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DOI https://doi.org/10.3846/cpc.2017.273
Vsevolod LADOV
This article analyzes contemporary writings on the philosophy of information with special attention to the
concept of informational scepticism. The author of the concept, Luciano Floridi, supposes that scepticism
that arises as the result of the attempt to differentiate real and virtual objects in modern information society
is epistemologically harmless, since the difference between the real and the virtual does not have any specific
informative content. This article points out logical and epistemological difficulties of this theoretical viewpoint
and proposes a way of overcoming them.
Keywords: coherence theory of truth, correspondence theory of truth, informational scepticism, paradox,
real object, virtual object.
38
COACTIVITY: Philosophy, Communication 2017, 25(1): 3847 39
on ourselves, to quote Willard Van Orman models describes its system of objects
Quine (1953), any ontological commitments. and, what is more, in the sceptics words,
Information appears as a certain complex of we cannot distinguish between reality
data on some object, and the amount of this and fiction (virtual world V is identical
data does not increase or decrease depending to real world S);
on whether we are dealing with an actually 4. From 1), 2), and 3) we can conclude
existing object or with an artificially generated that we do not have a chance to find out
fiction. whether M is an information file about
The harmlessness of radical epistemological the system S, and not about the system
scepticism, which Floridi calls informational V, since both systems S and V turn out
scepticism with regard to modern conditions, is to be indistinguishable. Thus, we should
demonstrated using the notions of the theory of conclude that Hamming distance in
information. In particular, Floridi uses the no- terms of M and S in fact is unknown
tion Hamming distance (2010: 74) to justify (hd(MS) = ?).
his viewpoint. Provision 4) is a thesis of informational
In the theory of information, Hamming scepticism, which, according to Floridi, does
distance between two sequences of equal not harm our cognition in any way. Absence of
length refers to a number of positions where knowledge about Hamming distance between
the corresponding symbols are different. In the model M and the system S does not make
other words, Hamming distance denotes the our epistemological undertaking distorted,
maximum number of replacements required to providing we are really sure that hd(DV) = 0
change one sequence to another, or the number and hd(MD) = 0. That is, if the information file
of errors transiting one sequence into another contained in the model in general fully and
(Hamming 1950). properly conveys all data on the objects of the
Using the notion of Hamming distance, system, then this model is fully informative. The
Floridi (2010) puts forward reasoning that I will amount of information in the model describing
try to reproduce as follows. the system does not change, no matter whether
1. Let us assume that some model M is an this system really exists or it is only an artifi-
information file about the system S (real cially created virtual world.
world). The quality of this model is such If we follow the theorist of epistemologi-
that Hamming distance in this case equ- cal harmlessness of informational scepticism,
als zero (hd(MS) = 0), i.e., the model M using an image from the well-known movie
reproduces data on the objects of the sys- The Matrix, we do not need to swallow the
tem S adequately and fully; red pill that would help us see how the world
2. Let us assume further that there is some really looks. In terms of informative content,
model D containing an information file the model of the man in The Matrix is as self-
about some system V (virtual world). sufficient and complete as the epistemological
The model D also fully and adequate- model of the man living in the real world, if it
ly presents all data about the objects of fully presents all properties of the objects of
this special virtual world V, that is why some system, regardless of whether this system
Hamming distance between D and V is really exists.
minimal again (hd(DV) = 0); Floridi summarizes his reasoning thus:
3. According to the logic of a radical scep- There is nothing to be epistemologically wor-
tic, we should conclude that Hamming ried about calling the real virtual, or the virtual
distance between models M and D is also real, if the two are identical. It is only a matter
zero (hd(MD) = 0), since each of these of poetic taste (2010: 85).
COACTIVITY: Philosophy, Communication 2017, 25(1): 3847 41
information society), as we may guess, these description of the objective state of affairs. It
questions do not seem necessary. is in this claim that the value of the theoretical
If now we assume that moderate scepticism construction consists. When some or another
implies the truth understood within the coher- researcher constructs his study on some or an-
ence concept (i.e., if we think that the aim of other area of the matter, his task lies not in just
our cognition is to build the utmost extensive presenting a certain amount of information, but
and internally consistent system of knowledge in justifying the truthfulness of theses contain-
[information] about objects), then moderate ing information with the help of some set of
scepticism really turns out to be quite compat- arguments, i.e., justifying that the state of affairs
ible with the idea that informational scepticism in the area in question is objectively like this.
is harmless. All of this fits into the semantics of Gottlob
Frege (19181919) typical of analytic philoso-
phy. A sentence contains a thought. But other
An argument from self-reference than thought, it also contains an affirmation.
