G.R. Nos.

79937-38 prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than

P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but
February 13, 1989 in the body of the complaint the amount of his
pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said
SUN INSURANCE vs ASUNCION,
amended complaint was admitted and the private
respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of
P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than
Facts: On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint with the RTC of
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a
Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a
supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is
declaration of its nullity against private respondent
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986,
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent is declared in
private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
default for failure to file the required answer within the
P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of
reglementary period. On the other hand, on March 28,
the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein
1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC
private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was
petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on
docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. Q-41177, initially against
April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps
docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent
and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The
appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90
complaint sought, among others, the payment of
for the docket fee considering the total amount of his
actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists
costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint
that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
did not quantify the amount of damages sought, said
P257,810.49.
amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about P50, 000,000.00. Only the
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied
amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise
defraud the government of the docket fee due to it is
his objection.
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint
but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
Issue:Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over
a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any
been paid.
additional docket fee until] the case was decided by
this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to
the fraud committed on the government, this Court
held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction
Ruling: No. The contention that Manchester cannot
over the case and that the amended complaint could
apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
complaint was null and void.
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to
The present case is among the several cases of under-
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by
as required.
this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee
In the body of the original complaint, the total amount that was paid is still insufficient considering the total
of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of
the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized
stated. The action was for the refund of the premium docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,
and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid require the private respondent to pay the same.
for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 160479. June 8, 2005
ARQUIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: The petitioners, spouses Godofredo V. Arquiza
and Remedios D. Arquiza, obtained a loan from private
respondent Equitable PCI Bank for P2.5 million. To
secure the payment thereof, the petitioners executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over their parcel of land covered
by TCT. When the spouses defaulted in the payment of
their loan, the private respondent filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. A
public auction during which the mortgaged property,
together with all the improvements existing thereon,
was sold to the private respondent as the highest
bidder. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale over the
property was issued in favor of the private respondent.
This was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City on November 22, 1999. Following the
expiry date of the redemption period without the
petitioners having exercised their right to redeem the
property, the private respondent consolidated its
ownership over the subject property. As a pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34094. The petition of
consequence, the Registry of Deeds issued TCT in the
name of the private respondent, canceling the
petitioners former title.
The petitioners filed a complaint against the private
respondent and the sheriffs with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City for the declaration of the
nullity of the promissory note, real estate mortgage
and the foreclosure sale and damages with a plea for
injunctive relief for the suspension of redemption
period. Meanwhile, the private respondent demanded
that the petitioners vacate and surrender possession of
the subject property, but the latter refused to do so.
This compelled the private respondent to file an Ex
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Issue: Whether or not the failure to attach a
certification against forum shopping is fatal to the filing
of an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession.
Whether or not the petition of the private respondent
should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Whether or not the trial court erred in not delving into
the validity of the mortgage and the foreclosure
proceeding before granting the petition for a writ of
possession.
Ruling: No. The certification against forum shopping is
required only in a complaint or other initiatory
pleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an
initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent
denominated its pleading as a petition, it is,
nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion
from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party executing it, but rather its
purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion
is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a
mere incident in the registration proceeding. Hence,
although it was denominated as a petition, it was in
substance merely a motion.
***
No. The Court rejects the contention of the
petitioners that the RTC erred in not dismissing the
petition of the private respondent on the grounds of
forum shopping and litis pendentia, in view of the
the private respondent for a writ of possession was not
an ordinary action. Any order or decision of the RTC in
LRC Case No. Q-14150(01) is not determinative of the
merits of Civil Case No. Q-98-34094.
Well established is the rule that after the consolidation
of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor
to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The
issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial
function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to
be a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in
the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be
barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.
Conversely, we reject the petitioners argument that
the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession should have been dismissed on the ground
of forum shopping. The test to determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. In other words, when litis
pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can
forum shopping exist. Having settled that litis
pendentia does not exist, it follows then that no forum
shopping likewise exists in this case.
