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asia policy, number 24 ( july 2017 ) , 65122
http://asiapolicy.nbr.org
roundtable
Chinas Belt and Road Initiative:
Views from along the Silk Road
Michael Clarke
Andrew Small
Harsh V. Pant and Ritika Passi
Sebastien Peyrouse
Meena Singh Roy
Nargis Kassenova
Hong Yu
The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

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Introduction
Jessica Keough
I n 2013, Chinas president Xi Jinping announced an initiative that would

set the course for much of Chinas foreign policy toward its Eurasian
neighbors. Consisting of two partsan overland belt connecting China
with Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Europe and a maritime road
linking Chinese ports with those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Europethe Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisions a
vast network of railways, highways, ports, pipelines, and communication
infrastructure spanning the Eurasian continent and facilitating trade,
investment, and people-to-people exchange (see Figure 1). In 2015, Beijing
announced a plan to develop six economic corridors to advance this
initiative (see Figure 2). Chinas leadership has rallied behind BRI, pledging
substantial investment, creating new financial institutions such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Silk Road Fund, and making
diplomatic commitments to countries along the proposed routes. To many
observers, BRI appears to be an outline of Chinas ambitious new grand
strategy,1 but what do states in the region think of this initiative?
The seven contributors to this Asia Policy roundtable seek to answer this
question by examining how Asian states along this new Silk Road view BRI
and its potential implications. Michael Clarke begins the roundtable with
an essay that analyzes Chinas motivations and objectives. He concludes
that BRI is motivated by Beijings desire to resolve long-term domestic,
economic, and geopolitical challenges by strengthening states in Chinas
frontier regions, exporting Chinese capital and labor, and establishing an
alternative to the current international order. BRI integrates these objectives
into a strategy that furthers Chinas goal of returning to great-power status
without provoking strong counterreactions.
Andrew Small seeks to understand Pakistans role in BRI through an
examination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite
Pakistan and Chinas long history of an all-weather friendship, previous
joint infrastructure and economic projects have generally failed to deliver
jessica keough is Managing Editor of Asia Policy at the National Bureau of Asian Research.
She can be reached at <jkeough@nbr.org>.
1 For a comprehensive study of BRI, see Nadge Rolland, Chinas Eurasian Century? Political and
Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research).
[ 66 ]
FIGURE 1
Chinas Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
Silk Road Economic Belt R U S S I A

Moscow
NETHERLANDS
Rotterdam BELARUS
POLAND
GERMANY
Duisburg
UKRAINE
FRANCE
ROMANIA KAZAKHSTAN
MONGOLIA
Venice
Almaty Horgos Urumqi
ITALY BULGARIA
UZBEKISTAN Bishkek
KYRGYZSTAN
Istanbul Samarkand
TURKMENISTAN Beijing
TURKEY TAJIKISTAN
GREECE Athens Dushanbe

SYRIA Tehran Lanzhou
AFGHANISTAN Xian
IRAQ IRAN CHINA
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PAKISTAN NEPAL
BHUTAN
EGYPT Fuzhou
BANGLADESH Quanzhou
INDIA Guangzhou
SAUDI ARABIA Kolkata Haikou
OMAN MYANMAR Hanoi
LAOS Zhanjiang
YEMEN THAILAND
SUDAN
CAMBODIA
BURKINA
GHANA SOMALIA
VIETNAM
SRI LANKA
ETHIOPIA Colombo
Kuala Lumpur
M A L A Y S I A
KENYA
Nairobi
roundtablechina s belt and road initiative
21st Century Maritime Silk Road
Jakarta
I N D O N E S I A
Source: West China Seeks Fortune on Modern Silk Road, Xinhua, May 15, 2016 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/15/c_135360904.
htm. Originally published in Chinese in Xinhua, 2014. Reprinted with minor changes from Nadge Rolland, Chinas Eurasia Century? Political and
Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 49.
FIGURE 2
The Six Economic Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative
China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor
New Eurasian Land Bridge

Economic Corridor
ChinaCentral
AsiaWest Asia
Economic Corridor
Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar
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Economic Corridor
China-
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Pakistan
Economic
ChinaIndochina
Corridor
Peninsula
Economic Corridor
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council Head Office, The Belt and Road Initiative, January 21, 2016 u http://china-trade-research.hktdc.
com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-More-Information/obor/en/1/1X3CGF6L/1X0A36H1.htm.
Reprinted from Rolland, Chinas Eurasia Century? 73.
on their rhetoric. Although both sides clearly stand to gain from CPEC and
some progress has been made, long-standing challenges in Pakistan provide
reason for skepticism that the project will in fact meet Beijings goals.
While not on board with BRI, India is closely watching the initiative,
particularly CPEC. Harsh Pant and Ritika Passi argue in their essay that
pressure is mounting on New Delhi to decide whether to remain on the
sidelines. India is wary of the security implications of BRI, particularly for
the contested area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and for Indian Ocean
ports and sea lanes; however, Chinas infrastructure development projects
could be a boon that increases the regions economic interdependence and
gives India leverage to shape the initiative from within. India thus faces
challenging decisions as BRI unfolds.
Russia, by contrast, has moved from caution to an embrace of BRI, at
least for now. The initiative will expand Chinas presence not only in Central
Asia, Russias traditional sphere of influence, but also further westward
in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. While Moscow recognizes this
dilution of its own influence, Sebastien Peyrouse argues that Russias
economic crisis and the effects of Western sanctions have left it with few
other powerful partners. By linking BRI to its own regional initiative
the Eurasian Economic UnionMoscow hopes to stake a claim to partial
ownership of the idea and largely preserve its regional influence while
avoiding conflict with Beijing and direct responsibility for the practicalities
of implementing BRI in Central Asia.
Meena Singh Roy argues that Afghanistan has straightforward reasons
to welcome BRI: the prospects of the new investment and development it will
bring. Kabul hopes that the initiative will improve infrastructure to better
connect war-torn Afghanistan with its South and Central Asian neighbors,
allowing the country to increase its regional trade. Afghanistan also would
like to see China undertake a greater peacekeeping role in the country in
order to protect Chinese citizens and investments. However, security,
geopolitical, and economic challenges may well prevent the realization of
these aspirations. For China to consider a bigger role for Afghanistan in
BRI, the countrys security situation will first need to improve.
Kazakhstan likewise has high expectations for BRI, stemming in part
from a history of cooperation with China on transportation and energy
projects. Nargis Kassenova explores the complementary ideas and projects
behind Chinas BRI and Kazakhstans Bright Path (Nurly Zhol) economic
policy. She cautions, however, that both popular fear of China and ongoing
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government corruption might present obstacles to the elites generally warm

reception of BRI.
Hong Yu explores the implications of BRI for Southeast Asia. Despite
a strong sense of regionalism, countries in Southeast Asia see differently
the opportunities and challenges arising from BRI depending on their level
of development and comfort with China. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar,
three countries more closely aligned with China, are supportive of the
infrastructure development promised by the initiative. Malaysia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines welcome the infrastructure and trade that
BRI could bring but are wary of becoming too economically dependent on
China. They are also suspicious of Chinas geopolitical intentions, given its
assertiveness in the South China Sea disputes.
As this roundtable demonstrates, there is considerable optimism
about BRI across Asia, as well as concern and skepticism regarding
Chinas ultimate intentions and ability to deliver on its promises. While
infrastructure development is sorely needed in many areas of the region, the
prospect of greater Chinese geopolitical and economic influence is sobering
to many of the countries involved. Time will tell whether China is able to
realize its ambitious strategy for a more integrated Eurasia and what the
implications of that outcome will be.
[ 70 ]
The Belt and Road Initiative: Chinas New Grand Strategy?

Michael Clarke
I n 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled major components of

what has since become known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
During an address to Nazarbayev University in the Kazakh capital,
Astana, on September 7, Xi announced Chinas desire to jointly build
an economic belt along the Silk Road with Central Asian partners to
deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region.1
A month later, in an address to Indonesias parliament, Chinas president
encouraged Southeast Asian states to work with China to develop the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Subsequently, China has put more meat
on the bones of such aspirational statements through the identification of
six core economic corridors linking the Silk Road Economic Belt and the
Maritime Silk Road; the establishment of supporting multilateral financial
institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB)
and Silk Road Fund (SRF); and the publication of an official blueprint by
the National Development and Reform Commission for the implementation
of BRI.2 Beijing has also backed the initiative with a considerable financial
commitment, earmarking $40 billion for the Silk Road Economic Belt,
$25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road, $50 billion for the AIIB, and
$40 billion for the SRF.3
This ambitious agenda has sparked a variety of reactions among
governments throughout the regions encompassed by the initiative and by
external commentators and analysts. In the main, there have been three
major interpretations of BRI. The first view holds that BRI is driven by
michael clarkeis Associate Professor in the National Security College at the Australian National
University. He can be reached at <michael.clarke@anu.edu.au>.
1 Full Video: President Xi Jinping Delivers Speech at Nazarbayev University, CCTV, September 7,
2013 u http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130907/102105.shtml.
2 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of
Commerce of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015 u http://en.ndrc.gov.
cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. The six economic corridors are China-Mongolia-
Russia, ChinaCentral AsiaWest Asia, ChinaIndochina Peninsula, China-Pakistan, Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar, and the new Eurasian land bridge (connecting Lianyungang, in Jiangsu
Province, with Rotterdam).
3 Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou, The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering Security Implications
and EU-China Cooperation Prospects, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February
2017, 51 u https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/silk-road-economic-belt.
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Beijings geopolitical goals to break perceived U.S. encirclement in the

Asia-Pacific and constrain the rise of India.4 A second view emphasizes
the economic underpinnings of the initiative. Here, BRI is seen as a direct
outgrowth of Chinas economic travails after the global financial crisis,
notably its long-standing desire to redress economic imbalances between
its coastal and interior provinces and to find outlets for excess production
capacity. In this view, geopolitical gains that may come from the success of
BRI are welcome but of secondary importance.5 Finally, others have pointed
to BRI as an outgrowth of Beijings increasing desire to augment its growing
economic and strategic influence with a soft power narrative that presents
China as an alternative leader to the global hegemony of the United States.6
This essay presents two interconnected arguments in this context.
First, it suggests that BRI is clearly motivated by Beijings desire to resolve
long-term domestic, economic, and geopolitical challenges. Domestically,
BRI is guided by Chinas ongoing state-building agenda in its traditional
frontier regions (such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan).
Economically, BRI flows from the quest of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) to ensure the ongoing economic growth on which its
legitimacy depends by finding new outlets for Chinese capital and exports.
Geopolitically, BRI with its focus on developing trans-Eurasian connectivity
centered on China, speaks to Beijings desire to construct a viable strategic
and economic alternative to the current international order. Second,
BRI constitutes a grand strategy that integrates these factors in pursuit
of Beijings decades-long goal of returning to great-power status without
provoking overt counterreactions from its neighbors and the United States.
As such, BRI did not spring fully formed from the mind of Xi but builds
on the corpus of foreign and security policy concepts bequeathed by his
successors. Most significantly, BRI represents an overturning of Deng
Xiaopings famous maxim of biding time and building capabilities. Xis
vision, embodied in BRI, posits Chinas continued economic development
and stability as an engine of regional and global stability.
4 See Ashley J. Tellis, Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific, testimony before the U.S.
Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 2017; and Jayant Prasad, One Belt and Many Roads:
Chinas Initiative and Indias Response, Delhi Policy Group, Issue Brief, September 2015.
5 Peter Cai, Understanding Chinas Belt and Road Initiative, Lowy Institute for International
Policy, Analysis, March 22, 2017 u https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/
understanding-belt-and-road-initiative.
6 Francis Fukuyama, One Belt, One Road: Exporting the Chinese Model to Eurasia, Australian,
January 4, 2016 u http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/one-belt-one-road-exporting-the-
chinese-model-to-eurasia/news-story/269016e0dd63ccca4da306b5869b9e1c; and David Shambaugh,
Chinas Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2015, 99, 100.
[ 72 ]
BRI: State-Building, Economics, and Geopolitics

A key challenge for Beijing since the establishment of the Peoples
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 has been to integrate its traditional
frontiers of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan. For much of the
PRCs existence, Beijing has been vigilant about the security of these regions
due to their nonHan Chinese ethnic populations, histories of autonomy,
underdevelopment, and geopolitically important position. In the reform
and opening era, Beijings strategy to resolve its anxiety has largely rested
on the assumption that if it can deliver the fruits of economic development
and modernization not only will restive ethnic groups such as the Uighurs
and Tibetans acquiesce to Chinese rule but these regions integration into
the PRC will be assured.
The development model adopted in the 1980semphasizing the
comparative advantages of Chinas more heavily populated and industrially
advanced eastern provincesresulted in widening regional economic
disparities by the following decade. Beijing has attempted to redress this
imbalance through a variety of measures since the 1990s. Most notably,
in 1999 President Jiang Zemin launched the Great Western Development
campaign (xibu da kaifa), which focused on six provinces (Gansu,
Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), five autonomous
regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang), and one
municipality (Chongqing). Key in the reshaping of frontier regions were
major infrastructure projects such as the Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline and
the Qinghai-Tibet railway that physically linked such regions to the center.
The campaign also created urban hubs, or networks of development,
such as Kashgar, Shihezi, and Urumqi in Xinjiang, that focused on specific
industrial or infrastructural features7 and opened major border ports such
as Alashankou and Khorgos to facilitate trade with Central Asia.
Generally, though, the campaigns policies took a domestic focus:
government-led investment in projects that linked the west with the
existing centers of production in the east. A significant problem, however,
remained the lack of direct access to international markets that had
proved so successful for the eastern provinces in the 1980s. Many of
the countries adjacent to Chinas land bordersfor instance, in Central
Asiawere perceived as underdeveloped, with poor governance, embryonic
infrastructure, and difficult terrain. To successfully pursue development in
7 Shihezi, for example, is a core hub of Xinjiangs energy extraction and transit system.
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its frontier regions, China had to break the connectivity bottleneck, in the
words of one Chinese scholar. 8
Thus, the development of urban hubs or networks initially undertaken
under the Great Western Development campaign has been extended to the
six core economic corridors central to BRI. The Silk Road Economic Belt
aims to intensify connectivity between Xinjiang and Central Asia and South
Asia via the ChinaCentral AsiaWest Asia corridor and China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor. Similarly, Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia will
become gateways to Mongolia and the Russian Far East. The area is central
for the development of a Eurasian high-speed transportation corridor
linking Beijing with Moscow, thereby lessening Chinas dependency on
current sea routes. China also wishes to leverage Tibets geographic location
for extending a Silk Road node to Nepal. The focus under BRI on such
development is designed to speed up and reduce spatial barriers in order
to facilitate flows of capital and bring products to market and accelerate
the development of Chinas frontier regions.9
In a broader economic context BRI also contributes to Chinas efforts
to overcome key challenges to its economic model in the wake of the
global financial crisis. Major issues identified in this regard are managing
industrial overcapacity, developing new markets for exports, securing
access to natural resources, and finding uses for surplus capital. BRIs heavy
emphasis on infrastructure development makes sense by moving excess
production capacity out of China, which helps reduce the supply glut at
home while helping less developed countries to build up their industrial
bases.10 The need for new export markets is another economic driver of
BRI. For example, the 20,000 km of new railwayscould create demand
for as much as 85 million tons of steel and diversify exports to countries
like Vietnam, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.11
Enhancing Chinese access to natural resources, particularly energy
resources, is also transparently a driver of BRI. The majority of the
six identified economic corridors involve significant energy-related
infrastructure developments and investments, including pipelines to
Russia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Strategically, BRIs focus on
8 Chen Dingding, Chinas Marshall Plan Is Much More, Diplomat, November 10, 2014 u
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-marshall-plan-is-much-more/.
9 Tim Summers, Chinas New Silk Roads: Sub-national Regions and Networks of Global Political
Economy, Third World Quarterly 37, no. 9 (2016): 1636.
10 Cai, Understanding Chinas Belt and Road Initiative, 13, 4850.
11 Jonathan Holslag, How Chinas New Silk Road Threatens European Trade, International Spectator
52, no. 1 (2017): 49.
[ 74 ]
the development and diversification of overland supply routes is a means of

