TodayisFriday,August04,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L47799May21,1943

AdministrationoftheestateofAgripinoNeriyChavez.ELEUTERIONERI,ETAL.,petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIAAKUTINANDHERCHILDREN,respondents.

OzamisandCapistranoforpetitioners.
Gullas,Leuterio,TannerandLaputforrespondents.

MORAN,J.:

This is a case where the testator in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage, the herein respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. This
Courtannulledtheinstitutionofheirsanddeclaredatotalintestacy.

Amotionforreconsiderationhasbeenfiledbytherespondentsontheground(1)thatthereisnopreteritionasto
thechildrenofthefirstmarriagewhohavereceivedtheirsharesinthepropertyleftbythetestator,and(2)that,even
assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but
simplythereductionofthebequestmadetothem.

1.ThefindingsofthetrialcourtandthoseoftheCourtofAppealsarecontrarytorespondents'firstcontention.The
childrenofthefirstmarriageareEleuterio,Agripino,Agapita,Getulia(whodiedalittlelessthaneightyearsbefore
thedeathofherfatherAgripinoNeri,leavingsevenchildren),RosarioandCelerina.

As to Eleuterio, the trial court said that "it is not, therefore, clear that Eleuterio has received his share out of the
propertiesleftbyhisfather."ItistruethatEleuterioappearstohavereceived,asadonationfromhisfather,parcel
of land No. 4, but the question of whether there has been a donation or not is apparently left for decision in an
independentaction,andtothateffectIgnaciaAkutinhasbeenappointedspecialadministratrixforthepurposeof
institutingsuchaction.

WithrespecttoAgripinoandAgapita,theparcelsoflandwhichtheyhaveoccupied,accordingtothetrialCourt,"are
apartofpubliclandwhichhadbeenoccupiedbyAgripinoNeriChaves,and,therefore,werenotapartoftheestate
ofthelatter."

ConcerningGetuliawhodiedabouteightyearsbeforethedeathofherfatherAgripinoNeri,thetrialCourtfoundthat
"neitherGetulianorherheirsreceivedanyshareoftheproperties."

AndwithrespecttoRosarioandCelerina,thetrialCourtsaidthat"itdoesnotappearclear,therefore,thatCelerina
andRosarioreceivedtheirsharesintheestateleftbytheirfatherAgripinoNeriChaves."

Thisisinconnectionwiththeproperty,realorpersonal,leftbythedeceased.Astomoneyadvances,thetrialCourt
found:

It is contented, furthermore, that the children of Agripino Neri Chaves in his first marriage received money
from their father. It appears that Nemesio Chaves is indebted in the amount of P1,000 Agripino, in the
amountofP500asappearsinExhibits14and15Getulia,intheamountofP155asappearsinExhibit16,
17,and18CelerinaintheamountofP120asappearsinExhibit19,19Aand19B.

FromthesefindingsofthetrialCourtitisclearthatAgapita,RosarioandthechildrenofGetuliahadreceivedfrom
thetestatornopropertywhatsoever,personal,realorincash.

Butclause8ofthewillisinvokedwhereinthetestatormadethestatementthatthechildrenbyhisfirstmarriagehad
alreadyreceivedtheirsharesinhispropertyexcludingwhathehadgiventhemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroubles
andthemoneytheyhadborrowedfromhimwhichhecondonedinthewill.Since,however,thisisanissueoffact
triedbytheCourtofFirstInstance,andwearereviewingthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsuponaquestionof
lawregardingthatissue,wecanrelyonlyuponthefindingsoffactmadebythelatterCourt,whichareasfollows:

SincealltheparcelsthatcorrespondedtoAgripinoNeriyChavesarenowintheadministrator'spossession,
asappearsintheinventoryfiledincourt,itisclearthatthepropertyofthedeceasedhasremainedintactand
thatnoportionthereofhasbeengiventothechildrenofthefirstmarriage.

xxxxxxxxx

It is stated by the court and practically admitted by the appellants that a child of the first marriage named
Getulia,orherheirsafterherdeath,didnotreceiveanyshareofthepropertyofherfather.

ItistruethatinthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsthereisalsothefollowingparagraphs:

AsregardsthatlargeparceloflandadjoiningparcelNo.1,itiscontendedthatafterthecourthaddeniedthe
registrationthereof.AgripinoNeriyChavesabandonedthesaidlandandthatlateronsomeofthechildrenof
the first marriage possessed it, thereby acquiring title and interest therein by virtue of occupation and not
throughinheritance.Itisnottruethatthisparcelcontaining182.6373hectaresisnowassessedinthenames
of some of the children of the first marriage, for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11g, the
ownersofthepropertyareAgapitaNerideChavesyHermanos.Apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedto
bethepropertynotonlyofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage.

ThisparagraphisbutacorroborationofthefindingmadebytheCourtofAppealsthatnopropertyhaseverbeen
advancedbythetestatortothechildrenbyhisfirstmarriage.ThelargeparceloflandadjoiningparcelNo.1was
alleged by the children of the second marriage to have been advanced by the testator to the children by his first
marriage but the Court of Appeals belied this claim. "It is not true," says that Court, "that this parcel containing
182.6373hectaresisnowassessedinthenamesofsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriage,forasshownonTax
DeclarationNo.9395,Exhibit11g,theownersofthepropertyareAgapitaNerideChavesyHermanos,"thatis,the
childrenofbothmarriages.AndtheCourtofAppealsaddedthat"apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedtobethe
propertynotonlyofthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebutalsoofthoseofthesecondmarriage,"whichisanotherway
ofstatingthatthepropertycouldnothavebeenadvancedbythetestatortothechildrenbythefirstmarriagewould
notlayaclaimonit.

Weconclude,therefore,thataccordingtothefindingsoffactmadebytheCourtofAppeals,thetestatorleftallhis
property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and that without expressly disinheriting the
childrenbyhisfirstmarriage,heleftallhispropertybyuniversaltitletothechildrenbyhissecondmarriage,heleft
nothingtothemor,atleast,someofthem.Thisis,accordingly,acaseofpreteritiongovernedbyarticle814ofthe
CivilCode,whichprovidesthattheinstitutionofheirsshallbeannulledandintestatesuccessionshouldbedeclared
open.

2.Uponthesecondquestionpropoundedinthemotionforreconsideration,respondentsseemtoagreethatarticle
814oftheCivilCodeisthelawapplicablebut,intheirdiscussionastotheeffectofpreterition,theyconfusearticle
814witharticles817and851andotherarticlesoftheCivilCode.Thesethreearticlesread:

ART.814.Thepreteritionofoneorofalloftheforcedheirsinthedirectline,whetherlivingattheexecutionof
the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heirs but the legacies and
bettermentsshallbevalidinsofarastheyarenotinofficious.

Thepreteritionofthewidowerorwidowdoesnotannultheinstitutionbutthepersonomittedshallretainall
therightsgrantedtohimbyarticles834,835,836,and837ofthisCode.

ART. 817. Testamentary dispositions which diminish the legitimate of the forced heirs shall be reduced on
petitionofthesameinsofarastheyareinofficiousorexcessive.

ART. 851. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contested, is not shown, or which is not one of those stated in the four following articles, shall annul the
institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person but the legacies, betterments, and
othertestamentarydispositionsshallbevalidinsofarastheyarenotprejudicialtosaidlegitime.

Thefollowingexamplewillmakethequestionclearer:Thetestatorhastwolegitimatesons,AandB,andinhiswill
heleavesallhispropertytoA,withtotalpreteritionofB.Uponthesefacts,shallweannulentirelytheinstitutionof
heirinfavorofAanddeclareatotalintestacy,orshallwemerelyrefusethebequestleftA,givinghimtwothirds,
thatisonethirdoffreedisposalandonethirdofbetterments,plusonehalfoftheotherthirdasstrictlegitime,and
awardingBonlytheremainingonehalfofthestrictlegitime?Ifwedothefirst,weapplyarticle814ifthesecond,
weapplyarticles851or817.Butarticle851appliesonlyincasesofunfoundeddisinheritance,andallareagreed
thatthepresentcaseisnotoneofdisinheritancebutofpreterition.Article817ismerelyageneralruleinapplicable
tospecificcasesprovidedbylaw,suchasthatofpreteritionordisinheritance.Themeaningofarticles814and851,
their difference and philosophy, and their relation to article 817, are lucidly explained by Manresa in the following
manner:

Cuandolalegitimanoesusufructuria,comoocurreenlosdemascasos,lapretericionnopuedemenosde
alteraresencialmentelainstituciondeheredero.Estahadeanularse,peroentodooenparte,estoes,solo
encuantoperjudiqueelderechodellegitimariopreterido?Elarticulo814optaporlaprimersolucion,yaque
hemosdeatenermosestrictmentealtestodelaleymientrasqueelarticulo851,encasosanlogos,optapor
lasegunda.

En efecto la desheredacion sin justa causa no produce el efecto de desheredar. El heredero conserva
derecho a su legitima, pero nada mas que a su legitima. Los legados, las merjoras, si las hay, y aun la
instituciondeheredero,sonvalidasencuantonoperjudiquenalherederoforzoso.

La diferencia se notara perfectamente con un ejemplo. Un solteron, sin decendientes ni ascendientes

legitimos,hacetestamentoinstituyendoporherederoaunparientelejano.Despuesreconoceunhijonatural,
o se casa y tiene descendencia, y muere sin modificar su disposicion testamentaria. A su muerte, el hijo
natural,oloslegitimos,fundadoseenlanulidadtotaldelainstitucion,conarregloalarticulo814,pidentoda
laherencia.Enelcasodelarticulo851solopodrianpodrianpedirsulegitima.Preterdos,adquierenderecho
atododesheredados,sololescorrespondeuntercioodostercios,segunelcaso.

En el fondo la cuestion es indentica. El testador puede siempre disponer a su arbitrio de la parte libre. El
legitimario,contralavoluntadexpresadeltestdor,solotienederechoasulegitima.Preteridoodesheredado
sin justa causa la legitima. Preterido o desheredado sin justa causa la legitma es suya. Desheredado o
preterido,laporcionlibrenolecorresponde,cuandoeltestadorlaasignaaotro.Logicamentenocabequeel
legitmario,encasodepretericion,recibatodoslosbienescuandoeltestadorhayadispuestodeellosatitulo
deherencia,ynocuandohayadispuestodelterciolebreatitulodelegado.

Cual es la razon de esta differencia? En la generalidad de los casos puede fundarse el precepto en la
presuntavoluntaddeltestador.Este,aldesheredar,revelaqueexistealgunarazonamotivoqueleimpulsaa
obrar asi podra no ser bastante para privar al heredero de su legitima, pero siempre ha de estimarse
sufficiente para privarle del resto de la herencia, pues sobre esta no puede pretender ningun derecho el
desheredad. El heredero preterido no ha sido privado expresamente de nada el testador, en los casos
normales,obrasipordescuidooporerror.Hemosvistountestamentoenelquenoseinstitulaherederaa
una hija monja, por creer la testadora que no podia heredar. En otros caos se ignora la existencia de un
descendienteodeunascendiente.Cuandoelpreteridoesunapersonaquehanacidodespuesdemuertoel
testador o despues de hecho el testamento, la razon es aun mas clara la omision ha de presumirse
involuntariaeltestadordebesuponersequehubierainstituidoherederoaesapersonasihubieraexistidoal
otorgarseeltestamento,ynosoloencuantoalalegitima,sinoentodalaherencia,casodenohaberotros
herederosforzosos,yenigualesterminosquelosdemasherederosnomejoradosdeunmodeexpreso.