***
No. The petitioners fault the trial court for not
delving into the validity of the mortgage and the
foreclosure proceeding before granting the petition for
a writ of possession. This contention is barren of legal
basis. The judge to whom an application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the
mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. In the
issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is left to
the trial court. Any question regarding the cancellation
of the writ or in respect of the validity and regularity of
the public sale should be determined in a subsequent
proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.
Petition is DENIED .
Manotoc vs CA
G.r. No. 130974
August 16, 2006
The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on
a valid service of summons. Without a valid service,
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to
it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a
pending action against him and assured of the
opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper
service of summons is used to protect ones right to
due process.
Facts: Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No.
63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf
of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R.
Marcos-Manotoc for Filing, Recognition and/or
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano
seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment
rendered on May 1, 1991 by the US District Court of
Honolulu, Hawaii in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et
al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil
Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased
Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence
officials of the Philippines allegedly under the
command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance,
sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then
Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial
court issued a Summons on July 6, 1993 addressed to
petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corp
or Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco
Avenue, Pasig City. On July 15, 1993, the Summons
and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served
upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned
earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the
trial court declared her in default through an
Order dated October 13, 1993.
On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special
appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her
person due to an invalid substituted service of
summons. The grounds to support the motion
were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the
Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling,
residence, or regular place of business as provided in
Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party
(de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place;
(3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal
and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4)
defendant was a resident of Singapore; and (5)
whatever judgment rendered in this case would be
ineffective and futile.
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected
Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its
findings that her residence, for purposes of the
Complaint, was AlexandraHomes, Unit E-2104, No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the
documentary evidence of respondent Trajano.
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded
Manotocs plea for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Court of Appeals which the
appellate court dismissed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether there was a valid substituted service
of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction.
Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court. In an
action strictly in personam, personal service on the
defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be
served with the summons within a reasonable period,
then substituted service can be resorted to. While
substituted service of summons is permitted, it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the
usual method of service. Hence, it must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules.
A meticulous scrutiny of the Sheriffs Return readily
reveals the absence of material data on the serious
efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in
person. Wanting in detailed information, the Return
deviates from the ruling in Domagas v. Jensen and
other related cases that the pertinent facts and
circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the
summons personally must be narrated in the Return.
 Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners
address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such
summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the
Complaint only states that respondents were informed,
and so [they] allege about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner.
It is also required t that the summons must be left
with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in
defendants house or residence. Thus, there are two
(2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must
be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2)
recipient must reside in the house or residence of
defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz,
aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la
Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed
out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist
and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is
doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner
Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a
married woman of her stature in society would unlikely
hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With
the petitioners allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not
her employee, servant, or representative, it is
necessary to have additional information in the Return
of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruzs refusal
to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary relation
of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners
right to due process by being accorded proper notice of
a case against her, the substituted service of summons
must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid
substituted service, the proceedings held before the
trial court perforce must be annulled.
Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 88105
December 18, 1989
FECUNDO vs BERJAMEN
Facts:
Petitioner's recourse to this Court is basically founded
on the contention that public respondent's above
described conduct, particularly in the election case
pending before him, involving petitioner (as protestee)
and private respondent (as protestant) is not in
consonance with the standard of cold neutrality of an
impartial judge and thus he cannot render a fair and
impartial decision in the case.
Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition before the
respondent judge with notice of hearing. Respondent
judge denied the motion for non-compliance with the
three (3) day notice rule. No motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner due to
respondent-judge's statement in open court on 8 May
1989 that:
If you intend to file another pleadings, (sic] you can do
and the Court will cross the bridge when it comes to it,
without considering the merits and demerits of this
motion, the Court resolved to deny said motion. So, if
you file another one, the Court will just deny when it
received (sic) it.
These manifestations of alleged partiality to private
respondent (or perhaps, antipathy to petitioner) and
the fact that petitioner's counsel was not allegedly
furnished a copy of the 10 February 1988 order are
cited in support of the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction when he denied the motion to inhibit for
non-compliance with the 3-day notice rule.
Whether the respondent judges actions in the present
case constitutes bias and impartiality.
Ruling: No. Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
requires that notice of a motion be served by the
movant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof. Section 5 of the same Rule
provides that the notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, and shall state the time and place for the
hearing of the motion. A motion which does not meet
the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk has no right to receive and the court
has no authority to act upon. Service of copy of a
motion containing notice of the time and place of
hearing of said motion is a mandatory requirement.