The affirmation is assertion of the fact being
This concession to Floridis viewpoint is tem- expressed in the thought. The sentence It is
porary. At a deeper level of discussion radical raining outside contains the idea that it is
scepticism cannot be harmless for cognition raining, but other than that, it also asserts the
even in its specific modern form of informa- existence of this very fact in objective reality. It
tional scepticism. is this assertion that is the difference between
Is a philosopher of information able to man- the sentence It is raining outside and the inter-
age only with information transfer? Is he able rogative version of it.
to carry out informative reduction, to use the The discourse regarding objects of the vir-
terminology of Edmund Husserl (1913)? Or tual world cannot be identical to the discourse
do statements about the existence of some fact about objects of the real world, even if the real
turn out to be significant for the stance of a phi- and virtual worlds are identical. If the sentence
losopher of information himself? For instance, It is raining outside refers to objects of the
when a philosopher of information produces virtual world, if it is uttered by the character
a statement, We can transfer information, in The Matrix, for example, then it is false, as
without taking upon ourselves any ontological it attempts to say about the non-existent that
commitments, does he in this way transfer just it exists. If the sentence relates to objects of the
some information file, without any ontological real world, it is true, as it refers to the existent,
commitments, or it is still important for him to to say that it exists.
declare this state of affairs as a fact of existence? The author of the idea of harmlessness of in-
Can this question be formulated metaphorically, formational scepticism will insist that assertion
again using images and characters from The of the existence of some fact is uninformative.
Matrix: When a philosopher of information The sentence It is raining outside provides a
produces a statement, We do not need to swal- complete information file about some of the
low the red pill, does he say that after he himself facts without regard to the fact of whether it is
has already swallowed this pill? in real or virtual worlds. And if these worlds
The viewpoint expressed by Floridi does not are indistinguishable, the information file
comply with the methods by means of which it expressed in the sentences about the real and
becomes expressed. Any theoretical construc- virtual worlds will be the same. But as shown
tion presented in assertoric discourse, besides by the above reasoning, this thesis is not le-
information, contains a claim for the truth in gitimate. If the discourse of the virtual world is
the correspondence sense, i.e., for adequate not identical to the discourse of the real world
COACTIVITY: Philosophy, Communication 2017, 25(1): 3847 43
objects, and if the difference of these discourses However, Hilary Putnam notes quite fairly
is in assertion of existence (in the first case the that, despite the external appearance, Rortys
statement is false, and in the second one it is arguments retain an attempt to say that from
true), then we must admit that the quality of the point of view of Divine Vision that it
assertion is yet informative. Simply put, we still (Divine Vision) does not exist (Putnam 1990).
are not indifferent whether or not our sentences Pragmatists want to liberate our culture from an
are true in the correspondence sense. incorrect conception of the nature of the human
At least, this indifference entirely covers being. They want to show us how to understand
the theoretical assertoric discourse. The claim the human being, how to see the human being
to assertion of existence of some fact is the as that which it really is.
most important information in assertoric The above-stated critical argument in re-
discourse. When a philosopher of information lation to the position of Floridi is similar to
produces a saying The systems S and V are in- Putnams argument in relation to Rorty. Putnam
formatively indistinguishable, he tells us about indicated that this positioning of Rortys theo-
the real existence of such a fact. He claims that retical concept is not consistent with the content
he correctly describes some objective state of presented therein. Rorty insists on the content
affairs. In this case, the philosopher tries to of his theoretical construction, that the concept
give an account in his conception of the actual of correspondence truth should be excluded
situation of the system informativeness, the from philosophy, but he bases this statement
relation between the real and virtual worlds, on the fact that he knows how in fact (i.e., on
and the significance of the sceptical position the basis of the correspondence understanding
in epistemology. of truth) the theoretical work, which is called
If a thinker simply expressed his views philosophy, should be carried out.
without claiming correctness for his position, With the help of the same argument it is
philosophy, to use the comparison of Bertrand possible to criticize Floridis concept of in-
Russell (1959), would become idle chatter over formational scepticism. Positing the thesis of
a cup of tea, where any saying of communicative harmlessness of informational scepticism is
partners is pronounced not to state anything, not consistent with the content of this thesis.