Laopinioncontrariapuedetambiendefederse,suponiendoquelaleyanulaeltitulodeheredero,masnoen
absolutolaparticipacionenelcaudalqueasicomoalexceptuarlamejoraserefiereatodoelterciooala
partedeelquehayadistribuidoelcausante,alexceptuarloslegadosserefiersealapartelibredequehaya
dispuestoelmismotestador,considerandocomounsimplelegatariodeesaporcionalapersonaaquienel
testador designo como heredero. Abonaria esta solucion el articulo 817, al declarar que las disposiciones
testamentaria que menguan la legitima de los herederos forzosos han de reducirse en cuanto fueren
inoficiosas,puesamparadoenestearticuloelherederovoluntario,puedepretenderqueladisposicionasu
favorsearespetadaencuatonoperjudiquealaslegitimas.

La jurisprudencia no ha resuelto de frente esta cuestion, porque no se le ha presentado en los terminos

propuestosperohademonstradosucriterio.

HemoscitadolasResolucionesdelaDireccionde30deoctubrede1896yde20demayode1893.Enla
primera se decide con valentia, con arreglo al texto expreso del articulo 814 la institucion de heredero se
anula en absoluto, y se abre para toda la herencia la succesion intestada. En la segunda se rehuye la
cuestion,fundandoseencircunstanciassecundarias.Enelarticulosiguienteexaminaremoslasentenciade
16deenerode1895.

Lainterpretacionquerectamentesedeprendedelart814,esladequesolovalen,yesoencuantonosean
inoficiosas,lasdisposicioneshechasatitulodelegadoamejora.Encuantoalainstituciondeheredero,se
anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo, o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el
articulo851,enelqueseexpresaqueseanularaainstituciondeherederoencuantoperjudiquealalegitima
del desheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo, como
especialenelcasoquelemotiva,rigeconpreferenciaal817.(6Manresa,3.aed.,pags.351353.)(Emphasissupplied).

ThefollowingopinionofSanchezRomanistothesameeffectanddispelsallpossibledoubtonthematter:
 Laconsecuenciadelaanulaciononulidaddelainstituciondeherederoporpretericiondeuno,variosotodos
los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion entestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el
testadorquecometelapretericion,hubieredispuestodetodoslosbienesportitulouniversaldeherenciaen
favor de los hrederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto
legal del articulo 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anularia la institucion de
heredero".Ciertoesquelapreericionestaintorducida,comoremediojuridico,porsusefectos,ennombrey
paragarantiadelaintergridaddelalegitimadelosherederosforzososycomoconsecuenciadelprecepto
del813,deque"eltestadornopodraprivaralosherederosdesulegitima,sinoenloscasosexpresamente
determinadosporlaley",quesonlosdedesheredacionconjustacausa.

Cierto es, tambien, que en la desheredacion es muy otro el criterio del Codigo y que su formula legal, en
cuanto a sus efectos, es de alcance mas limitado, puesto que, conforme al articulo 851, la desheredacion
hechasincondicionesdevalidez,"anularalainstituciondeheredero",lomismoquelapretericion,perosolo
"en cuanto perjudique la desheredado de modo ilegal e ineficaz salvedad o limitacion de los efectos de
nulidad de la institucion de los efectos de nulidad de la institucion hecha en el testmento, que no existe,
segunsehavistoenel814,porelquesedeclara,enformageneraleindistinta,queanularalainstitucionde
heredero sin ninguna atencuacion respecto de que perjudique o no, total o parcialmente, la cuantia de la
legitimadelherederoforzosoenlinearecta,preterido.

Elresultadodeamboscriteriosyformulaslegales,manifestamentedistintas,tienequesermuydiverso.Enel
casodelapretericion,propiamentetalototalpuessifueraparcialyseladejaraalgoalherederoforzoso
porcualquiertitulo,aunqueseealgonofueresuficientealpagodesusderechosdelegitima,noseriacaso
de pretericion, regulado por el articulo 814, sino de complemento, regido por el 815 y la institucion no se
anularia sino que se modificaria o disminuiria en lo necesario para dicho complente o de institucion de
herederoentodalaherencia,alanularselainstitucion,porefectodelapreteridoopreteridos,respectode
toda la herencia, tambien mientras qeu en el caso de desheredacion y de institucion en la totalidad de la
herencia,tambienmientrasqueenelcasodedesheredacionydeinstitucionenlatotalidaddelaherenciaa
favordeotrapersona,soloseanularaenparteprecisapranoperjudicarlalegitimadeldeshersado,queaun
siendo en este caso la lata, si no hubo mejoras, porque no se establecieron o porque los intituidos eran
herederos voluntarios, dejaria subsistente la institucion en la poarte correspoondiente al tercio de libre
disposicion.Asiesquelospreteridos,enelsupuestoindicado,sucedenabintestatoentodo,enconcurrencia
conlosdemasherederosforzososollamadosprolaleyalabintestatolosdesheredados,unicamenteendos
terciosoenunooenunotansolo,enlahipotesisdehaberseordernadomejoras.

En cambio, ni por la desheredacion ni por la pretericion pierde su fuerza el testamento, en cuanto a dicho
tercio libre, is se trata dedescendientes o la mitad, si se trata de ascendientes, ya desheredados, ya
preteridos,proque,niporelunoniporelotromedio,seanulamasquelainstituciondeheredero,engeneral,
y totalmente por la pretericion, y solo en cuanto perjudique a la legitima del desheredado por la
desheredacionperosubsistiendo,enamboscasos,todasacquellasotrasdisposicionesquenoserefeirena
la institucion de heredero y se hallen dentro del limite cuantitativo del tercio o mitad de libre disposicion,
segunquesetratededescendientesoascendientes,preteridosodesheredados.

Lainvocaciondelarticulo817paramodificarestosefectosdelapretericion,procurandolimitarlaanulacion
de la institucion de herederos solo en cuanto perjudique a la legitima, fundadose en que dicho articulo
establece que "las disposiciones testamentarias que menguan la legitma de los herederos forzosos se
reduciran, a peticion de estos, en lo que fueren inoficiosas o excesivas," no es aceptable ni puede variar
acquellos resultados, porque es un precepto de caracter general en toda otra clase de dsiposiciones
testamentariasqueproduzcanelefectodemenguarlalegitima,quenopuedeanteponerse,ensuaplicacion,
alasdeindoleespecialparasealarlosefectosdelapretericionodeladesheredacion,reguladosprivativay
respectivamenteporlosarticulos814y851.

No obstante la pretericion, "valdran las mandas y legados en cuanto no sean inoficiosas." El texto es
terminanteynonecesitamayorexplicacion,despuesdelodicho,quesupropialetra,anoserparaobservar
que constituye una confimacion indudable de los efectos de la pretericion, en cuanto alcanzan solo, pero
totalmente,alaanulaciondelainstituciondeheredero,peronoaladelasmandasymejorasencuantono
seanpreteridoscalficativodetales,comosinonimolegaldeexcessivas,queenotrosarticulos,comoel817,
establecelaley.(6SanchezRoman,Volumen2.opags.11401141.)

These comments should be read with care if we are to avoid misunderstanding. Manresa, for instance, starts
expoundingthemeaningofthelawwithanillustration.Hesaysthatincaseofpreterition(article814).thenullityof
theinstitutionofheirsistotal,whereasincaseofdisinheritance(article851),thenullityispartial,thatis,insofaras
the institution affects the legitime of the disinherited heirs. "Preteridos, adquieren derecho atodo desheredados,
sololescorrespondeuntercioodostercios,segunelcaso."Hethenproceedstocommentuponthewisdomofthe
distinctionmadebylaw,givingtwoviewsthereon.Hefirstlaystheviewcontrarytothedistinctionmadebylaw,then
theargumentsinsupportofthedistinction,andlastlyapossibledefenseagainstsaidarguments.Andafterstating
thattheSpanishjurisprudencehasnotasyetdecidedsquarelythequestion,withanallusion]totworesolutionsof
the Spanish Administrative Direction, one in favor of article 814 and another evasive, he concludes that the
constructionwhichmayrightlybegiventoarticle814isthatincaseofpreterition,theinstitutionofheirsisnullin
totowhereas in case of disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the legitime of which the disinherited
heirshavebeenillegallydeprived.Hefurthermakesitclearthatincasesofpreterition,thepropertybequeathedby
universaltitledtotheinstitutedheirsshouldnotbemerelyreducedaccordingtoarticle817,butinstead,intestate
succession should be opened in connection therewith under article 814, the reason being that article 814, "como
especialenelcasoquelemotiva,rigeconpreferenciaal817."SanchezRomanisofthesameopinionwhenhe
said:"Lainvocaciondelarticulo817paramodificarestosefectosdelapretecion,procurandolimitarlaanulacionde
lainstituciondeherederosoloencuantoperjudquealalegitima,fundandoseenquedichoarticuloestableceque
"las disposiciones testmentarias que menguan la legitima de los herederos forzosos se fueren inoficisosas o
excesivas,"noesaceptablenipuedevariaraquellosresultados,porqueesunpreceptodecaractergeneralentoda
otra clase de disposiciones testmentarias que produzcan el efecto de menguar la legitima, que no puede
anteponerse, en su aplicacion, a las de indole especial para sealar los efectos de la pretericon o de la
desheredacion,reguladosprivativayrespectivamenteporlosarticulos814y851.

Of course, the annulment of the institution of heirs in cases of preterition does not always carry with it the
ineffectiveness of the whole will. Neither Manresa nor Sanchez Roman nor this Court has ever said so. If, aside
fromtheinstitutionofheirs,thereareinthewillprovisionsleavingtotheheirssoinstitutedortootherpersonssome
specific properties in the form of legacies or mejoras, such testamentary provisions shall be effective and the
legaciesandmejorasshallberespectedinsofarastheyarenotinofficiousorexcessive,accordingtoarticle814.In
the instant case, however, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased
having been left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. The effect, therefore, of annulling the
institutionofheirswillbenecessarilytheopeningofatotalintestacy.

Butthetheoryisadvancedthatthebequestmadebyuniversaltitledinfavorofthechildrenbythesecondmarriage
shouldbetreatedaslegadoandmejoraand,accordingly,itmustnotbeentirelyannulledbutmerelyreduced.This
theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of
institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly,thentheprovisionsofarticles814and851regardingtotalorpartialnullityoftheinstitution,wouldbe
absolutelymeaninglessandwillneverhaveanyapplicationatall.Andtheremainingprovisionscontainedinsaid
articleconcerningthereductionofinofficiouslegaciesorbettermentswouldbeasurplusagebecausetheywouldbe
absorbedbyarticle817.Thus,insteadofconstruing,wewouldbedestroyingintegralprovisionsoftheCivilCode.