extracting China from its Malacca dilemmai.e., its reliance on seaborne
supply routes that may be vulnerable to U.S. maritime power in the event
of a conflict with Washington.12 Finally, institutional bodies established
by China to support BRI, such as the AIIB and SRF, demonstrate Beijings
desire to harness surplus capital to support major infrastructure projects
and enhance Chinas financial influence. Indeed, Chinese officials view
these institutions not only as a means to address Asias infrastructure
deficit but as a way to promote the internationalization of the renminbi.13
BRI and Chinas Evolving Grand Strategy

BRI serves a number of Chinas core domestic, economic, and
geopolitical interests. The initiative thus can be seen as a grand strategy
inasmuch as it constitutes an intellectual architecture that gives form and
structure to foreign policy and is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas
about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should
go about doing so.14 As argued above, BRI is the result of the evolution of
Chinese foreign and security policy thinking since the late 1980s, which has
proceeded in four major stages.
First, after the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, regime survival was the paramount
concern of the CCP. For Deng Xiaoping, that goal could only be assured
through coupling continued reform and opening and the delivery of
economic growth and development with firm one-party rule. In order to
effectively carry this out, China required a stable international environment
characterized by a return to multipolarity (duojihua). While waiting for
this order to materialize, Chinas foreign policy sought to bide time and
build capabilities (taoguang yanghui) through developing multiple regional
and global linkages to accelerate economic growth, resolve long-standing
disputes with neighbors, and combat the ill effects of U.S. predominance.15
12 David Brewster, Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of Chinas New Pathways
in the Indian Ocean, Geopolitics 22, no. 2 (2016): 26991.
13 Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on
the Silk Road, China Economic Journal 9, no. 2 (2016): 121.
14 Hal Brands, Barack Obama and the Dilemmas of American Grand Strategy, Washington
Quarterly 39, no. 4 (2016): 118.
15 See, for example, Bates Gill, Rising Star: Chinas New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 2225.
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Second, Dengs successor, Jiang Zemin, built on this foundation,

embedding preferences for cooperation, multilateralism, and
regionalism within the practice and discourse of Chinas foreign policy.
These watchwords became central to Beijings new security diplomacy
of the late 1990s, which aimed at dampening tensions in Chinas external
environment to focus on domestic, political and social reform challenges.16
Crucially, embedding China into regional and multilateral bodies would
assist it in countering, co-opting, or circumventing U.S. influence and
hegemony around the Chinese periphery.17 This amounted to a grand
strategy of assurance that sought to maintain the conditions conducive to
Chinas continued growth while simultaneously reducing the likelihood
others would unite to oppose China.18 In a regional context, this strategy
was most successful in Central Asia. Beijing not only quickly established
strong bilateral relationships with the post-Soviet states but also resolved
long-standing territorial disputes and took the lead in establishing a regional
multilateral forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.19 By and large,
Chinas foreign policy under Jiang was guided by the perception that the
international environment was characterized by a one superpower, many
great powers (yichaoduoqiang) formulation that recognized both Chinas
own rising power and the constraints placed on the exercise of that power
by continuing U.S. primacy.20
Third, Hu Jintao perceived a strategic opportunity for China to
transition from Dengs approach of bide time and build capabilities
to a foreign policy that would seek to do something, or striking some
successes (yousuo zuowei) while maintaining a primary focus on the
overarching goal of economic modernization and development. Hu
emphasized Chinas desire for peaceful development rather than
hegemonya policy that Premier Wen Jiabao asserted would send a clear
message to the world that China will achieve its development mainly through
its own efforts and mitigate misgivings in the international community
that China is bound to engage in external plundering and expansion when
16 Suisheng Zhao, Chinas Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors, Security Dialogue 30, no. 3
(1999): 33546.
17 Gill, Rising Star, 29.
18 Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy: A Rising Powers Emerging
Choice, China Quarterly 168 (2001): 835.
19 Chien-peng Chung, The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: Chinas Changing Influence in
Central Asia, China Quarterly 180 (2004): 9891009.
20 See Zhou Jianming, Zhengque renshi yichaoduoqiang de guoji geju [Properly Understand the
International Structure of One Superpower, Many Great Powers], Shehui Kexue 2 (1998): 3437.
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it reaches a certain stage of development.21 This rationale was also evident

in Hus harmonious world rhetoric in which harmony signified the
importance of the coexistence of diversified civilizations and consultation
among all of the countries involved, rather than unilateralism driven by
hegemonic ambitions.22 Here, then, Chinas peaceful development and
international stability were conceived of as mutually reinforcing.
Finally, under Xi Jinpings leadership, China appears to have cast off
strategic reassurance in favor of a more confident posture encapsulated in
the rhetoric of the China dream (Zhongguo meng).23 For Xi, crucial steps
on the journey to great national rejuvenation will be the achievement of
the two centenary goals: achieving a moderately prosperous society by
the hundredth anniversary of the CCP in 2021 and becoming a modern
socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally
advanced, and harmonious by the hundredth anniversary of the PRC
in 2049.24 Continued economic growth will be essential not only to the
realization of these goals but also to the legitimacy and longevity of the
CCP. As a result, some observers have discounted the China dream rhetoric
as a purely domestically directed strategy to embed consultative Leninism
as the foundation of the countrys political order.25
Yet there is also a clear foreign policy element to the China dream.
Achieving the two centenary goals would not only consolidate CCP rule
but also provide China with the capacity to preserve a peaceful external
environment. Xi and other prominent leaders have asserted that realization
of the China dream would benefit the people of the world, as it is based
on principles of peace, development, cooperation and win-win relations.26
It would thus place China on a par with the United States as a great power
21 Wen Jiabao, Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning
Chinas Foreign Policy, Beijing Review, March 12, 2007 u http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/
txt/2007-03/12/content_58927_3.htm.
22 Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy under Hu Jintao: The Struggle between Low-Profile Policy
and Diplomatic Activism, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5, no. 4 (2010): 363.
23 See Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London: I.B. Tauris,
2014), 2068.
24 CPCs New Governance Theories Steer China on Fast Track to Two Centenary Goals, Xinhua,
May 4, 2016 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/04/c_135334465.htm.
25 Steve Tsang, Contextualizing the China Dream: A Reinforced Consultative Leninist Approach to
Government, in Chinas Many Dreams: Comparative Perspectives on Chinas Search for National
Rejuvenation, ed. David Kerr (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 1034.
26 Yang Jiechi, Implementing the Chinese Dream, National Interest, September 10, 2013 u
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/implementing-the-chinese-dream-9026; and Michael D.
Swaine, Xi Jinping on Chinese Foreign Relations: The Governance of China and Chinese
Commentary, Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor, no. 48, 2015 u http://www.hoover.
org/research/xi-jinping-chinese-foreign-relations-governance-china-and-chinese-commentary.
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capable of providing leadership to the international system and demonstrate

the success of the Chinese development model.27 Such an understanding
implicitly puts the China dream in direct competition with the existing,
largely Western-led liberal international order by integrating equality and
hierarchy into a new form of statism that is involved in a global competition
of social models.28
Conclusion
It is in this context of Chinas evolving grand strategy that BRI arguably
takes on its full significance as a means to achieve domestic security and
economic development in a manner that minimizes the risk of a U.S.
counterreaction. Refocusing on Chinas Eurasian frontiers is seen as a
prudent response to the United States rebalance to Asia during the Obama
administration. Indeed, one Chinese scholar has argued that the essence
of BRI is to divert Chinas strategic attention and resources to engage
countries in Chinas western flank including Central Asia, West Asia, South
Asia and beyond, and avoid direct and high-intensity confrontation with
other major players in the Asia-Pacific.29 BRIs focus on frontier regions
is a rational attempt to secure Chinas overland linkages to the economies
and security spheres of Central, South, and Southeast Asia and undergird its
decades-long state-building priorities along its continental frontiers.
While the impact of this confluence of state-building and geopolitics on
the nonHan Chinese peoples of the frontier regions, such as the Uighurs
and Tibetans, is relatively cleari.e., economic modernization, integration,
and assimilationthe same cannot necessarily be said for Chinas neighbors.
In terms of diplomatic positioning, BRI and its associated components and
initiatives such as the AIIB and SRF seek to portray China as a provider
of international public goods, rather than a free rider, and suggest that its
rise will in fact be beneficial rather than detrimental to regional and global
security.30 Yet given BRIs focus on the integration of traditionally insecure
frontier regions, it is also possible that the initiative will provide Beijing with
27 William A. Callahan, Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China
Dream, Politics 35, no. 34 (2015): 219.
28 William A. Callahan, History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist Modernization in the
World of Great Harmony, Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 96 (2015): 986.
29 Minjiang Li, From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiangs Role in ChinaCentral Asian Relations,
Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 516.
30 Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, Chinas Place in Regional and Global Governance: A New World
Comes Into View, Global Policy 7, no. 4 (2016): 19
[ 78 ]
the wherewithal to more forcefully project power beyond its frontier, with
the potential for destabilizing key relationships with neighboring states.
BRI promises to make Chinas foreign policy interests truly global
in scope by enmeshing the PRC in regions and security dilemmassuch
as those in the Middle East and South Asiain which it has historically
played a limited role. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, for instance,
holds the potential not only to consolidate Chinas all-weather friendship
with Pakistan but also to exacerbate Sino-Indian ties and expose Chinese
personnel and investments to attacks from Uighur militants based along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier.31 Thus, perhaps the most surprising aspect of
BRI is how under Xis leadership a famously risk-averse China has embraced
increased risk abroad in the service of achieving the dream of great national
rejuvenation at home.32
31 Michael Clarke, How Terrorism Could Derail Chinas One Belt, One Road, National Interest, March 5,
2017 u http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-terrorism-could-derail-chinas-one-belt-one-road-19660.
32 Peter Ferdinand, Westward HoThe China Dream and One Belt, One Road: Chinese Foreign
Policy under Xi Jinping, International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 957.
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First Movement: Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative

Andrew Small
T he China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been billed as the

flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), constituting
the most expansive package of Chinese investments to be set in motion
under its auspices to date.1 The headline numbers cited by the Pakistani
government$46 billion after CPECs launch in 2015, rising to $51 billion
after the agreement of additional projects in September 2016may err on
the high side, but by late 2016 even the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
more conservative estimates of activities moving forward on the ground
already totaled $14 billion.2 The scale and nature of CPEC, incorporating
energy projects, rail and road connections, infrastructure development,
and industrial zones, make it one of the only so-called corridors that
genuinely seems to match the purported ambitions of Xi Jinpings scheme.
In the florid language of Wang Yi, Chinas foreign minister: If One Belt,
One Road is like a symphony involving and benefiting every country, then
construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the sweet melody
of the symphonys first movement.3
That Pakistan should occupy such a prominent role in the initiative
is surprising. Despite deep political and security ties between China
and Pakistan, trade and investment has long been a weak element in the
relationship, with a cautionary history of similarly grand announcements
failing to translate into effect. One RAND study found that between
2001 and 2011, while $66 billion of Chinese investments in Pakistan were
cumulatively announced, only 6% of these were ever actually realized.4
andrew small is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Funds Asia Program.
He can be reached at <asmall@gmfus.org>.
1 Li Keqiang, Building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Flagship Project, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Press Release, November 8, 2014 u http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/t1209089.shtml. Note that this
term was being used even before the BRI was formally established.
2 China Has So Far Poured $14b into CPEC Projects, Express Tribune, September 27, 2016 u
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1188886/economic-corridor-china-far-poured-14b-cpec-projects.
3 Saeed Shah and Jeremy Page, China Readies $46 Billion for Pakistan Trade Route, Wall Street
Journal, April 26, 2016 u https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveil-billions-of-dollars-in-
pakistan-investment-1429214705.
4 Charles Wolf Jr., Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner, Chinas Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored
Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations, and Implications (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2013) u http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/
RR118/RAND_RR118.pdf.
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The concept of CPEC is only the latest iteration of proposed transportation

and energy corridors between the two countries, which have tended
to take more vivid form in the minds of geopolitical strategists than in
reality. Although some of the conditions leading to this consistent pattern
of disappointment in bilateral economic links have improvedincluding
the security situation in Pakistanmany have not. As a result, when
Xi launched CPEC during his April 2015 visit, many analysts evinced
understandable skepticism about whether it would really move ahead at all.
The subsequent period has provided other grounds for skepticism too.
The original list of projects included some figures that had a back of the
envelope quality: rushed agreements on paper to generate high-dollar-value
headlines, some of which have since been shelved after more detailed studies
were undertaken.5 There are transparency concerns, with even the governor
of Pakistans central bank stating that he did not have a clear overview of the
financing of the scheme.6 Fights have unfolded between different provinces,
with critics, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, arguing
that CPEC would benefit the traditionally dominant Punjab Province
disproportionately. Economic analysts have raised questions about the
implications of such a large volume of Chinese loans and imports for
Pakistans balance of payments and broader financial situation, which
has been crisis-prone even at the best of times.7 CPEC also attracted more
vociferous criticism from India than had been anticipated. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi personally objected to an initiative with infrastructure
connections that pass through disputed territory and pointedly raised the
Baluchistan issue as a warning to China of the potential repercussions. 8 It
is not difficult to assemble the material to portray CPEC as a geopolitically
controversial scheme that will load Pakistan with debt, leave it in hock to
China, stoke internal divisions, and leave behind a host of white elephant
projects and incomplete plans. More lurid versions of the picture feature
Chinese land-grabs, a creeping imperial takeover of Gilgit-Baltistan, and an
influx of Peoples Liberation Army troops.
5 See CPEC Coal Project, Dawn, May 19, 2016 u https://www.dawn.com/news/1259166.

