Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of Language Malcolm D. Eckel Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jul., 1978), 323-337. Stable URL hip: flinks.jstor-org/siisici=003 1-822 1% 28197807%2928%3A3%3C323%3 ABA TEMT%3E2.0,.CO%3B2-U Philosophy East and West is currently published by University of Hawaii Press. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hup:/www,jstororglabout/terms.hml. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www jstor.orgyjoumals/uhp hm. ch copy of any part of'a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @ jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ ‘Sat Nov 19 12:10:54 2005Malcolm D. Eckel Bhivaviveka and the early Madhyamika theories of language Inthe last fifty years, Western interpreters of Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy have worked diligently to devise a philosophical vocabulary in which the insights and techniques of the Madhyamika. dialecticians can be accurately and intelligibly expressed to Western readers.* This is not an easy task, but it has sometimes been done quite effectively Even in the most successful studies, however, one element is often conspicuously lacking. Scholars have compared the work of carly Madhyamika philosophers with similar work in the West, but they have been reluctant for various reasons to compare the early Madhyamika philosophers with each other.® This, of course, has led to a certain admirable simplicity in the results of their comparison, but it has sacrificed a degree of sophistication and philosophical accuracy that would enrich their results. In this article I would like to redress the balance in one small area by considering the development of the theory or theories of language in the works of Nagarjuna, Bhavaviveka, and Candrakirt. By so doing, I hope to demonstrate that a sure way to promote conceptual accuracy in the com- parative enterprise is to understand how individual philosophers in the Mad- hyamika tradition chose to develop and differentiate themselves from the work of their predecessors. The comparison of early Madhyamika philosophers with each other has been hindered in recent years by the relative scarcity of major texts translated into Western languages. We are fortunate to have translations of the basic works of Nagirjuna and Candrakirti, but we only have fragments of the works of other authors like Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka, and original Tibetan works on Madhyamika philosophy are almost unknown in Western languages.* This imbalance has led, perhaps inevitably, to the notion that early Madhyamika philosophy was considerably more homogeneous than it actually was. What is necessary now to expand our understanding of this school is ‘eater familiarity with the lesser known authors, like Bhivaviveka, and with the great Tibetan scholars like Tsof-kha-pa, who wrestled in their own works with the diversity of the early philosophy. Such familiarity would show that the homogeneity of the early tradition is merely apparent. In fact, Bhavaviveka distinguished himself quite sharply from the earlier tradition on certain points, and Candrakirti, in turn, distinguished himself from Bhavaviveka. Tsof-kha-pa and his successors recognized this and, in their own efforts to harmonize the differences, gave a very useful account of the ways in which the two disagreed. ‘Theories of language play an important part in the Madhyamika philosophy of the early period, not primarily because the individual philosophers were interested in constructing a positive semantic theory, although that interest did impinge somewhat on the works of Bhivaviveka and Candrakirti, but ‘Malcolm D. Eck is Insiructor, Religion Department, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3, July 1978. © by The University Press of Hawati ll rights reserved Paso Ear and Wo 2.2.3 ey 198 by The Ui Pr of Mana AB ps ee324 Eckel because the disputes between Madhyamika and rival Indian schools were often, at bottom, cast in terms of disagreements over the use of language. This is perhaps a natural consequence of the Madhyamika critical method. Mad- hyamika philosophers were interested more in devising a critical scheme for removing their opponents’ misconceptions than they were in building their ‘own positive theory. In the absence of shared metaphysical assumptions, their criticism often took the form of objections to certain uses of language. The Madhyamika account of language is thus useful, in the first case, as a mirror of the relationship between Madhyamika philosophers and their Indian ‘opponents, but its importance isnot limited just to this. The account of language is also closely related to a central Madhyamika notion, the two levels of truth, Madhyamika philosophers recognized this as a distinction between a level of nonconceptual, ultimate truth (paramartha) and a level of truth that lay within the domain of concepts and words (yyavahdra). The two were distinct, but the second was understood to function in some way as a vehicle for the first.’ The account of language given by any particular Madhyamika philosopher neces- sarily affected his notion both of the exact nature of the distinction between the two truths and of the way one served indirectly to express the other. An understanding of the development of Madhyamika accounts of language is thus useful to us ina number of ways, both in describing the Madhyamika response to other Indian schools and in following internal differences on certain fundamental points. It also has the advantage, as will be evident later, of sharply delineating basic differences between Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti. ‘Nagarjuna laid the groundwork for later Madhyamika accounts of language in the second century 4.D., at a time when Indian philosophers were becoming conscious in a rudimentary way of the need to formulate rules for debate between opposing philosophical schools, Sanskrit was being used increasingly as a tool