Thedestructiveeffectofthetheorythusadvancedisduemainlytoafailuretodistinguishinstitutionofheirsfrom
legaciesandbetterments,andageneralfromaspecialprovision.Withreferencetoarticle814,whichistheonly
provisionmaterialtothedispositionofthiscase,itmustbeobservedthattheinstitutionofheirsisthereindealtwith
asathingofseparateanddistinctfromlegaciesorbetterment.Andtheyareseparateanddistinctnotonlybecause
theyaredistinctlyandseparatelytreatedinsaidarticlebutbecausetheyareinthemselvesdifferent.Institutionof
heirsisabequestbyuniversaltitleofpropertythatisundetermined.Legacyreferstospecificpropertybequeathed
byaparticularorspecialtitle.Thefirstisalsodifferentfromabettermentwhichshouldbemadeexpresslyassuch
(article828).Theonlyinstanceofimpliedbettermentrecognizedbylawiswherelegaciesaremadewhichcannot
beincludedinthefreeportion(article828).Butagainaninstitutionofheirscannotbetakenasalegacy.

It is clear, therefore, that article 814 refers to two different things which are the two different objects of its two
differentprovisions.Oneoftheseobjectscannotbemadetomergeintheotherwithoutmutilatingthewholearticle
withallitsmultifariousconnectionswithagreatnumberofprovisionsspreadthroughouttheCivilCodeonthematter
of succession. It should be borne in mind, further, that although article 814 contains who different provisions, its
specialpurposeistoestablishaspecificruleconcerningaspecifictestamentaryprovision,namely,theinstitutionof
heirsinacaseofpreterition.Itsotherprovisionregardingthevalidityoflegaciesandbettermentsifnotinofficiousis
amerereiterationofthegeneralrulecontainedinotherprovisions(articles815and817)andsignifiesmerelythatit
also applies in cases of preterition. As regards testamentary dispositions in general, the general rule is that all
"testamentarydispositionwhichdiminishthelegitimeoftheforcedheirsshallbereducedonpetitionofthesamein
sofarastheyareinofficousorexcessive"(article817).Butthisgeneralruledoesnotapplytothespecificinstance
ofatestamentarydispositioncontaininganinstitutionofheirsinacaseofpreterition,whichismadethemainand
specificsubjectofarticle814.Insuchinstance,accordingtoarticle814,thetestamentarydispositioncontainingthe
institution of heirs should be not only reduced but annulled in its entirety and all the forced heirs, including the
omittedones,areentitledtoinheritinaccordancewiththelawofintestatesuccession.Itisthusevidentthat,if,in
construing article 814, the institution of heirs therein dealt with is to be treated as legacies or betterments, the
special object of said article would be destroyed, its specific purpose completely defeated, and in that wise the
special rule therein established would be rendered nugatory. And this is contrary to the most elementary rule of
statutoryconstruction.Inconstruingseveralprovisionsofaparticularstatute,suchconstructionshallbeadoptedas
will give effect to all, and when general and particular provisions are inconsistent, the latter shall prevail over the
former.(ActNo.190,secs.287and288.)

ThequestionhereinpropoundedhasbeensquarelydecidedbytheSupremeCourtofSpaininacasewhereina
bequestbyuniversaltitlewasmadewithpreteritionofheirsandthetheorywasadvancedthattheinstitutedheirs
shouldbetreatedaslegatarios.TheSupremeCourtofSpainsaid:

El articulo 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando
parezca,yenalguncasopudieraser,masomenosequitativa,porqueunanulidadnosignificaenDerecho
sinolasuposiciondequeelhechooelactonoseharealizado,debiendo,porlotanto,procedersesobretal
base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testmento donde fate la institucion, es obligado llamar a los
herederosforzososentodocaso,comohabriaquellamaralosdeotraclase,cuandoeltestadornohubiese
distribuidotodossusbienesenlegados,siendotantomasobligadaestaconsecuencialegalcuantoque,en
materiadetestamentos,sabidoes,seguntienedeclaradolajurisprudencia,conrepeticion,quenobastaque
seaconocidalavoluntaddequeintestasiestavoluntadnoapareceenlaformayenlascondicionesquela
ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpertacion arbitraria, dentro del
derechopositivo,reputarcomolegatarioaunherederocuyainstitucionfueseanuladaconpretextodeque
esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para
modificar la ley, peo que no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamnetificaion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay rason para convertir este juico en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por
esteprocedimientoloqueellegislatorquiereestablecer.(6SanchezRoman,Volumen2.o,p.1138.)

It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the
CodeofCivilProcedure,andthatthe"heir"underthelatterCodeisnolongerpersonallyliableforthedebtsofthe
deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code, should his acceptance be pure and simple, and from all
these the conclusion is drawn that the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code regarding the total nullity of the
institutionofheirshasbecomeobsolete.Thisconclusioniserroneous.Itconfusesformwithsubstance.Itmustbe
observed,inthisconnection,thatinconstruingandapplyingaprovisionoftheCivilCode,suchmeaningofitswords
andphrasesashasbeenintendedbytheframersthereofshallbeadopted.Ifthusconstrueditisinconsistentwith
theprovisionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedure,thenitshallbedeemedrepealedotherwiseitisinforce.Repealsby
implicationarenotfavoredbythecourtsandwhentherearetwoactsuponthesamesubject,effectshouldbegiven
tobothifpossible(Posadasvs.NationalCityBank,296U.S.,497).Theword"heir"asusedinarticle814ofthe
CivilCodemaynothavethemeaningthatithasundertheCodeofCivilProcedure,butthisinnowisecanpreventa
bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the subjectmatter of article 814 of the Civil Code.
Again,itmayalsobetruethatheirsundertheCodeofCivilProceduremayreceivethatbequestonlyafterpayment
ofdebtsleftbythedeceasedandnotbeforeasundertheCivilCode,butthismayhaveabearingonlyuponthe
questionastowhensuccessionbecomeseffectiveandcaninnowaydestroythefactthatsuccessionmaystillbe
byuniversalorspecialtitle.Sinceabequestmaystillbemadebyuniversaltitleandwithpreteritionofforcedheirs,
its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil
Procedure. What is important and is the basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its
possiblenamenorthemomentofitseffectivenessundertheCodeofCivilProcedure.

Furthermore,therewereintheCodeofCivilProceduresectionsNos.755and756whichread:

SEC.755.Shareofchildbornaftermakingwill.Whenachildofatestatorisbornafterthemakingofawill,
andnoprovisionisthereinmadeforhim,suchchildshallhavethesameshareintheestateofthetestatoras
if he had died intestate and share of such child shall be assigned to him as in cases of intestate estates,
unlessitisapparentfromthewillthatitwastheintentionofthetestatorthatnoprovisionshouldbemadefor
suchchild.

SEC.756.Shareofchildorissueofchildomittedfromwill.Whenatestatoromitstoprovideinhiswillfor
anyofhischildren,orforissueofadeceasedchild,anditappearsthatsuchomissionwasmadebymistake,
oraccident,suchchild,ortheissueofsuchchild,shallhavethesameshareintheestateofthetestatorasif
hehaddiedintestate,tobeassignedtohimasinthecaseofintestateestates.

ItistheseprovisionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedurethathaveaffectedsubstantiallyarticles814and851oftheCivil
Code,buttheyhavebeenexpresslyrepealedbyActNo.2141,section1ofwhichreadasfollows:

Sections seven hundred and fiftyfive, seven hundred and fiftysix, seven hundred and fiftyseven, seven
hundredandfiftyeight,andsevenhundredandsixtyofActNumberedOnehundredandninety,entitled`An
Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands are
hereby repealed and such provisions of the Civil Code as may have been amended or repealed by said
sectionsareherebyrestoredtofullforceandeffects.(Emphasisours.)

AmongtheprovisionsoftheCivilCodewhicharethusexpresslyrestoredtofullforceareundoubtedlyarticles814
and851.Therecanbenopossibledoubt,therefore,thatthosetwoarticlesareinforce.

Article1080oftheCivilCodethatisalsoinvokeddeservesnoconsiderationexceptfortheobservationthatithasno
relevancyintheinstantcase.
OurattentionisdirectedtothecaseofEscuinvs.Escuin(11Phil.,332).Wehaveneverlostsightoftherulinglaid
downinthatcasewhichhasbeenreiteratedinEleazarvs.Eleazar(37Off.Gaz.,p.1782).IntheEscuincase,the
deceasedleftallhispropertytohisnaturalfather(notaforcedheir)andhiswifewithtotalpreteritionofhisfather
and wife. Without reconsidering the correctness of the ruling laid down in these two cases, we will note that the
doctrine stands on facts which are different from the facts in the present case. There is certainly a difference
betweenacaseofpreteritioninwhichthewholepropertyislefttoamerefriendandacaseofpreteritioninwhich
thewholepropertyislefttooneorsomeforcedheirs.Ifthetestamentarydispositionbeannulledtotallyinthefirst
case,theeffectwouldbeatotaldeprivationofthefriendofhisshareintheinheritance.Andthisiscontrarytothe
manifest intention of the testator. It may fairly be presumed that, under such circumstances, the testator would at
leavegivehisfriendtheportionoffreedisposal.Inthesecondcase,thetotalnullityofthetestamentarydisposition
wouldhavetheeffect,notofdeprivingtotallytheinstitutedheirofhisshareintheinheritance,butofplacinghimand
theotherforcedheirsuponthebasisofequality.Thisisalsoinconsonancewiththepresumptiveintentionofthe
testator.Preterition,generallyspeaking,isduemerelytomistakeorinadvertencewithoutwhichthetestatormaybe
presumedtotreatalikeallhischildren.

Andspeciallyisthistrueintheinstantcasewherethetestatoromittedthechildrenbyhisfirstmarriageuponthe
erroneousbeliefthathehadgiventhemalreadymoresharesinhispropertythanthosegiventothechildrenbyhis
second marriage. It was, therefore, the thought of the testator that the children by his first marriage should not
receivelessthanthechildrenbyhissecondmarriage,andtothateffectisthedecisionofthisCourtsoughttobe
reconsidered.Motionforreconsiderationisherebydenied.

Yulo,C.J.,Iconcurintheresult.
Generoso,J.,concurs.

SeparateOpinions

OZAETA,J.,concurring:

IconcurinthemajorityopinionaftermaturereflectiononthetwopointsdiscussedinJusticeBocobo'sdissent.

Whether or not there was preterition of the testator's surviving children by his first marriage, may not be entirely
beyonddispute,becauseitisnotaltogetherimprobablethat,beforethetestatormadehiswill,saidchildrenofhis
hadreceivedcashadvancesfromhim,asstatedinclause8ofthewill.But,tomaymind.therecanbenodoubtthat
therewaspreteritionofthetestator'sgrandchildrenbyhisdaughterGetulia,whodiedlongbeforethetestatormade
his will. These lineal descendants of the testator, who are also forced heir of his, were completely ignored and
omittedinthewill.Inclauses7and8ofhiswill,thetestatordeclared:

Seventh.Ideclarethatthechildrenbymyfirstwifehavenolongeranyparticipationinthepropertydescribed
above,astheyalreadyreceivedtheircorrespondingsharesinmyexclusivepropertytoeachofmychildren
bymyfirstwifemustexceedwhatwillcorrespondtoeachofmychildrenbymysecondwife.

Eight. I supplicated my children by my first wife that they should not contest this my last will, as they have
already received their shares in my own property, much more than what I now give to the children by my
secondwife,excludingyetwhatIhavegiventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroublesandwhattheyhave
borrowed,whichtheyhavenotyetpaidmeandwhichInowcondonetothem.

BoththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsfoundineffectthatthesedeclarationsturnedouttobeunfoundedin
fact,atleastinsofarastheyreferredtopropertiesotherthanmoneyallegedtohavebeenreceivedbythechildrenof
the first marriage. Be that as it may, I believe the deceased Getulia was not comprehended in said declaration
anyway.Whenthetestatorsaid,"Ideclarethatthechildrenbymyfirstwifehavenolongeranyparticipationinthe
property described above," he referred only to his children who were living at that time and who, he evidently
expected, would claim some participation in the property left by him He could not have referred to Getulia also
becauseshe,havingpassedaway,couldnolongerhaveorclaimanyparticipationinhisproperty.Neitherdidhe
refertoGetulia'schildren,forhedidnotmentionthematall.Again,whenthetestatorsaid,"Isupplicatedbychildren
bymyfirstwifethattheyshouldnotcontestthismylastwill,"hecouldnothavehadGetuliainmind,becausehe
knewthedeceasedcouldnotcontesthiswillandifhehadintendedtoincludedGetulia'schildren,hewouldhave
mentionedthemashisgrandchildren.Thecondonationofdebtsmadebythetestatorinclause8ofhiswillreferred
tothedebtsofthosechildrenofhiswhomheentreatedtorefrainfromcontestinghiswill,andsinceGetuliacould
nothavebeenentreatedbyhim,itislogicaltoconcludethatherpettydebtofP155wasnotembracedwithinthat
condonation. Getulia having passed away long before her father made his will, he had evidently forgotten her as
wellasherpettydebt.

TheconclusionthatGetuliaandherchildrenwerenotincludedintheabovequoteddeclarationsandthat,therefore,
theywereentirelyomittedinthewill,isfurtherstrengthenedbytheundisputedfactthatasidefromthesmallsumof
P155borrowedbyherfromhimduringherlifetime,hehadnotgivenherorherchildrenanyportionofhisproperty.
Therefore,whenthetestatorsolemnlydeclaredinclause7ofhiswillthathischildrenbyhisfirstwifehadalready
receivedtheircorrespondingshareinhisexclusivepropertyinexcessevenofwhatwouldcorrespondtoeachofhis
childrenbyhissecondwife,hecouldnothavehadGetuliaorherchildreninmind,foritisundisputablethathehad
notgivenheranypropertywhatsoever.HecouldnothavehadtheP155inmind(1)becauseithadnotbeengiven
butonlyloanedtoher,and(2)becauseitwassorelativelytrivialanamountthathecouldnothaveconsideredit
equaltothesharehelefttoeachofhischildrenbyhissecondwife.Hisestatewasassessedbythecommitteeon
appraisalsatP18,000,withaclaimagainstitofonlyP480.

Inurgingthatthechildrenofthefirstmarriagebegivenonlyashareintheshortlegitime,theminorityopinionsays
thatthetestatorhasmade"aclearandexplicitdeclarationinhiswillthatthechildrenofthesecondmarriageshall
be preferred." On the other hand, the majority opinion maintains that the testator omitted the children of the first
marriageupontheerroneousbeliefonhispartthathehadgiventhemagreatershareinhispropertythanthatleft
to the children of the second marriage. From this the majority infer that the testator did not intend to discriminate
againsthischildrenbyhisfirstmarriagebygivingthemlessthanwhathelefttohischildrenbyhissecondmarriage.
Themajorityviewassumesthatthedeclarationsofthetestatorinclauses7and8ofhiswill,althoerroneous,were
madeingoodfaith.Ontheotherhand,theminorityviewsupposesthatthetestatorintendedtopreferhischildrenby
hissecondwifebyleavingtothemallhispropertysothatthechildrenbythefirstmarriageareentitledonlytotheir
share in the short legitime which by law the decedent could no withhold from them. I think the minority view is
untenable.Intheabsenceofproofitcannotbepresumedthatthetestatormadetheabovequoteddeclarationsin
badfaiththathemadethemknowingthatitwasnottruethathehadgiveneachofhissurvivingchildrenbyhis
firstwifeatleastanequalifnotagreatershareinhisinheritancethanwhathelefttoeachofhischildrenbyhis
second wife. But if he had made those declarations in bad faith or as subterfuge to deprive his children and
grandchildren by his first marriage of their legal share in his inheritance, he could only have done so with the
intentiontofrustratetheirright.Inthatcasethepreteritionwouldonlyassumeadifferentform,voluntaryinsteadof
involuntary.Buttheresultwouldbethesame.AsstatedbytheSupremeCourtofSpaininitsdecisionofJune17,
1908,thepreteritionofaforcedheir"puedeserdebidaaignoranciadequeexistiera,uolvidoopropositodeburlar
losderechosquelaleylesreconoce,supuestostodesquedesvirtuanlafuerzayeficaciamoraldeaquellavoluntad
yquejustificanlaanulaciondesuexpresion."

BOCOBO,J.,dissenting:

Afteracarefulstudyofthiscase,Iamconstrainedtodissentfromtheresolutionofthemajoritydenyingthemotion
forreconsideration.IbelievethejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsshouldbeaffirmedbecause:

First,therehasbeennopreteritionunderarticle814,CivilCode.

Second,evensupposingthattherehasbeenapreterition,thechildrenofthesecondmarriageare,however,entitled
tothethirdforfreedisposalandtothethirdformejora,inadditiontotheirsharesinthestrictorshortlegitime.

I
ThereIsnoPreterition

ThereisnopreteritionbecausethefindingsofboththeCourtofFirstInstanceoftheCourtofAppealsshowthatall
the children of the first marriage have received, in property and in cash, a part of their short legitime. One of the
requisites of preterition is that one or some of the heirs of the direct line be totally deprived of their legitime. As
Manresasays(Vol.6,pages356357,4thEd.):

Quelaomisionseacompleta.Estacondicionsededucedelmismoarticulo814,yresultaconevidenciaal
realcionarestearticuloconel815.Elherederoforzosoaqueineltestadordejaalgoporcualqueirtituloensu
testamento,nosehallapropiamenteomitido,puesselenombrayselereconoceparticipacionenlosbienes
hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el articulo 814, si era o no necesario que se reconocies el derecho del
heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se ocupa de la privacion
completa o total, tacita este, de la privacion partcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como veremos,
completamentedistintos.

Astoproperty,EleuterioreceivedparcelNo.4bywayofdonation.Thetrialcourtfoundthatsaidparcel"appearsto
havebeendonatedbyAgripinoNeritohissonEleuterio,andwhichmaybebroughttothecommonmass."Inthe
judgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstance,itisorderedthatsaidparcelNo.4"shouldbebroughttothecommonmass."

Moreover,thereisalargeparceloflandcontaining182.6373hectareswhich,accordingtoafindingoftheCourtof
Appeals, "is still claimed to be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the
secondmarriage."ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsmakesthesefindingsoffact:

AsregardsthatlargeparceloflandadjointparcelNo.1,itiscontendedthatafterthecourthaddeniedthe
registrationthereof,AgripinoNeriyChavesabandonedthesaidlandandthatlateronsomeofthechildrenof
 the first marriage possessed it, thereby acquiring title and interest therein by virtue of occupation and not
throughinheritance.Itisnottruethatthisparcelcontaining182.6373hectaresisnowassessedinthenames
of some of the children of the first marriage, for as shown on Tax Declaration No. 9395, Exhibit 11g, the
ownersofthepropertyareAgapitaNerideChavesyHermanos.Apparently,thesaidlandisstillclaimedto
be the property not only of the children of the first marriage but also of those of the second marriage.
(Emphasisours.)

ItistruethataccordingtotheCourtofAppeals,Getuliaorherheirsdidnotreceiveanyshareofthepropertyofher
father,butthetrialcourtfoundthatGetuliawasindebtedtoherfatherintheamountofP155whichdebtiscondoned
inclause8ofthewill.

Furthermore,itisunquestionedtatallthechildrenofthefirstmarriage(exceptGetuliawhodebtofP155hasbeen
condoned in the will) had certain parcels in their names for tax purposes. The fact that said parcels were either
publiclandoccupiedanddevelopedbythetestator,ordidnotbelongtohim,cannotsupportthetheoryofpreterition
because the essence of preterition is the omission of any descendant or ascendant. If his right as an heir is
recognized in anyway, there is no preterition, and his remedy is that provided in article 815, which is to have his
sharecompletedincasehereceivedlessthanhislegitime.Inthiscase,thetestatoradmitsthathischildrenofthe
firstmarriagearealsohislawfulheirsbutstatestheyhavealreadyreceivedtheirrespectiveshares.

Asforthecashadvances,thetrialcourtfoundthatthesixchildren,threeAgripino,GetuliaandCelerinawere
indebted to the testator in the amounts of P500, P155 and P120, respectively. With regard to the other children,
EleuterioAgapitaandRosario,clause8ofthewillsays:

Eight. I supplicated my children by my first wife that they should not contest this my last will, as they have
already received their shares in my own property, much more than what I now give to the children by my
secondwife,excludingyetwhatIhavegiventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroublesandwhattheyhave
borrowed,whichtheyhavenotyetpaidmeandwhichInowcondonetothem.(Emphasisours.)

Itwillbenoticedthatthetestatorintheaboveclausespeaksoftwokindsofcashadvancestohischildren:(1)aid
fromtheirfatherduringtheirfinancialtroublesand(2)amountsborrowedbythemfromtheirfather.Intheabsence
of proof to the contrary, it may be presumed that the testator was referring to all his children of the first marriage
whenhestated:"excludingyetwhatIhavegiventothemasaidduringtheirfinancialtroubles.."Itishardtobelieve
thatduringthewholelifetimeofthetestator,whowaswelltodo,andlivedtotheadvancedageof86years,anyof
hischildrenofthefirstmarriagedidnotreceiveevenasmallfinancialaidfromthefather.

Allthechildrenofthefirstmarriagehavingreceivedapartoftheirshortlegitime,eitherinpropertyorcashorboth,
thereinopreterition.Thelawapplicableisnotarticle814butarticles815and817.CivilCode,whichprovide:

ART.815.Elherederoforzosoaquieneltestadorhayadejadoporcualquiertitulomenosdelalegitimaquele
corresponda,podrapedirelcomplementodelamisma.

ART.817.Lasdispocisionestestmentariasquemenguenlalegitimadelosherederosforzosos,sereduciran,
apeticiondeestos,enloquefuereninoficiosasoexcesivas.

Thesearticlesgovernwheretheheirhasreceived,eitherinthewillorbydonationintervivos,apartofhislegitime.
Commentingonarticle815.Manresasays(Vol.6,page366):

Elespiritudelarticulo815resultaevidente:cuantoelherederoforzosonohassidoolvidadoporeltestandor,
cuando ha tomado algo de los bienes herditarios, solo puede reclamar que se le complete su legitima. La
letra del articulo, aunque aplicable especialmente a las disposiciones testamentarias, no repugna su
extensionatodoactodedisposiciondeltestadorportitulolucrativo.Yademas,elparrafo1.delaritculo819,
el decir que las donaciones hechas a los hijos imputan a su legitima demuestra que lo que los herederos
forzososrecibenenvidadeltestadordeeste,seentiendecomorecibidoporsulegitimaenelmomentodesu
muerte,y,porconsiguiente,comodejadoporeltestadoratitulodeherencia.

