You are on page 1of 6

1NR

Taiwan
Extend 1NC #( ) no Taiwan Invasion two warrants
A. Hurts Public Perception by forcefully taking over Taiwan, China would
be perceived as a forever-malicious nation that hurts their strategy to
be the hegemon
B. Uncertainty of True Unification theres a difference between beating a
nations army and pacifying the country resistance to unification
spurs defiance on the mainland, which outweighs thats Keck
C. It isnt technologically feasible for them to invade they know they
dont have the military power and any war would be short and
wouldnt escalate thats Babones
D. Chinas goal is for the KMT to win back Taiwans Presidency in 2020
theyre putting pressure on voters, not planning an invasion.
Kastner 16 Jens Kastner, Taiwan Correspondent for the Asia Sentinel, 2016 (Expect More
China-Taiwan Tensions, Asia Sentinel, May 23rd, Available Online at
http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/china-taiwan-tensions-to-increase/, Accessed 07-11-2016)

With newly-sworn Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen wriggling around a Beijing demand that she verbally
acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, a cryptic version of the One China principle agreed by her China-friendly Kuomintang predecessors,
China is likely to wage a four-year campaign to convince the island of the folly of voting for the
mainland-wary Democratic Progressive Party ( DPP). There will be no honeymoon. The government faces multiple

challenges, many emanating from China. There have been military exercises in the S outh China Sea as a
warning to the Tsai regime to abide by the 1992 Consensus. There undoubtedly will be additional
indirect military pressure on Taiwans 23.4 million people and the government although military action is unlikely while
Beijing continues to concentrate on united-front work in order to rally more segments of Taiwanese
society, including those dissatisfied with the DPP or with a vested interest in doing more business
with China. Beijing has already sought to bring Taiwan back into line by cutting tourism numbers and
making it more difficult for Taiwanese to do business on the mainland . It is likely to be a futile
strategy, if the past is any prologue. Young Taiwanese have increasingly resisted Beijings
blandishments, with antipathy to the mainland playing a major role in Tsais solid 56 percent majority
win over two opposing candidates in the January 2016 general election. In her inaugural address on May 20, the scrappy 60-year-old former law professor
concentrated on a center-left agenda focusing on the concerns of the younger generations and the need to put history aside by launching a truth and conciliation process
Xi Jinping earlier upped the ante by proclaiming that the earth
in order to heal the wounds of Taiwans autocratic past. Chinas President

will move and the mountains will shake if the 1992 Consensus was is not accepted. But Tsai didnt
do him the favor mentioning it by name, let alone acknowledge that there is One China. Instead, she said,
Taiwan and China in 1992 only agreed to set aside differences to seek common ground. She indirectly gave something of a nod to a blurry version of One China,
referring to the existing Republic of Chinas constitutional order as well as Taiwans Act on the relations between peoples of both sides of the Strait, a hint to her
adherence to the idea that the ROC includes both Taiwan and mainland China. Great speech, quite different from Chen Shui-bians [who as Taiwans first DPP president
governed from 2000-2008], as she did not say anything negative, such as no future for One China, noted Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Professor and head of the Department of
it wont be enough for China since
Government and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University, in an interview with Asia Sentinel. But

she did neither mention One China nor the 1992 Consensus. Cabestans predictions are downbeat. He believes that
Beijing will now go about downgrading meetings between Chinas and Taiwans bodies for cross-
straits negations (ARATS and SEF respectively); narrow Taiwan international space; and continue reducing the
number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan. But at the same time, Cabestan said, Beijing will not cut all links
with Taiwan because it wants Taiwan to become more dependent on China and not the opposite,
given that it wants to lay the ground for a return of the KMT to power.
Extend 1NC #( ) Taiwan Straits conflict doesnt escalate two warrants
A. Their escalation scenario is based off of an epistemologically bankrupt
interpretation of Chinese leadership their pragmatic not irrational
nihilists
B. The CCP policy is rooted in self-preservation they wont sacrifice
everything created since 1949 for an island thats Cole

Prefer our evidence Cole is a Senior Fellow at Nottinghams China Policy


Institute specifically indicting the underlying assumptions of the AFF it a
meta-question