6 Katharine Houreld, Pakistan Should Be More Transparent on $46 bn China Deal, State Bank Head Says,
Reuters, December 4, 2015 u http://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-china-idUSL3N13T4SK20151204.
7 For a summary, see Khurram Husain, IMF Warns of Looming CPEC Bill, Dawn, October 17, 2016
u https://www.dawn.com/news/1290523.
8 Chinese Scholars Deeply Disturbed by PM Modis Reference to Balochistan, Times of India,
August 28, 2016 u http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Chinese-scholars-deeply-disturbed-
by-PM-Modis-reference-to-Balochistan/articleshow/53900481.cms.
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Yet this characterization of a scheme that is simultaneously strategically

threatening and doomed to fail seems at best inadequate and at worst a
serious misunderstanding of Chinas objectives. For long-term watchers of the
China-Pakistan relationship, the most striking fact is that, unlike previous
economic ventures, CPEC is materializing on the ground. Early-harvest
projects are in the process of being completed, roads are being built, Gwadar
port has already been connected to the interior of Baluchistan, and power is
being added to the grid.9 Previous Pakistani governments also sought large-
scale Chinese investment, and did so at a time when Beijing was pushing
forward a rich array of projects across the developing world. Yet in the past,
even when plans were agreed on, myriad obstacles and concerns were used as
excuses for the Chinese side to slow down or shelve projects entirely. What has
changed? How does CPEC align with strategic considerations on Chinas part
that have informed its relationship with Pakistan for decades? The remainder
of this essay will address these questions to better understand Pakistans role
in Chinas BRI.
Becoming the Flagship by Default

Several changes relate to Pakistan itself. The election of the Pakistan
Muslim LeagueNawaz party in 2013 meant that Pakistans government,
with a proclivity for large-scale infrastructure projects and an energy crisis
to fix, was a good fit for Chinas embryonic BRI. Pakistan had a long list of
shovel-ready projects that were eagerly pitched to a Chinese government that
was scrambling to find concrete ways to put Xi Jinpings plans into effect.
The close security and political relationship between the two sides means
that Pakistan has a unique level of comfort with the strategic factors that
underpin BRI, including, for instance, ports that can serve both commercial
and military purposes, as well as a rare willingness to provide Chinese firms
with privileged access across so many sectors of its economy.
Another factor is that the transition in Chinas economic model leaves
Pakistan better placed to benefit than it was during a period dominated by
fixed investment at home and natural resource purchases abroad. China
is looking for large new markets with significant growth potential for the
consumption of Chinese products; openings for profitable infrastructure
and industrial investments abroad as returns at home diminish, overcapacity
9 See, for example, Muhammad Zafar, First Chinese Trade Convoy Arrives in Gwadar through
CPEC, Express Tribune, November 12, 2016 u https://tribune.com.pk/story/1228780/
first-chinese-trade-convoy-arrives-gwadar-cpec.
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problems abound, and wages rise; and countries where closer connectivity
could act as a growth driver for provinces in the Chinese interior. The last
few years also saw tangible improvements on the security front. The Pakistan
Armys Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North Waziristan removed a
standing irritant between the two sidesthe presence, on Pakistani soil, of
the headquarters of the Turkistan Islamic Party, the principal militant group
targeting China. The protection measures that the Pakistani security forces
have put in place for Chinese workers since the spate of attacks in 2007
have largely been effective, and have been further upgraded since CPECs
launch with the establishment of the Special Security Division. Even more
germane, the broader security situation in the country, whether measured
in terms of the number or deadliness of terrorist attacks, is markedly better.
Yet it is not clear that these factors alone would have been sufficient to
give CPEC the momentum that is currently evident on the Chinese side. For
many Chinese firms and officials, Pakistan is still perceived to be a difficult,
unfamiliar, and insecure location, and however foolproof the protection,
operating under constant armed guard is not reassuring.10 Even with a
welcoming government, high potential returns, and healthy financing from
Chinese state development banks, there would have been good reason to
expect a cautious, stop-start process. Instead, the political backing from
China has been consistently strong, with a view to solving problems rather
than allowing them to derail projects. For some analysts, then, Beijings
enthusiasm is better understood through a strategic prismindeed, in some
cases they even contend that economic considerations are entirely irrelevant.
The Corridor That Isnt

The history of the China-Pakistan relationship suggests that when a
major investment has gone forward, be it military-industrial cooperation,
the construction of the Karakoram Highway, or cooperation on civil nuclear
power plants, it has only been when a clear strategic rationale existed.
Defining that strategy, however, is less straightforward.
One version of the analysis holds that Chinas strategic interest is to gain
a land bridge to the Indian Ocean, with CPEC functioning as a transit route
for goods and energy to flow between Xinjiang and Gwadar port and thus
reduce Chinas vulnerability to maritime chokepoints. However, it is far from
clear that this is Chinas intention. For entirely practical reasons, Beijing has
10 COAS Vows Foolproof Security for CPEC, Dawn, December 7, 2016 u https://www.dawn.com/
news/1301014.
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been consistently skeptical of Pakistans value as a transit corridor. The land

route between the two countries is routinely closed by landslides and was
virtually impassable for several years. The cost of transporting energy via
pipelines or other means is also prohibitively expensive. From a military
perspective, the route is extremely vulnerable in the event of a major conflict.
Yet while there are security concerns about Baluchistan and other locations
on the route, topography is by far the greater challenge. Before CPEC, China
was already working with Pakistan to upgrade the Karakoram Highway to
a wider, all-weather surface, including tunneling to reduce the vulnerability
of some of the most landslide-prone sections of the route. But the continued
expectation is that, while land trade will rise from its existing low base, the
most reliable and economically efficient trade route between the two sides
will still be by sea.
This is evident from any assessment of the plans for current and future
CPEC projects through 2030. The cross-border connectivity elements are
modestno railways and pipelines, for instance. The plans instead include
a diffuse array of Chinese investments across Pakistan, heavily focused on
energy projects and improvements in internal infrastructure connections. If
these elements are successful, the partners envisage broader-based industrial
cooperation through special economic zones and other ventures. Although
the term corridor is evocative, CPEC is more accurately described as an
investment package. Indeed, Chinese analysts and officials have publicly
poured cold water on the concept, explaining why pipelines are not
economically viable, dismissing the notion of a transit route, and drawing
on the absolving phrase that all of Pakistan is a corridor.11 There is a degree
of delicacy about this strategy. Some of the most enthusiastic advocates
for the idea that China is itching to build trade routes from Xinjiang to
the warm waters of the Indian Ocean are on the Pakistani side. Sharif
himself raised the prospect of rail links between the two countries in his
first address as prime minister. For its part, China is keen to push forward
its naval cooperation with Pakistan and certainly views cooperation on port
projectsincluding Gwadarwith security considerations in mind too.
But this partnership would be proceeding regardless of CPEC. And while a
symbolic convoy was sent from Kashgar to Gwadar, none of the economic
planning envisages this being a regular occurrence.
11 See Mian Abrar, China Mulling Trade Route with Iran as Pak Leadership Bickers, Pakistan Today,
January 30, 2016 u https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/01/30/china-mulling-trade-route-
with-iran-as-pak-leadership-bickers; and Lu Xuanmin, Gwadar Port Benefits to China Limited,
Global Times, November 11, 2016 u http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1019840.shtml.
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A second version of the argument is that because CPEC is not a viable

transit corridor, and thus economic factors cannot really be the motivation,
Chinas strategic goal must be to gain leverage over Pakistan. According to
this account, once the financial terms are renegotiatedas they are likely
to be, given the supposed unviability of the projectsChina can make
political demands, gain land concessions, and generally exploit Pakistans
position of growing dependence to pursue military and political ends.
However, while this might be a plausible argument for Chinas dealings with
certain other developing countries, it is at odds with the dynamics of the
Sino-Pakistani relationship. Pakistan is already highly accommodating to
Chinese preferences. It has been more than open to Beijings requests for
everything from use of military facilities to privileged access for Chinese
companies. And on the rare occasions when Beijing does choose to exercise
its leverage more forcefully, it has been able to do so.12 Neither is any of this
dependent on regime type or a particular political party being in power. If
anything, creating a more coercive set of conditions would risk weakening
Chinas hand. Its leverage rests on a hard-earned reputation as the country
that is most reliably aligned with Pakistans long-term security interests and
on the resulting high levels of trust among both elites and the public. CPEC
has already proved more controversial in Pakistan than China would have
liked, and there is little appetite for measures that would foster resentment
in a relationship that Chinese leaders wish to portray as a model to follow.13
Meet the New Strategy

CPEC is intended to fulfil strategic goals for China, but of a quite
differentand relatively familiarnature. The first is to help bolster
Pakistans capabilities. An economically thriving partner would be
far better able to fulfil the roles of balancer in South Asia and security
partner in and beyond the region that China has consistently wanted
to see Pakistan play. The second goal is to address long-term anxieties
about the implications of growing extremism in Pakistan. China has been
concerned about everything from sympathies for Uighur militant groups
in the country to the long-term ramifications for the Pakistan Army if it
is recruiting from a population with significant pockets of sympathy for
12 For some examples, see Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asias New Geopolitics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2015), especially xixv and 8081.
13 Pakistan Remains Faithful Partner of China, Global Times, December 28, 2015 u http://www.
globaltimes.cn/content/960904.shtml.
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jihadism. A transformative economic program is seen, in the words of Li

Keqiang, as a way to wean the populace from fundamentalism.14 The third
is to effect a psychological shifta change in the balance of incentives, even
a change in the narrative for Pakistanto help give economic factors a more
central role in the countrys orientation. China would like to see Pakistan
functioning as a more predictable, measured actor in its neighborhood, with
fewer destabilizing risks. Just as Indias economic takeoff has induced even
greater strategic caution alongside the considerably greater means to sustain
capabilities, China would like to see Pakistan economically, politically, and
militarily strengthened but commensurately more restrained.
These are relatively familiar security objectives for China: supporting
Pakistans capacity to act as a counterbalance to India, while stabilizing its
western periphery through mitigating conflict risks and addressing threats
from militancy. But now China has more significant economic means
to deploy and a better alignment of foreign policy goals and domestic
economic needs. The fact that CPEC has become the BRI flagship project
gives additional political salience to the corridor. Its success is intended to
demonstrate that the broader scheme can succeed, and that being a friend of
China brings clear economic benefits. This also means that there is an active
process of self-correction as problems present themselves.
None of this analysis assumes that Beijing will actually achieve its
goals. To list only a few of the challenges, the International Monetary Funds
2016 assessment spells out a range of potential financial risks; the security
threats have not gone away; there will be local unhappiness about many of
the projects, particularly given the lack of Chinese experience in effectively
navigating political sensitivities; some of the investments will fail; the
most successful investments will likely be in places where the economic
conditions are already relatively benign, rather than in less developed parts
of the country, with the potential to exacerbate existing divisions; there are
major implementation challenges both for Pakistans bureaucracy and for
a Chinese bureaucracy that has never undertaken a development-oriented
strategic project of this nature; there has been little attempt to use CPEC
to catalyze various necessary reforms in Pakistan; the calculation that
economic investment equals stability and de-radicalization is questionable;
and the regional politics of CPEC have not been handled well, in particular
by misleadingly billing the entire scheme as a corridor in the first place.
14 Shishir Gupta, Govt Makes It Clear: India Has Not Forgotten Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir,
Hindustan Times, May 24, 2015 u http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nsa-makes-it-clear-
india-has-not-forgotten-pakistan-occupied-kashmir/article1-1350639.aspx.
[ 86 ]
In assessing how these issues are likely to be addressed, Chinas

well-demonstrated strategic objectives in the region, and in its relationship
with Pakistan, will prove the best guide to its behavior. Supposedly
strategic motivations concerning goals about which Beijing has been
deeply skeptical, in the case of the transit corridor, or that would undermine
the basis of one of Chinas few friendships, in the case of a neo-imperial
approach to Pakistan, are a great deal less plausible. In many ways, CPEC
is a useful indicator of how BRI as a whole is likely to proceed. China will
doubtless learn a number of lessons from the package of projects that
function as a test case for the overall scheme. But the relationship with
Pakistan is also sui generis. There are other instances where transit routes
occupy a central role in Beijings plans or where Chinese loansand loan
renegotiationshave been utilized for political leverage, which may serve
Chinas interests better than the projects themselves. In the case of CPEC,
Chinese goals will be best achieved by its success, however challenging that
may prove to achieve.
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Indias Response to Chinas Belt and Road Initiative:

