Questions and Answers in Administrative Law
of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or
Q What is the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings? Explain.
ANS: In administrative proceedings, due process
simply means an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the order complained of; it cannot be fully equated
to due process in its strict jurisprudential sense. A
respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to
be informed of the preliminary findings and
recommendations; he is entitled only to a reasonable
opportunity to be heard, and to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence. (Vealasquez v.
CA, G.R. No. 150732, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA
357). Note that it is the administrative order, not the
preliminary report, which is the basis of any further
remedies the losing party in an administrative case may
pursue. (Viva Footwear Mfg. Corp. v. SEC, et al., G.R.
No. 163235, April 27, 2005).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the
same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine
a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present
case. (Rep., et al. v. Lacap, et al., G.R. No. 158253,
March 2, 2007).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The underlying principles of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies rests on the presumption that
the administrative agency, if afforded a complete
chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same
correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for
the principle. The administrative process is intended to
provide less expensive and speedier solutions to
disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the
courts for reasons of law, comity, and convenience
will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity
to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. (Berdin, et al. v. Hon. Eufracio
Mascarinas, et al., G.R. No. 135928, July 6, 2007,
Tinga,

Reviewer In Administrative Law By Atty.
Edwin Sandoval
Posted on March 22, 2012. Filed under: 2012 Bar
Review Materials, Bar Review Materials, Case
Digests, Political & International Law |
Tags: Administrative Law, Bar Examination, Case
Digests, Constitutional Law, Law Review, Political
Law |
Describe the Administrative Code of 1987.
Held: The Code is a general law and incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance (Third Whereas Clause,
Administrative Code of 1987) and embodies changes in
administrative structures and procedures designed to serve
the people. (Fourth Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of
1987) The Code is divided into seven (7) books. These
books contain provisions on the organization, powers and
general administration of departments, bureaus and offices
under the executive branch, the organization and functions of
the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well
as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers
both the internal administration, i.e., internal organization,
personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and
the effects of the functions performed by administrative
officials on private individuals or parties outside
government. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23,
1998 [Puno])
What is Administrative Power?
Held: Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v.
Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
What is an Administrative Order?
Held: An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
[Puno])
What is the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines?
Ans.: The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial,
city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of
local government. (Sec. 2[1], Introductory Provisions,
Executive Order No. 292)
What is an Agency of the Government?
Ans.: Agency of the Government refers to any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein. (Sec. 2[4], Introductory Provisions, Executive
Order No. 292)
What is a Department?
Ans.: Department refers to an executive department created
by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any
instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the
rank of a department, regardless of its name or
designation. (Sec. 2[7], Introductory Provisions,
Executive Order No. 292)
What is a Bureau?
Ans.: Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of
any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality
given or assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual
name or designation, as in the case of department-wide
regional offices. (Sec. 2[8], Introductory Provisions,
Executive Order No. 292)
What is an Office?
Ans.: Office refers, within the framework of governmental
organization, to any major functional unit of a department or
bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any
position held or occupied by individual persons, whose
functions are defined by law or regulation. (Sec. 2[9],
Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
What is a Government Instrumentality? What are
included in the term Government Instrumentality?
Ans.: A government instrumentality refers to any agency of
the national government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. The term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2[10], Introductory
Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
What is a Regulatory Agency?
Ans.: A regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly
vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or adjudicate
matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private
persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a
collective body, such as a commission, board or
council. (Sec. 2[11], Introductory Provisions, Executive
Order No. 292)
What is a Chartered Institution?
Ans.: A chartered institution refers to any agency organized
or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes state universities and colleges
and the monetary authority of the State. (Section 2[12],
Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
What is a Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation?
Ans.: Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to
any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of
its capital stock; x x x (Sec. 2[13], Introductory Provisions,
Executive Order No. 292)
When is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
deemed to be performing proprietary function? When is
it deemed to be performing governmental function?
Held: Government-owned or controlled corporations may
perform governmental or proprietary functions or both,
depending on the purpose for which they have been
created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits
or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in
the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of
public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the
function is governmental. Powers classified as proprietary
are those intended for private advantage and
benefit. (Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425, Sept. 11,
1998, En Banc [Purisima])
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation with an
original charter under R.A. No. 95, as amended. Its
charter, however, was amended to vest in it the authority
to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties,
taxes, fees and other charges, etc. With the amendnt of
its charter, has it been impliedly converted to a private
corporation?
Held: The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a
public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission. The PNRC was not impliedly converted to a
private corporation simply because its charter was amended
to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from
payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges,
etc. (Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, Aug. 6,
1999, 1st Div. [Pardo])
When may the Government not validly invoke the rule
that prescription does not run against the State?
Illustrative Case.
Held: While it is true that prescription does not run against
the State, the same may not be invoked by the government
in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject
matter. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the
government at the time Rafael Galvezs title was ordered
cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no
longer holds true today.
Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Base
Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority. X x x
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the
government no longer has a right or interest to protect.
Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and
it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the
defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only
in cases where the government is a party in interest. x x x.
Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the
Government, which stands to be benefited if the land
covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner
is cancelled.
Nonetheless, it has been posited that the transfer of military
reservations and their extensions to the BCDA is basically for
the purpose of accelerating the sound and balanced
conversion of these military reservations into alternative
productive uses and to enhance the benefits to be derived
from such property as a measure of promoting the economic
and social development, particularly of Central Luzon and, in
general, the countrys goal for enhancement (Section 2,
Republic Act No. 7227). It is contended that the transfer of
these military reservations to the Conversion Authority does
not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its
interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a
body corporate which will act as its agent for the realization
of its program. It is consequently asserted that the Republic
remains to be the real party in interest and the Conversion
Authority merely its agent.
We, however, must not lose sight of the fact that the BCDA is
an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct
from the government. X x x
It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of
government have been classified into governmental or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit
and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the
economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be
attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that
the functions performed by the BCDA are basically
proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social
development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the
countrys goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the
BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations
have been created by government to act as its agents for the
realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the
NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting
public interest and public welfare, are not government-
function corporations invested with governmental attributes.
It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of
the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the
BCDA which may file an action to cancel petitioners title, not
the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One
having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action. A suit
may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
party in interest. x x x
However, E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC is cited as
authority that the Republic is the proper party to sue for the
recovery of possession of property which at the time of the
installation of the suit was no longer held by the national
government body but by the Philippine Ports Authrotiy.
In E.B. Marcha, the Court ruled:
It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the
Republic of the Philippines, acted as principal of the
Philippine Ports Authority, directly exercising the commission
it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. We may
presume that, by doing so, the Republic of the Philippines did
not intend to retain the said rentals for its own use,
considering that by its voluntary act it had transferred the
land in question to the Philippine Ports Authority effective
July 11, 1974. The Republic of the Philippines had simply
sought to assist, not supplant, the Philippine Ports Authority,
whose title to the disputed property it continues to recognize.
We may expect the that the said rentals, once collected by
the Republic of the Philippines, shall be turned over by it to
the Philippine Ports Authority conformably to the purposes of
P.D. No. 857.
E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at
bar. In the former, the Court considered the Republic a
proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the
Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner therein were
the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would
have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter
since the PPA would have to refile the case on the same
claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case here since
to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the
issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the
BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the
State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies
created by the State for special purposes, it being said that
when the title of the Republic has been divested, its
grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in
the same category as ordinary persons. By raising the claim
of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the
BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did
in E.B. Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of
action proscribed by said case.
Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to
sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow
the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or
controlled corporations, causes of action which have already
prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real
party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said
corporations having been created merely as agents for the
realization of government programs.
It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a
buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the
property in 1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original
certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not to do
violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens
System, petitioner must be afforded some measure of
protection. (Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
352 SCRA 334, Feb. 20, 2001, 3rd Div. [Melo])
Discuss the nature and functions of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and analyze its
powers and authority as well as the laws, rules and
regulations that govern its existence and operations.
Held: The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order
No. 546 x x x. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to
the Board of Communications and the Communications
Control Bureau, which were both abolished under the said
Executive Order. Previously, the NTCs function were merely
those of the defunct Public Service Commission (PSC),
created under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Service Act, considering that
the Board of Communications was the successor-in-interest
of the PSC. Under Executive Order No. 125-A, issued in
April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the
Department of Transportation and Communications.
In the regulatory communications industry, the NTC has the
sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio
communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems.
Such power includes the authority to determine the areas of
operations of applicants for telecommunications services.
Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes
the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates
of Public Convenience for the operation of public services
within the Philippines whenever the Commission finds that
the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests
in a proper and suitable manner. (Commonwealth Act No.
146, Section 16[a]) The procedure governing the issuance of
such authorizations is set forth in Section 29 of the said Act x
x x. (Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.,
373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
Is the filing of the administrative rules and regulations
with the UP Law Center the operative act that gives the
rules force and effect?
Held: In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a CMTS, the NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of its
1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. Upon the filing of an application,
complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board
may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative,
the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the
affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto,
without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the
hearing which shall be called within thirty (30) days from
grant of authority asked for.
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC
should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register on
February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase
on its own initiative; accordingly, a provisional authority may
be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the
Commission.
In answer to this argument, the NTC, through the Secretary
of the Commission, issued a certification to the effect that
inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been
published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has
been applying the 1978 Rules.
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by
the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still
governed by the 1987 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant
of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on
February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of
the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that
gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section
3 thereof merely states:
Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the
date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against
any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the
issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of
codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the
President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National
Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may
select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs (Administrative
Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 7). In a similar
case, we held:
This does not imply, however, that the subject Administrative
Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power.
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989,
under which the respondents filed their applications for
importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The questioned
Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid
within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines),
unless it is otherwise provided. X x x
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP
Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not
cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order.
This Court, in Tanada v. Tuvera stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those
issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since
its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to
LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of
general circulation is a condition sine qua non before
statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. This is explicit
from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of
the Civil Code, and which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided (E.O. 200, Section 1).
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act, fall squarely
within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the
case of Tanada v. Tuvera.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exception are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties (PHILSA International Placement & Services Corp. v.
Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356
SCRA 174).
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself
mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Section 20
thereof). In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is
the 1978 Rules that govern. (Republic v. Express
Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15,
2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
May a person be held liable for violation of an
administrative regulation which was not published?
Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable
for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which
may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of
publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letter of instructions
issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as
having no force and effect the following administrative
issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint
Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment
Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of
hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; b) Letter of
Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due
and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the
national government; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by
the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to
Hong Kong; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation
regulating applications for importation from the Peoples
Republic of China; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances
and fringe benefits to government officials and employees.
In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances
questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were
not published or filed with the National Administrative
Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must
likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 provides
for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation
fees for private employment agencies or authority holders.
Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be
collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is
P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in
compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor
Code x x x.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce
and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed
with the National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced. (Philsa International
Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of
Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 174, April 4, 2001,
3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
Does the publication requirement apply as well to
administrative regulations addressed only to a specific
group and not to the general public?
Held: The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues
that the questioned administrative circular is not among
those requiring publication contemplated by Tanada v.
Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons
and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or authority
holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling
in Tanada v. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of
Service Exporters v. Torres, the administrative circulars
questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller
group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged
in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the
Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the
said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or
those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been
shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the case
of Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs is misplaced. In
the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum
Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they
were addressed to a particular class of persons, the customs
collectors, who were also the subordinates of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said
Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions
to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with
instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate
regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance
which does not obtain in the case at bench. X x x
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three
(3) counts of exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No.
2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative
sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. (Philsa
International Placement and Services Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 174,
April 4, 2001, 3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to
formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid
exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project?
Held: Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the
mandate that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (Sec.
29[1], Article VI of the 1987 Constitution) Thus, in the
execution of government contracts, the precise import of this
constitutional restriction is to require the various agencies to
limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law
for each fiscal year.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law
that the existence of appropriations and the availability of
funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine
qua non for the execution of government contracts. The
obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a
priori requisites to the validity of the proposed
contract. Using this as our premise, we cannot accede to
PHOTOKINAs contention that there is already a perfected
contract. While we held in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation that the
effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of
the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award
to the bidder, however, such statement would be
inconsequential in a government where the acceptance
referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold
otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding
contract that would obligate the government in an amount in
excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the
contract was attempted to be made. This is a dangerous
precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the
legal requirements as early as the bidding stage. The first
step of a Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to determine
whether the bids comply with the requirements. The BAC
shall rate a bid passed only if it complies with all the
requirements and the submitted price does not exceed the
approved budget for the contract.(Implementing Rules and
Regulations [IRR] for Executive Order No. 262, supra.)
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was
awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the amount
of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However, under Republic Act No.
8760 (General Appropriations Act, FY 2000, p. 1018,
supra.),the only fund appropriated for the project was P1
Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds
(CAF) only P1.2 Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the
amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the
entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC
could enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose
accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by
law for the project. This being the case, the BAC should
have rejected the bid for being excessive or should have
withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes
of the law, the same is null and void.
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain
that provides for a contract price in the amount of P1.2 Billion
Pesos is unacceptable. x x x While the contract price under
the draft contract is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the
certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the
VRIS Project, i.e., the issuance of identification cards for only
1,000,000 voters in specified areas. In effect, the
implementation of the VRIS Project will be segmented or
chopped into several phases. Not only is such
arrangement disallowed by our budgetary laws and
practices, it is also disadvantageous to the COMELEC
because of the uncertainty that will loom over its
modernization project for an indefinite period of time. Should
Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary for the
completion of the entire project, what good will the
accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the project failed
to sell with the Department of Budget and Management.
Thus, Secretary Benjamin Diokno, per his letter of December
1, 2000, declined the COMELECs request for the issuance
of the Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year
obligatory authority to assume payment of the total VRIS
Project for lack of legal basis. Corollarily, under Section 33
of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter into a multi-year
contract without a multi-year obligational authority, thus:
SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. In the
implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall enter
into a multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational
Authority issued by the Department of Budget and
Management for the purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance
of the multi-year Obligational Authority, the obligation to be
incurred in any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed
the amount programmed for implementation during said
calendar year.
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract
with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into
a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and
available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile
exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of
nullity. x x x
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is
inexistent and void ab initio (Article 1409 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines). This is to say that the proposed contract is
without force and effect from the very beginning or from its
incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence,
cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder,
cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract.
Since PHOTOKINAs bid is beyond the amount appropriated
by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is
not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void x x
x. (Commission on Elections v. Judge Ma. Luisa
Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18, 2002, En Banc
[Sandoval-Gutierrez])
What is the remedy available to a party who contracts
with the government contrary to the requirements of the
law and, therefore, void ab initio?
Held: Of course, we are not saying that the party who
contracts with the government has no other recourse in law.
The law itself affords him the remedy. Section 48 of E.O. No.
292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary
to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and the
officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly
between private parties. So when the contracting officer
transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in
excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting authority, the
Government is not bound under the contract. It would be as
if the contract in such case were a private one, whereupon,
he binds himself, and thus, assumes personal liability
thereunder. Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is
unenforceable as to the Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the
culpability lies, however, the constitutional mandate cited
above constrains us to remind all public officers that public
office is a public trust and all public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people. The authority of public officers
to enter into government contracts is circumscribed with a
heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their
contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered
into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the
Government may not be the victim of ill-advised or
improvident action. (Commission on Elections v. Judge
Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, Sept. 18,
2002, En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])
Does the Commission on Human Rights have the power
to adjudicate?
Held: In its Order x x x denying petitioners motion to
dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members
of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-
judicial body. This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Carino v. Commission on Human
Rights, the Court x x x has observed that it is only the first of
the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication of adjudgment, but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the
adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
x x x [T]he Commission on Human Rights x x x was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have. (Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights,
229 SCRA 117, 125, Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
Does the Commission on Human Rights have
jurisdiction to issue TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction?
Held: In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission
on Human Rights, the Court x x x explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction
on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only
by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication.
Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid services
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction)
which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of
the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for
a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his
district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal
action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for
appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government. (Simon, Jr. v.
Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 134-135,
Jan. 5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
Does the petition for annulment of proclamation of a
candidate merely involve the exercise by the COMELEC
of its administrative power to review, revise and reverse
the actions of the board of canvassers and, therefore,
justifies non-observance of procedural due process, or
does it involve the exercise of the COMELECs quasi-
judicial function?
Held: Taking cognizance of private respondents petitions
for annulment of petitioners proclamation, COMELEC was
not merely performing an administrative function. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to
determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and
governmental instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political
parties, organizations or coalition, accredit citizens arms of
the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and
recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of
any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it
has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order
or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct
control and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse
claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the
existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of
canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It
behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine
the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the
alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this
issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-
judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore,
acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions filed by private respondent. (Federico S. Sandoval
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
Discuss the contempt power of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR). When may it be validly exercised.
Held: On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in
the Rules of Court. That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of
its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To
exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body,
or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline
to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The order to desist (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative
power that it does not possess. x x x (Simon, Jr. v.
Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, 134, Jan.
5, 1994, En Banc [Vitug, J.])
Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior
Resort).
Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply
this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies even if the
question involved is also judicial in character. It applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly
applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor
v. CA, 280 SCRA 297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])
Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies. What are the exceptions thereto?
Held: 1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of courts jurisdiction is
fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any
finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its
practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
This doctrine is disregarded:
when there is a violation of due process;
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceeding;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])
2. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial
determination and for that reason a party has no cause of
action to ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA
132, March 3, 1997, 3rd Div. [Davide])
Powers of Administrative Agencies
1. Quasi-legislative power / Power of subordinate
legislation
2. Quasi-judicial power/Power of adjudication
3. Determinative powers (Note: Senator Neptali
Gonzales calls them incidental powers)
Definition of Quasi-legislative power
It is the authority delegated by the law-making body
to the administrative body to adopt rules and
regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a
law and implement legislative policy.
Distinctions between Quasi-legislative power and
legislative power
1. LEGISLATIVE power involves the discretion to
determine what the law shall be. QUASI-
legislative power only involves the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced.
2. LEGISLATIVE power CANNOT be delegated.
QUASI-legislative power CAN be delegated.
Tests of Delegation (applies to the power to
promulgate administrative regulations )
1. COMPLETENESS test. This means that the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature so that when it
reaches the delegate, it will have nothing to do
but to enforce it.
2. SUFFICIENT STANDARD test. The law must offer
a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative
policy and specify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented.
Definition of Quasi-Judicial Power
It is the power of administrative authorities to make
determinations of facts in the performance of their
official duties and to apply the law as they construe it
to the facts so found. The exercise of this power is
only incidental to the main function of administrative
authorities, which is the enforcement of the law.
Determinative Powers
1. ENABLING powers
Those that PERMIT the doing of an act which the law
undertakes to regulate and would be unlawful without
government approval.
Ex. Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular Legislative
business. regulations
have the
2.DIRECTING powers force and
effecr of law
Those that involve the corrective powers of public immediately
utility commissions, powers of assessment under the upon going
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws, into effect.
and awards under workmens compensation laws, and Such is Merely
powers of abstract determination such as definition- accorded by persuasive/Received
the courts or by the courts with
valuation, classification and fact finding
by express much respect but
3. Force and provision of not accorded with
3. DISPENSING powers
effect statute. finality
Exemplified by the authority to exempt from or relax a Requisites of a Valid Administrative Regulation
general prohibition, or authority to relieve from an
affirmative duty. Its difference from licensing power is 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the
that dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a legislature.
standard. 2. It must be within the scope of the authority
given by the legislature.
4. SUMMARY powers 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure.
Those that apply compulsion or force against person 4. It must be reasonable
or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a
judicial warrant to authorize such action. Usually Need for Previous Notice and Hearing
without notice and hearing. 1. General Rule: Administrative rules of GENERAL
application do NOT require previous notice and
Ex. Abatement of nuisance, summary destraint, levy of hearing.
property of delinquent tax payers 2. Exception: When the legislature itself requires
it and mandates that the regulation shall be
5. EQUITABLE powers based on certain facts as determined at an
appropriate investigation.
Those that pertain to the power to determine the law 3. If the regulation is in effect a settlement of a
upon a particular state of facts. It refers to the right controversy between specific parties, it is
to, and must, consider and make proper application of considered an administrative adjudication,
the rules of equity. requiring notice and hearing.

Ex. Power to appoint a receiver, power to issue

injunctions Prescribing of Rates

Kinds of Administrative Regulations It can be either:

DISTINCTION LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATIVE 1. LEGISLATIVE
1. Capacity
that
If the rules/rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
administrative of a given kind throughout the country.
agency is
acting in Legislative Judicial No prior notice and hearing is required.

It 2. QUASI-JUDICIAL
supplements
2. What the statute If the rules and rates imposed apply exclusively to a
administrative by filling in It says what the particular party, based upon a finding of fact. Prior
agency is doing the details statute means notice and hearing is required.
Requirement of Publication
Administrative Regulations that MUST be published:
1. Administrative regulations of GENERAL
application.
2. Administrative regulations which are PENAL in
nature.
Administrative regulations that do NOT NEED to be
PUBLISHED:
1. Interpretative regulations
2. Internal rules and regulations governing the
personnel of the administrative agency.
1. Letters of instruction issued by administrative
superiors concerning guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Special Requisites of a Valid Administrative
Regulation with a PENAL sanction
1. The law itself must make violation of the
administrative regulation punishable.
2. The law itself must impose and specify the
penalty for the violation of the regulation.
3. The regulation must be published.
Requisites for Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power
1. Jurisdiction
2. Due process
Administrative Due Process : Requirements
1. Right to Notice, be it actual or constructive
2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend
his rights and to introduce witnesses
3. Impartial tribunal with competent jurisdiction
4. Finding or decision supported by substantial
evidence
Exceptions to the Notice and Hearing Requirement
1. Urgency of immediate action
2. Tentativeness of the administrative action
3. Right was previously offered but not claimed
4. Summary abatement of a nuisance per se
5. Preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges
6. Padlocking of filthy restaurants/theaters
showing obscene movies
7. Cancellation of a passport of a person sought
for criminal prosecution
8. Summary distraint and levy of properties of a
delinquent taxpayer
9. Replacement of a temporary or acting
appointee
Questions Reviewable on Judicial Review:
1. Questions of FACT
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the
findings of administrative agencies acting within the
parameters of their own competence so long as such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. By
reason of their special knowledge, expertise, and
experience, the courts ordinarily accord respect if not
finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals.
2. Question of LAW
Administrative decision may be appealed to the courts
independently of legislative permission.
It may be appealed even against legislative prohibition
because the judiciary cannot be deprived of its
inherent power to review all decisions on questions of
law.
Doctrine of Finality
Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of an
administrative agency prior to its completion or
finality, the reason being that absent a final order or
decision, power has not been fully and finally
exercised, and there can usually be no irreparable
harm.
EXCEPTIONS: Interlocutory order affecting the merits
of a controversy; Preserve status quo pending further
action by the administrative agency; Essential to the
protection of the rights asserted from the injury
threatened; Officer assumes to act in violation of the
Constitution and other laws; Order not reviewable in
any other way; Order made in excess of power
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
1. This doctrine states that courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy which requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters of intricate questions of fact
are involved.
2. Relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the court even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court.
Doctrine of Prior Resort
When a claim originally cognizable in the courts
involves issues which, under a regulatory scheme are
within the special competence of an administrative
agency, judicial proceedings will be suspended
pending the referral of these issues to the
administrative body for its view.
Note: The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and prior
resort have been considered to be interchangeable.
Substantial evidence defined to mean not
necessarily preponderant proof as required in
ordinary civil cases but such kind of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Under this doctrine, an administrative decision
must first be appealed to the administrative
superiors up to the highest level before it may
be elevated to a court of justice for review.
1. Reasons :
1. to enable the administrative superiors
to correct the errors committed by
their subordinates.
2. courts should refrain from disturbing
the findings of administrative. bodies
in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers.
3. courts should not be saddled with the
review of administrative cases
4. judicial review of administrative cases
is usually effected through special civil
actions which are available only if their
is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.

3. Exceptions

a. when the question raised is purely legal, involves

constitutional questions
b. when the administrative body is in estopped
c. when act complained of is patently illegal
d. when there is urgent need for judicial intervention
e. when claim involved is small
f. when irreparable damage is involved
g. when there is no other plain, speedy ,
adequate remedy
h. when strong public interest is involved
I. when the subject of controversy is private land
1. in quo warranto proceedings
2. When the administrative remedy is permissive,
concurrent
3. utter disregard of due process
4. long-continued and unreasonable delay
5. amount involved is relatively small
6. when no administrative review is provided
7. respondent is a department secretary
(DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
ALTER EGO DOCTRINE)