Its economy outweighs China will not sacrifice growth for the annexation of
Taiwan
Cole 15 (J. Michael, is a senior fellow at the University of Nottingham's China Policy Institute, If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up
to China over Taiwan, The National Interest, 5/7/15, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-
12825?page=show)

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over
Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a bunch of
deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a core
issue, it is in my view unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal
over the matter of Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble Chinas
economy over Taiwan by launching major military operationsall the more so if there is a promise
that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international
community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international
community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if
we believe itand Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to doas winning
without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)
Solvency
China says no to the grand bargain a few warrants from Lingwall
A) Its a bad offer China believes its claim over Taiwan is indisputable
they already think they own it and economic unification has already
occurred effectively they know the threat of Chinese military forces
dissuade Taiwan from independence which means they think unification
is inevitable if not already happening in the squo Taiwan fails as a
bargaining chip because China is already an influential power means
they see no reason to make concessions over something they own
B) The accept US presence quo China is moving towards assertive
diplomacy in the status quo accepting US presence directly counters
that tensions in the SCS and ECS prove that they are unwilling to
compromise when US forces get involved outweighs the benefits
because China has prioritizes countering US hegemony
C) The resolve territorial disputes quo its difficult to enforce because
China is overwhelmed with claims in Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines
there are too many to concede China doesnt want to undermine its
rep as a maritime power is comparably more symbolically important
than Taiwan even if they say yes it induces CCP officials to take
unpredictable and aggressive strategies concessions cant be verified

Extend 1NC Lingwall China cheats a couple of reasons


A) China hates US interference and hegemony
B) Could rollback the conditions of the agreement whenever
C) China hates to look weak and appeasing to US demands in front of
China
D) Its unenforceable
An 15 David An was formerly a tenured US diplomat who covered China, Taiwan and
East Asia in the State Department, Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014. He
helped coordinate several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of
the US Embassy in Beijing and throughout East Asia. (David, "Glasers Simple Idea: Trade
Taiwan for China," Ketagalan Media, 7/15/15,
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-trade-taiwan-
china/)\\BPS
The concept of anarchy in international relations theory provides the rationale. States exist in anarchy, which does not mean
If
utter chaos, but rather means that the world lacks an overarching world government to enforce agreements or promises.
the US backs away from Taiwan, international relations theory maintains that there is little
to nothing that the rest of the world could do to prevent China from imposing whatever will
it has toward Taiwan, despite any previous agreement or promise. The United Nations, International
Criminal Court and other institutions cannot effectively punish states or sitting heads of state as effectively as domestic
institutions could with their full sovereignty to rule. A world government does not exist with jurisdiction to
resolve disagreements or enforce rule of law; therefore China could promise one thing and do
another. Glasers theory simply assumes a grand bargain with China will, somehow, be kept by
China. Neither does Glasers theory address the reverberating effects of the US abandoning Taiwan for US partners and allies
in the region. The safest course of action for Taiwan is to maintain its freedom to choose its own
political, social, and economic future for the longest extent possible. The so-called 1992 Consensus
has allowed both sides of the Taiwan Strait their respective interpretations of the cross-Strait status quo under the rubric of
One Chinawith China saying One China is under the Peoples Republic of China, and Taiwan saying the two sides are
unified under its Republic of China. This kind of ambiguous policy constructs have allowed the Chinese Communist Party and
the Kuomintang to sidestep the issue of sovereignty, while Taiwan has so far grasped onto enough leeway to choose its own
direction. Taiwans political choices have allowed it to blossom into a mature democracy, which is something that is typically
not allowed in China. Taiwans
future is its own to decide only if it continues to enjoy the USs
support and commitment. Though I highly respect and admire much of Glasers academic work, I cannot support his
provocative conclusions. A more humanistic and historical theoretical framework would show the value of continued US
support for a loyal partner, more than a rational theory that embodies much thinking but little heart.

