Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Introduction
Methodological individualism (MI) has been a major topic in the philosophy of social science over
the past several decades. Originally, the idea was that the social world is made up of
individuals, and so explanation of social phenomena should be in terms of the behavior and
attitudes of individuals.
all phenomena of society are phenomena of human natureand the Laws of the
phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions and
passions of human beings, that is to say, the laws of individual human nature. Men
are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance (Popper
1945/2011, 303; quoting Mill (1882/2009), quoted in Epstein (2015a, 8)).
This idea can be divided into two claims1:
Ontological individualism is the view that the social world is exhaustively constituted by individuals
(persons) and their relations and interactions. The slogan is: there is nothing in the social
world over and above individuals and their interactions.
Explanatory individualism is the view that social phenomena should be explained in terms of
individuals and their interaction.
Explanatory individualism has some plausibility if you accept ontological individualism.
Suppose that the social domain consists entirely of individuals, their attitudes, the actions
driven by these attitudes, and their consequences. So, the fact that crime increases in the
summer (Lauritsen 2014) is just a fact about the actions of individuals in the summer, and
these actions are the result of a pattern of attitudes that people have when the weather is
warmer. But then the target should be to explain attitudes. As Jackson and Pettit put it:
If a social fact obtains in virtue of a certain distribution of attitudes or actions, perhaps
in a certain context, then the factors which would be invoked in our folk psychology
as the sources of those attitudes and actions are also at the causal origin of the social
fact. We might conceivably look to the detailed psychological antecedents of such
facts in attempting to explain them. But if we are to do social theory then the
explanation we seek must be relatively more abstract than this. It must prescind in
some degree from that level of detail. Or so at least we shall assume. (Jackson and
Pettit 2004, 132)
Social explanation is not trying to explain a particular event, but a pattern. So, given one
form of ontological individualism, we must look for an explanation of the pattern of attitudes that
gives rise to the pattern of actions which, in turn, constitutes the social fact. A familiar way to do
this is to illuminate what would make the attitudes in question rational. This is the motivation
behind at least some forms of rational choice explanation. However, one need not focus on
rationality, if one builds into the picture that there are certain robust patters of irrationality.
Thus, some explanations relying on implicit bias, or social imaginaries, as a systematic
irrational influence on individual behavior may (or may not) count as individualistic in the
relevant sense (Brownstein and Saul 2016; cf. Medina 2013, Gatens 1996).
2. Ontological Dependence
Lets begin with the proposed ontological dependence of the social domain on facts about
individuals and their relations. It is important to note that the facts or properties of a
particular domain may depend on the facts or properties of a different domain, without being
constituted by those facts. This is particularly true if the higher-level domain is a system and its
parts are functional parts of the system. For example, a human body is an organism made
up of organs that perform certain functions, e.g., the eye, the kidney, the heart.2 A heart,
2 It is a complicated and delicate matter how to determine what somethings function is, whether it has more than
one function, or even any function. This is especially challenging in the case of human bodies. For example, there
are humans whose eyes do not enable them to see. Should we conclude, following Aristotle (e.g., Meta 1035a23-25,
also Shields 2002), that they are eyes in name only because eyes are defined functionally allowing that such
an individuals hands function as eyes (enabling them to read, navigate using a cane, etc.)? Or should we say
that the individual has eyes being now defined in material terms and that their use of hands to read and
navigate does not show they can see with their hands, but instead shows us some of the amazing things that
hands can do? Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes for discussion of this issue.
3 For the purposes of exposition, Im assuming a multiple occupancy view of composition, so I refer to overlapping
things, rather than properties of the concrete network (being a thoroughfare, being I-95) or facts (the fact that the
concrete network is a thoroughfare, that it is I-95). This is not essential to the discussion and can be adjusted as
needed, depending on ones metaphysical commitments.
4 I think we should distinguish a thoroughfare from a road: ii*) A network of concrete (as described in (i) and (ii))
that was designed and built as such for transportation. Roads wont be relevant for our current purposes.
