Lagdameo vs Lagdameo CA 50 O.G.

3112

[ G.R. No. L-19953, December 24, 1964 ]

PILAR REVILLA DE LAGDAMEO, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN LAO, RESPONDENT.

GUARDIANSHIP; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA HAS JURISDICTION BEFORE ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT. A guardianship case is properly cognizable by the Court of First Instance of Manila where it was filed and heard before the organization
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on June 1, 1956, although after the passage of the law creating the latter court. The effect of Section 2,
Republic Act No. 1401, the law creating said court, has been to defer the operation of the grant of authority to said court, made in Section 1 thereof,
until the organization thereof.

DECISION

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On November 5, 1955, petitioner Pilar R. de Lagdameo commenced this special proceeding No. 28064 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with
a petition for her appointment as guardian of the person and property of her nieces, the minors Trinidad Revilla La'O and Bettina Revilla La'O, who
are children of petitioner's sister Elena Revilla, left by her under petitioner's custody, and Juan La'O. The latter opposed the petition and prayed
that he be given the custody of said minors. The case was heard on February 18, 1956, and evidence were then introduced by the parties. Three (3)
days later the lower court rendered judgment for the petitioner, appointing her as guardian of the person and property of said minors, upon the
filing of a P1,000.00 bond. Juan LaO appealed to the Court of Appeals which, instead of deciding the case on the merits, dismissed the petition,
without prejudice to the filing thereof with the proper court, upon the theory that the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. A reconsideration of the order of dismissal having been denied, petitioner interposed the present appeal by
certiorari.

The only question before us is whether the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction to entertain this case in view of the provision of
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1401, approved on September 9, 1955, conferring upon the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court "exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide x x x cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgement". The Court of Appeals
resolved the issue in the negative, this case having been instituted on November 5, 1955, or almost two (2) months after the approval of said
Republic Act No. 1401, on September 9, 1955, on which date it became effective. Petitioner assails this conclusion of the Court of Appeals as
erroneous, invoking Section 2 of said Act which provides:

"Upon the organization of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Secretary of Justice shall cause all cases and proceedings pending: before
the municipal court and the court of first instance of Manila properly cognizable by the court herein created to be transferred thereto."

Petitioner maintains that the effect of this Section 2 has been to defer the operation of the grant of authority, made in Section 1, in favor of the
juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, until the organization thereof on June 1, 1956.

Petitioner's contention is well taken. Indeed, otherwise, the result would be that, from September 9, 1955 to June 1, 1956, there would have been
in Manila no judicial body competent to hear the cases specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1401. We cannot assume that, in enacting the
same, Congress intended to create such vacuum in the very capital of the Republic, where precisely the biggest number of said cases exist. Such
vacuum would surely be inimical to public interest and we must not assume that Congress intended to bring about such result. On the contrary, the
assumption should be that, to avoid that result, Congress intended no such vacuum, and, accordingly, meant the grant of jurisdiction to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to be operative only upon the establishment or organization of that court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case hereby remanded to said Court for decision on the merits, with the
costs of this instance against respondent Juan La'O.
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Medina vs Makabali SCRA 502

ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.

Fausto D. Laquian for petitioner-appellant.

Maximino Q. Canlas for respondent-appellee.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga,
owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaidas third, had with a married
man, Feliciano Casero.

The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him treated at her expense
for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real
mother never visited her child, and never paid for his expenses.

The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance, if not the
acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero
makes about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the petition for rights and duties of parents and children should go to the petitioner (parent)

Held:

Upon extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he reaches the age of 14, the Court held
that it was for the childs best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.

We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not
lose sight of the basic principle that in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be
paramount (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the
mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae
ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pea, now there is
no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. 1

As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide
the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the
Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but
actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage
the child could derive from being coerced to abandon respondents care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular
menage a trois with Casero and the latters legitimate wife.

It is hinted that respondents motivation in refusing to surrender the boy is to coerce petitioner to pay for the rearing of the child. This is not
acceptable, for Dra. Makabali knew (at least at the trial) that any expectation on her part is illusory, given Zenaidas meager resources, yet
expressed willingness to care and educate him.
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No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we hold that said order should be, and
hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.
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