Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CHINESE THESIS
Author(s): Albert Szymanski
Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 22 (1977-1978), pp. 131-166
Published by: Regents of the University of California
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41035250 .
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byAlbertSzymanski
SovietForeignTrade
Allforeign tradein theSovietUnionis carried on bystatetrad-
ingcorporations (in thelate 1960stherewereabout30 of them,
eachspecializing in a differenttypeof commodity overwhichit
hasa completemonopoly) . Theseforeigntradecorporationshave
thesameexclusive rightto buylocallyproducedgoodsforexport
andtopurchase foreign goodsforimport.The Ministry ofForeign
Trademaintains tightcontroloverthestatetradingcorporations
throughdetailed plans for volume, assortment, prices and
transportofcommodities, whichspecifyhowthetrading corpora-
tionsoperate.4
playsno rolein thebehavior
Profitability ofthetrading corpor-
ations.The corporations purchaseSovietgoodsat theprevailing
domesticpricesand sell themoverseasat the prevailing world
market price.The difference betweenthedomesticand external
pricesgoes to the generalreservesof the Soviet state. The
Sovietdomestic industrial haveneither
enterprises knowledge of,
norinterestin,thepriceordisposition ofexportgoods.The state
tradingcorporations purchaseimports abroadat theworldmarket
pricesutilizingfundsfromthe generalSoviet state reserves
and thensell the importedcommodities to the domesticcon-
sumingenterprise at the prevailinginternalprice (if greater
than the world marketprice the enterpriseis thus subsi-
dized by the state,if less,the enterprisesubsidizesthe general
treasury).SincetheSovietproductive haveabsolutely
enterprises
no connection withforeigntrade,fluctuations in worldprices
haveno impacton theiroutputplans,planswhicharedetermined
bytherequirements of theoveralleconomicplan. Generally the
Sovietstendtosellandbuyin theinternational market wellbelow
theirdomestic prices;thisimpliesa subsidy forexportorientedin-
dustriesanda taxon import oriented
industries.5
inRelationtoNetMaterial
TABLE1. SovietImports Product
RawMaterial /
Imports /
TotalImports
N.M.P. N.M.P.
1950-53 2.0% 3.3%
1954-57 1.9 3.1
1958-61 1.8 3.3
1962-65 1.7 3.7
1966-65 1.4 3.5
1970-72 .9 4.3
FuelsandRaw Manufactured
Industrial Materials
Machinery (ex.foods) Foods Consumer
Goods
SovietandEastEuropeanForeignTrade,1946-1969,
Source:PaulMarer, pp. 44, 53.
exploiting theothersocialist
countries
throughtrade,thereis evi-
dencethattheyhavestriven forhegemony
overtheothersocialist
countries byusingtradeas a weaponto get theothersto follow
policiesapprovedbytheSovietUnion.
SovietForeign Aid totheLessDevelopednon-Socialist Countries
The "foreign assistance" ofa typical capitalist imperialist coun-
trysuch as the UnitedStates is designed to (1) the
facilitate exports
of themajordomesticcorporations to theThirdWorld("assist-
ance" is almostexclusively in the formof exportcreditswhich
mustbe usedon designated products ofthe"donor's" majorcor-
porations,productswhichare so designatedbecause of their
inabilityto be otherwise competitive); (2) pressure therecipient
countries to followpolicieseconomically favorable to the trans-
nationalcorporations basedin thedonorcountry (e.g. no restric-
tionson therepatriation ofprofits, no discrimination in favorof
locallyownedbusinesses,low wages,etc.), and politically and
militarilyfavorableto the donor state;and (3) very often, resultin
a profitforthetreasury ofthedonornationwhichrequires repay-
mentat interest, usuallyin "hard" currency.16
The totalamountofSovietforeign assistance to thelessdevel-
opedmarket countriesofAfrica, AsiaandLatinAmericahasfairly
consistently averagedonlyabout 10% of U.S. aid in theperiod
1954-1974.In theperiod1955-1965Sovietaid averaged8% of
U.S. aid, whilein theperiod1967-1974it was 10%, a slightbut
notveryimpressive growth. Overthree-fourths ofall Sovietaid to
the less developedmarketeconomiesis to the countries of the
NearEastand SouthAsia.In theperiod1954-1974thelargestre-
cipientsofSovietaid were,inorder:India($1,943million),Egypt
($1,300),Afganistan ($826), Iran ($750), Iraq ($549), Pakistan
($652),Turkey($530), Algeria($425) and Syria($417). The pri-
oritiesforaid forthesecountries werebasicallythesamein the
periods1954-1966and 1967-1974, withtheexceptions thataid to
Turkeyand Pakistanhas been grantedsince 1966, most of
Pakistan's since1971.In thepost-1966periodChile,Bangladesh,
Argentina and Guineahavealso beenmajorrecipients of Soviet
aid.17Anexamination ofthecountries favored bySovietaid seems
to revealtwofactors whichmotivateits distribution: (1) Soviet
strategicinterestsaround itssouthern borders, e.g., Turkey, Iran,
India,Pakistan, Afghanistan, whichseemstodictateaid indepen-
dentofthenatureoftheregimes;and (2) supportofprogressive
anti-imperialist forces,e.g., Iraq, Algeria,Egypt,Syria,Argen-
tina,Chile,Guinea.
