CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
VOID DONATIONS BY THE SPOUSES: DONATIONS IN COMMON LAW MARRIAGES
MATABUENA VS. On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
CERVANTES Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law
relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September
BY APORTADERA 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix,
questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a
marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid
the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was
made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
PROPERTY RELATIONS FOR MARRIAGES BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE
DELIZO VS. DELIZO Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages. The first was with Rosa Vilasfer, from 1891 until her death
in 1909, a period of 18 years. The second with Dorotea de Ocampo, from 1911 until the death of
BY APORTADERA Nicolas in 1957, or a period of 46 years.
The action for partition was instituted in 1957 by the 3 children and the heirs of the first marriage, all
against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine 9
children, the herein petitioners-appellants.
Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are 66 hectares of agricultural
lands in Caanawan, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; 58 hectares of riceland in Muñoz of the same
province; and a lot in Manila.
It was found by both the TC and the CA that the Caanawan lands were acquired as homesteads
during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no
affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore
correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer.
With regards to the other properties, the CA found that these were all acquired during the existence
of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo. However, since these properties were acquired from the
produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry
of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said
properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal
partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
1
Whether the Article While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the
133 of the civil code marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
applies to donations require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
between live-in public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
partners? of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in
ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written.
Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. The
Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the
questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to
the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
Whether the From the findings of the Appellate Court that 66 hectares of the Caanawan properties were acquired
property acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does not necessarily
by homestead is follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being
conjugal property of homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of
the 1st or 2nd the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with
marriage? prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Under Act 926, which was then the
applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he
has complied with all the requirements of the law. The decisive factor, therefore, in the
determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the
first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but
the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to
the patent. What was transferred to Nicolas Delizo were not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights
as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Having received the homestead
only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the
five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. The CA erred in, holding that
the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Nicolas
Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated
and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the
rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the
requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal
partnership. In connection with the other properties, the CA held that "there is no controversy that
these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo." Since these
properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is
the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only
eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to
the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of
the first marriage. It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the
second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the
old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important considerations
which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan
lands contributed considerably to the acquisition.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 2
BALLADOS VS. COURT
OF APPEALS

BY APORTADERA

JOCSON VS. COURT OF

APPEALS

BY LAGASCA

ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF

BY LAGASCA

CASTRO VS. MIAT

BY LAGASCA
WHEN CPG COMMENCES AND APPLIES?

PNB VS. QUINTOS

BY LAGASCA

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

LAPERAL VS.
KATIGBAK

BY LAGASCA

BARCILLES VS. GSIS Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement
premiums and terminal leave and representation and transportation allowances are being
BY TRINIDAD contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery,
England and Ione (lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased.
Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and
their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her
four children Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending claimants) also claim a
share in the benefits.
The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion:
77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse;
10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione;
5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural child;
4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda.
Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous, that they are the
only legal heirs under the law. The contending claimants also appealed claiming that they should
be the only ones entitled to the benefits.
Is the GSIS decision The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this
valid? court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry therefore the four
children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They are entitled to
NO their share in the benefits. The marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only
presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry.
As to Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His birth certificate was not
signed by either the father or mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the
birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual
Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an acknowledged natural child. Under the law,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights so long as there is
admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the
benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proved and paternity
was not established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and
allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona,
Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums, the same is presumed conjugal, there
being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One half
belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the
estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs.

