PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

Negros Oriental Planters Association vs. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental

Branch 52 and Camos
G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008
Case No.: 1

Facts:

Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement. Campos allegedly paid in full, but was only able to receive a partial delivery of the
molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered. More than
six years after NOPA filed its answer, NOPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of an alleged
failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately
concealed in his complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value
of the withdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees. RTC
denied the motion to dismiss. CA dismissed petition for certiorari ruling that there was no
substantial compliance with the procedural requirements because petitioner failed to allege in
its verification that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records and failure to attach the necessary documents on its pleadings as
required by Section 1, Rule 65, Rules in Civil Procedure.

Issue:

Whether or not CA committed error?

Ruling:

No.

Clearly, the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule 7 was in order to make
the verification requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath
that he
Believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he
has knowledge that such statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically
alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records. A
pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is merely based on the partys knowledge and
belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
remedied.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the
deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPAs motion for reconsideration
with attached amended petition for certiorari. As ruled in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, decisions of a
trial court which "lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or
criminal at law or in equity. Where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting the
substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in appellate proceedings is made
absolute by the express terms of the statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to
declare that where the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the
substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a
clear and affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise,
or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper exercise under a
misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings
had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and
in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is
not a wilful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion
which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands
of equity and justice

Quo Warranto, Service of Summons, Support, Dismissal of Action by Prescription of the Right to
File an Action, Default, Evidence, Promissory Estoppel, Posting of Bonds, Execution of
Judgement, Redemption Period
 QUO WARRANTO

Ferdinand Topacio vs. Associate Justice of the SANDIGANBAYAN Gregory Santos Ong and
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008
Case No.: 2

Facts:

The Petitioner filed a Letter-Request/ Complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
initiate a post haste quo warranto proceeding against Associate Justice Ong (Ong) of the
Sandiganbayan, in conjunction with the case of Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita in which the
Court enjoined Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court until the issue on his natural-born citizenship is decided in an adversarial
proceeding. Ong filed a Petition for the Amendment/Correction of Annotation of an entry in his
Certificate of Birth with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Hence, the OSG informed petitioner that
it cannot favorably act on his request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the RTC case
attains finality.

Petitioner assails the position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, and
questions Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed?

2. Whether or not the Office of the Solicitor General committed a grave abuse of discretion in its
decision for not filing a quo warranto petition against Asscociate Justice Ong?

Ruling:

The petition is dismissed.

1. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.

The court treated the case as a petition for quo warranto because it effectively seeks to declare
the appointment of Associate Justice Ong as associate justice of Sandiganbayan null and void
being unconstitutional. Being a collateral attack to the public officers title, the present petition
for Certiorari and prohibition should be dismissed. The title to a public officers office cannot be
contested except directly by a quo warranto proceeding .

2. The Solicitor General did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to file the petition.

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OSG. It is within the powers of the
solicitor general to turn down or suspend the institution of a petition for quo warranto where
there are just valid reasons. After studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-
litigating the same issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the
RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping.

Further, the court ruled that the present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,
given Ongs and declared that Ong may turn out to be a de jure officer or a de facto officer whose
office may not be contested except by a writ of quo warranto, which contingencies will depend
on the outcome of the RTC case.
Finally, the court also noted that the petition is defectively verified because it was
acknowledged before a notary public who happens to be the petitioners father, contrary to the
Rules of Court and the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004.
 JUDGMENT/DECISION

Sari-Sari Group of Companies vs. Piglas Kamao

G.R. No. 164624 August 11, 2008
Case No.: 3

Facts:

Mariko Novel Wares, Inc. (petitioner) began its retail outlet operations under the name "Sari-
Sari" in the basement of Robinson's Galleria in Quezon City. Respondents organized a union
known as Piglas Kamao (Sari-Sari Chapter). At the time of the formation, the officers of the
union were respondents Ronnie Tamayo, President; Jose del Carmen, Vice-President; and
Jocelyne Padua, Secretary. On December 14, 1993, respondent union filed a petition for
certification elections with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Meanwhile, respondents were informed of the petitioner's plan to close the basement level
store to give way to the opening of a Sari-Sari outlet on the third floor of Robinson's Galleria.
Respondents were supposed to be absorbed in other Sari-Sari store branches. During the month
of January 1994, petitioner's managerial staff approached union members to express
disapproval of the union membership. On the next day, petitioner notified DOLE and the
respondents of the closure of the Galleria branch due to irreversible losses and non-extension of
the lease of the store premises, to be effective on February 28, 1994. Moreover, the respondents
were told that they would not be absorbed in the other branches of the petitioner because of
redundancy.

All of these instances led the respondents file a case for unfair labor practice. Both LA and NLRC
dismissed the illegal dismissal case but CA reversed the decision stating that the petitioners
failed to show proof regarding the irreversible losses.

Because of this, petitioners appealed where one of their contentions is that the CA erred in
recognizing the case as the requirements of certification of non-forum shopping was not met.

Issue:

Would respondent Jose del Carmens lone verification suffice to meet the requirements of
certification of non-forum shopping?

Ruling:

Yes.

A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification and
noncompliance with those for Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification, non-
compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the
court may order a correction if Verification is lacking; or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

In the case at bar, respondent Jose del Carmen shares a common interest with the other
respondents as to the resolution of the labor dispute between them and the petitioner. They
collectively sued the petitioner for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices and have
collectively appealed the NLRC decision. Similarly, there is sufficient basis for Jose del Carmen
to speak on behalf of his co-respondents in stating that they have not filed any action or claim
involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor is there any other pending action or
claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, even if only respondent Jose
del Carmen signed the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping, the rule on substantial compliance
applies. The CA therefore did not commit any error in entertaining the appeal of the
respondents.
 MANDAMUS/QUESTION OF LAW

Altres vs. Empleo

G.R. No. 180986 December 10, 2008
Case. No.: 4
Facts:

Sometime in July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions
in the city government to the CSC. The city government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to
publicly announce the existence of the vacant positions. Petitioners and other applicants
submitted their applications for the different positions where they felt qualified. Toward the
end of his term or on May 27, June 1, and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to
petitioners.

In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued Resolution No. 04-242 addressed
to the CSC Iligan City Field Office requesting a suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city government as of March 19, 2004
until the enactment of a new budget. The Sangguniang Panglungsod subsequently issued
Resolution No. 04-266 which, in view of its stated policy against "midnight appointments,"
directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management Office to hold in abeyance the
transmission of all appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor.

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of
funds for the payment of salaries and wages of petitioners, as required by Section 1(e)(ii), Rule
V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998

The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments
issued to petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of availability of funds.

On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in Cotabato City, by Decision of
July 30, 2004, dismissed the appeal, it explaining that its function in approving appointments is
only ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed by the civil service
law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it without delving into the reasons why the
requirement was not complied with.

Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City the above-stated petition for mandamus
against respondent Empleo or his successor in office for him to issue a certification of
availability of funds for the payment of the salaries and wages of petitioners, and for his co-
respondents or their successors in office to sign the position description forms.

As stated early on, Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners petition for mandamus.
It held that, among other things, while it is the ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify
as to the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenses and obligations may properly be
charged under Section 474(b)(4) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification as to
availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of petitioners as this ministerial
function pertains to the city treasurer. In so holding, the trial court relied on Section 344 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration in which they maintained only their
prayer for a writ of mandamus for respondent Empleo or his successor in office to issue a
certification of availability of funds for the payment of their salaries and wages. The trial court
denied the motion by Order of October 22, 2007, hence, the present petition.
Issue:

Whether it is Section 474(b)(4) or Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii),
Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of 1998?

Ruling:

On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that

all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that
the persons who have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal
knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any
action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule, however, admits of an
exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign
the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the outright dismissal
of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.

With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other
petitioners to sign as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing
the case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the
case.

The trial court thus erred in relying on Section 344 of the Local Government Code of
1991 in ruling that the ministerial function to issue a certification as to availability of funds for
the payment of the wages and salaries of petitioners pertains to the city treasurer. For at the
time material to the required issuance of the certification, the appointments issued to
petitioners were not yet approved by the CSC, hence, there were yet no services performed to
speak of. In other words, there was yet no due and demandable obligation of the local
government to petitioners.

In fine, whenever a certification as to availability of funds is required for purposes other

than actual payment of an obligation which requires disbursement of money, Section 474(b)(4)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies, and it is the ministerial duty of the city
accountant to issue the certification.

The Court declares that it is Section 474(b)(4), not Section 344, of the Local Government
Code of 1991, which applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds under
Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of
1998.
 FORUM SHOPPING

United Paragon Mining Corp., (UPMC) v Court of Appeals (CA)

G.R. No. 150959, August 04, 2006
497 SCRA 638,647-648
Case No.: 5

Facts:

1. Cesario F. Ermita, private respondent, was a regular employee working as a foreman of

United Paragon, petitioner.
2. On 1/18/1996, Cesario received a termination letter bearing the signature Feliciano M.
Daniel, personnel superintendent, informing him that his employment as a foreman is
terminated effective thirty days after his receipt of the letter on the ground of Cesarios
violation of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee.
3. As a result of termination, the matter was brought to the grievance machinery as
mandated by the CBA. Having failed to reach a settlement thereat, they agreed to submit
the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
4. Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered decision in favor of Cesario on the ground that
his termination was unjustified because it was arrived at through misapprehension of
facts. Stated in the decision is the immediate reinstatement of private respondent
without loss of seniority nor interruption of service, and to pay him his back wages.
5. UPMC sought to avert the decision by offering a separation pay instead because his
position has already been filled up; and reinstatement is no longer appropriate in view
of the supposed strained relations between Cesario and UPMC. However, it was denied
by the voluntary arbitrator.
6. UPMC elevate the case to CA through Superintendent Daniel, asserting the VA Mendez
committed grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of
substantial justice.
7. CA without going into the merits of petition, dismissed the same on the ground that
petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy in order to seek review or nullify
decision or final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter; and the verification in the petition is
ineffective and insufficient because it was merely signed by the companys
superintendent without alleging or showing that he is authorized for said purpose and
that the verification was based on knowledge and information. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON CA erred in dismissing the petition after finding that verification portion of the
petition was ineffective and insufficient in the absence of allegation or showing that
Superintendent Daniel was duly authorized to file the petition.

Ruling:

NO. There is no reversible error committed by the CA.

It has thus been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any
court is lodged with its BOD that exercises its corporate powers.
Daniel has no right to file the petition in behalf of the corporation without any authority
from its board of directors. It is basic in law that a corporation has a legal personality entirely
separate and distinct from that of its officers and the latter cannot act for and on behalf without
being so authorized by its governing board.
Given the reality that the petition was filed by Daniel in behalf of and in representation
of petitioner UPMC without an enabling resolution of the latters BOD, that petition was fatally
defective, inclusive of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed by
Daniel Himself.
 CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. NO.175049, November 27, 2008
Case No: .6
Facts:

The spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin were the owners of a parcel of
agricultural land in Iligan City. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria administered the subject
property with Virgilio. On 16 February 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio executed a Deed of Sale over
the subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste.

Upon Hilarias death, Juan Nanaman, Gregorios brother, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate). On June
16, 1956, Edilberto Noel was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel
cannot take possession of the subject property since it was already in Delestes possession.
Thus, Noel filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property to
the Estate.

While case was still pending, Presidential decree No. 27 was issued which mandated
that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer Program and
be awarded to farmer beneficiaries. In accordance therewith, the subject property was placed
under the Operation Land Transfer Program. On 12 February 1984, the Department of Agrarian
Reform issued Certificate of Land Transfer in the names of herein private respondents, the
tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. Subsequently, Original Certificates of Title
and Emancipation Patents were issued in favor of the private respondents over their respective
portions of the subject property.

Deleste passed away sometime in 1992. The Heirs of Deleste, filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents EPs. DARAB held that the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of Deleste who
should informed the DAR of the pendency of the Civil Case at the time the property was placed
under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer Program. The Heirs of Deleste filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the Motion was denied by the DARAB. The Heirs of Deleste thereafter
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The petition was denied as material
portions of the record and supporting papers were not attached thereto, in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 43.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioners failure to attach to their petition the duplicate originals or certified true
copies of some of their annexes, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

2. Whether failure of all the petitioners to sign the Special Power of Attorney to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping on their behalf is fatal to the petition.

Ruling:

1. No. Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court does not require that all supporting
papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate original or certified true copies.
What it explicitly directs is that all petitions originally filed before the Court of Appeals shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution or ruling subject thereto. Similarly, under Rule 65, governing the remedies of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitions for the same need to be accompanied only by
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned judgment, order or resolution.
Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to such petitions may be mere machine
copies thereof.

2. Yes. Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not therefore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
 VERIFICATION

THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, v. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, ET AL.,

Respondents.
G.R. No.L-14174. October 31, 1960
Case No. : 7

Facts:

On September 30, 1950, respondents Pedro B. Bautista, Dativa Corrales Bautista, Inocencio C.
Campos, and the Flash Taxi Company jointly and severally applied for and obtained a credit
accommodation from the petitioner bank in the sum of P100,000.00, and as security therefore
executed in favor of the bank, in one single document, a real estate mortgage over four parcels
of land, and a chattel mortgage on some movie equipment and thirty taxicabs.

Respondents having failed to pay the total amount of P128,902.42 due on the credit
accommodation referred to, the petitioner bank procured the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended, and at the foreclosure sale
on January 9, 1956, the bank acquired the properties mortgaged as the highest bidder for the
sum of P68,365.60.

Claiming a balance of P62,749.72 still due from respondents on their credit accommodation, the
petitioner bank, instead of foreclosing respondents chattel mortgage, filed against them on May
22, 1956, for the collection of said balance.

On June 29, 1956, respondents confessed judgment and accordingly, the lower court, on June 30,
1956, rendered judgment ordering defendants to pay the plaintiff bank, jointly and severally,
the sum of P62,749.72, with interest thereon at the rate of 7% per annum from May 22, 1956
until the said amount is fully paid.

On September 18, 1956, the court issued an order to execute said judgment; it does not appear,
though, that plaintiff sought the enforcement of the writ of execution. On April 24, 1957, the
court issued another order for the execution of the judgment. The sheriff sold the rights,
interests, or participation of respondents in the certificate of public convenience in question to
the plaintiff bank as the highest bidder for the amount of P60,371.25, and two days later, on May
15, the sheriff issued to plaintiff the corresponding certificate of sale. On June 13, 1957, the
plaintiff bank filed with the court a petition praying for the confirmation of the sale, which
petition respondents did not oppose at the hearing thereof. On June 8, 1957 the court below
issued an order confirming said sale.

Sometime thereafter, plaintiff bank sold all its rights, interests, or participation in the certificate
of public convenience in question to Alberto Cruz for the sum of P66,000. On June 18, 1957, the
Public Service Commission provisionally approved the sale of said certificate from the
respondents to the plaintiff bank, and from the bank to Alberto Cruz, and pursuant to the
provisional authority granted him by the Commission to operate said certificate, Alberto Cruz
acquired and purchased twenty taxicabs and has since then been operating said franchise.

Holding that the properties offered by respondents were more than sufficient to satisfy the
judgment, and that the sale of the certificate of public convenience in question would cause
them and their drivers in their taxicab business grave and irreparable damage, the lower court,
on October 17, 1951, issued an order setting aside the sheriffs sale in question, which order was
followed by the two other orders of February 20, and August 1, 1958, mentioned in the first part
of this opinion. It is to have these orders set aside and annulled that the plaintiff bank, as earlier
stated, presented this petition for certiorari before this Court.
Issue:

Whether the petition, not being verified, is fatally defective.

Ruling:

We do not think so. It is true that Rule 67, sec. 1, of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition
for certiorari be verified, the apparent object thereof being to insure good faith in the averments
of the petition. Where, however, the material facts alleged are a matter of record in the court
below, consisting in pleadings filed or proceedings taken therein, and the questions raised are
mainly of law, a verification as to the truth of said facts is not an absolute necessity and may be
waived as this Court has done in this case when we gave due course to the present petition. In
fact, many authorities consider the absence of verification a mere formal, not jurisdictional,
defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act in the
case.
 VERIFICATION

ANTONIO BUENAVENTURA, vs. GERONIMA HALILI UY

G.R. No. L-2815, March 31, 1987
Case No.: 8

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant Antonio Buenaventura by virtue of a written contract of lease, leased unto the
defendant-appellee Geronima Halili Uy and her husband a portion consisting of 144 square
meters of his residential lot located at Bolton Street, Davao City, where the latter constructed
their residential house. The consideration is P50.00 a month for a period of twenty five (25)
years. The appellees however, occupied an area of 279 square meters or 135 square meters in
excess of the leased premises. Upon discovery of this unauthorized occupancy, appellant
notified appellees to remove the additional construction on the excess portion. However,
appellees agreed to pay an additional rent of P30.00 a month for the area in question and
appellant allowed them to occupy the same until the time he would need the premises.
Sometime later, this need arose and appellant thru counsel demanded that appellees vacate the
excess portion. Upon refusal to vacate, an action was filed for "forcible entry and detainer,"
before the City Court of Davao City,

Issue:

Whether that the absence of verification of the original complaint was a jurisdictional defect.

Ruling:

NO. It is settled that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is a formal not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is simply intended to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Thus, the court may order the correction of the
pleading if not verified, (Oshita v. Republic, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]). The defect was merely format
It did not affect the validity and efficacy of the pleading, much less the jurisdiction of the court
(Gadit v. Feliciano, Sr., 69 SCRA 388, 389 [1976]).
 CERTIFICATE AGAINST NON-FORUM SHOPPING

Vicar International Construction, Inc., et al vs. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation
G.R. No. 15719, April 22, 2005
Case No.: 9

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals against herein
petitioners.
These complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB Leasing by Vicar, a
corporation engaged in construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. For
the total loan of around P30 Million, Vicar claims to have paid FEB an aggregate amount of P19
Million in monthly installments.
Nonetheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of P22 Million,
despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners subdivision lots in Laguna, which in the
auction sale produced P17 Million, in which Vicar claims should have been applied to its
outstanding loan balance.
In the course of the replevin case, the trial court issued several orders pertaining to the
possession and custody of eight (8) units of subject heavy equipment in favor of FEB. Vicars
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court. Hence, Vicar filed a petition for
certiorari (Rule 65) before the Court of Appeals to stop the implementation of the writ of
replevin issued against the eight units of equipment.
The petition was however, dismissed by the Court of Appeals because the Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping, executed by petitioner Carmelita V. Lim, without
attaching thereto the Board Resolution as well as the Corporate Secretarys certification
authorizing her to sign for and in behalf of petitioner-corporation.
The day after receiving the Court of Appeals resolution dismissing the said petition,
Vicar filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Secretarys
Certificate. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals still denied the Omnibus Motion. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari
for failure of the petitioner Carmelita V. Lim, in behalf of Vicar Corporation, to attach the board
resolution and Secretarys certificate in their petition before the Court of Appeals, authorizing
her to file said petition.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the petition.

Citing several cases excusing non-compliance with the requirement of certificate of non-
forum shopping, the court held that with more reason should the instant petition be allowed
since petitioner did submit a certification on non-forum shopping failing only to show proof that
the signatory was authorized to do so. The Supreme Court further states that the subsequent
submission of the Secretarys certificate authorizing petitioner Carmelita V. Lim to file the action
on behalf of the corporation, mitigated the oversight.
Moreover, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless, it must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing
the undesirable practice of forum-shopping.
 Finally, the court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not to frustrate justice. Rules of Procedures are but tools designed to facilitate, not to
obstruct the attainment of justice.
 JURISDICTION

IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., vs. SEHWANI

G.R. 179127, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 535
Case No.: 11

Facts:

IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity engaged mainly in the restaurant business,
incorporated under the laws of California, United States (US) of America, which is a signatory to
the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Petitioner is never engaged in business
in the Philippines. Whereas, respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are
corporations organized in the Philippines.
On 2 June 1997, petitioner filed trademark and service mark applications with the
Bureau of Trademarks of the IPO for "IN-N-OUT" and "IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design."
Petitioner later found out, through the Official Action Papers issued by the IPO on 31 May 2000,
that respondent Sehwani, Inc. had already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark "IN N
OUT (the inside of the letter "O" formed like a star)." By virtue of a licensing agreement, Benita
Frites, Inc. was able to use the registered mark of respondent Sehwani, Inc.
On 4 June 2001, petitioner filed an administrative complaint before the Bureau of Legal
Affairs (BLA) of the IPO against respondents for unfair competition and cancellation of
trademark registration. In answer, the respondent averred that the petitioner has no business in
the Philippines, thus has no cause of action. Respondent further alleged that they are not
involved in unfair competition. After due course, the IPO Director for Legal Affairs pronounced
in her Decision that petitioner had the right to use its trade name and mark "IN-N-OUT" in the
Philippines to the exclusion of others, including the respondents. However, respondents used
the mark "IN N OUT" in good faith and were not guilty of unfair competition. Both parties filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied except on petitioners partial motion on account
of unfair competition. Respondent filed an appeal before the CA, however it was dismissed, but
not with regard to unfair competition, wherein the CA pronounced that the Director of Legal
Affairs of the IPO has without jurisdiction to rule on issue of unfair competition, because Section
163 of the Intellectual Property Code confers jurisdiction over particular provisions in the law
on trademarks on regular courts exclusively.

Issue:

WHETHER THE IPO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE

COMPLAINTS?

Ruling:

No, the assailed decision was invalid.

Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs. Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the cancellation of
the disputed mark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation
of petitioners intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the IPO Director of
Legal Affairs.
Under the Doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. Hence,
the petition is granted.
 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARMELITA V. LIM, vs. FEB LEASING
AND FINANCE CORPORATION (now BPI LEASING CORPORATION), respondent.
G.R. No. 157195. April 22, 2005
(Case No. 15)

Facts:

This controversy originated from a Complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc.
(Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing
Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation filed a Complaint against Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum
of money, damages and replevin.

These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged in
the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans,
Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back" provision were executed by the parties. In those
Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and,
at the same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid
FEB an aggregate amount of P19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.

Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about P22,000,000,
despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising
an aggregate area of 20,300 square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as
additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced P17,000,000 which, Vicar
claims, should have been applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to
the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2,
2002, the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied
the latter's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an
Order dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporation's Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.

On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to stop the
implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject equipment.

The Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein assailed Resolution dated
October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping had
been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to
sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.

On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary's
Certificate." Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion, hence the petitioners elevated
the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling:

Yes.

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such
swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition
and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner
Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion
of petitioners that it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the
Secretary's Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.

In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are
but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.

The Petition is GRANTED.

 VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

CECILIA AMODIA VDA. DE MELENCION, VENERANDA

AMODIA, FELIPE AMODIA, EUTIQUIO AMODIA and GO KIM
CHUAN, Petitioners, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 14884, September 25, 2007

Case No: 18
Facts:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated March 30,
2001 and praying that the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City, dated
February 18, 1993, be upheld.

The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land (subject property)
particularly denominated as Lot No. 3368, located at Suba-basbas, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City,
Cebu, and part of a total area of 30,777 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 206264 (entire property) in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan (Go Kim
Chuan).5

The entire property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy6 who had only one
child, Juana Bonghanoy-Amodia,7 mother of the late Leoncia Amodia and petitioners Cecilia
Amodia Vda. de Melencion, Veneranda Amodia, Felipe Amodia, and Eutiquio Amodia8 (the
Amodias). The entire property was brought under the operation of the Torrens System.9
However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World War.

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale10 whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban
Bonghanoy and conveyed the subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company
(AZNAR) for a consideration of P10,200.00. On August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act 334411 as there was no title
on file at the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu

City (Register of Deeds). Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and constructed
a beach house thereon.

On February 18, 1989, petitioners Cecilia Amodia Vda. de Melencion, Veneranda

Amodia, Felipe Amodia and Eutiquio Amodia12 (petitioners Amodias) executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale,13 conveying the subject property in favor of Go Kim
Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. The lost title covering the subject property was
reconstituted pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 26.14 A reconstituted title particularly
designated as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2899 was issued in the name of Esteban
Bonghanoy15 and, subsequently, a derivative title (TCT No. 20626) was issued in the name of
Go Kim Chuan on December 1, 1989. Thereafter, Go Kim Chuan exercised control and dominion
over the subject property in an adverse and continuous manner and in the concept of an owner.

On February 14, 1990, AZNAR wrote a letter16 to petitioners Amodias asking the latter
to withdraw and/or nullify the sale entered into between them and Go Kim Chuan. On the same
date, a Notice of Adverse Claim17 was annotated by AZNAR on TCT No. 20626. Because
petitioners did not heed AZNAR's demand, on April 25, 1990, AZNAR filed a case against
petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
2062618 alleging that the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale of the subject
property which had earlier been sold to it. Petitioners Amodias denied that they executed the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of AZNAR, claiming
that their purported signatures thereon were forged.19 Trial on the merits ensued.

The RTC's Decision

On February 18, 1993, the RTC dismissed AZNAR's complaint and declared Go Kim
Chuan as the real owner of the subject property. The RTC ratiocinated that the signatures of the
Amodias in the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
favor of AZNAR were found by the document examiner of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
Crime Laboratory to be forged, thus, the said deed did not convey anything in favor of AZNAR.
Moreover, the subject property had been brought under the Land Registration Act; hence, all
transactions involving the same should have complied with the said law. Finally, the RTC held
that AZNAR failed to show that Go Kim Chuan acquired the subject property in bad faith.

Aggrieved, AZNAR appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.20

The CA's Decision

On March 30, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision holding that the Extra-Judicial Partition
of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Amodias in favor of AZNAR was
registered ahead of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Go Kim
Chuan, thus, pursuant to Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, the former deed should be given
preference over the latter; that AZNAR's adverse claim was annotated earlier than the execution
of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan; hence, the
latter should have respected said adverse claim and should have made inquiries as to possible
defects that may exist in the title over the subject property; and that in the absence of a final
determination by a court of proper jurisdiction on the alleged forged signatures of the Amodias
in the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, the finding of the
document examiner was insufficient for the RTC to rule in favor of the petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 which the CA denied in its

Resolution23 dated June 5, 2001.

In its Comment25 dated September 18, 2001, AZNAR argued, among others, that the
Petition is dismissible because the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping were
not signed by all the petitioners, invoking this Court's Decision in the case of Loquias v. Office of
the Ombudsman,26 and that the same were signed only by one April Socorro Go, daughter of the
late Go Kim Chuan, who did not even appear to be authorized to file the instant case in behalf of
the other petitioners.

In their Reply27 dated October 22, 2001, petitioners contended that April Socorro Go is
one of the legitimate children and an heir of the late Go Kim Chuan and, as such, she has
personal knowledge of the truth of the facts alleged in the Petition. Petitioners submitted that
they substantially complied with the Rules of Court by attaching the required Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and since the same are required simply to facilitate and
promote the orderly administration of justice, compliance therewith should not be imposed
with absolute literalness.

On December 19, 2001, petitioners, through counsel, filed a Motion28 for Leave to
Admit Amended Petition29 for Review on Certiorari (Amended Petition). Petitioners manifested
that they were seeking to correct a defect in the designation of parties and prayed that the Heirs
of Go Kim Chuan, namely, Estrella S. Go, Sonia Beth Go-Reynes, Daryl Go, and April Socorro Go
be impleaded as petitioners instead of the earlier designated petitioners, Cecilia Amodia Vda. de
Melencion, Veneranda Amodia, Felipe Amodia, Eutiquio Amodia, and Go Kim Chuan. Counsel for
petitioners admitted that he inadvertently included the petitioners Amodias in the initial
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Original Petition), as they were parties before the RTC and CA.
The counsel also manifested that he was only representing the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan in this
case. Lastly, he claimed that other than the substitution of the original petitioners, both the
Original Petition and Amended Petition uniformly raised the same issues and should be given
due course in the greater interest of justice and that the instant Motion was not interposed for
delay.

Per directive of the Court,30 AZNAR filed its Comment31 on the said motion wherein
AZNAR manifested that it had no serious objection to the admission of the Amended Petition if
the same was intended merely to implead the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan as petitioners. However,
AZNAR interposed strong opposition to the Amended Petition's admission since the names of
the petitioners Amodias were deleted without their written consent.

In their Reply,32 the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan, through counsel, claimed that petitioners
Amodias were excluded from the Amended Petition because they can no longer be located
despite diligent efforts exerted by counsel. The counsel claims that after the rendition of the
assailed CA Decision, he sent several letters to petitioners Amodias but they did not reply;
hence, the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan, left with no choice, filed the instant case before this Court on
their own.

The Court issued a Resolution33 dated September 16, 2002 giving due course to the
Petition and requiring the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.

On the other hand, in its Memorandum,36 AZNAR maintains that the Original Petition is
dismissible because the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping thereof were not
signed by all the petitioners. AZNAR further claims that the Amended Petition was filed in order
to cure a fatal defect which should not be countenanced by this Court.

Before resolving the main issues raised, the Court shall first deal with an apparent
procedural lapse in this case.

Counsel for petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition for Review
on Certiorari in order to implead the Heirs of the late Go Kim Chuan as the new petitioners and
to delete the names of petitioners Amodias because they could no longer be located. Said
petitioners sought the relaxation of the rules so that in the interest of justice, the case can be
decided on the merits. AZNAR opposes the Amended Petition because it was allegedly filed to
cure a fatal defect in the original petition non-compliance with the rules on Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

Issue :

Whether the Amended Petition of the Petitioner is dismissible or not due to lack of
compliance with the mandatory rules.

Ruling:

The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition (or complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and
noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is
only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement.

The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one
executed by only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, that
the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present
case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such
verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum
shopping. The general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and
the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a
number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because
the requirement

of strict compliance with the provisions merely underscores its mandatory

nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.

Thus, we held in Iglesia ni Cristo that the commonality of interest is material and crucial
to relaxation of the Rules.

In the case at bench, the petitioners in the Amended Petition are Heirs of the late Go Kim
Chuan. They represent their predecessor-in-interest in whose favor a title was issued covering
the subject property and said title is sought to be canceled by AZNAR. Clearly, there is presence
of the commonality of interest referred to in Iglesia ni Cristo. Under the circumstances, the rules
may be reasonably and liberally construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice,
because it cannot be denied that the ends of justice are better served when cases are
determined on the merits after all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes
and defenses rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
 Alice Sheker v Estate of Alice Sheker
GR No. 157912 December 13, 2007
(Case No. 19)

Facts:
Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina.
Alice left a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City. The trial court issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In
compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of
P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties
for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the
money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-
forum shopping thereto.
Issue:
Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping
is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate
proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan Shekers money claim but rather upon the filing of the
petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money
claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator
of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not
an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected
with and dependent upon the principal remedy.
 Certification of Non-Forum

Five Star Bus Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127064 August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 367
(Case No. 20)

Facts:
One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned
by Five Star Bus Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral
filed a civil action for damages against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged
for four years by reason of the bus companys lawyers repeated request to reset the hearing of
the case. Until the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for
resolution. The bus companys lawyer filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
The bus companys lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
but the latter court summarily dismissed the petition because said petitions affidavit of non-
forum shopping was not signed by the plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was
signed by the lawyer. The lawyer explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was in
a haste to submit the petition at the earliest possible time in order to protect his clients interest.

Issue:

Whether the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company will prosper.

Ruling:

No, the petition will not prosper.

Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in two (2) different fora, for such practice works havoc upon
orderly judicial procedure. Forum shopping has been characterized as an act of malpractice that
is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It
constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also
been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.

Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. We are not unmindful of this Courts
ruling in Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, Loyola v. Court of Appeals, and Kavinta v. Castillo, Jr. that
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 is sufficient.
It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and
applied to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that
circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as
to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. The fact that the Circular requires
that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be
dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
 Tible & Tible Company, Incorporated, et al vs Royal Savings and Loan Association
G.R. No. 155806, April 8, 2008
Case No. 22

Facts:
Tible and Tible Company Inc. (TTCI) obtained a loan amounting to 1.5 Million from
Royal Savings and Loan Association. The loan matured however, TCCI was not able to pay hence
Royal Savings sued TTCO and the properties were foreclosed and was awarded to Royal
Savings. Upon the issuance of the Deed, TTCI filed an action for annulment of deed of sale. This
was eventually dismissed TTCIs motion for reconsideration was also dismissed.

In 2002, TTCI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition
on the ground that among others, the verification or affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed
by one Almabella Menla Vda. De Tible, but there is no Special Power of Attorney, Board
Resolution nor Secretarys Certificate was attached thereto authorizing said signatory to sign
the verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals may relax the application of the rules requiring
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Ruling:

Non-compliance with the rules is fatal to a petition for certiorari. Certiorari being an
extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules
laid down by the law. The Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for
certiorari (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court,
agency or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of
the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars. Clearly, petitioners in their petition before the CA
committed procedural errors.

The petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of Revised Circular No. 2-91 by
having the certification against forum shopping signed by one of its officers and petitioner
Almabella Tibles signature in the verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was not
ratified by any special power of attorney, board resolution nor secretarys certificate executed
by her co-petitioners authorizing her to sign for and in their behalf. Section 4, Rule 7 of the
Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the
verification should have been signed also by the co-petitioners or at least the signature
appearing therein was ratified.

As the Court finds nothing on record which constitutes compelling reason for a liberal
application of procedural rules, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
 FORUM SHOPPING

PET PLANS INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 148287 November 23, 2004
443 SCRA 510
Case No. 23

Facts:

Ocampo, the President of Pet Plans Inc., and Rolando Espino, the Vice president and Corporate
Secretary, employed Jaime Abad (Abad) as its Sales Operations Manager in its branch office in
Aparri, Cagayan on January 16, 1995. On June 10, 1999, he got demoted and was reassigned as a
Trust Manager, a lower rank than his previous position. The reason for his demotion was his
failure to comply with the sales quota for years 1998 and 1999 to recruit manpower and to
develop his agency. Abad filed a complaint in full back wages and other benefits computed at 26,
533.00 including his 13th month pay for the year 1996-1998 amounting to 144, 910.35.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed special civil action
for certiorari to CA but the latter dismissed for defective or insufficient certification against
forum shopping because it was not signed by the principal party (Ocampo) or by the principal
himself but instead it was signed by Espino who is authorized to represent Pet Plans (Rule 7,
sec. 5). Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence the present petition.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for non-compliance against forum shopping.

Held:

NO. Pet Plans shows that Espino is authorized to represent only Pet Plans, not its co-petitioner
Ocampo. Sec. 1 of Rule 65 states that The petitioner shall be accompanied by a certificate
true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of sec. 43 Rule 46. The failure to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Hence,
nothing in records shows Espino is authorized to represent Ocampo and thus, the certificate of
non-forum shopping is invalid.
 VENUE

Anita Mangila vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125027. August 12, 2002
Case No. 24
Facts:

Sometime in January 1988, petitioner contracted the freight forwarding services of

private respondent for shipment of petitioners products, such as crabs, prawns and assorted
fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Petitioner agreed to pay private
respondent cash on delivery. Private respondents invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent
interest per annum on all overdue accounts. In case of suit, the same invoice stipulates
attorneys fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. Despite several
demands, petitioner never paid private respondent. Thus, on June 10, 1988, private respondent
filed Civil Case No. 5875 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for collection of sum of
money. On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not
served on petitioner. A woman found at petitioners house informed the sheriff that petitioner
transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that
petitioner had left the Philippines for Guam.

On February 9, 1989, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of
improper venue. Private respondents invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates that if
court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection xxx the agreed venue for such action is
Makati, Metro Manila. Private respondent filed an Opposition asserting that although Makati
appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press
whose general manager executed an affidavit admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, private
respondent claimed that petitioner knew that private respondent was holding office in Pasay
City and not in Makati. The lower court, finding credence in private respondents assertion,
denied the Motion to Dismiss and gave petitioner five days to file her Answer. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but this too was denied.

Issue:

Whether there was improper venue.

Held:

The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue
on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is
not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to
show that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties intention to
restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue,
as long as jurisdictional requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while
considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be
considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There
are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the
parties that Makati is the only or exclusive venue where the action could be instituted. We
therefore agree with private respondent that Makati is not the only venue where this case could
be filed.

Nevertheless, we hold that Pasay is not the proper venue for this case.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. The exception to this rule is when the
parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in the rules. But, as we
have discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence, following the general rule,
the instant case may be brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the
election of the plaintiff (private respondent herein).

In the instant case, the residence of private respondent (plaintiff in the lower court) was
not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was the postal address of her sole
proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only when private respondent testified in court,
after petitioner was declared in default, that she mentioned her residence to be in Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque City.
 MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 149660, January 20, 2009
Case No. 25

Facts:

Private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant
on April 24, 1995. This lasted until February 7, 1997. Respondent worked in Century Park Hotel,
an establishment owned by the petitioner.

Petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development Corporation.[3] Subsequently,

private respondent Oabel was transferred to MANRED, with the latter deporting itself as her
employer.[4] MANRED has intervened at all stages of these proceedings and has consistently
claimed to be the employer of private respondent Oabel. Private respondent filed before the
Labor Arbiter a petition for regularization of employment against the petitioner. However,
private respondent Oabel was dismissed from employment.[6] Respondent converted her
petition for regularization into a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision on July 13, 1999, dismissing the
complaint against the petitioner. Consequently, Oabel appealed her case before the National
labor Relations Commission (NLRC) The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held
that MANRED is a labor-only contractor and private respondent was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a resolution, the

appellate court dismissed the petition on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the
board resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of
Appeals.

Hence, the petitioner elevated the case in Supreme Court filed petition for review

Issue:

Whether filing of a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum

shopping attached constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement

Ruling:

No. Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory
requirement. Substantial compliance applies only with respect to the contents of the certificate
but not as to its presence in the pleading wherein it is required.

Petitioners contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended
certificate of non-forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely
specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is
required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar
issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural
and juridical persons.

Any doubt on the matter has been resolved by the Courts ruling in BPI Leasing Corp. v.
Court of Appeals[17] where this Court emphasized that the lawyer acting for the corporation
must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.[18] Specific authorization,
the Court held, could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of
Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the
certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation
 Cagayan Valley Drug Corp v Commissioner of Internal Revenue
GR No.151413 February 13, 2008
Case No. 26

Facts:

Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation, the petitioner, filed a petition for review to recall the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for review of the petitioner to the Court
of Tax Appeal on the ground of defective verification and certificate of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner, a duly licensed retailer of medicine and other pharmaceutical products under
the name of Mercury Drug, claimed that on 1995, it granted 20% discounts to qualified senior
citizens on purchase of medicine pursuant to RA 7432 and treated such discount as deduction
from the gross sales in compliance with RR 2-94 instead of treating them as tax credits as
provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.
Petitioner filed with the BIR a claim for Tax Refund/Tax Credit of the discount they
granted to Senior Citizens however the BIR did not act on such claim thus petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
The CTA dismissed the petition on the grounds that the discount granted by the
petitioner should be treated as tax credit and not a deductions from the gross sales as
erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94 for being an invalid administrative interpretation of law
that contravenes the provisions of RA 7432 thus the petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds because the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by the president of the corporation who failed to
adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the Board of Directors to do so.

Issue:

Whether the president of the corporation can sign the verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping without proof of authority from the board of directors.

Ruling:

The President of the Corporation can sign the Verification and Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. The Rules of Court is silent as to who the authorized signatory should be if the litigant
is a juridical person. However, In the long line of cases, the Court recognized the authority of
officers of the corporation to signed the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
without the authority from the board of directors. These officers includes Chairperson of the
Board of Directors, the President of the Corporation, the General Manager or Acting General
Manger, Personnel Officer, and Employment Specialist in a labor case, being in the position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.
 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. WMC RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL PTY.
LTD. and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006

Case No. 27

Facts:

In a contract denominated as Tampakan Option Agreement, respondent WMC

Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC), through its local subsidiary Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), acquired the mining claims in Tampakan, South
Cotabato of the Tampakan Companies. The Tampakan Option Agreement was amended by
subsequent agreements under which the Tampakan Companies were given preferential option
to acquire the shares of WMC in WMCP and Hillcrest Inc. in the event WMC decided to sell them.
WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement, sold to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
(Lepanto) its shares of stock. As the Tampakan Companies later availed of their preferential
right under the Tampakan Option Agreement, a Sale and Purchase Agreement was concluded
between WMC and the Tampakan Companies over the same shares of stock priorly purchased
by Lepanto.
The Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(MGB) of the DENR of the exercise of their preemptive right to buy WMCs equity in WMCP and
Hillcrest, Inc. Lepanto wrote the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said agreement and
reiterated its request for the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares.
Lepanto subsequently filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a complaint
against WMC, WMCP, Tampakan Companies. WMC et al. filed before the RTC a Joint Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. The RTC denied WCM et al.s Motion to Dismiss. On
appeal, the CA granted the petition of respondents ruling that Lepanto is guilty of forum
shopping. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied said motion.

Issue:

Whether Lepanto is guilty of forum shopping?

Ruling:
It is clear from the proceedings before the DENR, specifically before the MGB, that the
issue of which between petitioner and respondent Tampakan Companies possesses the
better right to acquire the mining rights, claims and interests held by WMC through its local
subsidiary WMCP, especially with respect to the 1995 FTAA, had been brought to the fore. The
MGB cannot just assess the qualifications of petitioner and of the Tampakan Companies as
potential transferee or assignee of the rights and obligations of WMCP under the FTAA without
also resolving the issue of which has priority of right to become one.
True, the questioned agreements of sale between Lepanto and WMC on one hand and
between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock
from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or
interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the
questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by Lepanti before the DENR, is inextricably
linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the
law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that Lepanto seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.
Forum shopping exists when both actions involve the same transactions, same essential
facts and circumstances and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. Such
elements are evidently present in both the proceedings before the MGB and before the trial
court. The case instituted with the RTC was thus correctly ordered dismissed by the appellate
court on the ground of forum shopping. Besides, not only did Lepanto commit forum shopping
but it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by opting to go ahead in seeking reliefs
from the court even while those same reliefs were appropriately awaiting resolution by the
MGB.
 SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

Novelty Philippine Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

G.R no. 146125, September 17, 2003,
Case No. 28

Facts:

The dispute between Novelty Philippines, Inc. (Novelty) and Reform the Union
Movement in Novelty (RUMN) arose when the latter started assessing penalties against its
erring members. On June 26, 1997, RUMNs executive board adopted a Resolution sanctioning
union officers and members who had failed to join big rallies, with a penalty equivalent to their
salary for one day.
On November 19, 1997, petitioner issued a Memorandum announcing that, for the
payroll period November 16 to 22, 1997, it would deduct from the salaries of union members
who had failed to attend the mobilization on July 28, 1997, amounts equivalent to their one-day
salary. According to it, the check off was being done pursuant to the Resolution of the RUMN
executive board and existing individual check off authorizations when some members of the
union allegedly complained of the salary deduction, petitioner temporarily held in abeyance the
implementation of the check off on the special assessment made by RUMN. Petitioner also
requested from the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
its opinion on the matter.
The RUMN continued to insist on the implementation of the check off on the special
assessments. Nevertheless, citing an Opinion rendered by the legal office of the DOLE, petitioner
rejected RUMNs persistent demand for a check off. Consequently, RUMN raised the matter for
grievance. Since no settlement was reached during the grievance procedure, the case was
elevated to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, which referred the controversy to
voluntary arbitration after the submission of the necessary pleadings by the parties, the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a Decision dated April 26, 2000, in favor of the RUMN
Petitioner filed with the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied in a Resolution dated June 19, 2000. Thereafter, the former elevated the
matter to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue:

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari despite petitioners substantial compliance with the requirements of the
rules.

Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, subsequent submission
of a Special Power of Attorney constituted substantial compliance with the subject rules and, in
effect, ratified Venturas authority to file the Petition for and on behalf of the company.

The court was order that the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Resolutions SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs.
 Expropriation
MCIAA, vs. CA and Chiongbian
G.R. No. 13949, November 27, 2000
Case No.30
Facts:
On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation
proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot
941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.In 1953, appellee Chiongbian
purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case.
Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name.Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the
expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for
Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was
transferred to the Republic under a TCT.

Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport were
transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.In 1995,
Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging, that
sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug
Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several
parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by
Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NACs offer for the
compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of
Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled Republic of the Philippine vs.
Damian Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified
judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other
hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of
the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once
the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written agreement

Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the
Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its
name.
However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-
interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to
restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941
upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to
effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.

MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence
this petition.

Issue:

Whether Chongbian can still repurchase the expropriated lot of the Government?
Ruling:
No. If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is
granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the
city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary. Many other similar examples might be given. If, upon the
contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of
course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the
title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise
of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner
The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee
simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the
lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the
purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used
other than as the Lahug airport.
 SPOUSES WILLIAM and JANE JEAN DIU v. DOMlNADOR IBAJAN, et al.
G.R. No.132657. January 19, 2000
(CASE NO. 31 CIVIL PROCEDURES)

Facts:

Defendants, filed against William Diu and the Register of Deeds of Naval, Biliran, an
action for the annulment of certain deeds of sale with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Defendants claimed to be the owners of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 21540
and asserted to be the owners of the building, partly commercial and partly residential, erected
thereon. The plaintiffs averred that defendant Diu had caused one of the defendant to sign a
document, supposed to be a deed of real estate mortgage covering the aforesaid lot but which
turned out to be a deed of absolute sale. Diu, it was also alleged, had caused the execution of a
deed of absolute sale over the residential and commercial building by forging the signature of
Dominador Ibajan, one of the defendants.

Petitioners then commenced, in a complaint, an action for forcible entry with damages
before the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Biliran. The plaintiffs in the ejectment suit alleged that
the spouses Ibajan, aided by the other defendants who falsely represented themselves to be
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, unlawfully entered his property (the parcel of
land involved), took possession thereof and ejected their employees therefrom. The Trial Court
ruled that in both cases raise the issue of possession and ownership. It is of course fundamental
that the issue of the possession in Forcible Entry is only de facto, unlike that in ownership cases
which is de jure. Nonetheless the law allows the MTC to resolve the issue of ownership.

Furthermore, the present case, this is quite improbable, as the issues of ownership and
possession are Intertwined and inseparably linked. The parties should have brought this fact to
the attention of the Municipal Trial Judge to obviate or preclude the possibility of making two
(2) courts decide on the same issues. That is exactly the very situation that is obtaining now.
This Court is saddled with two (2) cases involving ownership and possession. The same
documents are relied upon by both parties in the two (2) cases; the same source of their alleged
rights and interests. Accordingly, said Court held that decision on the issue of possession can be
made only after the trial involving the issue of ownership. Until then this court is thus hard put
to say who was or who is entitled to possession for which reason this Court correspondingly
orders the DISMISSAL of this appealed Forcible Entry Case, leaving only the Annulment of Deeds
of Sale Case, still pending for the final determination of the primary issues of possession and
ownership.