for learned discourse, and the Hindu logicians were attempting to develop a theory of semantics and syllogistic reasoning on which philosophical argument could be based. Nagirjuna’s position in this philosophical environ- ment was necessarily rather ambiguous, He was committed, as a Sanskrit dialectician, to the process of discussion and debate facilitated by the develop- ‘ments in Hindu logic, but he could not, as a Buddhist, accept the ontology on which the theories were based. In particular, he could not accept the notion advanced by the Hindu logicians that the meaning of a term was the substantial entity to which it referred. He appeared, in fact, to assert exactly the opposite, namely, that all things are empty of substantial reality, and terms which refer to such things are equally empty of reality, since there is no real substance to which they refer. In the terminology of the Sanskrit philosophical schools this, was expressed in the following words: “Nothing at all possesses intrinsic nature” (sarvesdim bhavndm sarvatra na vidyate svabhdval).® For Nagarjuna this quasi-assertion posed a basic problem concerning the function of language. ‘The problem is simply this: if all things are empty (siinya) of intrinsic nature325 (svabhdva), then terms that refer to them are similarly empty. In the semantic theory of the Hindu logicians, an empty term, that is, one with no reference, is meaningless. So to say “all things are empty of intrinsic nature” is to say that all terms are meaningless, including those in the assertion itself. The assertion is thus useless as a means of argument. Nagarjuna formulated this problem for himself in the first part of the Vigrahavyavartani. Here an objector says: Is, 1] If nothing at all possesses an intrinsic nature, then your statement [that nothing possesses an intrinsic nature] itself possesses no intrinsic nature, and it cannot refute intrinsic nature.” [Vs. 9] If there is no intrinsic nature, then even the word “no intrinsic nature” (nilisvabhava) is impossible, because there can be no word without an object, [to which it refers} (nama hi nirvastukam nasti)* In the second part of the work, Nagarjuna formulates his reply largely in terms of examples. [Commentary on verse 22] You have not understood the emptiness of things. -If things existed by virtue of their own intrinsic nature, they would exist even without causes and conditions. But they do not. Therefore they have no intrinsic nature, and they are called empty. Similarly, because itis dependently produced, my statement has no intrinsic nature, and because it has no intrinsic nature, it is reasonable to call it empty. Now. things like a cart, a pot, or a cloth, though they are empty of intrinsic nature because they are dependently produced, serve their various functions. For example, they carry wood, grass, or dirt, they contain honey, water, or milk, or they protect from cold, wind, or heat. Similarly, my statement serves to establish the fact that things have no intrinsic nature, even though, because it is dependently produced, it has no intrinsic nature.” Nagarjuna shows a number of the important ch these passages. The first point to note is that he works out his own account of words and their function primarily in response to the challenge of a Hindu logician, who wants to force him to say more than he is willing to say. The response he gives is largely negative. He refused to be pushed by the logician into admitting that either his words or the things to which they refer exist by virtue of thei intrinsic nature (svabhava). The second point has to do with the way words actually function, even though they are empty of intrinsic nature. In fact, Nagarjuna does not present a positive theory of language to aecount for the effectiveness of his sentence; he simply makes an appeal to conventional usage. His words admittedly have no intrinsic nature, but they work conven- tionally as well as does a cart. The cart, when we examine it, has no nature which we can designate as its “eartness,” but it still manages to carry out its function effectively. We cannot actually say that Nagarjuna presents a coherent theory in these lines. In his appeal to ordinary usage, however, Nagirjuna suggests the direction in which some future Madhyamika philosopher might 20 in developing a theory based on pure convention,326 Eckel If this were all Nagarjuna had to say about his philosophical statements, our problem would be greatly simplified; but Nagarjuna recognized that the statement “All things are empty of intrinsic nature” contains an added element of complexity. It purports to convey a general truth about the nature of things: all entities, without exception, are empty of intrinsic nature. If the statement functions this way, however, it raises a number of new difficulties. We might ask, in particular, whether the truth conveyed in this statement has, in ‘Nagarjuna’s terminology, an intrinsic nature. If it does, it renders the statement itself false. If it does not, itis not clear what the statement is meant to convey of how it is meant to convey it, Nagarjuna actually poses this question for himself in a somewhat different form. He asks whether the statement “All things are empty of intrinsic nature” asserts anything, and if not, what itis, understood to do, His explanation is the following: [Vs. 29] If | made any assertion ( prarijid), I would be in error. But I make no assertion, thus I am not in error. [Commentary] If I made any assertion, then the error you describe would be ine. But I make no assertion, How can there be any assertion when all things are empty, completely at peace, and isolated by nature.!