A Policy in Motion
Harsh V. Pant and Ritika Passi
A sense of aloofness and wariness, perhaps even deflection, initially

characterized Indias official response to Chinas Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). But as BRI has progressed to the point where New Delhi
can no longer afford to ignore it, public comments have underscored several
reservations and contentions. The first such pronouncement was made by
the Indian foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in 2015:
Where we are concerned, this is a national Chinese initiative.
The Chinese devised it, created a blueprint. It wasnt an
international initiative they discussed with the world, with
countries that are interested or affected by it.A national
initiative is devised with national interests, it is not incumbent
on others to buy it. Where we stand is that if this is something
on which they want a larger buy-in, then they need to have
larger discussions, and those havent happened.1
The unilateral ideation and announcement of BRI, as well as Beijings

subsequent bilateral follow-up with regional states, reinforced suspicions
of Chinas geopolitical designs. Indian critics fear that China may use its
economic power to increase its geopolitical leverage, and in doing so
intensify existing security concerns for India. As Jaishankar commented
more substantively in March 2016 at the inauguration of Indias official
foreign policy conference, the Raisina Dialogue:
The interactive dynamic between strategic interests and
connectivity initiativesa universal propositionis on
particular display in our continent.[W]e cannot be
impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an
exercise in hardwiring that influences choices. This should be
discouraged, because, particularly in the absence of an agreed
security architecture in Asia, it could give rise to unnecessary
competitiveness.
harsh v. pant is Professor of International Relations at Kings College London and Head of the
Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. He can be reached at
<harsh.pant@kcl.ac.uk>.
ritika passi is a Project Editor and Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in
New Delhi. She can be reached at <ritikapassi@orfonline.org>.
1 Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (remarks following a IISS Fullerton lecture, Singapore, July 20, 2015).
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Connectivity should diffuse national rivalries, not add to

regional tensionsif we seek a multipolar world, the right way
to begin is to create a multipolar Asia. Nothing could foster
that more than open-minded consultation on the future of
connectivity.2
Unnecessary competitiveness and regional tensions hint at the

growing Chinese footprint in Indias neighborhoodboth on land and at sea.
But proof positive for the Indian government of Chinas unilateral pursuit
of self-serving geopolitical gains is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), BRIs flagship project that connects Chinas Xinjiang Autonomous
Region with Pakistans Baluchistan Province. The corridor runs through
the contested territory of what India calls Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and
Pakistan claims as the areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Indian
officials have repeatedly taken up CPEC and the breach of sovereignty with
their Chinese counterparts during bilateral interaction. Despite Chinese
foreign minister Wang Yis assertion that the corridor will be sensitive to the
comfort level of other parties, no satisfactory response from Beijing has been
forthcoming that addresses what is clearly a red line for India.3 Therefore,
after merely alluding in the context of discussions about connectivity that
CPEC adds to regional tensions, Indian officials are now making bolder
statements. For instance, opening the Raisina Dialogue in January 2017,
Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated, Connectivity in itself cannot override
or undermine the sovereignty of other nations.4 Ahead of Chinas BRI Forum
for global leaders in May 2017, Jaishankar reiterated Indias concerns:
They have extended an invitation to the government to
participate in the summit. We are examining the matter. The
fact [is] that China Pakistan Economic Corridor is part of [BRI].
CPEC violates Indian sovereignty because it runs through
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.We were very frank with them in
sharing what our concerns were and we share it in public. But
the issue for us is a sovereignty issue. 5
2 Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (speech at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi, March 2, 2016) u http://mea.
gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/26433/Speech_by_Foreign_Secretary_at_Raisina_Dialogue_
in_New_Delhi_March_2_2015.
3 Wang Yi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Peoples Republic of China, March 8, 2015 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/
wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1243662.shtml.
4 Narendra Modi (speech at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi, January 17, 2017) u http://mea.
gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural_Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_Second_
Raisina_Dialogue_New_Delhi_January_17_2017.
5 Jaishankar made these remarks while in Beijing in February for the first India-China strategic
diplomatic dialogue. See K.J.M. Varma, CPEC Violates Sovereignty: India Tells China, Press Trust
of India, February 22, 2017 u http://www.ptinews.com/news/8435073_CPEC-violates-sovereignty
--India-tells-China.
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While Modi had declined to participate, the jury was still out on
whether India would send a representative. One day prior to the BRI
Forum, however, the Ministry of External Affairs issued an even more
comprehensive complaint that not only reiterated Indias stance on CPEC
but also broached wider concerns of implementing connectivity projects
relating to good governance, rule of law, transparency and equality.6
Needless to say, India was absent at the BRI Forum as it expanded the ambit
of its concerns.
But Indias response continues to fuel an active conversation among
policymakers, academics, journalists, analysts, and commentators in India on
what the countrys response should be going forward. Under what conditions
could India change its stance on the initiative? For instance, would it be open
to participation if Beijing were to extend an olive branch by promising to
accommodate New Delhis interests vis--vis CPEC? This essay will trace the
contours of this debate and consider policy options for India.
To Join or Not to JoinThat Is the Question

Suggested responses to BRI from the Indian policy, academic, and
think tank circles run the gamut from active engagement to abstention to
the exploration of alternatives. The following discussion examines Indian
concerns from economic, political, and security perspectives.
Trade and growth vs. limited gains. Beijing is pushing what it calls a
regional economic cooperation architecture to facilitate trade connectivity,
integration of markets, and economic and financial policy coordination.
As China pursues this objective, creating capacities in other countries
and increasing multimodal connectivity, India could reap the following
economic advantages: access to new markets as well as resources and
commodities, such as those in Central Asia and the Middle East; shorter
and faster routes that are cheaper and that could boost trade volumes
between India and other countries and regions; and the potential emergence
of India as a true nodal hub in a flourishing Indian Ocean network of trade
and connectivity that at present remains limited.
With China becoming the prime voice promoting free tradewith,
importantly, the capacity to bankroll further globalizationthe argument
6 Official Spokespersons Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,

Ministry of External Affairs (India), May 13, 2017 u http://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.
htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+O
BORBRI+Forum.
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is that India will deprive itself of the economic benefits of increased regional
connectivity by not joining BRI. If the physical infrastructure (which
includes not just land and maritime connectivity but also digital and
cyberspace infrastructure) is slowly substantiated by convergent economic
and financial policies as well as rules and norms, India could find itself
on the sidelines. Already, an arc of connectivity exists from China to
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian republics, Iran, and Europe.
Countries may opt to engage and trade more with other BRI member
countries given common logistics and processes.
Chinese capital and infrastructure could also catalyze and sustain
Indias economic growth by filling in infrastructure gaps and funding
further industrialization. Indeed, India makes for a more credible long-term
economic partner for China under BRI than other, more risky countries for
investment. Some in India have suggested that it is effectively in Chinas own
interests to pursue an economic partnership with India under BRI given its
problem of industrial overcapacity. One commentator has even suggested
that India is the only country left in the world that is large enough to
absorb, and therefore gainfully employ, Chinas immense excess capacity.7
Most analysts advocate a case-by-case approach to BRI that takes into
account convergences of interest. For example, if India were to develop Irans
Chabahar port, as it has been invited to do, it could then use Chinese-built
pathways to access Europe and Russia. But CPEC remains a red line for
India even as Pakistan and China have extended an invitation to India
to join the corridor or extend it into India using precisely the economic
argument. 8 Instead, weaning away China from CPECby inviting China
to implement a corridor from Kolkata to Gandhinagar and develop a port
off the coast of Gujarathas been suggested as a way to encourage economic
dividends without geopolitical or security concerns impeding the way.9
Buttressing this cautious, case-by-case approach is the concern that
economic advantages accruing to China outweigh those that would result
7 Prem Shankar Jha, Why India Must Embrace Chinas One Belt One Road plan, Wire (India),
August 13, 2016 u http://thewire.in/58810/india-must-embrace-chinas-one-belt-one-road-plan.
8 Even more recently, the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir reiterated the need for India and
Pakistan to move beyond border skirmishes and become partners in economic growth and share
the benefits of projects like the CPEC. CM Mehbooba Asks: Why Cant JK Be Part of CPEC?
Greater Kashmir, March 15, 2017 u http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/story/243743.
html. The Chinese ambassador to India at the time, Le Yucheng, suggested extending the corridor
into India during a visit to Amritsar in March 2015.
9 Samir Saran and Abhijnan Rej, Engage the Dragon on Balochistan, Times of India, web log,
February 4, 2016 u http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-editorials/engage-the-dragon-
on-balochistan.
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for India. India already suffers from a substantial trade deficit with China
of over $50 billion, and Chinese protectionist tendencies have not been
conducive to a healthy, two-way economic relationship.
Political accommodation vs. isolation. Economics and politics,
however, are two sides of the same coin. As noted earlier, the potential
for Chinas growing economic weight to expand its political influence is
one reason why New Delhi is wary of BRI. One salient example is CPEC,
which has complicated Indian efforts to internationalize the issue of
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Likewise, a larger Chinese presence in the
Indian Ocean as a result of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road would
shape Indias ties with its neighboring countries. (Afghanistan, Maldives,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal have already signed on to BRI.) The
implementation of BRI has regional repercussions that will decide political
winners and losers in this period of global recalibration.
Some have posited that India should join BRI for the purposes of
shaping the initiative from within, especially given that it is far from a
done deal. To this end, some have proposed swapping CPECs route from
the contested Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Afghanistan to enable India
to come on board.10 Other proposals have substituted Indian-administered
Kashmir in place of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Initially, some observers
opined that by joining BRI, New Delhi could potentially leverage its soft
power for the advancement and implementation of the initiative in exchange
for Beijing putting pressure on Pakistan; however, that burst of optimism
died a quick death.
One reason is recent developments in the India-China relationship that
have seen critical differences emerge on counterterrorism and the global
nuclear order. Other factors contributing to Indias deep suspicion and
mistrust of China are the legacy of the Sino-Indian War and the unresolved
border dispute, Chinas all-weather friendship with Pakistan, the significant
trade imbalance in Chinas favor, and the reality of being in the vicinity of a
bigger regional power that at best does not factor India into its calculations
and at worst devotes some capital to keeping India unbalanced.
This broader bilateral context and ongoing developments have
prompted calls for India to pursue and strengthen partnerships with both
the United States and Japan, even as some continue to encourage India to
engage with China on BRI. Such partnerships will help New Delhi better
10 Suhasini Haidar, Way to Get Back on Board, Hindu, March 23, 2017 u http://www.thehindu.
com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/way-to-get-back-on-board/article17595830.ece.
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navigate the unfolding geography across Asia and give itself maneuvering
space. This will be particularly necessary if a China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran
alignment emerges from CPEC. Given the downturn in Sino-Indian ties,
some pundits have questioned whether India would be better off engaging
with Japan and its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. Not only is Tokyo
likely to offer more lucrative financial terms, but by collaborating with
Japan on feasible regional connectivity projects, New Delhi will be dealing
with an actor with which it is more politically at ease and that could help
keep Chinas grand ambitions in check. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,
pitched by Modi and substantiated by an Indo-Japanese joint vision
document during the 52nd annual meeting of the African Development
Bank, is very much a step in this direction.11 India also remains committed
to the International North South Transportation Corridora proposed
7,200-kilometer multi-modal (ship, rail, and road) transportation system
connecting the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran
to Russia and North Europethough progress toward its operationalization
remains slow. If India realizes and capitalizes on more such options that do
not involve China, we could end up seeing an Indian response that is not
circumscribed by the contours of BRI.
Security concerns: Real or overblown? While Beijing has been making
the case that BRI is not a tool of geopolitics, the resultant geography poses
a number of security challenges for India. A stronger physical axis between
China and Pakistan hems in India on land. Some Indian analysts find the
network of routes that form CPEC suspect, stating that they either furnish
missing links or refurbish entire stretches conducive for more efficient
military transportationby both Pakistan and China.
Furthermore, CPEC gives China a foothold in the western Indian Ocean
in Gwadar port, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, where Chinese
warships and a submarine have surfaced. Access here allows China greater
potential to control maritime trade in that part of the world (a vulnerable
point for India, which sources over 60% of its oil supplies from the Middle
East). What is more, if CPEC does in fact solve Chinas Malacca dilemma,
it could give China greater operational space to pursue unilateral interests
in maritime matters to the detriment of freedom of navigation and the trade
and energy security of several states in the Indian Ocean region, including
India. More generally, the Maritime Silk Road reinforces New Delhis
11 Avinash Nair, To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa Sea Corridor, Indian
Express, May 31, 2017 u http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-
japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-4681749.
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concerns about encirclement. Beijings port development projects in the

Indian Ocean that are open to the possibility of dual-use complicate Indias
security calculus. Such an assessment remains a key reason why some
advocate staying away from the Chinese initiative.
One plan of action counseled by both naysayers and backers of Indian
participation in BRI is the immediate pursuit of smaller-scale connectivity
projects and partnerships to ensure Indias security in its own backyard.
These include developing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, making
progress on the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation initiative, and focusing
on developing key ports in the region to secure key sea lanes. This would
effectively give India a firmer bargaining position vis--vis China.
India has expressed its interest in pursuing the subregional
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum for Regional
Cooperation, which China officially considers closely related to BRI:
Jaishankar stated, India today is a pro-connectivity country. We have
connectivity initiatives with all sides and we are active participants (in)
most of them.We had agreed to take part in the [BCIM] corridor in which
I pointed out India is (the) most active country.12 Indias involvement in
this initiative, as well as its other projects in the region (such as the Kaladan
Multimodal Transit Transport Project), could give New Delhi clout to define
the terms of any engagement with BRI.
Conclusion
Indias response to BRI will be shaped by the broader political and
economic context in Asia. For one, India confronts a formidable challenge
in its own growth story: the domestic and regional lack of infrastructure.
The Asian Development Banks figure of $550 billion per year of
infrastructure spending in the developing Asia-Pacific between 2010
and 2020 has been recently revised to $1.5$1.7 trillion per year through
2030.13 Indias own infrastructure needs have been assessed at $1.5 trillion
in the next decade, but with little clarity on how this impressive goal will
be achieved. Moreover, improving connectivity with Indias neighbors
remains a key national objective.
12 Varma, CPEC Violates Sovereignty.