Issue:

Is the decision of Trial Court proper dismissing a forcible entry case on appeal to it from
the Municipal Trial Court upon the thesis that the latter court is bereft of jurisdiction since an
issue of ownership has been raised in the ejectment suit.

Ruling:

It has repeatedly been held that in ejectment cases, the sole question for resolution is
the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question and neither
a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the
defendant can outrightly deprive the court from taking due cognizance of the case. Ejectment
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff merely needs to prove
prior possession de facto and an undue deprivation thereof. The pendency of an action
questioning the ownership of property will not divest the city or municipal trial court of its
jurisdiction over the ejectment case [and neither will it bar the execution of a judgment thereon.
Hence, the decision of Trial Court is not proper.
 MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO v. ROGELIO I. RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008
Case No. 32

Facts:

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic

Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP,
Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create
a committee for such purpose. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended
the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as
suspension for six (6) months.

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution8 dated
May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order under Rule 65 which was also dismissed. The CA rendered its Decision13 on
December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral
certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, committed
forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before the Supreme Court?

Ruling:

No. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping.
We must point out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the
adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001
Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling.

When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition
for Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-
Forum Shopping", that there was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court
denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to Domingos petition, the same had already been
dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the
resolution was received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It consists of filing multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties
or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3)
identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.

Hence, the Republic did not commit Forum Shopping in the present case.
 Young vs. Sy
G.R. 157745 September 26, 2006
Case No.: 33

Facts:

The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both
petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial
Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D.
Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by her mother
that adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is unenforceable,
since at the time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval
had been procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia
Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the
subject property; that the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent
Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had been registered with the Register of
Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the
property in question.

The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching
the Supplemental Complaint and she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal
redemption.

The RTC denied the Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule
65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition and held that the cause of action
of the petitioner in the Supplemental Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint;
that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in
the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still appeal the same, hence,
the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45.

While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint) was
pending in the CA, trial in the RTC continued. On August 29, 2001, a day before the hearing
slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, alleging that she was
indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through counsel, objected to the
postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC sustained the
objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint.

On top of the foregoing appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice of
Appeal to the CA, filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of the ordinary
appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues. CA denied the petition and held that
the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment correctible by ordinary
appeal and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the mode of ordinary appeal by
filing a Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the remedy of appeal was available,
then the petition for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, must fail.

Issue:

Whether or not there is forum shopping

Ruling:

YES, the Petitioner guilty of forum shopping

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata.

The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had
elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which
eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition.

The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits are founded
on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which
dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is
seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and
the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount
to res judicata in the other.
 Santos v. Comelec

G. R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003

Ponente: Ynares-Santiaho, J.

Case No.: 34

Facts:

Petitioner Santos and respondent Panulaya were bath candidates for Mayor of the
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed responded Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor. Petitioners filed an
election protest before the lower court. After trial and revision of the Ballots, the trial court
found that petitioner garnered 2, 181 votes while respondent received only 2, 105. Hence, it
rendered judgment declaring and proclaiming petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor,
and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of respondent made by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile,
before the trial court could act on petitioner's motion, respondent filed with the COMELEC a
petitioner certiorari, assailing the decision of the trial court. Likewise, respondent appealed the
trial court's decist to the COMELEC a petition for certiorari. The COMELEC issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, which effectively enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioner's
motion for execution pending appeal. Subsequently, the COMELEC dismissed petition for
certiorari after finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed judgement. Moreover, the COMELEC held that the remedy from the decision of the
court a quo was to file a notice of appeal. Hence, it directed the trial court to dispose of all
pending incidents in the election protest with dispatch. The trial court issued an Order
approving the Motion of Execution Pending Appeal and installing petitioner as the duly elected
Mayor. Meanwhile, respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition in SPR NO. 20-2002. After five days, or an August 26,2002, he filed a
supplemental petition. Barely 2 days later, an while his motion for reconsideration and
supplemental petition were pending, respondent filed another petition with the COMELEC. The
petition contained the same prayer as that in-the supplemental position.

Acting on respondent's motion, the COMELEC issued the assailed order directing the
parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of
Mayor.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of
dismissing outright despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum shopping,
and in setting aside the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent was guilty of
forumshopping. Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgement or
order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favourable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.

It may be the institution of 2 or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the court would make a favourable disposition. For it to exist, there
should be:
 (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both
action;

(b) identity of right asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and

(c) identity of 2 preciding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

COMELEC's act of settling aside the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal is
premised on the argument that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are
not good reasons. This is not tenable.

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based upon good reason and a combination of 2 or more of them will suffice to grant execution
pending appeal:

(a) public interest involved or will of the electorate;

(b) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and

(c) the length of time that the election protest has been pending.
 Forum Shopping

ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA MORALES, LIZA

OCAMPO, et. al, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent

G.R. No. 75349, October 13, 1986

Case No.: 35

FACTS:

On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in this Court a special civil action for prohibition to the
end that respondent Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila, be
"perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously revoking or cancelling ...
their licenses or permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and threatening the physical demolition
of their respective business stalls in the places specified in such licenses or permits. 1 They also
sought a temporary restraining order in view of Mayor Lopez' actual threats of physical
demolition of their respective small. This the Court granted on the same day. 2

Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly authorized vendors of ... religious
articles, medicine herbs and plants around the Quiapo Church, ... Manila," bringing suit 'for
themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves." They allege that their licenses
"were revoked or cancelled (by respondent Mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws," written notice of such
cancellation having been served on them on or about May 30 (actually May 3), 1986; that the
revocation of their licenses was beyond respondent Mayor's competence, since Section 171 (n)
of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) authorizes the same only "for violation of the law
or ordinances or conditions upon which they have been granted " and no such violation had
been committed by them; 4 but this notwithstanding, respondent Mayor "had given (them) an
ultimatum to vacate the premises where their respective stalls are situated or suffer physical
demolition thereof. 5

It appears that on July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8636563, a special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. 8 It was filed ("Samahan") composed, according to
the petition, of "some 300 individual owners and operators of separate business. The president
of the Samahan and its Press Relations Officer are two of the five petitioners in the case at
bar, described in the petition before this Court as suing "for themselves and all others similarly
situated as themselves.

Issue:

WHETHER THE PETETIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR ACTS OF FORUM SHOPPING, THUS, PROPER
FOR DIMISSAL OF THE CASE AT BAR

Ruling:

YES

Indeed, the petitioners in both actions, described in their petitions as vendors of religious
articles, herbs and plants, and sundry merchandise around the Quiapo Church or its
"periphery," have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in
accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also the punitive measure of dismissal of both
their actions, that in this Court and that in the Regional Trial Court as well Quite recently, upon
substantially Identical factual premises, the Court en banc had occasion to condemn and
penalize the act of litigants of hearing the same suit in different courts, aptly described as
"forum-shopping," viz: The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum shopping, an act
of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice.

As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an Identity
as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis
thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action
pendant or lis pendens 15 That same Identity puts into operation the sanction Of twin dismissals
just mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement
of the controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to appeal
from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15,
1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive. 16

It would seem that the(president and press relations officer, respectively, of the Quiapo Church
vendors' association known as the Samahan) of the petition in this case, "for themselves and all
others similarly situated as themselves" (i.e., the members of the Samahan; who are vendors in
the area of Quiapo Church) they came to the belated that in view of the pendency of the Identical
action filed by them in the Regional Trial Court (Case No. 86-36563), they were vulnerable to
the accusation of "forum shopping," and thus amenable to its dire consequences.
 Forum Shopping

GUARANTEED HOTELS, INC., represented by Urma Baltao Chiongbian

-versus-

Josefina S. Baltao, Rocio P. Baltao, Gary Baltao and Gino Baltao

G.R. No. 164338, January 17, 2005
Case No.: 36

Facts:

On November 4, 1996, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) and
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the purpose of
developing a resort complex in Cabituagan, Zambales. The JVA included a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 11391 which was allegedly registered in the name of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.

On August 28, 2001, the Testate Estate of Eugenio S. Baltao represented by Mariano
Alejandro L. Baltao, Eugenio L. Baltao III and Urma Chiongbian, and Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.,
represented by Urma Chiongbian, in her capacity as a stockholder, filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City a derivative suit (OLONGAPO CASE) against Sta. Lucia and
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. The OLONGAPO CASE sought the annulment of the JVA insofar as the
inclusion of TCT No. 11391 is concerned because it was allegedly made without the consent or
knowledge of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.

On June 21, 2002, during the pendency of the OLONGAPO CASE, Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.,
represented by Urma Chiongbian filed a second derivative suit before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (MANILA CASE) against Rocio, Josefina, Gary, Jaime and Gino, all surnamed Baltao as
alleged stockholders and directors of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc., and Alicia Pantig and Jane and
John Does. The MANILA CASE, sought to annul and set aside all resolutions, corporate acts, and
transactions of the defendants, herein respondents, from 1990 up to the present, including but
not limited to those where the respondents allegedly authorized Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. to
enter into joint venture agreements with Sta. Lucia and other corporations for the development
of the properties of Guaranteed Hotels, Inc.

The respondents filed their answer in the MANILA CASE on August 16, 2002, raising
petitioners violation of the rules on forum shopping as one of their defenses.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari claiming that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying their motion to conduct a preliminary
hearing. The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights being asserted and the reliefs prayed for in
the two derivative suits are identical thus the petitioner violated the rules on forum shopping
and decided to side in favour of the defendants.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners committed forum shopping?

Ruling:

Yes. The petition is denied.

Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata in the other.

The practice of forum shopping is proscribed because it unnecessarily burdens our

courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources of the
judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes thereby affecting the efficient
administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has prompted the issuance of circulars
penalizing violators with the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.

Petitioner, in filing the OLONGAPO and MANILA cases engaged in forum shopping. The
elements of litis pendentia are present between the two derivative suits filed by petitioner.

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition
by two competent tribunals of two separate, and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in
several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, we
adhere strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in
the dismissal of a case.
 Judgement/Decision

Emilio Young v. John Keng Seng

GR No. 143464 March 5, 2003
(Case 37)

Facts

John Keng Seng filed a complaint for accounting of general agency, injunction, turning over of
properties, and damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 53, against the
herein petitioner Emilio Young and his wife, Tita Young. The Youngs filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of cause of action. RTC Bacolod dismissed the case.

Three (3) months after, Keng Seng filed another complaint against Emilio Young for accounting
and damages with the RTC Branch 44, Bacolod City. Young filed a Motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a good, valid and/or worthwhile cause of action
against the defendant. The respondent court denied the Motion to Dismiss in its order of August
19, 1997. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, one of the reasons is that the
plaintiff fatally failed to comply with the rule against forum shopping.

Both the RTC and CA ruled that complainant did not violate the rule on forum shopping.

Issue

Did John Keng Seng violate the rule on forum shopping?

Ruling

No.

We hold that substantial justice requires the resolution of the present controversy on its
merits. It must be noted that the verification requirement is a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. Moreover, the ground for the dismissal of the First Case was lack of cause of
action, which means that essentially, no case was filed, because the Complaint was fatally
defective on its face. Hence, its dismissal was not determinative of the Second Case.

We repeat: the First Case was dismissed because of lack of cause of action. It was thus a
dismissal without prejudice; respondent was not barred from filing a new suit against petitioner
involving the same facts, but raising a cause of action arising therefrom. In fact, respondent
actually filed the Second Case, even if he failed to disclose in his certification that he had
commenced the First Case against the same defendant, herein petitioner. Furthermore, we must
bear in mind that, whenever possible and feasible, procedural rules should be liberally
construed to ensure the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings on
their merits.

The rule on non-forum shopping was designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and, therefore, should not be interpreted literally at all times. The fact
that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory
nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.
 EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, DEFAULT & NON-FORUM SHOPPING

Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 143933, February 14, 2003
Case No.: 38
FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of the contractual liability of respondent under
its Marine Cargo Policy No. LP-0001-08287 and its Endorsement No. LP-0001-91399. Sought to
be recovered therein was the sum of P2,698,637.00, representing the insured value of the lost
or undelivered 377.168 metric tons of Prime Newly Hot Rolled Steel Billets, including attorneys
fees and costs. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of failure to state a cause of
action and improper venue. Petitioner filed a motion to admit its amended complaint, attaching
therewith a copy of the pleading itself, which the respondent court granted in an order dated
September 17, 1993.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the February 4,
1994 Order granting petitioners Motion for Execution pending appeal. The appellate court
belittled petitioners argument that respondent had erred in filing a special civil action for
certiorari instead of a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the judgment. The CA explained
that both of these remedies were sanctioned by jurisprudence, and that neither one of these ran
afoul of the interdiction against forum-shopping. It also held that a motion for reconsideration
was no longer necessary, because the question of whether respondent was entitled to appeal,
despite being declared in default, had already been ruled upon by the RTC.

The CA annulled the Writ of Execution. Finally, the CA also held that the trial judge had
improvidently issued the default Order. It concluded that the date on which respondent
received it allowed the latter to file an answer only on November 9, 1993, way beyond the
October 31, 1993 deadline set by the judge. Hence, the appellate court granted it an opportunity
to file its responsive pleading, so that the case could be properly evaluated and adjudicated on
the basis of every piece of evidence adduced by both parties.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals plainly erred and acted contrary to existing
laws and jurisprudence in annulling the trial courts Special Order dated February 4,
1994, allowing execution pending appeal. This, despite the existence of good reasons
therefore coupled with the filing of the bond.

2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals plainly erred and acted contrary to existing
laws and jurisprudence in ruling that the trial court improvidently declared the
respondent in default, considering the fact that:

a. the said issue was already raised and squarely resolved by the same appellate
court, seventh division, in respondents main appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547,
which ruled that the trial court properly declared the respondent in default.
b. the said ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 that the respondent was properly
declared in default has become final since this issue was no longer raised by the
respondent in its appeal in G.R. No. 138084; and
c. this issue was actually not raised by either party, much less by the respondent, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33387.
 3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals plainly erred and acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence in not dismissing the respondents Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 33387,
considering the failure of respondent as petitioner therein to attach an affidavit on non-
forum shopping and lack of statements of material dates showing that said Petition was
timely filed as required by relevant SC Circulars. Simply put, the issues are as follows:
(1) the propriety of the February 4, 1994 RTC Order allowing an execution pending
appeal, (2) the validity of the Order declaring respondent in default, and (3) the effect of
respondents failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping and a statement
showing the material dates.

RULING:

1. Execution Pending Appeal

Petitioner contends that the alleged dilatory tactics employed by respondent are
sufficient reasons to grant the formers Motion for Execution pending appeal. On the other
hand, respondent argues that the CA was correct in striking down the Writ of Execution
pending appeal, because of the following: (1) petitioner showed no proof that respondents
appeal would derail the implementation of the RTCs judgment, (2) the RTC did not have the
authority to rule on whether the appeal was dilatory, and (3) the filing of a supersedeas
bond per se did not authorize the execution pending appeal.

We agree with respondent. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 2 of Rule 39 of
the pre-1997 Rules of Court, the trial court is granted, upon good reasons, the discretion to
order an execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal. For convenience, that
Section is reproduced hereunder:

The present Rules also grant the trial court the discretion to order the execution of a
judgment or a final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal, also upon good
reasons stated in a special order after due hearing. Such discretion, however, is allowed only
while the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
original record, or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion. Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

Thus, the CA committed no reversible error in annulling the February 4, 1994 RTC
Order allowing an execution pending appeal.

2. RTCs Order of Default

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that the RTC had improvidently
declared respondent in default, considering that this issue was not raised in CA-GR No.
33387. Moreover, this question has already been resolved by the Seventh Division of the CA
in CA-GR No. 45547.

On the other hand, respondent contends that it was only on November 9, 1993 that
it received the October 21, 1993 Order of the RTC giving it ten days to file its answer. By that
time, the RTC had already declared it in default in another Order dated November 5, 1993,
which respondent received on November 19, 1993. It admits, however, that it has raised the
improvident declaration of default in CA-GR No. 45547.

We side with petitioner. Because the issue of the correctness of the Order of default
had never been raised by respondent in CA-GR No. 33387, the Court of Appeals improperly
ruled on the matter.

3. Non-Forum Shopping and Material Dates

 Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not outrightly dismissing the Petition for (1)
not containing a verified statement of material dates showing that it had been filed within
the prescribed period and (2) an affidavit of non-forum shopping required by SC Revised
Circular No. 28-91.

Petitioner never raised this matter in its March 1, 1994 Comment on Petition for
Certiorari with Opposition to Prayer for Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
which it filed with the CA on March 3, 1994. Neither did it raise the issue when it moved for
the reconsideration of the March 31, 2000 CA Decision. It did so only when it received an
adverse decision from the appellate court.

The Petition before the CA was in fact filed within the prescribed period. In this light,
we hold that the failure to state the material dates was merely a procedural lapse that could
be waived by the other partys failure to raise the matter at the proper time.
 Forum Shopping

Employees Compensation Commission vs. Court of Appeal (CA)

G.R No. 115858, June 28, 1996
257 SCRA 717
(Case No. 39)

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA reversing a ruling by the petitioner, holding that private respondent, a
policemans widow, is not entitled to compensation.
Aida Alvaran, private respondent, wife of the deceased, which was a member of the
Mandaluyong Police Station and serving said station for more than twenty years, filed a claim
for compensation benefits under PD 626,a s amended. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground
that at the time of the accident the deceased was plainly acting as a father to his son, an act
which is purely personal, foreign and unrelated to his employment.
Private respondent elevate her case to the Employees Compensation Commission ECC
for review. ECC affirmed the holding of the GSIS, thus, the former appealed before the CA. CA
reversed the decision of ECC. In addition, she also raised the raised the issues of forum-shopping
that this court had already dismissed an earlier petition questioning the very same decision of
the CA.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner engages in forum-shopping in filing this petition.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner engaged in forum-shopping in filing this petition.

Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicita in the other.
The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the two
(or more cases) pending, there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or cause of action, and (c)
reliefs sought. Applying the above test, there is no question that there is identity of cause of
action and reliefs sought between this petition and the petition in GR No. 115040. Also, forum-
shopping does not require a literal identity of parties. It is sufficient that there is identity of
interests represented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision is again AFFIRMED.
 Prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis pendentia

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 159323, July 31, 2008
Case No.40
Facts:

Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and

sale of soft drink beverages. Co-petitioner Eric Montinola was the general manager of its plant in
Bacolod City. Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer physician at the companys
plant in Bacolod City.

In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for one
year. The agreement provided that either party may terminate the contract upon giving thirty
(30)-day written notice to the other. In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco agrees
to perform the duties and obligations enumerated in the Comprehensive Medical Plan, which
was attached and made an integral part of the agreement.

Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employee-employer

relationship shall exist between the company and Dr. Climaco while the contract is in effect. In
case of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due to
him at the time of termination.

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of Labor and Employment and the
SSS whether he was an employee of the company. Both agencies replies in the affirmative. As a
result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Bacolod City. In his complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and
demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits.

During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its Retainer Agreement
with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaint for illegal dismissal against the
company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked that he be reinstated to his former position as
company physician of its Bacolod Plant without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of
back wages, other unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.

The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in favor of the petitioner company.
The first complaint was dismissed after Labor Arbiter found that the company did not have the
power of control over Dr. Climacos performance of his duties and responsibilities. Likewise the
second complaint was dismissed in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.

On appeal, the NLRC Fourth Division, Cebu City, affirmed the Arbiter disposition. On
petition for review before the CA, the NLRC ruling was reversed. The appellate court ruled that
using the four-fold test, an employer-employee relationship existed between the company and
Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case through a petition for review on certiorari before this
court.

Meantime, while the NLRC case was pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bacolod
City, a petition praying, among others, that petitioner be ordered to report him for compulsory
social security coverage. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. They argued that there is no employer-employee relationship between the
company and Dr. Climaco; and that his services were engaged by virtue of a Retainer
Agreement. The SSC issued an order stating among others, that the resolution of Petitioner
Companys motion to dismiss is held in abeyance pending reception of evidence of the parties.
Petitioners again moved for the dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the ground of
forum shopping and litis pendentia. The SSC denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. The
company filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. the CA dismissed the petition for want of
merit. Hence, the present case.

Issues:

1. Whether previous complaint for regularization and/or illegal dismissal, poses a

prejudicial question to the subject present case.
2. Whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping before the Social Security Commission.
3. Whether petition should be dismissed outright on the ground of litis pendentia.

Ruling:

1. No prejudicial question exist because there is no pending criminal case. The

consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as previously instituted civil cases. Prejudicial
question is understood in the law to be that which must precede the criminal action, that which
requires a decision with which said question is closely related.

Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the
case filed by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question o whether or not he is an employee
of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory coverage of the Social Security
System. On the contrary, the cases filed before the NLRC involved different issues. In his first
complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and demanded payment
of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
Christmas bonus and all other benefits. The second complaint was for illegal dismissal, with
prayer for reinstatement to his former position as company physician of the companys Bacolod
Plant, without loss of seniority, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for
payment of damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinative of whether or not
the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must
be determinative of the case before the court.

2. No forum shopping. Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as

trifling with the court and their processes. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in once case will amount to res judicata in the
other.

Dr. Climaco is not guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that the parties are identical
in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs sought and the causes of action are different. Dr. Climacos
basis in filing the cases before the NLRC and the SSC is his Retainer Agreement with the
Company. This does not mean, however, that his causes of action are the same. As the SSC and
the CA correctly observed, different laws are applicable to the vases before the two tribunals.
The Labor Code and pertinent social legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC, while
the Social Security Law would govern the case before the SSC. Clearly, as the issues pending
before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not amount to res
judicata in the case before the SSC.

3. No litis pendentia to speak of. As previously explained, although the parties in the
cases before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted,
and the reliefs prayed for each tribunal, are different.

Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes
another for he enforcement or protection of a redress or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Every other remedy is a special proceeding. Evidently, there is no another action pending
between petitioners and Dr. Climaco at the time when the latter filed a petition before the SSC.
 REV. LUIS AO-AS, ET. AL. Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL. Respondents.
G.R. NO.128464, June 20, 2006
Case No.: 41

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal of the
Court of Appeals' Decision1 dated 10 October 1996 in favor of respondents [hereinafter referred
to as the Batong group] and Resolution2 dated 3 March 1997 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the herein petitioners [hereinafter referred to as the Ao-As group].

The Lutheran Church in the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the LCP) is a religious
organization duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 8, 1967. Its
members are comprised of the Lutheran clergymen and the local Lutheran congregations in the
Philippines which, at the time of its incorporation, was divided into three districts, namely: the
North Luzon District (hereinafter referred to as the NLD); the South Luzon District (hereinafter
referred to as the SLD); [and] the Mindanao district (hereinafter referred to as the MDD).

The governing body of the LCP is its national board of directors (hereinafter referred to as the
LCP Board) which was originally composed of seven (7) members serving a term of two years.
Six members of the LCP Board are elected separately in district conferences held in each district,
with two members representing each district - the elected district president becomes the clergy
representative to the LCP Board and the other is a lay representative to the LCP Board. The
seventh member of the Board is the National President of the LCP who is elected at large in a
national convention held in October of every even-numbered year.

During the 1976 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed dividing the North Luzon
district (NLD) into two districts: the NLD Highland District (NLHD) and the NLD Lowland
District (NLLD) - - thereby increasing the number of directors from seven (7) to nine (9). Again
in the 1984 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed creating another district, namely,
the Visayan Islands District (VID) thereby increasing further the number of directors to eleven
(11). Both resolutions were passed pursuant to Section 2 of Article 7 of the LCP By-Laws which
provides that: "LCP in convention may form additional districts as it sees fit".

Since the addition of two or more districts, an eleven (11) member board of directors
representing the five (5) districts managed the LCP without any challenge from the membership
until several years later when certain controversies arose involving the resolutions of the Board
terminating the services of the LCP business manager and corporate treasurer since 1979,
Mr.Eclesio Hipe.

The termination of Mr.Hipe sparked a series of intracorporate complaints lodged before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For the first time, the legality of the eleven (11)
member Board was put in issue as being in excess of the number of directors provided in the
Articles of Incorporation since no amendments were made thereto to reflect the increase.

On September 14, 1992, [the Batong group] filed their Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied in an Order dated September 23, 1992.

On September 23, 1992, [the Batong group] filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that the SEC-SIDC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in creating the management committee.
Shortly thereafter, on September 29, 1992, the following were appointed to the management
committee: Atty. Puno as Chairman; and private respondents Jose Laking, Eduardo Ladlad,
Romeo Celiz as members. However, Atty. Puno later resigned and was replaced by Atty. Oscar
Almazan who was appointed as Chairman. After the death of Romeo Celiz, he was replaced by
private respondent Luis Ao-As.

On October 6, 1992, [the Ao-As group] filed a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction seeking to enjoin [the Batong group] not only from continuing to act as LCP board of
directors but also from calling a national convention to elect new set of officers and members of
the Board as provided in the LCP Constitution and By-Laws.

However, even before the creation of the management committee, the LCP national convention
had already been called in a Board meeting held on September 26, 1991 at the Lutheran
Hospice, Quezon City. Hence, by the time the writ of preliminary injunction was issued, all
notices had already been received by all local congregations and convention delegates had
likewise already been chosen to attend the national convention.

The district conference for NLD was likewise held before the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction on October 7 to 9, 1992. In said convention, the local congregations and clergymen
executed a manifesto expressing their own opposition to the appointment of a management
committee.

[The Batong group] then filed with the SEC En Banc a Supplemental Petition dated November
13, 1992 alleging the supervening events in the case which took place after the filing of the
original petition on September 23, 1992.

Subsequent to the 17th LCP national convention of October 1992, a special convention was
called by the SEC Management Committee on January 25 to 29, 1993 at Cagayan de Oro City to
elect a different set of officers for LCP. [The Batong group] allege that the required notices were
not sent to several local congregations and even fewer LCP members were permitted by [the
Ao-As group] to attend the special convention as evidenced by the list of official delegates
contained in the minutes of the special convention.

On July 21, 1993, [the Batong Group] filed a Second Supplement to its petition for certiorari in
the SEC En Banc alleging the supervening events and seeking the review of an Order of the
Hearing Officer dated June 9, 1993 which enlisted the aid of the Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government and the PNP Director General to enforce the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned petitions, the management committee took
control of several church properties, replaced clergymen from their parsonages and froze all
bank accounts in the name of LCP.

[The Batong group] then filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction on August 19, 1993 seeking to unfreeze the bank accounts
and recover the seized buildings.

All of the aforementioned petitioners (sic) were denied by the SEC En Banc. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but the same was likewise denied.3

The Batong group then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
Decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission En Banc. In said Petition, the Batong group
alleged that the Ao-As group persisted in carrying out ultra vires and illegal acts, to
On 10 October 1996, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Batong group. Hence, this
petition, where the Ao-As group brings forth the following issues to be resolved by this Court:

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case of
forum shopping.

HELD:

The Ao-As group did not commit willful and deliberate forum shopping in the filing of SEC-SIDC
Case No. 3857.

Since a ruling upholding the Court of Appeals on the issue of forum shopping would render all
the other issues in this petition moot, we resolve to pass upon the same at the onset.

The Ao-As group claims that the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case
No. 3857 is a case of forum shopping. The Court of Appeals had ruled:

Finally, SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a clear case of forum shopping. The acts of [the Batong
group], as embodied in several board resolutions, have already been raised and passed upon in
other cases pending at the time the [Ao-As group] instituted the present controversy.

The board resolutions denominated as LCP-BD-29-90 and LCP-BD-37-90 - authorizing the

dissolution of the LCP business office and termination of the employees connected therewith -
was the subject of NLRC CASE NOS. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90 pending before the National
Labor Relations Commission.

The board resolution denominated as LCP-BD-28-90 authorizing the transfer of the LCP
corporate records from the Sta. Mesa Office to the Caloocan Office - was the subject of Civil Case
No. 133394-CV and 131879-CV pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branches
20 and 21 and subsequently dismissed in view of the FORMULA OF CONCORD entered into
between the parties.

On the other hand, the legality of the composition of the eleven-member LCP Board was already
the subject matter of SICD Case No. 3524 which was appealed to the SEC En Banc and docketed
as SEC Case No. 352.

SEC Case No. 3857 is not the first case where the [Ao-As group], or those with similar interests,
have asked for the appointment of a management committee. In SEC Case 3556 entitled
"ExclesioHipe and Lutheran Church of the Philippines v. Thomas Batong, et al.", in a motion
dated June 18, 1991, private respondent ExclesioHipe prayed for the appointment of a
management committee for LCP. In an Order dated August 15, 1991, the SEC-SICD ruled that the
Motion for the Appointment of a Management Committee and Accounting filed by the
petitioners cannot be given due course considering that the same is one of the incidents in SEC
Case No. 3857 entitled Rev. Luis Ao-As, et al. v. Thomas Batong now pending in the sala of Hon.
Elpidio Salgado". Petitioners knew that similar petitions have been previously commenced
because Atty. Oscar Almazan who is also a co-counsel in the case was the counsel of record in
SEC Case No. 3556 and the other cases.

Clearly, the act of the [Ao-as group] in filing multiple petitions involving the same issues
constitutes forum shopping and should be sanctioned with dismissal. x x x8
We hold that this is not a case of willful and deliberate forum shopping and, hence, the SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857, which contains the earlier prayer to create a management committee, should not
be dismissed. The reason for this is the strict evidentiary requirement needed to grant a prayer
to create a management committee. The power of the SEC14 to create a management committee
is found in Section 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, which provides:

Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:

d) To create and appoint a management committee, board or body upon petition or motupropio
to undertake the management of corporations, partnerships or other associations not
supervised or regulated by other government agencies in appropriate cases when there is
imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other properties or
paralization of business operations of such corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to
the interest of the minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.

Evidently, it should be difficult to deduce the "imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of assets or other properties" from an allegation of a single act of previous
misappropriation or dissipation on the part of the Batong group. It is often only when the
previous misappropriations and dissipations have become extensive and out of control that it
can be candidly said that there is an imminent danger of further dissipation. The Ao-As group
cannot be faulted therefore for not praying for the creation of a management committee in the
first couple of cases it filed with the SEC, and neither can they be faulted for using the causes of
action in previously filed cases to prove their allegation of imminent dissipation. We cannot rule
out the possibility that the danger of imminent dissipation of the corporate assets became
apparent only in the acts of the respondents subsequent to the filing of the first two SEC cases.
 CORPORATION AS PARTY

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GR no. 89070, May 18, 1992
Case No. 42

Facts:

In 1982, Peter Cosalan, then general manager of the Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO),
received an audit report from the National Electrification Administration (NEA). The said audit
advised Cosalan of certain irregularities in the management of the funds of BENECO. Cosalan
then sought to address the issue by introducing reforms recommended by the NEA as well as by
the auditing body, Commission on Audit. However, the Board Members of BENECO reacted to
these reforms by issuing a series of resolutions which first reduced Cosalans salary and
allowances, then he was excluded from his work, and eventually, he was suspended indefinitely.

Cosalan then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the BENECO Board Members, he later
impleaded BENECO itself. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Cosalan. The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the LA but modified it so as to absolve
the Board Members from liability as it held that the Board Members merely acted in their
official capacity. BENECO, being the only party adjudged to be liable, then appealed said
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the National Labor Relations Commission is correct.

HELD:

No. The act of the Board Members is ultra vires. There was no legal basis for them to suspend
Cosalan indefinitely for under the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code the maximum period
form preventive suspension should not go beyond 30 days. Further, it was found that Cosalan
was never informed of the charges against him nor was he afforded the opportunity to present
his case. He was deprived of due process. Nor was Cosalans suspension approved by the NEA,
which is also required for due process purposes.

These acts by the Board Members are tainted with bad faith. A very strong presumption arises
that the Board Members are acting in reprisal against the reforms sought to be introduced by
Cosalan in order to address the irregularities within BENECO. The Board Members are therefore
liable for damages under Section 31 of the Corporation Code. And even though BENECO is a
cooperative, it is still covered by the Corporation Code because under PD 269, cooperatives are
considered as corporations.

The Supreme Court ruled that BENECO and the BENECO Board Members are liable for the
damages caused against Cosalan. However BENECO can seek reimbursement from the Board
Members so as not to unduly penalize the innocent members of BENECO.
 Docket Fees

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al vs. Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, Presiding Judge, Br. 104,
RTC, Q.C.
G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Case No. 43

Facts:

On March 28, 1984, private respondent Manuel Tiong filed a complaint in the RTC of
Quezon City fro refund of premiums and the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against
petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of
actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, Attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and cost of the suit.
In the body of the complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about
P50 Million. However, in the prayer, the amount of damages asked was not stated. The amount
of only P210 was paid for the docket fee.
On June 23, 1986, the private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the
prayer, it asked to be awarded to no less than P10 million, as actual and exemplary damages,
but in the body of the complaint, the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44
million. Said amended complaint was nevertheless admitted and private respondent was
reassessed additional docket fee of P39 thousand based on his prayer of not less than P10
Million.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint altering an
additional claim of P20 Million in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64 Million.
Private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80 thousand. Again, on April 28, 1988,
private respondent paid and additional docket fee of P62 thousand. Hence, private respondent
appears to have paid a total of P182 thousand of docket fees based on his claim of P64 Million.
Petitioner (Sun Insurance) insist that the payments of docket fees made by private
respondent was insufficient , prompting it to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order of
the RTC admitting the amended and supplementary complaints without payments of the proper
docket fees, hence, it should likewise be dismissed for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss the complaint
and grant the writ of preliminary attachment. Hence, the instant petition before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, where the correct or proper docket
fees has not been paid.

Ruling:

The court ruled that, citing the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals:

The court acquires jurisdiction over any case upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction
in the court, much less the payment of the docket fees based on the amounts sought for in the
amended pleading.

In the said Manchester case, the court held that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because the petitioner did not pay the additional docket fees until the
case was decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, there was intent to defraud the government of
the payment of docket fees.
In the present case, the court applied a more liberal interpretation of the rules
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required by the order of the trial court.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
 PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF
RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL et al.
G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 575
Case No. 45

FACTS:
Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but
was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the
quality of the products being delivered. Thus, a complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages
was filed on March 17, 1999.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing fee.
According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of actual
damages by opting to estimate the value of the un-withdrawn molasses in order to escape the
payment of the proper docket fees.
After due course the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by NOPA and likewise
denied its Motion for Reconsideration. NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC. However, said petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE MOTION TO DISMISS SHALL BE GRANTED ON THE GROUND OF

FAILURE TO PAY THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF DOCKET FEES?

RULING:

No, the petition is unmeritorious.

Evidently, the party was in good faith absent of any motive or intention to defraud the
Court in the payment of docket fees.

In the case of United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros, the Court reiterates
that In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees
when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester will apply.

Accordingly, the petition is denied.

 RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, respondents
G.R. No. 175914 , February 10, 2009
Case No.: 46

FACTS:

Petitioner obtained a loan in the total amount of 95,700,620.00 from respondents

Romeo Y. Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by real estate mortgages over five
parcels of land, all located in Triangulo, Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) No. 38376, No. 29918, No. 38374, No. 39232, and No. 39225, issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Naga City, in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when
it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the
same.

In a Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 March 2005, respondents Tan and Obiedo

granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its indebtedness, and condoned the
interests, penalties and surcharges accruing thereon from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005
which amounted to 74,678,647.00. The Memorandum of Agreement required, in turn, that
petitioner execute simultaneously with the said Memorandum, "by way of dacionenpago,"
Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo, covering the same parcels of
land subject of the mortgages. The Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated 2 January
2006, and state that petitioner sold to respondents Tan and Obiedo the parcels of land for the
following purchase prices:

TCT No. Purchase Price

38376 9,340,000.00
29918 28,000,000.00
38374 12,000,000.00
39232 1,600,000.00
39225 1,600,000.00

Petitioner could choose to pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five parcels of
land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan and Obiedo the following
prices for the same, inclusive of interest and penalties:

TCT No. Redemption Price

38376 25,328,939.00
29918 35,660,800.00
38374 28,477,600.00
39232 6,233,381.00
39225 6,233,381.00

The Memorandum of Agreement further provided that should petitioner contest,

judicially or otherwise, any act, transaction, or event related to or necessarily connected with
the said Memorandum and the Deeds of Absolute Sale involving the five parcels of land, it would
pay respondents Tan and Obiedo10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and
attorneys fees. Petitioner would likewise pay respondents Tan and Obiedo the condoned
interests, surcharges and penalties. Finally, should a contest arise from the Memorandum of
Agreement, Mr. Ruben Sia (Sia), President of petitioner corporation, personally assumes, jointly
and severally with petitioner, the latters monetary obligation to respondent Tan and Obiedo.

Respondent Atty. Tomas A. Reyes (Reyes) was the Notary Public who notarized the
Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 March 2005 between respondent Tan and Obiedo, on one
hand, and petitioner, on the other.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner, represented by Mr. Sia,

executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale, over the five parcels of land, in favor of respondents
Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces provided for in the said Deeds, somebody wrote the 3rd of
January 2006 as the date of their execution. The Deeds were again notarized by respondent
Atty. Reyes also on 3 January 2006.

Without payment having been made by petitioner on 31 December 2005, respondents

Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated 3 January 2006 before the Register
of Deeds of Naga City on 8 March 2006, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over
the five parcels of land in their names.

On 16 March 2006, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan,
Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages, with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO). The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-0030.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated
2. Whether the special civil actions, except judicial foreclosure of mortgage, EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE which will
3. Whether the all other actions not involving property

RULING:

The Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against
respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action
necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance
with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
did not commit any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional
docket fees for its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.

The Court does not give much credence to the allegation of petitioner that if the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand and not rectified, it would result in grave
injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the prohibitive amount assessed against
it. It is a sweeping assertion which lacks evidentiary support. Undeniably, before the Court can
conclude that the amount of docket fees is indeed prohibitive for a party, it would have to look
into the financial capacity of said party. It baffles this Court that herein petitioner, having the
capacity to enter into multi-million transactions, now stalls at paying 720,392.60 additional
docket fees so it could champion before the courts its rights over the disputed real properties.
Moreover, even though the Court exempts individuals, as indigent or pauper litigants, from
paying docket fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a corporate entity.
 ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 94677 October 15, 1991
Case No.: 48

Facts:
Original Development and Construction Corporation (ODECOR) sued Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMC) for breach of contract and for damages. ODECOR accused the two of divesting its
customers which resulted to massive losses for the corporation.
In ODECORs claim for damages it asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary
and moral damages, the amount of which will be proved at the trial; that for actual damages
its claiming P2,272,193.10 but the rest appears to be unspecified amount of damages which the
trial court could not assess. ODECOR paid the docket fee for the claim for the actual damages
specified as well as the docket fees for the unspecified damages.
HIGC then moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over it because of non-payment of the proper docket fees.
The trial court did not order the dismissal of the case but rather directed the Clerk of
Court to issue a certificate of reassessment of the proper docket fee and if there is a deficiency
ODECOR should pay the same. In the assessment, the Clerk of Court determined that the claim
for attorneys fee which was stated in the body of the complaint was not reiterated in the
PRAYER of the complaint hence, the docket fees paid by ODECOR could not have included
payment for the fees for the claim of attorneys fee. ODECOR was then ordered to amend its
complaint.
In its amended complaint, ODECOR restated substantially all its allegations in the first
complaint except that it specified its claim for attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total
monthly liability and other expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
HIGC then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA ruled in favor HIGC and enjoined the trial court from
hearing the case.
ODECOR then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
No. The claims for the other damages (other than actual) are vague. The terms used by
ODECOR in its claims i.e. the amount of which will be proved at the trial and the demand for
attorneys fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of litigation
and costs of this suit are not definite enough to be the basis of the computation of the proper
docket fees.
While it is not required that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in
his estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the amount of such
docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint did not state enough facts and sums
to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the
judge mere guesswork as to these amounts, which is fatal.
 NOTES: The court may allow amendment of a pleading (in complaints purely for money
and damages) if such does not specify the amount of claims. When amended, the pleader shall
pay the appropriate docket fees. Where the amount of claim is specified but the docket fees paid
were not sufficient, the pleader is allowed to cure the defect by paying the deficiency.
PROVIDED, that in both cases prescription has not set.
If the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and the prescribed
fees for an action involving real property have been paid but the amounts of the unrelated
damages are unspecified, the court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action on the real
property but may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages.
Accordingly, the court may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within the prescriptive
period.
 Civil Procedure Service of Summons by a Police Officer

PATRICIO BELLO vs. EUGENIA UBO and PORFERIO REGIS

G.R. No. L-30353, September 30, 1982
Case No.: 49

Facts:
A land dispute arose between Bello and Ubo. Bello is claiming ownership over the property that
Ubo and her son have been occupying for years even paying taxes therefor. Ubo and her son
(Porferio Regis) claimed that they inherited said land.
Bello then filed a civil suit against Ubo and Regis. Summons were issued by the court.
A certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia served the summons. What he did was go to where Ubo and
her son was residing. Ubo and Regis initially refused to accept the same. But Yobia explained the
nature of the Summons; that there is a civil case filed against them; that they need to find a
lawyer to assist them. Ubo and Regis then reluctantly signed the summons. Thereafter, he
detached the copy of the complaint and handed it to Ubo and Regis. He however took back the
same afterwards; he also held on to the copy of the summons and afterwards returned to his
police station.
Despite signing the summons, Ubo and Regis did not file any responsive pleadings nor did they
appear in court. Eventually, the trial court declared them in default and decided in favor of Bello.
Issue:

Whether or not there is a proper service of summons in the case at bar.

Ruling:

No. A police officer is not one of those enumerated as a person authorized to serve summons.
The list provided in the Rules of Court is exclusive. Yobia was not a sheriff or a court officer of
the province where service was made; and neither was he a person who, for special reasons,
was specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who issued the same.
Furthermore, even assuming that Yobia could be considered as a proper person to serve the
summons, still there was no valid and effective service since he brought back the summons with
him together with the copy of the complaint. Since there is no valid service of summons, the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Ubo and Regis. Therefore, the ex parte
proceedings that took place as well as the decision favoring Bello is null and void.
 Filmerco Commercial Company v Intermediate Appellate Court
GR No. 79661 April 9, 1987
Case No.: 51

Facts:
Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the payment of the obligation stated in the promissory
notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein
the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the payment of the
latter's obligation under the loan-accounts. The loans remained outstanding even after they
became due and demandable. Hence, BPI filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money
against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Rizal.

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were in default for failure to file an answer
within the reglementary period. The plaintiff was then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte
where the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. On the ground that the period to appeal expired
without any decision having been appealed, the plaintiff filed a motion for execution of
judgment before the lower court. This motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued
against Filmerco and the Miguels. Pursuant to the writ of execution, the properties were
scheduled for sale. The defendants then filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of
execution, notice of levy/attachment and to restrain the holding of the auction sale. The motion
was premised on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants because no
valid summons was served on them.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring their within
the jurisdiction of the court.

Ruling:

No. No valid service of summons was made.

The Supreme Court found that no valid service of summons upon the defendant spouses could
be effected as the address No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila was neither the "residence" nor the "dwelling house" of the petitioners at the time
summons was served upon them as contemplated by the Rules.

Moreover, Angle Morger is not a proper person with whom the copies of the summons could be
left. The sheriff 's return indicates that she refused to sign the summons and the same was
returned to the court unsigned. This fact adds credence to Angle Morger's manifestation about
her informing the sheriff that she was not authorized to receive papers in behalf of the
defendant-spouses and that she refused to receive them.
 Service of Summons Invalid Service; Consequence
Sps. Miranda v. Court of Appeals
G.R. 114243, February 23, 2000
Case No.: 52

Facts:
In 1965, Luneta Motor Company filed an action for recovery of a jeep and for recovery of
sum of money against Lucila Java. Java did not appear in court nor did she file responsive
pleadings despite notice hence she was declared in default. As a result, LMC won the case and
eventually a writ of execution was issued in their favor. Pursuant to said writ certain properties
of Java were sold in a public auction including a parcel of land which LMC was able to buy in said
action. LMC then sold said parcel of land to spouses Miranda.
In 1977, Java filed an action to annul the previous judgment, the auction proceedings,
and the subsequent transfers of the auctioned property. Java alleged that the reason why she
did not appear in court and why she never filed an ANSWER was because she never received
any summons from the trial court.
The Court Sheriff however testified that he handed a copies of the summons and the
complaint to a certain Ernesto Elizondo (son in law of Java) in the compound where Java
resides; that said service was by way of substituted service.
The trial court ruled that there is a proper service of summons. The Court of Appeals
however reversed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid service of summons.

HELD:

No, there is none. The Sheriffs report did not fully explain why he did a substituted
service. Particularly, sheriff did not explain why personal service was not done. Substituted
service can only be effected if personal service, under certain circumstances, cannot be effected.
Service of summons upon the defendant is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his
person. The modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made.
Another glaring defect in the service of summons is that assuming that substituted
service can be effected, still the service of summons in this case is invalid because said service
was upon Elizondo who testified in court that though he lives in the same compound as Java, he
does not reside in the same dwelling as Java (they live in different houses) hence, this is a
violation to the strict requirements of the Rules of Court.
As a result, the judgment of the trial court, as well as the public auction and the
subsequent transfers of the properties involved are all void. The trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over Java.
 Jose vs. Boyon
GR No. 147369, October 23, 2003
Case No.: 53

Facts:

Petitioners lodged a complaint before the RTC for specific performance against
respondents to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. Respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court issued
summons to the respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted
to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
respondents failed. Petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court
to Effect Summons by Publication which was granted. The respondent judge, sans a written
motion, issued an Order declaring herein respondents in default for failure to file their
respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to
submit their evidence ex-parte. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA
held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and
Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them.

Issue:

Whether or not there was valid service of summons.

Ruling:

No. No valid service of summons was made.

In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out
in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. As can be gleaned from the rules,
personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in
charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers
return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. In the instant case, it appears
that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons
without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. Summons by publication in
this case was also improper. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.
 Summons

Venturanza vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77760, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 305
Case No.: 54

Facts:

On 22 May 1985, plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint
against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVI 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 109950, for
collection of sums of money in the aggregate amount of P9,711.50, representing several loans
evidenced by promissory notes which had become due and demandable but unpaid despite
repeated demands. On 10 June and served 1985, summons was issued against the petitioners
on Augusto Soan, father of petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street. Barrio
Obrero Tondo, Manila, the address of petitioners stated in the complaint.

For failure of the petitioners to file their Answer, a decision dated 12 August 1985 was
rendered by the court a quo based on the allegations of fact in the complaint, and ordering the
petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondent the sum of P9,711.50 with
interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from due date per promissory
notes until fully paid, to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Considering that, as
per sheriff's Return, dated 17 August 1985, said decision could not be served upon the
petitioners at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero Tondo, Manila, on the ground that they were no
longer at said address, the same was served on 16 September 1985 upon Violeta S. Venturanza
in her office at Asian Development Bank, Roxas Blvd., Pasay City.

