FINAL - Ravenscroft V CRT

Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWHC 1874 (Ch)
Case No: HC-2015-001906

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice

Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 24/07/2017
Before :
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE

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Between :
MR LEIGH RAVENSCROFT Claimant

- and -
CANAL AND RIVER TRUST Defendant
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Leigh Ravenscroft - Litigant in Person (Represented by Nigel Moore (McKenzie Friend)

for the Claimant
Christopher Stoner QC (instructed by Shoosmiths) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 22, 23 and 24 May 2017

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Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this
Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
.............................
THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE

THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE Ravenscroft v Canal and River Trust
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Mrs Justice Asplin :

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1. This is a dispute between Mr Leigh Ravenscroft, the owner of a boat named

The Three Wise Monkeys and the Canal & River Trust (the CRT). On 27
January 2015, the CRT removed the Three Wise Monkeys from its mooring
on the River Trent at Farndon Ferry, Newark, Nottinghamshire and put it in
storage in Chester. It was returned to Mr Ravenscroft on 6 May 2015 on
payment of 8,176.
2. Mr Ravenscroft contends that CRT had no power to remove The Three Wise
Monkeys from the River Trent because it was moored in a part of the river
which did not constitute the main navigable channel. He says therefore, that
the powers in section 8 British Waterways Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) did not
apply. Mr Ravenscroft seeks various declarations in that regard to the effect
that the seizure of the vessel was unlawful, the term main navigable channel
having the same meaning as it does in the British Waterways Act 1971 (the
1971 Act) and the Transport Act 1968 (the 1968 Act). He also seeks a
refund of the sum of 8,176 and compensation.
3. If he is wrong about the ambit of the main navigable channel, Mr

Ravenscroft says that the removal of his vessel from the River Trent was a step
which was disproportionate, unnecessary and contrary to Article 1 of Protocol
1 of Human Rights Act 1998. He seeks a declaration to that effect, together
with such relief or remedy under that Act as the Court thinks fit.
4. Further, and in any event, Mr Ravenscroft contends that the CRT took the
Three Wise Monkeys and used it unlawfully to distrain for licence fees. He
seeks a declaration to that effect, a refund of the removal and storage charges
of 6,490.80 and subsequent costs together with such compensation as the
Court considers just and appropriate
5. At paragraph 17 of the Amended Particulars of Claim, under the heading

Damages, Mr Ravenscroft refers to having lost an agreed sale as a result
of the seizure of his boat and having been unable to find a buyer since storing
it on a nearby farm at a continuing cost. No particulars of loss are provided.
There is reference in Mr Ravenscrofts witness statement, however, to having
agreed to sell the boat on 30 December 2014 for 28,000, subject only to an
out of water survey. Further, at paragraph 18 reference is made to having paid
4 years of pleasure boat registration, totaling 1,685.20 even for years I did
not own the boat and at paragraph 20, having had to borrow money in order
to retrieve my boat and pursue this claim. No particulars are provided of the
alleged loss as a result of borrowing money, nor are details set out in Mr
Ravenscrofts witness statement. However, in his witness statement, Mr
Ravenscroft refers to having had to sell the boat at a loss to repay funds
borrowed in order to secure its return. He makes no reference, however, to not
having been the owner of the boat during the relevant four year period.
6. Although it is not pleaded, in his witness statement, Mr Ravenscroft also refers

to the front and rear canopies of the boat having been ripped off. However, in
cross examination, Mr Ravenscroft accepted that no damage was caused to the
vessel when it was taken from the water, other than peripheral scratches to the
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paintwork and forcing of studs on the canopy which was easily remedied.
There is no evidence before the Court as to any loss in that regard.
Background
7. CRT is the statutory successor to the British Waterways Board (the BWB)
and pursuant to the British Waterways Board (Transfer of Functions) Order
2012 (SI 2012/1659) all references to the BWB in the legislation with which
this matter is concerned are to be construed as references to the CRT. The
CRT is a charitable body and the navigation authority for certain inland
waterways in England and Wales. It is not in dispute that that stretch of the
River Trent upon which the Three Wise Monkeys was moored is such an
inland waterway by virtue of section 4 and Schedule 1 to the 1971 Act as
amended. The reference in the schedule to the 1971 Act is to The Trent
Navigation from the tail of Meadow Lane Lock, Nottingham to Gainsborough
Bridge. The extent of the River Trent to which section 4 of the 1971 Act
applies was extended by virtue of section 36(2) British Waterways Act 1974 to
include:
The Trent Navigation from Shardlow to the tail of Meadow

Land Lock, Nottingham, by way of the Beeston Canal and part
of the Nottingham Canal and including the branch to the river
Soar and the length of the river Trent from its junction with the
Nottingham Canal to Beeston Weir.
8. When known as the Grandma Molly, the Three Wise Monkeys had a
pleasure boat certificate issued by the BWB. That certificate expired on 30 th
June 2011. It is not in dispute that the vessel has not had a pleasure boat
certificate or other form of relevant consent since. CRTs evidence (which is
disputed) is that prior to its removal from the River Trent, various notices were
served both on the vessel itself and on Mr Ravenscroft at his last known
address but that no response was received.
Representation
9. Mr Ravenscroft is a litigant in person. By an order of Chief Master Marsh

dated 14 September 2016, Mr Ravenscroft was granted permission to have the
assistance of Mr Nigel Moore as a McKenzie Friend and Mr Moore was
granted rights of audience. Mr Moore is a person who appears to have
extensive knowledge about the regulation of the inland waterways and to have
an interest in pursuing issues on behalf of boaters. At the beginning of the
hearing before me I asked Mr Ravenscroft if he wanted Mr Moore to continue
to speak on his behalf and if so, why. He explained that he is dyslexic and
could not carry out the task himself. I therefore, did not consider it necessary
to vary the order of Chief Master Marsh.
10. The CRT was represented by Mr Stoner QC.
The Evidence
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11. The evidence was contained in witness statements of: Mr Ravenscroft dated 12
January 2017; Mr Stuart Garner, an enforcement officer on behalf of the CRT,
dated 10 January 2017; Mr Michael Grimes, Head of Boating at the CRT but
who has since left that employment and whose evidence was adopted by Mr
Thomas Deards, the CRT Head of Legal in his first witness statement of 22
March 2017 and Mr Deards second witness statement of 8 May 2017.
12. The majority of Mr Ravenscrofts witness statement is concerned with the

events which occurred at the Farndon Ferry Marina on 27 January 2015 when
the Three Wise Monkeys was removed from the water and he, his father and
a number of others confronted Mr Garner, the CRT Enforcement Officer. In
that regard, I was also shown extracts from a video which was taken by
someone at the scene. Mr Ravenscroft also deals with the sequence of events
after the vessel was seized.
13. Mr Moore also provided me with a number of Google Earth images. They
were: an aerial view of the Trent Navigation at Farndon Ferry and its environs;
a close up aerial view of the Farndon Ferry area itself; a stretch of the River
Trent showing a pontoon stretching out some distance almost to a dotted line
imposed down the centre of the river; an aerial view showing boats moored in
a river close to the bank; and an aerial view of a stretch of the River Thames
showing boats moored in the centre of the river in the lee of an island, also in
the centre of the river.
14. Mr Garners evidence relates for the most part to the notices served in relation
to the Three Wise Monkeys and the events at the Marina on 27 January
2015. Mr Grimes evidence which was adopted by Mr Deards, contains
general information about the management of waterways by the CRT.
15. Mr Garner says that on 1 June 2012, the BWB sent a letter to the owner of the
land at Farndon Ferry, requesting details of the owner of the vessel. No
response was received. He goes on to say that on 17 July 2012, a patrol notice
was served on the boat stating the owner should apply within 14 days for a
licence and requested that the owner contact the relevant Enforcement Officer.
Further, on 9 August 2012 notice was served pursuant to section 8(2) British
Waterways Act 1983 requiring the boat to be removed. Mr Garner states that
the notice was served both on the boat itself and at Mr Ravenscrofts last
known address. Thereafter, a further patrol notice was served on the boat and
by post at Mr Ravenscrofts address on 17 October 2012.
16. On 14 February 2014, Mr Garner wrote a letter to Mr Ravenscroft referring to

a patrol notice dated 17 July 2012. He stated:
We have still not received your completed application

within the time specified and I have therefore today
served notice under section 8 of the British Waterways
Act 1983 (copy enclosed) which requires you to remove
your boat from inland waterways owned or managed by
British Waterways within 28 days. If you fail to do this
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we will immediately being the process of removing your

boat at your expense.
You have 28 days to obtain your licence and you need to

allow 14 days for us to process your application, so you
must submit your application within the next 2 weeks in
order to avoid your boat being removed.
The notice itself is headed Notice Pursuant to section 8(2) British Waterways
Act 1983 Sunk, Stranded, Abandoned or Unauthorised Craft. It makes no
mention of arrears of licence fees.
17. Thereafter, on 1 July 2014, Mr Garner says that he served a further patrol
notice on the boat in which it was stated that the boat was on a waterway
without permission and was not displaying a licence. It also stated that a
licence should be applied for within 14 days. On 15 July 2014, a further
section 8 notice was served on the boat and by recorded delivery at Mr
Ravenscrofts last known address. The notice included the reference to the
boats new name, the Three Wise Monkeys. The notice served by post was
returned marked not called for. A final patrol notice in the same form as
before, was served on the boat on 3 September 2014.
18. Copies of all the relevant notices and correspondence are exhibited to Mr
Garners evidence together with photographs of the vessel with notices
attached to it dated 9 August 2012, 14 February 2014 and 15 July 2014 and a
photograph of the interior of the vessel dated 27 January 2015 which shows a
bundle of unidentified papers on a surface in the cabin.
19. No response having been received from Mr Ravenscroft in relation to any of

the notices, on 27 January 2015, the Three Wise Monkeys was removed
from the water at the Marina, as I have already mentioned. It is not disputed
that during heated scenes at the Marina, at which the police were present, Mr
Ravenscrofts father offered to pay any arrears of licence fees and that Mr
Garner quoted a ball park figure of 8 - 9,000 odd which was inclusive of
removal and haulage charges together with arrears of licence fees.
20. Thereafter, on 10 February 2015, Mr Ravenscroft applied to the Nottingham

