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JOINT INQUIRY - Commitee Sensitive
‘Team Fie: OODIState Document Number:
Prepared By: Dave Barton Reviewed By: Everette Jordan
(U) INTERVIEWEE: Diplomatic Security, State
(U) SUBJECT: Visa Freud al U.S. Embassy, Doha, Qatar
(U) Interview Method: In person
(U) Place: State, Room 6313, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(U)Date: August 29, 2002
(FOU) Participants:
JIS: Evorette Jordan Oave Barto
(O) RECORD OF INTERVIEW
‘We requested this interview in order to receive from the State Department their account of
incidents reported in the press related to visa fraud at the U.S. embassy in Doha, Qatar involving
2 Jordanian incividual, We were told thal Diplomatic Security at State was handling the case and
this interview was set up. At the beginning ofthe interview it was specified that all the information
was unclassified unless otherwise stipulated. The entire interview and briefing were conducted at
the unciassified level. However, the information is aw enforcement sensitive.
‘Joffrey Culver is the Division Chief in the Office of Passport and Visa Fraud Investigations in the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security at State. He offered to give us a chronological briefing on the Doha
investigation at the unclassified level. He.began by stating that arrests had been made in the
‘case. He specified that in December of 2001 Diplomatic Security received information from the
FBI about a Jordanian national who
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had paid $10,000 to an employee within the Doha embassy for two visas. These leads from the
FBI were then sent out to Doha end Diplomatic Security's regional representative in order to fin
out what had occurred. They found the visa issuances in the database but found no visa
‘applications nor any receipt of payment forthe visas. This indicated that the issuance was llegal
‘and Diplomatic Security requested the assistance of Consular Affairs in order to pursue the case,
They searched in the issuance and refusal database and matches this against their records of
visa applications and discovered the issuance of 70 illegal visas over a period of several
‘months(12 montis) and then they searched an edsitiona’ 3 months in each direction so that their
‘search covered a time period of 18 months, These 70 ilegal visas had the same profile, visas
issued but no visa application and no fee payment,
‘The Jordanian indivicual who had paid for the two visas was named Razmi al-Shannaq and by
May, 2002 Diplomatic Security was ready to search and arrest him since they knew he was living
in the Baltimore erea. They had proved by that time that he had not been in Doha at the time his
visa was issued and there was sutticient evidence to search and arrest him on charges of visa
fraud. They presentes their evidence to the United States Attorney's Ottice in Baltimore and the
judge gave them permission to search but not his computer. On June 14, 2002 his residence was
searched. On June 24, 2002 the search was expanded to include his computer and he was taken
into INS custody. Connections to the visa fraud involving the other 70 individuals was found.
Once in custody, he admitted to residing with Hani Hanjour and Nawafal-Hazmi, Therefore, he is
Delieved to have resided with hijackers Hanjour and Hazmi for approximately two months, March
‘and Apri 2001. One additional fraudulent vise recipient, a Jordanian named Anmed Ahmed, also
admitted, once arrested that ne had also vec with the same hijackers and al-Shannaq during the
seme period of time.
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Due to tis connection of a-Shannaa tthe two hijackers, Diplomatic Secryimmesalty called
fora meeting wih FE, INS, and US Altorey's ofes fo plot a srategy to pursue al 70
freudulent visa recipients and dlscuss the nernaltnalterorst plication of ths visa fraud
Case, At that meeting on June 28,2002 N was decid tat Diplomate Securty shoul take the
lead in searching out te 70 invivals since they woud be charged uncer tne vse fraud statute,
18 USC 1940, but that NG and FBI and the JTTTICT regione! oftos would al cooperate and
Support te DS lead. $0, Immedially. 2 nalionwide search was launched and called Operation
Eagie Sire. Tey were also abe to get he US Aforey in Maryland to fake te enlarged case
1S reported that the TTF have 2een a ig help and tnere has deen god law enforcement
‘cooperation and support from DBA, FBI, and INS. The results: by July 5" 31 arrests had been
made nationwide wrin many confessions. These confessions leo tne eporenension of he to
Uisa brokers a Jordanian who was artested in ordan ana confessed n July, and @ Pakistan who
‘was arrested in Qatar and confessed in July. By August 28” the number of arrests had risen to
188. DS essesses that thore are 12 more individuals at large inthe U.S. and #0 outside the US
Some of those arrested inthe
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USS. have requested expedited deportation but DS has argued persuasively wih judges thus far
thal nese ndivdvals should be prosecuted so Ina hed record wil show a felony court, which
Should make t more dficul or fem ever fo re-enter he US. The US Aitomey offees are
Cooperating in pursuing prosecuton whereas. proto 9/1, tis was rarely done wh visa rad
Cases, There are some women and chicren volved and prosccution wil ot be sought n thet
Cases ot, th fer, aof he maiesaporehended wil be prosecuted. The US Atorney in
Balimore ein te ead: DS nas a smal taskforce ofS analysts and agents workng the casein
‘2dton to thei regional DS agnts and thay are all working cosely withthe ther agencios end
the srt.
DS spected that, a fr as ey know now, here ae ely the 2indviduals,Atned Ahmed an
Razmi al-Shannaq, who had direct connection to any of the 19 September 11" hijackers. When
bressee about other questionable igures amongst ine 70 OS sad that tne also knew of Wo
tines, one wth sore Dackground working for & chemical company and ove wth a Flaziat
permit OS was rot sure wnat other name end backgroune chaste were being ran onthe 70 but
Esoumed that CIA and Fl were running checks,
DS also spectied hat as fr as iney knew a of he visa were BIB-2 visas, When we asked
inthe US, 0S
Tavdulent visas and DS sated at her assumption was that many, if not al of these individuals
might not have met the normal visa requirements and therefore they needed visas without being
screened.
The nest aspect ofthe briefing by Mr. Culver dealt with the investigation of how the visa issuance
had occurred at the embassy In Doha. They were looking at the internal mechanisms at the
‘embassy for visa issuance, Some form of manipulation ofthe visa process lock place and their
investigation is designed to determine exactly whet happened. \ his point in the investigation
1/10 3" country nationals who worked al the embassy are under suspicion. They have botn
resigned. They hed access as foreign service nationals tothe data entry portion ofthe visa
issuance. They do not know what was compromised. They explained whal safeguards exist inthe
‘embassy procedures in terms of an audit wal, inventory control, and systems logs. So, they nave
had many ways of tracking what individuals at the embassy might have done. They stated thet
they are working dligenty to find out what happened anc to identify the responsible parties,
including any American citizens working at the embassy who might have been involved. They
‘aid that a this point they could no telus whether any American employees atthe embassy
were under suspicion of Being involved but they were not ruin i out. They explained in some
detail he data entry function and the watchlist check function and the inventories, audits, and
system logs. One sof point might have been the compromise of @ password used by a consular
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atfers officer to actualy accomplish the visa issuance which isnot avaliable to the foreign service
nationals(in this case 3° country foreign service nationals since in Qatar Qataris do not do that
{ype of work atthe embassy). An
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‘ditional safeguard which wil be instituted soon is 8 process of scanning inthe vise applications
anc usifying them agains the visa issuance ston @ much more regular basis to check the
matchup.
DS informed us tha the State IG has already begun an investigation of the case and wil pursue it
even though the casei stil acve and contining in Dah. DS assessment al this ime is thal the
70 fraudulent visas were part of a money-making scheme rather than ary pat of terrorist pot
but they have not ruled out anything. DS specified thatthe natorales of he 70 inctosed mosty
Jordanians and Pakistanis as well as one Bangladeshi, one Syrian, and one Kuwait
DS indicated to us thatthe Balimore US Attorney in the lead on the case fs Harvey Eisenberg
‘Another person involved in the ital phases ofthe case was Stuart Goldberg in
The Department of Justice's Public teary Section
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