° [Vs. 63] do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. Therefore you slander me when you say that I negate something. {Commentary} I negated something. what you say would be correct. But I do not negate anything at all for thee is nothing to be negated, Therefore, when all things are empty and there are no negation and thing to be negated, your statement is slanderous, [Vs. 64] You may say that something that does not exist can be negated without words. But in this case [in our statement] speech simply makes known that it does not exist; it does not negate it. {Commentary] You may say, “Something that does not exist can be negated without words; then what point is there in your statement that all things lack intrinsic nature?” We wh that our statement that all things lack intrinsic nature does not cause all things to have no intrinsic nature; it simply makes Known that things lack intrinsic nature For example, when Devadatia is nt in the house, someone ‘might then say to him, “He is not.” That statement does not ereate Devadatta's absence in the house, but only makes known his absence in the house, Similarly, the statement, “Things have no intrinsic nature,” does not create the absence of intrinsic nature; itonly makes known the absence of intrinsic nature.?® Nagarjuna makes it quite clear here that his statement should not be understood cither as an assertion ( pratjfia) or negation of any positive entity. When pressed to give a positive account of the function of his words, he again appeals to a conventional example to show that, while they do not assert anything, they still have significant effect. ‘The account of the function of language presented in these passages is, of course only a small part of Nagarjuna’s philosophy, but it can serve to call attention to some of the basic features of his method. First, we have noted that he proceeds only in response to claims made by his opponents, and he327 refuses to be drawn by their arguments into making positive assertions. In particular, he refuses to accept the notion that the statement “All things are ‘empty of intrinsic nature” functions as an assertion of any positive entity. Second, on the positive side, he argues from conventional usage that the refusal to accept either the intrinsic nature or the assertive value of the statement in no way impairs its ability to function effectively. His words do not assert anything, but they do make known the absence of intrinsic nature, In this way, Nagarjuna drew the outline of a Madhyamika account of the function of language. We will see that his successors had great difficulty staying within its limits, In the four centuries that intervened between Nagarjuna (cirea 150 A.D.) and the next Madhyamika philosopher we will consider, Bhavaviveka (500-570 Ab.) Indian philosophy underwent a remarkable expansion. The basic texts of the Hindu schools were settled and provided with commentaries, and the earlier dominance of Madhyamika among the Mahayana Buddhist schools came to be challenged by a school of Buddhist idealists and logicians. In the face of this widening doctrinal diversity, Bhavaviveka seems to have been by temperament and training particularly prey to the attraction of other philo- sophical opinions. He was apparently a brahman and retained a fondness for the diversity of brahmanical learning, from alchemy and palmistry to Advaita Vediinta, long after his conversion to Buddhism and the philosophical method ‘of Nagarjuna"? A basic motivating impulse in his philosophy. in fact, seems to be the need he felt to reestablish Madhyamika philosophy in a form that ‘would allow room for the variety of conventional learning. Apart from matters, ‘of temperament, however, there were good logical reasons to reassess Nagar- juna’s handling of some basic questions. The rules of logical debate recorded in the Nyaya-sitras seem to have evolved after Nagrjuna and partly in response tohis methods. This seems particularly evident in the definition of an unaceept- able form of reasoning known as vitanda or “cavlling.” Nydya-sitra 1.23 defines this as “that [sophistry (jati)] which lacks the establishment of a ‘counter-position.”! Nagarjuna, as we have seen, avoided making a positive assertion of anything and did not seem to be concerned that this would violate the rues of debate. Bhavaviveka, on the other hand, makes a conscious effort, in at least two places in his work to meet the objection that he is guilty of vitanda and show that it does not apply. In chapter 3 of the Tarkajvaila, for instance, he raises it as an objection. [Objection:] Because you do not establish your own position (svapaksa), but ‘only refute your opponent's position (parapaksa), are you not guilty of vitanda? [Reply |] Our position is “emptiness of intrinsic nature” (svabhava-sinyara); since this is the nature of things, we are not guilty of vitanda.!* Bhavaviveka manages to deal with the objection but only at serious cost to the integrity of Nagarjuna’s method. He is now willing to admit something Nagarjuna fought hard to resist; he accepts “emptiness of intrinsic nature” as328 Eckel 4 positive philosophical assertion. This change has formidable significance for the development of the Madhyamika accounts of language. Bhavaviveka’s reasons for making this move deserve careful scrutiny. Before we consider Bhdvaviveka’s reasons, however, we need to look again at another aspect of Nagarjuna’s argument. We saw earlier that Nagarjuna took some pains to account for the way the words of the sentence “All things are empty of intrinsic nature” could express a significant truth about the nature of things, even though the words themselves were empty and the truth was not the object of an assertion, Those familiar with Madhyamika philosophy will recognize this distinction as the verbal form of the distinction between two levels of truth. Nagarjuna says more about this distinction in his commentary fon verse 28 of the Vigrahayyavartani. We do not say. “All things are empty,” without resorting to conventional truth (xvavahara-sarya) or by rejecting conventional truth, For itis impossible to teach the Dharma without recourse to conventional truth. As we said [in the Madhyamakakarikas}: “Ultimate truth (paramdrtha) cannot be taught without resorting to conventional expressions (vyavahdra); nirvana cannot be reached