Thechildrenofthefirstmarriagenothavingbeenentirelyforgotten,thewillshouldberespectedandcarriedout,but
thechildrenofthefirstmarriageshouldhavetheirrespectivesharesinthestrictlegitimecompletedaftertakinginto
accounttheamountsalreadyreceivedbythemfromtheirfather.

Asfortheconcurringopinion,IfinditdifficulttobelievethatthetestatordidnothaveinmindGetuliaorherchildren
inclauses7and8ofthewill.Myreasonsarethefollowing:

1.Thetestatorclearlyintendedthathiswillshouldnotbecontested.Whenhesaid"Isupplicatedmychildrenbymy
firstwifethattheyshouldnotcontestthismylastwill,"itisnotventuresometopresumethathealsoreferredtothe
children of Getulia because they, as the testator's grandchildren, were also his heirs by right of representation of
theirmother.Itismostunlikelythatthetestatorwouldfrownuponacontestbyhischildrenofthefirstmarriagebut
notuponacontestbysaidgrandchildren.
2.Inhiscondonationofthemoneyadvancestohischildrenofthefirstmarriageinclause8,itisimprobablethathe
had forgotten his daughter Getulia although she had been dead for several years. Is the memory of a deceased
daughterblottedoutinthefather'smindpreciselyatthemomentwhenheissearchinghisownconscienceashe
makeshiswill?Moreover,didnotthepresenceofGetulia'schildrenservetoremindthetestatoroftheirmother?

Getulia's debt of P155 having been condoned in clause 8, it follows that articles 815 and 817 of the Civil Code,
supra, are applicable. The children of Getulia are, therefore, entitled to have their short legitime completed
accordingtothearticlesaforesaid,buttheymustreturntotheestate,bywayofcollation,theamountofP155under
article11038,paragraph1oftheCivilCodewhichprovidesthus:

ART.1038.Cuandolosnietossucedanalabueloenrepresentaciondelpadre,concurriendoconsustioso
primos,colacionarantodoloquedebieracolacionarelpadresiviviera,aunquenolohayaheredado.

II
TheMandasandMejorasAreValid

Butgrantingthattherewasapreteritionbecauseoneorsomeofthechildrenofthefirstmarriageneverreceived,by
donationintervivosorbywill,anythingfromtheirfather,itisclearfromthewillinquestionthatthechildrenofthe
secondmarriageareentitledtothethirdforfreedisposalandtothethirdformejora(inadditiontotheirshareinthe
strictlegitime).Thatistosay,Ithinkweshouldapplyinthiscasethisprovisionofarticle814onpreterition:"pero
valdranlasmandasymejorasencuantonoseaninoficiosas."

ThemajorityresolutionreliesuponquotationsfromManresaandSanchezRomantosupportthepropositionthatthe
annulment of the "Institucion de heredero" entirely annuls the will. However, the majority is laboring under a
misunderstandingofthe"instituciondeheredero"undertheSpanishlaw.Itisthatmisconceptionwhichhadledthe
majorityintoawronginterpretationofwhatthosetwoSpanishjuristsmeanwhentheysaythattheannulmentofthe
"institucion de heredero" is total. It is to be noted, at this juncture, that both authors, while stating that preterition
entirely annuls the "institucion de heredero," nevertheless admit that "manda" and "mejoras" which are not
inofficiousarevalid.SaysManresa(Vol.6,pages359,360,4thEd.):

En el fondo la cuestion es identica. El testador puede siempre disponer a su arbitrio de la parte libre. El
legitimario,contralavoluntadexpresadeltestador,solotienederechoasulegitima.Preteridoodesheredado
sinjustacausa,lalegitimaessuya.Desheredadoopreterido,laporcionlibrenolecorresponde,cuandoel
testadorlaasignaaotro.(Italicsours.)

Lainterpretacionquerectamentesedesprendedelarticulo814,esladequesolovalen,yesoencuantono
seaninoficiosas,lasdisposicioneshechasotitulodelegadoomejora.Encuantoalainstituciondeheredero,
seanula.Loqueseanuladejadeexistir,entodo,oenparte?Noseaadelimitacionalguna,comoenel
articulo 851, en el que se expresa en cuanto perjudique a la legitima del desheredado. Debe, pues,
entendersequelaanulacionescompletaototal,yqueestearticulo,comoespecialenelcasoquelemotiva,
rigeconpreferenciaal817.

Todaslasdemasdisposicionestestamentariasreferentesalosbienes,comoloslegadosylasmejoras,ensu
caso,continuaransubsistentes,noobstantelapretericion,siemprequenoseaninoficiosas,estoes,siempre
que las mejoras no excedan del tercio, y los legados con las donaciones por causa de muerte, y las
donaciones colacionables, no excedan de la parde de herencia de libre disposicion. Si excedieren, se
reduciranporlasreglasdelCodigo,hastadejarasalvolalegitima.(Emphasisours.)

Furtheron(p.363)Manresaadds:

Estimadalaaccion,yanuladalainstituciondeheredero,seabrelasucesionintestadarespectoalapartede
bienes de que el testador, dentro de la porcion libre no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o
donacion.

SanchezRomanalsostates:

En cambio, ni por la desheredacion ni por la pretericion pierde su fuerza el testamento, en cuanto a dicho
tercio libre, si se trata de descendientes o la mitad, si se trata de ascendientes, ya desherederos, ya
preteridos,porque,niporelunoniporelotromedio,seanulamasquelainstituciondeheredero,engeneral,
y totalmente por la pretericion, y solo en cuanto perjudique a la legitima del desheredado por la
desheredacionperosubsistiendo,enamboscasos,todasaquellasotrasdisposicionesquenoserefierena
la institucion de heredero y se hallen dentro del limite cuantitativo del tercio o mitad de libre disposicion,
segunquesetratededescendientesoascendientes,preteridosodesheredados.(Emphasisours.)

xxxxxxxxx
 No obstante la pretericion, 'valdran las mandas y legados en cuanto no sean inoficiosas'. El texto es
terminanteynonecesitamayorexplicacion,despuesdelodicho,quesupropialetra,anoserparaobservar
que constituye una confirmacion indudable de los efectos de la pretericion, en cuanto alcanzan solo, pero
totalmente,alaanulaciondelainstituciondeheredero,peronoaladelasmandasymejorasencuantono
sean inoficiosas o perjudiquen a le legitima de los preteridos calificativo de tales, como sinonimo legal de
excesivas, que en otros articulos, como el 817, establece la ley. (6 Sanchez Roman, Volumen 2.o 1140
1141.)

The seemingly selfcontradictory statements of each of these two eminent jurists are confusing, as they have
confusedthemajority,unlessheexaminesthehistoricbackgroundofthe"instituciondeheredero"intheSpanish
CivilCode.

Article764oftheCivilCodeProvides:

Eltestamentoseravalidoaunquenocontengainstituciondeheredero,oestanocomprendalatotalidadde
losbienes,yaunqueelnombradonoacetelaherenciaoseaincapazdeheredar.

Enestoscasossecumpliranlasdisposicionestestamentariashechasconarregloalasleyes,yelremanente
delosbienespasaraalosherederoslegitimos.

Manresaexplainsthedevelopmentofthe"instituciondeheredero"thus(vol.6,pages8586,4thEd.):

Lainstituciondeherederoeselactoenvirtuddelcualeltestadordesignalapersonaopersonasquehande
sucederleensusderechos,accionesyobligacionesysuimportanciaenlatestamentifaccionesindiscutible,
puesto que de ella surge la continuacion de la personalidad del testador, si bien con las limitaciones
impuestas por el mismo. En efecto, por virtud de dicha institucion, la persona o personas instituidas por
herederas suceden al causante en la universalidad de sus derechos y obligaciones, en los terminos que
expusimosalcomentarlosarticulos659y660.

Hoy esa importancia ha cedido algun tanto, aunque no ha desaparecido por completo, puesto que no es
necesarialainstituciondeherederosparalavalidezdeladisposicionmortiscausaperoenloantiguollegoa
ser considerada como la cabeza y raiz del testamento, dando lugar su falta a la nulidad e ineficacia del
mismo.

En las secciones precedentes hemos venido refiriendonos con repeticion a dos sistemas sucesorios
distintos:unoformalistayrituario,mantenidoconstantementeporelderechoromanoaunenlostiemposde
mayor laxitud del mismo, y otro mas libre y expansivo, cuya genuina representacion se halla en el
OrdenamientideAlcala.Yesedualismoprofundoqueentoncesobservamosentrelalegislacionromanayla
germana,hubodemanifestarsetambienclaramenteenlamateriarelativaalainstituciondeherederos.

Nohemosderepetiraquiideasexpuestasyaenlareseahistoricaconqueencabezamoslaintroduccional
estudiodeltratadodesucesiones,peroconvienerecordar,paralamejorinteligenciadelareformallevadaa
cabo en nuestras antiguas leyes, que la naturaleza de los primitivos testamentos romanos, asi como la
organizacion de la familia en aquella potente nacion, y sus caracteres de universalidad y perpetuidad,
impusieronlanecesidaddeunherederoquecontinuaselapersonalidadjuridicadelcausante,revistiendoa
su vez a dicha institucion de las mismas condiciones de necesidad, universalidad y perpetuidad. Era
necesaria la institucion como cabeza y solemnidad interna del testamento: era universal, puesto que tenia
queserhechasobretodoelpatrimonio,nopermitiendosetestarsobreunapartedeelynosobreelrestoy
erapor,ultimo,perpetua,porquesiendoelmediodelacontinuacionysubsistenciadeltestador,nopodiaser
ordenadalainstitucionconlimitaciondetiempo,yelheredero,unavezaceptadalaherencia,nopodiadejar
deserlo.

Porelcontrario,nienlalegislacioncastellana,nielelFueroJuzgo,encarnaciondelelementogodonienlos
Fueronmunicipales,inspiradosenelmismoespiritunienelFueroViejodeCastilla,niaunenelFueroReal,
seencuentradisposicionalgunaqueleatribuyadichocaracter,acusandoenelloslainstituciondeherederos
unconceptocompletamentediverso,hastaquelasPartidas,sintenerencuentaloselementosdistintosde
nuestro derecho y la diferente organizacion de la familia espoala, importo de plano la doctrina romana, y
conellatodoelcomplicadoorganismodesusistemasucesorio.Seguntenemosdichosya,elOrdenamiento
deAlcalahizodesaparecereseregimentanenoposicionconelderechopatrio,asignandoalainstitucionlos
caracteresdelibertadeindependenciaquehaconservadohastalapublicaciondelCodigo,puestoquelas
leyes posteriores a dicho Ordenamiento no introdujeron modificacion alguna, manteniendo la libertad de la
institucion de herederos, sin mas limitaciones que el respeto a la moral y a los derechos legitimarios, asi
comomantuvolaindependenciaabsolutaentredichainstitucionyeltestamento,hastaelpuntodeservalido
este,aunquenohayaherederonosehayadispuestoeneldelatotalidaddelaherencia,locualpermitiaque
elcausantemuriesepartetestadoyparteintestado.(Emphasisours.)