County Court for an injunction to prevent CRT from selling or disposing of the
boat. Those proceedings were withdrawn and Mr Ravenscroft was ordered to
pay CRTs costs in the sum of 4,500 odd.
21. On 16 February 2015 in an email from Helen Underhill on behalf of CRT to

Mr Ravenscrofts then litigation assistant, Ms Tracy Thomas, CRT set out
removal and storage fees of 6,078 and four years of licence fees and quoted a
total amount outstanding of 7,763.20. Thereafter, by a letter dated 10 March
2015, from Shoosmiths, solicitors acting on behalf of CRT to Ms Thomas on
behalf of Mr Ravenscroft, CRT stated:
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. . .
In early March 2015 and at your request, CRT provided
you with details of the removal and storage charges
incurred by them, which are payable by Mr Ravenscroft
under section 8(3) of the Act. We again attach details of
the same for your records. Removal and storage charges
total 6,630.00 as of Todays [sic] date. Storage charges
will continue to accrue at a rate of 45 + VAT per week
until such a date that said expenses have been paid in
full, upon which CRT will release to Boat [sic] to Mr
Ravenscroft in accordance with section 8(4) of the Act.
In addition, Mr Ravenscroft owes CRT 1,685.20 in
respect of Licence Fees payable from 1 July 2011 to 30
June 2015, as outlined previously to you and in the
attached. Therefore, the total amount outstanding is
8,315.20. . .
22. However, in a subsequent email of 19 March 2015, from Lucy Gray of

Shoosmiths to Ms Thomas on behalf of Mr Ravenscoft it was stated that
arrangements would be made to deliver the vessel to Mr Ravenscroft on
payment of 12,676 which was itemised below. The figure included both
removal and storage costs and arrears of licence fees. An email in similar form
also quoting the figure of 12,676 was sent on 2 April 2015. Thereafter, on 12
April 2015, Mr Ravenscroft emailed Lucy Gray stating that he would pay the
12,676 figure less the costs of the injunction proceedings being 4,500. He
stated therefore, that he proposed to pay 8,176, albeit under protest and that
he did not accept that the CRT was entitled to hold the vessel as a lien in
respect of arrears of licence fees. The money was paid and the vessel returned
to an address of Mr Ravenscrofts choosing on 6 May 2015, before the action
was commenced.
23. In the circumstances of this case, and the nature of the relevant issues to which
I refer below, to further the overriding objective, only limited cross
examination took place. Nevertheless, I asked for a list of matters contained in
evidence which are challenged albeit not addressed in cross examination.
Those lists are appended to this judgment.
24. In cross examination, Mr Ravenscroft accepted that his postal address

remained the same as that which he had given for the purposes of obtaining a
pleasure boat licence prior to 2011 and which had been used in relation to all
notices other than the patrol notices served on the vessel itself. He said that he
had either lived at the address at all material times, or when it was rented out
he had used it as his postal address and asked tenants to pass his mail on.
However, he denied receiving any of the notices sent to his address. It seems
to me that on the balance of probabilities and in the light of the fact that only
one of the notices was returned by the Post Office, that it is more likely than
not that the remainder of the correspondence sent to Mr Ravenscrofts address
was received by him and I am unable to accept his evidence in this regard.
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25. Mr Ravenscroft also accepted that he was on the vessel most days in 2014
whilst he was painting and refurbishing it. He stated that he saw patrol boats
but that they never pulled over to the Three Wise Monkeys. He was shown
the photograph of the notice attached to the window of the vessel which is
dated 14 February 2014 but denied receiving it. He did, however, admit that he
had received one of the patrol notices when other people also involved in the
refurbishment of the vessel had given it to him and explained that he did not
have to do anything until the refurbishment was complete and the vessel was
ready for sale. He asserted that he did not need a licence because he was not
using the vessel to go up and down the river at that stage. He described it as
being a like a car in the garage rather than on the road. In this regard, in my
judgment on the balance of probabilities, given that Mr Ravenscroft accepted
that he had been on the boat most days in 2014, he must have seen and
received the patrol notices served during that year, which were affixed to the
boat, a number of which appear in the relevant photographs. I am unable to
accept his evidence, therefore, that he only received one such notice and that
despite the content of those notices he considered that he did not need to
contact CRT to obtain a licence.
26. In relation to the purported sale of the vessel in 2011, Mr Ravenscroft said that
he had an invoice and an email about it but accepted that they were not before
the court. He also accepted that he had not informed CRT of a change of
ownership in 2011 or in relation to his alleged re-purchase of the vessel in or
around 2014. He later suggested that he had sold the vessel very quickly in
December 2014 on Ebay. Once again there was no documentary evidence of
this before the court. In the absence of such evidence and in the light of Mr
Ravenscrofts shifting oral evidence on the subject, the fact that he did not
inform CRT of a change of ownership in 2011 and his re-purchase thereafter
and the fact that he did not mention the transfer of ownership when four years
arrears of licence fees were demanded, I am unable to accept his evidence in
that regard. In the absence of any documentary evidence, I am also unable to
accept his evidence in relation to the alleged contract for sale of the vessel in
December 2014. In any event, no particulars of loss have been provided, nor
were submissions made in relation to any loss.
27. In relation to the letter of 10 March 2015 from Shoosmiths, solicitors on

behalf of CRT, setting out charges of 6,630 to be paid before the return of the
vessel plus licence fees of 1,685, Mr Ravenscroft retorted that at the time, he
would not have paid a shilling to get the vessel back.
28. Mr Garner was cross examined by Mr Moore. Mr Garner maintained that there
was no intention on the part of the CRT to hold the vessel as a lien for arrears
of licence fees and that his reference to them in the Marina on 27 January
2015 when confronted by Mr Ravenscroft, his father and associates had been
in response to a specific enquiry as to arrears. He accepted the total figure that
he had quoted orally on that occasion to enable Mr Ravenscroft to recover his
vessel had included such arrears.
29. Mr Deards confirmed in cross examination that section 8 is used as a remedy

to ensure that unlicensed vessels are removed from the river, that he was not
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aware of the CRT having sought to have any prosecutions brought under the
1971 and/or 1983 Acts and that it is correct that licences can be withheld under
section 17 of the British Waterways Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) unless the
criteria set out at sub-sub-sections (a) (c) of that section are met. In his
second witness statement he also clarified that CRT does not contend that the
public right of navigation in relation to the River Trent was repealed by the
Transport Act 1968.
The Issues
30. The main issue which is at the heart of this matter is the true construction of
the phrase main navigable channel in section 4 of the 1971 Act as amended.
If, as Mr Ravenscroft contends it does not extend from bank to bank but is
equivalent to the fairway or thoroughfare of the River Trent, the Three
Wise Monkeys was not moored within it and there was no power to remove
his boat in the first place, to levy either the removal and storage charges or the
sum in respect of arrears of licence fee. If the main navigable channel
extends to the full width of the main river and only excludes tributaries,
streams and backwaters, as CRT contends, although Mr Ravenscroft accepts
that the Three Wise Monkeys should have had a pleasure boat certificate, he
says that the steps which were taken were disproportionate, unnecessary and
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of Human Rights Act 1998. Further, and in
any event, Mr Ravenscroft contends that the CRT took the Three Wise
Monkeys and used it unlawfully to distrain for licence fees.
(i) Main navigable channel
Principles of statutory construction
31. The first issue is the proper construction of the phrase main navigable
channel in section 4 of the 1971 Act. Neither Mr Moore nor Mr Stoner took
me to the principles of statutory construction in their oral submissions,
although Mr Stoner did refer to the principle in Pepper v Hart. Since the
hearing, they have both indicated that they have no objection to me adopting
the approach outlined by Arden LJ in 9 Cornwall Crescent London Ltd v
Mayor & Burgesses of the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea [2006] 1
WLR 1186 at [50] and [52], where she stated:
50 Where the true meaning of a statute is in doubt, and in

dispute between the parties, it is the court's function to decide
that meaning. In modern theory, the court primarily finds the
interpretation of a phrase by examining the words used by
Parliament in their particular context. Courts have moved away
from a purely literal approach to statutory interpretation. As
Lord Steyn held in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for
Health [2003] 2 AC 687 , 700:
The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods

of construction. This change was not initiated by the
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teleological approach of European Community

jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal
culture generally, but it has been accelerated by
European ideas: see, however, a classic early statement
of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in River
Wear Comrs v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743 , 763.
In any event, nowadays the shift towards purposive
interpretation is not in doubt. The qualification is that
the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the
context, eg social welfare legislation and tax statutes
may have to be approached somewhat differently.
52 By context, I mean the legislative context, and the

policy context, as shown by any admissible material, such as
Law Commission reports, explanatory notes accompanying
legislation, travaux prparatoires and (in certain cases)
Hansard. Courts will not speculate as to Parliament's purpose,
though they may infer it from (for example) the indications
provided in the legislation itself. In this particular case, we have
not been taken to any material outside the 1993 Act.
32. The principle in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 is well known. It is that
reference to Parliamentary materials as an aid to construction is permissible
only where three conditions are met, as set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson at
p.640B-C:
I therefore reach the conclusion, subject to any question

of Parliamentary privilege, that the exclusionary rule
should be relaxed so as to permit reference to
Parliamentary materials where (a) legislation is
ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) the
material relied upon consists of one or more statements
by a Minister or other promoter of the Bill together if
necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is
necessary to understand such statements and their effect;
(c) the statements relied upon are clear.
Legislative background and relevant provisions
33. By way of background, I was taken to Transport Act 1962 which created four
public authorities including CRTs predecessor, the BWB. Section 10 provides
that it is the duty of the BWB in the exercise of its powers under the Act, to
provide to such extent as they may think expedient (a) services and facilities
on the inland waterways owned or managed by them . . . and to have due
regard to efficiency, economy and safety of operation as respects the services
and facilities provided by them. Further, by section 43(3), the CRT and the
BWB before it, was empowered to demand, take and recover . . . such
charges for their services and facilities, and to make the use of those services
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and facilities subject to such terms and conditions, as they think fit. Section
43(8) provides that:
The services and facilities referred to in subsection (3)

of this section include, in the case of the British
Waterways Board, the use of any inland waterway
owned or manages by them by any ship or boat.
34. Mr Moore on behalf of Mr Ravenscroft also took me to the British Waterways