without recourse to ultimate truth."1® ‘The distinction between ultimate and conventional truth has many implications for Nagarjuna, particularly in the realm of practical behavior (as might be inferred from the conventional orientation of a work like Nagarjuna’s Rat- navali).? But in the philosophical works, like his Vigrahavyavartani, Nagar- jjuna develops the distinction in only a limited way. We might understand ultimate and conventional truth here simply as two sides of the same verbal strategy. Ultimate truth (paramirtha) might be understood as that which the statement “All things are empty,” acting as a verbal expedient, is meant to convey; but we must remember, of course, that Nagarjuna resisted any formu- lation that would turn ultimate truth into the object of a positive assertion. This account of the relation between ultimate and conventional truth is simple and seems to stay close to Nagarjuna’s didactic intent, which was to call attention to the inadequacies and misconceptions hidden in conventional expressions and use them asa vehicle to realize the emptiness of things. Bhavavi- veka took a somewhat more complicated view of the matter. ‘As we have seen, Bhavaviveka was inclined temperamentally to include a large variety of contemporary views and practices into his Madhyamika system; he also wanted to make room for the possibility of positive philoso- Phical assertions. Both these goals would have been hard to realize if he had closely followed Nagirjuna’s method, with its concentration on conventional truth only asa vehicle for the expression of ultimate truth. Bhavaviveka needed new form of interpretation, and he found it in a new grammatical analysis, of the term paramartha, “ultimate truth.” He interpreted paramartha not as ultimate truth itself but as knowledge of ultimate truth."* In this way he was able to change paramartha from the content of teaching, which Nagarjuna329 discussed purely in linguistic terms, to a realm of experience that could be severed from vyavahdra, conventional truth, Paramartha and yyavahdra could thus be separated into two realms of existence, each of which had practices and doctrines appropriate only to it. The two were sill connected, but less in the lingustic way that Nagarjuna outlined in the Vigrahavydvartant than in ‘temporal and causal way. representing a slow progression from one level to another along the stages of the bodhisattva path. Bhavaviveka explains this process in the third chapter of the Tarkajsata [Vss. 10-11] Ultimate wisdom effects the complete negation of the network of conceptual thought and is motionless moving in the clear sky of ultimate truth (cartva), which is peaceful, directly experienced, without concepts or letters, and free from unity and diversity [Vss. 12-13] It is impossible to mount the pinnacle of the palace of truth without the ladder of conventional truth. For this reason, the mind, isolated in conventional truth, should become clear about the particular and general characteristics of things."° Bhavaviveka did not consider the process of climbing through conventional truth to be either easy or quick, ashe says in his commentary on these verses, “It is impossible to climb this palace suddenly. For without ascending the ladder of conventional knowledge for seven countless eons, the completion of the perfections, powers, and super-knowledges is impossible.” 2° Progress along the path could be quite leisurely and there was much time along the way to enjoy the subtleties ofthe conventional world.** By separating paramdrtha and vyavahara into two different realms of ex- perience in this way, linked only by a gradual progress along the path to per- fection, Bhavaviveka succeeded in the first part of his program, He created a realm of experience in which he could concentrate on the subjects of the con- ventional world that caught his interest, without having to worry at every ‘moment about applying Nagarjuna’ critique. That part of the Madhyamika ‘method belonged to the realm of ultimate truth and could be postponed indefinitely while one considered problems in the mundane realm. Bhavavi- vveka’s fascination with this realm had important consequences for historians of Indian philosophy; his diligence in collecting the details of other philoso- phical systems provided important evidence for the development of some of the Indian schools, 2? But what was the cost of this rehabilitation of con- ventional truth? Nagarjuna achieved great power and simplicity in his philoso- phical method by treating every question rigorously, as if it were an ultimate question. In doing this he showed that there were no areas of existence that were not subject to the corrosive effect of his critique. By separating a particular realm in which this critique, for practical purposes, did not apply, Bhavaviveka appears to have damaged the unity of Nagarjuna’s method and engaged in a subtle absolutizing process in which conventional truths are again established in their own right. The full consequences of this process will not be seen until330 Eckel we consider the efforts by Tsof-kha-pa and Candrakirti to explore its im- plications, but at least one problem will be apparent when we examine Bhava veka’s treatment of his second philosophical concern, the fashioning of positive philosophical assertions. We saw earlier that Bhavaviveka was troubled by the accusation that he, as a Madhyamika philosopher, was guilty of virandd. Now that we have seen Bhavaviveka’s method for separating the two levels of truth, we are in a position to examine the justification for his peculiar response to this charge. As we saw, Bhavaviveka responded by saying that he, in fact, did maintain a positive position of his own, namely, the emptiness of all things. In the scheme of Bhavaviveka’s separation of the two levels of truth, this claim would be quite reasonable if confined only to the first level; for it was on the conventional level that Bhavaviveka permitted himself the liberty of investigation