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITIONS BY GRATUITOUS TITLE DURING THE MARRIAGE
VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo
died, he borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry. Veloso claims the husband
BY TRINIDAD pawned the jewelry to him with full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that the
jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from her mother.
EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITION BY REDEMPTION
PLATA VS. YATCO Amalia Plata while single, sold a parcel of land to Celso Saldaña. The latter again resold the
property to “Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa.” In consideration of a Php 3,000 loan,
BY TRINIDAD "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa" mortgaged the identical property
to Cesarea Villanueva, signed by Gaudencio Begosa as co-mortgagor. The mortgage was
foreclosed extrajudicially and Villanueva obtained said property by being the highest bidder.
Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained judgment that became final. A writ of
execution was issued but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from her property and filed a claim
averring ownership of the property.
LIM VS. GARCIA Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow (Isabela Garcia) and nine
children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos EXCEPT:
BY SAWIT 1. A house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000 pesos which, it
was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim
2. 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also
admitted had been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of
the administration of his estate, together with improvements
TC - the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal
property.
Counsel for the administrator,surviving children - none of the said property should be treated as the
property of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to
the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the
defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage
or at any time thereafter.
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
3
Who is entitled to The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her
the jewelry? mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article
MARTINEZ. 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she
had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might
administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever
delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could
not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without
compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.
Is Plata bound by She had acquired the property while still single. Evidence before us against the marriage of
the petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak. The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso
detainer/judgment Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not
against Begosa? transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to
Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents
NO Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does
the conveyance of it by Saldaña to her. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and
purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's
possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment
against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by
law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate
without his knowledge or consent.
Should the property The TC was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this contention was not sufficient to
be considered overcome the presumption established in article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the
conjugal? estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property (bienes
gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the
YES wife, and we think after a careful examination of the record that this finding must be
sustained. The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the value of the
lot sold during the administration) as the separate property of the husband who brought the lot to the
marriage, and the treatment of the balance of the price received for this lot, together with the
buildings thereon, as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record that these buildings
were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds, was in entire accordance with the
provisions of article 1404, which provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land
belonging to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property,
after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof." The foregoing disposes of all the errors
assigned by counsel for the appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order
the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name
of the appellee and claimed as her separate estate. It is contended by the appellant that these
parcels of land were conveyed to the appellee during the coverture (that’s marriage, incase you’re
wondering) by the said Hilario Lim either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either
event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. It
appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not acquired by the appellee
by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by
way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the
coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of
article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging
separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
CPG: ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY BY THE OTHER SPOUSE
VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ
BY SAWIT
MANOTOK REALTY VS. Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting
COURT OF APPEALS de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an
overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the
BY SAWIT lot.
Apr 2,’50 - the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her
paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed
under custodia legis.
Apr 28,’50 - Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate.
Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Mar 13,20,’59 - Manotok Raealty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust
Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in
dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale, among others, provided for the
following terms and conditions:
• The VENDEE renounces the right to warranty in case of eviction with the knowledge of
the risks of eviction and assumes its consequences with respect not only to the lots
subject-of the above mentioned cases and claims but also with respect to any other lots
subject of contracts of sale or promises to sell that may have been executed by the
deceased, Clara Tambunting de Legarda and/or Vicente L. Legarda, and it hereby
relieves the estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda and the Philippine Trust Company, in
its capacity as Administrator thereof, of any and all liability with respect thereto in case of
eviction.
• The VENDEE assumes the risk and expenses of ejecting the tenants or squatters on the
said parcels of land if it decides to eject them
In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the Manotok Realty
caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the occupants
to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow.
Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying
TC dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to
enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its
predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda).
Manotok Realty - Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don
Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the
petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of
Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no authority whatsoever to sell
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
4
which it is exchanged. The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is
nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry, and indeed
the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her
separate estate (paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character.
Whether Don There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
Vicente Legarda administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of
could vlidly dispose the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by the private
of the paraphernal respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara
property? Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only
consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly
NO disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of
Dona Clara Tambunting.
Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.
Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal
property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer it.
In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property.
As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security.
We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda
and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor
administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of
the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.
Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 40, 49) - Under the provisions of the Civil
Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the
right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code).
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara
Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the
disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request,
then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the
above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the
balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned
sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither
acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place.
Madlangawa - the provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or admission against the interest
of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified by the Philippine
Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped
from questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the property in dispute.
CPG: ENCUMBRANCE / DISPOSITION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
PALANCA VS. SMITH Smith, Bell , pending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila obtained a judgment against
BELL the said Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money. Later the said Smith, Bell & Co. obtained an
execution out of said court which was levied upon the property in question in this case, which
BY SAWIT property was known as No. 16, situated in an alley without name running toward the old Santa
Mesa race track, upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co. After said execution
was levied upon the property in question, the plaintiff and appellant herein commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendant herein, asking that said court
dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the property described in the
complaint, with a right to the possession of the same, and that said attachment be dissolved. To
this petition the defendants filed a general denial. After hearing the evidence adduced during the
trial of the cause, the lower court denied the prayer of the petition of the plaintiff and appellant,
absolving the defendants therefrom and charged the plaintiff with the costs. From this decision the
plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error - The court erred in not
allowing as proven the transfer of property No. 16, above described, made on September 20, 1904,
by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, and in not finding that
she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having no interest whatever in
the property in question.
LIM QUENCO VS. SPANISH
CARTAGENE
BY SAWIT
PRESUMPTION OF CPG
TORELA VS. TORELA Decree 440157 was issued by the CFI of Negros Occidental in favor of Felimon Torela, married to
Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3770), and ordering that the same
BY ROCAMORA be registered. Consequently, OCT 29257 covering lot was issued in favor of Felimon. As the
certificate of title was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, he filed a verified petition
for reconstitution praying that after due publication in the Official Gazette, an order be issued
setting the petition for hearing. Thereafter the court, orders the Register of Deeds to reconstitute
the original as well as the owner’s duplicate of OCT 29257. Thus, OCT 6898 was in favor of
Felimon, in lieu of the lost and/or destroyed one. Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot.
3770 having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife,
Graciana Galeego, the Cadastral court ordered that land be registered in the name of Torela,
married to Graciana Galeego, that his first wife died many years ago; and that he is married by
second nuptial to Marciana Gepanago. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movant’s) civil status, appearing on the face of OCT,
from Felimon, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torella married to Marciana Gepango”. The
court, finding no opposition thereto and with the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon by
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
5
Is the property An examination of the evidence brought to this court shows that the said Alejandra Palanca was
conjugal property? the owner of certain property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said Emiliano
Boncan, with the consent of the said Alejandra Palanca, as a guaranty for the payment of the sum
YES of P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the International Banking Corporation. With the
money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house in question, and later, by a
public document executed on the 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in question to the
plaintiff and appellant herein as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking
Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which the said plaintiff and appellant had given her
private property. This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the
property of his wife, became conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when
the same was reinvested in the construction of a house, the house became conjugal
property and was liable for the payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil Code.)
Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer the assignments of error made by the
appellant, and without discussing the same in detail, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Whether or not the The property question is one of those documented in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the
parcel of land herein other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first
involved is a wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons,
conjugal property of defendant Felimon had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first
the spouses marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint was correctly dismissed by the court below. Petitioners
Felimon Torela and claim that since the lot in questions was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that
(plaintiffs’ mother). one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother. While it is rule
that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party
who invoke the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.
This proof is a condition sine qua not for the application of the presumption. In the instant case there
in is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of
Felimon Torela and Graciana gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding of the CA is to the effect
that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is bolstered by that fact that
no one of the petitioners herein, Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her father’s Ex-Parte Motion,
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
First marriage, granted the motion and ordered the Register of Deeds to change the civil status of
the movant from “Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanto which is the actual civil status of
the movant, upon payment of the required fees. Felimon executed a definite deed of sale, whereby,
for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold said lot to Marcos and Maria Luna Mahilum, He also
stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower by first marriage to Graciana Gallego, and now
married to Marcina Gepango, that he is the registered owner of lot, having acquired it by
inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego, deceased. The document
was acknowledged before Notary Public. Upon its registration, Transfer Certificate was issued to
spouses. According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they had seen their father
Felimon and their mother Graciana clean the lot in question, and when their mother died, their
father married Marcina Gepango. In other words, the plaintiffs want us to believe that the parcel of
land is a status and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their right to the estate
appertaining to their mother. Alleging that they were deprived of their corresponding share from the
property thus sold.
PNB VS. COURT OF Clodualdo Vitug died intestate so his estate was settled and distributed in special Proceeding 422
APPEALS in the CFI of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor, his second wife, was the Administratrix.
BY ROCAMORA Meanwhile, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot 24, which is covered by TCT
2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was
extended. By virtue of a general power od attorney executed by Donata Montemayor in favor of
Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug.
Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in
the CFI of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the estate of Donata
Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencio all surnamed Vitug,
Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesusand Luz all
surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.
The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be conjugal property of the
spouses Donata Motemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of ½ thereof.
They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void.
They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Motemayor, decided on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for
partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be
conjugal in nature.
MAGALLON VS. The petition seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge. Case was
MONTEJO instituted by the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of
parcel of land in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which defendant had perfected a claim by
BY ROCAMORA homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaquia
Pichan, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
6
wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon had acquired the property by way of inheritance prior
to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego. The circumstances that Decree 440157 of the CFI
of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon over the land in question
described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time
and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further
circumstances that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that
it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act. 496 does not confer title; it
confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.
Does the When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata
presumption of Montemayor, widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage
conjugal life of loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted and
properties acquired registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata
by the spouses Montemaor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more.
during coverture On its face the properties owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to
provided for in doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are
Article 160 of the no liens and encumbrances covering the same. The well known rule in this jurisdiction is that a
Civil Code apply to person dealing with a registered land gas a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title
properties covered and to dispose with the need if inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
by a Torrens knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man make such
certificate of title in inquiry. Article 160: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
the name of the unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The presumption
widow? applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on
the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already
a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as
to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The
PNB had no reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the properties
mortgaged. For all legal purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage
covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the title of the
mortgagor. At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions,
however, they are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties
thereto. The PNB not being a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear
that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage
loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved
the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the
consent of all other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public
auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question.
Is petitioner bound This ruling presumes that petitioner is the legal wife of Lacerna though no marriage contract was
by final judgment presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of
rendered in an Eustaquia. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by
action to which she virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right to
was not made a it.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia — although he
admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him — as well as
paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave
his denials no credence. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the
homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The
plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. The IAC affirmed.
It appears that at the time the case was brought, no certificate of title to the land had yet been
issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the conditions necessary to a
grant thereof. OCT P-11 568 was issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC. While
it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during
his coverture with Eustaquia, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no clear clue,
it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania
Magallon," the latter being the present petitioner.
After the confirmative Decision of the IAC had become final and executory, the respondent Judge,
on motion of the plaintiffs issued an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff to
order the defendant Martin to divide and partition the property, ½ of which is the share of Eustaquia
in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are also entitled thereto; and deliver
portion of 5 hectares of the lot to the plaintiffs as their share to satisfy the said judgment and your
fees thereon.
Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin and petitioner, the latter filed with the Trial Court a
"Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land subject of the writ was
conjugal property of herself and Martin under a certificate of title issued way back 1978 without
legal impediments, and now incontestable," as well as valid, binding and legal unless declared
otherwise in an independent proceedings, and praying that the property of herein intervenor be
excluded from the enforcement of the writ of execution." Said motion was denied.
The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the latter's decisions, are binding
upon this Court and can no longer be controverted, as when as the pertinent allegations of the
petition, leave no doubt that the land, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin
and Eustaquia, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses,
was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin and petitioner Epifania. In such a
situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for
the party rightfully entitled thereto.
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. Clearly, the petitioner, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to
the private respondents that part of the land to which she now claims an ostensible title, said
portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal
partnership with Martin.
CUENCA VS. CUENCA Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property
and damages against the petitioners before the then CFI of Davao del Norte. The lower court
BY ROCAMORA rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the
private respondents.
This Case involves parcels of land which were claimed by two sets of families. Private respondents
Restituto and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership on the ground that they are the legitimate
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
7
party? YES
The petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her
name as the "wife" of the owner Martin. Such entry on the certificate of title has been established by
evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through
fraud. Moreover, the phrase "married to Epifania written after the name of Martin in said certificate of
title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin and does not necessarily prove that the land is
"conjugal" property. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 that
property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of
her alleged marriage to Martin except that which arises by implication from the entry in the
certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim on the land was
shown to have been perfected during Martin's marriage to Eustaquia, mother of the private
respondents.
The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the reasons urged in the petition.
The judgment of the respondent Trial Court merely declared the private respondents entitled to one-
half of the land, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them the same. A writ of
execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from,
or not clearly included in, what is awarded by judgment.
Both the lower courts appear to have overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and
compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with the finding that the half
portion of the land sued for pertained to the late Eustaquia as her share in the conjugal partnership
with Martin, they should have ruled that Martin concurred with the three private respondents in the
succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal share. Unfortunately, said error is beyond
review because Martin allowed the judgment to become final and executory without raising that
point of law, even on appeal.
The writ of execution is set aside. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is
ordered to effect the partition of the land in accordance with the terms of its now final and executory
decision and the provisions of Rule 69.
The appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. There was, therefore no need
to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners Engracia and Agripino much less to prove the
legitimacy of the other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia.
The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that the lands were
conjugal properties of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The petitioners alleged that these parcels
were surveyed for Agripino and approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia as
indicated in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and
therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased. They alleged that some of the
parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and
Agripino. They also alleged that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because
at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
The petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and
Maria as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children. They claimed that Agripino and their
mother Engracia were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They
contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
The documents presented are proofs that the properties belong exclusively to Maria as her
paraphernal property, a fact declared by the husband in a declaration against his interest. It was
error for the trial court to brush aside the importance of the declaration in the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Maria. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to
prove the origin of the properties and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the
marriage by Maria to Agripino as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses.
These, and other, pieces of evidence established that the plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria and
Agripino, who by law should succeed to the possession and ownership. On the other hand,
defendants' evidence consist only of the oral testimonies which proved nothing concrete as they
merely are inferences conveniently tailored to support their claim.
8
Article 160: "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," this Court ruled that the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
The documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that the claims
to the parcels were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The
perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact
that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved during their marriage is not
determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were conjugal properties. Moreover, the
documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or
Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved. The non-applicablility of the presumption should also be
upheld. The petition DISMISSED. The resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.

