G.R. No.

102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of
People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction
by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed
therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil
liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is
final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a
su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the
old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such
that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the
simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute
a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and
the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability
in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al.
vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of
the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and
Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this
court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal
and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but
from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while
the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws
of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the
extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant
whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that
actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall
be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-
accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival
of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of
law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his
criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly
liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the
civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court
of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained
of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10)
days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and
has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar
as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us
to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in
the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is
there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto
when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action
which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal
action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum
of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify
the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of
his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had
the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be
borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render
fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This
is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred
to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the
civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source
of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's
civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution
of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the
type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court
of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should
be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can
hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the
estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule
86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What
are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while
the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred
to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the
estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered
by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously
charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an
injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to
persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86
because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we
stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be
filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) ...

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The
Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil
liability (supported by the Supreme Courts decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of
the accused claimed that in the Supreme Courts decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court
said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge
Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be no party defendant in the case.
There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated it is, thus, evident that
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only
survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could
not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be
extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotass death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and
his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald
of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the
other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial,
reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the
above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111,
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the courts decision. And so, when appellants
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere
culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians,
and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616,
73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages
in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be Indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath
to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
Ubi jus Idemnified remedium. (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on
culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in
the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at
the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasi-delicts.) And it is precisely the underline qualification, not punishable by law, that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that killeth, rather than
the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that (W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana
orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code,
it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law, thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws. More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and culpa extracontractual or cuasi-delito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery., (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of
liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or
negligencia covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginalds emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is
already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor (child), it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus (E)mancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.

Now under Article 2180, (T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion
with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication
of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without
the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees

Elcano vs Hill

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald
and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is
barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag, et. al., G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio Teehankee Jr.
allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but before
the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file
the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.

The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused to be arraigned
on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered
the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The
petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue
raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's admittance of the
amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the
amended information.

Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
Held: Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and
may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely
formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations
are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim,
the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in
the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold
that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to nullify the
order 1 of respondent judge admitting the amended information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to
nullify the appointment of a counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge
from "over-speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to compel
respondent judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.

Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of frustrated murder allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have
caused the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro
Hultman which prevented her death.

After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to file an
amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended information, 4 filed on October 31,
1991, reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to
kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the prosecution. On November 13,
1991, the trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.

At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered
that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.

Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner's counsel
manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court
appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner.

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:

(a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted;

(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an accused who is
represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due
process and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and

(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and preferentially scheduled
for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially older, criminal cases. 8

In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition. It
appearing from a further review of the record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this case
are sufficiently presented in the petition and the annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of
petitioner and respondents, the Court has decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate needless
delay in fairness to petitioner.

I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein underscored, that the
accused ". . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun
Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the
death of said Maureen Hultman . . ." constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of
the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner further submits that "(t)here is a
need then to establish that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and able
medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could have been caused by a supervening
act or fact which is not imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there being a substantial
amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.

Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely
different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is
essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can
be admitted.

We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the trial
court.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and
may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph
refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or
after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the
information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges
an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when
the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 10

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations
are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim,
the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in
the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold
that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.

Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen Navarro
Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The
proposition is erroneous and untenable.

As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made
at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of
court.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely
formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription. 14

We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. 15 The test of whether an amendment is only of
form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any
evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other; if
the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 16

Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily
show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation,
that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the
proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to
be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the
original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the
amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be
secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public
accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information
could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges
essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore
held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not
necessary. 17

We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner whose
counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been
demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive
to the delay in the disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and
other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion of
the trial court.

WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to
him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City,
and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a
lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal
Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC
the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a
special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage
to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A.
2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond
are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to
review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question
on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal
by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending
trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his
standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the
30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance
does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension
of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.

Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case
turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense."
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to
be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to
the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or
both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph
5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three
points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to
deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence:
murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated
as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding
penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead,
our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole
class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an
intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22
that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller
in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365
are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There,
a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the
same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges,
the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by
the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by
the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano
v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause
to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent
prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the
accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the
same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the
reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more
than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940,
allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite
his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle
upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless
imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona.
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968),
this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with
the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of
the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits
that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of
damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence
must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical
injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount
of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the
mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief,
but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v.
Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between
the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed
or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95)
signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these
two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against
them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just
a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was
denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In
the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the
vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by
the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police
constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be 249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things
we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that
is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the
charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga
case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability
of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent
but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding
from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of
the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution
multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365
governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light,
less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-
criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is
the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No.
7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365
which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article
365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution
of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and
the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-
crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence
separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge
alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another,
the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall
be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53
(Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting
acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require
single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as
provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains
us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is
a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor
Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the
accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper
use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number
or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article
365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010

Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las
Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor
to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC
thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder
and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial
court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on
to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide.
From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision
of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.
Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the
claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make
much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of
hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with
extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.