Board General Canal Bye-Laws of 1965 which were made pursuant to the
powers contained in the British Transport Commission Act 1954. The first
bye-law makes it clear that the Byelaws applied to every inland navigation in
England and Wales belonging or under the control of the BWB, save for some
named exceptions. It is not in dispute that they applied to the River Trent at the
point where the Three Wise Monkeys was moored. The phrase main
navigable channel is used in Bye-law 19 which, where relevant, is as follows:
(1) A pleasure boat when meeting, overtaking or being

overtaken by a power-driven vessel other than a pleasure
boat shall as far as possible keep out of the main
navigable channel.
In his written submissions, Mr Stoner QC also referred to byelaw 3 of the

1975 Byelaws and of the 1976 Byelaws. They both refer to the need for a
pleasure boat to display a licence. They are both concerned with canals and
make no distinction as to the part of the canal in which the requirement is
intended to operate. I did not find them of assistance.
35. To return to the legislation in chronological order, by section 104 Transport

Act 1968, (the 1968 Act) for the purposes of section 105-111 of that Act,
inland waterways were divided into commercial waterways, cruising
waterways and the remainder. The commercial waterways were those listed
in Part 1 of Schedule 12 to the 1968 Act. The Schedule contains a list of
numerous waterways and is headed: The main navigable channels of the
following waterways: - and includes The Trent Navigation from the tail of
Meadow Lane Lock, Nottingham, to Gainsborough Bridge. The list of
cruising waterways is also headed in the same way. Both lists include both
canals and navigations. Amongst other things, section 105 contained a duty
upon the BWB and thereafter, the CRT to:
(a) to maintain the commercial waterways in a

suitable condition for use by commercial freight
carrying vessels;
and section 105(2) prescribed the dimensions and kind of vessel to which the
duty to in section 105(1) (a) and (b) related. Furthermore, the obligations in
section 10 of the 1962 Act were restricted to commercial waterways and
cruising waterways by section 107 of the 1968 Act. There was no longer an
obligation to maintain the remainder. It is also important to note that section
115 provides that for the purposes of section 105, references to any right of
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navigation over a waterway includes references to any right to use or keep a

vessel or craft on that waterway.
36. The preamble to the 1971 Act itself, describes it as An Act to make provision
for regulating the use of pleasure boats and houseboats on certain of the inland
waterways of the British Waterways Board and for making charges therefor; to
confer further powers on the Board and for other purposes. Section 3 contains
definitions for the purposes of the Act including:
inland waterway means any canal or inland navigation

belonging to or under the control of the Board . . . .
...
pleasure boat means a yacht, launch, randan, wherry,
tender, skiff, gig, dinghy, shallop, punt, canoe, float or
other ship, boat, vessel, or craft (including amphibious
craft) but does not include a vessel being used solely as a
tug or for the carriage of goods or a houseboat or a
mooring stage or a pontoon.
...
prescribed charge in relation to any pleasure boat or

houseboat means a charge for the registration of that
boat, or for the renewal
37. Part II of the 1971 Act is headed Pleasure Boats and contains the following
relevant provisions:
4. (1) This Part of this Act applies to the main

navigable channel of each of the inland waterways
specified in Schedule 1 to this Act which channel so
specified is in this Act referred to as a river waterway.
(2) The description of any waterway contained in

the said schedule shall be read subject to any order made
by the Secretary of State for further defining the
waterway by reference to a map.
5. (1) It shall not be lawful to keep, let for hire or use

any pleasure boat on a river waterway unless a
certificate, in this Act referred to as a pleasure boat
certificate, in relation to the pleasure boat is then in
force or unless there is then in force in relation to it a
licence issued by the Board allowing the use of all inland
waterways without further payment.
(2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) of

this section shall, for each offence, be liable to a fine not
exceeding twenty pounds and a daily fine of two
pounds.
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River waterways are set out in Schedule 1. It includes reference to the

Trent Navigation form the tail of Meadow Lane Lock, Nottingham to
Gainsborough Bridge. Section 6 of the 1971 Act contains provisions
concerning the registration of pleasure boats and section 7 is concerned with
the charges for a pleasure boat certificate. Section 7(1) provides that:
There shall be paid to the Board for the registration

of every pleasure boat to be used on a river waterway
and for every renewal of the pleasure boat certificate
such charge as the Board may from time to time
determine ...
That section is subject to section 4 of the British Waterways Act 1983 (the
1983 Act). There is no dispute that the Three Wise Monkeys is a pleasure
boat for the purposes of Part II of the 1971 Act which includes sections 4 -7.
38. In fact, conditions as to certificates and licences are contained in the 1995 Act
at section 17. It is relevant for these purposes to note that by section 17 a
relevant consent which is defined to include a pleasure boat licence may be
refused in respect of vessels unless three conditions are met. They are: (a) that
the vessel complies with the applicable standards; (b) the vessel is insured and
evidence of the policy is produced; and (c) that there is a mooring where the
vessel can be lawfully kept or the vessel will be used bona fide for navigation
and will not remain continuously in one place for more than 14 days or such
longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances.
39. The power to remove a boat from an inland waterway is contained in section 8
of the 1983 Act which is as follows:
(1) In this section
owner in relation to any relevant craft means the

owner of the relevant craft at the time of sinking,
stranding or abandonment and includes a person letting a
vessel for hire, whether or not that person owns the
vessel;
relevant craft means any vessel which is sunk, stranded

or abandoned in any inland waterway or in any reservoir
owned or managed by the Board or which is left or
moored therein without lawful authority and includes
any part of such a vessel.
(2) The Board may remove any relevant craft after

giving not less than 28 days notice to the owner of the
relevant craft stating the effect of this section.
(3) All expenses incurred by the board in

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(a) the removal, storage or destruction of the

relevant craft;
(b) the removal or storage of any furniture,

tackle and apparel of the relevant craft, or any
cargo, goods, chattels and effects on board the
relevant craft; or
(c) marking, watching, buoying or otherwise

controlling the relevant craft;
may be recovered by the Board from the owners of the

relevant craft.
40. Mr Moore also took me to the Trent Navigation Act 1906 and to section 46(5)
which contained an obligation on the Company to dredge the River Trent
between specific points so as to provide and maintain a channel of a
minimum depth of five feet and of a minimum width of sixty feet at the
bottom and to keep such channel clear and free from obstruction . . . which
might interfere with or obstruct the navigation. In fact, by section 34 of the
Trent Navigation Act 1858, the Company defined as the Company of
Proprietors of the River Trent Navigation, the Navigation being defined as
the River Trent from Wilden Ferry in the Counties of Derby and
Leicester, . . . to Gainsborough and includes the Canal and Side Cuts
constructed , was required to:
cleanse, scour, deepen, enlarge, straighten, contract,

improve and in a good and navigable State and
Condition keep, preserve, and maintain by all necessary
and proper works, Ways and Means, the Navigation, so
as to enable Vessels usually navigating thereon to carry a
Burthen of Forty Tons at least in all Seasons ...
41. In his skeleton argument, Mr Moore also referred to extracts from a debate in
relation to the Bill which became the 1971 Act, recorded in Hansard and to
extracts from Select Committee Minutes. He did not take me to them during
his oral submissions. He stated that it was clear that the intent of the 1971 Act
was to impose the requirement of registration only on boats utilising the main
navigable channel which as a result, benefited from the work done to maintain
navigability. In his skeleton, he set out a passage in which a Mr Jupp QC for
British Waterways explained to the Chairman of the Select Committee:
The licence which a boat owner takes out and pays for
makes him free of the artificial canal system, including
the locks, and gives him the free use of the locks on the
river navigations of the Board. On the rivers the situation
is different. The Board are able to, and do, charge for the
use of locks and people who have not got a canal licence
because they do not keep their boats on the canals pay
Approved Judgment
when they go through locks. Commercial traffic of

course pay tolls on the goods carried by them on the
river navigations so that the Board thereby has a means
of collecting revenue from the commercial traffic and
also from the pleasure traffic which uses locks. On the
other hand, the river navigation involves not only locks.
You can keep a boat on the river and by taking quite
large stretches which there are where there are no locks
you need never go through a lock and therefore need
never pay.
42. He also set out an extract from Hansard in which Mr John Wells MP in
presenting the Bill to Parliament stated:
Until tonight the rivers the Bill will create charges upon
have, in the jargon of the Inland Waterways community,
been called free rivers ...
One of the main points of the river authorities is that

they consider that the charges are fiscal in character and
must fetter the public right of navigation and offer no
tangible benefits in return for registration. I think I have
already dealt with the tangible benefits, which, I freely
admit, are not very great, but neither are the charges very
great, nor is the revenue going to be very great, and if
there is to be speed control and patrolling, then
registration must come about and there must be some
charge.
He also quoted a passage, described as being a statement of a Mr Downey

(Representative of the Minister of Transport) as follows:
... in considering this formal application the Minister

had to consider two things: the acceptability or otherwise
of the proposals to be contained in the Bill and whether
legislation was the right means of dealing with these
proposals. In considering that the Minister had to take
into account the fact that on the rivers in question there
are very ancient public rights of navigation, as the
Committee is already aware, and having regard to that
rather emotive matter it was felt - and the Treasury
Solicitor was consulted before that decision was reached
that it would not have been proper for the Board to have
attempted to achieve its aims by means of byelaws, that
it was necessary that legislation should be introduced for
this purpose.
43. Mr Moore also set out a passage which he described as a comment by Mr

Wells MP as follows:
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The board considers that the increase of leisure activity

resulting in the use of pleasure craft on these navigable
free rivers such as the Severn and Trent whose
navigation it controls necessitates making greater the
possibilities, far from those who use them, of
contributions to the works and services which the board
provides on its rivers, and to achieve this the board
wants to introduce a registration scheme for pleasure
craft navigating on such rivers. It has taken as the
essence of its scheme schemes already in existence
under the Thames Conservancy since the Act of 1966
and on the Norfolk Broads since the Great Yarmouth
Port and Haven Act, 1963.
He quoted a further passage from the speech of Mr Wells MP:
It is reasonable to point out that there must be increased

patrolling, increased sanitary facilities, increased water
facilitiesfresh drinking-water facilities, I meanand
increased lock facilities. I mean not that there will be
more locks but that the locks should be open for longer
hours. These are extra services for which people will be
asked to pay, and it seems to usto me, anywaythat
this is not unreasonable.
The proposed scheme is also of importance to the Board

in that it will enable the board to achieve a measure of
control and management of craft using its waterways, as
the craft will then be identifiable.
Submissions
44. Mr Moore on behalf of Mr Ravenscroft submits that it is important to consider

the meaning of main navigable channel in the context of the common law
right of navigation and the fact that all the relevant legislation is a derogation
from that principle. He reminded me that Mr Deards, who is Head of Legal
at CRT accepted that the public right of navigation had not been abolished in
relation to inland waterways other than canals when the 1968 Act was passed.
He submits therefore, that as long as a vessel is not moored in the main
navigable channel, even though it may not have a licence or certificate, it is
not left or moored . .. without lawful authority for the purposes of the
definition of relevant craft in section 8(1) of the 1983 Act and therefore, the
CRT have no power to remove it under section 8(2).
45. Mr Moore also says that it is important to look to the use of the term main
navigable channel before the enactment of the 1971 Act and, in particular, in
the 1968 Act and the 1965 Byelaws, as a guide to its meaning. He relies upon
the use of the term in Byelaw 19 of the 1965 Byelaws which is accepted by
CRT to mean the thoroughfare in the context in which it appears. He also
says that it is obvious that the term refers to the same channel which the CRT
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and the BWB before it, had an obligation to maintain under section 105 of the
1968 Act to enable navigation. He notes that the vocabulary used in relation
to the maintenance obligation is the same as that in relation to the registration
obligations in sections 6 and 7 of the 1971 Act.
46. Further, he points out that it is not suggested that the maintenance obligation
extended from bank to bank of either a river or a canal. In this regard, he
referred me to extracts from the Fraenkel Report entitled A Study of
Operation and Maintenance Cost which was commissioned by the
Department of the Environment and was produced in 1973. At paragraph
10.5.4, the Report contained an expression of opinion in relation to the
meaning of main navigable channel. It stated:
In our view the words main navigable channel are

used in the Schedules to distinguish the main through
routes of the respective Commercial and Cruising
Waterways from un-navigable river loops, canal
branches and unused sections not essential to through
navigation, and are not apt to discriminate between one
integral component and another of any one waterway. . .
The Report also contained numerous tables of dimensions both of locks and
other facilities and of the vessels using the waterways. As I understand it, it
also set out alternatives in relation to the extent of the maintenance obligation
under the legislation at the time. Mr Moore also took me to a table of depths
and widths which is published. On the relevant stretch of the River Trent the
published dimensions are 11.44 metres in width and 2.38 metres in depth, the
entire width of the River at that point being approximately 54 metres.
47. In this regard, Mr Moore also drew attention to an observation made by the
Waterways Ombudsman and reported in her Annual Report for 2010-11. She
noted at paragraph 12 of her Report, that the CRT can sometimes interpret
legislation in different ways depending on what suits them in particular cases
and pointed to her summary of case 516. In that summary, it was noted that the
CRT interpret the phrase main navigable channel as referring to the whole
width of the waterway. She went on:
I pointed out that that interpretation of main navigable

channel was not the one British Waterways had applied
previously when dealing with complaints about lack of
maintenance under moorings. Then they had argued that
as their maintenance obligation in the Transport Act
1968 applied only to the main navigable channel, they
were not obliged to dredge under moorings, only the
central part of the waterway. British Waterways accepted
that my comments were valid
48. Mr Moore also referred to the ability to further describe the main navigable
channel by reference to a map, set out in section 4(2) of the 1971 Act. It is
not in dispute that there are no such maps in relation to the River Trent.
Approved Judgment
However, Mr Moore says that: such a power is consistent first, with a

definition of main navigable channel which is other than bank to bank of all
but the tributaries, streams and inlets of a river; and secondly, allows for the
movement of the deepest channel in a river, which he accepts may happen
naturally, or due to passing traffic.
49. Further, having made a Freedom of Information request, on 15 September

2011, Mr Moore received a response from the Customer Service Co-Ordinator,
Ms Young, for BWB enclosing a map which delineated the entire width of the
Trent Navigation at Beeston Chalets as the area in which a current River
Licence was necessary for moored craft. Ms Young commented that You will
see that the intermittent green line is drawn on either edge of the section of the
River Trent to show the entire navigation and not, as you believed, drawn to
indicate the main navigable channel. Mr Moore relies on the statement as
consistent with a distinction between the full width of the Navigation and the
main navigable channel.
50. Lastly, Mr Moore says that main must be given a proper meaning. He also
says that it can be equated with or is closely aligned with what has become
known as the Minimum Operational Channel. He highlighted a passage in a
paper by Graham Holland, Head of Asset Management to a WUSIG Meeting
on 13 April 2011. It had a schedule of dimensions attached. It was stated that:
The suggested MOC dimensions is often but not always based on the
minimum width that would allow 2 standard beam boats for that navigation to
just pass .... The MOC dimensions for each canal, river and navigation appear
in a schedule. This includes dimensions for the River Trent. Mr Moore says
that the MOC is the absolute minimum for a main navigable channel.
51. Mr Stoner QC submits first that neither the 1965 Byelaws nor the earlier
statutes are of assistance in construing the 1971 Act because they precede it.
He submits that they would only be of relevance if what is referred to as the
Barass principle applied. That is referred to in Bennion on Statutory
Interpretation - A Code 6th edition at section 210(3). The sub-section is as
follows:
Under the Barras Principle, where an act uses a form of

words with a previous legal history, this may be relevant
in interpretation. The question is always whether or not
Parliament intended to use the term in the sense given by
this early history.
The comment on that sub-section states that under the Barras Principle where
an enactment uses a processed term, that is one upon whose meaning the
courts have previously pronounced, it may be presumed that it was intended to
have that meaning in the enactment. It is accepted that the principle also
applies if there is an event which bears on the meaning of a term used in
subsequent legislation. Mr Stoner says neither is the case here.
52. Concentrating on the 1971 Act itself, he says that the preamble makes its aim
and purpose clear: it was to regulate the proper use of the relevant waterways,
Approved Judgment
to provide services and to create a registration regime for which charges were
to be imposed. He submits that the provisions make no sense if main
navigable channel is to be construed narrowly to mean the deepest part of the
waterway which is used as a thoroughfare or fairway and that such a
construction is contrary to the aim and purpose of the Act itself. He asks
rhetorically, if that were the case, how would the strict liability offences
contained, for example, in sections 5(2) and 9(4) have any certainty about
them and how would the CRT and the BWB before it have proper control over
the waterway and be able to raise revenue in order to fulfil their maintenance
obligations and the provision of services?
53. In this regard, Mr Moore says that offences should be construed strictly and
narrowly in favour of the public and that the uncertainty in relation to
boundaries would arise in any event. He says that it can be resolved by
applying for a map under section 4(2) or one could mark the main navigable
channel with buoys to which Mr Stoner responds that marking with buoys
would be wholly impractical and that as the deepest part of a river changes
from time to time, if Mr Moore is right, one would have to apply for a map
and carry out surveys of all inland waterways at regular intervals and re-
position buoys with regularity.
54. Mr Stoner submits that it is of particular note that the definition of pleasure
boats for the purposes of the 1971 Act is so wide and includes even punts
which one would associate with shallow water. He says that the definition
itself is consistent with the main navigable channel encompassing the river
or navigation, bank to bank but for its unnavigable parts. In addition, he draws
attention to section 5(1) of the 1971 Act which amongst other things provides
that it is not lawful to keep . . . a pleasure boat on a river waterway unless a
certificate . . . is then in force. He submits that the inclusion of keep along
with let for hire and use in that sub-section is not consistent with a
definition of main navigable channel which is restricted to the thoroughfare
or fairway. He says that one does not naturally keep a pleasure boat in the
thoroughfare. He also points out that if Mr Moore were correct, it would be
possible to let a pleasure boat for hire without a pleasure boat certificate, as
long as it did not use the thoroughfare. He says that that would be inconsistent
with the aim of the 1971 Act expressed in the Preamble and cannot be the
ordinary and proper meaning of the words particularly, in the light of the strict
liability offence of contravening section 5(1) contained in sub-section (2).
55. He also points out that in the absence of any marking for the main navigable
channel, which Mr Moore accepts to be the case, it would be necessary to
argue the point on each occasion in relation to a prosecution under section 5(2)
and that this cannot have been the intention of Parliament. He makes the same
point in relation to sub-sections 9(1) and (4) which respectively contain the
requirement for registered boats to have their name and number conspicuously
displayed and create an offence of using such a pleasure boat on river
waterway without such registration marks. Mr Stoner says that in the light of
such matters, the phrase must have been intended to cover bank to bank and to
exclude tributaries, streams, cuts and unnavigable stretches and would be a
nonsense if it were restricted to the thoroughfare.
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56. He submits that this is reinforced by the fact that the Schedule 1 of the 1971
Act contains reference to both tidal and non-tidal waters. He took me to
paragraphs 6.04 6.06 of Wisdoms Law of Watercourses 6th Edition, at
which it is explained that the public have a right to use a tidal watercourse for
navigation in its entirety but that whether particular water is navigable is a
question of fact and depends on the character and nature of the channel. It is
also explained that there is no right at common law to navigate non-tidal
inland waters although a right may be acquired by immemorial usage and
other means. Mr Stoner submits therefore, that in such circumstances, his
construction of main navigable channel is consistent with both tidal and
non-tidal waters and avoids confusion. It includes the main waterway and
excludes tributaries, streams, cuts and creaks. I should add that in this regard,
Mr Moore says that Mr Stoners construction does not work because the
waterways listed in the schedule are not just river systems. They include
navigations.
57. If he is wrong and the provisions of the 1968 Act are relevant as an aid to
construction of the 1971 Act, Mr Stoner points out that the statutory obligation
to maintain contained in section 105 is not limited to dredging and applies to
commercial and cruising waterways which pursuant to section 104 and
Schedule 12 are the main navigable channels of the listed waterways. Mr
Stoner submits that the natural meaning of the phrase in the context of the
maintenance obligation applies bank to bank and not solely to a narrow
channel which might be created after the event and also had the capacity to
move. He points out that the maintenance obligation includes for example, the
maintenance of water levels on artificial watercourses, maintenance of
infrastructure and the control of vegetation.
58. He submits that a real window on the meaning of main navigable channel
can be found when one views sections 104 and 105 in the light of section
107(1) 1968 Act. It restricts the duty of the BWB under section 10 of the 1962
Act to provide services and facilities on the inland waterways owned and
managed by them to the commercial waterways and cruising waterways only.
The duty as redefined is applicable to the main navigable channel because of
the definition of commercial waterways and cruising waterways in
Schedule 12 of the 1968 Act. Mr Stoner says that it is plainly appropriate if
those waterways are the whole of the main channel from bank to bank and
wholly inappropriate if the main navigable channel is in fact limited, as Mr
Ravenscroft contends, simply to the main navigation fairway or thoroughfare.
He also submits that although section 105, which imposes the maintenance
obligation, does not use the term navigation it does refer to the obligation of
securing the waterways for public use for suitable craft, which implicitly is a
reference to navigation.
59. Mr Stoner also points out that the Fraenkel Report post dated the 1971 Act and
therefore, can be of no assistance in construing it. He says that the Minutes of
the Select Committee to which Mr Moore referred in his written submissions
and to the extracts from Hansard are both inadmissible and of no assistance.
He says that the criteria in Pepper v Hart are not met and that in any event the
Approved Judgment
documents referred to do not contain a clear statement by a promoter of the

