"Seen OP SECRET ern HOELSLL NT Hee 04014 Ase Beene] Type of Event: Interview Date: January 28, 2004 Special Access Issues: None Prepared by: Gordon Lederman ‘Team Number: 2 Location: K Street Office Participants ~ non-Commissio Co) Scheid, Alexis Albion, Gordon Lederman Participants ~ Commission: Ker (U) BACKGROUND (U) CTC’S ANALYTIC CAPABILITY uo ame 13526 Sle eH yan cE1/01 Classified thformation TOP SEER Te FHES HEL Sf National Security Agency (NSA) personnel were in CTC and were integrated ona more case-by-case basis, When he left CTC, NSA had more of a presence. if There was a warning unit in the Community Counterterrorism Board (CcBYL ‘senior NSA person was chair. NSA came (0 see it as its job [?) 3e NIE rellected the community View, and about the substance. does not recall any community disputes “TOP SEERER HES GENE 2ee aid ae rn cose INTELLIGENCE/POLICY NEXUS ‘Of analytic output to consumers, the NIE is only a small percentage. The action was At the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). The CSG is where everyone interacted, All the relevant players were there ~ Department of Justice, Jain This 1s also true for the CSG. The typical agenda would include very tactical information, programmatic information, and also to look ahead in a strategic way regarding certain terrorist problems. NSC staffer Dick Clarke was very the Olympics. Insofar as CTC had something strategic to say, it would be resenting to Clarke at CTC [note —I may have written CIC instead of “CSG” in my notes of the meeting]. Analysts would give information eee who would then present the analysis. The CSG was one of THE HOT ETECTIVE TIBCABTIE bodies because all ofthe players were there. (#8 Mr. Scheid asked how you get the messa Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)? xe out to the larg such as the 9/1 claseLtied mnformation ‘well my notes are unclear ‘passenger cabins. icra as weapons was one ofan assortment of ways, but it was not specifically briefed. The key issue was, what kind of security need? The security is to keep the terrorists and their weapons off of the planes. id not mention barring cockpit doors.) We already had metal detectors — ai that was the main defensive measure oe sect fo Me Scheid asked who had responsi for warning [ae A serdingreponsbity for aca! warming, was the saiiing TAFT CCB which TOP STORET ESSSHHES HENS. 3ya cloned by statute Fo sheRE ae teST SI — ‘was small, integrated, The chair of CB would decide to disseminate warnings, after lots of informal consultation. For strategic warning, it was the CTC analytic group. It was done by community papers, and a lot was talking points in meetings. At the time of the 1998 embassy bombings, everything that we had to say strategically was through DCI Tenet to the Principals Committee meetings. Around the time of the attack, Clarke created a CSG subgroup (Clarke's staffers Steve Simon and Dan Benjamin ran it) which ‘met by videoconference once per week. The main channel was the CSG. (S) Mr. Scheid asked how CTC pulled together the strategic threats, beyond focusing on tactical maters. Mr. Pillar responded that Cindy “Storrer” was the best person in CTC and used Alec Station material (she was not in Alec Station) to draft a paper on embassy bombings, which became the main input into the Presidential briefing on the subject. gohMr. ‘Scheid asked whether he was surprised at the sophistication of the East African Zrnbassy bombings in 1998, eel nol startle hrm. The Ineligence ‘Community had brought matters into focus in 1995 and 1997 regarding al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was the organization headed by UBL that perpetrated the USS Cole and 911 attacks. The term is also applied to Sunni extremists more generally. In the mid 1990s, ‘US understanding of that threat was growing, as the organization was growing. In 1996, UBL left Sudan for Afghanistan, and that is when al Qaeda started jelling. U) CTC/NSA RELATIONS. isogrees with Mike Scheuer’s account of NSA’s role. NSA people were ‘devoted to the effort against al Qaeda. Mr. Scheuer's problem with NSA reflected Caress Sega WEA tad acinar rtsiaey Cees Wer alo which is a bible for them — we need to look for creative ways of overcoming these issues. Disagreements with NSA were not debilitating, rather just frustrating such that you sded senior Jeadership to resolve it. aan nnn ae were peohlea NSA wim he sold cal ore aro The frustration was at lower levels, more related to operators and analysts. (U) ALEC STATION Sprine set-up of Alec Station became the main source of developing information. nitially, the station was for terrorist finance because UBL was the Ford Foundation of radical Sunni terrorists, As we leamed more about UBL. in 1996-7, the station changed its focus. Alec Station applied the principals underlying CTC itself to the specific UBL target ~ Alec Station was a center-within-a-center in order to have a more integrated effort. 485 Some analytic work was done in the DI. Some analytic papers were joint efforts with the DI. Everything had to be coordinated with the DI. DIA was a core player in the TOPoe CCB. A DIA or military intelligence person would be on the CCB, which was the principal channel for warning. ‘The Downing Commission made good sense about the Khobar Towers attack, that we a stateyie warning but no tactical warning ‘Ms. Albion asked about the issue of possibly dismantling Alec Station in May 1998. iS no proposal to dismantle it. CTC was always evolving ‘because the threat was always evolving draw the line between UBL and ote Islamic extents? We're talking about networks her." How do vou daw Ins amon Si wantio doa Li jow To organize jere were two Teasons for CTC’s formation: @Q) Inlate 1995/early 1996, the name UBL kept coming up as a major organizer, so UBL was a good topic for trying out the center-within-a-center concept. -AS+SHOFT Mr. Scheid asked whether the fact that UBL. jog up translated ino dreton o collection and acolecton sates). oo ee nasa larger sia de Center ata alo plod wa [Ramzi Yousef demonstrated that they wanted to attack within the U.S. CTC pursued linkages, sending messages to CIA to ask their assets for more information, and also to ask NSA for more information, Al ation was stared to do this typeof work UL ANALYTIC TR T Regarding the differences between analysis of counterterrorism and traditional ‘analysis, the big issue for counterterrorism is that the target is indeterminate. CTC cannot {just focus on groups that we know of - we need to focus on emerging groups as well. When following the Soviet target, you knew what the question was and where the target was. Regarding counterterrorism, the questions are indeterminate in addition to the answers being indeterminate, AS Moreover, if it is not a matter of tactical warning but rather focusing on capabilities ‘and avenues of attack, how can we choose to focus on one avenue of attack over another? Regarding aircraft as weapons, what would be the basis for telling airline security officials about that threat? There is no basis for focusing more on aircraft as weapons than anything else, Mr. Scheid noted that the Intelligence Community chose to focus : 5 TOMEERE THESE =D/L clowed by Seatuce ‘was all about attacks in the U.S. Mr. Scheid noted that, Tey officials 1m 2000 and 2001 were not ready Tour PERATIONS could, Dut ie hada Tess d fy percent chance of success. Ms. Albion noted that Mike Scheuer said that it was a missed opportunity but that other people say that it would not have succeeded ee san opportunity witha low perceniag chance of success HIT OU NE TO Comer the cons i Strong reservations about the plan. Of course, subsequent terrorist attacks always change the analysis of risk ave had successes against al Qaeda since 911. We have the support of the Bee gg re eal aise) Meera have done OEF before 911? Maybe after the East African embassy bombings, but highly unlikely. We lacked basing rights, but also President Clinton had political difficulties. President Clinton was well aware of the threat from al Qaeda, ‘Senate thought it was a “Wag the Dog” situation, There was @ Wemendous change m the attitude of the U.S. public on terrorism after 911. Also, we have made a lot of progress on getting international cooperation after 911, such as on terrorist financing. Having a national commitment is critical, f Regarding expectations ofthe Intelligence Community, we will om Zeca np osm er comeA The Crowe pane! after the embassy bombings judged that the U.S. Government relied ‘too heavily on the prospect of tactical warning. The FAA said: security is so expensive, so give us Warning and we will ramp up to the threat. (U) PERSONNEL “SHCSNEHThe CTC leadership changed as a result of rotation, Two years is a long time to be in that “mmeatgrinder.” (9Ms. Albion asked about Saudi initiatives| fhe Saudis were one of tire countries T influence the Taliban.(U) ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE s. Albion asked about the issue of actionable intelligence:[—] it was pretty good, but in 1998-9 there were always timeliness Tssues Biven that UBT moved around. The tribal assets were generally pretty good, but you ‘on a single-thread source if you are going to do something momentous, The 1996 Finding was broad cnough that CTC did not think It lacked authority for disruption operations. As a matter of operational reality on the ground, fine legal lines were blurred in a hurry. eis is spliting hairs pretty thin between authorization to capture fron isnot just an issue of intelligence and law enforcement. The main issue is, what fare the limits of what intelligence can 0, and what does that imply for what the rest of the counterterrorism mission should do and what Americans can expect. It would be a big, mistake to suggest tha, if only something was done differently, 911 would have been prevented. Until 911, we lacked domestic and international support for certain moves. COEF is a unique case for military action. (U) THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY “HAD IT RIGHT!” anal SFOPSEERER PHOS SH NE 89/1 closed by Stat —rorsrener frompHesteneNe The Intelligence Community conveyed messages to the CSG and other senior ‘responsible officials. The key strategic issues were elucidated — Sunni extremism, transnationality, that it would be a conventional attack — the Intelligence Community “had it right!” By 1997, certainly by 1998, the senior decisionmakers knew of the severity of the threat, Look at the Simon/Benjamin book. ‘Clarke did a masterly job to do all that he could[__ agrees for the most part Frith the Simon/Benjamin book. ‘Mr. Scheid asked what it takes to mobilize the rest of the government ‘responded that it takes 911. In the first World Trade Center attack, Ramzi Yousef wanted to topple the towers. In 911, they succeeded due to technical improvements. The U.S. should have been energized after the first attack! Also, resources were an issue ~ as late as 1995, CTC was cutting slots. The degree of public commitment is key — it affects how well the U.S. Government car military action, commit resources, etc, We cannot countTon the Intelligence Community to be able to uncover plots.