On 22 September 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past
Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no proper and
valid service of summons upon them in accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14
of the Rules of Court and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the residence of
Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the
petitioners, and that since April 1985, petitioners had been already residing at Aurora Street,
Pasay City. In an order dated 20 October 1985, the court a quo denied the motion, for lack of
merit,

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XLIII, the appeal being docketed
as Civil Case No. 86-34319, the decision of the court a quo was affirmed with a slight
modification, i.e., lowering the amount of attomey's fees to P 500.00. 8 On 6 March 1987, a
petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals. Said RTC decision was affirmed in
toto. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:

I. Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners when the summons was served upon Augusto Soan, father of petitioner Violeta S.
Venturanza at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero Tondo, Manila, which address is no longer the
residence nor the place of business of petitioners.

II. Whether the provisions of Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was legally complied with
by the Sheriff in serving the summons upon the father of one of the petitioners.
Held:

I. No, there was no valid service of summons, hence, the Metropolitan Trial

Court did not validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners. Under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there are three (3) methods of service of summons in civil actions,
namely: 1) personal service (Sec. 7); 2) substituted service (Sec. 8); and 3) service by
publication. Strict compliance with these modes of service is required in order that the court
may require jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Service of summons upon the
defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. This process is
for the benefit of the defendant, and is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard
on the claim against him. In the absence of valid waiver trial and judgment, without such
service, are null and void.

For a substantial service to be valid, summons must be served at the defendant's

residence at the time of such service. It is only when a defendant can not be personally served
with summons within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same
to be effected in the following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants'
dwelling house or residence, with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business, with some
competent person in charge thereof. For a substituted service to be valid, summons served at
the defendant's residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at
his former place of residence.

II. The Sheriff in serving the summons upon the father of one of the petitioners did
not substantially complied the provisions contemplated in Section 8, Rule 14 of
the Rules Court.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is

not applicable where it is patent that the sheriffs return is defective. Upon careful examination
of the sheriff's Return in this case, dated 10 June 1985, which purports to serve as proof that
summons had been served upon the defendants, together with a copy of the complaint, through
Augusto Soan, no statement is made that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve
the summons on the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said Return does not even
indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff 's return is defective.

In the instant case, the address of defendant Victoria Venturanza found in the 1984 ADB
Directory and the PLDT Directory for 1985-1986, together with the affidavit of the branch
sheriff, are not sufficient to substantiate the findings of the court a quo. It is the general rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence, are beyond this
Court's power of review.

However, in the instant case, we cannot but consider that the address of defendant
Victoria S. Venturanza found in the 1984 Asian Development Bank Directory and the PLDT
Telephone Directory for 1985-86, together with the affidavit of the branch sheriff, are not
sufficient to substantiate the findings of the court a quo that petitioners were bona fide
residents of 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila at the time summons was served on
Augusto Soan. There is no question, and in fact it was admitted by the petitioners, that in 1984
they were actual residents of 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila and, as correctly
reflected in the 1984 Asian Development Bank Directory.
 However, the change of their address, upon their transfer to Pasay City in April 1985,
could not be reflected in the 1985-86 PLDT Telephone Directory, because this directory had
already been printed and circulated to the public before their transfer in Pasay City. Moreover,
the copy of the contract of lease dated April 1985 between petitioner Romualdo Venturanza as
lessee and Linda Galvez as lessor over an apartment unit located at 2511 Aurora St., Pasay City
and the affidavit of Augusto Soan dated 29 April 1986 stating that he never told the sheriff that
the defendants were residing in his house at 3412 B.A. Tan St., Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila,
sufficiently negate the conclusion of the court a quo.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case was
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, including a valid service of summons.
No costs was recommended
 Commercial Company Incorporated vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 70661, April 9, 1987
Case No.: 56

Facts:

Filmerco Commercial Co.Inc (Filmerco) and the spouses Miguel have a joint and solidary
liability to BPI for a loan incurred by Filmerco from BPI. The loans remained outstanding even
after they became due and demandable. Thus, BPI filed a complaint against Filmerco and the
Miguels. Failure to issue summons upon Filmerco, alias summons were served. However, it was
noted that the alias summons for Filmerco was not and could not be served and the summons
pertaining to it returned unserved. As to the Miguels, according to the sheriff, summons were
served at their given address to a certain Mrs. Morger, a person residing therein, but refused to
sign.

Issue:

Whether valid summon were served upon petitioners.

Ruling:

No valid summonses were serves on apouses Miguel. According to the sheriff's return
dated March 31, 1984, summons were duly served upon "defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana
Maria Miguel at No. 18, Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, thru Mrs. Angle Morger, a person residing therein of suitable age and discretion to
receive service of that nature and who received the said court processes for and in behalf of the
defendants but refused to sign."

Petitioner spouses, Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel contend that the substituted service of
summons upon their persons thru Mrs. Angle Morger at No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific
Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was in- valid for the following reasons: (1)
at the time of the service they were not residents of the said address, and (2) Mrs. Angle Morger
was not authorized to receive papers or documents for them. They submitted affidavits of Angle
Morger to prove their point.

Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of court, summons must be served
on the defendant. However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made.

In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the
defendants could not be made because they moved out from their given address and their
whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's return. Hence, the court resorted to
substituted service of summons provided for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court:

SEC. 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

In one case, the SC ruled: The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held
to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former
dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal therefrom."
There is a strong showing that Mr. and Mrs. Jaime Miguel are not residents of 18 Yuchengco
Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa. Such that, the substituted service of
summons pursuant to Section 7 & 8, Rule 14, which was subsequently served was also not valid.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that no valid service of summons
upon the defendant spouses could be effected thru Mrs. Angle Morger. In her affidavits, Mrs.
Morger manifested:

1) that she and her husband are the bona fide residents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific
Malayan Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
2) that they leased the said premises from the owner thereof as evidenced by a contract
of lease dated August 8, 1983;
3) that they have been occupying the premises since September 1, 1983; that on March
31, 1984, Sheriff Villapana attempted to serve the official summons and a copy of a complaint
against spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel and Filmerco Commercial Inc.;
4) that she informed the sheriff that the Miguels do not reside in the place and that
neither was said residence the dwelling place of the Miguel spouses; that she does not know
Filmerco, Inc.;
5) that despite the fact that she informed the sheriff that she is not authorized by the
spouses and Filmerco to receive any papers for them, the sheriff left, leaving some
 JURISDICTION

CEZAR VS. RICAFORT-BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2001
506 SCRA 322
Case no. 57

Facts:

Private respondent Specified Material Corp filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
(P1,860,000 plus 3% monthly interest) against petitioner due to the latters failure to pay the
construction materials it purportedly purchased under a credit line from Specified. Cezar had
expressed willingness to pay Specified as long as an inventory is made and the parties
conflicting records as to materials delivered and actual materials used are reconciled. After
Cezar failed to show up in meetings for verification of documents, specified sent a final demand
letter and later on filed the complaint. Sheriff Marquez served the summons to Robles, an
alleged employee of Cezar. As Cezar failed to answer the complaint, the respondent judge
declared him in default. Specified filed an amended complaint, raising the obligation to
P2,005,000, a copy of the which was personally received by Cezar. Cezar, by way of special
appearance, filed a motion to set aside decision arguing that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person. After RTC denied the motion, he filed a petition for annulment of
judgment and preliminary injunction with CA, which was dismissed. SC also denied the
certiorari due to non-compliance with procedural requirements. After SCs resolution became
final and executory, specified moved for execution however the scheduled hearing on was reset
after Cezar filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing.

Issue:

Whether the RTC acquired the jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Yes. A court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent either through service of
summons or voluntary appearance. The service of summons is intended to give official notice to
the defendant or respondent that an action had been commenced against it. Whenever
practicable, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person and
he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering the summons to him. It is only when the
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that a substituted service may
be made. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find
the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed in the proof service. In the case, the
sheriffs return is patently defective for failure to state impossibility of personal service.
However, the defect in service was cured and the RTC acquired jurisdiction by virtue of Cezars
voluntary through his motion for re-setting the courts hearing on the motion for execution. An
appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or
respondent. A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. The
defendant may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he
specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person. Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
 Service of Summons

Ma. Theresa Bianco vs Philippine Countryside Rural Bank

G.R No. 161417 February 8, 2007
Case No. 58
Facts:

Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in
the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several
loans from the respondent bank. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its
due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand on September 28, 1999.
On February 22, 2000, respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against
the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served
to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at
Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City.

On October 31, 2000, the sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses
Biaco at their residence in #92 9th Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of execution
was personally received by Ernesto. By virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court,
the mortgaged property was sold at public auction in favor of the respondent bank in the
amount of PhP150,000.00.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that
extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings.
According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more
than six (6) months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against
her because the bank failed to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate
mortgage and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory
notes. She moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons
were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service
could not be made.

Issue:

Whether the summons were properly served to the petitioner when it was only served
to her husband.

Held:

Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional

cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) provide that judgments may be
annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.

Petitioner asserts that extrinsic fraud consisted in her husbands concealment of the
loans which he obtained from respondent PCRB; the filing of the complaint for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage; service of summons; rendition of judgment by default; and all other
proceedings which took place until the writ of garnishment was served.

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully
his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic
fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sells out his clients interest to the other side. The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.

With these considerations, the appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no
fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner, noting that the spouses Biaco were co-
defendants in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance concealed
by the husband from the wife cannot be attributed to respondent bank.

The Court explained, citing El Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca, that foreclosure and
attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident defendant
who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction
over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he may be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property belonging
to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and
that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so
minded.
 E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD vs. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO
G.R. No. 136426, August 4, 1999, 312, SCRA 332No.
Case No. 59

Facts:
Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office
address at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive,
Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and
private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former
agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to
the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further
agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in
the proper courts of Makati.
On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract
and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a
few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.[1]
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City[2] but the Sheriffs Return of Service[3] stated that the summons was duly served upon
defendant E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL
SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City,
and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.
Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of
summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly
served upon its employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those
persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service
of summons may be made.
The trial court issued an Order[7] denying defendants Motion to Dismiss and was given ten
(10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that since the
summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch
manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Hence, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] alleging that
Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service
of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and
clear in that the word manager was changed to general manager, secretary to corporate
secretary, and excluding there from agent and director.
Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served. Petitioner invokes
Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:

Whether the Regional trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon
service of summons on its branch manager.

Ruling:

No. Service of summons upon a construction project manager[15]; a corporations

assistant manager[16]; ordinary clerk of a corporation[17]; private secretary of corporate
executives[18]; retained counsel[19]; officials who had charge or control of the operations of the
corporation, like the assistant general manager[20]; or the corporations Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer[21]. In these cases, these persons were considered as agent within the
contemplation of the old rule.[22] Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an
agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states general manager instead of
only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The
phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme
Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:[23]

A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court
over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the
statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x.

The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain
legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic
corporation.
 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC
GR No.91980, June 27, 1991
Case No.: 60

Facts:

The petitioner Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a union of employees of San Miguel

Corporation at National Capital Region, present to the company a demand for correction of the
significant distortion in the workers wages allegedly caused by RA 6727 otherwise known as
Wage Rationalization Act citing the provisions of the same act that in case of wage distortion,
the dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of deadlock,
the same shall be resolved through compulsory arbitration. The union claimed that the
company ignored their demand by offering across-the board wage increase of P7.00 per day, per
employee as against the proposal of the union which is P25.00 per day. Later, the union reduced
the proposal to P15.00 per day by way of amicable settlement however the company rejected
the proposal thus the union members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime
services that apparently caused substantial losses to the company. Thereafter, the company
filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint against the union and its members to
declare the strike or slowdown illegal and to terminate the employees and the shop stewards.
Later, the company, on the claim that its action in the Arbitration Branch yielded no relief, filed
directly to the NLRC to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for
the issuance of a cease-and desist and temporary restraining order. The NLRC First Division
through Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan issue a Temporary Restraining Order for a period of 20
days and direct the union and its members to Cease and Desist from further committing the acts
complained of.
The Labor Arbiter conducted the hearing and later announced that she would submit a
report to the Commission relative to the extension of the temporary restraining order thus the
union filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition asserting that the NLRC had no authority
to act as commissioners because their appointments had not been confirmed by the CA and
even assuming the contrary, the NLRC, as an appellate body, had no jurisdiction to act on the
plea for injunction. In traverse of the petition, the company filed a Comment with Motion to
Admit Comment as Counter-Petition contending that the NLRC has the positive legal duty and
statutory obligation to enjoin the slowdown complained of and to compel the parties to
arbitrate, and to effectuate the important national policy of peaceful settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration; accordingly, the NLRC had no legal choice but to issue injunction
to enforce the reciprocal no lockout-no slowdown and mandatory arbitration agreement of the
parties.

Issue:

Whether the NLRC Division had no jurisdiction to issue the Temporary Restraining
Order or otherwise grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by the SMC.

Ruling:

The NLRC had acted entirely in accord with applicable provisions of the Labor Code.
Article 264 of the Code provides that No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or
other entity, except as otherwise provided in article 264 that listed down the specific prohibited
activities which may be forbidden or stopped by a restraining order or injunction and article
218 that enumerates the power of the NLRC and lays down the conditions under which a
restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue, and the procedure to be followed is
issuing the same. The temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte if the complainant
alleged in his complaint that a substantial and irreparable injury to its property will be
unavoidable if the said order will not be issued which shall be effective for no longer than 20
days and shall become void at its expiration.
The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by
the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as
he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter
his recommendation to the Commission.
 SIGNETICS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105041, August 31, 1993
Case No.: 61
Facts:
The petitioner was organized under the laws of America through Signetics Filipinas
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary. Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of
land with respondent.
Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the
lease contracts the words machineries, equipment, and accessories, the defendant were able
to withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. On the basis of
the allegation that Signetics is a subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served
summons at Philips Electrical Lamps Inc., Las Pias, Metro Manila service of summons was
made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation.
By special appearance, Signetics filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines should first be established in order that summons could validly made and
jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation, Signetics moved to dismiss the
complaint.

Issues:
Whether a foreign corporation can be sued in the Philippines and validly summoned by
a Philippine Court without prior proof that it was doing business here at the time of the suit.

Ruling:
Yes, it should be recalled that jurisdiction and venue of actions are, as they should be,
initially determined by the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot made to depend on
independent pleas set up in a mere motion to dismiss, otherwise jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the defendant. The fact that doing business must then, be
established by appropriate allegations in the complaint. This is what the Court should be seen to
have meant in the Pacific Micronesian case. The complaint, it is true, may have been vaguely
structured but, taken correlatively, not disjunctively as the petitioner would rather suggest, it is
not really so weak as to be fatally deficient.
On the other hand, the complaint in this instance has alleged inter alia, that Signetics had
become interested in engaging in business in the Philippines; that it had actually organized
SigFil, as its local business conduit or actual operating entity in the Philippines; that through
SigFil, it had entered into the lease contract involving properties in the Philippines a situation
that could have allowed Frehauf to avail itself of the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, on
extraterritorial service of summons since the relief sought consist in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property within the Philippines. Having said that, Freuhauf, in effect, has
invoked the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and it cannot does be held to have
improperly caused the service of summons on TEAM Pacific pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 14.
As explained by the Court in the Pacific Micronesian, summons may be served upon an agent of
the defendant who may not be necessarily be its resident agent designated in accordance with
law. The allegations in the complaint, taken together thus, have been able to amply convey that
not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the Philippines but that, also
by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself.
 PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Banko Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca

37 Phil. 921, (1981)
Case No.: 62

FACTS:

Palanca was indebted to Banco Espanol-Filipino and he had his parcel of land as security
to his debt, which amounted to P218,294.10. Due to Palancas nonpayment Banco moved to
mortgage Palancas property, which is worth about P75,000 in excess of his debt. But Palanca
left for China and stayed there until his death. Since Palanca is a non-resident, Banco has to
notify him about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower
court ordered to furnish Palanca a copy and that it would be sent to Amoy, China. The court
eventually granted Banco petition to execute Palancas property. Seven years thereafter, Vicente
surfaced on behalf of Palanca as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Palanca never received the summons.

ISSUE:

Whether the judicial/procedural due process was observed

HELD:

Yes, the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are:

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over
the property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
 Extraterritorial Service
Sahagun, vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78328, June 3, 1991
Case No.: 64
Facts:
The case at bar commenced on June 25, 1982 when a case was filed in the defunct Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV,2 by private respondent Filinvest Credit Corporation
(hereinafter, Filinvest) against petitioner's spouse, Abel (alias Abelardo) Sahagun, manager of
Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (Rallye, for brevity). It was alleged that Abel Sahagun made it appear that
his company had sold a motor vehicle to one Ernesto Salazar who issued a promissory note for
the price and executed as security for the payment of the note a chattel mortgage on the motor
vehicle in favor of Rallye. Subsequently, Rallye, through said Abel Sahagun., assigned the note
and the chattel mortgage to Filinvest for valuable consideration. When the note matured,
Salazar failed to pay the value thereof to the assignee, respondent Filinvest, compelling it to sue.
However, Filinvest discovered later that the mortgaged car had not been delivered to Salazar by
Sahagun.

On July 7, 1983, the trial court issued an order granting petitioner time to file a complaint in
intervention and denying reconsideration of the denial of private respondent's motion to
declare

On January 10, 1986, the respondent trial court issued an order admitting the amended
complaint and directing service of summons and the amended complaint upon defendant Abel
Sahagun at a different address at his last known address "at 1228-A Antipolo Street, Makati,
Metro Manila."

Afterwards, summons was supposedly served on Abel Sahagun through publication in the
Manila Evening Post on March 7, 14, and 21, 1986, according to the affidavit of publication of its
president,17 with a confusing entry in the notice of order18 that his last known address was at
"No. 16 Mangga Chupoy, Pilar Village Subdivision, Las Pias, Metro Manila" and to which
address said notice was directed, thus clearly contradicting the address stated in the January 10,
1986 order of the trial court, which was "No. 1228-A Antipolo Street, Makati, Metro Manila."

On July 18, 1986, Judge Job Madayag of Branch 145, Regional Trial Court of Makati, issued an
order granting in part the omnibus motion of Filinvest dated June 26, 1986, and denying it in
part.21 Apparently, since only defendants Abel and Carmelita Sahagun were allegedly served
with summons, the former through publication and the latter by personal service as in fact she
had filed her answer, only defendant Abel Sahagun was declared in default for failure to file his
answer. Defendant Rallye, on the other hand, was not declared in default because summons had
not been served upon it.

Petitioner went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals, in a petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
09909, assailing as grave abuse of discretion the declaration of default of defendant Abel
Sahagun. On February 6, 1987, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing
the petition, and on April 22, 1987, it denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.22 Hence, the present recourse.

Issue:
Whether extraterritorial service by publication can be made in a local newspaper of general
circulation?
Ruling:

Yes. In Tolaram Menghra vs. Bulchand Tarachand, et al.25 it is reported that the summons
therein was served by publication in the territory of Hawaii where the defendant resided.
However, as early as the case of El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca, etc.26 where the
defendant mortgagor had returned to the City of Amoy, China and was residing therein when
the foreclosure suit was instituted against him, the lower court ordered the publication of
summons in a newspaper in the City of Manila, and the service of a copy thereof to the last
known address of defendant in accordance with the provisions of Sections 398 and 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which provisions have been reproduced in the aforestated Section 17,
Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

What further compounds the difficulty in the proposed requirement for foreign publication of
the summons in the case at bar is the fact that it does not appear in what state or county of the
United States the defendant Abel Sahagun presently resides. Necessarily, if the trial court should
be required to resort to publication in a foreign newspaper it must have at hand not only the
name and availability of such newspaper or periodical but also the laws and rules governing the
publication of judicial processes and notices in said place. Here, we only have a defendant in the
United States to contend with, but we can very well anticipate the plethora of problems that
would arise if the same question on nonresident defendants is replicated in the other countries
of the world. In this jurisdiction, at least, we have the corresponding regulatory guidelines in
Presidential Decree No. 1079.

In fine. while there is no prohibition against availing of a foreign newspaper in extraterritorial

service of summons, neither should such publication in a local newspaper of general circulation
be altogether interdicted since, after all, the rule specifically authorizes the same to be made in
such places and for such time as the court concerned may order. If it is felt that adjective policy
would be better served by denying such discretion to the trial court, then the corresponding
amendment of the present rule would be indicated but subject to empirical proof of the
necessity for and the wisdom of such a change.

Accordingly, for the nonce, the matter should continue to be addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court in each particular case since it has the facts before it, and we should interfere
only in the exercise of our corrective power over an error or abuse in its actuations in a specific
case. Undeniably, some controversies may present factual features which would justify resort to
local publication of summons. There is the possibility of debtors escaping the jurisdiction of our
courts through the simple expedient of seeking a foreign refuge, probably with their subsequent
whereabouts unknown or unascertainable. For that matter, it is on that very rationale that
summons by publication is authorized whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent even if he is in the Philippines.
 SPS. PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE vs. SPS. HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003
Case No.: 65

Facts:

Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against the Respondents to

compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court is presided by herein
public respondent Judge N.C. Perello. Respondent judge, issued summons to the
respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process
server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the respondents
failed. Petitioners then filed an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by
Publication. Public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion. Afterwards, said
public respondent declared herein respondents in default for failure to file their respective
answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit
their evidence ex-parte. Ultimately, respondent judge issued the assailed resolution, directing
the respondents to execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit
of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title to the
parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in
their names.

Thereafter, Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was
surprised to learn the resolution issued by the respondent court. She then filed
an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons
effected by the court a quo. Petitioners aver that they submit that although the case filed before
the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. They
further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient
that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which
they effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient. On the
other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void
because of the invalid and defective service of summons.

According to them, the Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC
failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly
tried to serve it personally on them He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same
day, supposedly because he could not find respondents in the above address. Respondents
contend that when summons is served by substituted service, the return must show that it was
impossible to serve the summons personally, and that efforts had been exerted toward that
end. They add that noncompliance with the rule on substituted service renders invalid all
proceedings relative thereto.

Issues:

Whether or not the proceedings before the lower court are null and void due to invalid
and defective service of summons and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the respondents.

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled in negative. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service.
 Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of
service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is
likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of
service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the
foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to
substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine effort to locate
respondents. In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that
personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable
in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for
specific performance.
 PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. v. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007
Case No.: 66

Facts:

Respondent entered into a Distribution Agreement5 on 1 June 1990 with Perkin-Elmer

Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Singapore and engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing
various laboratory/analytical instruments. By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA appointed the
respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines. The respondent was
likewise granted the right to purchase and sell the products of PEIA subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the Distribution Agreement. PEIA, on the other hand, shall give
respondent a commission for the sale of its products in the Philippines.

Under the same Distribution Agreement, respondent shall order the products of PEIA,
which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin-Elmer Instruments
(Philippines) Corporation (PEIP). On 2 August 1997, however, PEIA unilaterally terminated the
Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 212, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance
of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.

Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court
to Deputize Respondents General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside of the
Philippines but the said Alias Summons was served on 28 September 2000 and received by
Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and,
allegedly, a separate and distinct entity from PEIA.

Issue:

Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner having defective
service of summons?

Ruling:

No. The court did not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In the case at
bar, there is no valid extraterritorial service of summons upon petitioner, because the case
before the court involved a collection of a sum of money and damages, hence, an action in
personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of
the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement.

Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only
four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may
be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
defendant non-residents property has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances,
service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
 Filmerco Commercial vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 67

Facts :

Filmerco and the spouses Miguel have a joint and solidary liability to BPI for a loan incurred by Filmerco from
BPI. The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Thus, BPI filed a complaint
against Filmerco and the Miguels. Failure to issues summons upon Filmerco, alias summons were served.
However, it was noted that the summons for Filmerco was not and could not be served and the summons
pertaining to it returned unserved. As to the Miguels, according to the sheriff, summons were served at their
givenaddress to a certain Mrs. Morger, a person residing therein, but refused to sign.

Issue:

WON valid summon were served upon petitioners.

Held:

No valid summonses were served. Ratio:

1. In one case, the SC ruled: The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the
time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house,
residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal therefrom." There is a strong
showing that Mr. and Mrs. Jaime Miguelare not residents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan
Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa. Suchthat, the substituted service of summons pursuant to Section 7 & 8,
Rule 14, which was subsequently served was also not valid.

2. A sheriff's certification that he duly served summons on a defendant does not necessarily
mean that he validly served the summons.3.Since the appellate court considered service
of summons upon the petitioner-spouses as constituting service of summons upon the
petitioner-corporation, the inevitable conclusion is that no valid summons could have been effected
upon the petitioner-corporation.
 Service of Summons
VALMONTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108538, January 22, 1996
Case No.: 69

Facts:

Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are
husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of
Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita,
Manila.

Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition
against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at
present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants
are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center,
Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was
also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her
husband.

Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as the party to
whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made
upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but
not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her
behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.

Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent
moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in
behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of
respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo
hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

Held:

No, There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.

The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the
purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment
against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service,
to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which
the court may deem sufficient.
In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by
means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where
the defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made
upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed
sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of
the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19, such leave must be applied
for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not
less than sixty (60) days after notice.
 Service of Summons, Support

Dolores Montefalcon and Laurence Montefalcon vs. Ronnie S. Vasquez

G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008
Case No.: 70

Facts:

Petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support

against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support
to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.
According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since
Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance
despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally
married, and that Vasquez has his own family. However the court failed to serve summons to
the respondent both thru personal and substituted service of summons

The petitioners motion to declare Vasquez in default was granted by the trial court
including the petitioners prayer explaining that they had no ill-motive and that Dolores gave a
truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by his
silence. It further explained that Laurences certificate of live birth, being a public document, is
irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation.

In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners
opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial
court erred in trying and deciding the case as it never acquired jurisdiction over his person, as
well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly excessive and exorbitant.
The appellate court granted the petition and noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was
defective as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to
effect personal service.

Issue:

1. Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court
with jurisdiction over his person;

2. Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

Ruling:

1. Yes.

To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be

personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of
judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the
country once their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same
or new manning agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a
Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where
majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province
where he originates.
 Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when
the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas
seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of
summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced against
a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it,
service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section. (Emphasis supplied.)

The preceding section referred to states:

SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject
of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave
shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within
which the defendant must answer.

Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words may and also, it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-seaman.

The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga City-
based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons personally on
Vasquez. When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the whereabouts of Vasquez.
Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court commissioned a Taguig City-
based sheriff to serve the summons. Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquezs
whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to substituted service. There was
no undue haste in effecting substituted service. The fact that the Naga court allowed a
reasonable time to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was indeed no
precipitate haste in serving the summons.

In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified
because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail.
Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the
performance of their official duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of
suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquezs dwelling

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set
aside. The default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to file a
motion for reconsideration. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but failed
attempt at personal service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquezs place in Camarines Sur to the
final substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight months, a
reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service had failed and was futile.

2. Yes.
 Co-petitioner Laurence is legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the
amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial court is neither excessive nor unreasonable.

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article
172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public
document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default
of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Laurences record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to

prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He
signed as father in Laurences certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data
entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In
fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172,
there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by
itself a consummated act.

As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Under Article

195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is
variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the
award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
 Judgment/Decision

Toyota Cubao vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 126321, October 23, 1997
Case No.: 71

Facts:

Petitioner Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo
Guevarra. The repair cost of P76800.47 was paid by means of a check drawn by Guevarra in
favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored, i.e., "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds ('DAIF')." Petitioner thereupon requested that Guevarra should make good
the check. When Guevarra failed to heed the demand, petitioner filed a civil case for collection of
the unpaid account.

The trial court issued summons to Guevarra which was served by the Process Server. However,
the latter submitted to the Court a return on the service, alleging that it was duly served to
Guevarras sister-in-law but she refused to sign it.

As petitioner claims that Guevarra failed to file an answer, the former moved to declare the
latter in default. The motion was granted and judgment was enforced against Guevarra.

Guevarra turned over, on demand, the subject vehicle to the authorities; forthwith, however, he
asked, in a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-parte
judgment of 06 January 1994. Guevarra claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person because of a defective service of summons on him. CA reversed the decision
hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guevarra?

Ruling:

No.

It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process
server but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed
particulars that could justify the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due
process exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the
notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end, "the requirement
of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served."
Although Moran, on the Rules of Court, has said that "Irregularities of this kind (might) be cured
by proof that the copies (have) actually been delivered to the defendant," in the case at bar,
however, private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at
the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.
 SUMMONS, SERVICE OF PROCESS

Eliseo Botico vs. Manuel Chu, Jr.

G.R. No. L-58036, March 16, 1987
Case No.: 72
FACTS:

Boticano owned a truck, which was bumped by another truck owned by Chu. Chu agreed
to shoulder the repairs but he didnt fulfill this obligation. Boticano filed for damages. On the
trial, Chu failed to file a responsive pleading, which prompted Boticano to ask the Court to
declare Chu in default. The Trial Court rendered a decision against Chu and ordered him to pay
Boticano. Chu filed an appeal alleging lack of jurisdiction for the failure to serve summons. It
turns out that the summons was given to his wife (substituted service) and not to him
personally. CA said trial Court had no jurisdiction and declared the Trial Court declaration void.

ISSUE:

The principal issue, which arises in this case, which involves an inquiry into procedural
due process, is whether the question of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
raised for the first time on appeal.

RULING:

It has been held that upon general principles, defects in jurisdiction arising from
irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings, defective process or even absence of
process may be waived by a failure to make seasonable objections. Coming to the case at bar, it
has been pointed out that during the stages of the proceedings in the court below, defendant-
appellant could have questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court but he did not.

It can of course be argued that the failure to question the lower court's jurisdiction
cannot be accounted against Chu for his having been declared in default gave him no chance to
participate in the court deliberations and therefore no chance to raise the jurisdictional issue,
but then, he could have done so, in the subsequent pleadings he filed. Besides, even assuming
that such failure cannot be taken against him; the fact is he had VOLUNTARILY submitted
himself to the court's jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction was properly acquired by the trial court over the person of respondent thru
both service of summons and voluntary appearance in court; he was therefore properly
declared in default for not having filed any answer; despite respondent's failure to file a motion
to set aside the declaration of default, he has the right to appeal the default judgment but in the
appeal only the evidence of the petitioner may be considered, respondent not having adduced
any defense evidence.
 Dismissal of Actions/Res Judicata

Gaudencio Serrano vs. Donata Cabrera

G.R. No. L-5189, September 21, 1953, 93 Phil 774 (1953)
Case No.: 73

Facts:

Gaudencio Serrano, plaintiff, was a lessee of Eusebio Cabrera, father of Donata Cabrera,
defendants, on parcel of land containing an area of 24 hectares, more or less, situated in the
municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac. Said land was inherited by the defendant. The term of
lease was six agricultural years beginning May 1, 1941 with a year;y rental of 290 cavans of
palay.
The lessor brought an action to recover rentals due and unpaid for the agricultural years
1943-47 amounting to P13,620. A writ of attachment was issued. The plaintiff-lessee on the
other hand, brought an action against the lessor, alleging and claiming that they had paid to the
latter the excess of what was due for the unpaid rentals, thus, annul the proceedings and to
recover such excess payment of rental. However, defendant-lessor moved for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of res judicata and failure to state a cause of action.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata, hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether court dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata is valid.

Ruling:

No. Court dismissal of the complaint is valid.

Section 1, Rule 30, cannot be invoked in this case, because a dismissal of the action
without order of the court, which is without prejudice, is one by the plaintiff before the filing of
an answer by the defendant. It means that such dismissal would not preclude the plaintiff from
bringing another action against the same defendant on the same subject matter. Such dismissal
under the rule does not bar the institution of an action by the defendant which he could have
brought in the action against him by means of a counter-claim or cross-claim. The dismissal in
the first case was upon motion of the plaintiff consented to by the defendant and the ground
was that the latter had paid and satisfied all the claims of the former as prayed for in her
complaint. Further, a compromise shall have, with respect to the parties, the same authority as
res judicata.

THEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed.

 Separate Trials

HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO vs. MATILDE PALICTE

G.R. NO.159691, June 13, 2013
Case No.: 74
Facts:

Filemon has four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto, Pascuala Sotto-Pahang, Miguel
Barcelona, and Matilde. In June 1967, Pilar Teves and other heirs of Carmen Rallos, the deceased
wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the
Estate of Sotto seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon has inherited from Carmen,
and damages. The CFI rendered judgment awarding Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of
P233, 963.65, among other reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on
execution was effected against six parcels of land and two residential houses belonging to the
Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four
of the parcels of land in her own name, while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the two
houses because her family was residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Cebu executed a deed of redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of Court approved.

Matilde filed a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four properties. However,
the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in her favor null
and void, holding that Matilde, although declared as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify
as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties. Matilde directly
appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and on September 21, 1987, the
Court, reversing the CFIs ruling, granted Matildes petition for review but allowed he co-heirs
the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of six months before the
probate court would grant her to transfer the title to her name. On September 10, 1999, the
heirs of Marcelo, specially: Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Danilo C. Sotto, Christina C. Sotto, Emmanuel C.
Sotto, Filemon C. Sotto and Marcela C. Sotto, and the heirs of Miguel, namely: Alberto, Arturo
and Salvacion, all surnamed Barcelona (herein petitioners), instituted the present action for
partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City. The Estate of Sotto, through the administrator,
moved in the probate court to require Matilde to account for and turn over the four properties
that allegedly belonged to the estate, presenting documentary evidence showing that Matilde
had effected the redemption of the four properties with the funds of the estate in accordance
with the express authorization of Marcelo. The probate court granted the motion, but
subsequently reversed itself upon Matildes motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the judgment was barred by res judicata.

Ruling:

Yes. Res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners action for partition of the four
properties. Res judicata exist when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other
action these elements are present, namely: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of the parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions ; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that an judgment that may be rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in the first case, the
decision of the Court in the second case, the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC as upheld
by Court in the third case, and the decision in the fourth case all dealt with Matildes right to
the four properties has upheld Matildes right to the four properties and has all become final.
Such rulings were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
 Dismissal by the Plaintiff

O.B. JOVENIR CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. MACAMIR REALTY

AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et. al.
G.R. NO. 135803, March 28, 2006
Case No.: 75

FACTS:

On 3 February 1997, a complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
with private respondents Macamir Realty and Development Corp. (Macamir Realty) and
spouses Rosauro and Gloria Miranda as plaintiffs, and petitioners O.B. Jovenir Construction and
Development Corp. (Jovenir Construction), Oscar B. Jovenir, and Gregorio Liongson being
among the defendants. The complaint, sought the annulment of certain agreements between
private respondents and petitioners, as well as damages. It was alleged that Jovenir
Construction was contracted to complete the construction of private respondents condominium
project. Private respondents subsequently sought the termination of their agreements with
petitioners after it was discovered that Jovenir Construction had misrepresented itself as a
legitimate contractor.

Respondents likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. A hearing on
the prayer appears to have been conducted on 6 February 1997.

It was also alleged in the complaint that Gloria Miranda was the principal stockholder and
President of Macamir Realty while her husband Rosauro was the owner of the real properties
on which the condominium project was being constructed.

On 13 February 1997, or 10 days after the filing of the complaint, private respondents filed a
Motion to Withdraw Complaint, alleging that during the initial hearing on the prayer for
preliminary injunction on 6 February 1997, counsel for plaintiffs "discovered a supposed
technical defect in the complaint x xx that x xx may be a ground for the dismissal of this case."
Thus, private respondents prayed that the plaintiffs be allowed to withdraw the complaint
without prejudice.

Petitioners filed an opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 18 February 1997,

wherein they adopted Madeja's arguments as to the lack of authority on the part of the spouses
Miranda to sue on behalf of Macamir Realty. However, just one day earlier,

or on 17 February 1997, private respondents filed another complaint against the same
defendants save for Madeja, and seeking the same reliefs as the first complaint. This time, a
Board Resolution dated 10 February 1997 authorizing the spouses Miranda to file the
Complaint on behalf of Macamir Realty was attached to the complaint. This second complaint
was also filed with the Makati RTC. The Verification and Certification [of] Non-Forum Shopping
in the second complaint was accomplished by Rosauro Miranda.

On 24 February 1997, 11 days after the filing of the Motion to Withdraw Complaint and seven
days after the filing of the second Complaint, the Makati RTC the Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
The RTC noted in its Order that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiffs even without
Order of the Court by filing a notice of dismissal at anytime before the service of the answer
under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court," and accordingly considered the complaint
withdrawn without prejudice.
The battle then shifted to Civil Case No. 97-379, which had been raffled to Branch 136 of the
Makati RTC. On 4 March 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the second complaint on the
ground of forum-shopping. They pointed out that at the time of the filing of the second
complaint on 17 February 1997, the first complaint was still pending. The Makati RTC denied
the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated 23 May 1997, observing that at the time the Motion to
Withdraw Complaint was filed, none of the defendants had filed any answer or any responsive
pleading. Thus, it was then within respondents' right to cause the dismissal of the complaint
without having to await action of the court on their motion. This Order was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals

Issue:

Whether Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at the time of these
antecedents, the plaintiff may obtain the dismissal of his own complaint before a responsive
pleading has been filed through the filing of a notice of dismissal.

Ruling:

We find no error on the part of the lower courts since the denial of the motion to dismiss is
wholly in accord with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure stated:

Dismissal by the plaintiff - An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed
by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the
same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court.

Indubitably, the provision ordained the dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of
right at any time before service of the answer. The plaintiff was accorded the right to dismiss
the complaint without the necessity of alleging in the notice of dismissal any ground nor of
making any reservation.

The Court further ruled that "[plaintiff's] notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the
action then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the
Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or motives
[plaintiff] might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, Rule 17 points
out, 'without prejudice,' the contrary not being otherwise 'stated in the notice' and it being the
first time the action was being so dismissed."

It is quite clear that under Section 1, Rule 17 of the old Rules, the dismissal contemplated
therein could be accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through
motion subject to approval by the Court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without
prejudice unless otherwise stated in the notice. It is due to these considerations that the petition
should be denied.

Evidently, respondents had the right to dismiss their complaint by mere notice on 13 February
1997, since as of even date, petitioners had not yet served their answer on respondents. The
Motion to Withdraw Complaint makes clear respondents' "desire to withdraw the complaint
without prejudice." That respondents resorted to a motion to effect what they could have
instead by mere notice may be indicative of a certain degree of ignorance of procedural rules on
the part of respondents' counsel. Yet such "error," if it could be called as such, should hardly be
of fatal consequence. Petitioners posit that the "remedy" of filing a notice of dismissal is not
exclusive, respondents having the "option" of securing the court's approval to the dismissal. On
the contrary, the trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by
the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. Even if
the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court has no choice but to
consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of
right, regardless of ground.

We are in accord with the Court of Appeals when it pronounced:

While [the Motion to Withdraw Complaint] is styled as a "motion" and contains a "prayer", these
are innocuous errors and superfluities that do not detract from its being a notice of dismissal
made under said Section 1 of Rule 17 and which ipso facto dismissed the case. It is a hornbook
rule that it is not the caption of a pleading but the allegations thereat that determines its nature.
The court order of dismissal is a mere surplus age under the circumstances and emphasized by
the court a quo itself when it granted the motion "[x x x] considering that an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiffs even without Order of the Court[x x x]"

Thus, the complaint could be properly considered as having been dismissed or withdrawn as of
13 February 1997. Accordingly, when respondents filed their new complaint relating to the
same cause of action on 17 February 1997, the old complaint was no longer pending. The
certification against forum-shopping attached to the new complaint correctly asseverated that
the old complaint "was withdrawn on February 13, 1997."

As noted at the onset, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now requires that upon the filing of
such notice, the court issue an order confirming the dismissal. The new requirement is intended
to qualify the right of a party to dismiss the action before the adverse party files an answer or
asks for summary judgment. Still, there is no cause to apply the 1997 Rules retroactively to this
case. A plaintiff's right to cause the dismissal of his complaint under the old rules was
unqualified. Procedural rules may not be given retroactive effect if vested rights would be
disturbed, or if their application would not be feasible or would work injustice. Since
respondents possessed an unqualified right to cause the dismissal of their complaint without
need of confirmation by the trial court, as enunciated in the 1964 Rules, they did not err in
asserting that their first complaint was withdrawn on the day of the filing of their motion to
withdraw, and the lower courts were correct in agreeing
 VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

ANDRES, vs CUEVAS,
GR no. 150869, June 9, 2005
Case No.: 76

Facts:
On June 11, 1992, petitioners, along with Julita Andres, Jesus Andres, Rolando Andres
and Alicia Agra, as majority stockholders of the Rural Bank of Pandi, Bulacan, filed a Petition for
Injunction, Mandamus, Nullification of Transfer of Shares, Call for Special Election, Accounting,
Damages, Production of Corporate Records with prayer for Appointment of Management
Committee pendente lite, and Issuance of Writs of Attachment and Temporary Restraining
Order[3] before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against private respondents
Mercedes Coloma, Belen Santos and Jesus Santos (private respondents), together with Cecilia
Andres, Ricaredo Andres, Richelle Marie Andres, Pia Marie Andres, Diane Angeli Andres and
Ricaredo Andres II, who were minority stockholders of said bank.
In the petition before the SEC, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that respondents-minority
stockholders committed acts of mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest as directors and
officers of the bank.
private respondents filed a Complaint-Affidavit[5] dated September 15, 1992, docketed as I.S.
No. 95-674 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, charging petitioners
with perjury for making willful and corrupt assertions of falsehood on material matters.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA. The verification and certification against non-forum shopping appended to the petition was
signed only by petitioner Leonardo Andres.Petitioners subsequently filed, however, an
Amended Petition[20] on March 31, 2000 to which was appended a verification and
certification against non-forum shopping signed by all of them
the CA dismissed the original petition, ratiocinating that the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping attached thereto was signed by petitioner Leonardo Andres only and that there
was no showing that he was duly authorized by the other petitioners to execute the same in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether the Amended Petition is containing a new verification and certification of non-forum
shopping signed by all of them within the reglementary period under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

Held:

a party is given the right to file an amended pleading within the time and upon the conditions
specified and without the necessity of obtaining leave of court since a party may amend his
pleading once, whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced, as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served.

Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities.[28] This principle is generally recognized in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action and needless expense.

No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all
the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and
constitutes a defect in the petition. For the attestation requires personal knowledge by the party
executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or
similar to the current petition.

In the case at bar, however, petitioners filed an Amended Petition filed within the 60-day
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As amended, the petition had complied with Sec. 1 of Rule 65. The CA maintained its dismissal of
the petition, however, when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In holding that petitioners merely substantially complied with the requirements for the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the CA indeed erred.
 Amendment to the Complaint

Pedro Paeste, et al vs. Rustico Jaurigue

G.R. No. L-5711, December 29, 1953
Case No.: 77

Facts:

Pedro Paeste and Felix Carpio brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province against Jaurigue for the annulment of two documents, alleging that Felix Carpio and his
son Maximo Carpio had been compelled to sign through force, intimidation, and against their
will.
On motion of the defendant, the court dismissed the case on the grounds that plaintiffs
action had already prescribed, citing Article 1391 of the New Civil Code which provides: An
action for nullity in cases of intimidation or duress must be brought within 4 years from the
date the cause of action accrued.
Plaintiffs asked for reconsideration and filed an amended complaint alleging that since
the execution of the two deeds, the defendant, with aid of armed men, has continuously
committed and employed threat, intimidation, and duress against plaintiffs and with warning to
the latter not to bring this incident and matter to the proper authorities under pain of death. But
the court denied reconsideration and disallowed the amended complaint whereupon plaintiffs
brought the case to the Supreme Court by way of appeal.

Issues:

Whether the lower court erred in: 1) not admitting their amended complaint; and 2) in
holding that their action had already prescribed.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred on both issues.
The Rules of Court provides: a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course, that is, without leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading. As plaintiff
amended their complaint before it was answered, the motion to admit the amendment should
not have been denied. It is true that the amendment was presented after the original complaint
had been ordered dismissed. But that order was not yet final for it was still under
reconsideration. Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally construed in the
furtherance of justice.
As to the question of prescription, it is evident that the plaintiffs executed the
documents in question through force and intimidation, that defendant had been threatening
plaintiffs with death if they took the matter to the authorities and that these threats lasted until
the filing of the action, plaintiffs action does not appear to have prescribed, for in these cases,
prescription does not begin to run until the party affected is perfectly free to go to court as he
wishes.
 DEPOSITION

DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES et al

G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 622.
Case No.: 79

FACTS:

On September 1987, respondent, American President Lines, Ltd. sued petitioner

Dasmarias Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent
to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. In Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff APL, and set up compulsory
counterclaims against it.
During the trial, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H.
Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or
letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic
of the Philippines in Taipei. Thereafter, in an amended motion, APL prayed that the commission
or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian
Executive Exchange Center, Inc., to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforementioned
persons, since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one
China policy." This motion was opposed by Dasmarias. After due course, the trial court
resolved the case in favor of APL. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari to
nullify the orders of the Trial Court, hence, this recourse.

ISSUE:

WHETHER DEPOSITION IS ADMISSIBLE DURING TRIAL?

RULING:

Yes, deposition of witnesses is admissible.

Taking the deposition, in the present case is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the
deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the
law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and
probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any of the exceptions
for its admissibility.

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in
some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery
(interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of
documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party
to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also
those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery
is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from
whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer
from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely
laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
 Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for
the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be
presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing (Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court).

Hence, the petition is denied.

 Jowel Sales, Petitioner vs. CYRIL A. SABINo respondents,
G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005
Case No.: 80

FACTS:

On February 20, 1995, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Pasig City, Metro Manila,
herein respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among
others, herein petitioner Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which
ultimately caused the death of respondents son, Elbert.
Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified the
defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court,
RTC- Pasig City.

On December 27, 1995 and resumed on January 3, 1996, the deposition on oral
examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence
and with the active participation of petitioners counsel, Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even
lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of
Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits DD and EE, with submarkings.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a Formal Offer of

Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD and EE. Likewise offered in evidence as Exhibit BB is a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad
of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658.

Petitioner opposed the admission of Exhs. DD and EE and even asked that they be
expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their
admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, infra, were not complied with. He also
downplayed the evidentiary value of Exhibit BB for reasons he would repeat in this petition.
In its order of February 3, 1997, the trial court admitted, among other evidence, respondents
Exhibits DD, EE and BB. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the court in
its subsequent order of March 25, 1997,petitioner went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 44078, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
admitting in evidence the deposition in question (Exhibits DD and EE).

