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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE JOINT INQUIRY - Commitee Sensitive ‘Team Fie: OODIState Document Number: Prepared By: Dave Barton Reviewed By: Everette Jordan (U) INTERVIEWEE: Diplomatic Security, State (U) SUBJECT: Visa Freud al U.S. Embassy, Doha, Qatar (U) Interview Method: In person (U) Place: State, Room 6313, Bureau of Diplomatic Security (U)Date: August 29, 2002 (FOU) Participants: JIS: Evorette Jordan Oave Barto (O) RECORD OF INTERVIEW ‘We requested this interview in order to receive from the State Department their account of incidents reported in the press related to visa fraud at the U.S. embassy in Doha, Qatar involving 2 Jordanian incividual, We were told thal Diplomatic Security at State was handling the case and this interview was set up. At the beginning ofthe interview it was specified that all the information was unclassified unless otherwise stipulated. The entire interview and briefing were conducted at the unciassified level. However, the information is aw enforcement sensitive. ‘Joffrey Culver is the Division Chief in the Office of Passport and Visa Fraud Investigations in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at State. He offered to give us a chronological briefing on the Doha investigation at the unclassified level. He.began by stating that arrests had been made in the ‘case. He specified that in December of 2001 Diplomatic Security received information from the FBI about a Jordanian national who (Classification) ‘94/2002 12:03 PM 1 02693 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE had paid $10,000 to an employee within the Doha embassy for two visas. These leads from the FBI were then sent out to Doha end Diplomatic Security's regional representative in order to fin out what had occurred. They found the visa issuances in the database but found no visa ‘applications nor any receipt of payment forthe visas. This indicated that the issuance was llegal ‘and Diplomatic Security requested the assistance of Consular Affairs in order to pursue the case, They searched in the issuance and refusal database and matches this against their records of visa applications and discovered the issuance of 70 illegal visas over a period of several ‘months(12 montis) and then they searched an edsitiona’ 3 months in each direction so that their ‘search covered a time period of 18 months, These 70 ilegal visas had the same profile, visas issued but no visa application and no fee payment, ‘The Jordanian indivicual who had paid for the two visas was named Razmi al-Shannaq and by May, 2002 Diplomatic Security was ready to search and arrest him since they knew he was living in the Baltimore erea. They had proved by that time that he had not been in Doha at the time his visa was issued and there was sutticient evidence to search and arrest him on charges of visa fraud. They presentes their evidence to the United States Attorney's Ottice in Baltimore and the judge gave them permission to search but not his computer. On June 14, 2002 his residence was searched. On June 24, 2002 the search was expanded to include his computer and he was taken into INS custody. Connections to the visa fraud involving the other 70 individuals was found. Once in custody, he admitted to residing with Hani Hanjour and Nawafal-Hazmi, Therefore, he is Delieved to have resided with hijackers Hanjour and Hazmi for approximately two months, March ‘and Apri 2001. One additional fraudulent vise recipient, a Jordanian named Anmed Ahmed, also admitted, once arrested that ne had also vec with the same hijackers and al-Shannaq during the seme period of time. LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE ‘ Se 03000 %Y LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE Due to tis connection of a-Shannaa tthe two hijackers, Diplomatic Secryimmesalty called fora meeting wih FE, INS, and US Altorey's ofes fo plot a srategy to pursue al 70 freudulent visa recipients and dlscuss the nernaltnalterorst plication of ths visa fraud Case, At that meeting on June 28,2002 N was decid tat Diplomate Securty shoul take the lead in searching out te 70 invivals since they woud be charged uncer tne vse fraud statute, 18 USC 1940, but that NG and FBI and the JTTTICT regione! oftos would al cooperate and Support te DS lead. $0, Immedially. 