but simply to keep the conversation going. But This thesis consists in the fact that the differ-
in fact, the task of philosophy is not imagined ence of the real world (system S) and the virtual
like this even by those modern anti-realists and world (system V), under the condition that all
sceptics who claim that the truth is not the goal their events are identical (Hamming distance
of study, and all we can do in philosophy is to between S and V is 0), is uninformative and
carry out an infinite redescription of the world therefore radical doubt about the possibility of
pictures, which by themselves cannot qualify knowledge of objective reality is epistemologi-
as an adequate reflection of reality. Saying this, cally harmless. This thesis, however, is presented
they personally position some opinion as true in as a theoretical concept, which is claimed to be
the correspondence sense. For example, Richard an objective evaluation of the results of knowl-
Rorty wrote: edge. That is, the thesis claims to describe the
real state of affairs, and this fact is the most
These philosophers [realists V. L.] share important and most informative element of the
the image of human beings as machines built concept. The content of the thesis refers to the
(by God or evolution), among others, to see non-informativeness of differences of the real
things the right way. Pragmatists want to liber- and the virtual, but the claiming of this thesis
ate our culture from such self-perception is based on the importance and informativeness
(1995: 292). of this difference.
44 Vsevolod Ladov Scepticism in information society
If the argument of self-reference acts against emergence of set-theoretic paradoxes, but also
Floridi exactly as Putnams argument does would be able to appear to be a logical and
against Rorty, and if the distinction between epistemological justification for scepticism,
the real and the virtual is still fundamentally because the classical argument accusing the
meaningful and informative, then the thesis sceptical stance of inconsistency is also based
about epistemological harmlessness of radical on the idea of self-reference (Whitehead, Russell
scepticism, which appears as informational 1910). Tarski did not set such epistemological
scepticism in the current situation, is incorrect. goals for his semantic conception, but it also can
A radical sceptic claims that a person perform- serve as an appropriate logical defense for the
ing his cognitive activity will never be able to stance of scepticism.
determine whether he has to deal with objective The classical argument against scepticism
reality, or only some of appearances that can be comes down to the fact that the thesis of a
generated on the basis of special organization of radical sceptic, All statements are relative, is
his sense organs, cognitive apparatus, language, self-contradictory. This thesis also constitutes
culture, or on the basis of information and com- a statement and therefore its production as an
munication technologies in modern society. If epistemologically trustworthy one refutes its
the difference between the real and the virtual own content, according to which construction
is recognized by us as essential for theoretical of epistemologically trustworthy statements is
rational activity, and if a radical sceptic claims impossible.
that this distinction cannot be described, then From the point of view of distinguishing be-
this position is obviously negative and detri- tween a language and a meta-language, as done
mental to theoretical thinking, destroying its by Tarski in his semantic conception, it is not
opportunities and making it meaningless. that the position of scepticism, which states that
the truth of any kind of judgments is relativized
according to subjective/-inter-subjective factors
Attempts to get around the argument of knowledge (cultural, linguistic, psychologi-
from self-reference cal, biological), is wrong, but philosophers who
consider scepticism a contradictory position are
Is the argument from self-reference itself, which wrong. It is possible to regard the statement All
was the basis for the above criticism, essential? statements are relative as self-contradictory
Is it possible to overcome it by pointing to the only on the basis of incorrect mixing of differ-
failure of that type of reasoning? ent language levels. In fact, this very statement
In the 20th century, when the problem of refers not to the language, which in this case
overcoming the set-theoretical and semantic appears as an object about which something is
paradoxes in philosophy of mathematics and said, but to the meta-language, and, therefore,
logic was addressed, two well-known con- there is no contradiction in the statement of the
cepts criticizing the idea of self-reference were sceptic. His saying All statements are relative
developed, as it was declared to be the basis may well be absolute, and it does not lead us to
of paradoxes. These were the theory of types a certain collapse of thought, if only we do not
of Russell (1908) and the semantic theory of forget to distinguish between the levels of the
Alfred Tarski (1935). language each time.