5 For example, parts of it were once Native American trading paths. http://www.ncpedia.org/indian-trading-paths
Applying this to the case at hand (see figure 2), the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
(Fact a) anchors a Frame Principle, viz., meeting the conditions determined by the FHWA and
being certified as such grounds being an Interstate Highway. The concrete network that
underlies I-95 meets the FHWA conditions and has been certified as such (Facts g1-gn) and in
virtue of this, I-95 is an Interstate Social fact f). In this case, fact that I-95 is an Interstate is
anchored by a social fact and is grounded by both physical facts (about materials, dimensions,
etc.) and social facts (being certified to do so by the FHWA).
anchors
Passage of
Federal Highway Act
(Frame Principle) Meeting conditions C [determined
by the FHWA] and being certified as such ground what
is an Interstate highway.
So in thinking about ontological dependence, there are at least four general forms of
dependence: causing, constituting, grounding, and anchoring (allowing that there are multiple
kinds of grounding as well (Bennett 2011)). Each form of dependence can have social relata.
For example, there is a sense in which the concrete network is a social entity (artifact) because
it is caused by human design and effort. There are multiple senses in which the Interstate is a
6 Skow (2016) is mainly interested in reasons that are causes, but also allows that reasons can be grounds. Reasons
why C causes E arent anchors in Epsteins sense. Anchors are reasons why G-facts ground F-facts. Epstein argues
that anchors cant be grounds. I disagree. I think that there are different kinds of grounds, and some anchors, at
least, are grounds. In this context, I will continue with the terminology of anchors and grounds, however.
7 It is important to note that on Epsteins view, not all anchors are social. In some cases, the answer to the higher-
level question: why are these the reasons why? has nothing to do with us. Natural science provides many examples
in which we turn to a law for answers to second-level why questions (Epistein 2015a, 75-6).
8 Einheusers (2006) discussion concerns the ontological commitments of conventionalism uses the terminology of
carvings and substratum. Her take on the evaluation of counterfactuals, however, can be usefully extended to
anchors and grounds.
9 Epstein (2015a) considers several such counterexamples to supervenience, e.g., pp. 37ff, 41, 115-16.
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_gaps_in_Interstate_Highways,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pennsylvania_Turnpike/Interstate_95_Interchange_Project,
11 An externalist about propositional content might argue that the beliefs of the individuals in the two worlds differ
because the facts about the concrete network differ. This would, I think, take the wind out of the sails of MI the
anti-individualist would allow that the social globally supervenes on psychological and physical facts. The debate
over MIT concerns to what extent the social depends on us. Thanks to Miguel ngel Sebastin (UNAM) for
conversations about this.
12 Sometimes verdictives are taken to be authoritative, like exercitives. But as I read Austin, he intends to
differentiate verdictives and exercitives in part by virtue of their finality. verdictives, are typified by the giving of
a verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, for
example, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially giving a finding as to something fact, or value
which is for different reasons hard to be certain about. (Austin 1962, 150) The examples of jury, arbitrator, or
umpire, suggest that the judgment makes it so, but what follows, and the examples offered in the passages that
follow (calculate, measure, diagnose (152)), make it clear that whats crucial is that there is a judgment the attempts
to capture the truth, but may be wrong and so not constitute the fact in question. Note that sports differ in the
extent to which the referees are authorized to determine the facts of play. In baseball, umpires have exercitive
authority, but in basketball, given the use of replays to check their calls, make verdictive judgments that can be
overturned by the facts.
13 I am not arguing that this is the function of primary education it may be that this is only a manifest function of
primary education and it has a quite different latent function, or it may not be possible to isolate a proper function
at all. This is just an example to show that one may attribute functions to some parts of society without embracing
a full-blown functionalism. On manifest and latent functions, see Merton (1957, 60-69); I have used the terms
manifest and operative for similar phenomena (Haslanger 2012, Ch. 2).