Commentingonarticle764,Manresasays(Vol.6,page93):
 Siavirtuddeelnoesnecesariayaparalavalidedelostestamentosqueenellosconstelainstitucionde
herederos, logica deduccion de dicho principio es que el testamento no se invalide aunque no contenga
dichainstituciononocomprendalatotalidaddelosbienes,onoresulteeficazlainstitucion,hecha,yaporno
aceptarlaherenciaelinstituido,oporseresteincapaz.

The only purpose, therefore, of the "institucion de heredero" is to have someone continue the personality of the
testator,sothattheremaybesomeonewhoshouldbepersonallyliableforalltheobligationsofthetestatorandwho
succeedstoalltherightsofthedecedent.Butsuch"instituciondeheredero"isnolongeressential,sothatthere
maybeavalidwill,accordingtoarticle764,althoughthereisno"instituciondeheredero."AsManresasays,since
theOrdenamientodeAcalathereisanabsoluteindependencebetweenthe"instituciondeheredero"andthewill.
(Vol.6,page86.)

Therefore,inthecaseunderconsideration,theannulmentofthe"instituciondeheredero"onaccountofpreterition
doesnotrenderthewillineffective.

Thatthepreteritionunderarticle814doesnotentirelyinvalidatethewillisunanimouslymaintainedbytheauthors.

SanchezRoman,supra,saysthat the effectsofpreterition,"alcanzan,solo,perototalmente,a la anulacion de la

instituciondeheredero,peronoa la de las mandas y mejoras en cuanto no sean inofociosas o perjudiquen a la
legitimadelospreteridos."

Manresastates(Vol.6,pages362363):

Parapedirlaanulacion,correspondealherederopreteridounaaccion,quesiempresehallamadoquerella
deinoficiosotestamento.

xxxxxxxxx

Estimadalaaccion,yanuladalainstituciondeheredero,seabrelasucesionintestadarespectoalapartede
bienes de que el testador, dentro de la porcion libre no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejores o
donacion."(Italicsours.)

ScaevolainVol.XIV,page383ofhisworkontheSpanishCivilCodehasthistosay:

AccionesdefensivasdelegitimaPrescripciondelasmismas.Ennuestroentender,noconviveconel
Codigoenmateriadepretericionlatradicionalquerelladeinoficiosotestamento.Apoyamosnuestraopinion
endosrazones:primera,nonombrarlaasielCodigo,nicontenerdoctrinaequivalente,tantoenlaseccionde
legitimas, como en la de prescripcion segunda, sostener doctrina contraria a aquella de que derivaba la
sobredichaaccion.

Laquerellaseencaminabaadestruireltestamento,encasodepretericionelCodigo,conconocimientode
causa,conconcienciadeladoctrina,precisamenteenoposicionaella,noautorizataldestruccionencuanto
consigna la nulidad de la institucion hereditaria, pero la validez de las mandas y mejoras. No existiendo el
antecedente,nopuedeexistirelconsiguientederogadoelprincipiodoctrinalquedabavidaalaquerellade
inoficiosotestamento,desaparecioestaconel.Hamuertoalsucumbirlalegislaciondelaqueeraelemento
integrante,decuyocuerpoformabaparte.

Hoy la accion se encamina a la nulidad de la institucion hereditaria como medio para adquirir el heredero
forzosolaporcionquelesealalaley.Tratasesencillamentedeunaaccionreal,comunuordinario,devida
legaldetreintaaos."(Italicsours.)

GoyenainhisbookontheProjectof1851,commentingonarticle644ofthesame,whichprovidesthatpreterition
"anula la institucion de heredero pero valdran las mandas y mejoras en cuanto no sean inoficiosas" (the exact
wordingofarticle814ofthepresentSpanishCivilCode)observes(Vol.2,pages9495):

Laley24deToro,u8,titulo6,libro10,NovisimaRecopilacion,dice:'Cuandoeltestamentoserompiereo
anulareporcausadepretericionoexheredacion,etc.,noporesodejedevalerlamejoriadeltercioyquinto.'
Ex causa exhaeredationis vel praeteritionis irritum est testamentum cuantum ad instituciones, caetera
naumquefirmapermanent.Autentica,titulo28,libro6delCodigo.

Elarticulodemayorclaridadylatituc,oporlomenosfijeza,aestasdisposicionesPatriayRomana.

ApesardelaleydeToro,senoshaenseadoenlasescuelas,quelapretericionanulabaenteramenteel
testamento, y que no estaban corregidas por ella las leyes 3, titulo 7, y 1, titulo 8, Partida 6, que asi lo
declaraban:enDerechoRomanohemosaprendidocomoinconcusolocontrariodelaautenticaenelcasode
pretencion de un heredero suyo y esto era lo cierto, por que la autentica fue tomada de la Novela 115,
capitulos 3 y 4, en la que de intento se trata de la desheredacion y de sus causas, y de la rescision del
 testamento, por la querella de inoficioso de consiguiente, la desheredacion hace referencia al padre la
pretericionalamadre,puesrespectodeellaconstituyeunadesheredaciontacita.

SalaensusInstitucionesRomanoHispanas,parrafo5,titulo13,libro2,estaporlasleyesdePartidayensu
Ilustracion,numero3,titulo5,libro2,sostienelocontrario,yenapoyodelaleydeTorocitalaautentica.'Lo
establecieronasi(dice)lasleyesRomanas,ylopersuadelaequidad,quenopermitetengalugarlapenamas
alladelparticularenqueocurriolaindignidadosinrazonquelamotivo.'

Prescindiendodetodoesto,elarticulohacesencilloyclaroloquehastaahorahasidoembrolladoydudoso.

Finally,Prof.NicasioLopezR.GomezoftheUniversityofValladolidsaysinhisTratadoTeoricoLegaldelDerecho
deSucesion,"Vol.I,pages316319:

EnRoma,lavalidezonulidaddelainstituciondeheredero,envolvialadeterminaciondelosefectosjuridicolegales
del testamento, o su negacion, puesto que, si era la solemnidad interna y necesaria del testamento, y por
consecuencia, su cabeza y fundamento, aquel no podia subsistir cuando en su esencia concurriera un vicio de
nulidad,oestahubierasidoomitidaetsineillanonesttestamentum....Reconocidoelprincipiodelaslegitimas
y desenvuelto con arreglo a la clasificacion de los herederos suyos, suyos y necesarios y voluntarios, los dos
primeroshabiandesernecesariamenteinstituidosojustamentedesheredados:yporultimoladesheredacionjusta
con causa legal y expresa privaba de la legitima al heredero a quien se imponia. La desheredacion injusta sin
causaoconcausafalsanopodiaproduciresteefecto,dejandocompletamenteasalvoelderechodelegitima,y
otorgaba al desheredado la accion extraordinaria para reclamar contra la institucion por inoficiosa, con el efecto
absolutodenoreferirsesolamentealaporcionlegitima,sinoqueanuladalainstitucionquedabannulastodaslas
demasdisposicionesdeltestamento.

Lapretericiondeunherederoforzosotambienproduciaelmismoefectodenulidad.

LasLeyesdePartidaalreproducirladoctrinaromanacontodosurigorismoyencadenamientodelasinstituciones
sucesorias,importaronennuestralegislaciontodaslasdisposicionesreferentesalaquejadeinoficiosotestamento,
su naturaleza, extension, personas que podian ejercitarla en la linea recta ascendente y descendente y en la
colateral cuando la institucion recayera en persona torpo postergando a los hermanos y por ultimo en cuanto al
tiempooplazodesuejercicio.

La L. de. titulo 19 del Ordenamiento de Alcala, con su espiritu de transicion regenerador del primitivo Derecho
Espaol, llevo a cabo una transformacion completa e importantisima, pues al declarar la independencia absoluta
entrelosejectosdelainstituciondeherederoylosdeltestamento,laextensiondelaquejadelainoficiosidadde
este, quedo limitada estrictamente a reclamar contra la institucion en cuanto fuera inoficiosa, percibiendo el
desheredadoopreteridolaporcionlegitimaquelecorrespondiera,subsistiendolamismainstitucionencuantoalos
bienesquetuvieranelconceptodelibres,asicomotodaslasdemasclausulasdeltestamento.

ConsecuenciadeestoydeladeclaraciondelaL.9,deToro,losdescendientesyascendientes,injustamente
desheredados o preteridos, podian entablar la accion o querella de inoficioso testamento como herederos
forzososdesucausante,conelsoloefectodepercepciondesulegitima,sinanulareltestamentoniaunla
institucion de heredero que unicamente se rescindia en cuanto a aquella porciso y con respecto a los
colaterales o hermanos, perdieron el derecho de ejercitar la citada accion desde el momento que fueron
privados del concepto de herederos forzosos, que tenain en el unico caso de ser postergados a persona
torpe,porhaberquedadosinefectoestecalificativoylasdistincionesquehicieronlasleyesromanasyde
Partidas.

Con estos brevisimos antecedentes historicos podemos pasar a fijar el verdadero concepto de la queja de
inoficiosotestamentoparadespuesexponerladoctrinavigenteacercadeella.

Seentiendeporquejaoquerelladeinoficiosotestamento,laaccionquecompetealosherederosforzosos
preteridos o injustamente desheredados sin causa o con expresion de ella siendo falsa, para reclamar la
porciondebienesquecomolegitimalescorresponde.

xxxxxxxxx

La impugnacion de la institucion hecha en testamento, por el heredero desheredado o preteido, puede

efectuarse de lso maneras: por el ejercicio directo de la accion contra el instituido para que reconozca y
abone la legitima o por excepcion, cuando el desheredado se hallare en posesion de la herencia y el
instituidointerpusieralaaccioncorrespondienteparapercibirla.

El efecto inmediato de la queja de inoficioso testamento es anular la institucion de heredero en cuanto

perjudiquelosderechoslegitimariosdelactor.(Emphasisours.)
Applyingtheabovecitations,whatistheeffectofpreteritioninthiscase?DoesitrenderthewillofAgripinoNeriy
Chavezentirelyvoid,sothatanintestatesuccessionmustbedeclaredastoallhisproperty?Thenegativeanswer
isinescapablebecauseofthetruemeaningof"instituciondeheredero"asalreadysetforth,andthescopeofthe
"quejadeinoficiosotestamento"asexplainedbythewritersabovequoted.

Anulara la institucion de heredero" does not mean that the whole will is of no effect. It hereby nullifies the
clausedesignatingthechildrenofthesecondmarriageastheonly"herederos"orcontinuersofthetestator's
personalityandintheplaceofsuchclause,article814ordersthatallthechildren,ofbothmarriages,shallbe
suchcontinuersofAgapitoNeri'spersonality.Thisdoesnotmeanthatallthechildrenshalldividethewhole
estate equally, by the rules of intestacy. It simply signifies that the children of both marriages become
continuers of Neri's personality, and as such liable personally for all of Neri's obligations, so that under the
systems of the Spanish Civil Code, which distinguishes "herederos" from "legatarios," all the children are
liablepersonallyforthedebtsoftheirfather,evenbeyondandinexcessofthepropertyreceivedbyeachof
them.Theyarealsoentitledtoallhisrights,buttheextentofsuchrightsisdeterminedbythewill.Theyare
all"residuarylegatees"undertheCodeofCivilProcedure,sothatifthereisanypropertyundisposedofby
hiswill,allthechildrenshalldivideitequally.