13 Asia Infrastructure Needs Exceed $1.7 Trillion per Year, Double Previous Estimates,
Asian Development Bank, Press Release, February 28, 2017 u https://www.adb.org/news/
asia-infrastructure-needs-exceed-17-trillion-year-double-previous-estimates.
[ 94 ]
India is also facing a rapidly evolving global order that is seeing

old equations and attitudes face new partnerships and rapprochements.
Anti-globalization sentiments abound in the West, compelling developing
and emerging countries to find friends among themselves in the quest for
growth. Russia is developing ties with Pakistan and China that marginalize
India. India is looking to build a strategic relationship with the United States
that in turn has repercussions for the Sino-Indian relationship. These moves
and countermoves to adjust to new relationship dynamics underscore New
Delhis reaction to the unfolding BRI.
India has yet to articulate a formal policy on BRI, but a number of
Indian observers would like New Delhi to give the initiative a chance. Some
analysts have stressed that India need not compete with China, as it does
not have the capacity to provide an alternative in either scale or scope.14
Instead, by participating in BRI, it may be able to regain some cultural and
strategic leverage by advancing its own Sagar Mala project and cotton and
spice routes via the Maritime Silk Road. India might thereby give faster
expression to, and reap quicker benefits from, its own overland connectivity
plans on the back of Chinese investments.
New Delhi must acknowledge that BRI is still evolving and is likely
to face its own share of problems in the coming years, even as India needs
to navigate at times dissonant Chinese behavior and rhetoric. Even as
Chinese officials themselves give voice to confusion and uncertainty about
Xi Jinpings brainchild, India, through an active strategic imagination and
increased institutional agency, should advance a policy that blends economic
opportunity and political differences. At the end of the day, the Asian
century will not be Chinas alone. The very nature of regional integration
through hard and soft connectivity calls for an inclusive approach. India has
the opportunity to engage in dialogue with China to assess whether BRI is a
threat or an opportunity.
In sum, neither New Delhi nor Beijing can afford to be shortsighted.
India must balance short-term gains with long-term interests as it responds
to BRI. China too must rethink its strategy of needling India and instead
deal with the country as a responsible power. Chinas regional ambitions
have a better chance of being realized by building consensus through
accommodation of other countries key interests.
14 See, for example, Shyam Saran, What Chinas One Belt and One Road Strategy Means
for India, Asia and the World, Wire (India), October 9, 2015 u https://thewire.in/12532/
what-chinas-one-belt-and-one-road-strategy-means-for-india-asia-and-the-world.
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The Evolution of Russias Views on the Belt and Road Initiative

Sebastien Peyrouse
T he Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by Xi Jinping in 2013

and comprising both the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime
Silk Road, has provoked admiration for Chinas growing economic
power but also reluctance to endorse it. In Russia, the Kremlin at first
saw the initiative as confirmation of an emerging rivalry with China in
the post-Soviet space, especially an attempt to pull the five Central Asian
republics away from its sphere of influence.1 BRI was also perceived as a
challenge to Russias Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), to date the main
economic integration structure in the Eurasian space, which has opened
up a borderless free market among its member states (Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia). Finally, Moscow viewed BRI as a
challenge to Russias aspiration to serve as a bridge between Europe and
Asia, in particular via the Trans-Siberian Railway development project,
which could be supplanted by Chinese-built roads and railways bypassing
Russia via Central Asia.
In less than two years, however, the Kremlin has largely changed its
view. In May 2015, President Vladimir Putin signed a declaration with Xi
on a great Eurasian partnership, aimed at synchronizing BRI and the
EEU. This conciliatory approach is pragmatic: Putin hopes that Russia
will profit economically, as well as politically and geopolitically, from BRI
and growing Chinese power. For both countries, this agreement is also an
opportunity to work together and display their ability to put aside their
rivalry, thereby defying the expectations of political experts and media
commentators. However, questions about the cohesion of BRI, as well as
about the consequences of the increasingly contested Chinese influence in
Eurasia and the current tensions between Russia and the West, could make
the Kremlins new approach to BRI cyclical rather than long-term.
This essay will examine the evolution of the Kremlins policy toward
BRI. The first section will briefly discuss the potential increase in economic
and geopolitical influence that China could gain from this project. It will be
sebastien peyrouse is Research Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of
International Affairs at the George Washington University. He can be reached at <speyrouse@gwu.edu>.
1 Alexander Gabuev, Crouching Bear, Hidden Dragon: One Belt One Road and Chinese-Russian
Jostling for Power in Central Asia, Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 5, no. 2 (2016): 6178.
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followed by an update on Russias current challenging political and economic

situation, which could lead to an erosion of its foreign influence, especially
in Central Asia, and has forced the Kremlin to be more conciliatory toward
the Chinese project. The third and final section will show how Russia
chose to gauge and channel rather than prevent BRI, while arguing that
Sino-Russian cooperation on the initiative remains fragile.
BRI: A New High Point in Chinese Regional Influence

China has progressively advanced its pawns in the regional arena,
investing heavily, especially in the Central Asian market. Trade between
China and Central Asia has grown exponentially, from $1 billion in 2002 to
$45 billion in 2014.2 Since 2009, China has been the regions largest trading
partner. As in other regions of the world where Beijing is establishing itself,
its settlement strategies respond to many objectives, which are seen by the
Chinese authorities as intrinsically linked. First, China seeks to consolidate
its geopolitical influence in Central Asia by creating good neighborly
relations founded on an economic basis. This supports the second
strategy of encouraging regional development to avoid political and social
destabilization, particularly in border regions such as Xinjiang, as well as
to prevent slowing Chinese economic growth. Last, China seeks to exploit
market openings in Central Asia for Chinese products, which could open up
access to the whole of Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Europe.
For Moscow, BRI confirms Chinas economic, and potentially political
and geopolitical, designs on the Eurasian space. With the Silk Road
Economic Belt, Beijing is reclaiming an economic space that the EEU
was trying to take away. Chinese authorities have criticized the EEUs
principles on several occasions. In particular, they have argued that despite
officially being a free-trade market, it imposes import duties on its external
borders and therefore constitutes a highly restrictive trade barrier for
nonmember states.3 By contrast, Beijing says that BRI will be a regional and
transcontinental integration project through a collective decision-making
process, thereby eventually creating a huge free-trade market.
2 These figures have been calculated using data available from the European Commission u
http://trade.ec.europa.eu.
3 See Richard Pomfret, The Economics of the Customs Union and Eurasian Union, in Putins
Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, ed. S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell
(Washington, D.C.: Central AsiaCaucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2014), 4958.
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A Weakened Russia Forced to Find a Compromise

Despite strong reservations following the announcement of BRI,
Moscow eventually resolved to compromise with Beijing. In the two years
following the announcement, Russias position had been weakened by its
decline in regional influence, an economic crisis, and increasing criticism of
the EEU by some of its member states.
For more than fifteen years, Moscow and Beijing have sought to share
influence in the so-called near abroad. Russia has established itself as a
guarantor of hard security in Central Asia, whereas China has gradually
emerged as one of the engines of regional economic development. However,
the Sino-Russian rivalry is gradually growing. Russia utilized the rise in
hydrocarbon prices in the 2000s to launch initiatives aimed at the economic
and security reintegration of the post-Soviet space, especially through the
Collective Security Treaty Organization and the EEU. Formerly the primary
trading partner of Central Asia, Russia, with volumes reaching 20 billion
euros in 2015, is now far behind China, with 29.5 billion.4 In addition,
China is increasingly involved in the hydrocarbon sector and has gradually
supplanted Moscow in the Central Asian energy game. Since 2014, declining
world hydrocarbon prices have drastically reduced Russias profits from the
transit of Central Asian oil and gas through its territory, leading Moscow to
decrease imports from this region. In 2015, Gazprom purchased 25% less
gas than in 2014 (19.2 instead of 25.5 billion cubic meters).5 This situation
has further reduced Moscows potential political influence in the region.
More generally, the economic crisis in Russia, caused in part by the fall
in hydrocarbon prices and Western sanctions, has forced the country to
reduce and even cancel some of its investments abroad, especially in Central
Asia, consequently altering its credibility and regional influence. Russias
actions toward Ukraine and annexation of Crimea have further eroded its
reputation in the post-Soviet space. The Central Asian states, which still have
large Russian populations (around 4 million people total), have been scared
by Russias actions toward Ukraine in the name of defending its kinsmen.
Although perceived, accepted, and often praised as a fundamental guarantor
of regional military security, Russia now appears to be an unpredictable
4 These figures have been calculated using data available from the European Commission u
http://trade.ec.europa.eu.
5 Gazprom to Purchase 12,8 bcm of Gas from Kazakhstan, Construction.RU, January 24, 2017
u http://russianconstruction.com/news-1/26269-gazprom-to-purchase-128-bcm-of-gas-from-
kazakhstan.html.
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partner that is potentially ready to violate the fundamental principles of

international law, namely respect for state borders.
Last but not least, the Russia-led EEU, which has become an essential
tool for the economic reintegration of part of the post-Soviet space, is
under increasing criticism from its member states. They perceive it as a
closed structure that pushes aside China, a fundamental economic actor
in the region. Trade with China has been an important source of income,
employment, and development for the Central Asian states, especially for
the poorest EEU member, Kyrgyzstan. Second, Moscows pressure to push
some states, particularly Kyrgyzstan in 2015 and Tajikistan more recently,
to integrate with the union, has fueled suspicions among the Central Asian
states about its real intentions. Several Central Asian political figures and
experts see the EEU as a tool for Russia to restore a post-Soviet geopolitical
space under its rule.6 Third, several members feel increasingly concerned
about the consequences of their strong economic imbalance with Russia,
given Moscows one-sided decision-making within the EEU. In 2014, for
example, Moscow forbade members to import products from countries
that have imposed sanctions against Russia, and in 2016 it similarly forbade
imports from Turkey amid rising tensions with Ankara. Member states
also were not consulted on the agreement between Moscow and Beijing
to reconcile BRI with the EEU. Finally, the economic weakening of Russia
has further heightened Central Asian states skepticism about the union.
Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, despite being an outspoken
advocate of integrating the Eurasian space, has expressed increasing doubts,
even reserving the right to withdraw his country from the EEU if it does not
bring the expected results.7
Accepting and Using Chinese Power?

In this context of rising doubt about the legitimacy of Russian policies,
including concerning the EEU and Chinas increasing influence, in 2014
Moscow resolved to integrate BRI into a vast project called the great
Eurasian partnership. The partnership involves bilateral and multilateral
agreements at the regional level between and among members of the EEU
and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as with countries in the
6 Nargis Kassenova, Central Asia as Russias Near Abroad: Growing Ambiguities, Bishkek Project,
March 22, 2017 u https://bishkekproject.com/memos/15.
7 Assel Satubaldina, Kazakhstan May Leave EEU if Its Interests Are Infringed: Nazarbayev,
Tengrinews.kz, August 27, 2014 u https://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-
EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-255722.
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union.

It stipulates the simplification and regulation of trade exchanges between
the two structures and eventually aims to create a free-trade market. By
framing this project according to criteria that meet the interests of both
Moscow and Beijing, and by seeking to exercise greater control over Chinese
involvement, Russia hopes to reduce the economic asymmetry between the
two countries and thereby preserve its influence in the Eurasian space.
Moreover, in a context of strained relations with the West, Russia seeks
to enhance its global image. By presenting itself as the initiator of the great
Eurasian partnership, and as an essential bridge between the vast Asian
and Western markets, Russia expects to gain new economic and political
influence over European states.
The sudden evolution of Russias position on BRI may at first be seen
as an implicit acceptance of Chinas dominance over the region. However,
this shift may in fact allow Moscow to kill several birds with one stone.
First, it is a way to avoid tension with Beijing, which almost certainly would
have a negative impact on Russia. Second, it helps preserve both countries
share of regional influence and their tacit political agreement to support the
authoritarian regimes of the Eurasian states in the name of maintaining
political and social stability, as well as resisting interference from the West
(the EU and the United States). For years, Moscow and Beijing have feared
the spread of the Arab Spring and have agreed to minimize any political
destabilization on their borders, which could threaten their investments
and have a negative impact on domestic politics.
Moreover, the May 2015 agreement allows Moscow to be involved
in, but not responsible for, BRIs uncertain development. The economic
viability of the principle of developing transcontinental routesboth
roads and railwaysis much debated. 8 Past corridor experiments and
economic analysis show that, despite longer routes, maritime shipping is
much cheaper than continental transportation because border crossings
are unpredictable and often cause delays.9 Other challenges to BRI include
the Chinese economic slowdown and the growing controversy concerning
Chinas presence in Central Asian countries.10 While official declarations
8 See, for example, Alexander Cooley, New Silk Route or Classic Developmental Cul-de-Sac? The
Prospects and Challenges of Chinas OBOR Initiative, PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo, no. 372, July
2015 u http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/new-silk-route-or-classic-developmental-cul-de-sac.
9 Sebastien Peyrouse and Gael Raballand, Central Asia: The New Silk Road Initiatives Questionable
Economic Rationality, Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, no. 4 (2015): 40520.
10 Sebastien Peyrouse, Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia, Journal of
Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 1423.
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proclaiming the need to maintain friendly relations with Beijing have come
from all governments in Central Asia, the Chinese question is becoming
increasingly central to political debate among populations in the region.
On the other hand, if successful, BRI could be a profitable economic
opportunity for Moscow. The grand Eurasian partnership is thus a way for it
to channel development and, consequently, the regional influence of China,
without bearing much risk if BRI fails.
Finally, the Kremlins revised approach to BRI raises questions about
the possibility of Sino-Russian cooperation over the long term. First, future
cooperation likely will be eroded by tension and mistrust between the
two states.11 For Moscow, BRI remains an exclusively Chinese initiative,
based on essentially bilateral relations, and conceals Chinas ambitions
to increase its presence in Eurasia under the guise of multilateralism.12
Suspicion therefore remains. At the EEU summit in May 2016, the heads
of state merely authorized the EEU Commission to negotiate an economic
partnership with China, a process that according to the officials involved
will require no less than ten years.13
Russias rapprochement with China occurred in a particular
contextthat of heightened tensions between the West and Russiaand
presented Moscow with a way to emerge from its diplomatic isolation.
This context has placed Beijing in a position of strength in its negotiations
with Moscow. The current situation, however, will not necessarily last, and
any easing of tension between Russia and the West could undermine the
great Eurasian partnership.
Conclusion
Russias rapprochement with BRI may therefore be cyclical, and
it is unlikely that the cooperation envisaged under the great Eurasian
partnership will be achieved in either the short or medium term.
Despite the undeniable power of China, BRI is likely to have, at least in
the medium term, only a limited impact on Russias ability to preserve
its regional influence. For Moscow, the essential issues are to be found
elsewhere: its influence will probably depend much more on its ability
11 Mikhail Korostikov, Pod vysokim sopriazheniem, [Through a Strong Association], Kommersant-Vlast,

