Stare Decisis

Principle of Stare Decisis

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.[51]

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the
historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections[52] is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th
century, it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in
litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed
if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and,
(3) the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not
the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.

The doctrine migrated to theUnited States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
According toHamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the
courts.Madisonagreed but stressed that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree
about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He
added that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of
law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has
attempted to deal with for over two centuries.

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoys observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions
of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis
requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy,
imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our
Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis
and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution
while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts
enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis view
on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose,
Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is
not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion
of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the same vein, the
venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself and not what we have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies,
it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress
itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress role and the need to preserve the courts limited
resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts
refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges
can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed
its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked
Plessy v. Fergusons separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement
that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held
that separate . . . is inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare.
In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions
of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first
ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the
following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations
is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether
the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule
is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.[53]

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer
new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio
v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively
in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

KINDS OF RES JUDICATA AND ITS CONDITIONS:

The principle of Res Judicata is codified in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. There are two
kinds of Res Judicata, i)- Actual Res Judicata and ii)- Constructive Res Judicata. The difference between the
both is :a)- It is necessary in the former case that the matter must have been alleged by one party and
either admitted or denied by the other. This is not required in the case of constructive res judicata where
the test as laid down by Explanation IV of Section 11 C.P.C. is whether the matter might and ought to have
been made a ground of attack or defence. b)- The case/suit must have been heard and finally decided in
the former case. This condition cannot be satisfied with regard to constructive res judicata, as there can
be no hearing and decision respecting a matter never raised before a Court. However, in order to found
the plea of constructive res judicata there must be some decision either in express terms or by implication.
In all other respects all the conditions requisite for the applicability of the doctrine of actual res judicata
must also be fulfilled in respect of the doctrine of constructive res judicata.

CONDITIONS OF RES JUDICATA:

There are five conditions to attract the provisions of res judicata which are: 1)- The matter directly and
substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and
substantially in issue either actually(Explanation III), or constructively (Explanation IV), in the former suit.
2)- The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they
or anyone of them claim (Explanation IV). 3)- The parties as aforesaid must have litigated under the same
title in the former suit.

4)- The Court which decided the former suit must be a Court competent to try the subsequent suit in
which such issue is subsequently raised (Explanation II).

5)- The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally
decided by the Court in the first suit (Explanation V).

Law of the Case

The principle that if the highest appellate court has determined a legal question and returned the case to
the court below for additional proceedings, the question will not be determined differently on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.

The law of the case expresses the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is the final
determination of the rights of the parties. The doctrine of "law of the case" is one of policy only, however,
and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law
decided on the prior appeal. Such circumstances exist when an intervening or contemporaneous change
in the law has transpired by the establishment of new precedent by a controlling authority or the
overruling of former decisions.

Courts have ruled that instructionsdirections given by the judge to the jury concerning the law
applicable to the caseare the "law of the case" where the appealing defendant, the petitioner, accepted
the instructions as correct at the time they were given.