No. The respondent judge did not commit bias
and impartiality. However, the Court stated that while
bias and prejudice are not to be presumed especially if
weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his
oath of office to administer justice without respect to
person, the Court has at the same time admonished
judges to so conduct themselves and exercise their
discretion in a way that the peoples' and litigants' all-
important confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary' is ever nurtured and upheld.
While the procedural tactics and/or motives of
petitioner's counsel may not be all too laudable, as it
was, for instance, impossible for him to be unaware of
the 10 February 1988 order, yet, the language
employed by the respondent judge in his 10 February
1988 order and even in his comment on the petition at
bar, manifests at the very least an exasperation
bordering on indignation at petitioner and his tactics,
which may unnecessarily cloud his impartiality in
deciding the election case at hand. A spotless
dispensation of justice requires not only that the
decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the
judge rendering it must, at all times, maintain the
appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language,
both written and spoken, must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued
construed. Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 181303
September 17, 2009
MALANA vs TAPPA
Facts: Petitioners inherited the subject property from
Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.
During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed
Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to
Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern
portion of the subject property. Anastacio and
Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said
land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might
need it. But Consuelos family members continued to
occupy the subject property even after her death,
already building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject
property. Averring that they already needed it,
petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the
same. Respondents, however, refused to heed
petitioners demand.
During barangay conciliation, petitioner averred that
respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified,
and incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership
over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a
cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus,
petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a
Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.
Before respondents could file their Answer, the RTC
issued an Order dismissing petitioners Complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint.
They argued that their principal cause of action was for
quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included
merely to enable them to seek complete relief from
respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have
been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the MTC that
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where
the assessed value of real property does not
exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of
subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386
was P410.00, the real action involving the same was
outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as
Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders
dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their
Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier
argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
states that an action to quiet title falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended
that there was no obstacle to their joining the two
causes of action, i.e., quieting of title
and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing
Rumarate v. Hernandez. And even if the two causes of
action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that
the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a
ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion. It clarified that
their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling: No. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed
by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the
general circumstances in which a person may file a
petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphasis ours.)
As the aforequoted provision states, a petition for
declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further
provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet
title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis
ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for
the reformation of an instrument, recognized under
Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action
to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the
Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership
required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with
a right to repurchase. These three remedies are
considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry
the judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be
read together with those of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is
only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint
involving title to and possession of the said property is
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC,
not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach
or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately available;
and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission
of wrongs.
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting
of title was filed after petitioners already demanded
and respondents refused to vacate the subject
property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only
subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership
over the subject property before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they
had already been deprived of the possession of their
property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a
case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a
suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An
accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object
ones recovery of possession over the real property as
owner.
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations
for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an
action would depend on the value of the property
involved. Given that the subject property herein is
valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC,
has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.
The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners
Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO
TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental
Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO
TIRO, respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and
Rogelio Tiro, contractor by professions, bought tickets
bound for Tagbilaran City on December 31, 1971. They
boarded the vessel M/S Sweet Hope and upon learning
that the vessel was not heading to Bohol, because
most of the passengers were bound for Surigao,
private respondents upon advice, went to the branch
office of petitioner for relocation to M/S Sweet Town.
The latter vessel was already filled to capacity that in
effect forced the respondents to agree to hide at the
cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the
Philippine Coastguard. Thus, private respondents sued
petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of
carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before
respondents Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. This motion was premised
on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, i.e.,
Condition No. 14, which reads:
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and public policy to make the courts accessible to all who
all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions may have need of their services.
of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be
filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. G.R. No. L-35059 February 27, 1973

The motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioner ANTONIO T. TIONGSON, petitioner, vs.
moved to reconsider the order of denial, but no avail.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PASCUAL
Hence, this instant petition for prohibition for
ARNOBIT, CARLOS UBALDO, RAFAEL LAPENA,
preliminary injunction, alleging that the respondent
MARCELINO FELIXMENA, LUDOVICO ANTONIO
judge has departed from the accepted and usual
GALLIGUEZ, MARIANO MATEO, FORTUNATO
course of judicial proceeding and had acted without or
VILLASISTA, MELCHOR DE GUZMAN, MARCELINA
in excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in gross
SANTIAGO, TRANQUILINO CAYOG, JOSE GUBA,
abuse of discretion.