Bill.
Conclusion:
60. I approach the task of construction of main navigable channel with Arden
LJs approach in 9 Cornwall Crescent London Ltd v Mayor & Burgesses of the
Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea (supra) firmly in mind. I must
construe the phrase in its legislative context and policy context, as shown by
any admissible material, such as Law Commission reports, explanatory notes
accompanying legislation, travaux prparatoires and (in certain cases)
Hansard.
61. Before going any further, I should state that I do not consider that the extracts
from Select Committee Minutes or from Hansard to be admissible. In my
judgment, the criteria in Pepper v Hart are not met. It does not seem to me that
the relevant provisions of the 1971 Act are ambiguous, obscure or lead to
absurdity. Even if they did, I do not consider that the extracts from Hansard
and Select Committee Minutes contained in Mr Moores skeleton argument
contain clear statements by the Minister or promoter of the Bill which are
relevant to the task of construction in hand.
62. What then is the proper construction of the phrase main navigable channel in
Part II of the 1971 Act? It seems to me that taking into account both the
legislative and the policy context and the purpose of the 1971 Act itself, it
cannot be correct that the phrase main navigable channel is confined to the
deepest part of any river, canal or navigation which is used from time to time
as a thoroughfare or fairway. It seems clear from the Preamble to the 1971 Act
that its purpose or aim was the imposition of a licensing system in order
properly to regulate the use of waterways and to raise revenue for the
provision of related services. With that context in mind, Mr Moores
construction would make a nonsense of the control and registration provisions
contained in the 1971 Act and would render their operation all but impossible.
It would be surprising if main navigable channel were construed in a way
which only required licences to be obtained in respect of a narrow band of
unmarked and undefined water in the centre, or perhaps not in the centre of the
river or canal. It would render the entire regime of the 1971 Act unworkable.
On that basis, it seems to me that the statutory context is such that Mr
Ravenscrofts interpretation cannot be correct.
63. This is all the more so in the light of the fact that it is accepted that the
thoroughfare or fairway on the River Trent is not delineated and may change
from time to time. No doubt the position is the same on most of the inland
waterways for which the CRT is responsible. I do not consider that the
difficulty is resolved by the ability to apply for a map. It seems to me that the
power in section 4(2) of the 1971 Act is not apt to enable the production of a
map by order of the Secretary of State each time the route of the thoroughfare
of a waterway changes. If Mr Moore were right, it would be necessary to
conduct frequent surveys of all inland waterways for which CRT is responsible
in order to obtain up to date details of the position of the deepest channel and
Approved Judgment
to record the same on a map made by order of the Secretary of State. It seems
to me that the map produced to Mr Moore as a result of his Freedom of
Information request in 2011 takes the matter no further forward. It is not
suggested that the map was produced pursuant to section 4(2) of the 1971 Act
or that anything can be gleaned from the comments made by the Customer
Service Co-Ordinator.
64. I also agree with Mr Stoner that his wider construction is consistent with the
existence of the strict liability offences in sections 5(2) and 9(4) of the 1971
Act. If main navigable channel were construed in the way which Mr Moore
suggests there would be no certainty as to whether those offences had been
committed. In my judgment, it cannot have been Parliaments intention to
create strict liability offences the parameters of which are uncertain. Further,
although I place much less weight upon it, I also agree with Mr Stoner that his
wider construction is also consistent with the very wide definition of pleasure
boat in the 1971 Act.
65. The wider construction is also consistent with section 5(1) of the 1971 Act
which includes the term keep and let for hire. If Mr Moores construction
were correct, a pleasure boat certificate would only be required if a vessel
were kept or let for hire in the thoroughfare of the river in question. It
seems to me that it is not consistent with the purpose of the 1971 Act set out in
the Preamble. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is not normal to assume that
a pleasure boat will be kept in such a thoroughfare at all.
66. In fact, although it post-dates the 1971 Act and therefore, is not relevant as an
aid to construction (and I do not take it into consideration in that regard) I
consider that the natural and ordinary meaning of main navigable channel
was described in general terms in the Fraenkel Committee Report. The term is
used to distinguish between the entirety, bank to bank of the main through
routes of the respective Commercial and Cruising Waterways from un-
navigable river loops, canal branches, unused sections, cuts and creeks not
essential to through navigation. If such a construction is adopted all the
remainder of the legislative provisions are workable and make sense. In my
judgment, therefore, it is the correct construction and equates with that put
forward by Mr Stoner on behalf of the CRT.
67. I come to that conclusion despite the use of the phrase main navigable
channel in Byelaw 19 of the 1965 Byelaws. It seems to me that the use is
context specific. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that Parliament
intended the phrase to bear the same meaning in the 1971 Act as it did in the
1965 Byelaws. On the contrary, as I have already decided, it seems to me that
such an intention would be contrary to the scheme of the 1971 Act. In any
event, I was not referred to an authority on the meaning of the phrase which
pre-dated the 1971 Act or to an event prior to 1971 which would bear on the
meaning of the phrase in the 1971 Act. For completeness, I should also add
that I did not find reference to the 1975 and 1976 Byelaws to be of any direct
assistance.
Approved Judgment
68. I also agree with Mr Stoner that the provisions of the 1968 Act are of no
assistance in construing the provisions of the 1971 Act for the same reasons
which apply to the 1965 Byelaws. In any event, in my judgment, they do not
assist Mr Moore in the way in which he suggests. The obligation in section
105(1)(a) is to maintain the commercial waterways in a suitable condition for
use by commercial freight-carrying vessels. By virtue of Part I of Schedule
12, commercial waterways are defined as the main navigable channels of
the rivers, navigations and canals which are listed. Suitable condition is
expanded upon in sub-section 105(2) by reference to the dimensions (length,
width, height of superstructure and draught) of the vessels customarily using
the waterway in the nine months preceding 8 December 1967. As Mr Stoner
pointed out, there is nothing to suggest that the maintenance obligations in
section 105 are confined to dredging a central channel or thoroughfare. They
are general, albeit limited by reference to the dimensions of the vessels
described in sub-section 105(2), including notably, the height of the
superstructure of such vessels. Accordingly, it seems to me that the obligation
might well include necessary steps to be taken on or near the banks of a
waterway and may include for example, maintenance of locks, bridges and/or
tow paths and the removal of overhanging vegetation. Although I am not
required to determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the phrase main
navigable channel in Schedule 12 of the 1968 Act, given the breadth of
section 105, it seems to me that it is not naturally confined to a deep channel
or thoroughfare as Mr Moore would have it.
69. Further, I do not consider the fact that CRT may have sought to argue that its
maintenance obligation is limited to the thoroughfare, when before the
Waterways Ombudsman takes the matter any further forward.
70. For the sake of completeness, I should add that I did not find the references to
the Minimum Operational Channel of assistance. I was not informed as to
whether the term has any statutory basis and the information to which I was
referred did not itself refer to the main navigable channel. In the
circumstances, I derive nothing from the use of the term or the existence of
dimensions for specific waterways. Although I do not take it into account, it
seems to me that the existence of such dimensions referable to a term other
than main navigable channel in fact, militates against main navigable
channel being confined to the thoroughfare on a waterway.
71. In my judgment, therefore, Mr Stoners construction is to be preferred. It

makes sense in the context of the relevant legislation as a whole and the
purpose of that legislation. Accordingly, the Three Wise Monkeys should
have had a valid pleasure boat certificate and without such a certificate it was
not lawful to keep it on the River Trent in the place where it was moored: see
section 5(1) of the 1971 Act.
(ii) Human Rights Act proportionality
72. Mr Ravenscroft also contends that the removal of the Three Wise Monkeys
from the River Trent was a breach of his rights under the Human Rights Act
Approved Judgment
1998, in particular, under Article 1 of the First Protocol which is headed