WithregardtotheSpanishremedyof"quejadeinoficiosotestamento,"theauthoritiesalreadycitedlimittheeffectof
thesame,incaseofpreterition,undertheCivilCodetotherecoveryofthelegitimatepertainingtotheheirwhohas
beenomitted.Thisisconformitywitharticle814whichsaysthatthemandasandmejorasarevalidinsofarasthey
arenotinofficious.

Havemandasandmejorasbeen given to the children of the second marriage? It is plain that the intention of the
testator is to give to the children of the second marriage all that remains of his property the children of the first
marriagehavingalreadyreceivedfromhimtheirshares,inadditiontosumsofmoneybywayofaidandloan.This
beingso,andinasmuchasthegreaterincludestheless,hisdispositioninfavorofhisyoungerchildrenshouldbe
upheldastothetwothirdsofhisremainingproperty,viz:theonethirdforfreedisposalandtheonethirdformejora
(inadditiontotheirshareintheshortlegitimate).

First,astothethirdforfreedisposal.ThedecisionofthisCourtsaysthereisNo"legacyexpresslymadeintheir
behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal." I believe it is illogical to require in this case that the will
should expressly make a "legacy" from the third for free disposal. It is enough that the testator gives all his
remainingpropertytohischildrenofthesecondmarriagefromthatitshouldnotbehardtodeclarethanitwashis
intentiontogivethematleastthethirdforfreedisposal.Inlegalconceptanythinggivenfromthethirdavailablefor
freedisposalisa"manda"or"legado,"whetheritissonamedornot.

Second,asforthethirdavailableformejora,Iagreewiththedecisionthatthereisnoexpressmejora.ButIthink
thereisatacitmejora.Now,atacitmejoraiscreatedwhenthetestatorgivessomethingtoanyofhischildrenwhich
cannotbecontainedinthethirdavailableforfreedisposal.Article828provides:

ART.828.Lamandaolegadohechoporeltestadoraunodeloshijosodescendientesnosereputaramejora
sinocuandoeltestadorhayadeclaradoexpresamenteserestasuvoluntad,ocuandonoquepaenlaparte
libre.

Here again, we should not require that this portion should be expressly called by the testator a "mejora" or a
"manda"becauseitwouldhavebeenillogicalandimpropertospeakof"mejora"or"manda"whenhewasgivingthe
whole of his remaining property to his children of the second marriage. Article 814 simply means that in case of
preterition,alltestamentaryprovisionsarevalidinsofarastheydonotimpairthelegitime.Theeffectofthedecision
inthiscaseistodeclareanintestatesuccessionastotheentireestatewheneverthereisnoexpressmejoraand
expresslegacy.Thus,therewouldbetotalintestacy,inspiteofthetestamentaryprovisionstothecontrary,inthe
preteritionunderthefollowingcircumstances:

1.Wherethereisatacitmejora,underarticle828or

2.Whentherecanproperlybenomejora,expressorimplied,becauseachildordescendantisinstitutedasthesole
heirtothewholeestateor

3. When there can properly be neither express mejora nor express legacy because two or more children or
descendantsareinstitutedtotakethewholeestateequallyorwithoutexpressdesignationofshares.

Such could not have been the intention of the legislator, because the whole scheme of the Civil Code as to
successions is to respect testamentary provisions so long as the legitime is not diminished. (Arts. 763, 764, 767,
777,782,792,798,813,814,815,817,820,828,1036,and1037,CivilCode.)

Furthermore,itwouldappeartobeviolativeofthelawtothrowtheentirewilltothescrapheapanddeclareatotal
intestatesuccession,whensuchwillcanandshouldbeenforcedinsofarastheshortlegitimeofthechildrenofthe
firstmarriageisnotlessened.True,tosomeitmightseemmoreequitabletodividetheestateequallyamongallthe
children of both marriages. But so long as the short legitime is not impaired, the testator in this case was free to
distributehispropertyamonghischildrenashesawfitandfair.(Thisiswhyevenincaseofpreterition(article814),
mandasandmejorasarevalidtotheextentthattheyarenotinofficious.Ifthisminimumandobligatoryportion(short
legitime)ofeachchildiskeptintactinthepartitionunderthewill,thelawdoesnotadmitofanyinterferencewiththe
testator'swishes.Heisthesolejudgeastowhichchildrenshouldgetmorethantheothers.Toholdthatthereshall
be an equal division of the whole estate applying the rules of intestacy when the testator positively and
unmistakablystatedthatthereshallbeadifferentdistributionoftheremainingestate,iscontrarytolaw.Moreover,
intestatesuccessionisbaseduponthepresumeintentionofthedeceased.Saving,ofcourse,theshortlegitimeof
thechildrenofthefirstmarriage,weshouldnotresorttothatpresumedintentioninthefaceofaclearandexplicit
declarationinhiswillthatthechildrenofthesecondmarriageshallbepreferred.

Butgranting,arguendo, that strictly speaking there are no "mandas" and "mejoras" for the children of the second
marriage,yetbytheprincipleofconstructionbyanalogy,theprovisioninarticle814thatmandasandmejorasshall
be valid should be applied because the testator clearly intended to give at least twothirds of his estate to such
children,inasmuchashewasgivingallofittothem.Andhecoulddisposefreelyofsaidtwothirdsinfavorofsaid
childrenofthesecondmarriage,thatis,onethirdfromtheportion.forfreedisposal,andonethirdfromtheportion
assignedbylawtomejora.Inotherwords,grantingforthesakeofargumentthattherewasneitheramandanora
mejorainthiscase,neverthelessthepresentsituationoffersagap,notspecificallyforeseenbythelawmaker,which
shouldbefilledbyapplyingthewords,"valdranlasmandasymejoras"throughtheprincipleofanalogyinordernot
todefeatthemanifestintentionofthetestator.

Themajorityresolutionlaystressonthesupposeddifferencebetweentheeffectofarticle814(preterition)andof
article851(disinheritance).Whatevermaybethedistinctionbetweenthetwoarticlesintheory,thepracticalresult
is,however,thesamebecausebotharticlescontainasavingclauseinregardtothemandasandmejoraswhichdo
notimpairthelegitime.Article814says:"perovaldranlasmandasymejorasencuantonoseaninoficiosas,"and
article 851 also provides, "pero valdran los legados, mejoras y demas disposiciones testamentarias en lo que no
perjudiquenadichalegitima."Theidentityofideasisplain.True,article851(disinheritance)annulsthe"institucion
de heredero" in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited, where article 814 simply says that the preterition
"shallannulthe instituciondeheredero."However,the lackinarticle814ofthe qualifyingwords"insofarasthe
omittedpersonisprejudiced"isfilledandsuppliedbythewords"perovaldranlasmandasymejorasencuantono
seaninoficiosas,"whichimmediatelyfollow.Infact,thewords"encuantoperjudiquealdesheredero"inarticle851
are superfluous and unnecessary because the very same thought is conveyed by the words "pero valdran los
legados,mejorasydemasdisposicionestestamentariasenloquenoperjudiquenadichalegitima."

UptothispointIhavediscussedarticle814,CivilCode,purelyfromthestandpointofthatcode,withoutreferenceto
the Code of Civil Procedure. This latter code, however, has abolished the distinction between "heredero" and
"legatario"undertheCivilCode,andhaschangedthebasisofliabilityofpersons,whetherrelatedornottothe
deceased,whoreceiveanypropertyfromtheestate.AsstatedbythisCourtinthecaseofSuiliong&Co.,v.Chio
Taysan,12Phil.,13(year1908):

An examination more especially of sections 597, 644, 727, 729, 731, 733, and 749 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, read together with the remaining provisions for the administration of the estates of deceased
persons,clearlyindicatesthattheprovisionsofarticles660and661oftheCivilCodehavebeenabrogated.

Theseprovisionsofthenewcodeclearlydemonstratethatthetermsherederoandlegatario,asdefinedinthe
CivilCode(article660),arenotsynonymouswiththewords"heir"and"legatee,"asusedinthenewcodethe
word"heir"inthecodebeingtechnicallyapplicableonlytoarelativetakingpropertyofanintestatebyvirtue
of the laws of descent, devisee and legatee being reserved for all persons whether relatives or not, taking
respectively real or personal property by virtue of a will while heredero in the Civil Code as applicable not
only to one who would be called an "heir", under the provisions of the new code, but also to one, whether
relative or not, who took what might be called "a residuary estate under a will (el que sucede a titulo
universal).

It appears also from an examination of those provisions that the legislature has provided no machinery
wherebyanabsoluterightonthepartoftheheirtosucceedbythemerefactofdeathtoallthe rights and
property of the deceased may be enforced, without previous payment or provision for the payment of the
debtsandontheotherhandithasprovidedmachineryfortheenforcementofhedebtsandotherobligations
of the deceased, not as debts or obligations of the heir, but as debts or obligations of the deceased to the
payment of which the property of the deceased may be subjected wherever it be found. Thus section 597
expressly provides that, in those cases where settlement of an intestate estate may be made without legal
proceedings, either by a family council, as known under the Spanish law, or by an agreement in writing
executed by all the heirs, the real estate of the deceased remain charged with liability to creditors of the
deceased for two years after the settlement, "notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been
made" and we think the inference is clear that the legislator in this section recognizes and affirms the
doctrinethat,priortothedateofsuchsettlement,therealestateatleastwaschargedinlikemannerwiththe
debtsofthedeceased.Soitwillbefoundthat,wherelegalproceedingsarehadlookingtothesettlementof
 testate or intestate estates, provision is made for the recovery of claims against the deceased, not by
proceedingsdirectedagainsttheheirs,butbyproceedingslookingdirectlytothesubjectionofthepropertyof
the deceased to the payment of such claims the property both real and personal being, in express terms,
made chargeable with the payment of these debts, the executor or administrator having the right to the
possession of the real as well as the personal property, to the exclusion of the heirs, so long as may be
necessaryforthatpurpose(secs.727and729).

Forpracticalpurposesitmaywellbesaidthatintheeyeofthelaw,wherethereisnoremedytoenforcean
allegedrightwhenitisinvaded,theexistenceoftherightmaysafelybedeniedandwherethelawfurnishes
aremedywherebyonemayenforceaclaim,thatclaimisarightrecognizedandestablishedbythelaw.The
newCodeofProcedurefurnishingnoremedywherebytheprovisionsofarticle661oftheCivilCodemaybe
enforced,insofarastheyimposeupontheheredero(heir)thedutyofassumingasapersonalobligationall
thedebtsofthedeceased,atleasttotheextentofthevalueofthepropertyreceivedfromtheestateorinso
far as they give to the herederothe reciprocal right to receive the property of the deceased, without such
property being specifically subjected to the payment of the debts of the deceased by the very fact of his
deceased,theseprovisionsofarticle661mayproperlybeheldtohavebeenabrogatedandthenewcode
havingprovidedaremedywherebythepropertyofthedeceasedmayalwaysbesubjectedtothepaymentof
his debts in whatever hands it may be found, the right of a creditor to a lien upon the property of the
deceased,forthepaymentofthedebtsofthedeceased,createdbythemerefactofhisdeath,maybesaid
toberecognizedandcreatedbytheprovisionsofthenewcode.(Paviavs.DelaRosa,8Phil.Rep.,70)

The effect of such abolition between "heredero" and "legatario" under the Spanish law is to render obsolete the
words "anulara la institucion de heredero" in article 814 of the Civil Code, because at present all devisees and
legatees, whether designated as "herederos", "legatarios," "devisees," "legatees," or any other name are to be
treatedalikeinthesensethatnoneofthemispersonallyliablefortheobligationsofthetestator,buttheproperty
assigned to each of them is burdened with a lien in favor of the creditors of the deceased. In other words, the
"instituciondeheredero"undertheSpanishlaw,wherebythe"heredero"continuesthepersonalityofthedeceased
andispersonallyliableforalltheobligationsofthelatterhasdisappearedfromthejuridicalscene.Thatbeingso,
the words "anulara la institucion de heredero" in article 814 have become useless, anomalous and anachronistic,
andshouldbeabsolutelydisregarded.Theresultintheinstantcaseisthatthechildrenofthefirstmarriageshould
be merely added as coparticipants in the short legitimate, and the will shall be in all other respects enforced.
Therefore,theshortlegitimeshouldbedividedequallyamongthechildrenofbothmarriages,whilethechildrenof
thesecondmarriageshall,inaddition,havethemejoraandtheonethirdsetasidebylawforfreedisposal.