MARIANO NAZARENO, BIENVENIDO NATIVIDAD,
ISSUE: Whether the venue indicated in the ticket is VICTOR NEMENIO, MARCELINO MOLINA, and
valid and binding between the parties HERMINIGILDO MATEO, respondents.

HELD: ANTONIO, J.:

No, because condition No. 14 is subversive of FACTS

public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For,
Petitioner is the owner of the Green Valley Farm
although venue may be changed or transferred from
devoted to palay and secondary crops. Private
one province to another by agreement of the parties in
respondents are petitioner's tenants of said land. An
writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
ejectment suit was initially filed by petitioner with the
such an agreement will not be held valid where it
Court of Agrarian Relations against the private
practically negates the action of the claimants, such as
respondents which culminated in a judgment by
the private respondents herein.
compromise dated April 8, 1968, embodying the terms
The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of and conditions of the amicable settlement of the
venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as parties as regards their share tenancy relationship.This
well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of was amended by an order dated May 22, 1968 where
justice. Considering the expense and trouble a the court fixed the sharing basis of the parties and
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to what items are deductible from the gross produce.
prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most
On October 28, 1968, another action for ejectment
probably decide not to file the action at all. The
was filed by petitioner against the same respondents
condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends
on the ground that respondents violated the terms and
of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
conditions of the judgment by compromise. In answer
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its
to the complaint, respondents raised the defenses of
vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these
res judicata. The trial court rendered judgment
places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of
ordering the ejectment of the defendants.
Misamis Oriental, as was done in the instant case, will
not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice,
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
petitioner.
contending that the lower court erred in not dismissing
the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
Public policy is that principle of the law which holds
as it is barred by prior judgment. The Court of Appeals
that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which
ruled in favour of the respondents ruling out that the
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against
present case is barred by prior judgment (judgment by
the public good. Under this principle, freedom of
compromise is CAR case 1605-P-67). According to the
contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the
Court of Appeals, all the elements necessary to the
good of the public. Clearly, Condition No. 14, if
application of the petition of the principle of res
enforced, will be subversive of the public good or
judicata are present in the case and the prior judgment
interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases,
in CAR case 1605-P-67 is final and executor. The court
actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus
rendering the same had jurisdiction over the subject-
placing Petitioner Company at a decided advantage
matter and the parties, there is identity of parties, of
over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate
subject-matter and cause of action between the two
claims against it. The said condition should, therefore,
cases, and the prior judgment is on the merits. The
be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to
prior judgment in CAR case 1605-P-67 having the
sanction of the court, and entered as its determination
of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any
other judgment.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it
was also denied. The petitioner interposed the present
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellate Court misapplied
the doctrine of res judicata in reversing the judgment
of the Agrarian Court
HELD:
It must be noted that the principle of "res judicata"
embraces two different concepts. The first is "bar by
former judgment" and the other, "conclusiveness of
judgment." There is no question that where as
between the first case where the judgment is rendered
and the second case where such judgment is invoked,
there is identity of parties, subject-matter and cause of
action, the judgment on the merits in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action
not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but
also as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and to all matters
that could have been adjudged in that case. This is
designated as "bar by former judgment."
But where the second action between the same parties
is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or judgment was
rendered. In fine, the previous judgment is conclusive
in the second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the rule on
"conclusiveness of judgment" embodied in subdivision
(c) of Section 49 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
In the case at bar, the cause of action of petitioner is
upon a different claim or demand. The action of
petitioner was predicated upon the violation by the
private respondents of the terms and conditions of the
judgment by compromise rendered by the Agrarian
Court on April 8, 1968, as amended by its order of May
22, 1968. As to whether or not private respondents
violated the terms and conditions thereof by defiantly
refusing to use certified fertilizers recommended by an
agriculturist and maliciously failed and refused to use
tractor offered for their use by petitioner resulting in
substantial damage and prejudice to the latter, are
matters which were not actually and directly
controverted and determined in the previous case.