Agripino and Maria were legally married with Restituto and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that
Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple acquired properties during
the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his
children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the land; that one half of the land belongs to Agripino
and the other half to Maria the same having been acquired by them during their marriage-conjugal
partnership property. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses, one
half goes to Agripino which portion after the death of Agripino goes to his alleged third wife,
Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino.

The petitioners attached to their motion an alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of a
certified true copy of the Register of Birth of petitioner first child of Agripino and petitioner Engracia
which discloses that he is a legitimate child of the couple and a notarized public document which
discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to someone disproving the respondents' evidence. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre was entitled to inherit
from Agripino Cuenca together with the latter's legitimate children by Maria, the private respondents
herein.

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CPG?

ZULUETA VS. PAN-AM In an action for damage against Pan-am, plaintiff, his wife and their daughter were awarded moral
and exemplary damage as well as attorney’s fee. Said action was based on a breach of contract of
BY ROCAMORA carriage coupled with quasi-delict. Pending appeal, Mrs. Zulueta separated from the case insofar
into compromise agreement with Pan-am wherein she settled for P50,000.00. A motion to dismiss
the case insofar as Mrs. Zulueta is concerned was filed, but was denied in the ground that a wife
cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband’ consent, except in cases provided by law.
Hence this motion for reconsideration.
Whether or not the The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiff’s contract of carriage with defendant, for
damages involved which plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said
in the present case damages, there’re fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title
are among those during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions
forming the part of of Article 148 NCC or other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which
the conjugal chapter is entitled “Paraphernal Property”. What is more if “that which is acquired by right of
partnership. redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses” and “that”
which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to
such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which is acquired with money of conjugal
partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. Motion denied.

MENDOZA VS. REYES This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes with the CFI of Rizal, for Whether the The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides: The following are

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
the annulment of a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife,
BY ORILLAZA Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as
vendees. Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and
his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or
consent. Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their answer that
the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had purchased the
same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De
Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions. CFI dismissed the complaint and declared
the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It
ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the
Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.
9
properties are the conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
conjugal properties expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
of the spouses? spouses;
YES The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends
that the disputed property is paraphernal Article 160 provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements at the
expense of the common fund? The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the
spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
are liabilities of the partnership. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in
the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the
name of the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on
notice about its conjugal nature. Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease
of the properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own protection, yet when it
came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater transfer of rights such consent was not required.
CA ruling affirmed that properties are conjugal properties.

IMPROVEMENTS ON CPG PROPERTY

CALIMLIM VS. FORTUN

BY ORILLAZA

MARAMBA VS. LOZANO

BY ORILLAZA

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITH CONSENT

JAVIER VS. OSMENA

BY ORILLAZA

VDA. DE STA.
ROMANA VS. PCIB

BY ORILLAZA

DBP VS. ADIL Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained a P2k agricultural loan Whether the Prescription has set in as to the 1st PN as of February 10, 1940. However, when Confesor executed the 2nd PN on
from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now the Development Bank, as execution of the 2nd April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous PN on or before June 15, 1961, and
BY LEYNES evidenced by a PN whereby they bound themselves solidarily to pay in 10 equal PN by the husband upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, he thereby effectively and expressly renounced and
yearly amortizations. But the obligation remained unpaid and had prescribed. alone, confirming the waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This is not a mere case of
Confesor, then a member of Congress, executed a 2nd PN acknowledging the loan loan by the spouses, acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new PN
and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961 otherwise he would agree to the can bind the CPG? is the pre-existing obligation under the 1st PN. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the
foreclosure his mortgage and he would pay the amount if he can secure a debt.
certificate of indebtedness from the government of his back pay. Still, the amount YES