into the maze of worldly knowledge. The difficulty is, however, that Bhdvaviveka eventually must bring himself, as a Madhyamika philosopher, to discuss ultimate truth, This presents him with a dilemma, Does he continue to make his positive assertions into the realm of ultimate, nonconceptual knowledge, or does he confine his assertions to the conventional realm and again risk the charge of being guilty of vitanda—this time on the matters of greatest importance to his philosophical school? If we look in both of Bhivaviveka’s major works, the Tarkajvéla and Prajkdpradipa, we find that he takes a rather ambivalent position on this question. In the Prajidpradipa, he was writing a commentary on Nagarjuna’s root text, and this fact alone seems to have restrained Bhdvaviveka in his treatment of assertions at the ultimate level. The particular passage of interest on this point is the commentary on verse 18:9 in which Nagarjuna purports to give “definition” of ultimate truth. Bhavaviveka uses this as an opportunity to deal again with the question of vitanda [Objection:} If you think that ultimate truth (‘artva) can be realized by com- pletely rejecting the intrinsic nature of things which others conceptually construct, then you must state a definition of it. Otherwise you are refuting Someone's position without establishing your own: and that is vitanda (Reply:] If the definition of ultimate truth can be expressed. it should be ex- pressed. But itis not an object to be expressed (abhidheva). However, in order {o give confidence to those who are just beginning, the following is said in terms of conceptual, discriminative knowledge. {Vs. 18: 9] Not catised by anything else, peaceful, not expressed by verbal diversity, non-conceptual, not diverse in’ meaning—this is the definition of ultimate truth (tava). [Commentary] Since itis non-conceptual,it isnot expressed by verbal diversity Since it not expressed by verbal diversity, itis in the sphere of non-conceptuai Knowledge. Since it is in the sphere of non-conceptual knowledge, it is not known by means of anything else. Words do not apply to something that is not known by means of anything else. For this reason, the nature of ultimate truth completely surpasses words. It cannot be an object to be expressed, but the statement which negates both the intrinsic nature and the specific characteristics of all things can make known the nature of ultimate truth It{the statement} is produced by a superimposition of syllables which conform to the non- ‘conceptual knowledge produced by the method of non-production. Therefore, since ultimate truth, which is actually directly known (svasamvedva), is taught here in an expedient way way (updya-dvarena), we do. in fact, express a de- definition of ultimate truth, Thus we are not guilty of vitanda, and your criticism, does not apply.2* Here, with some equivocation, Bhavaviveka manages to stay close to Nagarjuna. He admits that ultimate truth (tattva) cannot be directly expressed, but he says that one can, as an expedient,’ appear to give a definition of it. This, in his opinion, is enough to rebut the charge of vitandi In the third chapter of the Tarkajvald, where he lays out his own independent philosophical position, Bhavaviveka allows himself more liberty with Naj jjuna’s method. In this chapter he formulates some of the more characteristic «elements of his own technique by considering. series of objections toa syllogism (of the type (svatantra-anumaria) for which his school of Madhyamika Svatan- trika is named. The example he uses isa syllogism denying the intrinsic nature of the gross elements. We can formulate the syllogism in four steps: (1) earth, and so on. 2) do not have the intrinsic nature of elements, from the point of view of ultimate truth (paramarthatah), (G) because they are produced, (4) like consciousness Steps | and 2 constitute the assertion (pratiia) which Bhavaviveka uses to deal with the accusation that he is guilty of vitanda, Step 2, however, raises another difficult question, As the syllogism is formulated in this example, the con- clusion belongs not to the realm of conventional truth, where words and con- cepts are appropriate, but to the realm of ultimate truth. How, then, can Bhvaviveka allow himself to carry on conceptual thought in the ultimate realm? He deals with this problem in the following surprising way: [Objection:] Paramartha transcends all (conceptual] thought, and a negation of the intrinsic nature of things is in the domain of language. For this reason four negation fails, iRepiy‘} Paramrtha occurs in two forms. One of them is fee from volition transcendent, pure, and free from verbal diversity. The other is volitional, accords with the accumulation of knowledge and merit, clear, and possessed of the verbal diversity known as “worldly knowledge.”2* Bhivaviveka’s interpretation of the word paramdrtha allows him to do some- thing that he did not permit himself with the word rartva in the passage just quoted from the Prajndpradipa. He interprets paramartha as a compound ‘meaning “knowledge of ultimate truth.” This allowed him earlier to separate it from the experience of conventional truth: here it allows him to separate it into two different levels of experience of the same thing. One level is free from verbal diversity; the other is not. In this way, Bhivaviveka can maintain332 Eckel that, while ultimate truth (tattva) is one, the knowledge of ultimate truth (paramértha) is not. The resulting distinction in levels of experience allows hhim to carry on positive philosophical activity at the “ultimate” level without being concerned about the fact that such activity involves words and concepts. Bhavaviveka’s analysis of the word paramdrtha is thus a powerful tool in allowing him (o carry out his philosophical program. He can maintain nominal adherence to the written text of Nagarjuna’s Karikds and still permit himself to make positive philosophical assertions up to and within the realm of ultimate truth