Protection of property and is in the following form:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
73. In this regard, Mr Moore says on behalf of Mr Ravenscroft that even if the
Three Wise Monkeys required a licence in the position in which it was
moored and therefore was unlicensed and even if it was unlawfully on the
river despite a common law right of navigation, CRT was wrong to use its
section 8 powers to remove the vessel from the water. He says it ought to have
used the more proportionate means at its disposal. He points out that CRT
could have: recovered the arrears by prosecuting Mr Ravenscroft under section
5(3) of the 1983 Act; it could have recovered the arrears of licence fees as a
debt under section 7(2) of the 1971 Act and section 5(2) of the 1983 Act; or it
could have marked and buoyed the vessel under section 8(3)(c) of the 1983
Act. He says it should only have used section 8 after all else had failed. He
says that that is the approach adopted by the Environment Agency on the
waters for which it is responsible.
74. In this regard, Mr Stoner took me to The Human Rights Act 1998, Wadham
7th ed at paragraph 8.07 which appears under the heading: Protocol 1, Article
1, Protection of Property. It is stated that three distinct rules arise from the
case of Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35. They are that to
establish that there has been prima facie interference with the right to property
it must be shown that: the peaceful enjoyment of the applicants possessions
has been interfered with by the state; the applicant has been deprived of his
possessions by the state; and the applicants possessions have been subjected
to control by the state. It makes clear that interference, deprivation or control
will not violate Protocol 1 Article 1 if done in the public interest or to
enforce such laws [as the state] deems necessary to control the use of property
in the public interest.
75. It also states at paragraph 8.30 that ECtHR has held that the second paragraph
of Article 1 should be construed in the light of the general principal enunciated
in the opening sentence of Article 1. It goes on to state: Controls on use of
property are therefore subject to the fair balance test in the same way as
deprivations of possessions. This principle was set out in R (Countryside
Alliance and Ors) v Attorney General and Anr [2007] UKHL 52, [2008] 1 AC
719. That was a case which was concerned with the validity of the provisions
Approved Judgment
of the Hunting Act 2004. Mr Stoner referred me to [155] of the speech of Lord
Brown in which he addressed Article 1 rights in the following way:
155. The justification required for depriving someone

of their possessions is merely that this be in the public
interest. Similarly the use of peoples property can be
controlled by the state if that is deemed necessary in the
public interest. The state must establish a legitimate aim
in the public interest and the deprivation involved must
be proportionate to that aim. A fair balance must be
struck between the demands of the general interest of the
Community and the need to protect the individuals
property rights, a balance that will not be found if the
individual has to bear an excessive burden. There is,
however, as the European Court of Human Rights made
clear in James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123,
para 51, no test of strict necessity to be found in this
article. That being so, and the interference with the
appellants property rights here being comparatively
slight, I am prepared to regard the moral objection of the
majority as a sufficient public interest justification.
76. Mr Stoner also referred me to R (Clays Lane Housing Co-operative Ltd) v The
Housing Corporation [2005] 1 WLR 2229. In that case, the claimant sought
judicial review of the decision by the Housing Corporation to direct the
claimant to transfer its land, against its will, to another registered social
landlord instead of permitting the voluntary transfer to another housing co-
operative. The appeal was concerned solely with whether it was
disproportionate for the Housing Corporation to adopt a course which was not
the least intrusive of the claimants rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol.
Maurice Kay LJ stated:
13. There is no doubt that these decisions were

informed and influenced by the decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in James v United Kingdom
(1986) 8 EHRR 123. The issue in that case related to the
impact of article 1 of the First Protocol on the rights of
tenants under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 to acquire
the freehold of their properties at a price below market
value. The court identified the aim of the 1967 Act as
being the remedying of an injustice whereby a long
leaseholder who may have expended large sums of
money improving and maintaining his property was
required to return the property to the lessor at the end of
the lease without compensation. The court observed, at p
145, para 50: there must. . . be a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be realised. It then set out and rejected the
landlords case in the following passage, at p 145, para
51:
Approved Judgment
According to the applicants, the security of tenure

that tenants already had under the law in force
provided an adequate response and the draconian
nature of the means devised to give effect to the
alleged moral entitlement, namely deprivation of
property, went too far. This was said to be
confirmed by the absence of any true equivalent to
the [Leasehold Reform Act 1967] in the municipal
legislation of the other contracting states and,
indeed, generally in democratic societies. It is, so
the applicants argued, only if there was no other less
drastic remedy for the perceived injustice that the
extreme remedy of expropriation could satisfy the
requirements of article 1. This amounts to reading a
test of strict necessity into the article, an
interpretation which the court does not find
warranted. The availability of alternative solutions
does not in itself render the leasehold reform
legislation unjustified; it constitutes one factor,
along with others, relevant for determining whether
the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable
and suited to achieving a legitimate aim being
pursued, having regard to the need to strike a fair
balance. Provided the legislature remained within
these bounds, it is not for the court to say whether
the legislation represented the best solution for
dealing with the problem or whether the legislative
discretion should have been exercised in another
way. The occupying leaseholder was considered by
Parliament to have a moral entitlement to
ownership of the house, of which inadequate
account was taken under the existing law. The
concern of the legislature was not simply to regulate
more fairly the relationship of landlord and tenant
but to right a perceived injustice that went to the
very issue of ownership. Allowing a mechanism for
the compulsory transfer of the freehold interest in
the house and the land to the tenant, with financial
compensation to the landlord, cannot in itself be
qualified in the circumstances as an inappropriate or
disproportionate method for readjusting the law so
as to meet that concern,
This approach was followed in Holy Monasteries v

Greece (1994) 20 EHRR 1 and Chassagnou v France
(1999) 29 EHRR 615. It was also followed by Lightman
J in R (Fisher) v English Nature [2004] 1 WLR 503, in
which James v United Kingdom was cited by the judge,
at para 46, as authority for the proposition that The fact
that there may be other even better methods of achieving
Approved Judgment
the same ends does not necessarily mean that any

particular measure is disproportionate under article 1.
It is evident that in the present case Keith J founded his
conclusion on this line of authority.
...
20. The centre piece of the Strasbourg jurisprudence

on this point is James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123.
The European Court of Human Rights, at para 51,
plainly rejected a test of strict necessity and
emphasised the need to strike a fair balance in
relation to article 1 of the First Protocol. The speech of
Lord Steyn in Dalys case [2001] 2 AC 532, para 27,
adopts the language of no more than ... necessary to
accomplish the objective. Although Dalys case
concerned article 8 it was no doubt because it has been
authoritatively applied more generally, and specifically
to article 1 of the First Protocol (see International
Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2003] QB 728, per Simon Brown LJ, at
para 51) that Mr Stanley accepted in the course of his
submissions that necessity is a requirement of
proportionality in the present case. His point is that
necessity is a more flexible concept than the strict
necessity that was rejected in James v United Kingdom.
In particular, he submits, it does not compel and is not to
be equated with the least intrusive option. To this extent,
he seeks to distinguish Samaroos case [2001] UKHRR
1150, another article 8 case.
77. Mr Stoner also took me to a passage from the first edition of Judicial Review
Principles and Procedure by Auburn, Moffett and Sharland concerned with
proportionality under the Human Rights Act 1998. At paragraph 18.19 it is
stated that a proportionality test is applied when assessing whether an
interference with a qualified right can be justified as necessary in a democratic
society. In a footnote it is stated that the proportionality review for the
purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol is less intensive than in relation to
other articles. It is also noted at paragraph 18.30 that the minimum
impairment requirement must be deployed with caution: . . what is
important is whether the objective can be achieved by a less intrusive measure
without significantly compromising that objective.
78. Lastly, in this regard, I was referred to Bank Mellat v Her Majestys Treasury
(No 2) [2014] AC 700, a case concerning financial restrictions imposed under
section 62 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Lord Sumption considered the test to
be applied at [19] and [20] in the following way:
19. It follows that the essential question raised

by the Banks substantive objections to the direction is
whether the interruption of commercial dealings with
Approved Judgment
Bank Mellat in the United Kingdoms financial markets

bore some rational and proportionate relationship to the
statutory purpose of hindering the pursuit by Iran of its
weapons programmes.
20. The requirements of rationality and

proportionality, as applied to decisions engaging the
human rights of applicants, inevitably overlap. The
classic formulation of the test is to be found in the advice
of the Privy Council, delivered by Lord Clyde, in de
Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC
69, 80. But this decision, although it was a milestone in
the development of the law, is now more important for
the way in which it has been adapted and applied in the
subsequent case law, notably R (Daly) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 (in
particular the speech of Lord Steyn), R v Shayler [2003]
1 AC 247, paras 57-59 (Lord Hope of Craighead).
Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2007] 2 AC 167, para 19 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill)
and R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2012] 1 AC 621, para 4. Their effect can be
sufficiently summarised for present purposes by saying
that the question depends on an exacting analysis of the
factual case advanced in defence of the measure, in order
to determine (i) whether its objective is sufficiently
important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right;
(ii) whether it is rationally connected to the objective;
(iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been
used; and (iv) whether, having regard to these matters
and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance
has been struck between the rights of the individual and
the interests of the community. These four requirements
are logically separate, but in practice they inevitably
overlap because the same facts are likely to be relevant
to more than one of them. Before us, the only issue about
them concerned (iii), since it was suggested that a
measure would be disproportionate if any more limited
measure was capable of achieving the objective. For my
part, I agree with the view expressed in this case by
Maurice Kay LJ that this debate is sterile in the normal
case where the effectiveness of the measure and the
degree of interference are not absolute values but
questions of degree, inversely related to each other. The
question is whether a less intrusive measure could have
been used without unacceptably compromising the
objective. Lord Reed JSC, whose judgment I have had
the advantage of seeing in draft, takes a different view on
the application of the test, but there is nothing in his
Approved Judgment
formulation of the concept of proportionality (see his

paras 68-76) which I would disagree with.
79. Mr Stoner submits therefore, that the question is not merely whether there was
an alternative to the measure adopted. He says that neither a prosecution nor a
claim for a debt are necessarily less intrusive measures and that marking and
attaching buoys under section 8(3)(c) of the 1983 Act is only relevant if the
vessel were sunk or stranded. In any event, he points out that section 8 is not
about the recovery of money. He says that its purpose is to facilitate the proper
management of the waterway in order to ensure safety and that vessels on the
river are insured. He submits therefore, that the legitimate aim of section 8 is
to remove vessels which are not lawfully on the waterway from the point of
view of good management and safety. In this regard, he relies on the evidence
of Mr Grimes which was adopted by Mr Deards, as to the substantial increase
in the boats on CRTs managed waterways and the pressure caused in a finite
space, the need to control that use and to raise revenue. Mr Stoner points out
that it is necessary to maintain a fair balance between those objectives and the
interests of the public in using the river for navigation. He adds that it is
important to view this case in context and on its own facts and points out that
there were seven notices served either on the Three Wise Monkeys itself or
at Mr Ravenscroft last known address without any response.
80. He also says that although the approach of the Environment Agency may be
different, there having been 324 prosecutions and only 17 removals during a
period the length of which is unclear, its powers are also different. Under
paragraph 16 of the Environment Agency (Inland Waterways) Order 2010 the
Agency has power to remove or relocate a vessel which is not registered but
also has power under paragraph 17 to require the owner or master of a vessel
to give information including the name, address and identity of the owner and
under paragraph 18, it is an offence not to do so. He says that CRT do not have
those powers and in this case, could not be certain of the identity of the current
owner of the Three Wise Monkeys and accordingly, would not have been in
a position to prosecute.
81. In response, Mr Moore referred to sections 5(2) and 7(2) of the 1971 Act and
pointed out that the former refers to any person contravening section 5(1)
being liable to a fine and that the latter refers to a liability in respect of the
master of the vessel which is defined to include, any person whether the
owner, the master or other person lawfully or wrongfully having taken control
of the vessel. He says therefore, that the comparative legislation is not
different.
82. Mr Stoner also points out that the vessel was returned to Mr Ravenscroft
before these proceedings were commenced, that there is no evidence of any
loss caused and accordingly, there can be no question of damages being
awarded under section 8 Human Rights Act 1998.
83. At paragraph 26 of the Amended Particulars of Claim there is also reference to