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in the herein assailed decision
dated January 20, 1998, upheld the trial court and effectively denied due course to and
dismissed petitioners recourse, explaining, inter alia, that petitioners active participation,
through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own exhibits, has
thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of respondents evidence.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) of the

Revised Rules of Court were satisfied by the respondent when it presented a
certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to
whether or not at the time his deposition was offered in evidence is in the Philippines

2. Whether or not the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of
his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith.
RULING:

Given the foregoing perspective, the second issue of whether or not petitioner is
estopped from objecting to the use of Corrals deposition as part of respondents evidence is
really no longer determinative of the outcome of this case, and need not detain us long. Suffice it
to state that, as a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the
ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But as
jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded
during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be
accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during
the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the
deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its
admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the
deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume
inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the
deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends support to
the conclusion just made. In gist, it provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions
as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the
deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition,
objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of
testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the
taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this point, certiorari will not lie against an
order admitting or rejecting a deposition in evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final
judgment. For this singular reason alone, the appellate court could have had already dismissed
herein petitioners invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.
 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARCELO et.al vs SANDIGANBAYAN,

G. R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 385
Case No.: 82

Facts:
The main issue tendered in this joint petition turns on whether or not respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying the motion for summary judgment of Marcelo, MFC and the other petitioner
corporations. According to the petitioners, the pleadings of the parties, and the admissions and
documentary evidence of the [Republic] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that [they] are entitled to a [summary] judgment as a matter of law.[29] They thus
urgently urge the reversal of the assailed Resolutions and the consequent dismissal of Civil Case
No. 21.

Issue:

Whether the summary judgment is proper.

Ruling:

We examine the records and found that summary judgment is in order. Under Section 3,
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed
at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the
expense of time involved in a trial. Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues,
summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine.[33] The presence or absence of a genuine
issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A
genuine issue, as opposed to fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence. To the moving party rests the onus of demonstrating the absence of
any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
 ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

ROSALINDA CANADALLA-GO
G.R. No. 153034
Case No.: 83
Facts:

The controversy stemmed in January 1977 when Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000
from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for purposes of financing her
piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed on 19 January 1977 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-7609 and OCT No. P-4226 of the
Registry of Deeds of Infanta, Quezon. On 10 August 1979, Canadalla procured another loan in
the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land
and a third parcel covered by OCT No. P-6679 of the Registry of Deeds of
the Province of Quezon. Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses,
compounded by devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her store
by fire, Canadalla failed to comply with her obligations to the DBP. Subsequently, the DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. On 5 September 1989, the mortgaged properties were
sold at public auction to the DBP, which emerged as the only bidder. The sale was evidenced by
a Certificate of Sale and registered on 17 January 1990. Canadalla was able to redeem the
foreclosed property covered by TCT No. T-7609 within the redemption period of one year
from 17 January 1990. As to the properties covered by OCT Nos. P-4226 and P-6679, she had six
years from 17 January 1990 to redeem the same, they being free patent titles. On 5 October
1995, she offered to redeem the properties for a redemption price of P1.5 million. But the DBP
countered that the redemption price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its total
claim, which was P1,927,729.50 as of 30 September 1995. Subsequently, she allegedly assigned
her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, herein private respondent Rosalinda A.
Canadalla-Go.In January 1996, Go offered to redeem the properties for P526,882.40. In
response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1,814,700.58
representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the
DBP consolidated its titles over the subject properties and new certificates of title were issued
in its name.

On 8 July 1996, Go filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Supplemental
Complaint for the Exercise of Right of Redemption and Determination of Redemption Price,
Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-483 in Branch 148 of
said court. After the DBP filed its Answer but before the parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a
Request for Admission by Adverse Party.Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment.During the
hearing on 20 May 1997, Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as
required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the
admission or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP
manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained in the Request for
Admission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had
already been either specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the
reasons for the denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein.

On 22 May 1997, the DBP filed a manifestation incorporating its response to Gos objections
during the 20 May 1997 hearing, attaching therewith an affidavit executed by its officer and
counsel Atty. Perla Melanie Caraan.On 9 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion
of Go to consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for
Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the DBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62142, attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of
discretion in granting the Request for Admission despite the fact that (1) some of the matters
assigned in the Request for Admission had already been specifically denied in its Answer to the
Supplemental Complaint; (2) the sworn statement of Atty. Caraan had sufficiently cured the
alleged defect of the Comment; and (3) some of the matters in the Request for Admission
involved questions of law, conclusions of facts, and matters of opinion which are improper
subjects of such a request. On 6 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. It held that since DBPs answer was not under oath, it could not be considered as
having substantially complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court. DBP elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which are mere
reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer may be
deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath.

Ruling:

Petitioner DBPs objection to the impropriety of some of the matters requested was promptly
made as early as the filing of its comment on the request for admission. DBPs comment
consistently averred that it had already dealt with the matters in question in its answer, either
admitting or specifically denying them. Moreover, during the 20 May 1997 hearing, the counsel
for DBP manifested the foregoing in open court. In so doing, the DBP, in effect, argued that the
matters in question are redundant and, therefore, improper subjects for admission.It must be
stressed that the rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended to expedite trial and to
relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Thus, if a request for admission would only
serve to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose
for the rule would certainly be defeated. After all, rules of procedures are intended to promote,
not to defeat, substantial justice and should not therefore be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense.
 Verification made by counsel

Lanada vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. NO. 102390, February 1, 2002
Case No.:86

Facts:

This consolidated case involved petitions for review on Certiorari of CAs decision dated
July 24,1991 in which is granted the motions to strike out the answers subject to request for
admission made on behalf of the defendants by their counsel and declaring each of the matters
requested to be impliedly admitted which in effect reversed the lower courts decision. The lone
question raised by the Spouses Hernandez in their Petition for Certiorari was whether a counsel
of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed under Section 1 Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court may answer such request on behalf of his client. The fats of the case disclosed
that the claims involved in the instant case was brought about by the tragic death of Dr. Vied
Hernandez during the bloody strike of workers of Nestle Cabuyao who are members of Union of
Filipino Employees. For the death of Dr. Hernandez, his parents spouses Hernandez filed civil
cases of r award of indemnity, damages and attorneys fees against Nestle and various
personalities involved in the security and transport of Nestles goods during the strike to whom
the Request for Admission was made by the petitioners. Through their respective counsels
defendants filed their verified answers to the request for admission which is herein being
contested by petitioner as not being in accordance with Sec. 2 Rule 26 and this should be treated
in the nature of hearsay which must be stricken out.

Issue:

Whether a counsel can answer on behalf of his Client the clients answer to written
Request for Admission?

Ruling:

Yes, as provided in Rule 26, a party shall respond to the request for admission. It should
not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to
make the response in his behalf. Indeed the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously
otherwise; it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court Sec. 23 of Rule 138 provides that attorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals,
and on all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. On the other hand Civil Code Art. 1878 on
Agency provides the specific instances when special powers of attorney are necessary.
Petitioners have not shown that the case at baar falls under any of the reorganized exceptions as
found in Art. 1878 nor was there any proof that the defendants have not authorized their
respective counsels to file in their behalf the respective answers, requested of them by the
petitioners Hernandez spouses written Request for Admission
 Sps. Zepeda v China Banking Corporation
GR No. 172175 October 9, 2006
Case No.: 87

Facts:

Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent Chinabank. They alleged
that they obtained a loan from respondent secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence
they requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence they were
surprised when respondent bank extra-judicially foreclosed the subject property where it
emerged as the highest bidder. Ownership was consolidated in its favor. According to
petitioners, the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the
posting and publication requirements. Respondent banks motion to dismiss was denied hence
it filed an answer with special affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of
interrogatories.

The trial court denied Chinabanks affirmative defenses for lack of merit as well as its motion to
expunge the complaint for being premature. Aggrieved respondent bank filed a petition for
certiorari under rule 65 which was granted by the Court of Appeals. It held that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the two assailed orders. It ruled that compelling reasons
warrant the dismissal of petitioners complaint because they acted in bad faith when they
ignored the hearings set by the trial court to determine the veracity of Chinabanks affirmative
defenses. They failed to answer Chinabanks written interrogatories and the complaint states
no cause of action.

Issue:

Whether the complaint states a cause of action.

Ruling:

Yes. Allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish a cause of action for
nullifying the foreclosure of the mortgaged property.

In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows:
admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer? To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint.
Extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters like aliunde are not considered, as in this
case.
 Written Interrogatories

Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97654, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 88, 93
Case No.: 88

Facts:

Insular Life Assurance Co., Inc. ("Insular Life"), instituted a petition for review
on certiorari, praying the reversal of the 7th January 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals
which sustained the 5th July 1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, at San Pablo
City, denying petitioner's motion (a) to dismiss the complaint of private respondents Ofelia A.
Brucal and Donna A. Brucal and (b) to declare respondent Ricardo Brucal in default on the third-
party complaint.

On 04 April 1989, Ofelia Brucal, together with her daughter Donna Brucal, claiming to be
the designated beneficiaries of Horacio Aquino, brother of Ofelia Brucal, brought an action
against Insular Life to recover from the latter the proceeds of an insurance policy covering the
life of now deceased Aquino.

In its answer, Insular Life contended, among other things, that the insurance policy was
a nullity, there having been gross misrepresentation and material concealment in its
procurement and that, in any case, the death of the insured was not accidental, but deliberate,
thereby precluding, under the terms of the policy, the recovery of the insurance proceeds.

Before pre-trial, Insular Life filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint
against Ofelia Brucal's husband, respondent Ricardo Brucal, an insurance underwriter of Philam
Life Insurance. Insular Life asserted that Ricardo Brucal forged, or caused to be forged, the
signature of Ricardo Aquino on the application for insurance coverage. The trial court granted
the motion. Ricardo Brucal filed his answer. The parties thereupon submitted their respective
pre-trial briefs.

In the course of the proceedings that followed, Insular Life sent private respondents a
request for admission along with a set of written interrogatories. Insular Life likewise filed a
motion asking the trial court to direct private respondents to produce six (6) other alleged
insurance policies, as well as other related papers, covering the life of Horacio Aquino and to
allow the inspection of the site where Aquino died. The trial court, in its 16th February 1990
Order, directed counsel for private respondents to comment. In their manifestation, dated 02
March 1990, private respondents averred that the request of Insular Life was merely designed
to delay the proceedings and just a fishing expedition.

The trial court, in its 13th March 1990 Order denied the request for the production of
the documents aforestated relative, however, to the written interrogatories.

Private respondents failed to give their answers to the interrogatories. On the scheduled
initial presentation of evidence by private respondents on 13 June 1990, private respondents
still had not provided any answer to the written interrogatories, prompting Insular Life to file,
on 20 June 1990, a motion to dismiss the complaint and to declare third party defendant
Rodolfo Brucal in default. Private respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the modes of
discovery should not be utilized as to, in effect, permit unrestrained "fishing expeditions.

In an Order, dated 05 July 1990, the trial court denied the motion of Insular Life, holding
that "substantial justice (would) be better served if the case (were to be) decided on (the)
merits. The denial was reiterated in its July 1990 Order, but the court re-scheduled the hearing
"to give (Insular Life) ample time to elevate the matter to the higher courts and (to) secure a
ruling thereon."

Two months later, or on 01 October 1990, Insular Life filed with the Court of Appeals its
petition for certiorari, injunction and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order,
assailing the 05th July 1990 Order of the trial court. On 11 October 1990, the appellate court
issued a restraining order.

On 07 January 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision ultimately
denying Insular Life's petition and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issue:

Whether the trial court has committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion of
Insular Life, holding that "substantial justice would be better served if the case were to be
decided on the merits.

Held:

No, there was no capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to grave
abuse of discretion when the trial court decided to try the case on the merits.

While the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with
great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. The
matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on
the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount
and overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the
resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be
ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each
case and to make their considered determination thereafter. It is only in clear cases of grave
abuse of that discretion when appellate courts will interfere in their judgment.

The discovery rules can contribute in no small measure to the simplification of issues,
and in thereby hastening the disposition of cases. While we do not see the disquisitions made by
both the court a quo and the appellate court to be lacking in good coherence, we find it
appropriate, nonetheless, to say here once again that the discovery methods under our Rules of
Court do not deserve to be taken lightly. These discovery rules can contribute in no small
measure to the simplification of issues, and in thereby hastening the disposition of cases.

The petition was DENIED. The questioned Decision of the Trial and Appellate Courts was
AFFIRMED. The case was REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is directed to proceed,
with dispatch, in resolving the case on the merits. No costs was recommended.
 Spouses Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76366, July 3, 1990
Case No.: 90

Facts:

The government appropriated strip of land from the property of the private respondent
and thereupon, constructed the Malitbog-Naksib Narra Road. Later, the government and private
respondent executed Road Right of Way Agreements whereby the originally donated strip of
land was exchanged with the strip of land where the Malitbog-Naksib Narra Road was
constructed.

After the execution of the two (2) Road Right of Way Agreements, private respondent
tried to take possession of the exchanged area. However, petitioners, together with others were
found in actual possession and cultivation thereof. Thus, private respondent instituted Civil
Case for Recovery of Ownership and Possession at the then Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro. Defendants therein, now petitioners, interposed the defense that in rightful
possession and occupation of the abandoned proposed road.

After service of summons, petitioners filed their answer in court but never furnished
any copy of such answer to private respondent. Moreover, on the scheduled pre-trial
conference, petitioner Donato Ramirez failed to appear, although his wife, Maria Ramirez
appeared and informed the trial court that her husband is not available. Thus, private
respondent moved for the declaration of petitioners in default. The trial court declared
petitioners in default. Despite receipt of a copy of the order by petitioners on June 30, 1980,
they did not ask to set aside the order of default nor did they seek any relief from said order.

After presentation of evidence ex parte, the trial court rendered judgment on November
8, 1982 ordering the plaintiff to surrender the possession of the land in question in favor of
Igmedio Reyes and to attorneys fees and indemnification.

From this judgment, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal before the then Intermediate
Appellate Court. However, was dismissed when petitioners failed to file appellants' brief. The
order dismissing the appeal became final and entry of judgment was issued on April 2, 1985.
Upon motion of private respondent, a motion for writ of execution was issued on May 13, 1985.
To prevent the implementation of the writ, petitioners instituted on June 10, 1985 before the
Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Civil Case for annulment of judgment. This complaint
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.On September 12, 1985, petitioners filed again before the
then Intermediate Appellate Court another annulment suit. In dismissing the complaint for
annulment of judgment, the respondent appellate court held:

The rule is well settled. A final judgment can be set aside only on grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction or lack of due process or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic
or collateral fraud. The extrinsic or collateral fraud which invalidates a final judgment "must be
such as prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense; it
must be such as prevented the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue." These
grounds are not present in the case at bar. The jurisdiction of the court a quo is not assailed by
the plaintiff. The alleged errors in the Decision are mere errors of judgment and not errors of
jurisdiction. Plaintiff cannot also claim that he was prevented from presenting his defense in the
court a quo. He did not answer the complaint and was declared in default. On appeal of his case,
he did not file his appellant's brief and resultantly his appeal was dismissed.
Issue:

Whether the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion in not annulling the decision
of the Regional Trial Court on the default order, both having been issued in violation of
petitioners' right to due process.

Ruling:

It is notable that from the inception of this case before the Regional Trial Court up to the
time it reached the Court of Appeals in both instances and then this Court, there was a virtual
lack of diligent effort on the part of petitioners to pursue their defense. First, there was failure to
furnish a copy of the answer to the plaintiff, respondent herein. Then, there was failure to
appear during pre-trial. Hence, they were declared as in default. Then, instead of seeking relief
from the judgment rendered by default, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court which was, however, dismissed for failure to file appellants' brief.
A suit for annulment of judgment was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro
but this was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Inspite of the dismissal, petitioners did nothing,
only to awaken when the writ of possession was issued against them by filing another suit for
annulment. Again, after receiving a copy of the questioned Court of Appeals' decision on
September 25, 1987, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file motion for
reconsideration only on October 13, 1986, or exactly eighteen (18) days from receipt of the copy
of the decision. Hence, the decision sought to be reviewed had already became final as early as
October 10, 1986 as decisions of any courts become final after fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the copy thereof.

Not only was the motion for extension of time filed out of time but also equally barred
by the mandatory injunction in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v. Japson, et al., G.R. No. 70895, August
5, 1985; 138 SCRA 46 against the filing of an extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The petition thereafter filed with this Court likewise failed to comply with the
formal requirements as it was filed without a verified statement of material dates to determine
the timeliness of the filing of the petition and of the payment of the docket and legal research
fund fees and lacks proofs of service to the Court of Appeals and to the adverse party.
Even after a judicious consideration of the arguments and counter-arguments of the parties
herein on the merits of the case, We find that respondent Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in dismissing petitioners' suit filed only on September 12, 1985 for annulment
of a judgment dated November 8, 1982.

There is no means whereby the defeated party may procure a final and executory
judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation beyond the period for
seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38, Rules of Court, unless (a) the
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been
obtained by fraud.
 DEFAULT

PHILIPPINE BRITISH CO. v. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES

G.R. No. L33720-21, March 10, 1995, 53 SCRA 50
Case No.: 91

Facts:

On June 12, 1970, a fire broke out in the premises of private respondents Tapia, for short at, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being holders of fire insurance policies from different
companies, among them the petitioners, and having failed to secure extrajudicial settlement of
their claims, they filed corresponding civil actions in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
Petitioner British was served summons on March 29, 1971 while petitioner Cibeles was served
theirs on April 2, 1971, hence their answers were due on April 13 and 17, respectively. On April
13, 1971, counsel for British filed by mail a motion asking for fifteen (15) days extension of its
time to answer, claiming that due to the intervening Holy Week and pressure of other works, he
would be unable to prepare his answer within the reglementary period. He was granted only
five (5) days ending April 19. No answer came until April 28, 1971, albeit it was mailed by
registered service on April 22, 1971. Cibeles in turn filed its own motion for extension on April
19, 1971, two days after due date. Obviously, the period could not be extended anymore. Just
the same, it filed its answer on April 22, 1971, which was joint with that of British. On April 24,
1971, Tapia filed separate motions in the two cases praying that petitioners be declared in
default. Not having received by then any answer of petitioners, (Petitioners did file a joint
answer, but as will be seen later, the same was actually received by respondent court only on
April 28, 1971.) An order of default was issued, directing at the same time that plaintiffs'
evidence be received by the clerk of court. This reception of evidence was done on April 26 and
27, and on April 28, 1971, the judgments complained of herein were rendered. After being duly
docketed, these judgments were released for service by registered mail on May 17, 1971,
addressed to petitioners' counsel, Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr. at his given address at Room 212 Lopez
Building, Aduana Street, Intramuros, Manila. The postman, Sugatan, said the mail was delivered
by him personally and was received by Miss Tuliao in May 19, 1971 and the second and third
notices was also delivered to the latter on May 30, 1971 and June 15, 1971.

Issue:

Whether the court erroneously declared the petitioners in default.

Ruling:

The contention of petitioners that they were erroneously declared in default has no merit. From
the incontrovertible facts in the record, the court did not see how it can be justly said that
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in making such declaration. As regards
Cibeles, there can be no question that even its motion for extension to file its answer was filed
out of time. It was served summons on April 2, 1971, and it is not disputed that its motion for
extension was filed on April 19th, two days late. With respect to British, its answer was
admittedly due on April 13, 1971, and although it asked for an extension of fifteen (15) days, it
was given only five (5) days ending April 19, 1971; consequently, its answer jointly filed with
Cibeles on April 22, 1971 was undoubtedly out of time. Counsel suggests that he was not given
enough time, considering that there was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor
ruled that precisely, counsel would have more time because of the holidays. Again, the court
perceives no grave abuse of discretion in such a pragmatic ratiocination. Besides, it is settled
that parties and counsel should not assume that courts are bound to grant the time they ask for
compliance with the rules, and, therefore, the fact that counsel received the order of extension
by mail only on April 26, 1971, is no reason for him to complain. Likewise, that he was not
notified of the motion to declare his clients in default is not against the rules, for he had no right
to such notice.
 Party in Default

Cavili vs Florendo
G.R. No. 73039 October 9, 1987
Case No.: 92
Facts:

The private respondents filed Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental against petitioners for Partition, Accounting, and Damages. After the case was raffled to
Branch I presided over by Judge Augusto S. Villarin, summons was issued to the three
petitioners, all at Bayawan Negros Oriental which was the address indicated in the complaint.

After trying to effect service, the process server went back to the court with the
following return of service to Quirino and Primitivo Cavili not contacted, according to Perfecta
Cavili, subject persons is (sic) staying in Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental."

Meanwhile, Atty. Jose P. Alamino filed a motion for extension to answer in behalf of the
defendants, manifesting the representation of his client Perfecta Cavili that she will inform her
brothers Primitivo and Quirino about the case.

The defendants, however, failed to file their answer within the request period and upon
motion of the plaintiffs, the defendants were declared in default, and on October 5, 1979, a
judgment by default was promulgated by Judge Augusto S. Villarin. The plaintiffs filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order granting new trial and at the same time prayed that a writ of
execution be issued but only in so far as defendant Perfecta Cavili was concerned.

Thereafter, the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 6880 was scheduled on October 9, 10,
and 11, 1985 before Branch XXXVI of the Regional Trial Court, presided by respondent Judge
Teodoro N. Florendo. The defendants, (now petitioners), presented Perfects Cavili dela Cruz as
their first witness. The respondents, through counsel moved for her disqualification as a witness
on the ground that having been declared in default, Perfects Cavili has lost her standing in court
and she cannot be allowed to participate in all premise the even as a witness. The court, through
the respondent judge, sustained the respondents' contention and disqualified her from
testifying.

Issue:

Whether a party in default can be a witness

Held:

Section 18, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states who are qualified to be
witnesses. It provides:

Section 18. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons interested in the
outcome of a case shall be excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor any
person on account of his opinion on matters of religious belief.

The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the
outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief
are not grounds for disqualification.

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19

disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity
renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on
conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on
privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of
witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking
the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception.
The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other
exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90)
The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

They advance the argument that to allow Perfecta Cavili to stand as witness would be to
permit a party in default "to take part in the trial."

An explanation of the Rule is in order.

Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an order of default. Thus, a party

declared in default is considered out of court and cannot appear therein, adduce evidence, and
be heard and for that reason he is not entitled to notice. (Rule 18, Rules of Court; Lim Toco v. Go
Fay, 80 Phil. 166) However, "loss of pending" must be understood to mean only the forfeiture of
one's rights as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary. A party in default loses his right to
present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has
no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may he object to or
refute evidence or motions filed against him. There is nothing in the rule, however, which
contemplates a disqualification to be a witness or a opponent in a case. Default does not make
him an incompetent.

As opposed to a party litigant, a witness is merely a beholder, a spectator or onlooker,

called upon to testify to what he has seen, heard, or observed. As such, he takes no active part in
the contest of rights between the parties. Cast in the cited role of witness, a party in default
cannot be considered as " a part in the trial." He remains suffering the effects of an order of
default.

A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by his co-defendants who have the
standing and the right to present evidence which the former may provide. The incidental benefit
giving the party in default the opportunity to present evidence which may eventually redound
to his advantage or bring about a desired result, through his co-defendants, is of minor
consequence.

Of greater concern or importance in allowing the presence of Perfecta Cavili as a witness

in the case at bar, is the preservation of the right of petitioners Quirino and Primitivo Cavili to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in their behalf. To reject
Perfects Cavili's presentation of testimonial evidence would be to treat Primitivo and Quirino, as
if they too were in default. There is no reason why the latter should also be made to bear the
consequences of Perfecta's omission. Moreover, we cannot deprive Quirino and Primitivo of the
only instrument of proof available to them, as Perfecta alone has been in possession and
administration of the claim.
 AMPARO SANTOS vs. HON. FELISA DE LA FUENTE SAMSON
G.R No. L-46371, December 14, 1981
Case No.: 93

Facts:

The record shows that on January 17, 1976, the herein private respondent, Angel A.
Reyes, Inc., a domestic corporation with principal offices at 1363 Quezon Boulevard Extension,
Quezon City, filed a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer" against the herein petitioner, Amparo
Santos, with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
2315. 1 Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon Amparo Santos on August 16,
1976, but she failed to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Upon motion of
the plaintiff therein, Amparo Santos was declared in default on January 12, 1977 and the
plaintiff was directed to present its evidence on January 20, 1977. 2

Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default, alleging that she failed to file an
answer by reason of fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence in that after receiving the
summons and a copy of the complaint, she went to see Angel A. Reyes at his office in 1363
Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City, to confer with him regarding the case; that Angel A.
Reyes, during their meeting, assured her that if she would update her accounts on the lots, he
would not pursue the case anymore; that with that understanding, she continued to make
payments on the lots, which the plaintiff received; and that the assurance of Angel A. Reyes
made her believe that it was no longer necessary for her to answer the complaint and realized
her error quite too late when she received a copy of the order declaring her in default.

The respondent Judge denied the motion on May 24, 1977, stating that the negligence of
the petitioner in failing to file an answer is not excusable since the motion to lift the order of
default was filed after the lapse of four (4) months from the time she received a copy of the
order declaring her in default; and that the herein petitioner wantonly disregarded established
procedure. 8

Issue:

Whether the respondent Judge of Court of First Instance erred in denying the
petitioners motion to lift the order of default.

Ruling:

Yes. The record shows that upon receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
petitioner immediately went to see Mr. Angel A. Reyes, president and executive officer of the
respondent corporation bearing his name, about the case. Mr. Reyes assured her that if she
would update her accounts, he would not pursue the case anymore.

While the motion to lift the order of default was filed four (4) months after the
petitioner was declared in default, no judgment has been rendered in the case as yet so that the
filing of the said motion was within the period prescribed by the Rules. Under Section 3, Rule 18
of the Rules of Court, a party declared in default may at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing
that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that he
has a meritorious defense. Considering that the failure of the petitioner to file her answer to the
complaint within the reglementary period is excusable; and that the granting of the petitioner's
motion to set aside the order of default would in no way prejudice the respondent corporation
and deprive it of any substantial right, nor is there evidence of intent to unduly delay the case,
the respondent Judge should have applied the Rules liberty and set aside her order of default.
Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for a default judgment is frowned
upon, and unless it clearly appears that the re-opening of the case is intended for delay, it is best
that trial courts give both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without
resort to technicality. 11
 Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank
GR No.151098, March 21, 2006
Case No.: 94

Facts:

This is the petition for certiorari filed by Gajudo et al assailing the decision of CA setting
aside the decision of the RTC declaring Traders Royal Bank in partial default for failure to file
answer.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Traders Royal Bank, City Sheriff and the
Registers of Deeds of Quezon City that sought the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure
and auction sale made by the sheriff of a parcel of land, the conventional redemption thereof
and prayed for damages and issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial dragged/ lengthen to several months due to postponement. Sometime in 1998,
a big conflagration hit the city hall which destroyed the records of the case. After the records
were reconstituted, petitioner discovered that the foreclosure property was sold by the bank to
Ceroferr Realty Corporation and the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of title of
the foreclosed property had already been cancelled. Accordingly, petitioner amended their
complaint but the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice due to failure to pay
additional filing fees.
Petitioner re-filed the complaint with the same court impleading as additional
defendants the Ceroferr Realty Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna Roque and included
an additional cause of action that said new defendants conspired with respondent bank in
cancelling the notice of lis pedens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City purportedly for the cancellation of said notice.
Summons was served on respondent bank per sheriff return. Supposing that all the
defendants had filed their answer, the petitioner filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial but
was denied by the court on the ground that respondent bank has not yet filed its answer.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they received by registered mail a
copy of respondent banks answer with counterclaim which the trial court denied for lack of
merit holding that the answer with counterclaim filed by respondent bank referred to another
case pending on the same branch of the same court.
For this reason, petitioner filed a motion to declare respondent bank in default,
thereafter alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons which was
granted by the trial court. On petitioners motion, the court allowed them to present evidence ex
parte in so far as respondent bank was concerned. Thereafter, the trial court rendered partial
decision declaring respondent bank in default.
Aggrieved, respondent bank filed a motion to set aside the partial decision by default
and admit the banks answer with counterclaim thereafter averred that the erroneous filing of
said answer was due to an honest mistake of the typist and inadvertence of its counsel but was
denied by the trial court.
Respondent bank appealed the partial decision to the CA. The CA ruled that the
erroneous docket placed on the answer was not an excusable negligence by the banks counsel
having the duty to be scrupulously careful in reviewing pleadings.
On the issue of whether the petitioners had convincingly established there right to relief,
the CA held that there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of the mortgage
property. Moreover, petitioner failed to prove that the bank had agreed to sell the property back
to them.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for once the respondent
is declared in default.
Ruling:

Respondents are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. Favorable relief can
be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence
offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. To win, the petitioner must still present
the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the respondent were still present. A
party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present
evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the
petitioners, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the respondent may not have been heard
or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
 JOSE NA. GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999
Case No.: 95

Facts:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different
persons for the same lot, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the
original title.

A deed of sale for lots E and G of Hacienda Maysilo and covered by OCT No. 983 was
executed in favor of Ismael Lapus, a bona fide occupant thereof. The deed of sale was presented
for registration and contained entries showing that it was annotated on the back of the OCT.
Contrary to SOP however, the deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT and that consequently,
that title was apparently not cancelled.
As a result of the registration of the deed of sale, TCT No. 4910 (Lapus Title) was issued to
Lapus. Upon his death, the two lots were inherited by his daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, who
had the land subdivided into 55 lots and sold some to her now co-respondents. Lapus and
successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands even before 1910 of more than 70
years.

In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed a motion
in land registration cases, alleging that they were deprived of their participation in the Hacienda
Maysilo. Since per the OCT the land seemed unencumbered, the court adjudicated the land in
their favor. The OCT was then cancelled and TCT No. 112235 (Rivera Title) was issued to the
Riveras. Lots 5 and 7 (E and G) were then assigned to Bartolome Rivera to Sergio Cruz and
Pacifico Garcia, and subsequent TCTs were issued in their behalf. Garcia had Lot 7 (G)
subdivided into lots A and B, retained lot A and assigned B to Antonio Munoz. Munoz mortgaged
lot B to Associated Banking Corp.

On the other hand, Cruz sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go. Go mortgaged Lot 5 to Philippine
National Bank. Both Munoz and Go did not pay their mortgage debts, hence the two banks
foreclosed the properties. PNB bought the mortgaged Lot 5 at the auction, but notice of lis
pendens was already annotated on the title. Riveras and their successors-in-interest have never
set foot on the disputed lots. Gozon finally learned about the Riveras and others acquiring the
land, had her adverse claims registered on the titles of lots 5 and 7 and filed an action to quiet
title and damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Gozon and co-plaintiffs and voided the TCTs issued to
the Riveras, others. CA affirmed the decision. Garcia and PNB appealed.

Issue:

Whether the 1920 Lapus title prevails over the 1963 Rivera title and subsequent titles
derived from it?

Ruling:

Yes, Lapus title prevails.

Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value who validly transmitted to his successors-
in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed lots. That title could not be
nullified or defeated by the issuance 43 years later to other persons of another title over the
same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued
to Lapus. This must be so considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in
possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in
tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land
resgistration matters.

The contention of PNB that it was a buyer in good faith has no merit because the deed of
sale in favor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest are all a matter
of public record in the registry of deeds. When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such
record is a constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein. Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence and good faith otherwise the very purpose of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. The bank should have made an on-the-spot investigation of the lot mortgaged.
 ORDER OF ARREST IN DEFAULT

Jaime T Malanyon vs. Delfin Vir Sunga,

G.R no. 49463, May 7, 1992
Case No.: 96

Facts:

Petitioner was personally served in his office a notice of hearing on the pre-trial set on
October 9, 1978 at 8:30 A.M. However, at around 8:10 A.M. of October 9, 1978, petitioner felt
chilly and went to see his doctor who ordered him to stay in bed for a couple of days as he had
just been released from Mother Seton Hospital where he was confined from September 30, 1978
to October 3, 1978. Thereafter, petitioner immediately sent a letter to the respondent judge
requesting for the deferment of his appearance on the scheduled hearing but said letter was
only filed at 10:05 A.M. of that same morning due to the stormy weather. Consequently, upon
petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing, he was declared in default and ordered arrested. In
the afternoon of the same day, petitioner's counsel filed a motion to lift the Order of Arrest
which was denied. On October 18, 1978, petitioner was airlifted and confined at the Veterans
Memorial Medical Center at Quezon City where he was operated for a gall bladder dysfunction
on November 13, 1978. On November 17, 1978, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to lift his
Order of Arrest, to set aside the order of default and to reset the hearing of November 27, 1978
and December 1, 1978 on account of his illness and subsequent surgical operation. Respondent
judge lifted the Order of Arrest of the petitioner but denied his motion to set aside the order of
default and the resetting of the scheduled hearing. Motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

Issues:

Whether the court order may the arrest of the party in default?

Held:

No. The respondent court's act of ordering petitioner's arrest is patently illegal. There is
nothing in the Rules which authorizes the trial court to order the arrest of the party in default. A
party declared in default merely loses the right to be notified of subsequent proceedings and the
right to take part in the trial, until the order of default is lifted.
 Order of Default
Alex Lina vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-63397, April 9, 1985,135 SCRA 637
Case No.:98

Facts:

Private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig) a case for sum of money with damages on March 31, 1982. On April 22, 1982, petitioner
Alex Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. On May 8, 1982,
when no answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, private respondent Northern
Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default. The motion was set for hearing on May 21,
1982. On May 19, 1982, petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention
to the fact that he had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading within the
reglementary period. On May 26, 1982, respondent judge issued an order declaring defendant
(herein petitioner) in default and allowing plaintiff (herein private respondent) to adduce its
evidence ex parte.

On May 27, 1982, defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint. On July 28, 1982,
respondent court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff (herein private respondent). On
August 11, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to set aside decision dated July 28, 1982. On August
25, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set aside decision.

Issue:
Whether the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction?

Ruling:
No. It was on May 5, 1982 or two (2) days before the expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary
period given to defendant to file his responsive pleading when petitioner moved for an
extension of twenty (20) days from May 7 within which to file his answer. Upon motion of
private respondent and over the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order
declaring petitioner in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) are:

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that
his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that
he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for
new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
 d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)

Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to
the appellate court on certiorari/prohibition. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
 HEIRS OF SATURNINA AKUT v. COURT OF APPEALS et al.
G.R. No. L-45472, August 30, 1982
Case No.:. 99

Facts:

The Respondent Court sets aside respondent appellate court's minute resolutions
dismissing petitioners' appeal from an order of default issued by the trial court in the case
below for late filing (by six days) of petitioners-defendants' answer to the complaint (which the
trial court refused to set aside on the mistaken notion that it had no authority nor discretion to
set aside the default order) on the procedural ground that "an order of default is merely
interlocutory and not appealable" instead of granting the substantive relief, to which petitioners
are clearly entitled, of setting aside the default orders and reinstating them to their original
standing before the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioners in default and in denying their motion to set aside the order of default.

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Said Court state that as an established doctrine, "(A)
motion to set aside the order of default filed prior to the rendition of the judgment on the merits
should be considered with liberality since it is presented promptly and without unnecessary
delay and not much inconvenience may be caused either to the Court or to the adverse party
there being as yet no judgment on the merits." The Court accordingly has departed on many
occasions from the general rule and entertained or considered as petitions for certiorari where
the appeal was found not to be the adequate remedy because the order which was sought to be
reviewed was merely of interlocutory or peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom could
be interposed only after final judgment and would therefore be of no avail.

It is true that an interlocutory order such as that rendered by the respondent judge in
the present case is not appealable during the course of the trial, but only after a final judgment
has been rendered therein. It is indeed a wise rule of procedure which refuses to permit the
interruption of a trial by means of incidental appeals; but, if the judge incidentally in the course
of a trial proceeds without or in excess of his jurisdiction, this rule which prohibits an appeal
does not leave the party aggrieved without remedy."

The controlling principle ignored by respondent court is that it is within sound judicial
discretion to set aside an order of default and to permit a defendant to file his answer and to be
heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired.
This discretion should lean towards giving party-litigants every opportunity to properly present
their conflicting claims on the merits of the controversy without resorting to technicalities.
Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, for default judgments are frowned
upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay, it is best
that trial courts give both parties every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without
resort to technicality. In the case at bar, considering that there were several defendants (now
petitioners) in the case, and they had yet to confer as to who would be the lawyer to represent
them and they had yet to raise money to pay for his services, coupled with the fact that two of
them were then sick, the failure or delay in filing their answer (by six days) can hardly be said to
be inexcusable.
 Time and again the Court has enjoined trial judges to act with circumspection and not to
precipitately declare parties in default, needlessly compelling the aggrieved party to undergo
the additional expense, anxiety and delay of seeking the intervention of the appellate courts and
depriving them of the much needed time and attention that could instead have well been
devoted to the study and disposition of more complex and complicated cases and issues.
 OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS
G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975
Case No.: 100

Facts:

On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. N-1963
and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos, against Omico
Mining and Industrial Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity
and as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two (2)
causes of action. The first, for the return of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation
borrowed from him by the defendants, and the second, for the payment of his services as legal
counsel for the corporation.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1)
improper venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident; and, as to
the second cause of action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff
and defendants was entered into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have been
filed in Manila in accordance with Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack
of cause of action, in that with regard to the stock certificates the same are in the name of
Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the contract of personal and professional services
wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal department of defendant Omico
Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is illegal, void and unenforceable, plaintiff being a
judge of the Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar.

Issue:

Whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper remedy available
to petitioners?

Ruling:

No. The remedy of appeal is no longer an adequate and speedy remedy for the
petitioner.

The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is properly, though not exclusively,
available to a defendant who has been validly declared in default. It does not preclude a
defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing a more speedy and
efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the judgment by default set aside as a
nullity.

It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is

differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former irreparably
loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such a right and may exercise
the same after having the order of default and the subsequent judgment by default annulled and
the case remanded to the court of origin. Moreover the former is limited to the remedy set forth
in section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by virtue of which he can contest only the judgment by
default on the designated ground that it is contrary to the evidence or the law; the latter,
however, has the option to avail of the same remedy or to forthwith interpose a petition for
certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default even before the promulgation of a
judgment by default, or in the event that the latter has been rendered, to have both court
decrees the order of default and the judgment by default declared void. The defendant-
petitioner's choice of the latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment by
default not on the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently invalid order
of default..

Granting, however, that an appeal is open to the defendant-petitioner, the same is no

longer an adequate and speedy remedy considering that the court a quo had already ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution and the carrying out of such writ loomed as a great
probability.
 Matute vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-26085, January 31, 1969
Case No.: 101

FACTS:

Carlos S. Matute filed a petition praying for the removal of Matias S. Matute as co-administrator
and his (Carlos) appointment in such capacity, alleging that Matias has neglected to render a
true, just and complete account of his administration, and that he is not only incompetent but
also negligent in his management of the estate. Respondent Matias interposed an opposition to
the aforesaid petition.
The Court removed co-administrator, Matias S.Matute, as such co-administrator of the estate
and orders him to submit a final accounting of his administration together with his past
administration accounts which have not been approved.
Matias interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary
mandatory injunction praying that the aforesaid order be set aside as a nullity for having
decreed his removal without due process and the appointment of Jose S. Matute without the
requisite hearing.
The CA gave due course to the aforesaid petition and resolved to grant a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Jose S. Matute moved for the dismissal of the abovementioned petition on the ground that the
CA does not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same since the value of the estate
involved is more thanP200,000 and that the value of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate for
purposes of jurisdiction had already been resolved where the CA refused to take jurisdiction
over a petition for certiorari contesting the appointment of Matias Matute as co-administrator.

ISSUES:

(1) the removal of the respondent as co-administrator of the Matute estate, and
(2) the appointment of the petitioner as the new co-administrator.

RULING:

The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule 82 lies
within the discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly expressed in one case, The
sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose
sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate
court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross
abuse of discretion is shown.
In the case at bar, we are constrained, however to nullify the disputed order of removal
because it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent from his trust without
affording him the full benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due
process.
Without forgetting such patent denial of due process, which rendered the order of removal a
nullity, let us examine the merits of the probate judges motu propio findings to determine
whether they warrant the ouster of the respondent.
Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity, this Court is
not prepared to sustain the validity of the appointment of the petitioner in place of the former.
To start with, the record does not disclose that any hearing was conducted, much less that
notices were sent to the other heirs and interested parties, anent the petition for the
appointment of Jose S. Matute, among others, as co-administrator vice Matias S. Matute.
 It is pertinent to observe that any hearing conducted by the probate court was confined
solely to the primary prayers of the separate petitions of Carlos S. Matute, and the Candelario-
Matute heirs seeking the ouster of Matias S. Matute.
The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all known heirs and other
interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the
appointment of and administrator in order that no person may be deprived of his right or
property without due process of law.
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.
The provision of Rule 83 that if there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be granted to any suitable person, cannot be used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute
even without a hearing, because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was
a general administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute
estate after the removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a
situation when after the removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the
estate, thus empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary
administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment of a new administrator after due
hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar.
 CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 88586, 263 Phil. 686, April 27, 1990
Case No.: 102

FACTS:

The Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against the
petitioner in the RTC. Before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period to answer,
petitioner filed 2 successive motions for extension of time to file responsive pleadings which
were both granted. On the last day of the second extension, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
complaint on the ground that plaintiff lack capacity to sue and lack of caise of action.

The motion was denied and was considered a pro forma motion to dismiss, both for lack of
merit and for having been improperly filed. TC argued that "The issues raised and the
arguments contended in the MR are the same issues and arguments presented in the appellant's
brief, reply brief and supplemental reply brief, which have been discussed and resolved by this
court".

It is this reason that the TC ruled that the MR did not suspend the running of the 15 day
period and thus it granted plaintiff's motion to declare petitioner in default for having filed only
a motion to dismiss and not a responsive pleading during the extension granted. Thereafter,
evidence for the plaintiff was received ex parke, resulting in a judgment in its favor.

ISSUE:

WON the default order was erroneous.

HELD:

Yes. The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained on appeal.
There is no question that the MTO was filed reasonably, within the period of the second
extension granted by the court. It is true that such a motion is not considered a responsive
pleading, nevertheless, it is also true that Sec. 1 of Rule 16 of ROC, it is provided that "within the
time for pleading, a motion to dismiss may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated,
including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.

Manifestly, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the
petitioner. The court recapitulates the rules which is the basis for the order of default be
considered premature, therefore null and void as well as the reception of private respondent's
evidence ex parte, the decision rendered thereon, and writ of execution, having been predicated
on the void order of default. Such are the following:

1. The TC may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15 day reglementary
period for the filing of responsive pleadings.

2. During the 15-day period, or any extension of such period, the defendant may file a MTO
the complaint.

3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another 15 days from notice
of the denial to file responsive pleading.

The full 15-day reglementary period start all over again. Accordingly, we held that in
issuing the order of default before the expiration of the opportunity to be heard of its defense.

The argument that the MR is pro forma is of no merit. The very purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision which in their view
are not supported by law or the evidence. Otherwise, his remedy would not be an MR but a new
trial or some other remedy. Conformably, we must hold that the MR was not pro-forma, and
hence, it did have the effect of suspending the reglementary period until the denial of the motion
was notified to the petitioner.
 Litigated Motion

DENSO (PHILS.), INC. vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND KAYAMANAN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
148 SCRA 280, February 27, 1987
Case No.: 103
Facts:

On June 23, 1984, a fire broke out at the Nippondenso Building at Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati,
Metro Manila. The building was owned by the Kayamanan Development Corporation (hereafter,
simply referred to as KAYAMANAN), and was then under lease to Denso (Phils), Inc. (hereafter,
simply DENSO). The fire caused extensive damage. DENSO and its correspondent firm in Japan,
NIPPONDENSO, reportedly suffered losses. On the other hand, KAYAMANAN's loss was
reported.

A year or so later, KAYAMANAN instituted an action against DENSO in the Regional Trial Court
at Makati, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 10768, for recovery of (a) unpaid rentals from ;
(b) the cost of repairing the damage caused by the fire to the leased building, it being alleged
that DENSO was bound to bear said cost under their lease agreement; and (c) unrealized
monthly rents and attorney's fees. 2

Summons was served on DENSO. It would seem, however, that the summons (together with the
accompanying copy of the complaint) was not referred by DENSO to its counsel which prompted
the latter to file a "MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER," pleading the late
referral, the need to attend to other legal work of equal importance, as well as the time
requirement for study of the factual and legal points involved in the action, and praying, in
consequence, for an additional period of 15 days within which to present the requisite
responsive pleading. The motion closed with a "Notice of Hearing" addressed to the Clerk of
Court, asking that the motion be submitted to the court for consideration and approval
immediately upon its receipt; and a notation that a copy of the motion had been furnished
plaintiff KAYAMANAN's counsel. 4 The copy of the motion was actually received by
KAYAMANAN's counsel.

The motion for extension was however denied by Order of Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.
"considering," according to His Honor, "that there was no proof of service that plaintiff received
a copy of said motion." KAYAMANAN then presented an "Ex parte Motion to Declare Defendant
in Default" and accordingly declaring DENSO in default and setting the reception of
KAYAMANAN's evidence ex-parte. At that appointed date and time, the Court-did receive
KAYAMANAN's evidence ex-parte; and four (4) days later, Judge Guadiz rendered judgment by
default, sentencing DENSO to pay to KAYAMANAN as accumulated monthly rentals and cost of
services and attorney's fees. 9

Inevitably, DENSO learned of the order of default and the judgment by default. It then filed on
August 2, 1985 a verified motion for reconsideration of said order and judgment. 11 Acting
thereon, the Trial Court promulgated an Order, setting aside, "in the interest of substantial
justice," the order of default but hearing was rescheduled only for the presentation of
defendant DENSO's evidence, the Court explicitly stating that the evidence already presented
(by KAYAMANAN) would remain on record "without the right of cross examination on the part
of the defendant
DENSO submitted its formal motion for reconsideration praying for the right to cross-
examine KAYAMANAN's witnesses however, this honorable court denies its (DENSO's) motion
to be allowed to cross-examine KAYAMANAN's witnesses. This prompted DENSO to file a
petition for review.

Issues:

WHETHER THE PETITIONER PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT BASED ONHIS FAILURE TO

SERVE NOTICES TO THE OTHER PARTY WHE HE REQUESTED THIS HONORABLE COURT FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING.

Ruling:

NO.

The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where
notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex-parte motion' made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties
to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties.' As
'a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought
by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard.

It has been said that "ex-parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural
matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an
exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the
resulting delay might tend to defeat the objection (sic) of the motion." 28

Upon similar premises, this Court has consistently held, since as early as in 1946, 29 that motions
for extension of time to file record on appeal may be filed and passed upon ex-parte, and the
rulings on that point are applicable, without differentiation, to motions for extension of time to
file answer.

Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file answer was, therefore, improperly denied for
lack of proof of service on the respondent, said motion having been seasonably filed and, as
already fully shown, there being no impediment to its being heard ex-parte. No pretense is made
that the motion was denied as having been filed merely for delay, but even if that ground were
read into the otherwise clear terms of the order of denial which do not even hint thereat, it
would still be belied by the fact that what was sought was only an extension of
the original reglementary period as well as that prima facie meritorious reasons were pleaded
for the desired extension. The petitioner's answer, alleging defenses 30 which, if established,
could defeat the respondent's claim, wholly or in part, was filed well within the period of
extension prayed for. All these considered, the order declaring petitioner in default for alleged
failure to timely file answer was clearly arbitrary; it ought not to have been issued and should
be struck down.
 Service of Summons

JOESTEEL CONTAINER CORPORATION vs. COMMONWEALTH FINANCING CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-25778, September 30, 1982
Case No.: 104
Facts:

The Commonwealth Financing Corporation filed an action against the Joesteel Container
Corporation before the City Court of Manila for the recovery of a certain amount of money, as
deficiency on the proceeds of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage executed by the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff. The summons, which ordered the defendant to answer the
complaint and enter into trial on August 12, 1965, and a copy of the complaint were served
upon the defendant through its General Manager on July 13, 1965. On the date set for the
hearing of the case, or on August 12, 1965, counsel for the defendant appeared before the court
and asked for an extension of time to answer the complaint, but the motion was denied. Then,
on motion of the plaintiff, the defendant was declared in default and the Deputy Clerk of Court
was commissioned to receive the evidence. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 20 days
from service of summons on July 13, 1965, within which to file an answer to the complaint and
the period expired on August 2, 1965. On August 13, 1965, the defendant filed a motion to lift
the order of default, but his motion was denied. On August 21, 1965, a judgment by default was
rendered against the defendant. The defendant appealed, but the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the petition for relief.

Considering that the defendant had up to the date set for trial of the case within which to
file an answer to the complaint or on August 12, 1965, (Zenith Films, Inc. vs. Herrera, G.R. No. L-
26619, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 120), on which day the defendant filed a motion for extension
of time within which to file an answer

Issue:

Whether the City Court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the defendant in default

Ruling:

Yes. the Court RESOLVED to SET ASIDE the order of default and the judgment rendered
by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 137730, entitled: "Commonweal Financing
Corporation, plaintiff, versus Joesteel Container Corporation, defendant," and to REMAND this
case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
 Judgment/Decision

Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-28173, September 30, 1971
Case No.: 105

Facts

A sales agreement dated was entered into by and between Petitioner Naga and Private
Respondent Pacific, by virtue of which the latter agreed to supply the former roofing and related
materials and to be responsible for their installation at the Naga City public market for a total
cost of P238,447.76. Under the said agreement, Naga covenanted that it shall (a) deposit the
sum of P106,300 with the Pacific upon the signing of the contract; (b) pay the balance of the
price, payable within 45 days after completion of the deliveries and installation of the roofing
materials, but not later than 95 days from the date of delivery thereof to the job site in case their
installation is delayed due to the fault of the Naga.

Pacific already performed its obligation however, Naga only paid P107,030 and failed to pay the
remaining balance. Thus, Pacific filed a complaint with the trial court. Naga filed a motion for
extension for 15 days stating that the undersigned counsel is unable to prepare and finalize
defendants answer due to burden of other equally if not more urgent professional work. The
motion was granted.

After the expiration of such period, they filed another motion for extension but was refused.
They were afterwards declared in default. Decision ruled in favor of Pacific. The case was
appealed but the ruling of the trial court was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue

Was it correct for the trial court to deny the second motion for extension and declare Naga in
default?

Ruling

Yes. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter
largely addressed to the sound discretion of a trial court. While trial courts are persuaded, as a
matter of policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our
adjective law, the defense should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse
a second request for extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief. Where, as
in the case at bar, another full period of 15 days to file the answer had been granted, substantial
grounds must be shown by the party declared in default in order that the questioned order of
the trial court may be reversed.

In its belated answer filed with the trial court for admission, the Naga explicitly denied that the
claim asserted in the complaint was already due and demandable at that time, the Naga saying
that the GSIS loan (the release of which was claimed to be a pre-condition to the payment of the
Pacific's claim) had not yet been released and that the installation work done by the Pacific had
not yet been accepted. A written denial of this nature will not, in our view, take long to make, as,
indeed, the Naga, after it came to know of the default order, was able to make the said answer in
less than three days. The said belatedly filed answer, as we read it, sufficiently joined issues
with the material allegations of the Pacific's complaint.
 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz

G.R. No. 157107, November 24, 2006
Case No.: 106

Amendment is a matter of right when a motion to dismiss was filed.

Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for the purpose of
Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her
complaint as a matter of right. Following the ruling in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. that
respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to
accept the amended complaint, and otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words,
the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent
should have not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint.

FACTS:

A complaint for replevin was filed by respondent against Alpine Lending Investors
(Alpine) and Zenaida Lipata. The complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondents former
neighbor who pretended to help respondent in securing a Garage Franchise from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). Zenaida then used respondents registration papers and
mortgaged the vehicle to Alpine. Thereafter, Zenaida disappeared with the vehicle. The LTO
showed respondent the Chattel Mortgage Contract bearing her forged signature.

Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and demanded the release
of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on condition that Zenaida should
first be charged criminally. Respondent then caused the filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City complaints for falsification of private document and estafa against Zenaida.
Alpine when informed, still refused to turn over the vehicle to her. Instead of filing an answer to
respondents complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is
not a juridical person, hence, not a proper party in the case. The RTC denied Alpines motion to
dismiss. RTC denied Alpines MR and then directed respondent to file her amended complaint
within ten (10) days. However, responded filed her Amended Complaint two (2) days late. RTC
admitted the amended complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents motion to
admit amended complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied by a
notice of hearing. RTC denied Alpines motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondents amended complaint.

HELD:

The trial court was correct in admitting respondents amended complaint.

As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a
motion to dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading for purpose of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed,
respondent could amend her complaint as a matter of right. Following this Courts ruling in
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., considering that respondent has the right to amend her
complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint;
otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial courts duty to admit the
amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should not have filed a motion
to admit her amended complaint.

It has always been the policy of this Court to be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings in order that the real controversies between or among the parties may be presented
and cases is decided on the merits without delay.
 Cause of Action

Alfredo Vergel De dios v Bristol Laboratories (Phil), Inc.

G.R. No. L-25530 January 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 349
Case No.: 107

Facts:

This is an appeal from the order of the CFI of La Union dismissing the complaint upon
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
Alfredo De Dios, plaintiff, filed a complaint against the defendant before the CFI of La
Union for recovery of damages due to the latters actuations with ulterior motives, contrary to
law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employer, in gross and evident
bad faith, and without giving the former his due, wilfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and dismissed
the former by means of libellous letter.
Bristol laboratories, defendant, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that it states no cause of action against them. The lower court sustained the motion and
dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal

Issue:

Whether the lower erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of action.

Ruling:

No. The lower courts had validly dismissed the complaint.

It was uniformly held by the court that in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in
the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficient of the fact alleged in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. The admission,
however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint.
Applying the test of sufficiency of the facts, the court could not render a valid judgment,
there being no alleged and admitted fact showing that the defendant have committed acts
constituting a delict or wrong; by which the defendant violated the right of the plaintiff causing
them loss or injury. Further, in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period, the
employer has a right to dismiss his employees at any time with or without just cause.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff.
 Venue of Actions

FORTUNE MOTORS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 76431, October 16, 1989
Case No.:108
Facts:

On March 29, 1982 up to January 6, 1984, private respondent Metropolitan Bank

extended various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the total sum of P32,500,000.00
(according to the borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the Bank) which loan was secured
by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune building and lot in Makati, Rizal.

Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the petitioner was
not able to pay the loan which became due. For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the
respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served,
posted, and published, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for the price of P47,
899,264.91 to mortgagee Bank as the highest bidder.

The sheriffs certificate of sale was registered with one-year redemption period to expire
on October 24, 1985. Three days before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioner
Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging
that the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the
publication notice of the sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price for
which the property was sold was shockingly low.

Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the
realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul
the foreclosure sale should be filed in the RTC of Makati. The motion was opposed by petitioner
Fortune Motors alleging that its action is a personal action and that the issue is the validity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings so that it may have a new one year period to redeem.

On January 8, 1986 an order was issued by the lower court reserving the resolution of
the Banks motion to dismiss until after the trial on the merits as the grounds relied upon by the
defendant were not clear and indubitable. The Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order but it was denied by the lower court.

The respondent Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals, which was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed and a resolution was issued
denying such motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a
personal action or a real action for venue purposes.

Ruling:

In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec.2
(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of
possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real
property. Real actions must be instituted in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.
 Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted where the defendant or any of
the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at
the election of the plaintiff (Sec.1, Rule 4, ROC).

A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true
objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property.

An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its
prime objective is to recover said real property.

An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action
to annul a private sale of real property.

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession
of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is
considered immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective. The
prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale or real property
does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is
to recover said real property. It is a real action. Respondent Court therefore, did not err in
dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised.

Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of title of the

property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which
should commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
 Forum Shopping

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (formerly WESTMONT BANK)vs. ROSEMOORE MINING &
DEVELOPMENT CORP. and DRA. LOURDES PASCUAL
G.R. NOS. 159669 &163521, March 12, 2007
Case No.: 109

FACTS:

Respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (Rosemoor), a Philippine mining

corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied for and was granted by petitioner Westmont
Bank1 (Bank) a credit facility in the total amount of P80 million consisting of P50,000,000.00 as
long term loan and P30,000,000.00 as revolving credit line.

To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate mortgage agreement was executed by Rosemoor
and Dr. Lourdes Pascual (Dr. Pascual), Rosemoor's president, as mortgagors in favor of the Bank
as mortgagee in the City of Manila. The agreement, however, covered six (6) parcels of land
located in San Miguel, Bulacan (Bulacan properties), all registered under the name of Rosemoor,
and two (2) parcels of land6 situated in Gapan, Nueva Ecija (Nueva Ecija properties), owned and
registered under the name of Dr. Pascual.

Rosemoor subsequently opened with the Bank four (4) irrevocable Letters of Credit (LCs)
totaling US$1,943,508.11. To cover payments by the Bank under the LCs, Rosemoor proceeded
to draw against its credit facility and thereafter executed promissory notes amounting
collectively to P49,862,682.50. Two (2) other promissory notes were also executed by
Rosemoor in the amounts of P10,000,000.00 and P3,500,000.00, respectively, to be drawn from
its revolving credit line.

Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under the LCs and promissory
notes. In view of the default, the Bank caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the Nueva Ecija
properties on 22 May 1998 and the Bulacan properties on 10 August 1998. The Bank was the
highest bidder on both occasions.

On 8 October 1999, the Bank caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificate of Sale covering
the Nueva Ecija properties on the certificates of title concerned. Later, on 16 March 2001, the
Notarial Certificate of Sale covering the Bulacan properties was annotated on the certificates of
title of said properties.

The foregoing facts led to Rosemoor's filing of separate complaints against the Bank, one before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Manila RTC) and the other before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC).

The two petitions before this Court have been consolidated. We find one common issue in G.R.
No. 159669 and G.R. No. 163521 - whether Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the
two cases against the Bank. The other issues for resolution were raised in G.R. No. 159669,
pertaining as they do to the orders issued by the Malolos RTC. These issues are whether the
action to invalidate the foreclosure sale was properly laid with the Malolos RTC even as regards
the Nueva Ecija properties; whether it was proper for the Malolos RTC to declare the Bank in
default; and whether it was proper for the Malolos RTC to deny the Bank's motion to dismiss
through a minute resolution.
ISSUE:

Whether Rosemoor committed forum-shopping in filing the Malolos case during the pendency
of the Manila case.

HELD:

The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. The elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other case.

As to the existence of identity of parties, several bank officers and employees impleaded in the
Amended Complaint in the Manila case were not included in the Malolos case. These bank
officers and employees were sued in Manila in their personal capacity. A finding of negligence or
bad faith in their participation in the preparation and execution of the loan agreement would
render them personally liable. Dr. Pascual, on the other hand, was included as petitioner only in
the Malolos case because it involved properties registered in her name. As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, Dr. Pascual is a real party-in-interest in the Malolos case because she
stood to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. Dr. Pascual, however, was not included
as plaintiff in the Manila case because her interest therein was not personal but merely in her
capacity as officer of Rosemoor.

As regards the identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the main contention of
Rosemoor in the Manila case is that the Bank had failed to deliver the full amount of the loan, as
a consequence of which Rosemoor demanded the remittance of the unreleased portion of the
loan and payment of damages consequent thereto. In contrast, the Malolos case was filed for the
purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over the
foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become
due and demandable. While the right asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds of
the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the foreclosure of the properties
mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due.

Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action
affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced
and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies. The Manila case, on the other
hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor,
whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila.
Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.

It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the need to
secure a writ of injunction because the consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged properties in
favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then, this action can only be commenced where the
properties, or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the petition for injunction would be
dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in filing the Malolos case
and cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.
 VENUE

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119657, February 7, 1997
Case No.: 110

Facts:

On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, simply KUBOTA) and
Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (hereafter, simply UNIMASTERS) entered into a "Dealership
Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.[1]
The contract contained, among others:

1) a stipulation reading: "** All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the
proper Courts of Quezon City," and

2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer
for its obligations to KUBOTA.

Some five years later, or more precisely on December 24, 1993, UNIMASTERS filed an action in
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a certain Reynaldo Go, and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch (hereafter, simply METROBANK) for
damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. The
action was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-12-241 and assigned to Branch 6.

Issue:

Whether private respondent (KUBOTA) limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the venue of
any complaint filed arising from the dealership agreement between them.

Held:

The question should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions
definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between
them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual
provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation should be construed,
not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing
suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this
case).

One last word, respecting KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of ** (UNIMASTERS') action considering that venue was improperly laid." This
is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is fundamental.
 Venue of Action

Polytrade Corporation vs. Victoriano Blanco

G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969
Case No. :111

Facts:

Plaintiff Polytrade Corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati
City. Defendant Victoriano Blanco has its place of business and a resident of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
The suit is an action for recovery of the purchase price of rawhide delivered by the
plaintiff corporation to defendant. The suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. In
their contract for the delivery and payment of the rawhides, the parties agreed that in the event
of any breach of the terms of the contract by either of the parties, any suit may be filed in the
City of Manila.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of improper venue. He
claimed that by contract, suit may only be lodged in the Courts of Manila. The Bulacan Court
overruled him. Defendant did not file his answer to the complaint. As a consequence, default
judgment was rendered against him. The defendant appealed.

Issue:

Whether venue of action was properly laid in the Province of Bulacan, the where
defendant resides.

Ruling:

Section, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions, provides that such
actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Further, section 3 (now section 4) of the same rule, states that venue may be stipulated
by written agreement-By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be
changed or transferred from one province to another. Such agreement must be made before
filing the action.
In the case at bar, the defendant contends that, because of their agreement, he can only
be sued in the courts of Manila. The court did not agree with the defendant.
Based on their agreement, the parties merely stipulated that they agree to sue and be
sued in Manila. Such agreement did not stipulate that Manila Courts is the exclusive venue for
the action. They merely consented to be sued in Manila, hence, it does not preclude the filing of
suits in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant.
Hence, the court held that venue was properly laid in the court of Bulacan.
 STIPULATION ON VENUE

PCIA INC., vs. SCHONFELD.

G.R. No. 166920, February 19, 2007
Case No.: 113

FACTS:

Respondent is a Canadian citizen and a consultant in the field of environmental

engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation
duly established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary
purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services both
in and out of the Philippines. It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan
(PCIJ). The president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based
in Tokyo, Japan.
On May 5, 1999, respondent was informed that his employment will be terminated
effective on August 4, 1999. However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen requested respondent to
stay put in his job after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report on
certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Respondent continued his
work with PPI until the end of business hours on October 1, 1999.
Respondent filed with PPI several money claims. PPI partially settled some of his claims,
but refused to pay the rest. Consequently, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. The complaint was dismissed,
the Labor Arbiter found that the contract of employment between respondent and petitioners is
controlling, and the differences regarding employer-employee relationship should be submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
judgment of the Labor Arbiter.
The respondent filed a petition before the CA, where it reversed the judgment of the
NLRC. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION?

RULING:

Yes, the assailed decision is valid.

Under the contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case
related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the
parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since
there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than
Philippines.

Settled is the rule that venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the
intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly
and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated
only at the place named by them, which was absent in the present case. Wherefore, the petition
is denied.
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.
 LEVITON INDUSTRIES, NENA DE LA CRUZ LIM, DOMINGO GO, and LIM KIAT,
petitioners,vsHON. SERAFIN SALVADOR, LEVITON MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-40163, June 19, 1982
Case No. : 114

FACTS:

On April 17, 1973, private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. filed a complaint
for unfair competition against petitioners Leviton Industries, Nena de la Cruz Lim, Domingo Go
and Lim Kiat before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, presided by respondent
Judge Serafin Salvador. The complaint substantially alleges that plaintiff is a foreign corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, United States of America, with
office located at 236 Greenpoint Avenue, Brooklyn City, State of New York, U.S.A.; that defendant
Leviton Industries is a partnership organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
with principal office at 382 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City; while defendants Nena de la
Cruz Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant Domingo Go acting as
General Manager of defendant Leviton Industries; that plaintiff, founded in 1906 by Isidor
Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical wiring devices in the United States under the
trademark Leviton, which various electrical wiring devices bearing the trademark Leviton and
trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since 1954;
that due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public, the same are
well known to Filipino consumers under the trade name Leviton Manufacturing Co., Inc. and
trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use of plaintiff's trademark and trade name in
the Philippines, defendants began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast, fuse and oval
buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.; that Domingo Go,
partner and general manager of defendant partnership, had registered with the Philippine
Patent Office the trademarks Leviton Label and Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse under
Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-1132 and 15517, respectively, which registration was
contrary to paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of
plaintiff's right over the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the trademark
Leviton but likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and that
the use thereof by defendants of its products would cause confusion in the minds of the
consumers and likely to deceive them as to the source of origin, thereby enabling defendants to
pass off their products as those of plaintiff's. Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic
Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to
prohibit defendants from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark
Leviton.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, drawing
attention to the plaintiff's failure to allege therein its capacity to sue under Section 21-A of
Republic Act No. 166, as amended. After the filing of the plaintiff's opposition and the
defendant's reply, the respondent judge denied the motion on the ground that the same did not
appear to be indubitable. On September 21, 1973, defendants filed their answer, reiterating the
ground supporting their motion to dismiss. Thereafter, defendants served upon plaintiff a
request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, of the following matters of fact, to
wit:

ISSUE:

Whether a foreign corporations licensed to do business in the Philippines, the right to

seek redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts.
RULING:

The motion for reconsideration having likewise been denied, defendants instituted the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, charging respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion in denying their motion to dismiss.

We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had failed to allege the
essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Private respondent's
action is squarely founded on Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, which we
quote:

Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or tradename has
been registered or assigned under this Act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for
unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has
been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act numbered Fourteen Hundred and
Fifty-Nine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings the
complaint; Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is
a citizen, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to
corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As amended by R.A. No. 638)

Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants to a But the said law is not without
qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the registration of the trade
mark of the suing foreign corporation with the Philippine Patent Office or, in the least, that it be
an asignee of such registered trademark. The said section further requires that the country, of
which the plaintiff foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or domicilliary, grants to
Filipino corporations or juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty,
convention or law,

All that is alleged in private respondent's complaint is that it is a foreign corporation.

Such bare averment not only fails to comply with the requirements imposed by the aforesaid
Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that
"facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons
that is made a party, must be averred "

In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action under the
Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out, explicitly sets down the
conditions precedent for the successful prosecution thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon
private respondent to comply with these requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such
be the case. It may be that private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but
our rules on pleadings require that the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with
such right be affirmatively pleaded. And the reason therefor, as enunciated in "Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Co., et al. versus Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc."4is that these are matters peculiarly
within the knowledge of appellants alone, and it would be unfair to impose upon appellees the
burden of asserting and proving the contrary. It is enough that foreign corporations are allowed
by law to seek redress in our courts under certain conditions: the interpretation of the law
should not go so far as to include, in effect, an inference that those conditions had been met
from the mere fact that the party sued is a foreign corporation.
 HATHIBHAI BULAKHIDAS vs. THE HONORABLE PEDRO L. NAVARRO and DIAMOND
SHIPPING CORPORATION,
G.R. No. L-49695, April 7, 1986
Case No.: 116

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch II dated August 21, 1978, dismissing petitioner's complaint.

Petitioner, a foreign partnership, filed a complaint against a domestic corporation,

Diamond Shipping Corporation, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the recovery of
damages allegedly caused by the failure of the said shipping corporation to deliver the goods
shipped to it by petitioner to their proper destination. Paragraph 1 of said complaint alleged
that plaintiff is "a foreign partnership firm not doing business in the Philippines" and that it is
"suing under an isolated transaction." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
action against defendant.

Acting on said motion to dismiss, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint on
the ground that plaintiff being "a foreign corporation or partnership not doing business in the
Philippines it cannot exercise the right to maintain suites before our Courts."

Issue:

Whether a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines can institute
an action before our courts.

Ruling:

In the longline of jurisprudence, "It is settled that if a foreign corporation is not engaged
in business in the Philippines, it may not be denied the right to file an action in Philippine courts
for isolated transactions. WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Court dismissing the
petitioner's complaint is hereby set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings, with
costs against private respondent.
 THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

Asian Consolidated Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 160242, May 17, 2005
Case No.: 117
Facts:

On March 13, 2001, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a Complaint for a sum of
money with damages against the Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC)
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The complaint alleged the following: ACDC
leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from MEC during the
period of March 13 to July 15, 1998 but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor in
the total amount of P4,313,935.00; from July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipments from
MEC were, likewise, leased by ACDC for the latters power plant in Mauban, Quezon, and that
there was still a balance of P456,666.67; and ACDC also purchased and took custody of various
equipment parts from MEC for the agreed price of P237,336.20 which, despite demands, ACDC
failed to pay. MEC prayed that judgment be rendered in its favor. ACDC filed a motion to file and
admit answer with third-party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel). In its
answer, ACDC admitted its indebtedness to MEC in the amount of P5,071,335.86 but alleged the
following in special and affirmative defenses. ACDC prayed that judgment be rendered in its
favor dismissing the complaint and ordering the third-party defendant (Becthel) to
pay P456,666.67 plus interest thereon and attorneys fees. MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to
file a third-party complaint against Becthel on the ground that the defendant had already
admitted its principal obligation to MEC in the amount of P5,071,335.86; the transaction
between it and ACDC, on the one hand, and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, were
independent transactions. Furthermore, the allowance of the third-party complaint would result
in undue delays in the disposition of the case. MEC then filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging therein that there was no genuine issue as to the obligation of ACDC to MEC in the total
amount of P5,071,335.86, the only issue for the trial courts resolution being the amount of
attorneys fees and costs of litigation. ACDC opposed the motion for summary judgment, alleging
that there was a genuine issue with respect to the amount of P5,071,335.86 being claimed by
MEC, and that it had a third-party complaint against Becthel in connection with the reliefs
sought against it which had to be litigated. In its reply, MEC alleged that the demand of ACDC in
its special and affirmative defenses partook of the nature of a negative pregnant, and that there
was a need for a hearing on its claim for damages.On August 2, 2001, the trial court issued a
Resolution denying the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint and granting the
motion of MEC, which the trial court considered as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
On July 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the
assailed decision. The appellate court ruled that since MEC had prayed for judgment on the
pleadings, it thereby waived its claim for damages other than the amount of P5,071,335.86;
hence, there was no longer a genuine issue to be resolved by the court which necessitated trial.
The appellate court sustained the disallowance of the third-party complaint of ACDC against
Becthel on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not arise out of the
same transaction on which MECs claim was based.Its motion for reconsideration of the decision
having been denied, ACDC, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review on certiorari
to the Honorable Supreme Court.
Issues:
I. Whether or not a third-party complaint is proper; and
II. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is proper;
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called
the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponents claim.

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may render
judgment on the pleadings, as follows:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or, otherwise,
admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an
independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action,
thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be
adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial
right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant.[15] This
right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rests in the discretion of the trial court.
The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs
complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the orig
inal complaint. It goes without saying that the denial of the petitioners motion with leave to file
a third-party complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a separate
complaint against the latter. Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability for the
principal claim of the respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint, the trial court did
not err in rendering judgment on the pleadings against it.
 Forum shopping vs lis pendens

VICTRONICS COMPUTERS, INC. vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 63, MAKATI,
G.R. No. 104019, January 25, 1993
Case No.: 120

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
seeks to set aside, for being inconsistent with law and jurisprudence, the 22 January 1992 Order
of respondent Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila which,
among others, denied a motion for reconsideration of its earlier dismissal, on the ground of lis
pendens, of a collection suit docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2069 filed against private respondents
Karl C. Velhagen and Archimedes R. King, alleged operators of a business under the names
VICTORIA COURT, GMT CONSOLIDATED COMPANY and VICTORIA GROUP OF COMPANIES.

Petitioner Victronics Computers, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the sale of

computer systems and peripherals.

As revealed in the complaint in Civil Case No. 91-2192, each of the aforementioned
establishments is owned by the herein six (6) respondent corporations which, however, decided
sometime in 1986 "to band together for their mutual interest and benefit, under the trade name
and style of the Victoria Court Group of Companies."

As further revealed in the Comment of these corporations, they operate under a

common management team wherein respondents Velhagen and King are the General Manager
and Chief Executive Officer, respectively.

Motion To Dismiss and/or To Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds

: (a) plaintiff (petitioner herein) failed to verify the complaint.

(b) plaintiff failed to sue the proper parties and

(c) there is a prejudicial question or a pending incident before another court. In support
of these grounds, they allege that (a) verification is a formal requirement under Section 6, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court; (b) the transaction in question was not entered into by them in their
personal capacities they acted for and on behalf of the corporations they represent; hence,
the latter, who chose not to honor the contract, are the real parties in interest; moreover,
"Victoria Court, GMT Consolidated Company and Victoria Group of Companies . . . are mere
tradenames" none of these named companies really exist;

On 19 September 1991, petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 91-2069 a contempt charge
against respondents Velhagen and King for forum-shopping, 18 claiming that after having
respectively received the summons and a copy of the complaint, both respondents did not file
an answer with compulsory counterclaim. Instead, "using the names of certain corporations that
represent the same interests they advance, [they] filed a separate action one day later before
Branch 150 of the Makati Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
91-2192" 19 which arose from the same transaction or occurrence as that obtaining in Civil
Case No. 91-2069; as a matter of fact, the complaint in the former reads like an answer with
compulsory counterclaim to the complaint in the latter. Hence, both are guilty of forum-
shopping, double dealing, trifling with the court and abusing its processes.
 On 4 October 1991, after allegedly accidentally learning of the 16 September 1991 Order
of dismissal of Civil Case No. 91-2069, petitioner requested, and thereafter obtained, a
photocopy of the said order which was not, unfortunately, served on the petitioner's counsel

Anent the particular issue of forum shopping, the lower court held that the same "is
negated by the move of defendants (private respondents Velhagen and King) to dismiss the case
filed before this court [Civil Case No. 91-2069], to give way to that which pends before Branch
150 [Civil Case No. 91-2192]." And, on the matter of litis pendentia, it reiterated its ruling that
the filing of one action ahead of another is not decisive on the issue of which of the two (2)
identical actions in two (2) separate courts of concurrent jurisdiction should be dismissed.

As a consequence of this 22 January 1992 Order, respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 91-
2069, issued on 20 February 1992 an order denying the petitioner's motion for the issuance of
an alias summons.

Issue:

The pivotal issues raised in the instant petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent
Court erred in dismissing, on the ground of litis pendentia, Civil Case No. 91-2069 which has
priority with respect to the time of filing, and (2) whether or not the private respondents are
guilty of forum-shopping.

Ruling:

It is a rule that for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the abatement or
dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in
the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

The presence of all the foregoing requisites with respect to Civil Case No. 91-2069 and
Civil Case No. 91-2192 is not controverted by the parties. As a matter of fact, both invoked these
identities in their respective motions to dismiss.

Like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia as a principle is a sanction of public policy
against multiplicity of suits. 38 Differently put, "[T]he principle upon which a 'plea of another
action pending' is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious."

To be sure, there are limitations to this rule. At common law, if it appears to the court
that the second action was not brought to harass or vex the defendant, and is not in fact
vexatious, it may refuse to abate the second action, allow it to stand, and order the first one to
be discontinued on proper terms. The court may also permit the plaintiff to discontinue the first
suit and thereby defeat the plea in abatement where the second suit is necessary in order to
protect and secure the plaintiff's full rights, or where the abatement of the second suit is
necessary in order to protect and secure the plaintiff's full rights, or where the abatement of the
second would result impossible loss of substantial rights on the part of the plaintiff. 41

The "more appropriate action" criterion was also applied in Ramos vs. Peralta,49 Ramos,
the lessee of a fishpond located in Pilar, Bataan, sought to consign with the CFI of Manila the
advance rentals for the fishpond for 15 March 1976 and 15 June 1976 after its tender was
refused by the lessors (Ortaez spouses) 50 and after he was informed by the vendee of the
property, P.R. Roman Inc. in its letter of 1 May 1976 that it had acquired the property and
would take possession thereof on 16 May 1976. Ramos filed the consignation case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 103647, with the lower court on 2 August 1976. Meanwhile on 13 August 1976,
P.R. Roman Inc. filed with the CFI of Bataan a complaint for quieting of title against Ramos; this
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4102. Consequently, P.R. Roman, Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 103647 on the ground of, inter alia, lis pendens. The motion was granted.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the lower court's decision considering the "broader scope of
inquiry involved in Civil Case No. 4102 and the location of the property involved."

In the case at bar, We do not hesitate to rule that the second case, Civil Case No. 91-2192,
was filed not so much upon the inspiration of unadulterated good faith to seek redress for a
genuine wrong committed but more to vex or harass in another forum the plaintiff in the first
case, the herein petitioner. What cannot escape Our attention is the undue, if not indecent, haste
in the preparation of the complaint in Civil Case No. 91-2192 by the counsel for the defendants
in Civil Case No. 91-2069. Civil Case No. 91-2192 is for the nullification of a contract the
purchase order signed by no less than the authorized officers of the six (6) respondent
corporations. It is, therefore, based upon a written document. Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that:

Sec. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or

defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such
instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a
copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be
deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth
in the pleading. (Emphasis supplied).
 Arceo vs. Oliveros
GR No. L-38251 January 31,1985
Case No.: 121

Facts:

Pablo Arceo filed a complaint with the defunct Court of First Instance of Quezon, against
defendants-appellees, spouses Jose Oliveros and Rufina Cabangon. In his complaint, Pablo
alleged that Sixta Arceo, his sister and co-heir, sold to defendants-appellees her undivided
interest in the parcel of land they have inherited from their deceased father, Roberto Arceo,
without his (Pablo's) consent. He further claimed that from the time of the sale up to the
present, defendants-appellees have not made any improvement on the land although in peaceful
and complete enjoyment of the property. Finally, Pablo averred that being a co-owner and co-
heir of said Sixta Arceo, he should be allowed to redeem and repurchase the property subject of
the sale in accordance with Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the land being covered by a free
patent title. Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, among others.

In a decision, the Court of First Instance of Quezon dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this appeal. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the
court a quo erred in holding that lis pendens lies.

Issue:

Whether or not lis pendens is in order.

Ruling:

Yes. Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be a ground for dismissal
requires: 1) Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
2) Identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3)
the Identity in both cases is such that the judgment which may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

It is not disputed that there is another case, Civil Case No. 435-G, pending between
plaintiff-appellant Pablo Arceo and defendants-appellees Jose Oliveros and Rufina Cabangon.
That case involves the same parcel of land and similar issues as those in Civil Case No. C-105. In
the said case, the Oliveros spouses as plaintiffs, impugn the extrajudicial settlement between
Sixta and Pablo wherein the former renounced her right over the disputed lot in favor of the
latter and seek to annul the transfer certificate of title issued to Pablo Arceo over the said lot.
Said spouses based their action upon a claim of ownership over the land pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale 19 whereby Sixta Arceo sold to them her definite or specific share in the homestead
she and her brother inherited from their father. In his Answer in the said case (Case No. 435-G)
Pablo Arceo, as defendant, sets up by way of counterclaim his right of compulsory redemption
over the same lot pursuant to Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act, claiming further that the property
has never been partitioned between him and her sister Sixta.
 Dismissal of Action

Valencia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 11401, October 17, 1996, 263 SCRA 275
Case No.: 122

Facts:

Private respondents were lessees of a 24-hectare fishpond owned by petitioner, as

substituted by his heirs, located at Paombong, Bulacan. The lease is covered by a lease contract
by and between the said parties. The lease executed on March 1, 1982 was supposed to have
expired on May 1987, but before the said date, petitioner filed on June 25, 1984 a complaint
against private respondents for the rescission of the lease contract. The Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan which took cognizance of said case issued a writ of preliminary Mandatory
Injunction ordering private respondents to surrender to the petitioner possession of the
fishpond. In view whereof, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Intermediate Appellate Court. The said court on September 21, 1984 issued a restraining order
enjoining petitioner and the Regional Trial Court from enforcing the mandatory injunction.

Petitioner contends that the error in the Decision lies in its failure to properly appreciate
the complaint filed with the Manila court, which, when taken together with private respondents
documentary and testimonial evidence, discloses that the alleged wrongful acts for which they
claimed damages arose out of, were connected with, and/or were incidents of the proceedings
in the action for rescission before the Bulacan court. Petitioner claims that the action for
damages commenced by private respondents constitutes splitting of a single cause of action
which is prohibited by the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that, for the aforesaid reasons, if indeed private respondents suffered
any damage, they should have filed a compulsory counterclaim or supplemental pleading for the
alleged acts of violation of restraining orders which are transactions, occurrence or event which
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. He insists that the
filing of a compulsory counterclaim is the proper recourse considering that petitioner had
posted a bond in the rescission case to answer for damages that private respondents might
suffer by reason of the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction. He also ventures to
say that the case filed with the Manila court can even be considered as a form of forum
shopping.

In fine, petitioner asserts that under the rule on litis pendentia the action for rescission filed
with the Bulacan court bars the action for damages filed in Manila. It is interesting to note that
petitioner does not contest the correctness of the award of damages made by respondent Court;
he merely insists on the dismissal (?) of the case for damages on the ground of litis pendentia,
there being a pending case for rescission in which private respondents could have asserted their
claim for damages. This being his lone assigned issue, the clear and unavoidable implication is
that if his contention is struck down, he is deemed to have waived any objection against the
award of damages by respondent Court.
Issues:

1. Whether the appeal is perfected.

2. Whether the respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the causes of
action in the two cases are not the same.
3. Whether petitioner should be held liable for the damage inflicted upon private
respondents as a result of his violating the IAC restraining orders.
4. Whether forum-shopping exists in this cases.
5. Whether the filing of supersedeas bond does not suspend execution as a matter of right.

Held:

1. Appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal.

Under the present procedure, an appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last day
to appeal by any party. It is not perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed. In the
present case, the defendants had up to January 18, 1989 within which to appeal and the plaintiff
had up to January 25, 1989. The motion for execution was filed by defendants on January 17,
1989, before the expiration of the last day to appeal by any of the parties.

Despite filing of notice of appeal, defendants could still avail of their rights. The fact that
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 1989 did not, as already stated, result in the
perfection of the appeal. Despite plaintiffs having filed his notice of appeal, defendants, had they
been so minded, could still have availed of the right, up to their last day to appeal which was
January 18, 1989, to also file their notice of appeal or to file a motion for new trial or to move for
execution as in fact they did, since plaintiffs appeal had not yet been perfected. That respondent
judge gave due course to plaintiffs notice of appeal, on the same date when it was filed on
January 16, 1989, is inconsequential. Both under the former and present procedural governance
on appeals, a notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court, and its act of
giving due course thereto, or seeming approval thereof, does not affect the rule as to when an
appeal is deemed perfected.

This Court has consistently held, in a long line of cases, that the requisites for the
existence of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are as follows: 1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; 2) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.

2. There may have been identity of parties in the two actions, but the other two requisites
are not similarly satisfied. The case in Bulacan was of course founded upon alleged violations by
the private respondents as lessees of certain stipulations in their lease contract with petitioner,
and therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the rights asserted (by petitioner as lessor) and relief
sought therein (i.e., rescission of the lease contract) were entirely different from those asserted
in Manila. The latter case stemmed from the prejudice suffered by private respondents due to
petitioners violation of the IACs restraining orders for the observance of status quo between the
parties, the relief demanded therein consisting of actual, moral and exemplary damages. Thus,
the respondent Court committed no reversible error in holding that the causes of action in the
two cases are not the same; they are founded on different acts; the rights violated are different;
and the reliefs sought are also different.
 The third requisite constitutes the test of identity in the aforestated particulars, and in
connection therewith, this Court quoted 1 Cyc., 28 thus: A plea of the pendency of a prior action
is not available unless the prior action is of such a character that, had a judgment been rendered
therein on the merits, such a judgment would be conclusive between the parties and could be
pleaded in bar of the second action. (underscoring supplied)

3. The res judicata test when applied to the two cases in question indicate in no uncertain
terms that regardless of whoever will ultimately prevail in the Bulacan case, the final judgment
therein whether granting or denying rescission of the lease contract will not be conclusive
between the parties in the Manila case, and vice versa. In other words, the outcome of the
Bulacan case has nothing to do with whether petitioner should be held liable for the damage
inflicted upon private respondents as a result of his violating the IAC restraining orders, the two
cases having arisen from different acts and environmental circumstances.

4. Forum-shopping is not present in the case at bar. The established rule is that for
forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. As held
by this Court in a recent case: The test for determining whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34,
October 13, 1986), also by Chief Justice Narvasa, and that is, forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other x x x (underscoring supplied)

It has already been established that litis pendentia could not have been properly pleaded
to abate the second action brought in Manila, and that a final judgment in either case would not
be res judicata with respect to the other. Thus, the allegation of forum-shopping must fail.

5. Filing of supersedeas bond does not suspend execution as a matter of right. That
petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending appeal, as
suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against him. The filing of such bond does not
entitle him to the suspension of execution as a matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be
categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a
losing party so circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other
remedial options at hand.
The petition was DENIED and the appealed Decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated on February 18, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27590, affirming the decision of
the trial court awarding moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees to private
respondents are AFFIRMED.
 Lourdes G. Suntay vs Heroico M. Aguiluz, et al.,
G.R. No. L-28883, June 3, 1992
Case No.: 124

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendants executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage under which
the former sold to the latter Lot located in Diliman, Quezon City. Defendants failed to pay the
P40,000.00 on due date. Plaintiff demanded payment and threatened to foreclose the mortgage.
Defendants then filed a complaint against herein plaintiff for specific performance with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-10313.

It was alleged therein that upon the execution of the contract, plaintiff would
simultaneously deliver to the defendants the certificate of title and other documents in order to
obtain a loan from the SSS and thereafter fully pay the balance of the purchase price. For no
justifiable reason and despite repeated demands, plaintiff refused to turn over to them the said
documents. Before being served with summons, a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4-
10313 and a copy of the above Order, herein plaintiff filed with the same court a complaint for
recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, the penalty provided for in the contract
and foreclosure of the mortgage. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-10343 and
was raffled to another branch of the court.

In said complaint, plaintiff prays for: (a) ordering the defendants to pay her the amount
of P50,000.00 (P40,000.00 representing the unpaid balance and P10,000.00 representing the
liquidated damages) with legal interest, attorneys fees and (b) an Order appointing her, during
the pendency of the action, as receiver of the property.

On 2 September 1966, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's Civil Case No. Q-
10343 on the following grounds: 1. That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; 2. That the complaint states no cause of action.

Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in holding that there is pending an action between the
same parties for specific performance of the very contract subject of this suit for foreclosure,
and it appearing further that the issues raised in this present action can well and should be
litigated in the suit for specific performance.

Ruling:

Yes, the lower court erred in its decision. As could be gathered from the body of the
complaint, Civil Case No. Q-10313 is an action for injunction filed in anticipation of the
foreclosure of the mortgage which plaintiff had threatened to pursue if defendants failed to pay
the unpaid balance of P40,000.00 on due date. The contract explicitly provides that said balance
shall be paid ''on or before August 6, 1966 without need of any demand." Defendants self-
serving characterization thereof as an action for "specific performance" is calculated to
obfuscate the issues and mislead the trial court. As this Court sees it, defendants herein merely
tried to beat the plaintiff to the draw and pre-empt the latter's legal moves.

The other causes of action in Civil Case No. Q-10313 are but mere embellishments to
give a semblance of viability to the alleged grievance of herein defendants. The contract fails to
indicate that (a) it was the intention of the parties to consider the delivery of the certificate of
title and the other documents mentioned therein as a condition precedent before the balance of
P40,000.00 would be paid or (b) such delivery constitutes a suspensive condition the non-
fulfillment of which prevents the obligation of defendants to pay said balance from arising.
On the contrary, as earlier alluded to, defendants unqualifiedly bound themselves to pay the
balance on or before 6 August 1966 without need of any demand. Besides, since the property
was mortgaged to the plaintiff as security for the payment of the unpaid balance of P40,000.00,
plaintiff, as mortgagee, was entitled to possession of the certificate of title. The filing then of
Civil Case No. Q-10313 was a clever ruse to avoid compliance with defendants' obligation. Even
if it were not so, lis pendens does not apply in this case.
The requisites of lis pendens a ground for dismissal of a complaint are: (1) there must be
the same parties or at least such as to represent the same interest; (2) there must be the same
rights asserted and the same relief prayed for, which relief must be founded on the same facts
and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same; (3) the Identity in these
particulars should be such that if the pending case had already been disposed of, it would be
pleaded in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties.
While concededly, the first requisite obtains in this case, the last two are conspicuously
absent. As earlier discussed, Civil Case No. Q-10313, although cleverly denominated as one for
specific performance with mandatory and prohibitory injunction, is in reality principally one for
injunction to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgage and to fix a new period to pay the
remaining unpaid balance of P40,000.00 which was to be paid on or before 6 August 1966
without any need for a demand.

Upon the other hand, Civil Case No. Q-10343 is a suit for specific performance which
asks for the payment of the balance and the liquidated damages and foreclosure of the
mortgage. The causes of action and the reliefs sought are entirely different. A decision in the
first will not amount to res judicata against the second case for whether or not defendants
prevail in the former, petitioner's right to the unpaid balance and the foreclosure of the
mortgage would still be litigable.

Plaintiff then had all the right to file the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-10313.
Unfortunately, however, while she actually filed such a motion, she failed to invoke lis
pendens; she merely raised: (a) unenforceability of the demands under the statute of frauds and
(b) lack of cause of action as grounds for the motion. Thus, the same was denied by the trial
court on 7 December 1966.

The trial court, therefore, committed an error in dismissing Civil Case No. Q-10343.
What it should have done was to order its consolidation, for joint hearing and trial, with Civil
Case No. Q-10313 pursuant to Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. As ruled by this Court
in Ramos vs. Ebarle:
 RES JUDICATA

FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC., VS. TRAJANO

G.R. No. 76273, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 725
Case No.: 125

Facts:

Far Eastern University-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Memorial Foundation, Inc., has a work force of about
350 rank and file employees, majority of whom are members of private respondent Alliance of
Filipino Workers. On February 13, 1986, private respondent filed a Petition for Consent and/or
Certification Election with The Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petitioner opposed the
petition on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the same parties is
pending resolution before the Supreme Court. In its position paper, private respondent
admitted: that as early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition for
certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment but the petition was denied by
the MED Arbiter and the Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that the petitioner was a
non-stock, non-profit medical institution, therefore, its employees may not form, join, or
organize a union pursuant to Article 244 of the Labor Code; that private respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of Article 244 of the
Labor Code; that pending resolution of the aforesaid petition, or on May 1, 1980, Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70 was enacted amending Article 244 of the Labor Code, thus granting even
employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions
of their choice; and that in the exercise of such right, private respondent filed another petition
for certification election with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. On April 17, 1986, the Med
Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition, declaring that a certification election be
conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file
employees of the petitioner. Respondent Director affirmed said Order on appeal. Hence, the
petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the respondent Director
which affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter in the petition for certification election.

Issue:

Whether any judgment rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court
constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration.

Ruling:

No. As held in Quimpo v. Dela Victoria, 46 SCRA 139, in order that the pendency of another
action between the same parties for the same cause may be availed of as a ground to dismiss a
case, there must be, between the action under consideration and the other action: (1) Identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the Identity on
the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the
other action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition
for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-49771) wig not constitute res
judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration.
 MOTION TO DISMISS

Lamis Enterprises vs. Lagamon

G.R. No. L-57250 October 30, 1981
Case No.: 126
Facts:

Sometimes on January 26, 1979, the defendants obtained a loan from the plaintiff in the
sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND (P 55,000.00) PESOS payable on or before February 28, 1979 at
14% interest per annum. For value received, on or before February 28, 1979, Neville Y. Lamis
Enterprises of Hiway, Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City, promise to pay the sum of
Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) Philippine Currency.

Interest of 14% per annum will be charged on delayed payment and twenty five (25%)
of the amount due as attorney's fees and expenses of collection in the event of judicial collection.

In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.

By motion dated February 18, 1981, which the defendant filed in Civil Case No. 1395, the
dismissal of the complaint was sought on the following grounds:

(1) THAT THE SUBJECT IS IN 'LIS PENDENS' AND/OR 'MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT' OF A

PRIOR AND EXISTING CIVIL CASE NO. 35199 ENTITLED NEVILLE Y. LAMIS ENTS PLAINTIFF
VERSUS SANTIAGO MANINGO, DEFENDANT, BEFORE CFI PASIG, BRANCH XXV FILED ON
NOVEMBER 16, 1979.

(2) THAT VENUE IN THE HEREIN CASE IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE

IMPROPERLY LAID.

Issues:

Whether the case should be dismissed because it is in lis pendens

Whether the venue was improperly laid

Held:

Rule 16, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion to dismiss an action may be
made, inter alia, on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause."

It has been said that for this ground to be invoked "there must be, between the action
under consideration and the other action, (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the Identity on the two preceding particulars should
be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration."

The petitioner contends that in so far as the complaint in Civil Case No. 1395 seeks to
collect the P 55,000 alleged loan, it should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia because
there is another case on the same cause pending between them in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal And with respect to the claim for P 200,000, the same can not be set up in the present
action on the ground of multiplicity of suits since Santiago Maningo's claim under the deed of
chattel mortgage (over the tractor) partook of a compulsory counterclaim which not having
been set up in Civil Case No. 35199 was forever barred under See. 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
 We find the position of the petitioner tenable. The claim of the private respondent for
P55,000 admittedly arose from the same transaction i.e., the Memorandum of Agreement sued
upon in Civil Case No. 35199, notwithstanding that no mention of the agreement is made in Civil
Case No. 1395. Moreover, it appears that in the answer with a counter-claim filed by the private
respondent as the defendant in Civil Case No. 35199, the same amount of P55,000 was
demanded of the plaintiff therein. Indubitably, in the resolution of the issues of facts and law in
Civil Case No. 35199, relative to the claimed amount, the right of the private respondent thereto
will have to be passed upon.

Similarly the private respondent's claim for the purchase price of the tractor is barred.
This claim should have been set up in Civil Case No. 35199, of which, in one of the causes of
action it was alleged that there was a misdelivery of tractor for which reason the plaintiff
therein asks for the delivery of the tractor specified in the Memorandum Agreement.
 UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK vs. SPOUSES SAMUEL and ODETTE BELUSO
G.R. No. 15991, August 17, 2007
Case No.: 127

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, UCPB granted the spouses Beluso a Promissory Notes Line under a
Credit Agreement whereby the latter could avail from the former credit of up to a maximum
amount of 1.2 Million pesos for a term ending on 30 April 1997. The spouses Beluso
constituted, other than their promissory notes, a real estate mortgage over parcels of land in
Roxas City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-31539 and T-27828, as additional
security for the obligation. The Credit Agreement was subsequently amended to increase the
amount of the Promissory Notes Line to a maximum of 2.35 Million pesos and to extend the
term thereof to 28 February 1998.

The three promissory notes were renewed several times. On 30 April 1997, the payment
of the principal and interest of the latter two promissory notes were debited from the spouses
Belusos account with UCPB; yet, a consolidated loan for 1.3 Million was again released to the
spouses Beluso under one promissory note with a due date of 28 February 1998.

To completely avail themselves of the 2.35 Million credit line extended to them by UCPB, the
spouses Beluso executed two more promissory notes for a total of 350,000.00:

However, the spouses Beluso alleged that the amounts covered by these last two
promissory notes were never released or credited to their account and, thus, claimed that the
principal indebtedness was only 2 Million.

Spouses Beluso filed a Petition for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB
with the RTC of Makati City.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Beluso

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and dismissed the Motion for reconsideration

Issue:

WHETHER HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE

ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING8

Ruling:

No. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions
between the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed.
However, this rule is not absolute. According to this Court in Allied Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals45 :

In these cases, it is evident that the first action was filed in anticipation of the filing of the later
action and the purpose is to pre-empt the later suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal
of the second action.
Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if
the later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the
parties. Thus, in Ramos v. Peralta, it was held:

[T]he rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case should yield to the
earlier case. What is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior
pending action. Considering the broader scope of inquiry involved in Civil Case No. 4102 and the
location of the property involved, no error was committed by the lower court in deferring to the
Bataan court's jurisdiction.

Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the following are the relevant
considerations in determining which action should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought
to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the
basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issues between the parties.
 Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 95223, July 26, 1996
Case No.: 128

Facts:

Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) granted a loan to private respondent Ekman &
Company Inc. with a promissory note secured by a cash deposit. On December 15, 1982, Allied
Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent. in the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal docketed under Civil Case No 649. Upon the reorganization of the
judiciary, the case was transferred to Regional Trial Court in Makati. Allied Bank alleged that
after applying private respondents deposit to its indebtedness, there remain a balance but
despite demands made, the amount had not been paid.
The case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of Allied Bank to prosecute its case but
was reconsidered upon petitioners explanation that it did not know that its case had been
transferred to Makati as a result of the reorganization of the courts. The courts directed that the
summons be served on private respondent however was returned by the sheriff unserved on
the grounds that private respondent had moved out of the address indicated thus the case was
ordered archived. Having information that the respondent having office at another address, the
petitioner asked the court to reinstate the case and order private respondent to be served with
summons at the new address which the court granted and the summon was successfully served.
It appears that on June 6, 1984 private respondent also filed a complaint against the
petitioner for accounting docketed under Civil Case No. 7500. Private respondent alleged that it
asked allied bank for the statement of account and the return of its deposit which Allied Bank
had applied to the payment of the loan but the latter refused the demand.
Allied Bank moved to dismiss the Civil Case No 7500 citing the pendency of its action in
Civil Case No 649 but was denied by the court. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
On December 12, 1984, petitioner filed its answer. The pre hearing conference was held
and the trial begun. However, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA questioning
the denial of its motion to dismiss Civil Case No 7500 and move for the suspension of the
proceedings.
Meanwhile, Civil Case No 7500 was transferred to another branch which dismiss the
case on the ground that private respondent failed to prosecute the case. However, the court
reconsidered its decision upon representation of private respondent that its failure to proceed
with the hearing is due to the fact there was a pending petition for certiorari in the CA.

Issue:

Whether the Civil Case No 7500 be dismissed because of the pendency of another case
between the same parties for the same cause of action.

Ruling:

In the pendency of two actions, the following are relevant considerations in determining
which actions should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the
first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely
to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3)
whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. In the
case at bar, not only was petitioners action in Civil Case No 649 brought ahead of private
respondents action, it is also the appropriate case for determining the partys rights.
Petitioners action in Civil Case No 649 is for collection of a sum of money, whereas private
respondents action in Civil Case No 7500 is simply for a statement of account apparently to
enable it to pay its obligation to petitioner. Private respondents claim is more in collection. As
such it should be asserted in Civil Case No 649 rather than in a separate action. However, there
are countervailing considerations which make dismissal of Civil Case No 7500 inequitable
considering that the pre-trial conference has already been held and hearing had begun hence
the two case must be consolidated.
 Republic vs. Yu
G.R. No. 157557, March 10, 2006
Case No.: 129

Facts:

Petitioner asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground
of res judicata and maintains that respondents are bereft of any right to assert ownership as the
sale in their favor was invalidated in Yu v. Republic. Petitioner further asserts that the
expropriation of Lot No. 939 was absolute and unconditional. Thus, no reversion could be
legally claimed despite the subsequent sale or reversion of the other nearby lots.

Respondents counter that the action is not barred by res judicata because the
abandonment of the government of the public purpose constitutes a new cause of action.
Further, respondents contend that the determination of their right to reacquire or repossess the
lot necessitates a full blown trial.

Issue:

Whether the action is barred by res judicata?

Ruling:

The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action. Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long
been nullified, they have not an iota of right over the property and thus, have no legal
personality to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal
personality to sue means that the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a
ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no
cause of action.

Consequently, the second issue is now mooted and made academic by our determination
of res judicata in this case. The petition is granted.
 Jose A Linzag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R no. 122181, June 26, 1998
Case No.: 130

Facts:

Petitioners Jose A Linzag and Cristobal A Linzag members of a non-Christian tribe know
as the Kalagan tribe of Mati, Davao Oriental inherited from their deceased parents a parcel of
land, otherwise known as Waniban Island, at the cadastrial proceeding, Cristobal Linzag filed his
claim over said lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed a claim. On 26 July
1971, one Orlando L Salvador filed a motion as an uncontested lot, in his favor he had acquired
the rights of Patricio Cunanan for sufficient consideration and that the owner claimant Cristobal
Linzag had withdrawn his answer/claim in favor of Patricio Cunanan and or/his successors-in-
interest, thereby making said lot as a non-contested lot. Salvador offered evidence in the
following; (a) Deed of Absolute sale of Hereditary Rights over an unregistered land and (b)
Verified Withdrawal of Claim/Answer signed by Cristobal and Jose Linzag and executed in favor
of Patricio Cunanan and/or his successors in interest

On 10 August 1971, the cadastral court, on the basis of the foregoing, issued an Order
]declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests had been in peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222, in concept of an owner for a
period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original claimant
Patricio S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot

On 4 February 1977, petitioners filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance
with damages against private respondents Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador before the
Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental as Civil Case In its decision, the trial
court dismissed the, because the action [was] improper and the action was filed beyond the
prescriptive period. Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals but the CA
dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Petitioners filed the instant special action
for certiorari with mandamus,

Issue:

Whether the respondent court of appeals can deny due course to the instant petition for
annulment of judgment on the basis that there was an earlier case for nullification of title before
the regional trial court

Held:

Yes, the Supreme court held that the remedy of annulment of judgment allowed in
Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was no longer available to petitioners. Such is available only where
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of petitioners. Here, petitioners had, in fact, availed of an
action for reconveyance where they litigated the grounds for annulment of judgment. There
would be no end to litigations if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the
appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard in an action to annul
the judgment.
 LITIS PENDENTIA
Casil vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121534. January 28, 1998, 258 SCRA 204
Case No.:132

Facts:
Private Respondent Anita U. Lorenzana is the lessee of a government property located
on Bilibid Viejo Street, near Quezon Boulevard, Manila. After the building on said land was
destroyed by fire, Petitioner Juan M. Casil and private respondent entered into a written
agreement authorizing the former to develop and administer the property. They also agreed
that rentals from the tenants would be divided equally between them. Thus, buildings, stalls
and cubicles were constructed on the subject property and leased to tenants. According to
private respondent, petitioner remitted the amount of P64,000 for the months of March and
April 1994. Thereafter, the remittances decreased. Private respondent allegedly found that
the tenants, except for one or two, had been paying their rentals on time, but that petitioner
was not properly remitting her share thereon. Thus, she wrote the tenants informing them
that she had already terminated her contract with petitioner and urging them to pay directly
to her. Petitioner countered by asking them to ignore private respondents letter..
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent for Breach of
Contract and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72362 before Branch 45 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, hereafter referred to as First Case.
Also, private respondent filed on January 11, 1995 before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, her own separate complaint against petitioner for Rescission of Contract,
Accounting and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-72598, hereafter referred to as
Second Case.
On March 13, 1995, petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the
ground of litis pendentia Subsequently, private respondent filed her opposition to said
motion.
Thereafter, on June 1, 1995, Judge Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. denied the motion. The Court of
Appeals subsequently dismissed the petition for certiorari, thereby affirming the trial courts
denial of the said motion.
Issue:
Whether there is a litis pendentia in the case?
Ruling:
Yes. In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other.
It is undisputed that the parties in the two civil actions are the same. In both actions, the two
parties invoke their respective rights: petitioner wants to be respected as administrator and
developer of the subject property, while private respondent asserts her right as a lessee of
the subject government property, and her entitlement to an equal share from rentals
collected by petitioner. Moreover, the reliefs prayed for are in substance the same. First, it
should be noted that the reliefs prayed for by all parties are founded on the same facts and
will thus require identical evidence. Private respondent as lessee of the government property
and petitioner as developer of the same have agreed to share equally between them the
rentals from the developed property. Second, private respondents complaint in the Second
Case and her answer in the First Case contained basically the same allegations, except the
prayer for rescission in her complaint.
Furthermore, any judgment in the First Case will serve as res adjudicata to the Second Case.
The requisites of res adjudicata are as follows:
(a) The former judgment or order must be final;
(b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
(c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and
(d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially
between the same parties.
There is identity of subject matter and of causes of action, for the same evidence presented
in the First Case will necessarily be presented in the Second Case, and the judgment sought in
the Second Case will either duplicate or contradict any judgment in the First Case. It is
beyond dispute, therefore, that a judgment in the First Case will constitute res adjudicata to
bar the Second Case.
It must be stressed that the Rules of Court seek to eliminate undue reliance on technical rules
and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient as can be done. This
is in accordance with the primary purpose of the Rules of Court as provided in Rule 1, Section
2, which reads:
Section 2. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.
Private respondents insistence on the continuation of the Second Case, separate from the
First Case, violates this hallowed objective of the Rules of Court. Splitting a cause of action
makes a mockery of this Courts crusade to unclog the dockets of the judiciary.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. ADELA SIA and ROBERT NGO
G G.R. No. 165836, February 18, 2009
Case No.: 133

Facts:

Midcom Interline Development Corporation (MIDCOM) was the registered owner of a

349-square meter lot with a ten-door apartment. MIDCOM signed a Contract to Sell the property
to the spouses Felicisimo and Myrna Galicia (Galicias).The subject property was again sold by
MIDCOM to Apolonia Sia Ngo and respondent Adela Sia, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. Thereafter, the Galicias received a letter that MIDCOM had already rescinded their Contract
to Sell.

Galicias filed before the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against MIDCOM and its
president, Miguel G. Say, Jr., Apolonia Sia Ngo, and the Register of Deeds of Manila for Specific
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Injunction. The complaint sought to compel
MIDCOM to execute a Deed of Sale in the Galicias favor upon payment of the balance of the
purchase price.

Subsequently, TCT No. 164726 was issued in the names of Apolonia S. Ngo and Adela Sia,
despite a temporary restraining order issued by the RTC, enjoining the registration of the Deed
of Sale and the issuance of a new title on the property.

Upon finality of the said decision, RTC issued a writ of execution and TCT No. 164726 was
cancelled and TCT No. 195378 in the name of the Galicias was issued.

Thereafter, Galicias and petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) signed a contract of real
estate mortgage over the property to secure a loan. Respondents then filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the decision be declared void on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, for failure to implead therein the respondents Adela Sia and
Robert Ngo as indispensable parties.

The appellate court held that what was entered into by MIDCOM and the Galicias was a
mere contract to sell. Accordingly, MIDCOM remained the owner of the disputed property and
could unilaterally rescind the contract to sell when the Galicias failed to pay the balance of the
purchase price. The appellate court likewise held that for failure to implead an indispensable
party, the judgment cannot bind respondent Adela Sia, who was a co-owner holding a one-half
pro-indiviso share of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not lack of indispensable party is a vital elements of res judicata.

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Accordingly, said Court states that Res
judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies,
in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
 For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, however, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.

In the present case, the first three elements of res judicata are present. As to the fourth
element, it is important to note that the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: first, bar by
prior judgment which is provided in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court and second,
conclusiveness of judgment which is provided in Section 47 (c) of the same Rule.

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in
the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is conclusiveness of judgment. Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may
involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but
merely identity of issues.

In this case, conclusiveness of judgment exists because respondents again seek to

enforce their right and title over the same subject matter, the litigated property, basing their
claim on the nullity of the judgment, for failure to implead them therein as indispensable
parties, which had been overruled by final and executory judgments. The same question cannot
be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
 ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANUEL F. PEREA and SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO
GR No. 117897, May 14, 1997
Case No.:134

Facts:

Petitioner IDP-Tamano Group alleges that sometime in 1971, Islamic leaders of all
Muslim major tribal groups in the Philippines headed by Dean Cesar Adib Majul organized and
incorporated the ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (IDP), the primary purpose of
which is to establish an Islamic Center in Quezon City. two Muslim groups sprung, the Carpizo
Group, headed by Engineer Farouk Carpizo, and the Abbas Group, led by Mrs. Zorayda Tamano
and Atty. Firdaussi Abbas. Neither group, however, took the necessary steps prescribed by the
SEC in its October 3, 1986 Decision, and, thus, no valid election of the members of the Board of
Trustees of IDP was ever called.

On April 20, 1989, without having been properly elected as new members of the Board
of Trustee of IDP, the Carpizo Group caused to be signed an alleged Board Resolution 11 of the
IDP, authorizing the sale of the subject two parcels of land to the private respondent INC for a
consideration of P22,343,400.00, which sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale 12 dated
April 20, 1989.

On May 30, 1991, the petitioner 1971 IDP Board of Trustees headed by former Senator
Mamintal Tamano, or the Tamano Group, filed a petition before the SEC, docketed as SEC Case
No. 4012, seeking to declare null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by the Carpizo
Group and the INC since the group of Engineer Carpizo was not the legitimate Board of Trustees
of the IDP.

Meanwhile, private respondent INC, pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
its favor, filed an action for Specific Performance with Damages against the vendor, Carpizo
Group. While a petition was pending, however, the Supreme Court rendered judgment on the
petition filed by Mrs. Leticia P. Ligon. The Decision, dated June 1, 1995, denied the Ligon petition
and affirmed the October 28, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Order
of Judge Reyes compelling mortgagee Ligon to surrender the owner's duplicate copies to the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City so that the Deed of Absolute Sale in INC's favor may be
properly registered.

Issue:

Whether there is res judicata?

Ruling:

No. The Court held that the requisites or res judicata do not obtain in the case at bench.

Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of res
judicata in actions in personam, to wit:

Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or

judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
 xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior
judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."

There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment
was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment on the
merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. But where
between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such
judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity of cause of action,
the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is
termed "conclusiveness of judgment."

Neither of these concepts of res judicata find relevant application in the case at bench.
While there may be identity of subject matter (IDP property) in both cases, there is no identity
of parties. The principal parties in G.R. No. 107751 were mortgagee Leticia P. Ligon, as
petitioner, and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as private respondent. The IDP, as represented by the 1971
Board of Trustees or the Tamano Group, was only made an ancillary party in G.R. No. 107751 as
intervenor. It was never originally a principal party thereto. It must be noted that intervention is
not an independent action, but is merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal
action. It is just an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the
original parties.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS BELLO, JR.,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 16, Laoag City, HAROLD M. HERNANDO, and SPOUSES
ROLANDO V. ABADILLA and SUSAN SAMONTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 110020, September 25, 1998
Case No.: 135

Facts:
Sometime in 1984, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), in
collaboration with the Ministry of Transportation and Communication, filed an expropriation
case against the Quetulios involving two parcels of land for the construction of a terminal
building for international flights at the Laoag International Airport. A compromise agreement
was entered into pegging the amount of just compensation at P1,454,859. The trial court
approved and adopted in toto the said agreement. Corresponding disbursement vouchers in the
amount agreed upon were turned over to the Quetulios. IAaCST In 1985, Harold M. Hernando
executed an affidavit revoking the compromise agreement he signed as attorney-in-fact of the
Quetulios. After obtaining new owner's duplicate copy of the title, Hernando, as attorney-in-fact
of the Quetulios, sold the property to the herein private respondent spouses Rolando Abadilla
and Susan Samonte. In an action for rescission, cancellation, reconveyance and damages filed by
the Republic, respondents Hernando and the Quetulios failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period. At the initial hearing, Hernando moved that he be granted opportunity to
formally appear as counsel for himself and his co-defendants and he be allowed to file an
answer. Despite the fact that respondent Hernando was then still serving a five-month
suspension from the practice of law for malpractice, the trial court granted both motions of
respondent Hernando. The trial court order dismissing the complaint on certiorari, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. The Republic then interposed this appeal before the Supreme
Court. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion not only in issuing its order
dismissing petitioner's complaint on a starkly erroneous ground, but also it committed a grossly
irresponsible act of allowing respondent Hernando who was then under suspension from the
practice of law, to represent himself and his co-defendants in the case. Also, after the lapse of
the period to file an answer by respondents Hernando and the Quetulios, the trial court set the
case for pre-trial without formally ruling on petitioner's motion to declare them in default.
Surprisingly, the trial court thereafter allowed said defendants to file their answer upon the
latter's verbal motion. This enabled respondent Hernando to file his pleading
"Comment/Answer/Motion to Dismiss," with certain annexes which were considered by the
trial court as actionable documents, despite the fact that petitioner was not a party thereto. All
these circumstances clearly demonstrate the trial court's bias and arbitrariness that should
have warranted the setting aside of the questioned order of CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there is res judicata in the present case.

2. Whether or not certiorari is a substitute for a lapse appeal.

Held:

It is well-settled that judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately
executory and not appealable unless a motion to set aside the same is filed on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, in which event an appeal may be filed from an order denying the same.
A court cannot set aside a judgment based on compromise without having declared in an
incidental hearing that such a compromise is vitiated by any of the grounds for nullity
enumerated in Art. 2038 of the Civil Code. Consequently, it was utterly erroneous for the trial
court to rule that there was such a revocation of the judicially approved Compromise
Agreement.
While as a general rule, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, however, where the
rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure, or miscarriage of justice, the rule
may be relaxed. Technicalities should be disregarded if only to accord to the respective parties
that which is due them. Therefore, considering the broader and primordial interests of justice,
particularly when there is grave abuse of discretion as in the case at bar, an occasional
departure from the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a
lost appeal is warranted. In the instant case, we rule that respondent court erred in not
entertaining the special civil action for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 29460) before it, considering
the patent irregularity and grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in dismissing
petitioner's complaint, such that appeal therefrom was not an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
 Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.: 128349, September 25, 1998
Case No.: 136

FACTS:

The respondent initiated an unlawful detainer proceeding against the petitioner. The lower
court rendered the decision ordering eviction of the petitioner and was affirmed in toto when
appealed to the RTC. The case was elevated to the CA by way of a petition for reviewer, however
the court affirmed the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed, still it was
put on hold due to the pending submission of a compromise agreement. The parties failed to
submit the compromise agreement, thus the denial of the MR. Hence, the decision ofthe appelate
court became final and executory.

Meanwhile, while the MR is pending, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
for refusing to honor a compromise agreement perfected between the parties during their
conference that superceded the ejectment case. Thus, the prayer for specific performance.

The respondent filed a motion for a writ of execution in the ejectment case. The petitioner
filed an application for the issuance of a TRO and writ of Preliminary injunction to enjoin the
writ of execution. The respondent countered by filing a motion for preliminary hearing on its
affirmative defeness along with a MTD. However, the trail court issued an order granting the
application of the petitioner.

The respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, however it was
dismissed. The court ruled that it was insufficient in form and substance for it fail to attach a
certified copy of each of the assailed order to the trial court. Undaunted, the respondent filed a
new petition alleging that since it had only received a copy of the assailed resolution of the trial
court, the refilling of the petition with the CA within a period of less than 2 months from the
date of such receipt was well within the reasonable time requirement under the Rules for a
special civil action for certiorari. In the meantime, the resolution which dismissed the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent became final.

In the newly filed petition, the respondent invoked that the respondent Judge acted
without, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance,
abide and acknowledge the final judgement of the CA which is enough justification for the
dismissal of the case grounded on res jundicata. The CA rendered the decision nullifying and
settling aside the orders of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint of the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether the specific performance case should be held barred by the unlawful detainer case
on the ground of res judicata.

HELD:

No. There are 4 essential conditions which must concur in order that res judicata may
effectively apply, viz: (1) The judgement sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgement or order on the merits; and (4)
there must be between the 1st and 2nd action identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In the case at bar, there is no question about the fact that all the first 3 elements are here
extant: it is the final condition requiring an identity of parties, subject matter, and of causes of
action, particularly the last 2, that presents a problem.
 Judgment/Decision

Aznar v. Bernad
GR No. 81190 May 9, 1988
Case No.: 139

Facts:

The private respondents, the spouses Nicolas and Redempta Kintanar, as plaintiffs, filed in the
Regional Trail Court of Cebu, a civil action against the defendants-spouses, the herein
petitioners, praying for the annulment of a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, damages, and attorney's
fees with preliminary injunction.

Petitioners, in turn, alleged for the first time the affirmative defense of prescription. That the
complaint for fraud, based on said Real Estate Mortgage, was filed only in September, 1986, or
more than eight (8) years since the date of registration.

The trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents stating that defenses or objections,
except the failure to state a cause of action, if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer,
are deemed waived. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Did the petitioner timely raised the affirmative defense of prescription?

Ruling:

Yes. The general rule, it is true, is that the affirmative defense of prescription when not
seasonably raised in either a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is deemed waived. This case,
however, does not fall under the cited rule. It cannot be said that the petitioners failed to allege
the defense of prescription in their answer. Precisely, the amended answer is being submitted to
take the place of the original one. Once the amended answer is admitted, the original answer
passes into oblivion and ceases to exist with its former place entirely taken over by the
amended answer.

Moreover, at the time the petitioners moved to have their original answer amended, they still
had the right to do so. The records do not show that a responsive pleading, like a reply, to the
original answer, has already been served to the petitioners by the private respondents. Neither
is there any showing that the case has already been calendared for hearing. There is, therefore,
no procedural impediment for the petitioners to amend their original answer. This being so, the
affirmative defense of prescription has been validly pleaded for resolution in due course.

even assuming that the petitioners had indeed failed to raise the affirmative defense of
prescription in a motion to dismiss or in an appropriate pleading (answer, or amended or
supplemental answer) and an amendment would no longer be feasible, still prescription, if
apparent on the face of the complaint, may be favorably considered. In the case at bar, the
private respondents admit in their complaint that the contract of real estate mortgage which
they alleged to be fraudulent and which had been foreclosed, giving rise to this controversy with
the petitioners, was executed on July 17, 1978, or more than eight long years before the
commencement of the suit in the court a quo, on September 15, 1986. And an action to declare a
contract null and void on the ground of fraud must be instituted within four years. Extinctive
prescription is thus apparent on the face of the complaint itself as resolved by the Court.
 CAUSE OF ACTION/PRESCRIPTION

Sps. Mariano Castillo v Heirs of Vicente Madrigal

G.R. No. 62650, June 27, 1991, 198 SCRA 556
Case No.: 141

Facts:

Petitioner spouse Mariano Castillo and Pilar Castillo, in their behalf in representation of
the heirs of Eduardo Castillo, filed a verified complaint before the CFI of Manila for the
annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance with damages
against private respondents heirs of Vicente Madrigal. They contended that never entered into
any transaction with any person conveying the subject property. Also, they did not sign any
document in favour of any one neither did they give any one authorization for that purpose.
Therefore, consent and cause did not exist in the execution of the deed of sale.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that (a) the complaint
states no cause of action; and (b) the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The lower courts dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. The CA, upon
appeal, sustained the decision of the lower courts. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

a. Whether petitioners action for annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title
and/or reconveyance with damages is subject to prescription.
b. Whether complaint states a cause of action against the private respondents.

Ruling:

a. No. The action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.

Both courts rules incorrectly, it is evident in the complaint that petitioner sought the
declaration of the inexistence of the deed of sale because of the absence of their consent. Thus,
following the provision of Article 1410 of the Civil Code, this kind of action is imprescriptible.
The action for reconveyance is likewise imprescriptible because its basis is the alleged void
contract of sale. The case involves not with a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake,
undue influence, violence or intimidation that can justify its nullification, but with a contract
that is null and void.

b. No. the complaint states no cause of action against the private respondents.
Notwithstanding the discussion on the imprescriptibility of petitioners action for
annulment of contract and transfer certificate of title and/or reconveyance, the dismissal of
their complaint by the trial court and Court of Appeals on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action was correct. Where the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land alleges that some of the defendants bought said land from their co-defendants who had a
defective title thereto but does not allege that the purchasers were purchasers in bad faith or
with notice of the defect in the title of their vendors, there is a failure to state a cause of action.
By reason of this failure, private respondent is presumed to be an innocent purchaser for value
and in good faith, entitled to protection under the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED, The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
 CIVIL LIABILITY

DULAY V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
Case No.: 144

FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon DulayMaria Benita A. Dulay, widow
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an
action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security
Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury Superguard:

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.

Civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal CodeCA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE:

Whether Super guard and Safeguard committed an actionable breach and can be civilly liable
even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide

HELD:

YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits Such civil action
includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in
the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.
 MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MIGUEL GARCIA and
HON. ROSALIO A. DE LEON
G.R. No. L-55935, July 30, 1986
Case No.: 150

Facts:

On August 16, 1979, petitioner Marcopper Mining Corporation filed a complaint for
quieting of title/reconveyance and damages against private respondent Miguel Garcia praying
that Garcia's Free Patent No. 542586 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2186 of the
Register of Deeds of Marinduque be declared null and void. It also asked that the Registrar of
Deeds be directed to cancel the OCT and to issue a transfer certificate of title in its favor, and
that petitioner be declared to be the true, lawful, and exclusive owner of the land in question.

The petitioner alleged in its complaint that it is the owner and present possessor of the
land in question, having acquired it in good faith and for value on October 2, 1972 from
Buenaventura Paez, that the latter, in turn, who had been in open, continuous, exclusive,
adverse and notorious possession, occupation, cultivation and enjoyment thereof since about
1921 until its sale to petitioner, inherited the land from his father Arcadio Paez and had
consistently declared it for taxation purposes in his name and religiously paid taxes to the
government; and that private respondent, through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation,
succeeded in misleading the Director of Lands to believe that it is still part of the public domain
and thus obtained the free patent and the corresponding OCT in his name.

After the petitioner had filed its answer to the respondent's counterclaim, the latter filed
a request for admission. The petitioner admitted the following facts: 1) It was not able to file any
opposition against the issuance of a Free Patent to the respondent because it had no notice of
any such application for free patent filed by respondent; 2) It did not file any action for
cancellation or annulment of the free patent within one year following its approval because it
had no notice thereof but the petitioner filed an action for the annulment of the free patent upon
its discovery in 1973; 3) Before the OCT was issued to the respondent, it was not able to file any
opposition thereto because it had no notice of such application by respondent; and 4) It did not
file any action for the cancellation or annulment of the said certificate of title within one year
following its issuance because it had no knowledge of such issuance but it did file an action for
the cancellation of such certificate of title upon its discovery in 1975.

On October 1, 1980, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was granted on the
ground that the complaint lack cause of action.

Issue:

Whether the complaint, assuming that the allegations therein are true, states a valid
cause of action in favour of plaintiff against the defendant

Ruling:

In the present case, before the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing
petitioner's complaint, it had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the
answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the
request for admission. It was but logical for said court to consider all of these pleadings in
determining whether or not there was a sufficient cause of action in the petitioner's complaint.
The order of dismissal was in the nature of a summary judgment.

Again, in the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry, (supra), we ruled:

Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking
dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only
from the allegations in the complaint. 'The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the
rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical
rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid
application cannot be countenanced.' (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157,
citing cases).

The trial court, therefore, did not err in considering, in addition to the complaint, other
pleadings submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of a cause of action.
 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

U. BANEZ ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY vs ABRA ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC

G.R. No. L-59480, December 8, 1982
Case No.: 151

Facts:

It appears that in June 1973, UBELCO filed a complaint in the court a quo alleging that it
is the holder of a Congressional franchise for electric and power system in the Municipality of
Bangued, Province of Abra, granted under Republic Act No. 4143; that under the said Act, when
defendant NPC shall have established its lines in the areas adjacent to or over the territory
covered by plaintiff's franchise, the NPC "may make available its power and heat only after
negotiations with and through U. Baez Electric Light Company, or with the authority and
consent of the grantee"; that the defendant NPC is now in a position to service the several
municipalities in the Province of Abra, including Bangued, but for one reason or another, and
notwithstanding repeated requests made by the plaintiff, NPC has unlawfully failed and refused
to enter into a power service contract with the plaintiff to its great damage and prejudice; that
defendant ABRECO, with the encouragement of and in connivance with defendant NEA, has
illegally attempted to establish, operate and maintain an electric system within the municipality
of Bangued without a valid franchise and without authority from the Public Service Commission,
as required by law, drawing power from defendant NPC without negotiating with or obtaining
the consent of the plaintiff, in violation of Republic Act No. 4143; that the municipality of
Bangued, Abra has no right to grant an electric franchise to defend ABRECO because said act
is ultra vires and because of the existence of plaintiff's franchise and also because there is no
necessity to allow two electric systems to operate within the same municipality; that defendants
ABRECO and NEA are attempting to construct, maintain and operate an electric system within
the municipality of Bangued, in violation of the rights of plaintiff, and unless said defendants are
enjoined, the plaintiff would suffer grave and irreparable damage and injury; and that plaintiff
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal from the
dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 718 of the Court of First Instance of Abra for failure
to state a cause of action. The appeal had originally been brought to the Court of Appeals but
was subsequently certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that it raises purely questions of
law.

Issue:

Whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint .

Ruling:

So viewed, the complaint does not sufficiently state a cause of action against the appellees, and
the same was properly dismissed on that basis. The lower court, contrary to the impression of
appellant, acted correctly in considering as hypothetically admitted only the facts alleged in the
complaint, in applying relevant constitutional and statutory provisions to the facts deemed
established by the filing of the motion to dismiss, and in disregarding averments of legal
conclusions such as the allegations that the franchise granted by the Municipal Council of
Bangued, Abra, to ABRECO pursuant to Act 667 is ultra vires and void, that the NPC has
entered into a power contract with ABRECO in violation of law; and that the NPC has refused to
supply UBELCO with electric power in violation of and contrary to law. In the instant case, on the
basis of the facts deemed established as distinguished from the averments of legal conclusions
in the complaint; NPC cannot be restrained from entering into a power contract with ABRECO
and compelled to conclude a power contract with UBELCO, which are the principal reliefs
prayed for in the complaint. Moreover, it is admitted that NPC and ABRECO have already
concluded a power contract. It is too late to restrain them from entering into such agreement.
 Santiago v. Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank
GR No. 77502 January 15, 1988
Case No.: 155

Facts:

Petitioner Emilia Santiago is the owner of a parcel of land. She executed a Special Power
of Attorney in favor of Construction Resources Corporation of the Philippines (CRCP).
Thereafter, CRCP executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the disputed property in favor of
FINASIA Investment and Finance Corporation to secure a loan of P1 million. FINASIA assigned
in favor of Pioneer Savings the receivable from CRCP and the mortgage constituted by CRCP
over the disputed property. CRCP failed to settle its obligation and Pioneer Savings opted for
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Upon learning the intended sale, Santiago filed
before the RTC an action to declare the nullity of the mortgage with an application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, claiming that she was not aware of any real estate mortgage she had
executed in favor of Pioneer Savings, the she had not authorized anyone to execute any
document for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the disputed
property, and that since the notice of sheriffs sale did not include her as party to the foreclosure
proceedings, it is not binding on her nor on her property.

The RTC dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of cause of action. Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the
case to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

Issue:
Whether or not the relief from extra-judicial foreclosure may be granted.

Ruling:
No. The evidence on record sufficiently defeats Santiagos claim for relief from extra-
judicial foreclosure. Her SPA in favor of CRCP specifically included the authority to mortgage
the disputed property. The real estate mortgage in favor of FINASIA explicitly authorized
foreclosure in the event of default. Indeed, foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-
payment of mortgage indebtedness. Santiago, therefore, cannot rightfully claim that FINASIA, as
the assignee of the mortgagee, cannot extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage property. A
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.

The assignment of receivables made by the original mortgagee, FINASIA, to Pioneer

Savings was valid, since a mortgage credit may be alienated or assigned to a third person, in
whole or in part, with the formalities required by law. Said formalities were complied with in
this case. The assignment was made in public instrument and proper recording in the Registry
of Property was made. While notice may not have been given to Santiago personally, the
publication of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale, as required by law, is notice to the whole world.
 Luis Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Davao, et al.,
G.R. No. L-12602, April 25, 1961
Case No.: 158

Facts:

On November 29, 1952, Potenciana Plando filed a complaint against Luis Pineda and
Bruno Eamirez, who allegedly took material possession of her land illegally and in bad faith.
Potenciana Plando alleged in said pleading that she was the surviving spouse and only heir of
the deceased Domingo Ramirez, who was the actual possessor of a parcel of land situated in
Lasang, Province of Davao. Accordingly, she prayed that judgment be rendered the lawful owner
and possessor of the land and the defendants to the premises in question. She also prayed for
the defendants to pay for the fruits of the land.

Luis Pineda and Bruno Kamirez were declared in default. Hence, a judgment by default
was declared in favor of the plaintiff. The latter then moved to "set aside the judgment by
default", but the motion was denied by an order. A reconsideration of this order, sought by them
and was also denied. Soon later, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of
certiorari with preliminary injunction and motion to dismiss the Complaint in said Civil Case
and the motion for relief of judgment by default therein rendered. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and the order denying relief of judgment by default was a final order and,
as such, appealable; and that, having failed to appeal therefrom.

Hence, Luis Pineda and Bruno Ramirez sought from the Supreme Court, in case G.R. No.
L-8357 thereof, a review by certiorari of said resolution of the Court of Appeals, but their
petition for review was, by minute resolution, dated November 18, 1954, dismissed for lack of
merit.
Subsequently, Luis Pineda instituted the present action against the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Eriberto Unson as Provincial Sheriff Ex-oficio of Davao, and Potenciana
Plando. Pineda alleged in his complaint that said declaration of ownership in favor of Potenciana
Plando is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, because the question of title to and ownership of
a homestead and the improvements thereon is a function exclusively belonging to the Bureau of
Lands, before which there was a pending controversy between the parties, which the Director of
Lands decided, on March 6, 1954, in his (Pineda's) favor, although Potenciana Plando had
moved for a reconsideration of said decision, which was still pending determination.

Plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered "annulling partially the decision by default,
particularly the portion * * * adjudicating the ownership of the land in Question and
improvements thereon and to suspend the execution of said decision during the pendency of the
case and pending the result of the controversy between the parties now in the Bureau of Lands."

Issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue between the
parties?

Ruling:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to decide the case. It is true that, subject to the authority of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Eesources, the Director of Lands has, by law, direct
control over the sale or any other form of concession or disposition and the management of the
public domain and that, accordingly, said officers are clothed with authority to decide, inter alia,
conflicts between applicants for homestead. It is, likewise, settled that, until such controversy
has been decided by the Director of Lands and/or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources or, to put it differently, until all administrative remedies have been exhausted a
judicial recourse for the settlement of said controversy has generally been held to be
"premature". The rule to the effect that administrative remedies must "first be exhausted
merely implies, however, the absence of a "cause of action", and does not affect the "jurisdiction"
of the court, either over the parties, if they have been properly summoned, or over the subject
matter of the case.

Luis Pineda does not claim that he had not been properly summoned in Civil Case No.
959. Upon the other hand, courts of first instance are, and have been expressly vested, with
original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property,
or any interest therein * * *" (Republic Act No. 296, section 44). Accordingly, even if the issue in
Civil Case No. 959 had been who, as between the parties therein had a better title to a
given public land, the court would have retained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case,
although, had its attention been called to the proceedings then pending in the Bureau of Lands
which were not disclosed by the record when the decision was rendered it should have
dismissed the case, not for want of jurisdiction, but for lack of "cause of action" on the part of
Potenciana Plando.

At most, therefore, said court erred in refusing to grant the motion for relief of judgment
by default, and, had an appeal been taken from the order denying said motion, it would have
been proper for the appellate court to reverse said order and set it aside. But, no such appeal
was taken, and the decision in Civil Case No, 959 was thus allowed to become final and
executory. Inasmuch as the court had jurisdiction to render it, said decision is valid and binding
upon the parties therein, no matter how erroneous it might have been.
 MOTION TO DISMISS INVOKING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
MOTION TO DISMISS INVOKING FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

YUVIENCO vs.. DACUYCUY

G.R. No. 55048. May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 668
Case No.: 159

Facts:

Petitioners, owners of a parcel of land and the building existing thereon, expressed through
their representative who wrote a letter to private respondents, that on July 12, 1978,
defendants (except defendant Tacloban City Ice Plant, Inc.) finally sent a telegram letter to
plaintiffs-tenants, through same Mr. Yao King Ong, notifying them that defendants are willing to
sell the properties (lands and building) at a total price of P6,500,000.00, which herein plaintiffs-
tenants have agreed to buy the said properties for said price; a copy of which letter is hereto
attached as integral part hereof and marked as Annex C, and plaintiffs accepted the offer
through a telegram dated July 25, 1978, sent to defendants (through defendant Pedro C.
Gamboa), a copy of which telegram is hereto attached as integral part hereof and marked as
Annex C-1 and as a consequence hereof, plaintiffs (except plaintiff Tacloban Merchants Realty
Development Corporation) and defendants (except defendant Tacloban City Ice Plant, Inc.)
agreed to the following terms and conditions respecting the payment of said purchase price, to
wit: P2,000,000.00 to be paid in full on the date of the execution of the contract; and the balance
of P4,500,000.00 shall be fully paid within ninety (90) days thereafter; and that on July 27,
1978, defendants sent a telegram to plaintiff-tenants, through the latters representative Mr. Yao
King Ong, reiterating their acceptance to the agreement and notifying plaintiffs-tenants to
prepare payment by bank drafts; which the latter readily complied with. Petitioners alleged that
where in the light of the telegram of Yao to Any. Gamboas letter of July 12, 1978 there was not
an absolute acceptance of the Contract for the sale of Land. Private respondents filed an action
for specific performance in the Court of First Instance of Leyte and petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and/or that
the claim alleged therein is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Respondent judge ruled
negatively; hence this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the contention of the petitioners is correct that the complaint state no cause of
action.
2. Whether a motion to dismiss invoking the Statute of Frauds may be filed even if the
absence of compliance does not appear on the fact of the complaint

Ruling:

1. Where in the light of the telegram-reply of Yao to Any. Gamboas letter of July 12, 1978
there was not an absolute acceptance of the Contract for the sale of Land under Article
1319 of the Civil Code, petitioners contention that the complaint of respondents state
no cause of action is correct.
2. A motion to dismiss invoking the Statute of Frauds may be filed even if the absence of
compliance does not appear on the fact of the complaint. Such absence may be the
subject of proof in the motion stage of the proceedings. (Moran, Comment on the Rules
of Court, Vol. I, p. 494, 1979 ed.) It follows that it becomes incumbent upon the plaintiff
to bring out what note or memorandum still exists in his possession in order to enable
the court to expeditiously determine then and there the need for further proceedings.
 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II vs CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

VIRGILIO S. DAVID
G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005
Case No.: 160

Facts:

Private respondent Virgilio S. David (hereinafter, David), a supplier of electrical

hardware, filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric
cooperative in Misamis Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-69402 entitled Virgilio David v.
Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II). The said case, which was essentially
a collection suit, pending before Judge Felixberto Olalia (hereinafter, Judge Olalia) of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 (the trial court), was predicated on a document
attached as Annex A to the Amended Complaint that according to David is the contract pursuant
to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer.

MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others,
affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These
grounds were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract between
David and MOELCI II under the Statute of Frauds pursuant to Section 1 (g) and (i), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, and improper venue.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda, Judge Olalia issued an order dated 16
November 1995 denying MOELCI IIs motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses.
MOELCI IIs motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in another order
issued by Judge Olalia on 13 March 1996.

Issue:

Whether the court should dismiss the amended complaint on the ground of lack of cause
of action.

Held:

In The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v. Genato,[30] as MOELCI IIs Motion is anchored on the
ground that the Complaint allegedly stated no cause of action, a preliminary hearing thereon is
more than unnecessary as it constitutes an erroneous and improvident move. No error
therefore could be ascribed to the trial court in the denial of such Motion. The Court ruled in the
cited case, thus:

. . . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private

respondents affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court
for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those
allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the
motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of
action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground.
No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence
and therefore must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other words, to determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other should be
considered.

The respondent Judge departed from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving
evidence in support of the private respondents affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of
action.

We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our
scrutiny to Annex A, which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to
a change in our conclusion. Now, whether in truth Annex A is, as entitled, a mere quotation
letter is a matter that could best be proven during a full-blown hearing rather than through a
preliminary hearing as this may involve extensive proof. Verily, where a preliminary hearing
will not suffice, it is incumbent upon the trial court to deny a motion for preliminary hearing
and go on to trial. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of
the case on the merits.
 Gochan vs. Gochan
GR No.146089 December 13, 2001
Case No.: 162

Facts:

Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and
the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Sometime in 1996, respondents offered to sell
their shares in two corporations to the individual petitioners amounting to P200, 000, 000.00
which was accepted and paid by the petitioners.
On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners for specific
performance and damages with the RTC, Cebu City Branch 11. Respondents alleged that
sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on behalf of all the petitioners, offered
to buy their shares of stock consisting of 254 shares in the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation and 1, 624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development Corporation and that
they executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein they enumerated the following as the
consideration of the sale: (1) P200M; (2) 2 hectares more or less of the fishpond; (3) L2 B9 with
an area of 999 square meters; (4) 3, 000 square meters of Villas; and (5) lot 423 New Gem
Building with an area of 605 square meters. Respondents claimed that they are entitled to the
conveyance of the aforementioned properties in addition to the amount of P200M which they
acknowledge to have received from petitioners.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses: (a) Lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of correct docket fees; (b) unenforceability of the
obligation to convey real properties due to lack of a written memorandum thereof, pursuant to
the statutes of frauds; (c) extinguishment of the obligation by payment; (d) waiver,
abandonment and renunciation by respondent of all their claims against petitioners; and (e)
non-joinder of indispensable parties.

Issue:

Whether the complaint is a real action as the basis of payment of correct docket fees.

Ruling:

The complaint filed was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated
as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees
shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the
claimant.
In case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within the reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive period provided that the respondent demonstrated the willingness
to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
 FJR GARMENTS INDUSTRIES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KAPISANANG MAGKAKAPIT-
BAHAY DAMAYAN AT ABULUYAN, INC.
GR No. 49320, June 29, 1984
Case No.: 168

Facts:

The city court of Pasay City on March 11, 1978 rendered a decision ordering Kapisanang
Magkakapitbahay Damayan at Abuluyan, Inc. to vacate the lots located at the corner of Leveriza
Street and Buendia Avenue, Pasay City, to restore the owner, FJR Garments Industries, to the
possession thereof and to pay the accumulated back rentals. That decision was served on
Kapisanan on July 6, 1978. Nine days thereafter, or on July 15, 1978, Kapisanan filed a notice of
a appeal but it did not pay the docket fee of P20 and the appeal bond of P50 and post the
supersedeas bond of P107,860 required under the Rules.

Issue:

Whether failure by the Kapisanan to file a supersedeas bond rendered the city court's
judgment immediately executory?

Ruling:

Yes. Its failure to file a supersedeas bond rendered the city court's judgment
immediately executory.

The fact that even before the expiration of the 15-day period the city court declared
Kapisanan's appeal "moot and academic" is of no moment since the fact is that during that
period the lessee did not attempt to pay the docket fee and appeal bond.

The Appellate Court's reference to liberality in the interpretation of the Rules of Court in
the matter of appeals refers to the material data rule found in section 6 of Rule 41. However,
this case does not involve the material data rule.

The Court emphasised that the Rules of Court prescribing the time within which certain
acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance
with such rules is mandatory and imperative.
 Judgment/Decision

Torres v. CA
GR No. L-25889 January 17, 1973
Case No.: 173

Facts:

The spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta B. Chivi,
representing to her that the land was not registered. That although the land was covered by a
pre-war free patent application, the application had not been approved and no patent had been
issued. Chivi then filed for its registration. While the application was pending, Chivi sold her
rights and interests in the land to the herein petitioners-spouses Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos
for P25,647.00.

The Laicos and Chivi learned that a free patent title had been previously issued to Isidro Sierra
as early as 26 February 1932. The Laicos then withdrew their application for registration and
filed instead a petition for the reconstitution of the title issued to Isidro Sierra.

The Sierras filed a complaint against Chivi and the Laicos in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
praying that they (plaintiffs) be allowed to repurchase the land under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. The Chivis and the Laicos filed their answers to the complaint and counter-
claimed for damages by reason of the alleged bad faith, misrepresentation and fraudulent acts of
the Sierras, as herein before recounted. The Laicos filed a cross-claim against the Chivis for the
latter's failure to deliver title to the Laicos.