Bhivaviveka can claim a certain amount of success in adapting Nagarjuna’s method to the requirements of his own philosophical milieu. He gave up Nigarjuna’s prohibition against positive assertions, but he might well claim that this was @ minor sacrifice made to keep the rest of Nagarjuna’s critique intact. A more damaging charge against Bhivaviveka, however, might be that he violated the serious and fundamental prohibition against attributing intrinsic nature either to the words of @ statement or to the things to which they refer. Bhavaviveka did not discuss this point explicitly in either the Tarkajvala or the Prajidpradipa on anything other than the ultimate level: perhaps he was not aware that it would be an issue. In any case, itis suficient for our purposes in tracing the development of the early theories of language to know that a substantial portion of the Madhyamika tradition did consider Bhavaviveka guilty of this more serious charge. Candrakirti and Tsoii-kha-pa both felt that, by establishing conventional truth as an independent realm, Bhavaviveka had violated the most fundamental point of Nagirjuna’s method he had refuted intrinsic nature on the ultimate level, only to let it back into his account of language on the conventional level In sorting out Candrakirt’s arguments against Bhavaviveka’s view of language, we are critically dependent on Tsoi-kha-pa’s analysis of the issues between them. In the key passage in the Prasannapadd, where he attacks the use of svalak ana or “intrinsic identity” on the conventional level, Candrakirti fails to identify his opponent. This has led Western interpreters to the quite reasonable supposition that the opponent Candrakiti had in mind was not Bhvaviveka, who does not explicitly develop svalaksana as a substratum for his use of language, but the Buddhist logicians who do2* In the Legs-béad- Shii-po, however, Tsofi-kha-pa argues on the basis of certain passages in the Prajhdpradipa that Bhavaviveka made a tacit assumption of svalaksana on the conventional level#® Candrakirti actually attacks the common idea that language requires a realistic basis in the world to function effectively. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the argument is meant to oppose any Buddhist who thinks he can analyze language on a conventional level and find any more substantial reality behind it than he does at the ultimate level ‘That way of thinking is normally associated in Buddhist philosophy with schools like the Vaibhisikas or logicians who attempted in varying degrees333 to give a realistic account of language, but Bhavaviveka evidently slipped into this pattern as well when he distinguished so sharply between the two levels of truth, On the ultimate level, he maintained the emptiness of all things, although, as we have seen, he still permitted himself some freedom in making ultimate assertions—but on the conventional level he allowed language to function in the manner accepted by the other schools. TsoA-kha-pa explains how widespread he thought this pattern to be ‘What way of thinking assumes that things are established by intrinsic nature (svalaksana)? First, let us speak of the method of the philosophers. In_an expression like, “Ths person performed an action and experienced the result,” they investigate the meaning of the term “person” ( pudgala) by asking whether this person is the same as his aggregates (skandhas) or different. In either case, whether he is the same or different, they ean establish the person as the accu mulator of karma, and so forth. if he. cannot be established as either one, then they are not content with “person” as a mere term. In ths way, when the person is established by an investigation into that to which the term refers, the person is established by intrinsic identity. All Buddhist philosophers from ‘Vaibhasikas to Svatantnikas hold this view.*7 The issue between Candrakirti and Bhivaviveka, then, as Tsof-kha-pa sees it, is whether itis necessary to reintroduce an element of semantic realism into the conventional realm to anchor the use of language. Candrakirti contends that this is impossible. The argument between Candrakirti and the semantic realists, among whom ‘Tsoi-kha-pa includes Bhavaviveka, hinges on whether it is acceptable in conventional usage to make statements involving a svalaksana or “intrinsic identity” underlying the ordinary use of language. Candrakirti starts by having the opponent cite examples in an attempt to claim conventional justification for statements of this sort. The opponent says that a statement of the form, “Hardness is the intrinsic identity of earth,” is acceptable, even though the intrinsic identity is identical with the earth, because similar expressions are part of conventional usage. For example, one can say, “the body of a statue” or “the head of Rahu,” when the body is no different from the statue, and Rahu, @ demon who has no body, is no different from his head. Candral puts the opponent's argument this way: Even so, even though there is no qualifier (viiesana) apart from the body and head [which are qualified] in the cases, “body of a statue” or “head of Rau,” there is still a relationship of qualifier and qualified, Similarly, we can say “intinsi identity of earth” even hough there sno earth apart fom ts intrinsic identity Candrakirti replies: This is not so, because the cases are not similar. When the words “body” and “head” normally occur in grammatical connection with companion entities like “hand” or “mind,” the thought produced on the basis of the words “body”334 Eckel and “head” alone cartes an expectation ofthe companion entities in the form, “Whose body?” and “Whose head?” Then itis reasonable for someone else, who wants to rule out a connection with a qualifier, to deny such an expectation by using the qualifiers “statue” and “Rahu” in a conventional way. But when arth is impossible apart from hardness, a relationship of qualifier and qualified is impossible. ... Furthermore, the terms “statue” and “Rhu,” which are the qualifiers, actually exist as part of conventional usage, and are accepted without analysis, as in the conventional designation “person.” Therefore your example is incorrect.