These are new facts which occurred subsequent to the
first judgment.
A judgment is not and may not be considered as
operating as an estoppel as to facts which did not
occur or rights which did not accrue until after the
particular judgment was rendered and which were not
involved in the suit in which it was rendered.
It was therefore error for the Appellate Court to
reverse the decision of the Agrarian Court and dismiss
the complaint on the ground of res judicata
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reversing the appellate court's
decision and returning the case to it for decision on the
merits.
But respondents-tenants were clearly wrongfully
ordered ejected from their landholding by the agrarian
court, notwithstanding their appeal, since under our
decision in Quilantang vs. Court of Appeals (L-34212,
Dec. 13, 1972) they are entitled under section 36 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844) "to
continue in the enjoyment and possession of (their)
landholding except when (their) dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory."
Respondents-tenants are therefore clearly entitled to
reinstatement pending decision on the merits of their
appeal by the Court of Appeals to which we have
ordered the case returned for decision on the merits.
In the interest of avoiding further delay in respondent-
tenants' obtaining the reinstatement and possession
which the law unqualifiedly grants them pending final
decision on the merits on their appeal (which
reinstatement has already been long delayed and
which will necessarily be further delayed,
notwithstanding the Court's directive that the appellate
court immediately issue such reinstatement order, due
to the mechanics of remanding the records of the case
to the said court), I vote that such immediate
reinstatement order should be issued directly by this
Court. I therefore dissent from the decision insofar as
it fails and declines to issue such reinstatement order
and to grant respondents' urgent petition expressly
praying for such reinstatement order from this Court.
This Court's authority to issue such order cannot be
seriously questioned nor can any valid technical or
procedural objection be raised against its directly
issuing such order in the decision at bar.
Concepcion, C.J., Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.,
concurs and dissents.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reversing the appellate court's
decision and returning the case to it for decision on the
merits.
But respondents-tenants were clearly wrongfully
ordered ejected from their landholding by the agrarian
court, notwithstanding their appeal, since under our
decision in Quilantang vs. Court of Appeals (L-34212,
Dec. 13, 1972) they are entitled under section 36 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844) "to
continue in the enjoyment and possession of (their)
landholding except when (their) dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory."
Respondents-tenants are therefore clearly entitled to
reinstatement pending decision on the merits of their
appeal by the Court of Appeals to which we have
ordered the case returned for decision on the merits.
In the interest of avoiding further delay in respondent-
tenants' obtaining the reinstatement and possession
which the law unqualifiedly grants them pending final
decision on the merits on their appeal (which
reinstatement has already been long delayed and
which will necessarily be further delayed,
notwithstanding the Court's directive that the appellate
court immediately issue such reinstatement order, due
to the mechanics of remanding the records of the case
to the said court), I vote that such immediate
reinstatement order should be issued directly by this
Court. I therefore dissent from the decision insofar as
it fails and declines to issue such reinstatement order
and to grant respondents' urgent petition expressly
praying for such reinstatement order from this Court.
This Court's authority to issue such order cannot be
seriously questioned nor can any valid technical or
procedural objection be raised against its directly
issuing such order in the decision at bar.
G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012
SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Petitioner, vs MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing
business under the trade name KARENS TRADING,
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, GODOFREDO
GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO
BAETIONG,
BRION, J.:
FACTS
A breach of contract was claimed by petitioner against
Leticia Magsalin, doing business as Karens Trading, for
the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of
parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners Makati
City condominium project called The Regency.
Petitioner sent a notice to respondent respondent FGU
Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding
damages pursuant to the surety and performance
bonds the former had issued for the subcontract. On
April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint for
breach of contract against both Magsalin and FGU
Insurance. FGU Insurance was duly served with
summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the
corresponding officers return declared that both she
and Karens Trading could not be located at their given
addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new
addresses could not be determined. In August 2002,
FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The
motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing
motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was
obliged to file an answer.