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
remained unpaid. DBP sued the spouses for the payment of the loan.
MTC – ORDERED the spouses to pay P5,760.96 plus additional daily interest of
P1.04 from September 17, 1970 (date of filing of complaint), P576 equivalent to
10% of the total claim by way of AF and incidental expenses plus interest at the
legal rate as of September 17, 1970, until fully paid and the costs of the suit.
CFI – REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint and counter-claim, holding that
Confessor cannot bind the CPG without his wife’s consent under Art. 166, NCC.
DENIED DBP’s MR.
DBP: Judge Midpanto Adil refused to recognize that the right to prescription may
be renounced or waived; and that in signing the 2nd PN, Patricio Confesor can bind
the conjugal partnership or otherwise became liable in his personal capacity.
CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITHOUT CONSENT
LUZON SURETY VS. Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co. executed a surety bond in
DE GARCIA favor of the PNB to guaranty a crop loan of P9k to Chavez. Vicente Garcia,
together with Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity
BY LEYNES agreement binding themselves solidarily for any and all damages and other
burdens Luzon Surety Co. may at any time sustain. The PNB sued Chavez and
Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of P4,577.95. Luzon Surety Co. filed a
third-party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia, based on the indemnity
agreement.
CFI – ORDERED Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay and likewise ordered
Chavez, Garcia, and Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co. the total amount to be paid
by it to PNB. Then, it issued a writ of execution against Garcia for the satisfaction
of the claim of Luzon Surety Co. Thereafter, the sugar quedans of the Sps. Garcia
were levied and garnished from their sugar plantation. The Sps. Garcia filed for
preliminary injunction, which was made permanent
CA – AFFIRMED the permanent preliminary injunction.
BA FINANCE VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
BY LEYNES
CARLOS VS. Honorio Garcia claims that Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
ABELARDO requested him to advance $25k for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable
and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own,
BY LEYNES Carlos issued a check in the name of Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who
acknowledged its receipt. When Carlos inquired the status of the loan, the
spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded they were not yet in a position
to make a definite settlement. He made a formal demand but they failed to comply,
hence the collection suit. Since the spouses were separated in fact for more than 1
yr. prior to the filing of the complaint, they filed separate answers. The wife
admitted securing a loan together with her husband, however, it was payable on a
staggered basis. The husband claimed that the money was not a loan since he
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
10
Under Art. 165, CC, the husband is the administrator of the CPG. As such administrator, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG are chargeable thereto. Confesor signed the 2 nd PN for the
benefit of the CPG. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
Whether the CPG, in The husband, as such administrator, the only obligations incurred by him that are chargeable against the CPG are
the absence of any those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing
showing of benefits right for the benefit of the family. The husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity
received, could be agreement did not act for the benefit of the CPG. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
held liable on an which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is no proof that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or
indemnity agreement guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the CPG. Nor could there be,
executed by the considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party, Ladislao Chavez. While the husband by thus
husband to signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the
accommodate a third confidence of the business community, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to
party in favor of a come within the express terms of the provision. To make the CPG respond for a liability that should appertain to the
surety company? husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective --- solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
NO REYES, concurring: I concur in the result, but the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the CPG" in describing the charges and obligations for which the CPG is liable, do not require that actual
profit or benefit must accrue to the CPG from the husband's transactions; but that it suffices that the transaction
should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. Obligations incurred by the husband in
the practice of his profession are collectible from the CPG.
Whether a written According to the records: (1) there was a check in the amount of US$25k issued by Carlos; (2) the spouses received
instrument by the it and gave it to Vallejo as full payment of a house and lot; (3) this house and lot became the spouses’ conjugal
wife, acknowledging dwelling; and (4) only the wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which the husband did not sign.
the loan for the
conjugal home, All the checks of the husband were all in the account of H.L. Carlos Construction. On the other hand, the $25k
without the signature check was drawn from the personal account of Carlos. Assuming to be true that the checks presented were his
of the husband can profits from the corporation, then all the more does this prove that the $25k was not part of such profits because it
bind both? was issued by Carlos from his own account. Moreover, the husband failed to substantiate his claim that he is
entitled to the profits and income of the corporation.
YES The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the CPG except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The spouses never denied the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
offered his services for Carlos’ construction company and such was his share of
the profits from the contracts he obtained for Carlos.
RTC – ORDERED the spouses to pay $25k, plus legal interest thereon and P100k
AF and the husband to pay P500k as MD and P50k ED.
CA – REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to
show that the subject amount was indeed loaned to the spouses because there
was evidence that the $25k was the husband’s share in the profits of H.L. Carlos
Construction.
Carlos: To prove his claim, he showed an instrument executed by the wife
acknowledging her and her husband’s accountability.
Manuel Abelardo: To prove his claim, he presented 10 BPI checks allegedly given
to him by Carlos and argued that if indeed, he and his wife were indebted to him,
the latter could have easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of
the profits.
CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: PERSONAL DEBTS
PEOPLE VS. The heirs of the victim, sued Froilan Lagrimas for murder and subsequently,
LAGRIMAS moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on his property, which
was granted.
BY LEYNES
LC – GUILTY of MURDER and ordered to indemnify the heirs P6k plus P10k as
damages, AF and burial expenses.
A levy was had on 11 parcels of land under the name of the accused. The sale
thereof at public auction was scheduled, but before which, the wife of the accused,
Mercedes, moved to quash the writ of attachment and execution because the
property belonged to the CPG which cannot be held liable for the pecuniary
indemnity of the husband.
LC – GRANTED MTQ under Art. 161, NCC.
CPG: JOINT ADMINISTRATION
YSASI VS. Juan Ysasi, petitioner, and Maria de Ysasi, one of the respondents, are husband
FERNANDEZ and wife. Juan concedes Hacienda Manucao-A is conjugal property. Since 1948,
the spouses have been commuting between the Philippines and Spain where they
BY VALDEZ also own real properties. But the husband shuttled more frequently between the
two countries on account of the management of the hacienda. Hacienda Manucao-
A was managed by Valentin Bilbao, from 1952-1965 but Juan maintained overall
supervision. Then in 1965, Jon, their son, took over as manager. Juan instructed
their younger son, Jose, to assist in the management. Jon did not allow him to
participate. He also refused to let Jose act as Cashier even as the latter was so
designated by the father. Dissension between the two developed. This prompted
Maria to leave for the Philippines to iron out the differences between the two
brothers and to inquire into the affairs of the hacienda. Juan claims Maria never
made any such report. When Jon resigned, Juan designated Bilbao as manager.
Jon refused to turn over the hacienda because Maria already took possession and
administration of the hacienda since his resignation. Subsequently, Maria filed for
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
11
money was used to purchase the conjugal dwelling. Hence, the acknowledgment of the loan by the wife binds the
CPG since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family so both are solidarily bound to pay the loan. While the
husband refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the conjugal home. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of the husband, under Art. 21, FC, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
What practical effect Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after
would be given this the responsibilities enumerated in Art. 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
particular liability of property or if it should be insufficient. The period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the
the CPG for the conjugal partnership is still existing. Partnership assets contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated
payment of fines and in Art. 161 chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. The termination of the CPG is not a
indemnities imposed prerequisite.
upon either husband
or wife? Considering that the obligations mentioned in Art. 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the
wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be
of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be,
representing the CPG may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of
recovery of the family of the offended party. The case was remanded for the proper receipt of evidence for recovery.
Whether a husband The changes introduced by the code have not relegated the husband to the position of an ordinary administrator of
may be deprived of another's property. He himself has an interest in the community property. Although certain rights are now recognized
his powers of in the wife, authorizing her to intervene in and question some acts of the husband, the code still assumes the
administration over existence of a residuary authority in the latter with respect to the administration of community property. The grant of
conjugal partnership certain rights to the wife is specific, and must be restrictively construed, so that all others not granted expressly
properties upon mere cannot be considered as enjoyed by her. The right to require the husband to render an accounting is not among
allegations of abuse those granted to her. Neither may the husband be divested of his administration upon mere assertions of fraud.
of such powers? These must first be proven. The law presumes good faith. The husband, accordingly, is entitled to take over
possession and management of the hacienda.
NO
At stake here are the husband's power of administration and the wife's right to be protected from abuse thereof. The
wife's right rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wife's right does not exist. The husband may not
be forced to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple expedient of merely
charging him with the naked averment that he has forfeited that right. Receivership at this stage is improper.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
administration of the CPG or, in the alternative, a separation of property with ex
parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite because her husband
was already 77 yrs. and has a blind left eye and he abandoned her and their
conjugal properties without just cause.
LC – GRANTED ex parte petition on the same day.
Juan moved to set aside the order appointing his wife receiver pendente lite. Maria
filed a supplemental petition asking to appoint a disinterested person, preferably
BPI, as receiver.
12
Because of the possible abuses that may ensue from the husband’s administration, which may result in damage to
the wife, mandatory injunction should issue but only upon bond.
Maria and Jon are to turn over to Juan the possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural
machinery, implements, work animals, and other properties used in the operation of the hacienda, as well as its
records, papers, documents and books of accounts, upon Juan's filing, and Judge Jose Fernandez' approval, of a
bond in the sum of P50k to answer for any and all damages which private respondents or any of them may suffer by
reason of the issuance of said injunction.

Juan set up affirmative defenses and counterclaim and filed a third-party complaint
against Jon and moved for a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive
injunction to compel his wife and son to turn over to Bilbao Hacienda Manucao-A.

