Excerpt from Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25,

1961

Seven weeks ago tonight I returned from Europe to report on my meeting with Premier
[Nikita] Khrushchev and the others. His grim warnings about the future of the world [and] Berlin,
his subsequent speeches and threats which he and his agents have launched, and the increase in the
Soviet military budget that he has announced, have all prompted a series of decisions by the
Administration and a series of consultations with the members of the NATO organization...
The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is not an isolated
problem. The threat is worldwide. Our effort must be equally wide and strong (...)
(...)Let me remind you that the fortunes of war and diplomacy left the free people of West
Berlin, in 1945, 110 miles behind the Iron Curtain...
Thus, our presence in West Berlin, and our access thereto, cannot be ended by any act of the
Soviet government. The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlinand we have
given our word that an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all. For West Berlin
lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet
supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a
Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron
Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees. West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now becomeas
never beforethe great testing place where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years
since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation (...)

Excerpt from Khrushchevs Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961

As for me and my colleagues in the state and party leadership, we think that the adversary
[opponent - the United States] proved to be less staunch [strong] than we had estimated. We expected
there would be more blustering [noise] and so far the worst spurt [outburst] of intimidation was in
the Kennedy speech [on 25 July 1961]. Kennedy spoke [to frighten us] and then got scared himself
[referring to Kennedy strengthening U.S. civil defense].
Immediately after Kennedy delivered his speech I spoke with U.S. representative John J.
McCloy. We had a long conversation, talking about disarmament instead of talking, as we needed to,
about Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty on West Berlin. So I suggested: come to my place
tomorrow and we will continue our conversation. I said: I dont understand what sort of disarmament
we can talk about, when Kennedy in his speech declared war on us and set down his conditions. What
can I say? Please tell your president that we accept his ultimatum and his terms and will respond in
kind [in the same way]
He then said Kennedy did not mean it, he meant to negotiate. I responded: Mr. McCloy, but you
said you did not read Kennedys speech? He faltered for clearly he knew about the content of the
speech.
You want to frighten us, I went on. You convinced yourself, that Khrushchev will never go to war
so you scare us [expecting] us to retreat. True, we will not declare war, but we will not withdraw
either, if you push it on us. We will respond to your war in kind.
I told him to let Kennedy know that if he starts a war then he would probably become the
last president of the United States of America.