On 12 March 1964 the Sierras and the Laicos entered into a compromise stipulating therein,
among other things, that the Laicos were now the absolute owners of the land and that the
Sierras would withdraw their objection to the reconstitution of the patent title and that said title
would be transferred in the name of the Laicos. The court also dismissed, upon their joint
motion, the action with prejudice. This was without the knowledge of the Chivis.

The trial court ruled in favor of Laicos, declared in default both Sierra and Chivi for failure to
appear in pre-trial. Chivis filed a petition to the Court of Appeals praying to annul the ex-parte
allowance of Laicos cross claim. Decision by the lower court was reversed by CA.

Issue:

Could the cross-claim in this particular action stand after the complaint in the same action was
dismissed with prejudice?

Ruling:

No. The cross-claim on Chivi's warranty to deliver title to them was so inextricably linked with
and so utterly dependent upon the success of the complaint of the Sierras for the repurchase of
the land that when the complaint was dismissed the cross-claim could not possibly survive. For
as the cross-claimants themselves alleged, the cross-defendants would be liable on the warranty
"should the plaintiffs finally obtain favorable judgment in their favor" (sic). The warranty
became functus oficio after the Sierras, who turned out after all to have a free patent title to the
land issued way back in 1932, agreed to transfer and did transfer said title to the Laicos first
by the deed of sale executed directly in their favor by the Sierras on January 17, 1960, and again
in the amicable settlement of the case between them. The fact that the Laicos paid P10,000.00 to
the Sierras in that amicable settlement created no liability on the part of the Chivis: first,
because the latter neither knew nor consented to such settlement; second, because the Laicos
had already acquired the land directly, from the Sierras by virtue of the aforesaid sale of January
17, 1960; and third because the said sum of P10,000.00 was not the subject of the cross-claim
against them.

The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the
complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above
enunciated, it could not be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon
which its life depended.
 Third-Party Complaint

Wenceslao Pascual vs. Pilar Bautista

GR No. L-21644, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 301
Case No.: 175

Facts:

This is an appeal taken by Mariano R. Flores from the decision of the CFI Manila in Civil
Case No. 48819 entitled Pilar Bautista vs. Mariano R. Flores which revived the decision of
Supreme Court in GR No. L-6569 and GR No. L-6576.

In Civil Case No. 5023 of CFI Manila, entitled Wenceslao Pascual vs. Pilar Bautista, et al,
filed, with leave of court, a third party complaint against Mariano R. Flores, having failed to
answer the third-party complaint, Flores was declared in default, thus, judgments were
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant Pilar Bautista, ordering the latter to
return to the plaintiff the sum of P2,000 representing part of the rent advanced by him. Also, in
favour of Pilar Bautista as third-party plaintiff and against Mariano R. Flores, as third-party
defendant, for the sum of P500,000 as liquidated damages.

Pilar Bautista secured a writ to execute the decision rendered in her favour in Civil case
No. 5203 as third-party plaintiff. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied. She eventually
filed an action with CFI of Manila for the revival of the final judgment heretofore mentioned
rendered in Civil Case No. 5203 against Flores. But the latter alleged that said judgment has
already prescribed. After trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment.

Issue:

Whether the filing of the third party complaint was proper, hence, be raised and invoked
in favor of Pilar Bautista, even if she is the one who filed it.

Ruling:

Yes. Filing of the third-party complaint is proper.

It is clear from the Rules of Court that for a claim to be properly raised in a pending
action by way of third party complaint, it is not necessary that it be one arising from entirely
dependent upon the main action; it is enough that it be in respect; of the claim of third party
plaintiffs opponent, or that it be connected with plaintiffs claim.
 DEFAULT

PAREDES vs. MORALES

G.R. No. 164375, October 12, 2006
Case No.: 178

Facts:

The protracted legal battle between the parties began with a complaint for the establishment of
a right of way filed by petitioners herein as plaintiffs against respondents as defendants.[1] The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2767 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, Branch 24, culminated in a judgment by compromise dated 26 April 1994.[2] In
the Compromise Agreement, respondent Cosme Hinunangan granted a two (2) meter-wide right
of way in favor of petitioners in consideration of the amount of P6,000.00 which petitioners
agreed to pay.

Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the Compromise
Agreement, on 28 September 1999, respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages against petitioners. It was docketed as Civil Case No. R-3111 also of the RTC of Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, Branch 24.

Issue:

whether the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial, with all defendants
themselves present, is a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to
present evidence ex parte.

Held:

We pronounce that the absence of counsel for defendants at pre-trial does not ipso facto
authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of
evidence ex parte. It bears stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions the
presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during
pre-trial. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and
equity.

Among the inherent powers of the courts expressly recognized by the Rules include the
authority to enforce order in proceedings before it, to compel obedience to its judgments,
orders and processes,[43] and to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.[44] Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct empowers the
courts to judiciously take or initiate disciplinary measures against lawyers for unprofessional
conduct.[45] A show cause order to counsel would have been the more cautious and reasonable
course of action to take under the circumstances then prevailing. In failing to do so, the trial
court impetuously deprived petitioners of the opportunity to meaningfully present an effective
defense and to adequately adduce evidence in support of their contentions.
 Succession Pagination of the Will Witnesses to a Will Language of the Will Thumb
Mark as Signature

JOSE S. LOPEZ vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO

G.R. No. L-1787, August 27, 1948
Case No.: 185

Facts:

In 1947, Don Sixto Lopez executed a will where Jose Lopez was named an heir. Agustin Liboro
questioned the validity of the said will based on the following ground, among others. The first
sheet, which is also the first page) is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. That the
witnesses to the will provided contradictory statements. That Don Sixto used his thumb mark to
sign the will. There was no indication in the will that the language used therein is known by Don
Sixto Lopez.

Issue:

Whether or not the will is valid.

Held:

Yes, the will is valid.

The omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other
forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters.
The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of
the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
Further, the first pages is captioned Testamento.

The contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses as are set out in Liboros
appelants brief are incidents not all of which every one of the witnesses can be supposed to
have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.

Don Sixto affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for
this was that he was suffering from partial paralysis. There is nothing curious or suspicious in
the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a
matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.

There is no statutory requirement which prescribes that it must be expressly placed in the will
that the testator knows the language being used therein. It is a matter that may be established
by proof aliunde.
 Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co., and or Chemical Bank vs. Guerrero
Manufacturer Hanover Trust co., and or Chemical Bank vs. Guerrero
GR No. 136804, February 19, 2003
Case No.: 192

Facts:

Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint in Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages
against petitioner Bank for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification
problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account.

The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New York and
this law does not permit any claim except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral
and exemplary damages.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Banks claim that
Guerreros bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law
bars all of the claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated
the Walden affidavit.

The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the
Banks motion for reconsideration as well stating that even if the Walden affidavit is used for
purpose of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the
Rule 132, Sec. 24.

Issue:

Whether there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial.

Ruling:

Yes. Petition DENIED. There being substantial triable issues, motion for partial summary
judgment is denied. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded
by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
Resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of
fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
courts.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. The conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a
trial on the merits. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on
damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New
York law on damages.
 Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit.
The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did
not present an opposing affidavit
 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EVADEL REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES ANTERO

AND VIRGINIA SORIANO
G.R. No. 144291. April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 395, 401
Case No.: 193

Facts:

On April 12, 1996, the spouses Antero and Virginia Soriano (respondent spouses), as
sellers, entered into a Contract to Sell with Evadel Realty and Development Corporation
(petitioner), as buyer, over a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 5536-C of the Subdivision
Plan of Lot 5536 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125062which was part of a huge
tract of land known as the Imus Estate. Subject of this agreement is the intended sale of 28,958
square meters which is a portion of TCT No. 125062 in the name of Party A to Party B and
which portion is herewith shown in Annex A hereof. Under the contract to sell it will be
payable in two installments subject to the conditions specifically laid down in the contract. Upon
payment of the first installment, petitioner introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the
property with concrete walls. Later, respondent spouses discovered that the area fenced off by
petitioner exceeded the area subject of the contract to sell by 2,450 square meters. Upon
verification of both parties, the area encroached upon was denominated as Lot 5536-D-1 of the
subdivision plan of Lot 5536-D of Psd-04-092419 and was later on segregated from the mother
title and issued a new TCT in the name of respondent spouses. Respondent sent demand letters
to petitioner to vacate the encroached land. Petitioner admitted receiving them refused to
vacate said area. Thus on May 23, 1997, a complaint for accion reinvindecatoria was filed by
respondent spouses against petitioner with the RTC, branch 88 of Cavite City. In its answer,
petitioner admitted the encroachment but claimed it was a builder in good faith since it merely
relied on the boundaries pointed out by the representatives of respondent spouses. Respondent
filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there existed no genuine issue as to the
material facts of the case due to the admissions made by petitioner in its Answer. Trial court
granted the motion and rendered judgment in favor of respondent spouses. Petitioner appealed
to the CA, however the CA only affirmed the order of summary judgment of the trial court hence
this petition with this Court.

Issue:

Whether the trial court was in error in rendering summary judgment of the case

Ruling:

No, Trial court was correct in rendering summary judgment of the case on the basis that
there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full blown
trial. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except as to the amount of damages,
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Its purpose is to weed out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss
of time involved in trial. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as
to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial. Applying these principles to the present case, we hold that the CA did not commit any
reversible error in affirming the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. The case at bar
is one for accion reinvindicatoria which is an action to recover ownership over real property.
Respondent spouse seek to recover a certain portion of land with a total area of 2,450 square
meters from petitioner which portion was allegedly in excess of the total area of the property
actually sold by them to the latter. In a reinvindicatory action, the basic issue for resolution is
that of ownership and in the present case, the determination of ownership of the subject
property is hinged on the following questions of factfirst, what was the total area of the lot
sold to petitioner by respondent spouses as agreed upon and embodied in the contract to sell
And second, whether or not the area being occupied by the petitioner is in excess of the land
which it actually bought from respondent spouses under the said contract. In its answer to the
amended complaint, petitioner admitted the existence and due execution of the Contract to Sell
which contained the specific description of the property it bought from respondent spouses.
Equally significant is the fact that in the same answer petitioner likewise admitted that the
relocation, survey conducted by the geodetic engineers of both parties disclosed that indeed
there were two encroachments and that the second area encroached upon was denominated as
Lot 5536-D-1 of the subdivision plan of Lot 5536-D of Psd-04-092419 and was later on
segregated from the mother title and issued a new TCT in the name of respondent spouses. With
the foregoing admissions by petitioners, clearly, there is no genuine issue of fact as to
ownership of the subject property because the said admissions made by petitioner in its answer
are tantamount to an admission that respondent spouses owned the property in question.
Hence CA was correct in affirming the decision of the trial court as it summarily resolved the
issue of ownership of the subject property in favor of respondent spouses. Petition must be
denied accordingly.
 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ONTIMARE vs ELEP
G.R. No. 159224 January 20, 2006
Case No.: 194

Facts:

Ontimare Sr. owned the adjoining house and adjacent lot on No. 72 Hyacinth Street. His
terrace extends to the boundary between his property and respondents. On December 3, 1995,
respondents wrote Ontimare Sr. a letter seeking his written consent to the construction of a
firewall adjacent to his existing firewall.

Instead of consenting, on December 20, 1995, Ontimare Sr. filed a Complaint with the
Building Official asking that the request for a building permit be withheld since a firewall would
adversely affect the ventilation and market value of his property.

Despite a building permit issued to respondents on January 8, 1996, a Cease and Desist
Order to stop the construction of the four-door apartment was issued on January 12, 1996, as a
result of the Complaint of Ontimare Sr.

However, when respondents wrote the City Engineer and explained they were
constructing a one-sided firewall within their property, the Cease and Desist Order was
forthwith lifted on January 16, 1996.

On January 26, 1996, the complaint of Ontimare Sr. was dismissed. He appealed to the
City Mayor, who ordered an investigation on the matter.

On February 2, 1996, Ontimare Sr. filed a Notarial Prohibition.

After hearings conducted on June 18 and 25, 1996, the Building Official dismissed the
complaint on July 11, 1996 and ordered Ontimare Sr. to make the adjustments in the
construction of his house. Respondents were issued a new building permit on July 16, 1996.

Meanwhile, the day before, on July 15, 1996, while respondents workers were plastering
and water-proofing the firewall, Ontimare Sr. fired his shotgun, threatening to kill anyone who
would enter his property and work on respondents construction. As a result, a portion of the
firewall remained unfinished. According to respondents, water seeped in the building and
damaged the sanding, the wood parquet floors and the ceiling. Respondents filed an action for
damages with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order against Ontimare Sr.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

After trial, Ontimare Sr. moved for a summary judgment while the respondents moved
for the resolution of the case on the merits.

Meanwhile, while the case was on appeal, Ontimare Sr. died. He was survived by his two
sons.

Issue:

Whether the summary judgment rendered by court is proper.

Held:

On this issue, Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court is pertinent. It provides:

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Hence, for summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur, to wit: (1)
there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2)
the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not
proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.

In the instant case, the summary judgment was rendered after the presentation of
evidence by both parties in a full blown trial. Records show that during the two-year trial of the
case, Ontimare Sr. had presented his own witnesses, all four of them, and had cross-examined
the witnesses of the opposing party.

The trial courts decision was merely denominated as summary judgment. But in
essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case.
 Rivera vs. Solidbank
GR No. 163269 April 19, 2006
Case No.: 196

Facts:

Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer of writ of attachment
before the RTC of Manila against the petitioner for failure to return his retirement benefits as a
consequence of his breach of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.
Accordingly, petitioner is working as Manager of the Credit Investigation and Appraisal
Division of the Consumers Banking Group of the respondent prior to his retirement. He applied
for Special Retirement Program whom he received his benefits amounting to P963, 619.28.
Respondent required him to sign an undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and was notarized.
Aside from acknowledging that he had no cause of action against the respondent, he also agreed
that the respondent may bring any action to seek an award for damages resulting from his
breach of the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Petitioner was likewise required to sign an
Undertaking as a supplement to Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in which he promised that he
will not seek employment with a competitor bank or financial institution within one (1) year
from February 28, 1995. On May 1, 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable)
employed the petitioner. As a consequence, respondent through its vice president for HRD,
Villarosa, informed the respondent that he violated the Undertaking and likewise demanded the
return of all the monetary benefits he received.
The RTC issued an Order of Summary Judgment declaring that there was no genuine
issue as to a matter of fact in the case since the herein petitioner voluntarily executed the
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, and the undertaking. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The CA partially granted the appeal with the modification that the attachment and levy
upon the family home is hereby set aside and discharged. The CA declared that there was no
genuine issue regarding any material fact except as to the amount of damages. Hence this
petition.

Issue:

Whether the summary judgment is proper raising no genuine issue as to material fact.

Ruling:

The Court agreed with the petitioner contention that the issue as to whether the post-
retirement competitive employment ban incorporated in the undertaking is against public
policy is a genuine issue of fact, requiring the parties to present evidence to support their
respective claims. Petitioner made two undertakings incorporated in the Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim where he undertake that he will not seek employment with any competitor bank or
financial institution within one (1) year. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or
a false claim. When the facts are plead appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is real or
genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand,
where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
 ROLANDO C. RIVERA vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163269, April 19, 2006
Case No.: 202

Facts:

Petitioner had been working for Solidbank Corporation since July 1, 1977.3 He was
initially employed as an Audit Clerk, then as Credit Investigator, Senior Clerk, Assistant
Accountant, and Assistant Manager. Prior to his retirement, he became the Manager of the
Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of the Consumers Banking Group. In the meantime,
Rivera and his brother-in-law put up a poultry business in Cavite.

In December 1994, Solidbank offered two retirement programs to its employees. Since
Rivera was only 45 years old, he was not qualified for retirement under the ORP. Under the SRP,
he was entitled to receive P1,045,258.95 by way of benefits.

Deciding to devote his time and attention to his poultry business in Cavite, Rivera
applied for retirement under the SRP. Subsequently, Solidbank required Rivera to sign an
undated Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995.8 Rivera
acknowledged receipt of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and
promised that "[he] would not, at any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly
engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or
subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers, directors, agents or employees, and their
successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information concerning the business of
Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind.

On May 1, 1995, the Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable) employed Rivera as

Manager of its Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group.
Solidbank demanded the return of all the monetary benefits he received in consideration of the
SRP within five (5) days from receipt; otherwise, appropriate legal action would be taken
against him. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period,
Solidbank filed a complaint for Sum of Money with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

Issue:

Whether the summary judgment rendered by the trial court was proper?

Ruling:

No. The summary judgment lacks propriety.

Petitioners contention that the issue as to whether the post-retirement competitive

employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking is against public policy is a genuine issue of
fact, requiring the parties to present evidence to support their respective claims.

For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a)
there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents
appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine
issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a
summary judgment.
 A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim. The trial court
can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits
or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary
judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on
record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be
given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

In the present case, respondent is still burdened to prove its entitlement to the aforesaid
amount by producing the best evidence of which its case is susceptible. It is settled that actual
damages or compensatory damages may be awarded for breach of contracts. Actual damages
are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss covered by said breach. They
cannot be presumed. Even if petitioner had admitted to having breached the Undertaking,
respondent must still prove that it suffered damages and the amount thereof.
 Judgment/Decision

People v. Escober
GR No. L-69564 January 29, 1988
Case No.: 207

Facts:

The accused-appellants were charged with the crime of Roberry with Homicide before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The aggrieved parties in this case are the spouses Vicente
and Lina Chua. Their two minor children, Irvin and Tiffany, were killed on the occasion of the
Robbery. Escober was then a security guard at Bee Seng Electrical Supply owned by the spouses
Chua. Also, one of the alleged co-conspirators is Amadeo Abuyen who was formerly a co-
security guard of Escober. Abuyen together with respondent Punzalan went to the abovesaid
company. Escober recognized Abuyen so he let him get inside the compound. After several
minutes, gunshots were heard. Thereafter, Abuyen and Punzalan fled, followed by Escober. The
spouses Chua were surprised to see that their two children were stabbed which caused their
deaths and several items were missing. Hence, the conviction of the accused-appellants.

In this petition, it is claimed that the actions of Escober are indicators that he has the prior
knowledge of the plot of Abuyen and Punzalan, and that Escober is a principal by indispensable
cooperation since he was the one who opened the gate for Abuyen. Escober asserts that he was
under an irresistible force when Abuyen pointed a gun. Because of this, Escober was not able to
prevent the crime. When Abuyen and company were about to escape, he fired shots and even
told Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. It is his contention that his acts are indications of his
innocence and that he has no prior knowledge of the crime.

One of the issues raised by Escober is that the trial court erred in rendering its two-page
decision and asserts that said decision is null and void for it does not conform with the
requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution and that it was rendered even
before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had been transcribed.

Issue:

Is the trial courts decision null and void as its form and substance do not comply with the
Constitution?

Ruling:

Yes. The inadequacy stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he
concluded that the material allegations of the Amended Information were the facts without
specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the
testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions
without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital details" Escober should
have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have been attended by the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among
others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges.
More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the
courts. Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.
 Judgment/Decision

Tomas Lao vs. Court of Appeals (CA)

GR No. 76598, February 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 243
Case No.: 209

Facts:

Leticia Abianda To-Chip, private respondent, filed a complaint against the Petitioner
with the Provincial Fiscal of Samar for the alleged violation of PD 772 which penalizes squatting
and other similar acts. However, after the preliminary conference, the provincial fiscal dismiss
the charges for lack of merit.

Tomas Lao, petitioner, filed an action for damages before the CFI of Samar, alleging that
the complaint publicly put him to shame as he is a businessman. The lower court awarded
petitioner moral damages of P50,000 and attorneys fees and litigation expenses of P10,000.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in its first division composed of Justice Gaviola, Justice Quetolio-
Losa and Justice Luciano, reversed the lower courts decision and the dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the validity of the decisions on the ground
of lack of quorum because a day before the promulgation of the judgment, two of the justices
had been effectively disempowered to sit thereon, as a result of the reorganization of said
court. However, CA denied the motion stating that justices who were not re-appointed because
of the reorganization held office in a hold-over capacity until the newly appointed as well as re-
appointed justices took their oath of office before the President, and the justices who were not
re-appointed were still validly performing judicial functions including the promulgation of
decisions. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the assailed promulgated judgment is valid?

Ruling:

No. The promulgated decision is not valid.

It is clear that when the decision in question was promulgated, Justice Gaveola and
Justice Quetulio-Losa has both ceased to be member of the CA since that time, they had been
informed that their resignation had been accepted by the President, hence, two of the three
justices necessary to constitute a quorum in a division had lost their authority to act as justices
by reason of the presidential acceptance of their resignation. To endorse the opinion of the CA
that the justices who were not re-appointed were acting in hold-over capacity, until their
replacements shall have taken their oath of office, will abet, rather than avoid, a disorderly
administration of justice.

Time and time again, it was ruled that to be binding, a judgment must be signed and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. Thus, the promulgation of a
decision after a judge retires is null and void.

Accordingly, the decision is hereby declared null and void. The case is remanded to the
Court of Appeals for adjudication and promulgation of a new decision.
 JUDGMENT

SALVADOR vs. SALAMANCA,

A.M.No.R-177-MTJ September24, 1986
Case No.: 212

Facts:

Judge Bienvenido S. Salamanca, Presiding Judge of Branch XIV of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila is charged with culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency for allegedly having
delayed the resolution of a forcible entry case as well as the motions for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction filed in connection therewith.

On April 26, 1982, complainant Zenaida C. Salvador and others filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila a complaint for forcible entry against Lily Arreza, Antonio Co, Domingo Co
and Lucio Co, docketed as Civil Case No. 073308 and raffled off to the sala of respondent judge.
In said complaint, therein plaintiffs prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction which prayer was reiterated in a motion filed on May 16, 1983.

On April 5, 1984, or after almost two years of litigation, the parties rested their case for final
adjudication by respondent judge. The parties agreed to simultaneously submit their respective
memoranda within twenty (20) days from receipt of the last copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes. On April 18, 1984, complainant and her co-plaintiffs filed an urgent motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and on May 3, 1984, they
submitted their memorandum.

On June 25, 1984, when no memorandum was submitted by therein defendants within the
period agreed upon, complainant manifested such failure to respondent judge and moved for
the resolution of the case without defendants' memorandum. On September 20, 1984,
complainant instituted the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether the Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases

Held:

We find to be correct complainant's proposition that the case should have been deemed
submitted for resolution at the end of the twenty-day period agreed upon by the parties for the
submission of the memoranda. As held in Bendesula v. Laya (58 SCRA 16), judges should decide
cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods. Non-submission
of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a
part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading
before a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the
rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence, [People v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA
321]-which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of the judge's personal notes and
the records of the case-non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the
privilege.

Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. 2 It
should also be noted that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, memoranda are prohibited.
 LIBRADA N. FIRME and FLORENCIO FIRME vs. ARSENIO REYES, HON. SIMEON M.
GOPENGCO G.R. No. L-35858, August 21, 1979
Case No.: 216

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 62906 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated
March 1, 1971, declaring Arsenio Reyes the owner of a 165-square-meter lot and the house
standing thereon located at 2371 Del Pan Street, Sta. Ana, Manila and ordering the spouses,
Librada N. Firme and Doctor Florencio Firme, to pay Reyes rentals for the use and occupation of
the house plus P1,000 as attorney's fees.

The Firme spouses received on March 27, 1971 a copy of that decision. On April 13, they
filed a motion for reconsideration which did not contain any notice of hearing. Copies of that
motion were furnished the adverse parties.

Reyes, the winning party, filed a motion dated May 3, 1971, praying that the decision be
declared executory and that a writ of execution be issued. He contended that the motion for
reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper because it was not set for hearing. The Firme
spouses opposed the motion for execution.

The trial court in its order of June 28, 1971 sustained the stand of Reyes, ordered that
the motion for reconsideration be stricken out of the record and directed the issuance of a writ
of execution.

The motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied on August 30, 1971 by the
trial court. It relied on the ruling that a motion for reconsideration without the proper notice of
hearing does not interrupt the reglementary thirty-day period for perfecting an appeal (Cledera
vs. Sarmiento, L-32450-51, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 552).

Hence, the lower court's judgment was regarded as executory and a writ of execution
was issued on October 7, 1972.

On November 23, 1972, or more than one year after the lower court ordered the
expunging from the record of the motion to set aside the judgment, the Firme spouses filed in
this Court their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion is set aside the judgment does not suspend the running of the
period within which to perfect an appeal.

RULING:

They prayed that the orders of June 28 and August 30, 1971 be reversed and that the
trial court be ordered to act on their motion for reconsideration. The petition was given due
course. A restraining order was issued.

At this juncture, it should be stressed that the Firme spouses suppressed in their
petition the fact that in 1971 they had filed in the Court of Appeals a similar petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which was dismissed for lack of merit (Florencio Firme, et
al. vs. Judge Simeon M. Gopengco, et al., CA-G. R. No. SP-00530, November 11, 1971).

The Firme spouses did not appeal from that decision of the Court of Appeals. As already
stated, they filed another petition in this Court which gave the erroneous impression that they
were assailing for the first time in the appellate court the lower court's orders of June 28 and
August 30, 1971 when the truth was that the matter was already res judicata.

Had the Firme spouses disclosed in their 1972 petition in this Court that in 1971 they
had filed a similar petition in the Court of Appeals, that it was dismissed and that the decision
therein had become final and unappealable, then this Court would not have entertained their
petition in this case.

This Court would not have entertained their petition in this case. We can stop at this
point and dismiss the petition herein on the grounds that it was filed in bad faith and is barred
by res judicata. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we have looked into the merits of the
petition., We find that the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the motion for
reconsideration of the Firme spouses did not interrupt the period for appealing from the lower
court's judgment, Consequently, that judgment became executory. The trial court rightly
ignored that motion.

Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial or
reconsideration should contain "a written notice" which should be served on the adverse party.
"Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3)
days before the hearing thereof." The notice shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. "No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof,
except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
" (Secs. 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court).

The written notice referred to in section 2 of Rule 37 is that prescribed in sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15. The provision in section 6 of Rule 15 that no motion shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service of such notice is intended to enable the court to find out whether
or not the adverse party is in conformity with the motion and, if he objects to it, to give him an
opportunity to file his opposition (Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263,
November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 982-983).

The petition herein, which is clearly devoid of merit, is dismissed with costs against the
petitioners.
 APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

FRANCISCO MAGNO, ESPERANZA MAGNO, EULOGIO MAGNO, AMELIA MAGNO VASQUEZ,

ULPIANO VASQUEZ, JOSE O. MAGNO, NICANOR P. MAGNO, FELECITAS O. MAGNO, and
LOURDES O. MAGNO, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE MARIANO BENEDICTO of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and DONATO M. VERGARA
G.R. No. L-28486, September 10, 1981
Case No.: 219

Facts:

Before the Bulacan Court of First Instance, in Civil Case No. 3198- M (Bulacan Case), which was
an action between members of the same family for partition of war damage payments received
from the United States Government, judgment by default was rendered on September 9, 1966 in
favor of petitioners herein, as the plaintiffs in the said case, and against private respondent
Donato M. Vergara and his father-in-law, Meliton Magno, jointly and severally, as defendants
therein. Judgment having become final, the corresponding Writ of Execution was issued and the
properties of private respondent were levied upon and scheduled for sale at public
auction.Private respondent resorted to an action for annulment of judgment and of Writ of
Execution before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 275 (Annulment
Suit) against petitioners and the Nueva Ecija Provincial Sheriff, as defendants, upon the main
contention that judgment in the Bulacan Case was procured by means of extrinsic fraud
committed by petitioner Francisco Magno against private respondent. Essentially, the extrinsic
fraud allegedly consisted in assurances made by Francisco Magno to private respondent during
a confrontation between them that it was never the intention of petitioners to involve private
respondent in the suit and that he would be excluded therefrom. Convinced, private respondent
was lured into inaction only to discover later that judgment was rendered against him and
execution against his properties ordered. Private respondent also prayed for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to restrain the enforcement of the judgment and of the Writ of Execution
pending the determination of the Annulment Suit.Petitioners moved to dismiss the Annulment
Suit and opposed the Injunction on the principal ground that the Nueva Ecija Court had no
jurisdiction to interfere by Injunction and to nullify a final judgment of the Bulacan Court, which
is a Tribunal of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. In deferring determination of said
Motion, respondent Judge ruled that the matters alleged in the Complaint are reflective of
extrinsic fraud "which, if true, would evince the nullity of tulle Decision under litigation". They
are "too evidentiary which could be resolved by the Court after having allowed both parties to
adduce their respective evidence pertinent to this contentious issue." Respondent Judge granted
the Injunction prayed for upon the filing of a bond of Pl,000.00.In petitioners' Motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, they averred that "there is no necessity of reception of
evidence to prove the allegations of the complaint in order to resolve the. defendants' motion to
dismiss because the ground of the said motion to dismiss which is lack of jurisdiction assumes
arguendo the truth of the said allegations; and under said assumption, it is the defendant's stand
that the Court has no jurisdiction to review, much less set aside, the final and executory
decision of the Bulacan Court. Reconsideration was denied by respondent trial Judge.

The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and Prohibition proceedings thereafter filed before it by
petitioners, upheld the jurisdiction of the Nueva Ecija Court. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari to the Honorable Supreme Court.
Issues:

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in disposing of case CA-G R. No. 39715-R and dismissing
the petitioners' petition on the basis of a legal point which was not in issue before it because the
legal proposition that a court of first instance may set aside the judgment of another court of
first instance on the ground of extrinsic fraud in the procurement of the said judgment is
admitted all along by the petitioners.

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the allegations of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 275, having been hypothetically admitted in the motion to dismiss, a hearing on
the merits in order to prove the said allegations is not necessary for the purpose of resolving the
said motion to dismiss.

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the allegations of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 275 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, even granting them to be true, do
not constitute extrinsic fraud, or stated in another way, do not state a cause of action as to
justify the respondent Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in exercising its jurisdiction to
interfere with and annul the final and executory judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3198-M.

Ruling:

In regards to the first assignment of error, although petitioners now admit that if, indeed, there
was extrinsic fraud, the judgment of the Bulacan Court can be set aside by the Nueva Ecija Court,
the record shows that before the Appellate Court they had argued "that the respondent Judge
has no jurisdiction to interfere with, much less annul, the final and executory decision of ... the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan ... because they have co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction". To
prevent further discussion on that point, we wish to state that the authority of a Court of First
Instance to take cognizance of a suit to annul a final and executory Decision rendered by
another Court of First Instance is beyond doubt. This was the doctrine enunciated in Dulap et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 3 wherein it was held that since the cause of action in an annulment
suit is entirely different from the action which gave rise to the judgment sought to be annulled, a
direct attack against it being the main object of such proceeding, there is no plausible reason,
why the venue of the action to annul the judgment should necessarily follow the venue of the
previous action. This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gianan vs. Imperial et
al. 4 and Francisco vs. Aquino. The conclusion follows that, as admitted even by the petitioners,
the Nueva Ecija Court has the power to annul the judgment of the Bulacan Court if, as alleged,
extrinsic fraud attended the procurement of the same.We will now discuss the third error
assigned. The issue raised is whether the allegations in the Complaint filed before the Nueva
Ecija Court constitute extrinsic fraud as to justify said Court in exercising its jurisdiction to
interfere with and set aside the judgment of the Bulacan Court and to enjoin the execution
thereof. After having concluded that the Complaint filed by private respondent before the Nueva
Ecija Court alleges ultimate facts which, if proven, can justify the annulment of the judgment of
the Bulacan Court, the second error assigned by petitioners becomes obviously tangential It can
not be alleged, as petitioners do, that since those allegations of ultimate facts have been
admitted by them in their Motion to Dismiss, then those facts cannot support the annulment of
the judgment of the Bulacan Court. The fallacy of that reasoning is so obvious that we find no
need to dwell on it at length.The Decision of the Court of Appeals, subject of this review, is
affirmed; the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to entertain Civil Case G.R.
No. 275 for annulment of judgment and to issue the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby
upheld; and this case is hereby remanded to said trial Court for appropriate action.
 Nida Gaba vs. Judge Jose P. Castro
G.R. No. 56171, January 31, 1983
Case No.: 226

Facts:

Pedro F. Martinez sued Nida Gaba, Naty A. Uy and Lilian C. Gabriel and their respective
husbands for the recovery of the sums of P20,000.00 and P3,000 plus damages. Nida Gaba and
the Uy spouses answered the complaint through lawyer Tirso L. Manguiat. Although duly served
with the summons, the Gabriel spouses did not answer the complaint.

Pre-trial was set on July 16, 1980, four copies of that order, which were sent by
registered mail to Manguiat, were received on July 8, 1980 by his clerk, Alfredo Chico. At the
pre-trial on July 16, where only plaintiff Martinez and his counsel appeared, Gaba and the Uy
spouses were declared in default for their non-appearance. Lilian C. Gabriel was declared in
default for her failure to answer the complaint. The clerk of court was commissioned to hear the
evidence.

A copy of the trial court's order of July 16, 1980, declaring the defendants in default, was
received by registered mail on August 1, 1980 by Manguiat's other clerk, Chona Seminiano
(back of p. 21, Record). Note that in another case plaintiff Martinez served on Chona on
November 24, 1980 a copy of an urgent motion intended for Manguiat.

In its decision dated July 31, 1980 based on the evidence presented ex parte by Martinez,
the trial court ordered Nida Gaba and the Uy spouses to pay him the separate sums of P20,000
and P3,000, both sums with twelve percent interest a year from the filing of the complaint.

A copy of that decision was received on August 22, 1980 by registered mail by
Manguiat's clerk, Alfredo Chico. On September 8, 1980, Martinez filed a motion for execution
with notice to Manguiat by registered mail.

On that same date, September 8, Manguiat filed an urgent motion to set aside the order
of default with the advertence that the clerk of court should submit the motion for the
immediate consideration by the trial court and, alternatively, that it be set for hearing with
notice to the parties.

Defendant Manny Tan, husband of Naty A. Uy, verified that motion. He alleged that
defendants' failure to appear in court was due to fraud or excusable neglect since no notice of
the trial was sent to them and their counsel. A copy of that motion was furnished Martinez's
counsel by registered mail.

The trial court in its order of November 12, 1980 denied the motion for lack of merit. A
copy of that order was received on November 27, 1980 by registered mail by Chico, Manguiat's
clerk. A writ of execution was issued on November 21, 1980.

Several months later, or on February 11, 1981, the Gaba, Uy and Gabriel spouses filed
the herein petition for certiorari through another lawyer, Camilo R. Flores. Attached to the
petition was the affidavit of Manguiat, a resident of 2401 Singalong Street, Manila (no longer
holding office at the City Court Compound). The Gabriel spouses, who are abroad, were later
dropped as petitioners.

Manguiat alleged that Alfredo Chico, who received copies of the notice of pre-trial and
decision, had ceased to be his clerk in December, 1979, that his other clerk was Chona M.
Seminiano and that Chico did not turn over to him the said papers. Manguiat did not attach any
affidavit of Chona.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are bound by the mistakes and omissions committed by their
counsel?

Ruling:

Yes. We gave due course to the petition because our first impression was that the
petitioners were denied due process of law due to the irresponsibility of their lawyer and
because of their defense that they were unjustifiably being made to pay twice the sum of
P10,000 and the interests on the loans.

A more intensive study of the record, including the expediente of the trial court, leads to
the conclusion that this is a case where the petitioners or the judgment debtors are bound by
the mistakes and omissions of their counsel and that they were not oppressively denied their
day in court.

Manguiat's claim that he was deceived by his alleged former clerk (Chico) cannot be
taken seriously in the light of the incontestable fact that although his other clerk, Chona
Seminiano, received on August 1, 1980 a copy of the order of default, yet it was only
on September 8, or thirty-eight days later, when Manguiat filed a motion to set it aside. He was
not conscientious in attending to his clients' interests.

As to petitioners' claim that the amount due from them was unduly inflated by the trial
court, it should be observed that petitioners Mariano Tan and Nida Gaba in a letter to
respondent deputy sheriff dated January 6, 1981 asked for a period of fifteen days within
whichto satisfy the judgment. They did not contest the validity of the judgment and the levy.
Since the said judgment had long become final and executory when the petitioners filed on
February 11, 1981 their petition for certiorari and as there is no clear showing that they were
deprived of due process or that the said judgment was procured by means of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, it can no longer be set aside. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction and did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in rendering and enforcing that judgment.

With reference to the alleged irregularities in the execution of the judgment, particularly
with respect to Rodolfo Gaba, the same should be first raised in the trial court. The record does
not show that the lower court's attention was called to the alleged improper implementation of
the writ of execution.
 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

PEOPLE VS. MANZANILLA

43 PHIL 167. March 09, 1922
Case No.: 227

Facts:

Seven persons, whose names appear in the information on which this action was
initiated, were prosecuted for the crime of robbery by a band. Two of them, Escolastico Manalo
and Bernabe de Chavez, were excluded from the information and used as witnesses for the
prosecution. The remaining five, who were found guilty of the crime charged after trial, were
sentenced, Sergio Manzanilla as the leader of the band, to ten years and one day of presidio
mayor, and all the rest to six years, ten months, and one day of presidio mayor, all of them to
return jointly and severally to Regino Pavino the sum of one hundred twenty-six pesos (P126)
and effects to the value of six pesos (P6), and to Anatolio Villaverde and Julian Romulo the
clothing and effects appraised at five (P5) and eleven pesos (P11) respectively, and to pay each
one-seventh of the costs. The five accused thus sentenced appealed from this judgment, but the
accused, Nicolas Barradas, Francisco Maliban, Luciano Mabilagan, and Luciano Zaragoza
withdrew their appeal during the pendency thereof. But Manzanilla maintained his appeal but
his attorney de oficio states to this court that he is constrained to say, in view of the evidence for
the prosecution and the absence of evidence for the defense, that the judgment appealed from
must be affirmed. Later on, a motion signed by this appellant, Sergio Manzanilla, was filed in this
court, asking for a new trial on the ground that the accused was not called to testify, (b) that the
proceeding was held without due process of law, (c) that some of his co-accused were used as
witnesses for the prosecution, (d) that his attorney was bribed by the accused who were used as
witnesses, and (e) that the trial court decided the case without the accused having presented
their evidence.

Issue:

Whether the motion for new trial shall be granted or not.

Ruling:

The motion for new trial cannot be granted. The charge of bribery against the attorney,
there is not even a prima facie evidence of such fact. Besides, this attorney, Mr. Felix Imperial,
from all that appears in these proceedings, does not seem to have conducted himself in an
irregular or improper manner, and much less to have acted adversely to the interest of the
appellant. The action of the attorney in not introducing any evidence for the defense and in not
permitting the accused to testify was within his discretion which he could lawfully exercise, and
did exercise, believing undoubtedly that, in doing so, the rights of the accused were better
protected. Incompetency or negligence of defendant's counsel. A new trial may be granted
where the incompetency of counsel is so great that defendant is prejudiced and prevented from
fairly presenting his defense, and a new trial sometimes is granted because of some serious
error on the part of such attorney in the conduct of the case. But a new trial does not necessarily
follow either the attorney's incompetency or his neglect. This latter rule has been applied to the
failure of defendant's counsel to introduce certain evidence, to his failure to summon witnesses,
to his failure to except to a ruling or an instruction, to his negligence resulting in defendant's
failure to make a statement to the court, to submission of the case . . . without argument. . ..
Considering the cause upon its merits, the court find that the facts established beyond doubt
are: That the herein appellant, Sergio Manzanilla, led the party formed by these seven accused;
that more than three of them were armed, and therefore, they constituted a band, within the
meaning of the law; that at the order of the said Manzanilla, who was armed with a revolver, the
seven accused took up their posts in different places in the Province of Tayabas for the purpose
of robbing, as they did in fact rob, about ten travelers, whom they stopped on the highway and
took to a nearby forest where they tied them to the trunks of the trees and intimidated them
with their weapons, the accused Sergio Manzanilla having fired four times on one of the victims,
named Tomas Villaro, when the latter attempted to escape, thereby inflicting a wound on his
head which, fortunately, was of a light character; and by this means the accused took the money
and effects mentioned in the information and referred to in the beginning of this decision,
leaving thereafter the victim tied, as they were, to the trunks of the trees in the craggy ground.
Hence, none of the accused presented any evidence. The facts above stated constitute the crime
of robbery by a band with illegal detention. As to the appellant, it further appears that the crime
is robbery with physical injuries, but this point is not alleged in the information.
 APPEALS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ARRO

G.R. No. L-48241, June 11, 1987
Case No.: 228

Facts:

On May 16, 1969, the petitioner filed a complaint entitled "Republic of the Philippines
vs. Isabelo I. Pacquing and Carmen B. Pacquing, " for the collection of deficiency taxes based on
the income tax returns filed by the respondents-spouses, for the years of 1956, 1957 and 1958.
After private respondents filed their answer to the original complaint through the assistance of
their counsel, Atty. Vicente Garcia, petitioner filed, with leave of court an amended complaint,
increasing the income tax deficiency sought. Private respondents moved to dismiss the
amended complaint. On June 7, 1973, respondent court denied the motion to dismiss. Private
respondents' Answer to the original complaint was adopted as their Answer to the amended
complaint.

On December 19,1977, notice and a copy of the decision was delivered at the office of
Atty. Vicente Garcia, which was received by his clerk. On January 19, 1978, there being no
appeal taken, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the judgment. Meanwhile, on January 23,
1978, private respondents, thru another counsel, Atty. Alberto Lumakang, filed a Notice of
Appeal with a motion for extension of time to submit record on appeal. Petitioner filed an
opposition on the ground that the copy of the decision was duly received by Atty. Garcia's clerk
and that from the date of said receipt thereof, the thirty (30) day period for appeal had already
lapsed. In the Order of March 9, 1978, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and granted
the motion for extension of time of twenty (20) days to file the record on appeal. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner. On April 21, 1978, the respondent court issued an Order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration as well as the motion for Writ of Execution.

Issue:

Whether the Notice of Appeal should be granted.

Held:

It is a requirement under the provisions that a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal should be filed in court and served upon the adverse party within thirty (30) days
from notice of judgment. This is mandatory and jurisdictional.

When a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in court, all notices

required to be given therein must be given to the attorney and not to the client. Hence a notice
given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings of
counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably adopt a system
whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his
address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that communications sent by mail,
addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly. The negligence of a counsel's
secretary in failing to note down the trial date on his desk calendar is negligence and failings of
counsel in having a negligent secretary said circumstances not constituting excusable
negligence.

This rule, however, is not without exception. In the case of an irresponsible lawyer who
totally forgot about the case and failed to inform his client of the decision, this Court held that
the client should not be bound by the negligence of the counsel.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the instant case the negligence of the counsel is far
from excusable. Atty. Vicente Garcia who was the counsel of private respondents went to the
United States of America but had a clerk in-charge of his office. The copy of the decision was
received on December 19, 1977 by said clerk. He did not do anything about the same so the
reglementary period of appeal lapsed. It can be assumed that said clerk received appropriate
instructions from Atty. Garcia as to what to do with any processes, orders or notices that maybe
received or otherwise that no such instruction were given. In either case there is inexcusable
negligence. Private respondents have no one to blame except their lawyer. They are bound by
the negligence and failings of their lawyer. And the appeal not having been interposed within
the reglementary period, the decision has now become final and executory.
 Arce v Arce
106 Phil 630, 1959
Case No.: 230

Facts:

The appellants filed a complaint for annulment of the duly notarized deed of sale against
defendant Emperatriz Arce at the Court of First Instance of Zambales wherein it appears that
the Severo Arce and Roque De Jesus, Father-In-Law respectively of Emperatriz Arce, had sold,
ceded, transferred and conveyed to the latter, in consideration of the sum of P20, 000.00 paid in
hand, receipt whereof was acknowledged and confessed, the aforementioned thresher and
tractor.
The defendant did not appear or answer the complaint, for which reason the appellant
petitioned and obtained an order declaring her in default.
The appellants testified that they are the owner of the rice thresher, that Roque De Jesus
had no right or interest therein and that Severo Arce did not remember having signed the deed
od sale nor had he seen notary public Artemio Maranon and the latters wife and that he had not
received the P20, 000.00 mentioned in the documents.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence this appeal. Appellant in this instant
charge lower court of having abused its discretion in re-setting or re-hearing the case motu
proprio without lifting its previous order declaring defendant in default and without giving her
the opportunity to be heard, in denying their motion for new trial and consequently upholding
the validity of the disputed deed of sale.

Issue:

Whether the appellant has the duty to adduce evidence even if defendant was declared
in default

Ruling:

The defendants failure to file an answer or his having been declared in default, does not
necessarily insure the plaintiff obtaining the remedy prayed for in the compliant; it is also
essential for the said plaintiff to adduce evidence in support of his contentions. It is elementary
that trial courts, before rendering judgment, have full control of the proceedings before them,
and as judges of Courts of First Inctance are judges of both fact and law, if after hearing all the
evidence adduced by the attorneys, the court is not satisfied, he may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance of justice call additional witnesses or recall
some of the same witnesses, for the purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfied his
mind wit reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. There is more so where the
defendant is in default and not in a position to controvert or scrutinize the evidence of the
plaintiff.
 JULIAN MENDOZA vs. HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, and SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON
MACAPAGAL
G.R. No. L-45885, April 28, 1983
Case No.: 236

Facts:

Petitioner Julian Mendoza and private respondents, spouses Renato Macapagal and
Corazon Macapagal, entered into a written contract, entitled "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapatayo Ng
Tirahang Bahay" whereby for and in consideration of the sum of P320,000.00, the petitioner
undertook to construct a residential house for the private respondents under the terms and
conditions therein provided for. The construction of the house was attended by some
misunderstandings between the parties, with the petitioner claiming that he is entitled to
certain amounts which the private respondents refused to pay, and the latter in turn alleging
that the petitioner should pay them damages for having abandoned the job.

Sometime in March 1976, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan against the private respondents for the recovery of two separate sums. After the
private respondents filed their answer to the complaint, a pre-trial was conducted in which the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Before any trial was conducted, however, the
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the same does
not state a cause of action which was resolved.

Issue:

Whether the order of dismissal by respondent judge was proper?

Ruling:

No. The order of dismissal is improper.

It is axiomatic that a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action is to be resolved solely on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint and no
others, which facts are deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of such motion. If such
facts constitute a cause of action on the basis of which the court may render a valid judgment,
the motion to dismiss on this ground must be denied. (1 Moran, 1970 Edition, pp. 494-495.)