The BPI, mortgagee of the hacienda, filed an Urgent Motion to Authorize Crop
Loan Releases. Juan asked the court that the releases be made to him.
LC – DENIED writ of preliminary injunction but reserved for a later date the
decision for the release of the crop loan lines. Meanwhile BPI was ordered to give
monthly allowance of P1,500 to the spouses. And declared BPI to be the receiver.

Juan: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. The wife is not
entitled — as of right — to joint administration. The husband may even enforce
right of possession against the wife who has taken cover the administration
without his consent. And, the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to
deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full and
complete accounting of such properties.

CPG: DISPOSITION & ENCUMBRANCE

FELIPE VS. HEIRS OF Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara and they bought parcels of land. Later, Whether the sale of The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, CC) Subject to certain exceptions, the
ALDON the lands were divided into 3 lots of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision. conjugal property by husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the CPG without the wife's consent. (Art. 166) And the
Gimena sold the lots to Sps. Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe without the consent the wife without the wife cannot bind the CPG without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172). Here,
BY VALDEZ of her husband. The heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their consent of the Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale
children sued the Sps. Felipe claiming they orally mortgaged the lots and they husband is valid? is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." Hence, the sale made was a voidable contract.
offered to redeem the mortgage, but was refused, hence the complaint. The Sps. Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to
Felipe claimed they acquired the lots by purchase and subsequent delivery. YES the husband alone but to both spouses.

TC - DECLARED the Sps. Felipe to be the lawful owners thereof
CA – REVERSED and ordered the Sps. Felipe to surrender the lots and
muniments of title, make an accounting of the produce derived and to solidarity
turn over the NET monetary value of the profits, after deducting the sum of
P1,800.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he
was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not
ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage
subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the
dissolution of the CPG by the death of Maximo did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do
during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the
defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's
share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The Sps. Felipe have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the heirs filed action to
recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died. Anent the first question, We quote with approval the
following statement of the Court of Appeals:

Since the Sps. Felipe acted in BF because as relatives they never sought the consent of Maximo, the period for

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
AGUILAR- REYES VS. Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since
MIJARES 1974. The disputed lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses’
conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their
BY VALDEZ garments business. In 1984, Ignacia learned that in 1983, Vicente sold the lot to
Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40K and that Vicente filed a petition for
administration and appointment of guardian, he had misrepresented that his wife
died in 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs.
LC – APPOINTED Vicente as the guardian of their minor children and authorized
Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.
Ignacia demanded the return of her ½ share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter
amicably, Ignacia filed in 1996 an annulment of sale.
Sps. Mijares:
They claimed to be purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it
was duly approved by the court.
Vicente: He contended to have sold his share only and never represented she was
already dead. He claimed that the Sps. Mijares took advantage of his illiteracy by
filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of
guardian without his knowledge.
LC – DECLARED the sale void with respect to the share of Ignacia. The purchase
price of the lot was P110k and ordered Vicente to return ½ thereof to the spouses.
Ignacia prayed the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be
ordered to reimburse the rentals they collected on the apartments built thereon.
LC – DECLARED the sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to
reimburse the spouses the purchase price of P110k, but did not award the rentals.
Ignacia and the spouses appealed. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was
substituted by her compulsory heirs.
CA – REVERSED, notwithstanding the absence of Ignacia’s consent to the sale, it
is still valid because the spouses were innocent purchasers for value.
CPG: EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT
DE LA CRUZ VS. DE Estrella de la Cruz complained her husband, Severino, had not only abandoned
LA CRUZ her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and prayed
for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency
BY VALDEZ of the action, and (3) payment of P20k as AF and costs.
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
13
extraordinary prescription (30 years) should be applied and it had not yet lapsed. The children filed action within the
period so their shares of the lands was awarded.
AQUINO, concurring: I concur in the result. With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the
husband's consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets. In the instant case, the CA did not
err in voiding the wife's sale of the conjugal land without the husband's consent. As that sale is contrary to law, the
action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe. Moreover, there are indications that the contract
between the parties was an antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.
Whether the sale of The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of
conjugal property by the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Ignacia’s action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June
husband without 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 yr. prescriptive period under Art. 173,CC. Even if reckoned
consent of the wife from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the spouses entered into a contract, Ignacia’s action
can be annulled? would still be within the prescribed period.
The spouses are not purchasers in good faith because of circumstances that should have placed them on guard.
YES The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however,
reveals that – (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the
alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or
cremation would be on March 8, 1982. These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted them to
investigate further, especially so when Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she suspected Ignacia
was still alive.
The prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual damages,
the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.
(1) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-
B-2, in the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof;
(2) Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 as
purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2, with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of
this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the
principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment.
(3) Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of
P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Did the separation of The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by Art. 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at
the husband and wife least 1 yr. are the same as those granted to her by Art. 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the
constitute husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under Art. 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere
abandonment in law separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
that would justify a desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband,
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 14
LC – GRANTED alimony pendente lite, which however, upon Severino's motion, separation of the despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal
was reduced to P2,000. ORDERED the separation and division of the conjugal conjugal partnership partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact Severino never ceased to give support to his wife and
assets, and directing Severino to pay P20k AF. properties? children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
On appeal to the CA, the same was certified to the SC because of the hefty If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving
amount involved. NO the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and
efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, the wife's petition
Estrella: She claimed that her husband did not sleep in the conjugal dwelling, but for separation of property must be denied. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in
paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations and left her for harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the CC requires that
his concubine. separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is
solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage and in the latter case, it may only be
Severino: He denied having a concubine and admitted that they were living ordered by the court for causes specified in Art. 191, NCC.
separately but explained that he was never amiss in his obligation to support his
family and manage the conjugal property.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved
Was Severino's that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a
failure or refusal to million pesos. The mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the
inform the state of wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute abuse of administration. For abuse to exist, it is not
their business enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts
enterprises such an injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse
abuse of his powers connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts
of administration of and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
the conjugal
partnership as to
warrant a division of
the matrimonial
assets?

NO

SUPPORT DURING CPG LIQUIDATION

SANTERO VS. COURT The petitioners Princesita, Federico and Winy are the children begotten by the late
OF FIRST INSTANCE Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel are four of the seven children begotten by Pablo Santero
with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo
BY BALANE Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to Pablo. Pablo Santero was
the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
During the intestate proceedings the respondents moved for allowance on the
ground they were of schooling age.
CFI – GRANTED the motion without conducting a hearing thereon
Whether allowance to Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained
the respondents majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married. Petitioners allege there was misrepresentation on the
should be on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other
mere allegation that miscellaneous expenses for school term. They further allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to
they are still cover the allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held in trust for
schooling without the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the
conducting a hearing administrator are derived.
thereon?
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
YES regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance
from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse
and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot
be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect
to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the
children here).