2 nalionwide search was launched and called Operation Eagie Sire. Tey were also abe to get he US Aforey in Maryland to fake te enlarged case 1S reported that the TTF have 2een a ig help and tnere has deen god law enforcement ‘cooperation and support from DBA, FBI, and INS. The results: by July 5" 31 arrests had been made nationwide wrin many confessions. These confessions leo tne eporenension of he to Uisa brokers a Jordanian who was artested in ordan ana confessed n July, and @ Pakistan who ‘was arrested in Qatar and confessed in July. By August 28” the number of arrests had risen to 188. DS essesses that thore are 12 more individuals at large inthe U.S. and #0 outside the US Some of those arrested inthe (Ciassticaton) Stazoce 12.03 eM 2 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE USS. have requested expedited deportation but DS has argued persuasively wih judges thus far thal nese ndivdvals should be prosecuted so Ina hed record wil show a felony court, which Should make t more dficul or fem ever fo re-enter he US. The US Aitomey offees are Cooperating in pursuing prosecuton whereas. proto 9/1, tis was rarely done wh visa rad Cases, There are some women and chicren volved and prosccution wil ot be sought n thet Cases ot, th fer, aof he maiesaporehended wil be prosecuted. The US Atorney in Balimore ein te ead: DS nas a smal taskforce ofS analysts and agents workng the casein ‘2dton to thei regional DS agnts and thay are all working cosely withthe ther agencios end the srt. DS spected that, a fr as ey know now, here ae ely the 2indviduals,Atned Ahmed an Razmi al-Shannaq, who had direct connection to any of the 19 September 11" hijackers. When bressee about other questionable igures amongst ine 70 OS sad that tne also knew of Wo tines, one wth sore Dackground working for & chemical company and ove wth a Flaziat permit OS was rot sure wnat other name end backgroune chaste were being ran onthe 70 but Esoumed that CIA and Fl were running checks, DS also spectied hat as fr as iney knew a of he visa were BIB-2 visas, When we asked inthe US, 0S Tavdulent visas and DS sated at her assumption was that many, if not al of these individuals might not have met the normal visa requirements and therefore they needed visas without being screened. The nest aspect ofthe briefing by Mr. Culver dealt with the investigation of how the visa issuance had occurred at the embassy In Doha. They were looking at the internal mechanisms at the ‘embassy for visa issuance, Some form of manipulation ofthe visa process lock place and their investigation is designed to determine exactly whet happened. \ his point in the investigation 1/10 3" country nationals who worked al the embassy are under suspicion. They have botn resigned. They hed access as foreign service nationals tothe data entry portion ofthe visa issuance. They do not know what was compromised. They explained whal safeguards exist inthe ‘embassy procedures in terms of an audit wal, inventory control, and systems logs. So, they nave had many ways of tracking what individuals at the embassy might have done. They stated thet they are working dligenty to find out what happened anc to identify the responsible parties, including any American citizens working at the embassy who might have been involved. They ‘aid that a this point they could no telus whether any American employees atthe embassy were under suspicion of Being involved but they were not ruin i out. They explained in some detail he data entry function and the watchlist check function and the inventories, audits, and system logs. One sof point might have been the compromise of @ password used by a consular LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 2 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE atfers officer to actualy accomplish the visa issuance which isnot avaliable to the foreign service nationals(in this case 3° country foreign service nationals since in Qatar Qataris do not do that {ype of work atthe embassy). An (Gassitcation) 91472002 12:03 M3 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE ‘ditional safeguard which wil be instituted soon is 8 process of scanning inthe vise applications anc usifying them agains the visa issuance ston @ much more regular basis to check the matchup. DS informed us tha the State IG has already begun an investigation of the case and wil pursue it even though the casei stil acve and contining in Dah. DS assessment al this ime is thal the 70 fraudulent visas were part of a money-making scheme rather than ary pat of terrorist pot but they have not ruled out anything. DS specified thatthe natorales of he 70 inctosed mosty Jordanians and Pakistanis as well as one Bangladeshi, one Syrian, and one Kuwait DS indicated to us thatthe Balimore US Attorney in the lead on the case fs Harvey Eisenberg ‘Another person involved in the ital phases ofthe case was Stuart Goldberg in The Department of Justice's Public teary Section 94/2002 12°03 PM 4 LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE 3

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