*® ‘There are actually two arguments here, one of which is somewhat stronger than the other. Candrakirti says frst that itis acceptable to qualify one word with a word that refers to the same thing only when there is some possibility of doubt about the fact that they are identical. There can be no doubt, however, that the intrinsic identity isthe same asthe earth; they are the same by definition, To say “intrinsic identity of earth,” then, is to violate conventional usage by using the two terms in a grammatical connection that is appropriate only if there is the possibility that they refer to different things. The second argument is stronger. In this Candrakirti says simply that “intrinsic identity” itself is an unacceptable term. It isa technical term masquerading as an ordinary word, and it is thus unacceptable as part of conventional usage in any grammatical connection at all Candrakirti’s argument is most interesting, perhaps, when he gives his own account of the way language functions on the conventional level. He insists, as Nagarjuna did, that he does not attempt to destroy the structure of ordinary language, as a semantic realist might suppose, but only to reestablish language ‘on the proper grounds, that is, on pure convention. Candrakirti outlines this theory in a reply to the further objection that, if his argument is correct, the expression “head of Rahu” can actually be no more acceptable than “intrinsic identity of earth,” since, in both cases, when the objects referred are analyzed, they are found to be identical. His reply is that the matter of “analysis” (viedra) is precisely what distinguishes ultimate from conventional truth. Conventional truth is only established unanalytically. When conventional terms are examined to find their true reference, they are no longer used conventionally. He explains this in the following passage: {Objection ] The examples are correct, because only the body [of the statue] and te head (of Raho ae actually copnized, since no other entities exist apart from them. {Reply } This is not the case; for such analysis isnot carried out in conventional usage, and without such analysis, conventional entities exist. When the dtman is analyzed as to whether it is different from [or the same as] matter, ete, it is not possible. But it does exist conventionally (loka-sanmvriya) with reference to the skandhas. The same is true of Rahu and the statue. Thus the example is not established. Likewise, in the case of earth, etc. after analysis, there is nothing to be qualified that is different from hardness, etc. [which are the alifirs), and a qualifier without something to be qualified is groundless Even 0, the masters have maintained that they exist in mutual dependence335 saraspardpeksasiddhih) as purely conventional. This must be accepted in just tba why herve, the cosventional ould ot reasonably be digingushe. It would become ultimate truth (taztva), not conventional *# The last few lines of this passage show what, in Tsoii-kha-pa’s view, was the real point of dispute between Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka. On one level, it is a dispute over language, but one does not have to go far beneath the surface to find the troublesome issue of two levels of truth. Candrakirti argues here that the attempt to establish an independent conventional realm, in which it is possible to carry out constructive philosophical reasoning, involves a mis- understanding of the distinction between the two levels. To give substantial reality to the conventional level, even with the laudable intention of promoting philosophical debate, was to transform it into a false ultimate. It was also to misunderstand the point of the discussion about language. To Candrakirti it was unnecessary to find some substantial reality to which words could refer to acquire their meaning, It was necessary only that they be used the way they are, Whatever meaning they had was acquired by a process of mutual depen- dence (paraspardpeksa siddhi), with one word depending for its meaning on the network of those that were used before it, In Candrakirt’s view, the move that Bhvaviveka made on the conventional level was the one that led other Indian philosophers into trouble. It was an attempt to make the technical terms of philosophy into more than conceptual constructions. The development of the different accounts of language in early Madhyamika philosophy is a complicated process, involving steps over which individual philosophers often strongly disagreed. Rather than be deterred by this diversity, however, we should accept it as a challenge to greater efforts of understanding. There are still formidable problems to be solved by both historians and com- parativists. The peculiar methods of Bhavaviveka, for instance, need much more thorough study before we can accurately assess his relation to Candrakirti and the Prasafigika school that has so dominated Western interpretations of Madhyamika. Madhyamika philosophy was not monolithic. A greater his- torical sophistication in understanding the differences between philosophers is an essential element, not only in understanding the philosophers themselves, but in developing true conceptual precision in the act of comparison NOTES 1. This article isthe revised version ofa paper rst presented at a workshop of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy of the American Philosophical Aswocition, Boston, Devember 28 1976, 2. Two particularly useful examples of ths kind of stud are: Jacques May, bouddhique de fa vacuite ofthe Absolut in the Madhyamaks Schoo.