May 9, 2016 u http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2978877.
12 Ibid.
13 Alexander Gabuev, Imagined Integration: How Russia Can Maintain Its Influence in Central Asia,
Carnegie Moscow Center, July 1, 2016 u http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=63993.
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to avoid what is viewed by an increasing number of political figures in

the region as a condescending or even dangerous attitude and instead
establish the basis for trustful and sustainable economic cooperation. The
latter is particularly necessary in a very fragile region facing a serious and
lasting socioeconomic crisis.14
14 See, for example, Emil Dzhuraev, Russias Friendships and Its Discontents, Bishkek Project,
April 26, 2017 u https://bishkekproject.com/memos/29.
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Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative:

Hope, Scope, and Challenges
Meena Singh Roy
I n September and October 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited

Central Asia and Southeast Asia, where he announced an initiative to
jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road. From the Chinese perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
is an ambitious economic vision aimed at cooperation among the countries
along the Belt and Road whereby they work in concert and move towards
the objectives of mutual benefit and common security.1 The BRI vision
document emphasizes the great potential and space for cooperation among
regional countries by promoting policy coordination and facilitating
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people
bonds. These have been identified as the initiatives five major goals.
Since being announced in 2013, BRI has become the centerpiece of Xis
foreign policy. In May 2017, representatives from over 100 countries, including
Afghanistan, attended the Belt and Road Forum, at which 68 countries and
international organizations signed cooperation agreements with China.
Xi explained that China hopes to find new driving forces for growth,
create a new platform for global development, and re-balance economic
globalization.2 This essay examines Afghanistans high expectations for BRI
and Chinese perceptions of the countrys potential role in the initiative. The
essay concludes by discussing the challenges that Kabul faces in realizing the
benefits of participation in this ambitious connectivity project.
Afghanistans Expectations for BRI

From Afghanistans perspective, BRI is a welcome project. The Afghan
government has shown interest and already confirmed its participation
meena singh roy is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She can be
reached at <msinghroy@gmail.com>.
Commerce of the Peoples Republic of China, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015 u http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.
2 China Focus: Riding on Fruitful Forum, Confident Xi Takes Belt and Road to Next Level, Xinhua,
May 16, 2017 u http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/16/c_129605282.htm.
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in the initiative. Highlighting the importance of this megaproject,

Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai said that the economic
development process along the Silk Road will reshape the international
development order that has been centered in our region and carries great
significance for human development in the 21st century.3
For Afghans, this initiative is a very important step toward improving
regional cooperation and regional and interregional connectivity,
which complements Kabuls long-standing policy of promoting
regional integration and economic cooperation. With an aim to
advance transnational projects, Kabul initiated the Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in 2005, and in 2011 the
Regional Cooperation Directorate was established in the Afghan Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. In March 2017, Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi
stated that Afghanistan has already aligned most of its domestic plans
with BRI. 4 The government believes that the initiative will provide an
opportunity for Afghanistan to once again become an Asian transit and
trade roundabout connecting South Asia to Central Asia and East Asia
to West Asia, thus bringing economic benefits not only to Afghanistan
but to the entire region. Specifically, Afghan leaders argue that the Lapis
Lazuli Corridor, the Five Nations Railway, and several gas pipeline
projects can be linked to other projects under Chinas grand connectivity
initiative. 5 In addition, since October 2016, Afghanistan has expressed
interest in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its
ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhilwal, has already extended Afghan
support for CPEC. Both Pakistan and China seem open to this possibility,
but the logistical question of how to extend CPEC into Afghanistan
remains unanswered.
The proponents of Afghanistan joining CPEC in particular and
BRI in general have argued that participating in this megaproject will
bring the following benefits to the country. First, the new infrastructure
within Pakistan could give Afghan businesses and investors access to the
consumer market in South Asia, thus reducing the cost of imports and
increasing exports to the region. This could help Afghanistan enhance its
3 One Belt One Road through Afghanistan, Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on
Afghanistan, May 10, 2016 u http://recca.af/?p=1883.
4 Sakhi Danish, One Belt One Road and Its Impact on Afghanistan, Daily Outlook Afghanistan,
April 3, 2017 u http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=17814.
5 Ahmad Bilal Khalil, Linking Afghanistan to Chinas Belt and Road, Diplomat, April 24, 2017 u
http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/linking-afghanistan-to-chinas-belt-and-road.
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trade with regional countries, thereby stabilizing its economy. In 2015,

Pakistan was the top export destination for Afghanistan ($392 million),
followed by India ($277 million). Similarly, Pakistan emerged as the top
origin for imports, with trade amounting to $1.95 billion, followed by
China ($587 million) and India ($560 million). So far Afghanistan has
been exporting goods like carpets, rugs, dried fruits, and medical plants
but not copper, iron ore, and other natural resources. BRI is expected to
offer the opportunity for Afghanistan to export these and other valuable
resources to markets in Central Asia, China, West Asia, and parts of Europe
with which Afghanistan does not trade extensively at present.6 Building a
trans-Hindukush motorway and railway line to Central Asia would extend
CPEC into the Asian Development Banks Central Asia Regional Economic
Cooperation (CAREC) project and potentially transform Afghanistan into
a land bridge between Central, South, and West Asia and China.7 Some
Afghan experts have thus argued that Afghanistans integration into [BRI]
will give the country the ability to pursue economic stability by improving
trading opportunities, connecting with regional rail and road networks,
emerging as an important partner in the regional energy market, and
fighting the regional narcotics trade.8
In addition to these economic benefits, participation in BRI is expected
to enhance the security and stability of Afghanistan. Afghans have been
looking for China to assume a greater peacekeeping role in the country.
In January 2015, President Ashraf Ghani stated, We hope that China will
play a proactive role in bringing peace to Afghanistan, because whatever the
Chinese do, they do it according to a plan and with focus.9 Given Chinas
economic, strategic, and political weight in the region and beyond, Kabul
hopes that to make BRI a success, Beijing will work actively to support the
peacebuilding process in Afghanistan.
6 Afghanistan, Observatory of Economic Complexity u http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/

country/afg; and Anurag Ram Chandran, Why Afghanistan Should Join CPEC, Diplomat, May 5,
2017 u http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/why-afghanistan-should-join-cpec.
7 Khalil, Linking Afghanistan to Chinas Belt and Road.
8 Zabihullah Mudabber, Where Does Afghanistan Fit in Chinas Belt and Road? Diplomat, May 3,
2016 u http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/where-does-afghanistan-fit-in-chinas-belt-and-road.
9 Ashraf Ghani as quoted in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Sunniva Engh, Silk Road Diplomacy: Chinas
Strategic Interests in South Asia, in South Asia and the Great Powers: International Relations and
Regional Security, ed. Sten Rynning (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 147.
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Chinas Vision for Afghanistans Role in BRI

Afghanistan has considerable interest in participating in BRI, and
China for its part has expressed interest in involving Afghanistan in the
initiative. In 2016, for example, the Chinese ambassador in Kabul confirmed
Chinas desire to cooperate with Afghanistan on construction of the Silk
Road Economic Belt.10 Recently, a Chinese delegation from the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences reportedly met the Afghan chief executive
officer Abdullah Abdullah to discuss BRI.11
Yet it is important to highlight that from the Chinese perspective
Pakistan, the East Asian countries, and the West Asian countries are more
important for the success of BRI than Afghanistan. A careful look at the map
of BRI (see the introduction to this roundtable) reveals that Afghanistan
does not figure as a key country in this megaproject. Nonetheless, China
will benefit greatly if Afghanistan becomes stable and is linked to CPEC and
larger BRI projects. To this end, there have been some positive developments
in building connectivity between China and Afghanistan. One significant
development was the completion in September 2016 of a new freight train
line extending seven thousand kilometers from Chinas eastern city of
Nantong to Hairatan in Afghanistan via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Over the last two years, Beijing has also attempted to play the role
of peacemaker in Afghanistan, though without much success. Chinese
trilateral and quadrilateral initiatives to bring about reconciliation between
the Afghan government and the Taliban have thus far failed. Some experts
have argued that the complexity of the Afghan conundrum and Chinas lack
of experience in conflict resolution make it difficult for Beijing to successfully
mediate between the Taliban and the current Afghan government.12 Chinas
interest in assuming this new, enhanced role can be attributed to four
factors: (1) safeguarding its investment in the country, (2) containing the
extremist activities of groups that are viewed as a serious threat to Chinas
own internal security situation, especially in Xinjiang, (3) securing a safe
corridor for China to extend its reach to Europe,13 and (4) gaining access
to various natural resources. With respect to the fourth factor, Afghanistan
10 One Belt One Road through Afghanistan.

11 Belt Plan to Open New Chapter in Sino-Afghan Relations, South Asia Monitor, May 9, 2017.
12 Authors communication with Christian Wagner, senior fellow at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, Berlin, May 17, 2017.
13 Wendy Wu, All Aboard for One Belt, One Road? Afghanistan Freight Train Trip One Stop in Chinas
Bigger Drive, South China Morning Post, September 13, 2016 u http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
diplomacy-defence/article/2018953/all-aboard-one-belt-one-road-afghanistan-freight-train.
[ 106 ]
has mineral deposits worth nearly $1 trillion, which include huge veins of
iron ore, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium.
If stabilized, the country could be transformed into one of the most
important mining centers in the world.14
Challenges and Uncertainties

While Afghanistan has high expectations for BRI, and China has
pursued Afghan participation in the initiative, many uncertainties and
challenges to realizing the full potential of this project remain. The first
and foremost challenge is the worsening security situation in Afghanistan.
As the reconciliation process stalls, the security situation is deteriorating
as a result of increasing violence and terrorist attacks and the growing
influence of extremist groups such as the Taliban. Narcotics trafficking is
another fundamental challenges faced by Afghanistan. President Ghani has
articulated the view that Afghanistan will be unable to attain its potential
as long as there is discord in the country. To address these challenges, the
Afghan government must build an effective, inclusive, and democratic state.15
Related to the above problems is the worsening of relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the past year. As discussed above, China has a
clear interest in improving access to Afghanistans resources and in making
use of its strategic location. Although the extension of CPEC to Afghanistan
is a core element of BRI, given the uncertain security situation within the
country and along its border with Pakistan, major projects might be difficult
to realize in the short term.16 A former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan,
Jayant Prasad, is of the view that domestic stability is a prerequisite for
successful participation in BRI. As long as Pakistan continues to provide
support and sanctuary to the Taliban and other extremist groups, attaining
stability will be difficult for Afghanistan. Instability and war will not
only disrupt the future of this project but deprive Afghanistan of the
economic benefits offered by heightened regional connectivity. Unless the
countrys security situation improves and its high-tech manufacturing
capacity increases, Afghanistan will struggle to fully realize the economic
opportunities created by BRI.
14 James Risen, U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan, New York Times, June 13, 2010 u
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html.
15 Ashraf Ghani, Russia: Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Russian Congress, Afghan
Videos, YouTube, July 16, 2015 u https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZR7PLYwhZg.
16 Authors personal communication with Sandra Distradi, a senior research fellow at the German
Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, May 16, 2017.
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Third, Chinas investments are mainly focused around, rather than

inside, Afghanistan. As a result, Beijing has committed only $100 million
to the country, compared with $62 billion to Pakistan under the CPEC
project and $31 billion to the Central Asian countries.17 Additionally,
previous Chinese commitments to projects within Afghanistan have not
yet materialized. The Mes Aynak project has not been operationalized
due to security concerns, and China also has not made the infrastructure
investments that it promised around the site. Similarly, the Amu Darya
project has faced delays, and Beijing has not fulfilled its commitment to
build an oil refinery in northern Afghanistan. Despite its narrative of
the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, China has only provided
$250 million to the country since 2001, and has committed merely
$327 million by 2017. This amount is insignificant compared to the
$110 billion of assistance from the United States since 2002 and the more
than $2 billion from India since 2001.18
Fourth, the economic viability of building new railway lines is another
important issue. In this context, some Chinese analysts have questioned
the plan to build new railway lines connecting China, Central Asia, and
Afghanistan. Chu Yin, for example, states that there is not enough freight
volume from both destinations and Chinese products would lose their
price advantage by rail transport compared with marine route costs. The
transregional railways need to be consolidated.19
Fifth, expectations are high but there is still a lot of skepticism. If
realized, BRI will greatly benefit the region, including Afghanistan.
However, its future will depend on how effectively China is able to
convince partner states and implement these ambitious projects, which
are still short on specifics. Wang Jisi, dean of Peking Universitys School
of International Studies, is of the opinion that while BRI is Chinas
grand strategy, the country does not appear to know much about the
region, which becomes a major limitation for successfully implementing
this strategy. 20 An economist from the China Centre for International
17 Sajjad Hussain, Chinas CPEC Investment in Pakistan Reaches $62 Billion, Livemint
u http://www.livemint.com/Politics/dB5tQKISoKNrvl7EwDPFbP/Chinas-CPEC-
investment-in-Pakistan-reaches-62-billion.html; and Nivedita Jayaram, Economic
Impact of OBOR on Afghanistan, Mantraya, September 28, 2016, http://mantraya.org/
economic-impact-of-obor-on-afghanistan.
18 Jayaram, Economic Impact of OBOR on Afghanistan.
19 Wu, All Aboard for One Belt, One Road?
20 Wang Jisi (roundtable discussion, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi,
September 23, 2016).
[ 108 ]
Economic Exchanges noted that the national strategy is the priority;

economic considerations are secondary.21 The other side of this limitation
is that the BRI countries do not know what Chinas strategic objectives
are. Much more explanation and clarity on the initiative are needed.
Prognosis
Although cooperation between China and Afghanistan on BRI offers
many potential benefits for both countries, these can only be realized when
the security situation in Afghanistan improves. To address this and other
challenges, neighboring countries and other international actors need to
extend their support and cooperation to build a stable Afghanistan. China,
for its part, must play a greater role in terms of economic and financial
commitments within the country. As a major regional power, China will
need to do much to live up to Afghanistans expectations.
21 Ben Blanchard, Ambition to Meet Reality as China Gathers World for Silk Road Summit, Reuters,
May 11, 2017 u http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-summit-idUKKBN18631D.
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Chinas Silk Road and Kazakhstans Bright Path:

Linking Dreams of Prosperity
Nargis Kassenova
I n 2013, President Xi Jinping announced Chinas Silk Road