In an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction
over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to
serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of
publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its
reply to FGU Insurances answer. FGU Insurance filed a
motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint
and claimed that the three had executed counter-
guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it
executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence,
should be held jointly and severally liable.
The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied
the motion to serve summons by publication on the
ground that the action against respondent Magsalin
was in personam. In May 2003, the RTC issued a
notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003.
FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on
the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet
filed their answer. The motion was granted.
In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-
party complaint and denied any personal knowledge
about the surety and performance bonds for the
subcontract with Magsalin. Of the three (3) persons
named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed
an answer to the third-party complaint; the officers
returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both
could not be located at their given addresses.
Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and Baetiong does
not dispute, that it was not served with a copy of
Baetiongs answer.
The petitioner argues that FGU Insurance, which is the
plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to
exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It
suggests that a motion to serve summons by
publication should have been filed for this purpose. The
petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have
scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the
summons to the third-party defendants.
The Trial Court rendered order in favour of the
respondents stating the dismissal was due to the
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute. The RTC denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration, prompting the
latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41
petition for review.
CA ruled that the dismissal raised by FGU Insurance
base on ground of lack of jurisdiction is a pure
question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings
before the issuance of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order. The CA agreed with FGU Insurance
and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: 1) Whether dismissal order is void
2) Whether the appeal was properly filed under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court
HELD:
1. The dismissal order is void.
The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face.
It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but
does not state the facts on which this conclusion is
based.
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December
16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified
order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with
prejudice. Dismissals of actions (under Section 3)
which do not expressly state whether they are with or
without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.
As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003
dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on
the merits so that the petitioners complaint in Civil
Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the
principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a
complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the
dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of
an adjudication on the merits. As an adjudication on
the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order
conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court
on the writing of valid judgments and final orders
The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates
this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the
petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus,
neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to
know the particular facts that had prompted the
prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed
to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to
take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of
its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had
it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the
trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order
does not say.
2. The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court
In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise
that since the facts presented in the petitioners appeal
were admitted and not disputed, the appeal must
thereby raise a pure question of law proscribed in an
ordinary appeal. This premise was effectively the legal
principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v.
Navarro,cited by the CA in its April 8, 2005 resolution.
Respondent FGU Insurance thus contends that the
proper remedy to assail the dismissal of Civil Case No.
02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
The reliance on Joaquin is misplaced as it is based on
the conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8,
2005 resolution i.e., that the pleading of undisputed
facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance
is inattentive to both the averments of the subject
appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative
legal principle in Joaquin is this: [W]here a case is
submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the
facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the
correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
question is one of law which [is properly subject to the
review of this Court. In this case, as already pointed
out above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial
courts conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in
the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin.
An authority material to this case is the case of Olave
v. Mistas. Directly addressed in Olave was the CAs
jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by
undisputed facts and seeking the review of a
prejudicial order of dismissal.
Among the critical factual questions were whether,
based on the records, there had been factual basis for
the dismissal of the subject complaint. This same
question is particularly significant in the present case
given that the order appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No.
83096 does not even indicate the factual basis for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488. Due to the absence
of any stated factual basis, and despite the admissions
of the parties, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096, still co-administrator of the joint estate of the Figueras
had to delve into the records to check whether facts to spouses.
justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 appears to have Consequently, in the civil case, respondents filed a
been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16, Joint Motion to Dismiss after Obando had rested his
2003 dismissal order does not state if it was issued case. The respondents built their evidence around the
upon the respondents or the trial courts motion), the loss of his legal standing to pursue the case. The trial
facts to be determined by the CA should include the court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case
grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules without prejudice. Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for
of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio Reconsideration to no avail. The Court of Appeals
dismissal pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this likewise dismissed his Petition for Certiorari and
rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject Mandamus and affirmed the dismissal Order of the
matter. These grounds are matters of facts. Thus, RTC.