14 Another way to put this point is to say that money is not a conventional kind. But, of course, it is controversial
what counts as conventional. On Lewiss (1969) classic view, conventions are arbitrary solutions to coordination
problems under conditions of common knowledge and the practical rationality of agents; they are durable, i.e., self-
perpetuating, because conformity to the convention serves everyones interests. There have been many criticisms
of this view, e.g., in Millikans work quoted below. I dont want to take a stand on an account of convention here,
so Ive followed Mason (2016) in using the expression up to us.
15 Rebecca Mason has argued this convincingly and at length in her dissertation, Social Ontology Naturalized, 2015.
16 I develop this account more fully in my What is a Social Practice? forthcoming in Philosophy. Social relations are
defined by roles in practices, and networks of such relations make up social structures. For example, the teacher-
student relation is defined by a set of educational practices and is part of a broader education system. Practices
are a key mechanism for social coordination.
17 In the past I have used the term schemas both for public cultural schemas and internalization of them as
psychological schemas. (This is how Sewell (1992), I believe, uses the term; see also Howard (1994), Hollander and
Howard (2000). This has caused confusion, so I will aim to use the term social meaning, and for webs of
meanings, cultural techn, in place of cultural schema going forward; though as I will indicate below, social
meanings include narratives, patterns of inference, and other cultural memes that one might not normally
consider meanings in a narrow sense. See also Balkin (1998).
18 Millikan (2005) is critical of Lewiss account of convention. She says, Lewiss analysis of conventions was very
complex, involving solutions to coordination problems defined in a complex way, regular conformity to
convention within a group, mutual knowledge of this conformity supporting its continuation on rational grounds,
and so forth. In contrast, on her account conventions may be simple, and require neither coordinations, regular
conformity, nor rational underpinnings. (2) I agree with Millikan, though I prefer to use a different term for the
phenomena she describes. My interest is in a broader category of social practices that also, contrary to Lewis, need
not be arbitrary, need not be in the interests of all participants, and are often a source of preferences, not just a way
to manage them.
19 I find it plausible to think of such explanations as pointing to mechanisms that give rise to the features of the
broader system. Tilly (2001), however, seems to contrast mechanistic explanations and systems explanations.
(See also Tilly and Tarrow 2015, Ch 2.) My reading of Tillys resistance to systems explanations is that he assumes
that such explanations involve an etiological approach to function: systemic explanations, strictly speaking,
consist of specifying a place for some event, structure, or process within a larger self-maintaining set of interdependent
elements and showing how the event, structure, or process in question serves and/or results from interactions among
the larger set of elements (2001, 23, my emphasis). He suggests, however, that system explanations can avoid
problematic functionalism. On his view, mechanistic explanations need not make reference to broader systems:
Compared with covering law, propensity, and system approaches, mechanism- and process-based explanations
aim at modest ends selective explanation of salient features by means of partial causal analogies (2001, 24); but
we might allow that some systems explanations are mechanistic. Thanks to David Hills for reminding me that not
all social practices, or social structures, are self-maintaining. Some, such as resistance movements, are even
designed to be self-destructive: success will make the movement obsolete.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Michael Bratman, David Chalmers, Brian Epstein, Ruth Groff, Helen
Longino, Rebecca Mason, Ron Mallon, Laura Schroeter, Miguel ngel Sebastin, Daniel
Stoljar, Ken Taylor, Stephen Yablo, and the participants at the First Annual Critical Social
Ontology Workshop, St. Louis, MO, June 2017.
References
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Austin, J. L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Balkin, J. M. 1998. Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Bennett, Karen. 2011. Construction Area: No Hard Hat Required. Philosophical Studies
154:79104.
Bratman, Michael. 1992. Shared Cooperative Activity. The Philosophical Review 101(2):
327-341.
Brownstein, Michael and Jennifer Saul (eds.). 2016. Implicit Bias and Philosophy 2 vol. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1975, "Functional Analysis." Journal of Philosophy 72: 741-765.