Economic Beltthe land-based component of the Belt and Road
Initiativeduring his visit to Astana. The choice of the venue did not seem
accidental. Kazakhstan had already become a prime partner for China in
Eurasia, with various connecting infrastructure projects completed or
underway and with bilateral cooperation diversifying and blooming. The
announced Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative promises better continental
and intraregional connectivity and can only add wind into the sails of
China-Kazakhstan cooperation.
This essay will give a brief overview of energy and transportation
infrastructure already connecting China and Kazakhstan to show that
cooperation between the two countries considerably predates the Belt
and Road Initiative. Then I will discuss the complementarity of their
interests and current visions for development and prosperity: Chinas
Silk Road Economic Belt and Kazakhstans Bright Path (Nurly Zhol). It is
important to address the gap in perceptions of Chinese investments by the
Kazakhstani ruling elites and the public at large, which will be the subject
of the next section. Finally, I will analyze the implications of growing
cooperation between China and Kazakhstan for the latters political and
economic development. I will also reflect on the geopolitical aspect of the
Belt and Road Initiative and raise concerns about its sustainability and
potential impact on governance in Eurasia.
China and Kazakhstan: Existing Energy and Transportation

Infrastructure
In the energy sector, bilateral cooperation has been advancing since
the 1990s due to the complementary objectives and geographic proximity
of resource-rich Kazakhstan and energy-thirsty China. In 2009 the two
countries launched a pipeline linking oil fields in western Kazakhstan with
Xinjiang in China. The Central AsiaChina gas pipeline, which supplies
nargis kassenova is Director of the Central Asian Studies Center at KIMEP University in Almaty,
Kazakhstan. She can be reached at <nargis@kimep.kz>.
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China with half of its natural gas imports, was first agreed upon by Beijing
and Astana and later was negotiated with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.1
There have also been long-term efforts to build better transportation
infrastructure connecting the two countries. Unlike Russia, Chinas
traditional land gateway to Europe, Kazakhstan is unreservedly enthusiastic
about serving as a transit area for trade between Europe and Asia.2 In fact,
becoming the bridge between East and West has been its official strategic
development project since the early years of independence. The first railway
link from Dostyk in Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China was launched
in 1991. The second link at Khorgos, where the two sides began building
an ambitious multi-modal logistical hub, dry port, and special economic
zone (SEZ), the KhorgosEastern Gate, was launched in 2012.
In 2008, Kazakhstan began construction of the West EuropeWest
China Highway, which will stretch from the Lianyungang port on the Yellow
Sea to St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea. By 2016, China and Kazakhstan had
completed their parts of the project, and Kazakhstani president Nursultan
Nazarbayev had to call on Russia to finish its section.3 The highway is also
connected to the KhorgosEastern Gate SEZ. In 2014 the parties also signed
an agreement on building a joint logistics terminal at Lianyungang, giving
landlocked Kazakhstan its window to the sea.
From the Kazakhstani governments perspective, enhancing the
countrys transit potential should help develop the national transportation
and communication infrastructure, which is not an easy task for a country
the size of Western Europe. For example, Astanas key motivation for
joining the Central AsiaChina gas pipeline project was to satisfy domestic
gas consumption needs by connecting the countrys energy-rich west with
the densely populated south.
The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Bright Path: Complementary Visions
In December 2015, Presidents Xi and Nazarbayev announced plans
to link the Silk Road Economic Belt and Kazakhstans Bright Path
1 Alexander Shustov, Why China Will Remain Turkmenistans Main Gas Buyer, Russia
Beyond the Headlines, January 26, 2017 u https://www.rbth.com/business/2017/01/26/
why-china-will-remain-turkmenistans-main-gas-buyer_689386.
2 Ivan Zuenko, Okno v Kitai: Pochemu u Kazakhstana poluchilos, a u Rossii net [Window to
China: Why Kazakhstan Was Successful, and Russia Not], Carnegie Moscow Center, February 16,
2017 u http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=68012.
3 Kazakhstan Asks Russia to Promote Construction of West EuropeWest China Motorway,
KazWorld.info, October 5, 2016 u http://kazworld.info/?p=57425.
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economic policy. The latter is a large-scale, five-year program announced

in 2014 by the Kazakhstani government to build domestic infrastructure,
focusing on transportation, industry, and energy, as well as the development
of the social sphere and institutions.4
The two parties put forward a joint plan in summer 2016 that indicates
three priorities: transportation infrastructure, trade, and manufacturing
industries. The first priority (transportation infrastructure) includes joint
work on building several transportation corridors: China, Kazakhstan,
and West Asia; China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Western Europe; and
China, Kazakhstan, South Caucasus/Turkey, and Europe. It also includes
development of logistics terminals in China, Kazakhstan, and third
countries (including a dry port, Incheburun, on the Turkmenistan-Iran
border and Bandar Abbas port in Iran). The second priority (trade)
addresses the stimulation and optimization of trade, increasing the share
of high-tech products and coordination of certification policies. The third
priority (manufacturing industries) focuses on the creation of joint ventures
in Kazakhstans SEZthe KhorgosEastern Gate in Almaty Oblast and
the National Industrial Petrochemical Technopark in Atyrau Oblastand
cooperation on biotechnology, energy, engineering technology, automobiles,
construction materials, and textiles.5
To realize the plan, the governments developed a special program
to transfer industrial capacity from China to Kazakhstan. Initially, the
program included 51 projects, worth around $26 billion, ranging from
developing the chemical industry and transportation infrastructure to
supporting agrobusiness and information technologies.6 While the list is
not finalized and remains subject to modification, it is not merely a simple
indication of good intentions; it is composed of feasible projects, some of
which are being implemented already.7
4 Plan sotrudnichestva po sopryazheniyu novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki Nurly Zhol i stroitelstva

Ekonomicheskogo Poyasa Shelkovogo Puti mezhdu pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan i
pravitelstvom Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki [Plan of Cooperation for Linking the New Economic
Policy Nurly Zhol and Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt between the Government
of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China], Tengrinews,
August 31, 2016.
5 Ibid.
6 Kitai perevedet v Kazakhstan 51 predpriyatie [China Will Transfer 51 Enterprises to
Kazakhstan], Forbes (Kazakhstan), September 2, 2016 u https://forbes.kz/finances/markets/
kitay_perevedet_v_kazahstan_51_predpriyatie.
7 Such speedy progress is in contrast with the slower pace of efforts to link the Silk Road Economic
Belt and Eurasian Economic Union agreed to by Beijing and Moscow in May 2015. The list of
39 priority projects was compiled by the Eurasian Economic Commission in March 2017 u
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/2-03-2017-1.aspx.
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Kazakhstani Perceptions of the Silk Road Economic Belt Initiative

Although there is considerable public interest in the plan to link the
Silk Road Economic Belt and Bright Path and in the possible implications
of such a massive inflow of Chinese investment and business know-how,
there is no publicly available detailed information about the contents of
the list, project descriptions, and financial arrangements. To quell fears
and concerns, the authorities keep emphasizing that the joint program is
not about moving outdated industrial capacities from China to Kazakhstan
but rather establishing new enterprises that will create employment
opportunities for Kazakhstanis. However, the lack of transparency does not
encourage trust in the governments arguments and intentions.
Of particular importance and sensitivity is the sphere of agriculture.
On the one hand, much hope is placed in Chinas investments and in access
to its vast market for local ecologically clean products: meat, wheat,
oil, and honey, for example. This market is perceived as a pot of gold
that is bottomless and insatiable. To acquire access to it, the Kazakhstani
Ministry of Agriculture has been working with its Chinese counterpart on
agreements on certification and sanitary norms. 8
The blooming cooperation, however, might be hindered by the
popular fear of China. Public opinion seems to be in a countercycle to the
government: while the political elites are warming up for a tight embrace
with China, ordinary citizens seem to be growing more worried, with
discussions of the China threat serving as a staple of public discourse on
security and the future of the country.9 Thus, in spring 2016, Kazakhstan
was shaken by protests against new land legislation that extended the
maximum lease on farming land for foreigners from 10 to 25 years. Despite
facing harsh punishment for demonstrations that the authorities did not
allow and therefore deemed illegal, people took to the squares and the
streets in several cities to oppose the change, which they feared would allow
Chinese companies and nationals to poison the soil or capture and colonize
land. The Kazakhstani leadership used a dual tactic to deal with the
protests: it put a moratorium on the legislation and at the same time cracked
down on the activists behind the demonstrations. In a similar manner,
when during the discussion of constitutional amendments proposed by the
8 Kazakhstan i Kitai vyhodyat na novyi uroven sotrudnichestva v selskom hozyaistve [Kazakhstan

and China Have Reached a New Level of Cooperation in Agriculture], Forbes (Kazakhstan),
March 31, 2017, https://forbes.kz/news/2017/03/31/newsid_139786.
9 Aziz Burkhanov and Yu-Wen Chen, Kazakh Perspective on China, the Chinese, and Chinese
Migration, Ethnic and Racial Studies Review 39, no. 12 (2016): 212948.
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government concerns were raised that the new article on ensuring universal
property rights was a sneaky way to push through the ownership of land by
foreigners, this amendment was quietly removed.
While the government is aware and afraid of the potential for public
mobilization on issues related to the growing Chinese presence in the
country, it is nevertheless moving very fast and without hesitation. Astana
seems determined to use the opportunity presented by Chinas expansionist
drive and willingness to invest, perhaps seeing it as the last hope to diversify
and jump-start the economy. All the previous efforts and programs have
failed to deliver results.
The governments embrace of China goes beyond the simple
considerations of benefits from trade and investments. The big eastern
neighbor is increasingly seen as successful and growing in power, and that
triggers the desire among the leadership to emulate and learn from it. China
has become one of the role models for Kazakhstan: a state with a dynamic
economy that is comfortable with globalization trends and open to the
world, while in full control of its domestic politics.
In addition to the alignment of their political-economic models, the
two countries also share positions on international issues. They often vote
in the same way in the UN General Assembly and Security Council, where
Kazakhstan has represented Asia as a nonpermanent member since 2017.10
Their alignment is particularly noticeable on Russia-related issues, where both
can disagree in principle with Moscows actions, but want to be polite toward
Russia and therefore abstain from a vote. Kazakhstan also supports Chinas
international initiatives, such as the creation of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and tighter regulation of the Internet.11
The Implications of Closer Ties

How clear-eyed is Kazakh leaders enthusiasm about Chinese
investment? What are the possible implications of the growing fascination
with Chinas model and efforts to move closer to the country geopolitically?
The gap between the enthusiasm of political and business elites and the
10 In March 2014, China and Russia abstained from voting for a resolution adopted by the UN
General Assembly in response to the Russian occupation of Crimea. In April 2017, China and
Kazakhstan abstained from voting on a draft UN Security Council resolution preemptively
declaring an attack in Syria to be chemical in nature. (Russia voted against the resolution.)
11 Joe McDonald, Xi Wants Internet Cooperation, U.S. News and World Report,
December 16, 2015 u https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015-12-16/
chinas-xi-calls-for-cooperation-on-internet-regulation.
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popular sentiments and fears of China has already created tensions. Will the
government be able to walk the tightrope and keep these tensions in check?
Chinese investments are welcomed by Kazakhstan because they
enhance connectivity and promote diversification. It is certainly better to
have greater connectivity, especially if you are a landlocked country. Yet it is
not clear how much economic sense massive investments in transportation
infrastructure will make. At present, the volume of commodities moving
from China into Europe via Kazakhstan has been on a sharp rise, but their
transport was sponsored by Chinese authorities promoting the Silk Road
Economic Belt. The central government gives subsidies to local authorities,
who then create compensation funds that cover the losses of companies
sending their products to Europe by land rather than by sea.12 How long will
the Chinese government continue to sponsor this more expensive route?
It is even better to attract foreign investments and technological
transfers and, with their help, diversify the economy. But it is not certain
that the coming investments will truly facilitate Kazakhstans development,
rather than merely leaving a mixed record of increased production capacity,
higher inequality, and worse governance. There is a general consensus in
Kazakhstan about the need to carry out structural reforms, strengthen
institutions, and rein in rampant corruption. The government has
introduced various programs to do so, including the current 100 Concrete
Steps program of five institutional reforms (forming a modern public service,
strengthening rule of law, boosting industrialization and economic growth,
shaping a nation of common future, and establishing a transparent and
accountable government).13 In order to introduce the best standards and
practices, Astana has also initiated a partnership with the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).14 Good intentions exist,
but considerable obstacles remain for the countrys future development, the
first being the nature of the political regime trying to preserve itself.
In sum, Kazakhstans pivot to China is controversial. On the one hand,
China gives assurances of support and patronage, which are particularly
welcome in times of uncertainty. It also provides a more successful,
powerful, and forward-looking anchor than Russia currently does. On the
12 Ivan Zuenko, Why China Subsidizes Loss-Making Rail Transport via Russia and Kazakhstan,
Carnegie Moscow Center, September 13, 2016 u http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64555.
13 Ministry of Justice (Kazakhstan), 100 shagov po 5 institutsionalnym reformam [100 Steps for 5
Institutional Reforms], November 24, 2015 u http://www.adilet.gov.kz/ru/node/108809.
14 OECD Bolsters Relationship with KazakhstanSigns Kazakhstan Country Programme
Agreement, OECD, January 22, 2015 u http://www.oecd.org/economy/oecd-bolsters-relationship-
with-kazakhstan-signs-kazakhstan-country-programme-agreement.htm.
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other hand, leaning toward an unreservedly authoritarian state that does

not believe in free media and genuine political contestation decreases
chances for political liberalization, which have already been weakened by
the current troubles experienced by the West.
The Belt and Road Initiative creates opportunities that are clearly
appreciated by the political and economic elites of countries like Kazakhstan.
The initiative consolidates the role of China as the economic locomotive of
Eurasia and positions it as the prime geopolitical center, making it the power
that shapes agendas, rules, and regulations. Some neighbors are adapting
to this reality better than others and are ready to ride the wave. However,
there are serious concerns about the sustainability of connectivity projects
driven more by the dream component than considerations of economic
feasibility. There are also concerns about the political and social outcomes of
Chinese investments. In many participating countries, they are welcomed
by states and resisted by the public. It is a challenge for both the Chinese
government and the local authorities, particularly the authoritarian ones
that are not used to working with public opinion and mediation mechanisms
and are often distrusted by their populations. Finally, it is an open question
whether these investments will improve or deteriorate the governance in the
recipient countries.
[ 116 ]
Chinas Belt and Road Initiative

and Its Implications for Southeast Asia
Hong Yu
D uring state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, Xi Jinping

announced the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, respectively. Shortly after that, these two
initiatives were combined to form one unified concept, known as the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI). This grand initiative, comprising various routes
by sea and land, is intended to connect China with Southeast and South
Asia, Central Asia, Pacific Oceania, Africa, and Europe. BRI is centered on
both soft and hard infrastructure connectivity, aiming to forge an integrated
and extensive network of regional infrastructure with China at its hub.
BRI has gradually emerged as a top Chinese national strategy. Given
Chinas emergence as a global power through industrial redeployment
and outward investment, this initiative could reshape the geopolitical and
geoeconomic landscape of Asia and beyond. BRI signals a shift in Chinas
foreign policy and a departure from its long-held low-profile approach.
Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese government has adopted a far
more proactive foreign policy stance, driven by global thinking.1 BRI serves
as the key driver to advance Chinas interests overseas and demonstrates
Chinas growing confidence and aspirations to be a rule-shaper in the
economic governance of the region and beyond. Meanwhile, the demise of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), following the withdrawal of the United
States, offers China further leeway to promote its New Silk Road agenda.
The TPPs failure will increase the international momentum behind BRI to
accelerate regional economic cooperation and integration through forging
infrastructure, trade, and investment linkages.
For the Southeast Asian countries, regional economic integration
plays a very important role in mitigating external uncertainties and global
economic vulnerabilities. The collapse of the TPP hit certain participating
countries within Southeast Asia very hard, particularly Singapore. Being a
tiny nation without an economic hinterland, Singapore has developed as the
hong yu is Senior Research Fellow in the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.
He can be reached at <eaiyuh@nus.edu.sg>.
1 Hong Yu, Motivation behind Chinas One Belt, One Road Initiatives and Establishment of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 105 (2017): 35368.
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most open and trade-dependent economy in the region. Chinas realization

of BRI depends on the support and participation of other countries;
in particular, the neighboring Southeast Asian countries are vital to the
success of this grand initiative.
The Southeast Asian countries, particularly developing countries
like Indonesia and the Philippines, have largely welcomed BRI, which
aims to promote close regional trade and investment linkage based on the
improvement of interregional physical connectivity. Southeast Asia needs
to focus consistently on constructing infrastructure in order to unleash the
regions economic growth potential. The Southeast Asian countries consider
that participating in BRI will help address their serious infrastructure
deficits and accelerate industrial and economic growth. China has
offered much-needed investment for connectivity-related infrastructure
construction.2 This essay will first examine the opportunities for Southeast
Asian countries to participate in BRI and then consider their perspectives
on the challenges for the initiative.
Opportunities for Southeast Asia Arising from BRI

Chinas rise to become the worlds second-largest economy and the
largest trading nation has exerted a very powerful pull on the Southeast
Asian economies. China has become the largest trading partner for all
Southeast Asian countries except for the Philippines. The region, for its
part, has benefited enormously from Chinas economic growth. It has taken
advantage of the Sinocentric regional production network created since
Chinas admission to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s to
export raw materials, intermediate goods, and mineral resources to China
for final manufacturing into industrial goods before their export to the
major consumption markets in the West.
Setting aside for the moment the underlying geostrategic and
geopolitical considerations, the potential benefits from BRI for Southeast
Asia could be enormous. China has committed enormous financial
resources to build a number of large-scale transportation projects aiming to
improve interregional connectivity. For example, construction has already
started on the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia and on a
railway linking Mohan, on the Chinese border, with Vientiane, the capital of
Laos. These two projects, both largely financed by Chinese banks and being
2 Hong Yu, Infrastructure Connectivity and Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Progress
and Challenges, Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 1, no. 1 (2017): 4463.
[ 118 ]
built by Chinese companies, mark Beijings efforts to further strengthen

infrastructure, trade, and investment linkages between Southeast Asia and
China. In particular, this region is the key partner and linkage point for the
Maritime Silk Road due to the strategic location of the Strait of Malacca,
which is one the worlds busiest commercial shipping routes. According
to the official blueprint released by the Chinese government in May 2015,
Southeast Asia is one of the priority regions for the improvement of physical
connectivity under the BRI framework.3
In May 2017, on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation, Xi met President Rodrigo Duterte of the
Philippines and President Joko Widodo of Indonesia individually.4 He
stressed that the Philippines and Indonesia are both important partners
under BRI and that China wants to achieve a win-win development
outcome by deepening cooperation on infrastructure construction, trade,
investment, and people-to-people exchange. Evidently, Chinese leaders have
made efforts to convince Southeast Asian countries that they can share the
benefits brought by BRI and yet still retain a sense of ownership over their
participation in this China-dominated initiative.
In particular, the Southeast Asian countries could stand to benefit from
improvements to infrastructure connectivity and the liberalization of trade
and investment through the elimination of trade and non-trade barriers.
Homegrown companies in sectors such as trade, finance, shipping, aviation,
information and communications technology, and infrastructure-related
professional services will be well placed to take advantage of BRI and gain
greater access to the other untapped markets along the Silk Road routes.
Regarding investment in regional connectivity, many Southeast Asian
countries face a lack of technological know-how and serious financial
difficulty in raising the significant amounts of capital needed to fund
required infrastructure projects. As a reference point, according to a study
by the Asian Development Bank in 2010, Asia will need nearly $8 trillion
in capital investment for infrastructure construction between 2010 and
2020, of which 68% is required for new capacity, while 32% is needed for
Commerce of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015 u http://en.ndrc.gov.
cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), President Xi Jinping Meets with President Rodrigo Duterte
of the Philippines, May 15, 2017 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1462704.
shtml; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), President Jokowi Meets President Xi Jinping
to Enhance Strategic Partnership Cooperation, May 15, 2017 u http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/
Pages/president-jokowi-meets-president-xi-enhance-strategic-partnership.aspx.
[ 119 ]
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replacement and maintenance.5 The Southeast Asian nations must address

this thorny issue of infrastructure deficits to realize their local economic
growth potential. Notably, inadequate port capacity and roads pose a major
constraint on the expansion of intraregional and interregional trade.6
Given that infrastructure development is an exigent need in Southeast
Asia, the developing countries in this region largely welcome BRI, and
in particular Chinas investment plans for new infrastructure, at least
for now. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, three of the least-developed
nations in the region, are traditionally strong allies of China and heavily
dependent on Chinese aid for economic growth. Since the announcement
of BRI in 2013, these countries have offered unconditional support for this
initiative. Meanwhile, the economies of developed countries in the region,
including Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, are largely complementary
with the Chinese economy; hence, these countries are keen to accelerate
industrialization through Chinese investment deriving from BRI.
China has already made huge investments in Southeast Asian
infrastructure, including railways, highways, sea ports, power plants, and
digital communication network facilities. Three Southeast Asian countries
in particularIndonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippineshave become
major beneficiaries of Chinese infrastructure investment diplomacy under
BRI. The growing bilateral cooperation between Malaysia and China on
infrastructure provision is a case in point. According to the agreements
reached between these two countries during the visit of Malaysian prime
minister Najib Razak to Beijing in November 2016, China could provide
huge investments in the construction of the Malaysia-China Kuantan
Industrial Park, Melaka Gateway port project, and the East Coast Rail Line
located in Malaysia in the coming years.
As a result of rising Chinese investment, BRI could lead to China
becoming the dominant force in determining the future economic
landscape of Southeast Asia. China is Asias economic powerhouse and has
become the largest trading partner for almost all Southeast Asian nations
since 2009. Against this backdrop, to accompany the inflow of Chinese
investment and the increasing presence of Chinese firms in the region via
the implementation of BRI, China will drive toward becoming the dominant
5 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Infrastructure
for a Seamless Asia (Tokyo: ADB and ADBI, 2009) u https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/159348/adbi-infrastructure-seamless-asia.pdf; and Biswanath Bhattacharyay,
Institutions for Asian Connectivity, ADBI, Working Paper, no. 220, June 2010, 125.
6 Yu, Infrastructure Connectivity and Regional Economic Integration in East Asia.
[ 120 ]
force in Southeast Asia, at least in the trade and economic arena. Over the
past year, the frequent high-level visits to Beijing by leaders of regional
countries have been a clear indication of their warming relations with
China. In addition to Prime Minister Najibs visit to China in November
2016, Philippine president Duterte and Vietnam Communist Party general
secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China in January 2017.
Challenges to BRI from the Southeast Asian Perspective

Although China has tried to downplay the widespread concern
expressed over the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea,
this issue has negatively affected bilateral relations with several Southeast
Asian countriesin particular, the Philippines and Vietnam, which have
ongoing territorial disputes with China. From the regional countries
perspective, China has taken a very assertive foreign policy stance toward
neighboring small countries in these disputes.
In July 2016, the judges on the Hague-based arbitral tribunal panel
issued a unanimous verdict on the South China Sea disputes. From Beijings
perspective, the tribunal abused its judicial power and unfairly took the
side of the Philippines. However, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other
like-minded nations in the region perceived the decision as lawful and
legally binding. Chinas noncompliance with the tribunals award could
damage its reputation in Southeast Asia as a responsible and law-abiding
power and harm its international image accordingly. This issue is unlikely
to be resolved in the near future, and the tensions in the South China Sea
will persist and even occasionally escalate. Mutual trust and confidence
between some Southeast Asian countries and China could be eroded as a
result, which might impede Chinas ambitions to engage in large-scale
infrastructure projects in the region and jeopardize the implementation and
ultimate success of BRI. Such initiatives depend on political commitment
based on strategic trust.
Considerations of national security and maintaining geostrategic
balance among major powers have engendered concerns in many Southeast
Asian countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. These
countries fear becoming too economically dependent on China through the
advancement of the BRI framework and being forced to adopt a pro-China
policy stance in regional and international diplomacy. In addition, they have
serious suspicions about the true motivation and strategic thinking behind
Chinas promotion of BRI. Although Chinese officials claim that it is a
[ 121 ]
asia policy
mutually beneficial initiative motivated by a desire to expand infrastructure,

trade, and investment cooperation, the Southeast Asian countries view BRI
as also carrying geopolitical implications in terms of strengthening Chinas
military capability in general and naval power in particular.
Conclusion
From Chinas standpoint, Southeast Asia is an indispensable strategic
partner in the grand Belt and Road Initiative and is especially crucial to the
success of the sea-based Maritime Silk Road. China views Southeast Asia as
the key linkage point and anchor for implementing this element of BRI.
Meanwhile, although the Southeast Asian countries generally
welcome Chinas investment in infrastructure and proposal to expand
regional trade and investment linkages, they are divided on the extent to
which they should participate in BRI. Countries such as Cambodia, Laos,
and Myanmar, which are long-term strategic allies and trusted friends
of China, overwhelmingly support the initiative and are prepared to
participate fully. However, other countries, such as Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, are taking a more cautious approach
toward BRI due to their concerns about the security risks of economic
overdependence on China. They fear that Chinas push to implement the
initiative will result in the emergence of a China-dominated economic
circle and a Sinocentric geopolitical order in Asia. Concerns over national
security and potential changes to the existing geopolitical order in the
region could render Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and the
Philippines unwilling to participate fully in BRI or to allow Chinese
companies to engage in large-scale projects in their territory.
[ 122 ]

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asia policy, number 24 ( july 2017 ) , 65122

Harsh V. Pant and Ritika Passi

Meena Singh Roy

The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

I n 2013, Chinas president Xi Jinping announced an initiative that would

Silk Road Economic Belt R U S S I A

GREECE Athens Dushanbe

21st Century Maritime Silk Road

China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor

New Eurasian Land Bridge

government corruption might present obstacles to the elites generally warm

The Belt and Road Initiative: Chinas New Grand Strategy?

I n 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping unveiled major components of

Beijings geopolitical goals to break perceived U.S. encirclement in the

BRI: State-Building, Economics, and Geopolitics

the development and diversification of overland supply routes is a means of

BRI and Chinas Evolving Grand Strategy

Second, Dengs successor, Jiang Zemin, built on this foundation,

it reaches a certain stage of development.21 This rationale was also evident

capable of providing leadership to the international system and demonstrate

First Movement: Pakistan and the Belt and Road Initiative

T he China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been billed as the

1 Li Keqiang, Building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Flagship Project, Ministry of

The concept of CPEC is only the latest iteration of proposed transportation

5 See CPEC Coal Project, Dawn, May 19, 2016 u https://www.dawn.com/news/1259166.

Yet this characterization of a scheme that is simultaneously strategically

Becoming the Flagship by Default

The Corridor That Isnt

been consistently skeptical of Pakistans value as a transit corridor. The land

A second version of the argument is that because CPEC is not a viable

Meet the New Strategy

jihadism. A transformative economic program is seen, in the words of Li

In assessing how these issues are likely to be addressed, Chinas

Indias Response to Chinas Belt and Road Initiative:

A sense of aloofness and wariness, perhaps even deflection, initially

The unilateral ideation and announcement of BRI, as well as Beijings

Connectivity should diffuse national rivalries, not add to

Unnecessary competitiveness and regional tensions hint at the

To Join or Not to JoinThat Is the Question

6 Official Spokespersons Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum,

concerns about encirclement. Beijings port development projects in the

12 Varma, CPEC Violates Sovereignty.

India is also facing a rapidly evolving global order that is seeing

The Evolution of Russias Views on the Belt and Road Initiative

T he Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by Xi Jinping in 2013

followed by an update on Russias current challenging political and economic

BRI: A New High Point in Chinese Regional Influence

A Weakened Russia Forced to Find a Compromise

partner that is potentially ready to violate the fundamental principles of

Accepting and Using Chinese Power?

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union.

11 Mikhail Korostikov, Pod vysokim sopriazheniem, [Through a Strong Association], Kommersant-Vlast,

to avoid what is viewed by an increasing number of political figures in

Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative:

I n September and October 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited

Afghanistans Expectations for BRI

in the initiative. Highlighting the importance of this megaproject,

trade with regional countries, thereby stabilizing its economy. In 2015,

6 Afghanistan, Observatory of Economic Complexity u http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/

Chinas Vision for Afghanistans Role in BRI

10 One Belt One Road through Afghanistan.

Challenges and Uncertainties

Third, Chinas investments are mainly focused around, rather than