given that the dismissal order does not disclose its
ISSUES:
factual basis, we are thus persuaded that the
petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the
1. Whether a motion to dismiss filed after the
dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
responsive pleadings were already made can still be
granted
[G.R. No. 134854. January 18, 2000]
2. Whether Obando lose his legal personality to
FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and the ESTATES of JOSE
prosecute the civil case and his conviction for estafa
FIGUERAS and DOA ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE
through falsification and the revocation of his
FIGUERAS, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO F. FIGUERAS
appointment as administrator, both of which are on
andAMIGO REALTY CORPORATION as represented by
appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil
ANTONIO A. KAW, respondents.
case
PANGANIBAN, J.:
RULING:
FACTS:
1. Yes, a motion to dismiss filed after the
Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of responsive pleadings can still be granted.
the deceased spouses. Before both intestacies begun,
The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon
Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of a will
the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of
identified as Doa Alegrias Last Will and Testament as
the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion
filed by the petitioner and nephew of Doa Alegria. The
to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary
alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and
period for filing a responsive pleading. Thus, a motion
others some of the properties left by the Figueras
to dismiss alleging improper venue cannot be
couple. When the probate case was consolidated with
entertained unless made within that period.
the intestate proceedings, Petitioner Obando was
appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint
However, even after an answer has been filed, the
estates.
Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of
Thereafter, Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a
jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of
forgery. NBI found that the questioned and the
action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that
standard signatures were not made by the same
would constitute a ground for dismissal. Except for lack
person. This led to the indictment and the conviction of
of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds
Petitioner Obando in Criminal Case 90-85819 for estafa
under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a
through falsification of a public document.
particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no
Subsequently, the probate court denied Eduardos motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary
Motion for authority to sell the aforementioned two period, it is generally considered waived under Section
parcels of land in New Manila. Despite such denial, 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.
Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the
Thus, petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-
respondents did not waive their right to move for the
administrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria, filed a
dismissal of the civil case based on Petitioner Obandos
Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the
lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it
nullification of the sale. However, the probate court, in
was only after he had been convicted of estafa through
its Order removed Petitioner Obando from his office as
falsification that the probate court divested him of his
representation of the Figueras estates. It was only
then that this ground became available to the
respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they
waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss filed after
their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses
his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as
in the present controversy, the defendant should be
allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse
of the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading.
2. Petitioner did not lose his legal capacity and
such did not constitute sufficient ground to dismiss the
civil case
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal
from administration are on appeal only means that his
legal standing could be restored. Thus, the civil case
was correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his
conviction is reversed and his appointment restored by
the probate court, the case may continue without
being barred by res judicata. The lower courts Decision
showed that it was careful in its action.
On the other hand, Obando has yet to show that he
has regained administration of the Figueras estates.
Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from office
was predicated not only on his conviction for a crime,
but also on his failure to render an accounting of the
rentals of a property leased to the Community of
Learners.
G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009
JOSEPHINE MARMO,*NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL
PILAR and MARISA DEL PILAR, Petitioners versus
MOISES O. ANACAY, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for
Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages
against the petitioners. Josephine, petitioner, was
actually authorized by the petitioner to sell the subject
property. She sold the property to petitioner Danilo for
P520,000.00, payable in monthly instalments.
However, Danilo defaulted in his installment payments.
The respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.
815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was
issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioner Josephine
subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo;
TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name.
The respondent sought the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the cancellation of TCT No. T-
991035; in the alternative, he demanded petitioner
Danilos payment of the balance. In her Answer,
petitioner Josephine averred, among others, that the
respondents children, as co-owners of the subject
property, should have been included as plaintiffs
because they are indispensable parties. Petitioner
Danilo echoed petitioner Josephines submission in his
Answer.
Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss the case for the respondents
failure to include his children as indispensable parties.
The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his
children are not indispensable parties because the
issue in the case can be resolved without their
participation in the proceedings.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. After the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners
elevated their case to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They
charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not dismissing the
case after the respondent failed to include
indispensable parties.
The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioners moved
for reconsideration but to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents children are
indispensable parties
HELD: The respondents children are not indispensable
parties.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without
whom there can be no final determination of an action
and who, for this reason, must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence further holds
that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an
interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but
also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting this interest or without placing
the controversy in a situation where the final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. He is a person whose absence
disallows the court from making an effective,
complete, or equitable determination of the
controversy between or among the contending parties.