a violation of Articles 6 and 7 of Part 1 of the Convention Rights because it
is said that CRT acted without any relevant paperwork establishing Court
Approved Judgment
involvement required by the relevant legislation. Mr Moore did not pursue

this element of the case before the court and I make no further mention of it.
Conclusion:
84. First, in my judgment, it is quite clear that the power contained in section 8 is
not one which can only be exercised once other powers have been exercised as
Mr Moore suggests. On its express wording, it is free standing. In any event,
as the cases make clear, the relevant question is: (i) whether the objective of
section 8 is sufficiently important to justify the limitation upon Mr
Ravenscrofts property rights; (ii) whether section 8 is rationally connected to
the objective; (iii) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used
without unacceptably compromising the objective of section 8; and (iv)
whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the
consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the
individual and the interests of the community.
85. In my judgment, the purpose and objective of section 8 relates to the proper
and safe management of the waterways and is not directly connected to licence
fees. Its objective is to keep the waterways safe and accessible for all craft
which use it and properly to regulate that use for all. Section 8 relates to
circumstances in which boats are abandoned and stranded as well as when
they are unlawfully on the waterway. It seems to me that the objective I have
described is sufficiently important in the circumstances to justify the inroad
into the right to property which it entails. If the CRT were not able to exercise
such a power in appropriate circumstances, the waterways which they manage
would be less safe and accessible to all.
86. I also consider that there is no question that given its wording, section 8 is
directly connected to its objective. It is concerned with the removal from the
inland waterway of vessels or parts of vessels which are sunk, stranded,
abandoned or left or moored without lawful authority. In my judgment
removal in such circumstances is directly connected with the safe and proper
management of the waterways for all users.
87. It also seems to me that although there are other measures which can be
adopted to recover arrears of licence fees, the power in section 8 is not
directed to that end and therefore, those powers, being the power to prosecute
and to recover arrears as a debt are not directly comparable or relevant. As I
have already stated, I consider the objective of section 8 to be the safe and
proper management of the waterway rather than the recovery of arrears.
Therefore, the question of whether there is a less intrusive measure which
could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective does
not arise.
88. However, if the ability to recover arrears of licence fees by way of a debt or
prosecution were directly comparable with section 8, I would have decided
that whilst prosecution was not less intrusive, recovery of a debt would have
been.
Approved Judgment
89. In any event, has a fair balance been maintained between the rights of the
individual and the interest of the community? I am satisfied that it has. It
seems to me that it is necessary to keep the waterways properly regulated for
the benefit of the whole community and that accordingly, it is appropriate to
take such steps as are necessary to remove boats in the circumstances set out
in section 8. In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that as long as the
owner is known, the vessel is not confiscated and can be recovered on
payment of the storage and removal charges. This it seems to me, is a proper
and fair balance between the competing interests of the community and rights
of the individual.
90. Accordingly, there is nothing in this point and it is unnecessary to consider

whether this a situation in which damages should be awarded under the
Human Rights Act 1998.
(iii) Statute of Marlborough distress
91. Mr Moore on Mr Ravenscrofts behalf says that it was quite clear that a
condition for return of the Three Wise Monkeys was the payment of arrears
of licence fees: it was demanded orally by Mr Garner at the Marina and was
set out as a condition in some of the correspondence from Shoosmiths on
behalf of CRT.
92. He submits that although the letter from Shoosmiths on behalf of CRT to Mr
Ravenscrofts previous assistant, Ms Tracey Thomas of 10 March 2015
separated out storage charges from arrears of licence fee and stated that the
Three Wise Monkeys would be returned if the former were paid although a
total made up of storage charges and licence fees was due, in the emails of 19
March and 2 April 2015, from Lucy Gray on behalf of CRT to Ms Thomas and
to Mr Ravenscroft respectively it was stated that the vessel would be released
upon payment of a total sum of 12,676 which included licence fee arrears. In
a previous email sent by Helen Underhill on behalf of CRT to Ms Thomas
dated 16 February 2015, a breakdown of seizure and storage charges was
provided together with a breakdown of arrears of licence fees and a total
amount owing was shown.
93. Furthermore, Mr Moore says that there was no mistake about it. It was clearly
CRTs policy to recover arrears of licence fees in this way and it was set out
on their website until recently.
94. He submits that this is a breach of the Statute of Marlborough 1267. Sections 1
and 4 of that Act are as follows:
1. Whereas at the time of a Commotion late stirred

up within this Realm, and also sithence, many great Men,
and divers other, refusing to be justified by the King and
his Court, like as they ought and were wont in Time of
the Kings noble Progenitors, and also in his Time; but
took great Revenges and Distresses of their Neighbours,
and of other, until they had Amends and Fines at their
Approved Judgment
own Pleasure: and further, some of them would not be

justified by the Kings Officers. nor would suffer them to
make Delivery of such Distresses as they had taken of
their own Authority; It is Provided, agreed, and granted,
that all Persons, as well of high as of low Estate, shall
receive Justice in the Kings Court; and none from
henceforth shall take any such Revenge or Distress of his
own Authority, without Award of our Court, though he
have Damage or Injury, whereby he would have amends
of his Neighbour either higher or lower.
And upon the foresaid Article It is Provided and granted,

that if any from henceforth take such Revenges of his
own Authority, without Award of the Kings Court as
before is said, and be convict thereof, he shall be
punished by Fine, and that according to the Trespass; and
likewise if one Neighbour take a Distress of another
without Award of the Kings Court, Whereby he hath
Damage, he shall be punished in the same wise, and that
after the Quantity of the Trespass; and nevertheless
sufficient and full Amends shall be made to them that
have sustained Loss by such Distresses.
...
4. None from henceforth shall cause any Distress

that he hath taken, to be driven out of the County where
it was [taken]; and if one Neighbour do so to another of
his own Authority, and without Judgment, he shall make
Fine, as above is said, as for a Thing done against the
Peace; nevertheless, if the Lord Presume so to do against
his Tenant, he shall be grievously punished by
Amerciament. Moreover, Distresses shall be reasonable,
and not too great; and he that taketh great and
unreasonable Distresses, shall be grievously amerced for
the Excess of such Distresses.
95. Mr Moore says that CRT should be punished for having levied unlawful
distress because it took possession of the Three Wise Monkeys and then
demanded arrears of licence fees as part of the condition for return of the
vessel despite the fact that section 8(4) of the 1983 Act makes clear that on
payment of storage and removal charges amongst other things, it shall return
the vessel. He says that even if the possession was lawful, it was being used
for unlawful means.
96. CRT accepts and admits that it was not entitled to seek payment for the licence
arrears as a pre-condition for the return of the Three Wise Monkeys.
However, it contends that it did not levy distress which is described in the 4 th
Edition of Words and Phrases Legally Defined as:
Approved Judgment
primarily [connoting] a summary remedy by which a

person is entitled without legal process to take into his
possession the personal chattels of another person, to be
held as a pledge to compel the performance of a duty or
the satisfaction of a debt or demand.
97. It is submitted that CRT was in lawful possession of the Three Wise
Monkeys pursuant to section 8, the vessel having been removed from the
River Trent because it was on the water without a pleasure boat certificate
which was unlawful under section 5 of the 1971 Act. Mr Stoner says that:
there is no evidence that it was removed from the River in order to recover the
licence fees; and it was not seized because of licence arrears or for the purpose
of obtaining payment of those arrears. Mr Stoner points out that none of the
notices served on the vessel made mention of fees at all.
98. However, it is admitted that after the vessel was removed from the water,
whilst still in the Marina, Mr Garner referred to the payment of 8,000 or
9,000 in order to have the vessel put back in the water, and that that figure
must have included an element of arrears of licence fees. In this regard, Mr
Stoner pointed out that Mr Garners reference to licence fees should be
understood in the context that he was expressly asked about them. It is also
accepted that in subsequent correspondence the sum demanded as a condition
for return of the vessel included arrears of licence fees. However, it is
submitted that the vessel was not detained longer as a result and that there was
no offer purely to pay the storage and removal charges despite the fact that the
correspondence reveals that Mr Ravenscroft was aware of the distinction.
99. Mr Stoner submits that if he is wrong and distress was levied, the Statute of
Marlborough does not apply in any event. He says that section 1 is concerned
with illegal distress and section 4 with excessive measures in relation to what
would otherwise be legal distress. He submits that the taking of the vessel was
not illegal and there is no evidence that there were cheaper means which
should have been deployed.
100. As the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (the 2007 Act) and the
Tort (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 (the 1977 Act) were also
mentioned in Mr Moores skeleton although not pursued before the court, Mr
Stoner also addressed those statutes. In short, he submits that the 2007 Act and
sections 62 65 which are concerned with enforcement by taking control of
goods is of no relevance because none of the relevant Waterways legislation is
referred to in Schedule 13. In relation to the 1977 Act, he submits that the
vessel was returned before the proceedings were commenced and therefore the
provisions of the Act have no application.
Conclusion:
101. As I have already made clear, I do not consider that the exercise of section 8
powers is inherently concerned with the recovery of arrears of licence fees. It
is concerned with the proper and orderly management of the waterways and
the maintenance of safety, including the provision of insurance for vessels
Approved Judgment
upon those waterways. Having said that, it is clear that the figure quoted when
the vessel was lifted from the water on 27 January 2015, included arrears of
fees and that it was not until 10 March 2015 that the matter was presented in
an appropriate matter, excluding those arrears from the figure required to
recover the vessel. Thereafter, a composite figure was quoted in
correspondence once again.
102. However, it seems to me that distress was not levied and therefore, neither
section 1 nor section 4 of the Statute of Marlborough is relevant. The vessel
was removed from the water pursuant to and for the purposes of section 8 of
the 1983 Act. It was not taken into the possession of CRT in satisfaction of the
arrears of licence fees. As Mr Stoner points out, none of the notices whether
served on the vessel or at Mr Ravenscrofts postal address made any reference
to arrears of fees.
103. It was extremely unfortunate that arrears of fees were rolled up in the figure
quoted at the Marina, that it took so long to present the matter properly and
that mistakes were made in correspondence subsequently. I also note the
policy which appeared on the CRT website until recently. However, in my
judgment, the removal of the vessel from the waterway was pursuant to
section 8 and did not relate to the arrears. Accordingly, it seems to me that it
was not removed from the water as a remedy without legal process for the
recovery of a debt.
104. Even if I am wrong about that and distress was levied when the Three Wise
Monkeys was removed from the River Trent, in addition to the exercise of the
section 8 powers, in my judgment, no loss was suffered whether for the
purposes of an action on the case under section 1 or section 4 of the Statute of
Marlborough. CRT was entitled to incur and to recover the storage and
removal charges incurred in the exercise of its powers under section 8 of the
1983 Act: section 8(3). Further, CRT was entitled to recover arrears of licence
fees under section 5 of that Act. There is no evidence of any further loss. At
the very best, if distraint were levied whether unlawfully or by excessive
means, Mr Ravenscroft might have been entitled to nominal damages.
105. Were it in issue, I would also agree with Mr Stoner that the 2007 Act is not
relevant. The relevant waterways legislation is not included in Schedule 13 of
the 2007 Act and therefore, its terms do not apply. Further, the vessel was
returned before the proceedings were commenced and therefore the only
possible claim which might have been advanced under the 1977 Act would
have related to trespass to goods. This has not been articulated in any way and
in any event, there is no evidence of any loss in relation to the removal of the
Three Wise Monkeys from the River Trent on 27 January 2015 and its return
to Mr Ravenscroft on 6 May that year.
106. For the reasons set out above, Mr Ravenscrofts claims are dismissed.
- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
Approved Judgment
APPENDIX
POINTS CHALLENGED BY CRT IN STATEMENT OF MR RAVENSCROFT
(Paragraph Number/what is challenged)
1. Not accepted the vessel has been sold.
2. Not accepted a sale was agreed in December 2014 (or at all)
3. Not accepted (as with all such references) that the Trust were stealing the boat.
6. Not accepted Stuart Garner acted in an intimidating manner.
7. Not accepted that Stuart Garner lashed out, pushing a phone into face.
11. Not accepted (if it is intended to suggest as much) that the police officer was saying
that payment of licence arrears would sort out the situation.
12. Not accepted the Trust employees simply refused to answer other than saying will
speak to you later.
16. Not accepted the letter showed previous address: it showed the same address as given
to the Court.
21. Not accepted canopies were ripped off.
26. Not accepted the Trust said they did not want the owner.
27. Not accepted the Trust employees found the situation funny.
30. Not accepted 2 hours had passed
35. Not accepted Mr Ravenscrofts father made an offer to pay
40. Not accepted any criminal damage was done to the canopies (or at all).
45. Not accepted that the Trust said if the matter was not sorted within 6 weeks the Trust
would claim ownership and sell or dispose of the vessel.
47. Not accepted there was essential paperwork on the vessel (unless reference is to the
notices posted on the vessel)
51. Not accepted that Mr Garner said the vessel would be held for 6 weeks whether sums
paid or not.
62. The way this is put is not accepted: it is accepted the Trust agreed not to include the
costs in the sums that had been sought. Did not distinctly insist that licence fees must
be paid (as distinct from it being part of the overall sum sought).
71. Not accepted that the Judge on appeal in the County Court suggested the appeal on
costs could be joined with High Court proceedings.
Approved Judgment
POINTS CHALLENGED BY MR RAVENSCROFT IN STATEMENTS
MR GARNER
Para. 4 Not accepted that there are any canal beds, channels etc at the Farndon
Ferry site with any implied CaRT ownership, if so intended; the
riparian owner is alongside natural river, owning the bed to the centre.
Para. 6 Not accepted that a licence is required. If in the main navigable

channel then a Pleasure Boat Certificate is mandatory, not the Pleasure
Boat Licence.
Para. 20 Not accepted that Claimant was physically aggressive in the manner
described; he was retreating as Mr Garner walked towards him, not the
other way around.
Para. 21 Not accepted that good warning given to cameraman before lashing out
at the camera.
Para. 24 Not accepted that anyone was aggressive in any way towards the CBS
personnel, though accepted that there was verbal aggression towards
police and Mr Garner.
Para. 25 It is vigorously denied that anyone loosened the wheel-nuts of the

truck. The driver was in the cab of the truck the whole time, police and
marina staff were everywhere, and in any event the tool required would
be out of the ordinary.
Para. 34 Is simply outdated. The application for permission to appeal has been
adjourned to a full Appeal Court hearing in December this year.
Para. 41 It is denied that Shoosmiths or the Defendant responded at all, at any

time, to the repeated claim that licence arrears need not be a condition
for retrieval of the boat, let alone in the email referred to.
Para. 43 the implication that any supporters of the Claimant loosened the wheel-
nuts is denied.
Para. 46 Not accepted that response to the exhibited letter was simply a refusal;
a 2 page email was sent with a counter proposal that seemed to the
Claimant to be an even better saving of court and litigant time and
expense.
MR GRIMES/DEARDS
Para. 13 Not accepted that the river Trent was created if that is intended to
imply a legal position equal to the canals vis--vis the public right of
navigation as later claimed [but correctly disavowed by Mr Deards].
Approved Judgment
Page l of 2
Para. 14&15 It is not accepted that finite space available has much relevance to
the area concerned in this claim; it is certainly true of localised areas
such as London.
Para. 17 & 18 Denied just for the record Mr Deards having correctly acknowledged

this to be untrue, but -

Para. 19 Follows with Accordingly. It is not accepted that the content of this
. .
paragraph can be viewed in isolation from the rejected premises. It is

not accepted that agreement to terms and conditions are required for
issue of a licence or certificate, and it is denied that breach of any
condition other than those listed in s.17 of the 1995 Act empowers
revoking of a pleasure boat licence or certificate [houseboat
certificates, by contrast, being tied to the terms and conditions set out
in the Act, and those imposed unilaterally as empowered under the
1971 Act].
Para. 20 It is denied that the Transport Act 1962 forms the basis for mandatory
boat licences, which requirement was only imposed in 1976 following
relevant empowerment to do so under the British Waterways Act 1975.
Imposition of further conditions MAY be imposed by byelaw under
that Act, but the primary legislation of 1995 was chosen as the
preferred avenue instead.
Para. 22 It is not accepted that a pleasure boat licence or certificate is subject to

unilaterally imposed terms and conditions as seems to be implied.
Using or keeping a licensed or registered boat is subject to the primary
and secondary legislation governing such keeping or using, but that is
distinct from the grounds for issuing the pleasure boat licence or
certificate in the first place.

FINAL - Ravenscroft V CRT

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FINAL - Ravenscroft V CRT

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Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWHC 1874 (Ch)

Case No: HC-2015-001906

Royal Courts of Justice

THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE

MR LEIGH RAVENSCROFT Claimant

Leigh Ravenscroft - Litigant in Person (Represented by Nigel Moore (McKenzie Friend)

Hearing dates: 22, 23 and 24 May 2017

THE HON MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN DBE

Mrs Justice Asplin :

1. This is a dispute between Mr Leigh Ravenscroft, the owner of a boat named

3. If he is wrong about the ambit of the main navigable channel, Mr

5. At paragraph 17 of the Amended Particulars of Claim, under the heading

6. Although it is not pleaded, in his witness statement, Mr Ravenscroft also refers

The Trent Navigation from Shardlow to the tail of Meadow

9. Mr Ravenscroft is a litigant in person. By an order of Chief Master Marsh

10. The CRT was represented by Mr Stoner QC.

12. The majority of Mr Ravenscrofts witness statement is concerned with the

16. On 14 February 2014, Mr Garner wrote a letter to Mr Ravenscroft referring to

We have still not received your completed application

we will immediately being the process of removing your

You have 28 days to obtain your licence and you need to

19. No response having been received from Mr Ravenscroft in relation to any of

20. Thereafter, on 10 February 2015, Mr Ravenscroft applied to the Nottingham

21. On 16 February 2015 in an email from Helen Underhill on behalf of CRT to

22. However, in a subsequent email of 19 March 2015, from Lucy Gray of

24. In cross examination, Mr Ravenscroft accepted that his postal address

27. In relation to the letter of 10 March 2015 from Shoosmiths, solicitors on

29. Mr Deards confirmed in cross examination that section 8 is used as a remedy

(i) Main navigable channel

Principles of statutory construction

50 Where the true meaning of a statute is in doubt, and in

The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods

teleological approach of European Community

52 By context, I mean the legislative context, and the

I therefore reach the conclusion, subject to any question

Legislative background and relevant provisions

The services and facilities referred to in subsection (3)

34. Mr Moore on behalf of Mr Ravenscroft also took me to the British Waterways

(1) A pleasure boat when meeting, overtaking or being

In his written submissions, Mr Stoner QC also referred to byelaw 3 of the

35. To return to the legislation in chronological order, by section 104 Transport

(a) to maintain the commercial waterways in a

navigation over a waterway includes references to any right to use or keep a

inland waterway means any canal or inland navigation

prescribed charge in relation to any pleasure boat or

4. (1) This Part of this Act applies to the main

(2) The description of any waterway contained in

5. (1) It shall not be lawful to keep, let for hire or use

(2) Any person who contravenes subsection (1) of

River waterways are set out in Schedule 1. It includes reference to the

There shall be paid to the Board for the registration

(1) In this section

owner in relation to any relevant craft means the

relevant craft means any vessel which is sunk, stranded

(2) The Board may remove any relevant craft after

(3) All expenses incurred by the board in

(a) the removal, storage or destruction of the

(b) the removal or storage of any furniture,

(c) marking, watching, buoying or otherwise

may be recovered by the Board from the owners of the

cleanse, scour, deepen, enlarge, straighten, contract,

when they go through locks. Commercial traffic of

One of the main points of the river authorities is that