Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JOSEPH CATALANO
Department of Philosophy, Kean College of New Jersey, Union, NJ 07208
the self. The presence, however, o f what we may here call the ideal
self to the self is b o t h more intimate to and different from that of
the presence o f the full m o o n to the crescent moon. The full
m o o n is present to the crescent m o o n insofar as it gives meaning
to the m o o n as a phase. It is only in imagination that we picture
the full m o o n drawing to it the phases o f the moon. There is no
true efficient or final causality in this external relation. Further,
the full m o o n is a completed totality; the full m o o n can indeed
be realized.
The ideal self is, however, present to the self as a detotalized
totality; that is, the ideal self constantly recedes as I approach
it. To be more accurate, the ideal self is a detotalized totality in-
sofar as it includes in its ideal b o t h the possibility that I will be
more than I am, and the question that I might be different than
I n o w am. In this respect, value is the surpassing o f all my sur-
passings in two senses.
First, I seek to surpass the self that I would like to be in the
future. For example, if I seek success, I seek also to be b e y o n d
the struggle for success. Likewise, the true revolutionary already
seeks a self that is both an awareness of the revolution and be-
y o n d the struggles of the revolution. Second, value is the nega-
tion of all m y surpassings in the sense that I am free to question
the entire complex o f a self-seeking-to-be-an-ideal-self. Sartre's
philosophy implies that this second sense in which value can be
the surpassing o f all my surpassings can again be taken in two
senses.
The first is the more ordinary sense in which Sartre speaks
about changing our original project. The revolutionary can be-
come a reactionary; he can renounce all his former values. For
Sartre, this is one o f the more interesting senses of freedom.
Sartre is not concerned about those deliberations that occur
within our project, but rather with our possibility of changing
projects. Although conversions are possible, they are rare be-
cause they require so much on our part. We can indeed change.
"But at w h a t a price? " ( B N , p. 454)
Sartre, however, implies that there is another more radical
sense in which value is the surpassing o f all our surpassings. Here
we approach the limits of language, because this value does not
exist until the very praxis that aims at establishing it exists. This
420
use our freedom to create the a priOri conditions that will in turn
limit our freedom or the freedom of others, as is done in colonial-
ism and racism, for example; or we can attempt to establish the
conditions for the possibility o f ourselves and others expanding
our freedom.
There is, however, an evolution in Sartre's thought on the
ways our free actions establish a priori values in the world. In
Being and Nothingness, the notion o f value is related to what
Sartre there called the free project. "The free project is funda-
mental, for it is m y being.' (BN, p. 479) This, and other com-
ments like this, have occasioned some commentators to speak o f
Sartre's notion o f freedom as absolute. But this claim is ambigu-
ous; there is no other freedom, for Sartre, except human freedom,
and to be human is to be situated. We speak o f human freedom as
being limited only because we first conceive o f the freedom o f
an angel or God. With this caveat in mind, it is nevertheless true
that Sartre grew to appreciate the~ difference between an histori-
cal situation and a local environment, and in this respect, there
is a development in Sartre's thought from Being and Nothingness
to the Critique o f Dialectical Reason.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre recognized that the freedom
o f the oppressed was not the same as the freedom o f the oppres-
sor. This difference in freedom could not, however, be one o f
degree, for such a view would imply an Aristotelian conception
o f the human b o d y as potentiality. Rather, for Sartre, the dif-
ference is that the value o f the oppressor's freedom is the limit
o f the freedom o f the oppressed. "Because I am a Jew I shall be
deprived - in certain societies - o f certain possibilities, ete . . . .
What is going to be the result o f this for the situation? We must
recognize that we have just encountered a real limit to our free-
dom - that is, a way o f being which is imposed on us without
our freedom being its foundation.' (BN, p. 524)
Sartre is here beginning to qualify the notion o f situation.
Every free act is situational, and, in this respect, the situation
does not limit freedom. I must have a specific body, and I have
no choice in the b o d y I am born with. In the abstract, freedom is
different, but not limited by situations. Social situations present
a complication, because here the other's freedom aims at limiting
us. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre still sees the Jew as having a
423
choice. The Jew could reject being a Jew, and thus not adopt the
limitations imposed by the anti-Semite. Clearly this solution is
not satisfactory; in renouncing his Jewishness, the Jew may also
be renouncing his sociality.
What " o u g h t " the Jew to do? Being and Nothingness is an
ontology, and it does not consider the question o f "ought." In
Anti-Semite and Jew, Sartre reexamines the issue and no longer
feels constrained to limit himself to an ontology. The ethical
issue is raised; the authentic Jew should choose to be a Jew in
the face o f anti-Semitism. Sartre recognized that this solution is
also unsatisfactory, because while it may seem to save the Jew
as an individual, it leaves the social structure o f anti-Semitism
untouched. "Thus the choice of authenticity appears to be a
moral decision, bringing certainty to the Jew on the ethical level
but in no way serving as a solution on the social or political level:
the situation of the Jew is such that everything he does turns
against him..3
For Sartre, the Jew confronts a Manichean notion of freedom.
Sartre interprets the doctrines o f Manes as claiming that both
good and evil are positive forces. If one conceives of evil as a
positive force rather than as the privation o f good, then evil
can be attacked directly. The reason that wars make the meaning
o f life simple is that, for a time, the enemy is an evil that is also a
positive being. Destroy the enemy and the good o f victory is
secured. It is a truism that this good is not the good o f peace,
and after a war the proper attitude is to turn attention to the
ambiguous and unending task o f building the peace. There are
some people and some nations, however, that long for the clarity
o f war. They see the world in terms of good and evil forces.
Sartre calls this a Manichean outlook, because good is seen as a
force that will o f itself overflow the world, once evil is eliminated.
A society that believes that its evils are caused by a criminal class
or by another nation sees its only task as the elimination o f the
so-called criminal class or threatening nation. The anti-Semite,
as a modern Manichean, sees the Jew as others see a so-called
criminal class or apparent threatening nation, that is, as the
personification o f evil. All the ills of society result from t h e
presence o f the Jew, and thus the task o f creating good in society
is the same as that o f eliminating the Jew. For Sartre, the anti-
424
Some years later, in his study, Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr,
Sartre again recognized that his earlier solution was incomplete.
The tragedy in the situation in which the freedom of some at-
tempts to limit the freedom o f others was not really examined.
Genet, who everyone saw as a thief, becomes the thief everyone
needs. Genet becomes a thief, because he seeks to be the authen-
tically social person. Genet accepts that others need him to be
subhuman in order that they may be " h u m a n . " Society also re-
quires that the subhuman appears to be so from nature. Genet
thus chooses to be explicitly conscious both of the choice of
limiting himself and o f making this limitation to appear as some-
thing created by nature. "To live is now to watch himself live.
It is to acquire a deeper understanding of his condition every
single instance as a whole and in its detail, in order to assume it
unreservedly, whatever it may b e . He takes his bearings every
second. ''4 The world tries to make Genet into a small evil pre-
cisely in order to justify its own small ambitions, but Genet
throws back at the world an invented evil that devours their
p e t t y goods. "Although he may occasionally relapse into resent-
ment, in the manner o f very young children who momentarily
425
All the characters which the world recognizes as evil are seen to
result necessarily from a hierarchy leading down to the God-Who-
Is-Not, that is, to Genet. "He reconstructs that real on every page
of his books in such a way as to produce for himself proof of his
own existence of God, that is, of his own existence." (Genet,
p. 469) Genet thus demystifies the Manichean outlook of the
adults, who pretend that they are forced against their will to
punish him, when, in fact, they need him and have created him.
Notes
this article, this work will be hereafter cited as Critique. See also Joseph
S. Catalano, Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical
Reason,' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 140-141.
6. For a discussion of the way value is related to the self in Sartre's study
of Flaubert, see Hazel E. Barnes, "Sartre's Concept of the Self," Review
of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry 17. I (Sartre Issue).