Moreover, Russell clearly stated that his The theory of types can also be used to de-
theory of types, by establishing a ban on fend scepticism. One can say that the wording
production of self-referential statements, of logical difficulties of these sceptical views is
would resolve the difficulties not only in the based on a mixture of different types of state-
area of philosophy of mathematics related to ments. The saying All statements are relative
COACTIVITY: Philosophy, Communication 2017, 25(1): 3847 45
falls into a higher logical type of statements than meta-position with respect to it and guided by
the type of those statements that it refers to. An a principle of relations between classes, other
appearance of contradiction arises because of than the theory of types. As a result, the theory
unjustified mixing of these types. of types itself is in a logical impasse. The diffi-
culties in substantiating this theory were men-
tioned soon after its occurrence by Paul Weiss
The failure of the concepts discussed (1928), who presented criticisms of it.
Putnams critical reasoning with respect to
The above-described concepts, in which con- the semantic concepts of Tarski, which uses the
struction of self-referential statements is metaphor of the so-called language of red ink
prohibited, and, therefore, argument from self- (Putnam 1990), is well known. If the rules of all
reference, critical with respect to a sceptic, is possible languages were written in red ink, and
annulled, do not seem consistent. They fall into statements in the languages were written with
the same traps of the logical paradoxes that they ink of all other known colors, what color would
have tried to overcome. be used for the rules of the language of red ink?
Thus, Russells theory of types, in fact, If red, then the language is closed on itself, i.e.,
prohibits universalist discourse in general. self-referential. If, however, we assume existence
One cannot talk about everything at once, one of a different ink of unknown color, the rules
should always keep in mind that any judg- of the language of red ink will not apply to this
ment may only apply to a limited topical area. new meta-language, and statements written
Consequently, the assessment of the truth of with the new color may be regulated by differ-
this statement cannot be universal as well, it ent rules, different from the developed semantic
must always be relativized regarding that par- concepts.
ticular range of subject matter that is covered in The fact that logical-semantic projects pre-
the judgment. But what about the very formula- sented in the 20th century could not annul the
tion of the theory of types? Does it refer only to significance of argumentation, which is based
certain kinds of statements covering a certain on the idea of self-reference, is extremely im-
limited subject area, or does it present an ex- portant. The idea of self-reference is one of the
ample of that very statement of the universal main ideas in philosophy. It defines the essence
nature that it tries to prohibit? Is the principle of of philosophy as a specific kind of rational activ-
distinguishing between a language and a meta- ity. In contrast to certain sciences, which limit
language formulated in just another particular their research to a particular area of existence,
language, in relation to which meta-position is philosophy has always claimed to be universal
also possible, or is a universal language, which knowledge of things in existence in general. To
covers all possible linguistic events, used here? present knowledge of the things existent in gen-
When Russell (1998) says that totality of classes eral, at the highest possible level of generality is,
in the world cannot be a class in the same sense actually, a goal of building an ontological system
in which the latter are classes, does not he for- in philosophy. Expression of such knowledge is
mulate a feature by which it is possible to collect possible in a semantically closed self-referential
all possible totalities of classes in some universal language, because only such a language can talk
totality of all classes? If so, the very formulation about everything that exists, including itself,
of the theory of types is the use of the concept as of a certain kind of existing things. Fitch
of a class of all classes that it opposes. If it is not emphasized this specificity of philosophical
so, then the wording of the theory of types does thinking: It is characteristic of philosophy to
not apply to all possible totalities of classes, but reach this maximum level and to be able to use
only to some of them, admitting the possibility the self-referential sorts of reasoning which are
of existence of other totalities that occupy the possible on this level (Fitch 1946: 69).
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Vsevolod LADOV
Straipsnyje analizuojami iuolaikiniai informacijos filosofijos tekstai, ypa daug dmesio skiriant informa-
cinio skepticizmo sampratai. ios koncepcijos autorius Luciano Floridi teigia, kad skepticizmas, kylantis
kaip pastanga atskirti realius ir virtualius objektus dabartinje informacinje visuomenje, epistemologiniu
poiriu yra nekenksmingas, nes realybs ir virtualybs perskyra neturi jokio specifinio informacijos turinio.
Straipsnyje ikeliami io teorinio poirio loginiai ir epistemologiniai sunkumai bei silomas j veikos bdas.
Reikminiai odiai: koherentin tiesos teorija, akivaizdumo tiesos teorija, informacinis skepticizmas, pa-
radoksas, realus objektas, virtualus objektas.
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