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1972) La philosophic Studia Phlosopica 18 (1958) 123-137; Jan de Jong, “The Problem ‘336 Eckel 3. My use ofthe phrase “early Madhyamika" is, ofcourse, somewhat arbitrary. In this artle, 1 will use it to refer tothe period in which the major diflerences between competing subschools were ist formulated. This covers the period from the time of Nagirjna inthe seond century ‘AD. to Candrakit in the late sith or early seventh 4. The bibliography of Western translations of the works of Nagarjuna and Candrakiet is well known and need not be recited here. The available works of Buddhapdlita and Bhivaviveka are perhaps les well known. A partial translation of chapter 2 of Buddhapilita’s commentary is available in, Musashi Tachikawa, "A Study of Buddh pilita’s Milamdhyamakyri,(1)" Bulletin of the Faculty of Leuers of Nagoya University 8 (1974)-1-19, Chapter 1 of Bhivavveka's Projpradipa is available in, Yuichi Kajiya hvavveka’s Prajtdpradipa (1 Kapitl)” Wiener Zetschifi fr die Kunde Sd. nd Ostasions 17 (1963):37-62 and 8 (1968):100-130. Portions of Bhivaviveka's Madhvamatakrdayakanikas (verses) and Tarkajiald (commentary) have been translated in, V. V. Gokhale, “The Second (Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakalrdaya (Taking the Vow of an Ascetic," Indo-ranian Journal 14 (1972): 40-48: V. V. Gokhale, “*Mastes of Buddhism Adore the Brahman Through Non= adoration” Bhavya, Madiyamakahrdaya, 11),” Indo-Iranian Journal 5 (1961-1962): 271-275: V. V. Gokhale, “The Vedinta Philosophy Described by Bhavya in His Madhyamatalydaya,” ‘Indo-iranian Journal? (1988) 165-180; André Bareau, “Tes tates su les sectes bouddhiques, e pari," Journol Asitigue 244 (1950) 167-199: Shotaro lida, An Introduction to Svitanirika ‘Maahyamika, University of Wisconsin Ph.D, dissertation (Ann Arbor, Mich: University Micro- films 1968); hereafter cited as lida, dissertation 5 See particularly Nigisjna’s Madhvamakakarikas 24: 8-10, found in Louis dela Valle Poussin, ed.. Milamadhyamakakankas (Madivamaka Sitra) de Nagdrjuna avec la Prasarnspad Commeniaire de Candrakii, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol 4 (St, Petersburg. 1913), pp. 492-494: hereafter cited as Prasannapada. 6. E.H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst, eds, “The Vigrhayavarton’ of Nigirjuna with the Author's Commentary,” Melanges chinois et bouddhigue 9 (1988-1952):108; hereafter cited as Vigrahayarrton 7. Vigrahayydvartan,p. 108 (translations ate mine unless otherwise noted), 8. Vigrahoyydvaran, p. 115, 9, Vigrahovyavartant p. 122. 10. Vigraharydvartan.p. 127 1, Vigrahorvavartant, pp. 148-147 12. Kida, dissertation, p. 86. 1B. Nydasitra 1.23: sa praipakyo-sthapan-hinovtanda. The ext of this stra with commen- ‘aries can be found in Anantalal Thakur, ed, Nydyadariana of Gautama, Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text No. 20, vol. ! (Darbhanga, 1967), p. 628, Thee has been disagreement over whether the Midhyamikas were actually accused of vitanda. Ina recent arile (*Madhyamika et Vai- snika,” Jounal Asiaique 263 (1975|:99-102), Kamaleswar Bhattacharya argues that Mad hyamikas were not guilty of vitandd according tothe strict definition ofthe txm given by the Nyda commentators. Uddyotakira, for insanee, explains that tarda means the absence of proof (cthipona) of counterposition rather than absence of the counterpostin itself, In his replies to the acusation of viindd, however, Bhivaviveka does not difereniate between sthpand and pratpokin the sublle manner favored by the later commentators. He thought the charge suf- Ciently applicable to his Midhyamika method to require serious refutation. 14, See notes 15 and 23 herein 15, Tibetan text in Kida, dissertation, pp. 109-110 (translation mine unles otherwise noted), 16. Vigrahavyavartan,p 127 17. Giuseppe Tues, “The Raindvali of Nagarjuna” Journal ofthe Royal Asaic Society (1934) 18, Bhavaviveka gives his grammatical analysis ofthe term paramartha in both the Tarkaala and the Prajtdpradipa. The appropriate passage from the Tarkajvla is available in ida, dsser- {ation, pp. 101-102. The following isa translation of a sine analysis From chapter 24 of the Prajhépriipa. “Paramartha isthe “supreme object (Karmadharaya compouns) because iis both supreme (parama) and an obec (arth). Or isthe “objet ofthe supreme’ tarpurusa compound) because iis the object of supreme, non-conceptual knowledge. It is defined as ‘not realizable337 through anything else’ Because paramriha i true, i is ulimate truth’ (paramatha-sarya), and lays, in every way. remains the same. Non-conceptual knowledge, which possesses that a5 its object by the method of having no object (iayahdvanayena, i also paramdrtha because its “that whose object is ultimate” [bohurii compound], ” Tibetan text in Daisetz T, Suzuki, ed The Tibetan Trptaka: Peking Edition (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Insitute, 1957), val 95, p. 246 (folio Toka 286a-b); hereafter cited as Peking Tripttak, 19, Sanskrit tex in lida, dissertation, pp. 82-83. sin the Tarkgal, these subtleties included: “grammar (aksara- astra), palmistry (mudra). alchemy (), medical science (kisi, arithmetic (ganand). charms (mania), spells (dy, ete" (das translation, dissertation, p. 86) 22. This e particulary true for Vedints, where lite other evidence is available from this early period, and for the eighteen schools of Nikaya Buddhism. See V. V. Gokhale, “The Vedin Philosophy Described by Bhavya in His Madhsomakalrdaya,” Indo-lranian Journal 2 (1958): 165-180; André Bareau, “Trois tratés sur les setes bouddhigues, Hl pari,” Journal Asianigue 244 (1930): 167-199. 23, Peking Triptako, vo. 98, p. 227 (fob Teko 2374-b). 24, Tibetan text in lid, dissertation, pp, 107-108. 25. Th. Stcherbatsy, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad, 1927), pp. 9-136. 26, Tsoi-kha-pa, Drovies-lep-biad-sitpo (Varanasi: Gelugpa Students’ Welfare Commitee, 1973). In all my observations about Tsof-kha-pa | am indebted to Acarya T. T. Doboom Tulku. ‘sho ist read this text with me, and to Professor Robert A.F. Thurman, who kindly made available his unpublished translation, W1 Legebiad-sinpo,p. 143 28, Prasannapadi,p. 66 29. Prasonmapada. p67