l6Fordiscussionsof the role of U.S. foreignassistancesee HarryMagdoff,The Age
of Imperialism, (New York: MonthlyReview Press, 1969); Teresa Hayter,Aid as
Imperialism,(Baltimore: Pelican, 1971); Steve Weissman, The Trojan Horse, (San
Francisco:RampartsPress, 1974).
17U.S. Department of State, Communist States and Developed Countries: Aid
and Tradein 1974, Table Two; and U.S. Departmentof Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, StatisticalAbstractof the United States, (1976), Table 1401 (and various).
"See Valkcnier. Also see the discussionof joint enterprisesin the later pan of this
paper.
"Tansky, p. 456; Sherman,p. 208; U.S. Departmentof State, p. 6.
"Goldman, pp. 191-192.
SovietMilitaryAssistance
Sovietmilitary assistanceto the less developednon-socialist
countrieshas expandedconsiderably in the 1970s.In theperiod
1955-1960Sovietmilitary assistanceaveraged$214milliona year,
in 1961-1964,$628 million;in 1965-1969,$405 million;and in
1970-1974,$1238 million.Thus in the firsthalfof the 1970's
Sovietmilitary assistance hasaveragedovertwiceSovieteconomic
assistance.31
The leadingbeneficiaries of Sovietarmsdeliveries
(salesandassistance) in theperiod1964-1974 were:Egypt($2,305
million),India($1,273),Syria($1,153),Iraq ($742),Iran($438),
Algeria($281), Afghanistan ($246), Indonesia($144), Libya
($125) and Somalia ($69). With the obvious exceptionsof
Indonesiaand Iran(and possiblyof Afghanistan and India) it is
clear that the Sovietstend to militarily supportthe most
progressivelessdevelopednon-socialist countries. In thecasesof
Iran,Indonesia,India and Afghanistan strategicconsiderations,
eitherin trying to neutralize U.S. or,to a lesserextent,Chinese
influence,areclearly operating.32
It shouldbe notedthatin theperiod1965-1974totalSoviet
armstransfers (salesplus grants)to thelessdevelopedcountries
totaled58% of U.S. transfers (ifNorthKorea,Cuba and North
Vietnamareexcluded,39%). The SovietUnionand Czechoslo-
vakiawerein the period 1965-1974virtually the onlyforeign
suppliersofmilitary weaponstoEgypt,Syria,India,Afghanistan,
Iraq,Algeria,Somalia,and Guinea.The U.S. suppliedno, oral-
mostno, military equipmentto thesecountries in theseyears.
ThustheSovietUnionhad a decisiveimpactin armingthemore
progressivenon-socialist countries of theThirdWorldas wellas
Cuba, NorthKorea and Vietnam(who respectively receiveda
totalof $295, $585 and $3,245 millionin military equipment
fromtheSovietUnionduringtheseyears.)33 Sovietmilitary sup-
pliesplayeda decisive roleinkeepingthesecountries independent
of U.S. imperialism withoutproducinga materialgain forthe
SovietUnion.
The Soviet'smilitary assistance program in theThirdWorld,as
39Paul Marcr, Soviet and East European Foreign Trade, p. 33, 43; and United
Nations, Yearbook ofInternationalTrade Statistics,1974, p. 926.
TheSixCOMECON
plusYugoslavia 15.0% 11.7% 64.2%
LatinAmerica 74.5 19.4 3.6
MiddleEast 75.7 19.8 2.2
Africa 81.1 11.0 6.1
Asia 66.5 28.3 4.2
TABLE4. SovietExports
toandImportsfromtheSixCOMECON Countries
ofEastern Europe
ofTotalExports
(AsPercentage orImports)
Manufactured
Industrial
Machinery FuelsandRaw Consumer Goods
andEquipment Material (ex.food) Foods (ex.food)
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1950-53 22.0% 39.2% 51.7% 43.7% 25.2% 7.2% 1.1% 9.9%
1954-57 15.5 46.8 60.7 37.1 21.6 5.8 2.3 10.3
1958-61 13.9 45.8 64.4 27.0 18.6 7.6 3.0 19.6
1962-65 19.7 49.8 65.9 20.5 12.2 7.9 2.2 21.9
1966-68 24.4 48.2 62.8 16.9 10.7 9.2 2.1 25.7
Source: PaulMarcr,
Sovietand EastEuropeanForeignTrade,1946-1969,
TableIII.
In comparisonwith the 26% of total EasternEuropean
COMECON exports to theSovietUnionwhicharerawmaterials,
fuelsor food,thepercentages of totalexportsto theU.S. from
countriesoftenregardedas its dependenciesare considerably
e.g. (circa1973):Columbia88.9%, DominicanRepublic
greater,
98.0%, Guatemala84.4%, Honduras97.9%, Mexico54.3%,
Nicaragua82.0%, Panama73.5%, the Philippines95.6% and
6lGoldman, Ch. 1; Marcr,Soviet and East European Foreign Trade, p. 236; Gil-
bert,p. 110.
62Goldman,pp. 20-21.
TABLE5. RatesofEconomic
GrowthoftheEuropeanCOMECON Countries
ComparedtoThoseofOthers1960-1973
Source:UnitedNations,Yearbookof NationalAccountStatistics,
1975, Tables 4A, 4B.
Conclusion
A closeempiricalexamination oftheaggregate economicrela-
tionsbetweentheSovietUnion,thecountries oftheThirdWorld
andtheCOMECON countries ofEastern Europe'does notsupport
theChinesethesisof"SovietSocialImperialism. '
Thereareno mechanisms analogousto overproduction operat-
ing in the Sovieteconomywhichforcethe pursuitof overseas
investment outletsor trade surplusesin orderto allow the
accumulation ofcapital;Soviettradedoesnotdisproportionately
benefittheSovietUnionat theexpenses ofothercountries; Soviet
economicassistanceis generousand not used to economically
dominateand exploitothercountries; theSoviets,unlikeall the
Westerncapitalistcountries,do not investin Third World
countriesforprofit;and Sovieteconomicintegration withEastern
Europeis mutuallybeneficialto all partiesand participated in
freelybytheEastern Europeancountries.
That no evidence could be found of Soviet economic
exploitationofeitherThirdWorldorothersocialist countries,or
anydynamic detectedin theorganization of theSovieteconomy
leadingit to be imperialist, does not necessarily implythatthe
SovietUniondoes not intervene in othercountries formilitary
advantage, doesnotsuppress working classand progressive move-
mentsin othercountries and does nothurtmorethanhelp the
advanceoftheworldsocialist movement. Thedemonstration ofa
lackofeconomic exploitation ofothercountries merely showsthat
theSovietUnionis notimperialist in thesamesenseoftheterm
thattheU.S.A. and otherWestern imperialist countries are. The
SovietUnion,althoughnotsocialimperialist, mightwellbe both
hegemonic andoppressive initsrelations withothercountries.
In facttherearenumerous casesofSoviethegemonism, mostly
in relationto othersocialistcountries, butsometimes in relation
to non-socialistThird World countriesas well (e.g., the
constraintsputon Egypt,thesupportto ZAPU butnotZANU in
Zimbabwe).Soviethegemonism was a farmorepotentforcein
thepre-1956periodwhenthedetailsof decisionmakingin the
Eastern Europeancountries weretypically dictatedbyMoscow.In
the1960sthedrastic sanctions againstChinaandAlbaniaand the