E) Pre-bargain activities thump


Roy, 15 - Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, Research Program at
the East-West Institute; PhD in Political Science at the University of Chicago (Denny, The
Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan 6/24,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-
dumping-taiwan-13177
The grand bargain idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington. From Beijings
point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it believes it already owns for
something else it believes it already owns. If they did agree, how the bargain would be operationalized is
unclear. What would it mean for China to officially accept U.S. alliances and military bases in the
Asia-Pacific? This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly principled
opposition to any country having Cold War era alliances and foreign bases. At the same time, it is
easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup, maneuvers
with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea, etc.) while claiming these were not
attempts to drive U.S. influence out of the region.

F) China thinks that they already own Taiwan if it aint broke, then
dont fix it
Lingwall 15 (Noah, Intern to the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College
and Student at the Shreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania State University, "The
Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It," The Diplomat, 8/8/15,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/opinion-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-
dont-fix-it)\\BPS
The effectiveness of a bargaining chip is predicated on whether or not the other party fears
losing control of that bargaining chip. From Chinas point of view, its claim over Taiwan is
indisputable. So why would China make concessions over a bargaining chip it believes it
already owns? China already has a powerful economic hold over Taiwan. In addition to economic
interdependence, the past several years have also witnessed an increase in direct flights and sea transportation between the
two nations. Businesspeople commonly make one-day trips across the Taiwan Strait. An effective unification is already well
underway in the economic realm.

Let our Glaser indicts frame your evidence comparison notice that hes 70% of
the evidence theyve read Glaser is wrong about East Asia
A) Hes new to the topic he only recently switched to studying China
previously he studied Russia and European countries which are
fundamentally different Glaser takes opposite positions from more
established and lifelong researchers of East Asia who advocate for
containment like Tellis, Blackwell, and Swaine internal link turns the aff
because it means competition is better than cooperation [filters their
offense on the appeasement disad]
B) Glasers theory is ahistorical he uses the grand bargain as an example
of engagement not as an actual policy option
An 15 David An, former U.S. diplomat who covered China, Taiwan, and East Asia in the State
Departments Political-Military Bureau between 2009 and 2014 where he helped coordinate
several US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues and worked out of the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing and throughout East Asia, 2015 (Glasers Simple Idea: Trade Taiwan for China,
Ketagalan Media, July 15th, Available Online at
http://www.ketagalanmedia.com/2015/07/15/glasers-simple-idea-trade-taiwan-china/,
Accessed 06-28-2016)

Third, Glaser seems to use Taiwan as no more than a convenient rhetorical specimen for
illustrating his theory, than a serious case study. Why just Taiwan? Rational theorys logical
implication of the US backing away from a single smaller partner to prevent conflict with that
partners adversary is also analogous of Israel versus Arab states. Why didnt Glaser make the
bold claim that the US should abandon Israel, and thereby improve relations with the Arab
states, based on the logic of his rational theory? I am not advocating for this course of action,
but merely pointing out that such an idea is borderline taboo since it would be career suicide to
pick a fight against Israel and its backers. His colleagues John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt
caught much flak for examining what they concluded was an overly influential Israel lobby in the
United States, far less than suggesting that the US break off support for Israel.

Instead, Glaser targets Taiwan.

In short, Glaser, himself not an expert in the intricate histories and personalities of the China
and Taiwan conflict, tries to fit the case of Taiwan neatly into a theory that has traded
applicability for elegance. American policymakers and academics should find that there is no
need to think about giving up support for Taiwan, because doing so will incur grave implications
in exchange for little to no benefit of possibly improving US-China relations.
Three implications to this
1. You start risk calc of their advantages at 0% because he faces a higher
burden of proof - even if Glaser is right about 40% of his defensive
realism theories 40% of his theories about engagement and 70%
about the importance of Taiwan thats a 0.112% risk of the scenario
let alone impact defense and other solvency deficits
2. You prefer our evidence over theirs on the disad even if Glaser is right
about some things hes wrong about fundamental aspects of the US
and Chinas positions in IR means you default to our authors because
theyve studied China their entire professional career let Glaser act as
an analytic analysis instead of definitive evidence
3. You prefer the thesis of the DA over the aff Glaser uses the bargain as
an example while our authors advocate for specific action towards
Taiwan pretend the aff doesnt have a solvency advocate

You might also like