Thereisanotherprovisionoflawwhichshouldnotbeoverlooked.Itisarticle1080oftheCivilCode,whichprovides:

Laparticionhechaconpretericiondealgunodelosherederosnoserescindira,anoserquesepruebeque
hubomalafeodoloporpartedelosotrosinteresadosperoestostendranlaobligaciondepagaralpreterido
lapartequeproporcionalmentelacorresponda.

Itistruethattheabovearticleexpresslyreferstopartitionamongtheheirs,buttheintentionofthelegislatorisclear,
that in a preterition, the partition should not be rescinded but the omitted heir should get his lawful share. By
analogy, the distribution made in the will by the testator in the present case should not be disturbed, though the
childrenofthefirstmarriageshouldgettheirportionfromtheshortlegitime.

Finally,theprinciplewhichIhereinmaintainhasbeenestablishedbythiscourtintwodecisions:Escuinvs.Escuin,
11 Phil., 332 (year 1908), and Eleazar vs. Eleazar, 37 Off. Gaz., 1782 (year 1939). In the Escuin case, Emilio
Antonio Escuin de los Santos who had no legitimate children, made a will instituting his natural father, Francisco
Escuin,andhis(testator's)wife,MariaTeresaPoncedeLeonashisuniversalheirs,whoshoulddividetheestatein
equal shares. After the testator's death, his acknowledged natural son, Emilio Escuin y Batac, claimed the entire
estate.However,thisCourtheldthathe,theacknowledgednaturalchild,wasonlyentitledtohislegitimateofone
thirdoftheestateunderarticle842,andthatthewillwas"validwithrespecttothetwothirdsofthepropertywhich
thetestatorcouldfreelydisposeof."Iquotefromthedecisioninthatcase,whichwaspennedbyMr.JusticeTorres:

With respect to the question which form the basis of this litigation and refer to the second assignment of
errors,itshouldbenotedthatthelatetestatordidnotleaveanylegitimatedescendantsorascendants,but
didleavearecognizednaturalchild,theappellantminor,andawidowthatthesaidminor,EmilioEscuiny
Batac,isthegeneralheirofhisnaturalfather,thesaidtestator,whorecognizedhimwhileliving(article807,
CivilCode),andinthepresentcaseisentitledtoonethirdofhisestate,whichamountconstitutesthelegal
portionofanaturalchild(article842ofthesaidcode)andforthereasonthattheminorwasignoredbyhis
naturalfatherinhiswill,thedesignationofheirsmadethereinwas,asamatteroffactannulledbyforceof
law,insofarasthelegalportionofthesaidminorwastherebyimpaired.Legaciesandbettermentsshallbe
valid, in so far as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot deprive the heirs of their legal
portions,exceptinthecasesexpresslyindicatedbylaw.(Arts.763,813,814,CivilCode.)

Ashasbeenseen,thetestatorwishedtodisposeofhispropertyinhiswill,designatingasheirshisnatural
father, Francisco Escuin, and his wife, Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, altogether ignoring his recognized
 naturalchildwhoishisgeneralheir.Inviewthereof,andforthereasonthatheexceededhisrights,thesaid
designationofheirsbecamevoidinsofarasitimpairedtherightofhisgeneralheiranddeprivedhimofhis
legalportionthewill,however,isvalidwithrespecttothetwothirdsofthepropertywhichthetestatorcould
freelydisposeof.(Arts.763,764,806,813,842,CivilCode.)

Notwithstandingthefactthatthedesignationofheirsisannulledandthatthelawrecognizesthetitleofthe
minor,EscuinyBatac,toonethirdofthepropertyofhisnaturalfather,ashislawfulandgeneralheir,itisnot
propertoassertthatthelateEmilioEscuindelosSantosdiedintestateinordertoestablishtheconclusion
thathisaidnaturalrecognizedchildisentitledtosucceedtotheentireestateundertheprovisionsofarticle
939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as in accordance with the law a citizen may die partly testate and partly
intestate(article764,CivilCode).Itisclearandunquestionablethatitwasthewishofthetestatortofavorhis
naturalfatherandhiswifewithcertainportionsofhispropertywhich,underthelaw,hehadarighttodispose
of by will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of his general heir was not thereby impaired, the two
formerpersonsbeingconsideredaslegateesunderthewill.

The abovementioned will is neither null, void, nor illegal in so far as the testator leaves twothirds of his
propertytohisfatherandwifetestamentaryprovisionsimpairingthelegalportionsofageneralheirshallbe
reducedinsofarastheyareillegalorexcessive.(Art.817,CivilCode.)(Emphasisours.)

Theabovedecisioniscontrollingauthorityforthepropositionthatpreteritionofanheirannulstheinstitutionofheirs
onlyinsofarasthelegitimateoftheomittedheirisimpaired,andthat,therefore,thewillisvalidwiththatlimitation
andnomore.Thedecisionandresolutionintheinstantcasewhichsetasidetheentirewillanddividetheestate
equallyamongallthechildrenonthebasicofintestacyiscontrarytothedoctrineofEscuinvs.Escuin.

ItwillbenotedthatinsaidcaseofEscuinvs.Escuin,thisCourthadinmindtheintentionofthetestator,andupheld
thewillinsofarasthenaturalchild'slegitimewasnotcurtailed,andthisCourtdidnotrequirethatthereshouldbe
anyexpressmejoraorexpresslegacy,aswasdoneinthedecisionandresolutionintheinstantcase.

IntheEleazarcase,thetestator,FranciscoEleazar,omittedinhiswillhisfatherEusebioEleazar,disinheritedhis
wife,EulaliaNagar,andinstitutedMiguelaEleazarashisuniversalheir.Thefathercontendedthattheinstitutionof
MiguelaEleazarasuniversalheirshouldbeannulledandthathe,thefather,shouldbeentitledtoalltheestateof
thedeceased.Butthiscourtrejectedthefather'stheory,saying:

The deceased, Francisco Eleazar, omitted in his last will and testament his legitimate father, the appellant
Eusebio Eleazar, expressly disinherited his lawful wife, Eulalia Nagar, and instituted the appellee herein,
Miguela Eleazar, as his universal heir. The lower court admitted the will to probate and adjudged appellant
andappelleeeachentitledtoonehalfoftheestate.

Appellantmaintaininhisappealthattheinstitutionoftheappelleeasuniversalheirshouldbeannulledand
thathebedeclaredentitledtoalltheestateofthedeceased.

Thewill,insofarasitdeprivestheappellant,aslegitimatefatherofthedeceased,ofhislegalportion,isnull
andvoid,butisvalidwithrespecttotheotherhalfwhichthetestatorcouldfreelydisposeofandwhichshould
beconsideredasalegacy.(Escuinvs.Escuin,11Phil.,332Arts.814,817,and809,CivilCode.)(Emphasis
ours.)

ItwillbenotedthatintheEleazarcase,thefreehalfwasconsideredbythiscourt"aslegacy"infavorofMiguela
Eleazaralthoughithadnotbeensoexpresslydesignatedinthewillbecausethewholeestatehadbeengivento
her.Thisispreciselymyviewinthepresentcase,butthemajoritynowstate,deviatingfromtherulingintheEleazar
case, that as the whole property is bequeathed by universal title to the children of the second marriage, "this is
inconsistent with the idea of legacy which essentially refers to a specific property bequeathed by a particular or
specialtitle."

But the majority tries to distinguish the present case from the two cases above cited, by saying that there is a
differencebetweenacasewherethewholeestateisgiventoamerefriend,andacasewherethewholepropertyis
lefttooneorsomeforcedheirs.Thisattempttolaydownadistinctionfailswhenitisconsidered:

1.Thatthelawmakesnodifferencebetweenthetwokindsofpreterition.Inbothinstancesofpreterition,therefore,
ontheauthorityofEscuinvs.Escuin,andEleazarvs.Eleazar,thewillshouldbeavoidedonlyinpart.

2. It is true that in the case of a friend, total annulment of the will would entirely deprive him of a share in the
inheritance,andthatinthecaseofsomeforcedheirsbeingthesolebeneficiariesinthewill,theywouldparticipate
equallywiththeomittedforcedheirsandwouldnotbetotallyexcluded.Butinthiscase,itwastheevidentintention
of the testator to give preference to his children of the second marriage. Moreover, I can not subscribe to the
majority'sreasoningwhenitbelievesthatthetestatorwouldbepresumedtogivetheentirefreethirdasalegacyto
afriendbutnottosomeofhischildren.Ifwearetoindulgeinanypresumptionatall,itshouldbethatthefather
wouldbeatleastasdisposedtogivethewholefreethirdasalegacytosomeofhischildrenwhoarehisown
fleshandbloodastoafriend.

3.Grantingforthesakeofargumentthatthebasisofsuchpreferencewasthemistakenbeliefthatthetestatorhad
alreadygiventhechildrenofthefirstmarriagemorethanthesharegiveninthewilltothechildrenofthesecond
marriage,whatsolutionwouldbewarrantedbylaw?Certainly,notthescrappingoftheentirewill,becausearticle
814 positively ordains that "mandas" and "mejoras" which are not inofficious shall be valid. It is too farfetched to
assumethathadnotthetestatormadeamistake,hewouldhavedividedhiswholepropertyequallyamongallhis
children.Whatsupernaturalpowersdoesanycourthavetodivinetheinwardsentimentsofthetestatortowardeach
andeveryoneofhischildren?Indeed,wouldnotasocalledequaldistributionproducerealandactualinequalityon
account of the different conditions of the various children in respect to fortune, age, mental capacity, moral
character, attitude toward the father, and so forth? This is the very reason why the law allows the testator ample
discretiontodividehisestateamonghischildren,providedthelawontheshortlegitimeisobserved.I,forone,am
notreadytoviolatethesanctuaryofthetestator'sconscience,expecttosafeguardtheshortlegitime.Solongas
thisportionisrespected,thetestatormaydisposeofthemejoraandthefreethirdinfavorofanyofhischildren.

In view of the foregoing, I believe the motion for reconsideration should be granted, and the will should be
disregardedonlyinpart,sothatthechildrenofbothmarriagesshoulddividetheshortlegitimeequally,buttherest
oftheestateshouldgo,inequalshares,tothechildrenofthesecondmarriage,inaccordancewiththeintentionof
thetestatorexpressedinthewill.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation