B.
the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and
then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated: samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown DECISION
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 14 of 18

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 the registered owner
of a motor vehicle challenges the Decision 2 dated July 11,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764
which held him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims
who were run over by the said vehicle.
Factual Antecedents
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud
(Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and
their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home
from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot,
Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in
Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep
bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by
Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name
of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a
public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to
Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-
103473 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple
Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision
dated March 13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.4
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father,
Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor
children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219, 6 an
independent civil action for damages based on culpa
aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his
alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen,
Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen)
and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr.
Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial
expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three
victims, and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was
employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death. 7
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims
deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have no cause
of action against them because he and his wife do not own
the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. 8 For
his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged
that Allan and his friends 9stole his jeep while it was parked
beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both
he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can
easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The
vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights
on.10 And implying that this was the manner by which the
vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his
documentary evidence the statements 11 of Jemar Alarcon
(Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were
with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared
before the investigating officer that during said time, the
vehicles headlights were off. Because of this allegation,
Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping
case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal
Case No. 93-10380.12 The case was, however, dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.13
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the
was the latters brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who plaintiffs and against the defendants Allan Maglasang and
was employed as the driver. 14 In any event, Allans Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
employment as conductor was already severed before the
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and
mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as such
in case of insolvency, for defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN,
conductor only from the first week of December until
JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
December 14, 1992.15 In support of this, Oscar Jr. presented
as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
"Junior" Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave,
testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the
on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the late Emilia Monsalud;
conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to work as c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the
such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.16 Cresencio, for his late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
part, testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from
December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the
his driver.17 He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured late Glenda Monsalud;
in an accident, he never bothered to verify the news. Instead, e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his
brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
Oscar Jr.18
g. The cost of this proceedings.
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a 2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses
days trip, the jeep would be parked beside Rodrigos rented OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and NORMA DEL CARMEN.
house19 for the next early-morning operation.
SO ORDERED.23
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still
Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to December 14, 1992. To Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration 24 contending that the
prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan provision on vicarious liability of the employer under Article
(Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he 2180 of the Civil Code25 requires the existence of employer-
would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board the employee relationship and that the employee was acting
jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the within the scope of his employment when the tort occurred.
subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also claimed He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee,
that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan
used to park the jeep at the yard of his house. 20 Jose likewise acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove
attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said the jeep.
period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running
December of 1992.21
without its headlights on at the time of the accident
indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
alleged that the jeep could not have been taken by only one
22
In its Decision dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380
spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot
evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in be pushed by only one person but by at least five people in
a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and
the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of the deep canal which separates the parking area from the
negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the curved road that was obstructed by a house.26
thing that caused an injury is shown to be under his
management and that in the ordinary course of things, the Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its
accident would not have happened had there been an Order27 dated June 21, 2000 granted the Motion for
exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It
registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the cited Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal
usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well acts of his employee, the latter should have committed the
aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with
even without the ignition key, they should have taken the Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a conductor
by unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded when he drove the jeep.
that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
constitute negligence making the registered owner of the
inapplicable since the property owner cannot be made
vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason
The RTC disposed of the case as follows: of the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only
Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 15 of 18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL
CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from all civil liability arising
from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN
MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
29
In its July 11, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary
issue of whether there was an employer-employee
relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the
accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave more credence
to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those of
Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA
ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo,
Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited
knowledge of the place. His testimony was also unreliable
considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice 30 during
the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios
testimony, the appellate court found it puzzling why he
appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the
jeep was the subject of an accident when it was his bread and
butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar Jr.s
asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when
Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr. 31
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable
to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the
registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by
the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s
defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the
carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was
dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar
Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to
use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited
the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were
both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a days work,
said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house
where Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be started even
without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was
not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the
vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21 June 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is
hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN
MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiffs-appellants:
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy
Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud
in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each
or for the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000.00);
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each for the death of
Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda
Monsalud (collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total
amount of Seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) each for the death of the Monsaluds or for a
total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
32
SO ORDERED.
Issues
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that the CA erred in:
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; misapprehension
of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the trial
court;
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord
with law and with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial
proceedings in the disposition of the appeal and [in
going] beyond the issues of the case. 33
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs
ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which was in accord with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by
an employee should have been done within the scope of his
assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa
aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this matter
even if it was glaring that Allans driving the subject vehicle
was not within the scope of his previous employment as
conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen
and stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a
vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts that although
Allan and his companions were not found to have committed
the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was
nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken by
them from a well secured area. This is considering that the
vehicle was running without its headlights on at the time of
the accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition
key.
Our Ruling
Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his
jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence
is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for
the death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He
highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the
parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and
concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions,
Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions
notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area
and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group
was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of
evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly
concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of
preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to
support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and
Benjamin, declared before the police that when Allan invited
them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on
December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if
there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30
at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang
arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride
together with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel
Rezada and Joven Orot.34
xxxx
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the
evening more or less on December 31, 1992, where were
you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot,
Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if
there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about
3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan
Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me
to ride together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel
Rizada and Joven Orot.35
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and
Benjamin were fetched by Allan who was driving the jeep, this
would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to
Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has
to be pushed by at least five people so that it could start
without the ignition key.
On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what
Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him about the accident
on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him
after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you
about the accident, what did he carry with him if any and
turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of
Registration) Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
Page 16 of 18
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
same pushed by a group, the ignition key should then be with that the jeep was carnapped, is that correct? voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, injured.44
A: Yes Sir.39
at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no
incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should have While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to
person just walking along the road would suddenly be
also returned the key to the operator together with the support his claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance
sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason
one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second,
Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly why the headlights were not on at the time of the accident
the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive
handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not was not sufficiently established during the trial. Besides, the
control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the
available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively
ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with
presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting the jeep as
regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including
attest on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems,
who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may
pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo: broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to
Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key to Allan Maglasang. evidence to support the defense of unauthorized taking, we observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing
Is that correct? cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action
The evidence on record brings forth more questions than or contribution on their part.
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an
clear-cut answers.
affidavit to show that he turned it over to the police. The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care
December 31, 1992, when it was driven by Allan
itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep.
Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily
in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
given by Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs
A: I was not there. driver Rodrigo.
conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct? Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
management of the defendant or his servants; and the secured and that he had expressly imposed restrictions as to
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver
carnapping case, thus: those who had management or control used proper care, it Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have
affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific
and [his] x x x co-accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo
Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute
[Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct? proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the
A: Yes Sir. substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
producing a specific proof of negligence." 41 It "recognizes that
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to
on December 31, 1992, your jeep was carnapped by proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
is that correct? registered owners vehicle in connection with his
with proof of the accident, enough of the attending
employment.
A: Yes Sir. circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or
presumption of negligence and thereby place on the Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct? defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence still his
A: Yes, Sir. on his part."42 The doctrine is based partly on "the theory that
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
Q: And you could well remember that this representation the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the
is the counsel of the co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious
that correct? liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil
such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege
Code cannot apply to him.
negligence in general terms."43
A: Yes Sir.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as
Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that Savings Bank,45 the car of therein respondent bank caused
established by jurisprudence are as follows:
correct? the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the
A: Yes Sir.
occur unless someone is negligent; bank liable for damages for the accident as said provision
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control
is that correct involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered
of the person in charge and
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
A: Yes Sir. would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 17 of 18

being driven on the highways or streets. 46 We have already
ratiocinated that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of
the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries
caused on public highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use 48 or that the
subject vehicle was stolen49 which are valid defenses
available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape
liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1
All told and considering that the amounts of damages
awarded are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the
Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the
awards made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 50 an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed
from the time the judgment of the RTC is rendered on April
17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such
amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with
further MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed
from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April
17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such
amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof.
SO ORDERED.

Evidence CASES: ii. burden of proof and presumptions Page 18 of 18