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE

GARCIA VS. Gonzalo Garcia sued his wife Consolacion for the judicial declaration of the Whether the Under Art 191, there must be abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property of the husband,

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
MANZANO separation of their CPG. Gonzalo claimed they have been living separately from
each other and all attempts at reconciliation have failed. He claimed that during
BY BALANE the separation, his wife had assumed complete management and administration of
the CPG and enjoyed its fruits without filing any ITRs.
Consolacion MTD for lack of cause of action because none of the grounds under
Art. 191, NCC for decreeing a judicial separation of properties was alleged.
LC – DISMISSED the complaint
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
So ordered.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
LACSON VS. SAN Carmen San Jose-Lacson left the conjugal home to reside in Manila and filed for
JOSE-LACSON custody of her children with Alfonso. The Sps. succeeded in reaching an amicable
settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property.
BY BALANE
JDRC – GRANTED the compromise
Alfonso delivered all the four children to Carmen and remitted money for their
support. Carmen wanted to modify the arrangement regarding their children and
the compromise regarding the separation of their property.
LIVE IN PARTNERS OR THOSE UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE
MAXEY VS. COURT OF Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) were married in a “military
APPEALS fashion” and thereafter, lived together as husband and wife and had 6 children.
During their cohabitation, Melbourne acquired the parcels of land and sold it to the
BY BALANE Sps. Monday. The Maxey children sued for the annulment of the documents of
sale claiming these were common properties of their parents, having been
acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. The sale by
their father after the death of their mother was without their knowledge and
consent. The Sps. Monday claim to be purchasers for value.
TC – DECLARED that the rules on co-ownership should govern because there
was only a live in relationship and held that justice demands that the woman
should be entitled to the share of the property and ORDERED the return of the
lands.
CA – REVERSED because the lands were the exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne.
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
15
complaint establishes or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court according to
a sufficient cause for the provisions of Arts. 167 and 173(3). In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been
judicial separation of entered against the guilty or absent spouse. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
property? conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
NO dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of Arts. 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in
Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable. This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Code's
restrictive policy.
In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the
wife manage the partnership, since such a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the community
property and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and
control of the conjugal property against his wife and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the
circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon
proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies
available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband
because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.
Whether the The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided
agreement to judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the CPG
voluntarily dissolve during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
the CPG is valid? conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
YES petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors
and other third persons. The spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution
of their CPG. It does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by these arrangements. Being
separated in fact for at least 5 yrs., there is propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest.
However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their CPG, the
Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.
Whether the NCC The new article in the CC recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of
should apply the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her
retroactively as to traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership
award the household would apply. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not
efforts of the wife and the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household.
allow her a claim on The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of their
the property gathered respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that
during the live in purse with funds.
relationship? The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman from a
profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through
YES caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from
household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Thee disputed properties were
owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. The
Sps. Monday are ordered to return one-half of the properties to the heirs of Regina Morales.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 16
BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES, ADULTEROUS / CONCUBINAGE RELATIONSHIPS, RELATIONSHIPS WHERE BOTH ARE MARRIED TO OTHERS, MULTIPLE ALLIANCES OF THE SAME MAN

JUANIZA VS. JOSE Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney Whether the Art. 144, CC requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR, which resulted in concubine, who is not marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract
BY BALANE the death of 7 and physical injuries of 5 passengers. At the time of the accident, a registered owner of marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under Art. 144, CC, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney
Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with the jeepney, can be belongs to the CPG of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages
Rosalia Arroyo, for 16 yrs. held solidarily liable arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the
for damages with her collision. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused
CFI - ORDERED Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to indemnify the victims live in partner? by its operation. Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise
solidarily and DENIED the MR of Rosalia (insofar as it condemns her to pay from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
damages solidarily with her co-defendant) because of her liability as co-owner of NO
the jeepney under Art. 144, CC.

GOMEZ VS. LIPANA

BY
BERNARDINO

VDA. DE
CONSEGUERA VS.
GSIS

BY
BERNARDINO

YAP VS. COURT OF

APPEALS

BY
BERNARDINO

CARINO VS. CARINO

BY
BERNARDINO

FAMILY: WHAT GOVERNS FAMILY RELATIONS?

ALVADO VS. CITY OF

TACLOBAN

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 17
BY BERNARDINO

ARROYO VS. COURT

OF APPEALS

BY SAWIT

FAMILY: FAMILY RELATIONS

GAYON VS. GAYON

BY SAWIT

WAINWRIGHT VS.
VERSOZA

BY SAWIT

FAMILY HOME: EXEMPTIONS

MODEQUILIO VS.
BREVA

BY SAWIT

SIARI VALLEY VS.

LUCASAN

BY SAWIT

PATERNITY & FILIATION: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

PERIDO VS. PERIDO

BY APORTADERA

DE LA PURTA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS

BY APORTADERA

TAN VS. TROCIO

BY APORTADERA

PATERNITY & FILIATION: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 18
MOORE VS. REPUBLIC

BY APORTADERA

NALDOZA VS.
REPUBLIC

BY APORTADERA

MANGULABNAN VS. Petitioner filed in the QC RTC an action for actual, compensatory and moral Whether the minor Petitioner established the paternity of the child not only by her own affidavit but also by the affidavits of two (2)
INTERMEDIATE damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. child, an illegitimate witnesses. In addition, petitioner submitted a birth certificate of the child. The private respondent claims that the
APPELLATE COURT child, is entitled to same is spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila when the child was born in Cavite Maternity Clinic
support? in Las Pinas Rizal. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived
Pending the litigation, an application for support pendente lite was filed to which an
BY GALVAN and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits. While the appellate
opposition was filed by private respondent.
court claims that the birth certificate is prima facie evidence of acknowledgment of the child, and that until it is finally
YES
proved to be spurious it must be upheld, it nevertheless observed that its probative value is impaired by the verified
TC ordered private respondent to pay monthly support in the amount of P1,500.00 opposition of the private respondent. The requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or by only one of
to the minor child them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the Civil Code. Such a child is
presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the
time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private respondent
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied
herein, is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural child
but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted.
CA annulled the orders of the TC. Under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. Such filiation
may be proved by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious child). Recognition is
voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. It
is compulsory when by court action the child brings out his recognition. As above related the affidavits of petitioner
and the two (2) witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the child, and a birth certificate was also
presented to corroborate the same. The Court agrees with the court a quo that the status of the minor child had
been provisionally established.

OSMENA DE The plaintiffs prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants, from using the Whether the We concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact
VALENCIA VS. surname "Valencia." The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and this sustained defendants can use that they are legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more,
RODRIGUEZ by the lower court. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs. the surname of their grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of their father.
father, “Valencia”?
BY GALVAN Said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a
The plaintiffs allege that they (except Catalina Osmeña) are the legitimate children
YES prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were
of the defendant Pio E. Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina
correct, they can stop countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."
Osmeña and contend that they alone have the right to bear the surname
The defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all appearances, Pio E. Valencia (the
"Valencia," in accordance with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that
father) acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by the defendants. But even if he objects, the defendants can still
legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father. And under
use the surname "Valencia," in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.
articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children (who are not natural)
are entitled only to support. Defendants, (except Emilia Rodriguez and Pio E.
Valencia) are the illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his common-law-wife,
defendant Emilia Rodriguez.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCESS

ANDAL VS. MACARAIG Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad Can Mariano Andal If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise,
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the be considered as the then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
BY GALVAN recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano
Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his
mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the
latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the
land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the
abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.
LC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are
involved.
MACADANGDANG VS. Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
COURT OF APPEALS Anahaw.
BY GALVAN
She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang; she also
alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated; that she gave birth
to a baby boy named Rolando Macdangdang.
Respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against
petitioner (then defendant)
Lower court dismissed the complaint; the decision invoked positive provisions of
the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities
CA reversed and denied appellant's motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.
TAN VS. TROCIO Complainant is a married woman with 8 children and a school directress. She filed
an administrative case against respondent was the legal counsel of her school.
BY GALVAN She alleged that after classes were dismissed, Respondent overpowered her and
against her will succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she
begot a son – Jewel Tan. Respondent denies that he had sexually assaulted the
complainant. OSG reported that respondent had committed acts violative of his
professional decorum and it recommended disciplinary actions against him.
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao also found the respondent guilty of the charge.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: BIOLOGICAL / SCIENTIFIC GROUNDS
JAO VS. COURT OF 1968: Petitioner Janice Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
APPEALS guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado filed a case for recognition and support with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) against Perico Jao.
BY GALVAN
Perico denied paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test duly conducted by
the NBI upon the trial court’s order. Result: Janice could not have been that
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
19
legitimate child of The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and
Emiliano Andal? his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the
alleged father Emiliano Andal. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1,
1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it
was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942,
which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under
the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit
intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from
bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse.
Whether there was
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of
physical impossibility
the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three
of access between
hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to
respondent and her
establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony,
husband?
respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her
husband in her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place
NO It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her
mother's house in Samal for treatment. Since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province,
the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed out,
respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence more
particularly that of her husband. The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven
(7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took
place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). As of March, 1967,
respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date.
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage
and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Under Article 255 of the Civil
Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
Whether the We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s charge. Respondent’s threat to cause the deportation of her alien
respondent had husband should she report to anyone made her desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted
sexually assaulted having lost contact with him. Another factor is that she continued having dealing with the respondent as if nothing
the complainant? had happened. The testimonies of complainant and her witness, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not
convincing enough to prove paternity. More importantly, Jewel was born in 1972 during the wedlock of complainant
NO and her husband alien and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate and
convincing proof.
Whether the result of In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA
blood grouping test is where the court held that the NBI expert’s report stating that “from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co
admissible and Tao is apossible father of the child” could not give any assurance that Co Tao was the father,only the possibility.
conclusive to prove There is now an almost universal agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
Paternity? inconclusive as to paternity (As shown in Co Tao). The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product o
the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents, but, if the blood
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
possible offspring of Perico and Arlene YES
The trial court found the test result legally conclusive
Janice filed MFR, and court ordered trial on merits where Janice was declared
Perico’s kid and thus entitled to monthly support.
Perico appealed to CA, contesting trial court’s error to appreciate result of blood
test and CA reversed trial court decision
Hence this appeal by Janice
Petitioner Amurao was sued for support by the offspring of his illicit relations with a 19-year old
AMURAO VS. COURTcollege student. He denied paternity and refused to give support. At the commencement of the trial,
OF APPEALS the trial court made a last-minute effort to simplify the issues by calling the parties for an agreement
– the parties agreed to submit themselves to a blood-grouping test to determine the paternity of
BY ROCAMORA plaintiff before the National Bureau of Investigation; and to be bound by the results of the said
government agency in the following manner: a) if finding is to be the effect that herein plaintiff may
be the offspring of defendant, paternity shall be admitted and this case will proceed for trial only on
the issue of amount of support; and b) if the finding is negative, then this case shall be dismissed
without further trial. The Court finds the same well taken.
The defendant and the natural mother were ordered to submit themselves to a blood-
grouping test before the National Bureau of Investigation for a determination of plaintiff’s paternity.
On the basis of the blood-grouping tests performed by the NBI, it found that: The said child is a
possible offspring of the alleged father Romeo Amurao with Fe Rosario Buenaventura as the
natural mother. Exactly one year later, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s
order impugning its validity. The motion was denied by the trial court. The petitioner sought a
review of the order by the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari but the petition was
denied.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: CONTRARY DECLARATION BY THE MOTHER
CHUA KENG GIAP VS.
This case arose when Chua Keng Giap fiels a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy
PAC Kao in the RTC of Quezon City. The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of
action and of the petitioner’s capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been
BY ROCAMORA declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sky Kao for the settlement of the
estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and executory.
The motion was by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked decided the paternity and
not the maternity of the petitioner. Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court
reversed the trial judge in a petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. The motion fro
reconsideration was denied for late filing. The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these
rulings.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to dismiss
based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these
allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically admitted. That is correct. He also submits
that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore reversible not in a
petition for on appeal. That is also correct. Even so the petition must be and is hereby denied.
WHO MAY IMPUGN LEGITIMACY?
Esperanza Frianeza – Cabatbat was survived by her husband Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, and
LIM VS. IAC the children of her deceased brothers. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza but is only a ward (ampon) of the spouses
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
20
type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods of the mother and the alleged father are cross
matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. In jurisdictions like the U.S., the admissibility of
blood tests results to prove non- paternity has already been passed upon in several cases (Gilpin v. Gilpin, Cuneo
v.Cuneo and Clark v. Rysedorph). The important doctrine from such cases is that toreject competent medical
testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific factand to deny progress. Legislation expressly recognizing the
use of blood tests is also in force in several states. Tolentino affirms this rule on blood tests as a proof of non-
paternity. Petitioner attempts to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests by impugning that qualification of the
NBI personnel who conducted the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. However, the NBI forensic
chemistry who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has extensive practice in this area for several years. The
tests were conducted6 times using 2 scientifically recognized blood grouping systems: MN test and ABOsystem,
under witness and supervision. Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first bloodtest, she, represented by her
mom, declined to undergo the test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Perico was willing to undergo the
test again.
Whether or not the The Supreme Court held that the determination of the amount of support payable to the private
petitioner made an respondent. It was perfectly proper for the Court to consider the evidence presented by the parties
admission of at the hearing of the plaintiff’s contempt motion against the defendant, as evidence also on the
paternity under the merits of the main case. The defendant (herein petitioner), by failing to appear at the hearing of the
terms of the trial main case, waived his right to adduce additional evidence. Hence, he may not be heard to complain
court’s order binding that he was denied due process. Whether or not the Court Appeals correctly determined that the
him to give support minor, who filed his action for support in 1977 when he was only an infant five months old, is now
to his child, is a (as an 11-year old student) entitled to an increase in the amount of support awarded to him by trial
finding of fact. court, is also a factual issue which we may not re-examine and review. In any event, it finds no
reversible error in the decision of the CA. The increase in the child’s support is proper and is
sanctioned by the provisions of Articles 290, 296 and 297 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not The Supreme Court held in an earlier case, petitioner Sy Kao denied that respondent Chua Keng
filiation could be Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner’s opposition is based principally
claimed if the on the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore, had
supposed mother no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings. The
flatly and respondent tried to appeal the courts resolution but his appeal was denied by the lower court for
unequivocally having been filed out of time. He then filed a mandamus case with the Court of appeals but the
declared that she same was dismissed. Respondent, therefore, sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari, before
was not the this Court but his petition was likewise dismissed on January 30, 1982, for lack of merit.
petitioner’s mother? Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really he son? More
than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say – as indeed she has said these many years – that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
Whether or not The Supreme Court held the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the
Violeta Cabatbat – Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuiness of her exhibit. This is not an
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
BY ROCAMORA Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit
of formal adoption proceedings.
Corazon Garcia is legally married but has been living separately from Ramon Yulo for more than 10
LAYAO VS. TANHOTI- years. She cohabited with William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Liyao’s death. Some
LAYAO witnesses, however, testified that Corazon and her husband were seen in each other’s company
during the supposed time Corazon cohabited with William Liyao.
BY ROCAMORA
In 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. Since birth, William Jr, also known as Billy, had
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/ or acknowledge
child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt act. During William Liyao’s birthday he was
carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his daughters, “Look, this is my son, very guapo
and healthy”. He talked about grand plans for the baptism of Billy. Unfortunately, it did not happen
due to his untimely death on December 2, 1975.
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr, represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed a civil
action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The RTC granted
his petition, however the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that the law favors the
legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The petition was filed for review on certiorari.
PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: RECORD OF BIRTH
REYES VS. COURT OF On January 29, 1967, private respondent as plaintiffs field a complaint in the Court of First Instance
APPEALS of Batangas praying that defendant Irene Reyes be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in
favor of plaintiffs over parcels of lands located in Quezon and Batangas. It was alleged in the
BY ROCAMORA complaint that the defendant’s thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other
falsifications succeeded in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and
Batangas a document of self adjudication, wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was
the sole child of Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the
complaint. Irene Delgado filed an answer to the complaint and set-up the affirmative defense that
she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased Francisco
Delgado. She also set up a counterclaim that as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she
has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother.
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
21
Lim is a legitimate action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
child of the inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
deceased? Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all.
Being neither a legally sdopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by illegal fiction
of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by
Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that
only one woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza
Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as
Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S Plaintiff’s Folder of Exhibits, p.39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118).
Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947
and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and only birth certificate
in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose
mother’s name is Benita Lastimosa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but with
modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela
B. Vda de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. De Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza
Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in
the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not the No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to
petitioner may be legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of the child, is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
impugn his own exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the
legitimacy to be scandal. Only in exceptional cases may his heirs allowed to contest such legitimacy. There is
able to claim nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth
from the estate of of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The Court held that it is settle that a
his supposed father child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have
William Liyao. declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress; the child himself
cannot choose his own affiliation – if the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child if fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the
child of his mother’s paramour.
Whether or not the No. The Court of Appeals found that although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter of
petitioner has the Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate because she was not
right to inherit as an recognized either voluntarily or by court action. The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to
illegitimate child of the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado’s mother, need not to be ruled upon because
the deceased of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado. What Irene have to proved is that she
Francisco Delgado. had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such
fact alone without valid recognition in a record of first will, statement before a court of record, or
authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She
nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be had
not presented any discovered document wherein be presumed father recognized her, the action to
compel recognition is already barred.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 22
CASTRO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS

BY ORILLAZA

MENDOZA VS.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: FINAL JUDGMENT

RAMOS VS. RAMOS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: ADMISSION IN A SIGNED PUBLIC DOCUMENT

LIM VS. COURT OF

APPEALS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: SIGNED & HANDWRITTEN PRIVATE INSTRUMENT

RANAS VS. RANAS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: OPEN & CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS

MENDOZA VS. COURT The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the
OF APPEALS latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her
complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the
BY SANTOS lower court.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, RTC. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single,
and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the
rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations.
Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him
Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at
his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged
him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of
the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a
house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been
held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious children.
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less
with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct
acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father.
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
This article has been substantially reproduced in Art. 172 Family Code
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the
Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita
Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to
her after admonishing Margarita.
Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work
with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio
acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in
1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's
baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito,
Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on
Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various
amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro
intended to give certain properties to Teopista.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared that
Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her.
Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half
sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed
that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.
RTC- rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of
the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family
CA- appellant has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status.
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
23
same evidence as legitimate children.
Both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions, focused on
the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had
apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of
the Old Civil Code.
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the
concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of
paternal affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous
possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article
283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by
another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told
Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It
should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the
record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of
pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father
Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista
was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
VDA. DE ALBERTO The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on
VS. COURT OF September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein
APPEALS private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea
Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners.
BY SANTOS
In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his
alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together
as husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10,
1942.
During the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and
wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment
to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living
together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to
the public as his natural child; that even the family of his father recognized him as
such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and mother separated, and
subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a
result of the marriage, two (2) children were born—herein petitioners Lourdes
Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.;
Although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him
and recognized him as his own child.
On July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del
Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father.
On the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of
the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his
deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said
intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
24
Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's
testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which
were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were
made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and
Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by
evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances
of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the
Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of
illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status
with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine
and technology
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of
the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILD TO BE BROUGHT
ONLY DURING LIFETIME OF PRESUMED PARENT. — The action for recognition of natural child may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the
child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]).
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILD TO BE BROUGHT WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS AFTER DEATH
OF THE NATURAL FATHER IN CASE THE LATTER DIED DURING MINORITY OF THE CHILD WITH A
GUARDIAN. — If the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority. In
such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father.
Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition
was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.
EVIDENCE; UNSIGNED BIRTHDAY CERTIFICATE, INCOMPETENT PROOF OF PATERNITY. — a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of
paternity.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 25
properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father,
he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous
knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently
and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his
share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him
as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over
to him.

BALUYOT VS.
BALUYOT

BY SANTOS

PATERNO VS.
PATERNO

BY SANTOS

PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN: COMPULSORY RECOGNITION

GAPUSAN VS. COURT Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 Whether or not Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory.
OF APPEALS in Bacolod City. Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other Felisa's sworn
known relatives — three (3) sisters and a nephew — made any move to settle her statement of assets Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent,
BY SANTOS estate judicially. and liabilities and her expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his;
application for the formality is added to make the admission incontestable, in view of its consequences." The form is prescribed by
It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of insurance are Article 278 of the Civil Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record
Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of "authentic writings" of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing."
the latter's estate. About a year and eight months after Felisa's demise, or on which effectively
January 15, 1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros operated as a Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it from that which is a purely
Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of recognition of Ligaya voluntary act of the parent. It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles
administration in her favor. 1 She also sought her designation as Special Gapusan-Chua as 283 and 284, setting forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural
Administratrix pending her appointment as regular administratrix. 2 her natural child, child, and Article 285 providing that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only
even if no action was during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
By Order dated January 16, 1968, the Court appointed Ligaya Special brought by the latter
Administratrix of Felisa Parcon's estate. to compel the former, The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary recognition is dealt with in
during her lifetime, to Article 281 of the Civil Code.
On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a recognize her as
motion for reconsideration of the Order of January 16, 1968. He denied that Ligaya such. Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent.
was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be
appointment as administrator of his wife's estate. necessary. A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.

Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya claimed affiliation. Ligaya presented,
among other proofs, the following documents:
Exh. a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya is
named and described as the daughter of Felisa;
Exh. b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set
out as her (Felisa's) daughter;
Exh. c) Check No. 44046 of the Government Service Insurance System in the sum
of P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share in the death benefits due the heirs of
Felisa Parcon.
In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth
or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual
recognized can impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.
Exhibits (a), (b), and (c) are undoubtedly an "authentic writing" within the contemplation of Article 278.

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION
The Probate Court found for Ligaya. Declared that petitioner is the acknowledged
natural child of the late Felisa Gapusan, and for being the next of kin of the
deceased (Rule 78, Rules of Court), she is hereby appointed regular administratrix
of the properties of the above-mentioned deceased with the same bond given by
her as special administratrix, with costs against the oppositors. CA- reversed.
Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently
establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon, and that
her appointment as regular administratrix is justified by law and jurisprudence.
More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, a
public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a legal requirement
therefor, and the latter's application for life insurance were in law indubitable
recognition by her mother of her status as an acknowledged natural child,
voluntarily made, and were adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her
status as heir. These statements, she alleges, were "authentic writings" in
contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code:
PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN
BY LAGASCA
PEOPLE VS. RIZO
BY LAGASCA
DEMSEY VS. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT
BY LAGASCA
MENDOZA VS. COURT
OF APPEALS
APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
26
It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa to
compel her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was
not made in a record of birth or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only
her own consent to the recognition being required. The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence,
conformably with the legal provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been
executed during Ligaya's minority. In other words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval
negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time
the writings were made.
The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still a minor or already of age at the time of her
recognition in the authentic writings mentioned, that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the attendant
facts.
In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be
given expressly or tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the
evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her
failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her
assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights
thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial
approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition,
after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased
mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter. The requirement
of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial
approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the protection of
the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such
approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after
reaching majority the minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no
difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after
reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's surname.
Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged
natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to
bear her mother's surname, and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 27
BY LAGASCA

PEOPLE VS.
BARRANEO

BY LAGASCA

ADOPTION

LAZATIN VS. CAMPOS

BY TRINIDAD

CERVANTES VS.
FAJARDO

BY TRINIDAD

REPUBLIC VS. COURT

OF APPEALS

BY TRINIDAD

WHO MAY ADOPT? HUSBAND & WIFE JOINTLY

REPUBLIC VS. COURT

OF APPEALS &
BOBILES

BY TRINIDAD

WHO MAY ADOPT? NEED FOR CONSENT

SANTOS VS.
ARANSANZO

BY TRINIDAD

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.