Rule 110 - Criminal Procedure Cases

[G.R. NO.
168168 : September 14, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 96-125
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10
years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,
who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try
and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous
desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually
abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paranaque,
Page 1 of 49
appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to
lie face down then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but
she kept the incident to herself as her father might hurt her.5
A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on
her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina which caused tremendous pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept
the ordeal to herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her
mother.
On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen
sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled
her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant
immediately asked her to dress up.7
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant
down on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their
shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8
On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon
learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed
a complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant
and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V.
Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and
Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the
Philippines in September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant
because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to
another assignment overseas.12
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1,
1996 because there were other people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant,
then she would not have accompanied him to the Paranaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of
San Antonio to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at
Sucat, Paranaque, where they applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also
maintained that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove
that he was responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse
with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated
the obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known
unless she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due
to the fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel
between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of
rape against appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-
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uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same.
Besides, she testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September
1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he
is imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor
maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Paranaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the
crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of
rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of
qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR
DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision
mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty
Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the
Supreme Court for review.
Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
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SO ORDERED.16
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS

OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE
FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported
them to the authorities when she accompanied him to Paranaque Police Station and the Barangay
Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues
that had the trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured by her
mother into filing the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence
which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses,
particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination by
counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment
of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.19
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight
and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been
abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a
public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only
have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her
person as follows:
For rape committed in September 1993:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you? cralawlibrary
A: September 1993.
Page 4 of 49
COURT:
No specific date? cralawlibrary
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
Can you remember how old were you at that time? cralawlibrary
A: 10 years old, Maam.
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything
happened? cralawlibrary
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next? cralawlibrary
RECORD: The witness is crying.
A: He inserted in my anus - ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.
Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you? cralawlibrary
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why not? cralawlibrary
A: Because I was afraid of my father.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father? cralawlibrary
A: Because he might hurt me.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred? cralawlibrary
A: There is, Maam.
Q: When was it? cralawlibrary
A: After a few days after the first incident.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next? cralawlibrary
A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
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Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing? cralawlibrary
A: He removed his clothes.
Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side - pinatagilid niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his
side.
Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21
For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened? cralawlibrary
A: There was, Maam.
Q: What is that incident? cralawlibrary
A: I was raped by my father on that day.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you? cralawlibrary
A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time? cralawlibrary
A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
Q: What about your father, what he doing? cralawlibrary
A: He was cooking.
Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He told me to approach him.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next? cralawlibrary
A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
Page 6 of 49
Q: What happened after you embraced him? cralawlibrary
A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next? cralawlibrary
A: He held my breast.
Q: After that, what happened next? cralawlibrary
A: He kept kissing my breast.
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast? cralawlibrary
A: Many times.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast? cralawlibrary
A: He put my shorts down.
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He held my organ.
ATTY. MALLARES:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
When you say organ', what do you mean? cralawlibrary
A: Pekpek.
COURT: Proceed.
ANSWER:
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next? cralawlibrary
Page 7 of 49
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.? cralawlibrary
A: We were in our sala on the sofa.
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to? cralawlibrary
A: Me and my father.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened? cralawlibrary
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time? cralawlibrary
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra? cralawlibrary
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time? cralawlibrary
A: Shorts and T-shirt.
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next? cralawlibrary
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of
me.
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time? cralawlibrary
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina? cralawlibrary
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23
The trial court believed the complainant and held that:
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The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is
spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and
convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if
she has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old
would not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not
true.24
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to
report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay
in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be
taken against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong
apprehensions brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt
or even distrust what should otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The
Court has thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even years, after the
commission of the offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were
fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to
appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought
about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A

survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown
by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the
appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring
the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open
court and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no
longer interested in pursuing the case.26
Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer
assisted her when she affixed her signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the
prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still
within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the
compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have
been filed in court.
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the
power to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the
Page 9 of 49
right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case
was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never
retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory
fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had
decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to
consent to annul his marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and
entrust the custody of his children to his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces
complainant's testimony that appellant raped her on several occasions.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without
consent.rbl r l l lbr r
If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only
because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years
of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be
employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's
father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the
victim into submission to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took
advantage of his moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December
29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted
rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try
and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the
crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution
which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous
desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission
of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.35 What is controlling is not the
Page 10 of 49
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute
the offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege
specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute
sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The
allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not
satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by
the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from
rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to
be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125
as the rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659,
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the
crime of rape, when committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented.
Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed on December 29, 1995,
Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies. It provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
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1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved
during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they
were also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate,
respectively.
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a
photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original
thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The admission of this secondary
evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.
Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute
their contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise
a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became
a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil
indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes
committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon a conviction for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when
the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying.44
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos.
96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the
prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases
without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.47
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to
Page 12 of 49
reclusion perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in
Criminal Case No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts
of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape
in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions
constituting the offense.
SO ORDERED.
Page 13 of 49
[G.R. NO. 143193 : June 29, 2005]
MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, The Honorable court of of appeals, and REBECCA G. SALVADOR,
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal prosecution against
petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-
166147.1
Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997,
the NBI stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the
United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA
basketball teams such as "USA Basketball," "Chicago Bulls," "Orlando Magic," "Los Angeles
Lakers," "Rockets," "Phoenix Suns," "Bullets," "Pacers," "Charlotte Hornets," "Blazers,"
"Denver Nuggets," "Sacramento Kings," "Miami Heat," Utah Jazz," "Detroit Pistons,"
"Milwaukee Bucks," "Seattle Sonics," "Toronto Raptors," "Atlanta Hawks," "Cavs," "Dallas
Mavericks," "Minnesota Timberwolves," and "Los Angeles Clippers." These names are used on
hosiery, footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment
products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered that
petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA"
garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners' prosecution for unfair competition under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.2
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of NBA
Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma &
Carbonell, as the company's attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the
filing of criminal, civil and administrative complaints, among others.3 The Special Power of
Attorney was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman
Goodman, County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul
Cecilia B. Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated the
certification.4 Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998, before Notary
Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.5
Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez
recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code.6 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
Page 14 of 49
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT
and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the
appearance of "NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the
goods offered by them are those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the NBA Properties,
Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the following
grounds:
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED8
In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed Welts's
complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the
copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal.9 They also contend that complainant is a
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the
business name "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since 1972, and their designs are original
and do not appear to be similar to complainant's, and they do not use complainant's logo or
design.10
The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy of the
complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it. Prosecutor Guray also
contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the
private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime.11
The trial court sustained the prosecution's arguments and denied petitioners' motion to quash in
its Order dated March 5, 1999.12
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision dated January 26, 2000.13
According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to
quash, and that the grounds raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the
merits.14 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.

Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings with dispatch in Criminal
Case No. 98-166147.
Page 15 of 49
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with
issues raised as follows:
1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE (sic) TO DO

BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR
COMPETITION.
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN BEHALF OF

A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS AND WHOSE

EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE IS ENTITLED TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ASSUMED

JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE ACCUSED.
5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE
PETITION.17
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA Properties,
Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been
personally sworn to by the complainant before the investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate
the claim that Welts failed to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any
action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA's trademarks are not being actually used in the
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by Philippine patent
laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair
competition.18
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its Amended
Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26,
2000.19
The petition must be denied.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy
to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.20 The proper procedure in such a case is
for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.21 Thus, petitioners
Page 16 of 49
should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash.
There are no special or exceptional circumstances22 in the present case such that immediate
resort to a filing of a Petition for Certiorari should be permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the Information filed
against petitioners.
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused,23 their arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal, complainant's capacity to sue and petitioners' exculpatory defenses against the
crime of unfair competition.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time
the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information,
to wit:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
single punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and cralawlibrary
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted
of the offense charged.
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by
complainant's affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn
to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in
their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
Page 17 of 49
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. All
these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S.
Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily
render it invalid.24 Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial
rights of the defendant on the merits.25
In this case, Welts's Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole

Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on
February 12, 1998,26 duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of
the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney
Gutierrez stated that complainant's representative will present the authenticated notarized
original in court,27 and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand.28
It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy.29
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor
based his recommendation, to wit:
(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the investigation conducted
from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the subsequent search and seizure of several items from
petitioners' establishment;30
(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio,
Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture,
distribution and sale of "fake products bearing the 'NBA' trademark, and in prosecuting the
proprietors of aforesaid factory;"31 and
(3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P. Bal-ot of the Pinkerton
Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez,
attesting to their findings that petitioners were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and
distributing counterfeit "NBA" garment products.32
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case,
the trial court should respect such determination.33
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code34 is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which
principally stands as the injured party. The complainant's capacity to sue in such case becomes
immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez,35 a case akin to the present dispute, as it involved the
crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of
search warrants issued against manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of
the petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:
Page 18 of 49
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition
for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal
offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after
the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor
the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the
petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act
against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a
private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much
significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to
escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime
has no standing to sue.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair
competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply
interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a
multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national
interest to do so.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, with regard to petitioners' arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not entitled to
protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee, that they have not
committed acts amounting to unfair competition for the reason that their designs are original and
do not appear to be similar to complainant's, and they do not use complainant's logo or design,
the Court finds that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during
trial on the merits of the case.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this case be
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where Criminal Case No. 98-
166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Page 19 of 49
Page 20 of 49
[G.R. No. 184537 : April 23, 2010]
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA AND SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH DIVISION AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners
who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008.
An Information[2] dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having violated
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government, reads:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of
Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio
Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the
Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares,
Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding,
thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price,
and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-
accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26319.
In a Resolution[3] promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners' Motion
Page 21 of 49
to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the
amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged."
In a Memorandum[4] dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with
the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information[5] dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, charging the
petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a
private person, to the prejudice of the government.
The information, subject of the petition, now reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of
Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of
his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B.
GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a
private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and
non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering
into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for
barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a
competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation[6] dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly
opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition[7] dated June 18, 2008.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation
before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter
charged a different offense-that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to
private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming
that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new
information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary
investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of
the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
Page 22 of 49
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying the
petitioners' motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no
substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified
the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not
such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation.
Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded
in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the information must
be sustained.
WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion under
consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the arraignment of both accused
shall proceed as scheduled.[8]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[9] dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the two
Informations substantially charged different offenses, such that the present information
constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan denied
the Motion[10] in open court.
Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
ORDER THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE A QUO, WHEN THE
SECOND INFORMATION IN THE INSTANT CASE CONSTITUTED SUBSTITUTED
INFORMATION WHOSE SUBMISSION REQUIRED THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.
II

ORDER THE CONDUCT OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE A QUO,
Page 23 of 49
SINCE THE SECOND INFORMATION THEREIN CONTAINED SUBSTANTIAL
AMENDMENTS WHOSE SUBMISSION REQUIRED THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.
III

ORDER THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE A QUO, ALTHOUGH THE
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MANDATES DUE RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
FINDING THAT PRIMA FACIE CAUSE EXISTED TO FILE THE CASE A QUO.[11]
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of
violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another
preliminary investigation.
In its Comment[12] dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that there is no substituted information in
contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would require the conduct of another preliminary
investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a different determination
should there be another preliminary investigation conducted.
In their Reply,[13] dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and
second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that
required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution,
substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its submission should
have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Page 24 of 49
The essential elements of the offense are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence;
and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. [14]
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public
officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation
of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing
the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but
rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.[15]
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction
that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."[16]
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information

dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense,
that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was
modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[17] provides
that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue
injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct
offense. An accused may be charged under either mode[18] or under both should both modes
concur.[19]
Petitioners' reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,[20] ruling that, "in substitution of information
another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new
information" is not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no
substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar, [21] that
failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
Page 25 of 49
accused before trial, the denial of petitioners' claim for a new investigation, however, did not
deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses
that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively
participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments
warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information,
and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct
violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that
such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very
least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same
transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction
of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern
Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of Matalam v.
Sandiganbayan. [22] The same is inapplicable to petitioners' case. In Matalam, there was indeed a
substantial amendment which entitled the accused to another preliminary investigation. The
recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely altered. In the original
information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, whereas in the
amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In
the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed previously, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners' Motion to Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be
amended.
The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,[23] where it was written:
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information
or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included
therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein
after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or
some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be
available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be
conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under
a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint,
the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal.
The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature
of the charged offense. Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot
be demanded by the petitioners.
Page 26 of 49
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of
the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it
is necessary that a new investigation be conducted to consider newly discovered evidence, in
particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit report. We are
not convinced.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence
are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight
that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.[24]
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant
way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be
considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of
the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the
preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners' Supplement to Motion
for Reinvestigation,[25] offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior
to the execution of the subject project.
More important is the prosecution's statement in its Memorandum that, "after a careful re-
evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the prosecution at the time of the filing of
the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the Information, the prosecution insists
on the finding of probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the Office of the
Ombudsman."[26]
Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,[27] viz:
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts
and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.
Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of
the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.[28] The only ground upon which it
may entertain a review of the Office of the Ombudsman's action is grave abuse of discretion.[29]
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on
law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.[30]
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
Page 27 of 49
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the
abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[31]
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the conduct of another
preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary
investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense
charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew will only delay the
resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete
preliminary investigation actively participated by both petitioners.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying petitioners' motion for preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 28 of 49
[G.R. No. 184800 : May 05, 2010]
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND

JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., PETITIONERS,VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI, BRANCH 149, AND JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the
issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) -
Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information
indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of
the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of
the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y.
Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint,[5] before
the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation
to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma.
Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira
Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo
Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI
(collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website
www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans,
Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned
by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-
need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after
PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of
payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI's refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans,
PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary
loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of
www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6]
under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] at
no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone
logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various
Page 29 of 49
dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering
13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly
derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC,
and particularly, Malayan."[8] He cited an article which was posted/published on
www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal
aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x .
That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET'S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP
AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and
other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves.
Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and
again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na
talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for
amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY

FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY
WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, finding probable cause to
indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations[11] charging them with libel. The
accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled
off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees
of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website
www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and
for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
Page 30 of 49
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is
attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory
article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that
the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question
was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant
before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor's Resolution by a petition for review
to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13] reversed the finding of
probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in
court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a
Motion to Quash[16] the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to
vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are not
punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the
Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial court's jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first
published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory
material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed,
quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked
any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at
Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first
published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,[20] insisting that the
Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.
Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that
Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged
that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that
since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to
Page 31 of 49
jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.[22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure
the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,[24]
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees
of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website
www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and
for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in
the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and
defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest
jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were
"printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the
Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent by Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
faulting the public respondent for:
1. ... NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT
PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ... ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL

ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
Page 32 of 49
3. ...NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE
PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]
With the filing of Gimenez's Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners
violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether
grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent's admission of the Amended
Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,[29] as a rule,
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and
those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[31] The rule is not iron-clad,
however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court's exercise of its discretionary
authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a
pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of
the RPC -whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written
defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for
in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Page 33 of 49
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.[33]
This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended,
specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects
of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which
laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to
reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation,
the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was
actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation
was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine
qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as
the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed
by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be
equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati
becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by
RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal
libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for
written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited,
regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally
did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation
of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in
any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it
was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is
transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Page 34 of 49
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press,
Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the
peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific
rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which
became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v.
Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate
or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to
accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of
the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means
or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to
forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its
printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez's premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would
spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations
where the website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly
accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts
of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates
to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are
unduly oppressive, the Court's pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
Page 35 of 49
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule
providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and
first publication, or at the complainant's place of residence. We would also have to abandon the
subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on
libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such
persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in
which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where
the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'
motion to quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-
876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
Page 36 of 49
[G.R. Nos. 172476-99 : September 15, 2010]
BRIG. GEN. (RET.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari[1] seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution[2] of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution
denied petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution
of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.[3]
During petitioner's term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS

approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for
development as housing projects.[4]
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-
in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,[5] executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the
subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused
the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter of
the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of
the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano
presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the
basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to
AFP-RSBS.[6]
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first

district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit[7] against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2)
malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was
docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,[8] found
Page 37 of 49
petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public
documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following
crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty
thereof:
xxxx
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for

twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral
Deeds of Sale;
xxxx
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts
of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct amount
of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;[9]
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations[10] for

violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations[11] for falsification of public documents
against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,[12] with a
supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999,[13] of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause
against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order,[14] the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioner's first
motion for reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its
evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February
12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to
inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the
action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP)
recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal
Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary,
stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral
deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject
property.[15]
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-
Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner's
name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the
recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military
was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner's first motion
Page 38 of 49
for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors[16] was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review,
the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on
the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale,
which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner's continued prosecution. In its 19 December
2005 memorandum,[17] the panel of prosecutors recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal and all
the other accused for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of the
amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should
only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of

prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled
the arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration[19] of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the
Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a
motion to set aside his arraignment[20] pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner's second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be
ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
denied for lack of merit petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The Issue
Page 39 of 49
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to
set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him?
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations. He
claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman
recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices have
to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds other than
the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner's motion to set aside his
arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed on 26
January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated Section
7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent
court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against
petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 15, Series of 2001,[22] sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court
upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. -
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall
be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of
court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution
subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar
the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the
accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the
information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused,
for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The
accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or
not guilty.[23]
Page 40 of 49
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,[24] otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998,
the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the
information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is
pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment
and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice,
judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. -
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean
the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto.
In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.[25]
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of
arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it
proceeded with petitioner's arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioner's
Page 41 of 49
motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman, in
its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner's first motion for
reconsideration,[26] impugning for the first time the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause
against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same
finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner's defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best
threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioner's claim that the Ombudsman made
conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him is baseless. The
memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner,
has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside

and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;[27] (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause
against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause.[28] The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints.[29] As
this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:[30]
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise
stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman
in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of the public service.[31]
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,[32] the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.[33]
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not
a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the
case.[34]
Page 42 of 49
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to set
aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent
and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law.[35]
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan
is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.[36] There being no showing of grave
abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all
deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[37] where we

stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not
by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan.
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court in which the petition [for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it
may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioner's motion to set
aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 43 of 49
[G.R. NO. 167571 : November 25, 2008]
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., Petitioner v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C.

TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004
and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992,Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00

from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of
the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson
claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had
lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent
various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Page 44 of 49
Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaintagainst Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on
the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the
complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings.
Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed
to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner
himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no
dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ,
this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file
three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines
and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which
governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act
No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Page 45 of 49
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached
to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate
court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition
for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari . They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable
to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of
cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being
neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with
the verification requirement.
Page 46 of 49
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground
that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003
resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33
a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals
committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He
argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave
injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription
for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.
22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one
year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
Page 47 of 49
in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing
rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or
examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code
(R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation

against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears
before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up
whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial
when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein
Page 48 of 49
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on
the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from
the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years
had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated
the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of
the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control,
like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 49 of 49

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[G.R. NO.

168168 : September 14, 2005]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.

Criminal Case No. 96-125

Criminal Case No. 96-150

Criminal Case No. 96-151

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS

We are not persuaded.

For rape committed in September 1993:

No specific date? cralawlibrary

A: I cannot remember, Maam.

A: 10 years old, Maam.

A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.

RECORD: The witness is crying.

A: He inserted in my anus - ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.

Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you? cralawlibrary

Q: Why not? cralawlibrary

A: Because I was afraid of my father.

Q: Why are you afraid of your father? cralawlibrary

A: Because he might hurt me.

A: There is, Maam.

Q: When was it? cralawlibrary

A: After a few days after the first incident.

Q: After he entered your room, what happened next? cralawlibrary

A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.

A: He removed his clothes.

Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary

A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21

For rape committed on December 29, 1995:

A: There was, Maam.

Q: What is that incident? cralawlibrary

A: I was raped by my father on that day.

A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.

Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time? cralawlibrary

A: I was then sitting at our dining set.

Q: What about your father, what he doing? cralawlibrary

Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any? cralawlibrary

A: He told me to approach him.

Q: After you approached him, what happened next? cralawlibrary

A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.

Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next? cralawlibrary

Q: After that, what happened next? cralawlibrary

A: He kept kissing my breast.

Q: How many times did he kiss your breast? cralawlibrary

Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast? cralawlibrary

A: He put my shorts down.

A: He also put down my panty.

When you say organ', what do you mean? cralawlibrary

For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:

A: We were in our sala on the sofa.

Q: What were you wearing at that time? cralawlibrary

A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.

A: Shorts and T-shirt.

Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any? cralawlibrary

A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23

The trial court believed the complainant and held that:

Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE

I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE