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context not of border rights and wrongs, but rather of Nehrus anger over
loss of an Indian presence in Tibet after the establishment of the
communist regime in China and particularly after 1959. He seemed to
believe that somehow the situation could be reversed by continued
pressure on China.
At the time the details of how India had co-operated with the CIA in
helping foment the 1959 Tibetan uprising were not known. But Beijing
was already providing good evidence of Indian involvement. In short, and
even without looking at the facts on the ground, it was very likely that
New Delhi, not Beijing, was instigating border tension.
In other words, China was clearly on the defensive. But none of the people
around me at the time seemed very interested in this kind of reliable inside
evidence of Chinese thinking. They had already decided that Beijing was
aggressive, and that was that.
What to do? Already London, Washington, and Canberra were coming out
with strident condemnations of Chinese aggression against peaceful India.