While there may be some legal basis for the ruling that the petitioner has no cause of
action with respect to the recovery of the value of the additional work in view of the provisions
of Article 1724 of the New Civil Code (a point which We do not now decide, it being the
petitioner's contention that he may recover the same on the ground of quantum meruit), there
appears to be no basis for dismissing the complaint insofar as the second cause of action for the
recovery of P48,000.00 is concerned. Although the petitioner admits that he had no written
authorization for performing the additional work, the private respondents similarly admit that
they have not paid the aforesaid sum of P48,000.00 to the petitioner. They merely justify the
non-payment thereof by claiming that the petitioner abandoned the work, and that they spent
an amount greater than the unpaid balance in finishing the construction of the house. In their
answer, private respondents counterclaimed for the sum of P37,636.81 supposedly
representing the expenses incurred by them over and above the contract price. Petitioner
denies having abandoned the work.
 The petitioner's cause of action for the recovery of P48,000.00 is alleged in paragraphs 8
and 9 of the complaint.

It is true that in their answer to the complaint, the private respondents have countered
that they are no longer obligated to pay the petitioner the aforesaid sum in view of the fact that
when the petitioner abandoned the work due to illness, they themselves undertook the
completion of the construction for which they spent a greater sum than what was due to the
petitioner. The said allegations of the private respondents do not destroy the petitioner's cause
of action as alleged in the complaint. They are matters of defense which should be proved
during the trial.
 Judgment/Decision

Peoples Homesite v. Jeremias

GR No. L-43252 September 30, 1976
Case No.: 241

Facts:

Sometime in June, 1960, the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) filed
with the Municipal Court of Quezon City an action for forcible entry and illegal detainer against
the spouses of Corazon Jeremias and Geronimo Perecho against a lot in Diliman. Answering that
complaint, the defendant-spouses claimed that they had applied with the PHHC to purchase the
lot; that they had protested the award of the lot to Mr. and Mrs. Tiongco (not parties to the case)
as they had a preferential right to purchase the property because of their occupancy, and their
protest was still under investigation by the PHHC, hence, they prayed that the hearing of the
case be deferred until the termination of the administrative investigation. The Court ruled in
favor of PHHC. The defendants did not appeal the case. The Court then required the spouses to
file their performance bond in the amount of P1,000.00 which they complied with, by filing with
Capital Insurance and Surety Co.

In the meantime, on October 8, 1963, the Board of Directors of PHHC issued Resolution No. 240
sustaining the award of the lot in question in favor of awardee-buyer Estela Tiongco. To
forestall the execution of the above-mentioned ordered of demolition, Corazon Jeremias and her
husband Geronimo Perecho filed an original petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Quezon City but was dismissed.

On the basis of the Court's decision in L-24504, PHHC sought from ow the City Court, Quezon
City, a writ of execution on the performance bond filed in Civil Case No. I-7608. Notice was sent
to Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. which filed through counsel a written opposition
disclaiming liability on the ground that its performance bond had already expired.

Issue:

1. Can the appellant surety company appeal from the aforesaid order of execution against its
bond notwithstanding the fact that it was not initially a party in the ejectment case?
2. Did the appellants liability in the surety bond expired upon termination of the ejectment
case?

Ruling:

1. Yes.. While it is a fact that the initial parties in the complaint for forcible entry and detainer
were PHHC and the spouses Jeremias-Perecho, however, when the latter filed a performance
bond to insure the execution of the judgment in said case and PHHC moved to execute that
bond, the surety company became necessarily a party in the case when notice was served on it
of the motion, and the inferior court granted a writ of execution against its performance bond.
The order of execution was a final order insofar as the surety-appellant was concerned, hence,
appealable.

2. No. A civil case is deemed terminated not upon the rendition of the final judgment but upon
execution and satisfaction of said final judgment.

Firstly, it is erroneous to claim thta the decision in Civil Case No. I-7608 became final on
September 13, 1965. What became final on September 13, 1965 (the date of final entry of
judgment of this Court in L-24504) was the order of dimissal of Civil Case No. Q-7807 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, which was the petition for relief from judgment of the City Court
in Civil Case No. I-7608.

Secondly, when appellant's surety bond was filed in Civil Case No. I-7608 the decision therein
had already become final, hence the phrase "upon final termination of Civil Case No. I-7608, MC
Quezon City" appearing in the bond could not have referred to the date of finality of the
decision.
 RECONVEYANCE

Abundia Espina vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102128, November 6, 1992, 2015 SCRA 484
Case No.: 243

Facts:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the CA affirming the RTC of
Dumaguete Citys decision which dismissed petitioners action for reconveyance against private
respondent.

The property in dispute is a 744-square meter lot which is a portion of Lot 2733 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, registered in the name of Rufina Lazaga. One half of said lot was acquired
by the husband of private respondent while the other half was purchased by a certain Alfonso
Artus.

Petitioner now seeks the reconveyance of the disputed lot as she alleges that the
property is owned by her mother, Maria Lazaga, who had it declared in her name in 1915 for
taxation purposes, and that she and her mother have been in the peaceful and public possession
and enjoyment thereof. She asserted that by means of deceit and fraud, the disputed property
was included and made part of Lot 2723 and subsequently registered in the name of Rufina
Lazaga, she further claimed that she only discovered the fraud in 1985 when the private
respondent required her tenants to pay rentals to them. Private respondent, on the other,
maintain that they are the owners of the land in dispute.

The CA in affirming the judgment of the trial court stressed that the land was subject to
cadastral proceedings way back 1918, but Maria Lazaga did not file an answer to claim any
interest in the land as required by Act No. 2259. Further, it would defeat the purpose for
instituting cadastral proceedings if after several years, a party could still claim ownership of a
land adjudicated in those proceedings to another party.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petitioners action for reconveyance on the
ground that was not touched upon in the decision of the trial court.

Ruling:

No. The CA did no err in dismissing the action.

It may be worth stressing that Lot 2723 was the subject of cadastral proceedings in
1918. However, petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Maria Lazaga did not intervene to claim an
interest as required by Act No. 2259, as amended, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. Such
proceedings in rem are thus binding upon the whole world.
It settled that the appellate court may uphold the judgment of a lower court on grounds
other than those relied upon by the trial court. In fact, even if issues are not formally and
specifically raised on appeal, they may nevertheless be considered as long as they are closely
related to the error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the question raised
by error assigned is dependent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

 INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. SINGSON

G.R. No. 150798. March 31, 2005
Case No.: 246

Facts:

The spouses Pablo and Ma. Theresa P. Tolentino were the owners of a condominium unit (Room
302) in the Tempus Place I Condominium located at Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City, covered
by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 8876. In 1993, Rudecon Management
Corporation (RMC) executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[2] in favor of the spouses Tolentino over
its condominium unit, Room 404, at the same Tempus Place I Condominium covered by CCT No.
3295 for P600,000.00. Sisenando S. Singson, on the other hand, was the owner of two
condominium units in the Tempus Place II Condominium, Unit A covered by CCT No. 5013, and
Unit B covered by CCT No. 5014.

On April 18, 1997, the spouses Tolentino and Sisenando Singson executed a Deed of
Exchange[3] in which the latter deeded his condominium units (Units A and B) to the spouses
Tolentino in exchange for Rooms 302 and 404, which the spouses Tolentino deeded to Singson.

On or about September 15, 1987, RMC filed a complaint against Ramon Veluz for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC), Branch 41. RMC sought the
eviction of Ramon Veluz from Room 404, which the latter leased from Singson on August 7,
1995. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 18436.

RMC filed an Omnibus Motion in CA-G.R. CV No. 64281 praying for the dismissal of Singsons
appeal in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 on the ground of forum shopping. They also prayed that
Singson and his counsel be cited for indirect contempt for their failure to comply with the
undertaking in the Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping embodied in his amended
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794, that is, to inform the trial court of the filing of the
complaint within fifteen (15) days thereof. RMC averred that as gleaned from the averments of
the amended complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444, and the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-00-39794, the two cases involved the same issues. RMC averred that Singson
had also submitted a false certificate of non-forum shopping in Civil Case No. Q-00-39794,
where he stated that he had not commenced any action or proceeding involving the same issue.

Issue:

Whether the mode of appeal resorted to by the petitioner is improper.

Held:

We agree with respondent that the mode of appeal resorted to by the petitioner is improper.
Indubitably, the Resolution of the CA dated July 31, 2001 denying the petitioners omnibus
motion is interlocutory in nature. The word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not
a final decision of the whole controversy The Court distinguished a final order or resolution
from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court
is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties
next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of
the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final
and executory.
 JUDGEMENT

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-FINDING
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000
Case No.: 253

Facts:

A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other
government officials with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired between and among themselves in
demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control
slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a
duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing
receipts for its collection. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner for
misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay pursuant
to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from the
premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet been become final, the petitioner argued
that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for
prematurely implementing the assailed decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively
liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is
immediately executory pending appeal.

Ruling:

NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above
provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one
month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. The
clear import of these statements taken together is impose penalties that are not enumerated in
the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely
filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision.
 De Castro Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-3602, February 29, 1988
Case No.: 260

Facts:

In the intestate estate proceeding of the late Agustin N. Medina, an order was issued by
the probate court approving the sale of the property known as "Bitucang Manok," to one of the
heirs, herein petitioner on January 29, 1969.

On February 6, 1969, the private respondents received a copy of the said order. On
February 15, 1969, the private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation praying that (a) the
implementation of the order be suspended, and (b) they be given the opportunity to check the
accounting records of the Special Administrator. On March 27, 1969, respondent Medina filed an
Amplification of the Motion of Movant-Heir, praying for the first time that the order granting the
motion of the Special Administrator to sell the "Bitucang Manok" property be set aside.

On March 6, 1970, the probate court issued an order, confirming the sale of the disputed
property to herein petitioner. In its order, the court passed upon the merits of the objections of
the private respondents. As manifested in the accountings of the administrator the defendant
Medina already received advances from the estate, while the other oppositor assignee Beda J.
Gonzales, who claims to have an interest, could not, in the mind of the Court claim a better right
over the vendee Rosalia Medina del Carmen.

The records show that the vendee complied with all the requirements of the Court
towards the consummation of the sale which was witnessed by the defendants respective
counsels. It is further observed that neither oppositor Uldarico S. Medina nor Beda Gonzales,
have ever made any counter-offer for the purchase of the property in question neither has there
been one from the rest of the heirs.

The above order was received by the private respondents on April 8, 1970. On April 17,
1970, they filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied and the respondents
received the order of denial on June 18, 1970. On June 23, 1970, respondents filed a second
motion for reconsideration captioned as "Petition For Reception of Evidence." This motion was
likewise denied by the court on August 3, 1970 and the same was received by the respondents
on August 7, 1970.

On August 13, 1970, the private respondents filed their Notices of Appeal and
subsequently moved for an extension of time to file their Record on Appeal which was granted
by the probate court.

Upon the elevation of the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, the petitioner filed
her motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that since the appeal was filed out of time, the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the same.

On November 22, 1972, the respondent Court of Appeals issued the questioned
resolution, denying the petitioner's motion "consider that the appellants (private respondents)
have already filed their printed record on appeal and brief." The appellate court likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration on Deceber 12, 1972.

Issue:

Whether CA was correct in dismissing petitioners motion to dismiss defendants appeal

on the ground that the same was filed out of time?
Ruling:

No. It is the contention of the petitioner that since the order approving the sale of the
disputed property was received by the private respondent on February 6, 1969, the latter
should have moved for the setting aside of such order within thirty (30) days from their receipt
thereof; however, said respondents categorically moved to set aside the order only on March 27,
1969. The petitioner further contends that even if the period of the filing of the appeal is to be
reckoned from the receipt of the order of the confirmation of the sale which was on April 8,
1970, still the notice of appeal was filed late as the second motion for reconsideration by the
private respondents did not toll the running of the period since the motion was pro-forma.
Therefore, as the notice of appeal should have been filed on or before August 9, 1970, the filing
of the same on August 13, 1970 was clearly out of time.

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that their second motion for
reconsideration was not pro-forma and, therefore, tolled the running of the period of appeal
because it contained a new ground which had not yet been passed upon by the court, and that is,
that they have actually filed a bond to suspend the sale or prevent its confirmation.

The private respondents' second motion for reconsideration was indeed pro-forma
since the additional ground contained therein had no merit and had earlier been passed upon.
The mere fact that the said respondents had actually filed a bond to prevent the confirmation of
the sale does not constitute a ground in itself to justify the tolling of the period of appeal.
Furthermore, the propriety of the respondents' filing of a bond was already passed upon by the
probate court in its order dated March 6, 1970.

The motion for reconsideration which was correctly declared by the lower court to be
pro-forma is of no moment. A pro-forma motion will not toll the running of the period of appeal.
And once a decision becomes final, the court can no longer amend or modify the same, much
less set it aside, as was erroneously done by the respondent Judge in this case. For to allow
courts to amend the final judgments will result in endless litigations.

The private respondents have somehow managed to prevent the order of sale from
becoming final by filing a "manifestation" within the period of appeal. They now try to employ
similar delaying tactics by filing a second motion for reconsideration to prevent the order of the
confirmation of sale from becoming final and executory. Obviously, tills is a dilatory tactic which
should not be countenanced by the court especially considering that the disputed property had
been paid for by the petitioner as early as 1969.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss the
appeal
 MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

VELASCO VS. ORTIZ

G.R. No. 51973. April 16, 1990
184 SCRA 303
Case No.: 261

Facts:

The ward of the spouses Velasco was able to withdraw money of the dead husband of
Velasco (the latter was diagnosed as disabled). The ward argued that she was instructed by the
decedent to withdraw money. The TC ruled in favor of Velasco. Copy of the decision was given
to the 1st counsel of the ward. The new counsel filed a Motion for New Trial based on newly
discovered evidence (a certification from a doctor that the decedent can still properly
communicate)

Issue:
Whether the motion for new trial shall be granted.

Ruling:
There is no dispute that at the time the motion for new trial was filed, the reglementary
period to appeal had lapsed, and the decision had become final & executory. A judgment which
has become final and executory can no longer be altered and modified, much less set aside by
the court which rendered it since such court has already lost jurisdiction over the case.
Thereafter, the power & prerogative to order suspension of the rules of procedure is reposed,
not in the court which had rendered such decision but rather in an appellate court and
ultimately in the SC, and then only upon a showing that otherwise the imperious demands of
substantial justice will be thwarted. Where the reglementary period to appeal had expired, the
remedy is a motion for new trial. If it has become final and executory, one can file a petition for
relief under Rule 38 or a petition for annulment of judgment. A motion for new trial upon the
ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted where there is concurrence of the
following requisites:

1. the evidence had been discovered after trial;

2. the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with exercise of
reasonable diligence
3. the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching.

What is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence;
not the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is
essential is, rather, that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but had not nonetheless failed to secure (it must
have been searched for but not found during trial). In the case at bar, the new evidence was
already presented as evidence in a criminal case vs. the ward for falsification. Therefore, she had
already come across that evidence before. Moreover, it is in the nature of an impeaching
evidence for it seeks merely to weaken or controvert previous evidence; it is not material or
corroborative.
 FILING OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Antonio vs CA
G.R. No. 77656 August 31, 1987
(Case No. 262)

Facts:

The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th
Avenue, Caloocan City. This property was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.

After due notice to the petitioners and all others concerned, the property was sold to the
private respondent at a public bidding held on July 29, 1982. It appears, petitioners deliberately
did not participate in the said bidding because they believed that, as tenants therein, they have
priority in law to acquire the property. Their thinking was that their participation would be
deemed a waiver of their right to question the act of the GSIS in selling the property and would
adversely affect their offer to buy the same.

The award or sale of the property to the private respondent was duly approved by the
GSIS Board of Trustees in its Resolution No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was then
certified that the possession and administration of the property had been transferred to the
private respondent A conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondent by
the GSIS stating that for all intents and purposes, the private respondent is the owner of the
property. The private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners with
the Metropolitan Trial Court in that locality. Said court rendered judgment on January 8, 1985,
ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises occupied by them and to pay certain amounts as
damages.

On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing

the petitioner for review. Later an entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified
thereupon by the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became final and
executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case were consequently, remanded to the
respondent Regional Trial Court on February 11, 1987. On February 23, 1987, the petitioners,
through their new counsel, filed an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For
Reconsideration, together with the Motion For Reconsideration With Prayer For Issuance Of
Temporary Restraining Order," with the respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the
respondent Court of Appeals admit their motion for reconsideration, which was obviously filed
beyond the reglementary period for filing the same, alleging that their counsel of record
abandoned them and migrated to the United States without at least informing them that a
decision was rendered against them.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in denying the Motion.

Held:

We agree with the Court of Appeals in denying the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. It is well-settled that after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from notice of
judgment, the same becomes final and the Court of Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case. And
the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment
nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost. The court a quo cannot decide the case
anew. decision rendered anew notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void.

In this case, the messenger, Mr. Obligar, received a copy of the decision on January 6,
1987. This decision became final and executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not be acted upon on the
merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was properly denied.

The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not
excusable. Clear and as it can be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of
record is the law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Atty.
Funelas signed the documents in his capacity as the representative of the said law firm. The
respondent Court of Appeals made this same observation in its questioned resolution.
 The City of Butuan v Ortiz et al
GR No L-18054 December 22, 1961
Case No.: 264

Facts:

On March 9, 1954, administrative charges for physical injuries and electioneering were
filed with the municipal board of Butuan City against Justiniano Soriano and as a consequence
he was suspended by Mayor Pizarro of Butuan City. The Board finds Soriano him guilty as
charged hence he brought an appeal to the Commission of Civil Service.
On June 1, 1954, Soriano filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Agusan alleging
that the 60-day period of suspension provided for in Republic Act No 557 had already elapsed
and the case against him had not been finally decided thereby compel Mayor Pizarro to
reinstate him pursuant to said Act. The Court issued a decision favorable to Soriano ordering his
reinstatement pending termination of administrative charges filed against him.
On November 27, 2017, Commissioner of CSC affirmed the decision of the Municipal
Board, finding Soriano guilty and separating him from service. Later, Soriano filed an ex-parte
motion to execute the judgment of RTC for reinstatement and was granted by the Court. The
City of Butuan filed a motion for reconsideration but same denied by the court. Hence, this
petition to set aside to said aside the order of execution, on the ground that the court committed
a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the said execution of the judgment as the Commissioner
of Civil Service has already affirmed the decision of the Municipal Board.

Issue:

Whether the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service barred to execute the
judgment of the Court for reinstatement.

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition meritorious. The Commissioner of the Civil Service had
already affirmed the decision of the municipal board finding Soriano guilty as charged. The right
to reinstatement was barred by said decision being a valid impediment to the execution of the
said decision for reinstatement. A supervening reason had arisen which rendered the decision
of the court ordering reinstatement unenforceable. A prevailing party in a civil action is entitled
to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by hi within five years from its entry. But it
has been repeatedly held that when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has
become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution imposable or unjust,
the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same
with judgment and the facts.
 FUA CAM LU vs. YAP FAUCO and YAP SINGCO
G.R. No. L-48797, July 30, 1943
Case No.: 270

Facts:

Fua Cam Lu, obtained in civil case No. 42125 of the Court of First Instance of Manila a
judgment sentencing the defendants-appellants, Yap Fauco and Yap Singco, to pay P1,538.04
with legal interest and costs. By virtue of a writ of execution, a certain parcel of land belonging
to the appellants, assessed at P3,550 and situated in Donsol, Sorsogon was levied upon the
provincial sheriff of Sorsogon who, on November 15, 1933, made a notice, duly posted in three
conspicuous places in the municipalities of Donsol and Sorsogon and published in the Mamera
Press, that said land would be sold at public auction. By virtue of a mortgage agreement, As a
result of the agreement thus reached by the parties, the sale of the land advertised by the
provincial sheriff did not take place. However, pursuant to an alias writ of execution issued by
the Court of First instance of manila in civil case No. 42125 on March 31, 1934, the provincial
sheriff, without publishing a new notice, sold said land at a public auction held on May 28, 1934,
to the appellee for P1,923.32.

Issue:

Whether appellants liability under the judgment had been extinguished by the
settlement evidenced by the mortgage executed by them in favor of the appellee?

Ruling:

Moreover, the sheriff's sale in favor of the appellee is void because no notice thereof was
published other than that which appeared in the Mamera Press regarding the sale to be held on
December 12, 1933. Lack of new publication is shown by appellee's own evidence and the issue,
though not raised in the pleadings, was thereby tried by implied consent of the parties,
emphasized by the appellants in the memorandum filed by them in the lower court and squarely
threshed out in this Court by both the appellants and the appellee. The latter had, besides,
admitted that there was no new publication, and so much so that in his brief he merely resorted
to the argument that "section 460 of Act 190 authorized the sheriff to adjourn any sale upon
execution to any date agreed upon in writing by the parties . . . and does not require the sheriff
to publish anew the public sale which was adjourned." The appellee has correctly stated the law
but has failed to show that it supports his side, for it is not pretended that there was any written
agreement between the parties to adjourn the sale advertised for December 12, 1933, to May
28, 1934. Neither may it be pretended that the sale in favor of the appellee was by virtue of a
mere adjournment, it appearing that it was made pursuant to an alias writ of execution.
Appellee's admission has thus destroyed the legal presumption that official duty was regularly
performed.
 Judgment/Decision

Cu Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar

GR No. 45351 June 29, 1940
Case No.:275

Facts:

Judgment for the plaintiff, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, was rendered in a foreclosure suit instituted
against the defendant, the Mabalacat Sugar Company. A writ of execution was later issued and
the mortgaged property, consisting of a sugar central, ordered sold at public auction. At the sale,
one B. H. Berkenkotter, filed a third-party claim over certain machineries of the central, but a
bond having been filed by the plaintiff, the sheriff proceeded with the public auction, at which
said plaintiff was the highest bidder for P177,000. The sale was confirmed by the trial court,
and, upon appeal to this court, the order of confirmation was affirmed.

In the meantime, Berkenkotter instituted a separate proceedings against plaintiff Cu Unjieng e

Hijos for the vindication of his claim over the machineries which constituted the subject matter
of his third-party claim. From an adverse decision of the trial court, he appealed to this Court.
While pending, Mabalacat presented a petition to the trial court praying that it should be
entitled to the proceeds of the central during its period of receivership which was opposed by
the plaintiffs. After due hearing, the cour held that a certified copy of the decision be presented
first.

From this order, the plaintiffs filed for a petition for a deficiency judgment. Defendant opposed
the petition, claiming that the question raised had already been adjudged in the court's order of
November 13, 1935.

On May 29, 1936, the trial court overruled defendant's opposition to plaintiff's petition for a
deficiency judgment and adjudged said plaintiff entitled thereto, ordering, at the same time, that
the sum of P36,793.99 representing the net proceeds of the receivership and which has already
been turned over to the plaintiff, be applied to the judgment debt, and rendering a deficiency
judgment which was the last balance unpaid. This order is the subject of the present appeal.

There are, therefore, two orders involved in this appeal, the first dated November 13, 1935, and
the second, May 29, 1936. Defendant-appellant contends that the second order is null and void,
for it has been rendered without jurisdiction, and that, even if it were valid, the same is
erroneous. As to the nullity of the second order, which was in effect reversal of the first order,
defendant's contention is predicated on the theory that the lower court has lost all jurisdiction
to amend or reverse the first order which had already become final and executory before the
second order was issued.

Issue:

Is the second order valid?

Ruling:

Yes. We have once held that orders or judgments of this kind, subject to the performance of a
condition precedent, are not final until the condition is performed. Before the condition is
performed or the contingency has happened, the judgment is not effective and is not capable of
execution. As a general rule, judgments of such kind conditioned upon a contingency, are held to
be null and void. "A judgment must be definite. By this is meant that the decision itself must
purport to decide finally the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted, by specially denying
or granting the remedy sought by the action." And when a definitive judgment cannot thus be
rendered because it depends upon a contingency, the proper procedure is to render no
judgment at all and defer the same until the contingency has passed.

The order of November 13, 1935, expressly directed the parties or any of them to introduce in
court a certified copy of the judgment which the Supreme Court shall render in the Berkenkotter
case. The requirements was proper, for only after such decision is rendered and a certified copy
thereof presented to the trial court could a final order be issued reciting how the contingency
has happened and setting definitely the rights of the parties in accordance therewith. But the
certified copy was presented in court on March 28, 1936, and no final order has as yet been
issued thereon. There was, therefore, nothing which could legally bar the issuance of the second
order of May 29, 1936. It is a well-settled rule that interlocutory or provisional orders are
subject to vacation or amendment at any time before final judgment is rendered or has become
executory. We conclude that the second order is valid.
 Motion for reconsideration

Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez v Hon. Gregorio Lantin

G.R. No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637
Case No.: 277

Facts:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this courts decision.

A motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to the observation made by the court
in its decision dated May 22, 1968. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be
paid by their counsels. Attys. Baizas and Bolinao seek reconsideration of the decisions in so far
as it reflects adversely upon their professional conduct and condemns them to pay treble costs.

The court of appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez position with respect
to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner
spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but
calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

The petitioner and their counsel chose to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion
causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. Spouses Perez as
represented by their counsel sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the
execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction
and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer.

Issue:

Whether petitioners counsel used devices to delay the execution of the judgment.

Ruling:

Yes. The petitioner counsels used devices to delay the execution of the judgment.

The circumstances relative to the motion for reconsideration clearly negates the avowal
of the movants that in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel
of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in
Civil Case No. 39407. The Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a
stratagem of remedies projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is DENIED.

 JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91885.August 7, 1996
Case No.: 280

Facts:

It appears that under a contract (date not indicated in the pleadings), private respondent
Laureano Brothers, Inc., undertook to supply petitioner Republic of the Philippines with
plumbing materials for the use of the National Water and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) which
procurement was financed by the United States Government through the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA).However, all the materials delivered by private respondent to
NAWASA were rejected because they did not conform to the agreed specifications.Refusing to
refund the money paid for said materials, private respondent was sued by the Republic in the
then Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 44566.

A decision was rendered by the trial court based on a compromise agreement whereby private
respondent agreed to pay the petitioner the amount of US$358,882.02 or its equivalent in
Philippine pesos.A disagreement on the rate of exchange for conversion of the dollars into pesos
was settled by this Court in G.R. No. L-25055[4] by fixing such rate at P3.91 per US$1.00.This
judgment became final and executory on July 27, 1968.

Thereafter, the then CFI ordered the attachment of the property of the defendant consisting of a
5,000 sq. m. lot with a two-storey building erected thereon located along Pasong Tamo
Extension, Makati.Upon motion of petitioner, a writ of execution was issued on September 2,
1972.

Issue:

Whether the five-year period within which to enforce the decision in Civil Case No. 44566 was
interrupted by the period when the question of the legality of the sale of respondents properties
was pending in the Court of Appeals and before this Honorable Court.

Held:

There is no question that the decision in favor of the Republic has not been satisfied and the
private respondent has not paid its obligation under such judgment. The only question is HOW
such decision shall be enforced against the obligor.Under the Rules,[7] a judgment may be
executed within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory.After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action.

In the present case, the decision sought to be enforced became final and executory onJuly 27,
1968.Upon petitioners motion, a writ of execution was issued on September 2, 1972, well within
said five-year period.However, the petitioners attention became focused on the validity of the
sale of the Pasong Tamo property -- which was previously attached but not levied upon --
instead of on the enforcement of the issued writ.This dispute was settled with finality only in
1984 with this Courts final ruling in G.R. No. L-52774.Hence, chronologically speaking, the
motion for execution filed on May 12, 1985 was almost seventeen (17) years after the decision
became final and executory.Petitioner, however, maintains that the period during which the
question of the legality of the sale had been pending should not be taken into account in the
computation of the five years.
 CITY OF MANILA, represented by Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. vs.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE ARMY & NAVY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 100626, November 29, 1991
Case No.: 284

FACTS:

Respondent Court of Appeals is faulted in this action for certiorari for having set aside
the order of execution dated June 10, 1991, and the writ of execution issued by Judge Wilfredo
Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 9156335.

This was a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the City of Manila against private
respondent Army and Navy Club for violation of the lease agreement between them over a
parcel of land on Roxas Boulevard in the said city. A summary judgment in favor of the
petitioner was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and seasonably elevated to
the Regional Trial Court. To stay its execution, ANC filed a supersedes bond in the amount of
P2,700,000.00, which was approved by Judge Reyes. He subsequently affirmed the appealed
judgment on June 7, 1991.

On June 10, 1991, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion for execution on the ground
that the judgment had already become final and executory under RA 6031. Judge Reyes granted
the motion the same day 4 and at 4:00 o'clock that afternoon the writ of execution was served
on ANC.

ANC moved to quash the writ on June 11, 1991, but hours later, sensing that the motion
could not be acted upon, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

On July 3, 1991, that court issued the questioned decision, prompting the filing of the
present petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the action of the respondent court and contends that decisions of
the regional trial court in cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts and are final and
executory under RA 6031.

The respondents argue on the other hand that under BP 129, decisions of the regional
trial court in cases originating from and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts are not final but subject to appeal in a petition for review to the Court of
Appeals. Such decisions cannot be executed where the period of time for the defendant to
perfect his appeal has not yet expired.

Both RA 6031 and BP 129 provide that decisions of the regional trial court in its
appellate capacity may be elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review. In effect,
both laws recognize that such judgments are "final" in the sense that they finally dispose of,
adjudicate, or determine the rights of the parties in the case. But such judgments are not yet
"final and executory" pending the expiration of the reglementary period for appeal. During that
period, execution of the judgment cannot yet be demanded by the winning party as a matter of
right.

In the present case, the private respondent had up to June 25, 1991, to appeal the
decision of the regional trial court. The motion for execution was filed by the petitioner on June
10, 1991, before the expiration of the said reglementary period. As the decision had not yet
become final and executory on that date, the motion was premature and should therefore not
have been granted. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, what the trial court authorized was
an execution pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari to assail an order of execution
pending appeal, this Court has held that

RULING:

The Court Ruled that, Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil
action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the (ordinary) course of law" this rule is not without exception. The
availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a
party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the
mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without merit that
usually determines the propriety of certiorari. 13

While appeal is normally employed to question an order or writ which varies the terms
of the decision being executed, it is nevertheless not the sole and exclusive remedy. The special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 was available to the private respondent
on the allegation that the regional trial court, in issuing the writ of execution, committed grave
abuse of discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction and that the ordinary remedy of appeal
was inadequate.
The last question to be resolved is, assuming that the decision of the regional trial court
had already become "final and executory," could the said court order its execution?
The rule is that if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is appealed to the regional trial
court and the decision of the latter is itself elevated to the Court of Appeals, whose decision
thereafter became final, the case should be remanded through the regional trial court to the
metropolitan trial court for execution. 14 The only exception is the execution pending appeal,
which can be issued by the regional trial court under Sec. 8 of Rule 70 or the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court under Sec. 10 of the same Rule.
As previously observed, the petitioner has shown no weighty justification for the application of
the exception. Hence, the respondent court committed no error in reversing the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and annulling the writ of execution issued by it on June 10, 1991, pending
appeal of its decision.
 EXECUTION

JP LATEX TECHNOLOGY, INC., versus BALLONS GRANGER BALLOONS,

INC. AND CHRISTOS SANTORINEOS, THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF BIAN, LAGUNA, TATSUYA OGINO AND KATSUMI
WATANABE
G.R. No. 177121, March 16, 2009
Case No.: 287

Facts:
Respondent Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc. (Granger) is a foreign corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of Canada. Anchoring on an isolated transaction,
respondent Granger filed a complaint for rescission and damages against petitioner JP Latex
Technology, Inc., a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the manufacture of latex and
balloons. Also named defendants were the officers of the corporation, namely; Katsumi
Watanabe and Tatsuya Ogino, and several John and Jane Does. Respondent Grangers president
and chief executive officer, Christos Santorineos, who is also a respondent in this case, joined as
plaintiff. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. B-6527, alleged that Ogino, representing
himself as the president of petitioner corporation, and respondent Santorineos entered into a
contract for the sale of respondent Grangers machinery consisting of four dipping lines and all
associated equipment for the amount of US$1,230,000.00 and other non-cash considerations
consisting of a 20% shareholding in petitioners distribution company and the distributorship of
its balloons in Canada and Greece. Although respondent Granger had performed its end of the
bargain by re-assembling the subject machinery in petitioners factory in Bian and transferring
its dipping formulations and technology to petitioner, the latter allegedly paid only a partial sum
of US$748,262.87 and reneged on its other non-cash commitments. According to respondent
Granger, it made several written and verbal demands for the full payment of the purchase price
to no avail. The complaint was accompanied by an application for the issuance of a writ of
replevin. Petitioner and Ogino separately filed their respective answers with counterclaims
while Watanabe failed to submit any responsive pleading. Watanabe was thereafter declared in
default. After declaring in default for his non-appearance at the scheduled pre-trial conference,
the RTC allowed respondent Granger to present ex-parte. On 10 August 2006, the RTC rendered
its decision in favor of respondent Granger. While the case was pending or on 05 August 2006,
respondent Granger moved for the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision, which was
promulgated on 10 August 2006 or a few days after it filed the motion. fter it received a copy of
the RTC decision on 30 August 2006, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof on 13
September 2006. Petitioner also opposed respondent Grangers motion for execution pending
appeal, which was denied in an Order dated 01 September 2006. Respondent Granger then filed
on 05 October 2006 an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Ocular Inspection, which
petitioner opposed. In the Order, dated 10 November 2006, the RTC denied respondent
Grangers prayer for an ocular inspection but granted the plea for execution pending appeal. The
RTC reconsidered its earlier position and consequently granted the execution pending appeal
after finding that the equipment under litigation were deteriorating and that petitioner might
not have sufficient funds to pay for the damages, thereby leaving respondents with an empty
judgment. On 15 November 2006, the writ of execution pending appeal was issued. On the
following day, Joel Arellano, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC of Binan, served on petitioner
at its office address a copy each of the writ and the Order dated 10 November 2006. Thereupon,
Arellano successfully effected the dismantling of the machinery. Thus, petitioner and Ogino filed
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. Named
respondents were Judge Romeo C. De Leon, Clerk of Court Rowena A.M. Galeon, Sheriff Joel
Arellano, respondents Granger and Santorineos. On 22 December 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed decision, denying the petition for certiorari mainly on the ground that
petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Order dated 10
November 2006. Petitioner sought reconsideration but its motion was denied per the appellate
courts Resolution dated 23 March 2007. Hence, the instant petition with urgent application for
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction.

In a Resolution dated 23 May 2007, the Court issued a TRO to prevent respondents from
implementing the writ of execution pending appeal conditioned upon the filing of a cash or
surety bond. Forthwith, petitioner posted a bond and the TRO was released and served. Upon
motion by petitioner, the Court directed the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff to release to
petitioner the properties levied under the restrained order of execution pending appeal.

Issue:

1. Whether execution pending appeal may be issued and implemented when the
decision sought to be executed is not yet final because of the pending and unresolved
motion for reconsideration of the decision sought to be executed pending appeal.

2. Whether a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement for filing a petition

for certiorari under rule 65 under the circumstances of the case.

Ruling:

Yes. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised
is purely of law; (2) when public interest is involved; or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth
exception, the Court has ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of
the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those
that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The
records of the case show that the motion had not been acted upon by the RTC before it ruled on
the motion for execution pending appeal. That being the case, the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration has prevented the period to appeal from even commencing. The period within
which a party may move for an execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision has not yet
also started.
Where there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution
pending appeal is improper and premature. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration
legally precludes execution of the RTC decision because the motion serves as the movants
vehicle to point out the findings and conclusions of the decision which, in his view, are not
supported by law or the evidence and, therefore, gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse
himself. In the event that the trial judge finds the motion for reconsideration meritorious, he can
of course reverse the decision.In the absence of an appeal from the decision, as the motion for
reconsideration is still unresolved, the execution ordered by the RTC cannot be properly
considered as execution pending appeal. All references to the assailed order as an order of
execution pending appeal are mislabeled. In any event, the Court does not find any good reason
to justify the execution of the RTC decision pending finality. The RTCs finding that the
machinery under litigation was deteriorating is not supported by the evidence on record. Nor is
the possibility that petitioner would not be able to pay the judgment award a good reason to
order discretionary execution. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or
damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed.
 EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR SPECIFIC ACT; REMOVAL OF IMPROVEMENTS ON
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF EXECUTION

ARCADIO VS. YLAGAN

A.C. No. 2734. July 30, 1988
43 SCRA 168
Case No.: 295

Facts:

Sometime in 1983, respondent, as counsel for his brother, instituted an ejectment suit against
Arcadio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, based on three grounds: sublease
by the lessee of the premises to another without the consent of the lessor; need of the
lessor/owner to repossess the unit for his own use or for the use of any immediate member of
his family; and, ownership by the lessee of another residential unit in Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. For failure to answer, Arcadio was declared in default. Soon thereafter, a decision
was rendered in favor of Ernesto Ylagan. However, this decision was set aside upon motion of
Arcadio. On January 23, 1984, Arcadio was ordered to vacate the apartment and to restore
possession thereof to the owner, as well as to pay P1,000.00 a month as damages in the form of
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises, starting June, 1983 until it
is vacated and the sum of P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, in addition to the costs. The trial
court found that all three grounds were duly established, any of which was sufficient to justify
Arcadio's ejectment. Arcadio appealed to the Regional Trial Court but respondent moved for
execution pending appeal, which was granted. Arcadio filed a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on May 16, 1984. On June 5,
1984, the petition was dismissed and accordingly, the restraining order was lifted, thereby
paving the way for execution. Arcadio left the apartment in the morning of June 7, 1984 and that
when the respondent arrived at the apartment, it was abandoned and padlocked from the
outside and they banged it until the small padlock was "smashed', which are indications that
their arrival was anticipated and that complainants intended to frustrate the writ. Hence, the
petitioner filed a sworn letter-complaint praying that Atty. Cesar Z. Ylagan be disbarred on the
ground that he, together with the sheriffs of Quezon City and two barangay officials, used
violence to break open the domicile without authority from the court.

Issue:

Whether the complaint must be dismissed for lack of legal basis.

Ruling:

The name of the process commonly resorted to by the successful party in an action of ejectment,
for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff in the actual possession of the land recovered is
called a habere facias possessionem. The records show that the execution issued by Judge
Gorospe, Jr. of the Metropolitan Trial Court on May 10, 1984 partakes of the nature of a habere
facias possessionem. It commanded the sheriff to cause the defendant Arcadio to vacate the
premises of the plaintiffs bearing No. 26 situated at the corner of Judge Juan Luna and Pitimini
Streets, Barangay Paltok, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, as well as all persons claiming
rights under her and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff. Since it is not disputed that no
one was in the apartment at the time execution was carried into effect and the doors, windows
and outer gate were padlocked, there was no need for the sheriffs and the respondent to secure
a "break-open" order inasmuch as the character of the writ in their hands authorized them to
break open the apartment, if they could not otherwise execute its command. Moreover, there is
merit in the position taken by the respondent, manifested in a memorandum of authorities
submitted to supplement his comment, that there is only one instance in the Rules of Court
which requires a special "break-open" order - that referred to in Section 14, Rule 39, which
reads: "Sec. 14. Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property
subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment debtor
or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon
special order of the court issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and
after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The
situation contemplated under the foregoing section is very much different from the case at bar
since no building or structure constructed by the tenant was demolished or required to be
demolished. The charge therefore cannot prosper, in the absence of any rule which imposes
upon the officer the duty to obtain a break open order.
 FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs YLLAS LENDING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 158997 October 6, 2008
Case No.: 296

Facts:

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORP. ( FBDC) executed a lease contract in favor of

Tirreno, Inc. over a unit at the Bonifacio Global City in Taguig, Metro Manila. The parties had the
lease contract notarized on the day of its execution. Tirreno used the leased premises for Savoia
Ristorante and La Strega Bar.

Due to Tirrenos alleged failure to settle its outstanding obligations, FBDC entered and
occupied the leased premises. FBDC also appropriated the equipment and properties left by
Tirreno pursuant to Section 22 of their Contract of Lease as partial payment for Tirrenos
outstanding obligations.

In 2002, Yllas Lending Corporation caused the sheriff of the trial court to serve an alias
writ of seizure against FBDC. FBDC found out that in 2001, respondents filed a complaint for
Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage with Replevin, against Tirreno, et al. In their complaint, Yllas
alleged that they lent a sum of money to Tirreno et al and in 2000 executed a Deed of Chattel
Mortgage in favor of Yllas as security for the loan. The Chattel Mortgage covered properties of
the Tirrenos restaurant and bar.

On the same day, FBDC served on the sheriff an affidavit of title and third party claim.

Despite FBDCs service upon him of an affidavit of title and third party claim, the sheriff
proceeded with the seizure of certain items from FBDCs premises. The sheriff delivered the
seized properties to Yllas.

Issue:

Whether FBDC can terminate the lease contract without judicial intervention.

Held:

YES. A lease contract may be terminated without judicial intervention. Consing v.

Jamandre upheld the validity of a contractually-stipulated termination clause:

This stipulation is in the nature of a resolutory condition, for upon the exercise by the [lessor] of
his right to take possession of the leased property, the contract is deemed terminated. This kind
of contractual stipulation is not illegal, there being nothing in the law proscribing such kind of
agreement.

Judicial permission to cancel the agreement was not, therefore necessary because of the express
stipulation in the contract of [lease] that the [lessor], in case of failure of the [lessee] to comply
with the terms and conditions thereof, can take-over the possession of the leased premises,
thereby cancelling the contract of sub-lease. Resort to judicial action is necessary only in the
absence of a special provision granting the power of cancellation.14

A lease contract may contain a forfeiture clause. In the same manner, we allow FBDCs
forfeiture of Tirrenos properties in the leased premises. By agreement between FBDC and
Tirreno, the properties are answerable for any unpaid rent or charges at any termination of the
lease. Such agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public policy. Forfeiture
of the properties is the only security that FBDC may apply in case of Tirrenos default in its
obligations.
 Guevarra vs. Ramos
GR No. 24358 March 31, 1971
Case No.: 298

Facts:

The third-party claimant and the judgment debtor filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of possession issued by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered final judgment
for damages in Civil Case No Q-2171 wherein the judgment creditors Petra et al caused the levy
on execution a parcel of land.
The provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale but prior thereto, the brothers
and sisters of the deceased Guevarra together with the judgment debtors sought to prevent the
sale at public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way of
inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and one half of the
value of the house situated thereon. However, on account of indemnity bond posted by Flores,
one of the judgment creditors, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale in which Flores was
the successful bidder. The judgment debtors failed to redeem the property within the one-year
period for redemption thus the sheriff executed the Officers Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Flores.
The judgment debtor opposed the execution pointing out that the said parcel of land is
in the possession of a third-party claimant whom filed their claim to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal but the opposition was overruled by the Court and granted the writ of possession by
Flores and ordered that the property be placed on the possession of Flores. However, said
execution was not enforced because of the resistance of the third-party claimants who had
taken possession of the property.
They court thereafter ordered to serve notice to the third party claimants to vacate the
premises. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the third-party claimants assertion of ownership over a portion of the land sold
on execution may defeat the purchasers right to have possession of the same after the
expiration of the one-year redemption period allowed by law.

Ruling:

The purchasers right to have possession is valid since the third-party claimants did not
originally in possession of the disputed property. When a parcel of land levied upon execution
by a party other than the judgment debtor, the lower court must conduct a hearing to determine
the nature of said adverse possession. Such hearing, however, was not necessary because the
third-party claimants were not in possession of the disputed property when it was sold in public
auction. When the land was levied upon and when it was sold on execution it was declared for
taxation in the name of judgment debtors who were in the possession of the property. The third
party claimants belated move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchasers right to
the same by virtue of the definite deed of sale in his favor which may be defeated and set aside
only by an adverse final adjudication against him of the third parties claim of ownership.
 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG vs.
HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA
G.R. No. L-34964, January 31, 1973
Case No.: 304

Facts:

Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B &
B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money.
Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to
answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or
Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was
rendered against the defendants.

To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation.
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and
served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong.

Issue:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405?

Ruling:

It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report
of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank
deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of
a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is
disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that
it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just
debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash
and depositing the same in a bank.
 Judgment/Decision

Iligan Bay v. Dy
GR No. 140836 & 140907 June 8, 2007
Case No.: 309

Facts:

Petitioner Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. (IBMC) constructed its oil mills on a parcel of land in
the Province of Lanao del Norte. Respondent Henry Dy was one of the suppliers that provided
electrical and construction supplies for the said oil mills. IBMC subsequently became part of co-
petitioner United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM), a conglomerate of oil mills which thrived during
the martial law era. When UNICOM took over its management, IBMC became bankrupt which
consequently, UNICOM obtained its lots.

In 1988, the Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte certified that IBMC and/or UNICOM was
delinquent in paying its real estate taxes since 1984, which prompted the provincial
government to levy on the disputed lot. It was then sold at public auction where respondent
Henry Dy emerged as the highest bidder. Due to IBMCS unpaid obligations, respondent filed
collection suits against it. Respondent, as an attachment creditor, exercised his right of
redemption in the tax delinquency sale.

On June 14, 1989, respondent sent a letter to the Provincial Treasurer, asking that a certificate
of redemption be issued in his favor. The latter however, did not accede to Henry Dys demand. A
Notice to Redeem over the disputed lot was also sent by UNICOM to the Provincial Treasurer
which was then recognized.

Respondent was informed of the Provincial Treasurers issuance of a Certificate of Redemption

to UNICOM. The Office of the Provincial Treasurer wrote Jeremias B. Benico informing him that
there was still an additional redemption price due from UNICOM. Because of UNICOMs failure to
pay and remit the total redemption price, respondent requested that a final deed of sale be
executed in his favor since the right of redemption was not effectively exercised by UNICOM
within the one year period. However, the Provincial Treasurer again denied respondents
request.

Therefore, petitioner IBMC and respondent Henry Dy executed a Compromise Agreement

wherein they agreed to settle the Civil case. Aggrieved for Provincial Treasurers refusal,
respondent filed a case in Court.

The Iligan City RTC found that the refusal of the Provincial Treasurer to issue a bill of sale in
favor of respondent Henry Dy was proper and in accordance with law. According to the trial
court, petitioner UNICOM had redeemed the subject property within the time allowed by law.
Dissatisfied, respondent appealed the case alleging that the trial court erred in ruling that the
compromise agreement barred his filing of petition of mandamus. The CA ruled in favor of
respondent. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Is the CA correct in ruling that the Compromise Agreement did not bar the filing of petition of
mandamus?
Ruling:

Yes. From the provisions of the Compromise Agreement, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent
and IBMC executed it in order to: (1) amicably settle and terminate Civil Case Nos. 1300, 1322,
and 1324; (2) abate any action or proceeding arising out of or in connection with the cause or
causes of action which gave rise to the three civil actions; (3) discharge and cancel the Writ of
Attachment annotated on TCT No. T-4,789; and (4) prevent future actions based on the claims
and counterclaims in the three (3) civil actions.

These actions are for the collection of sums of money which arose from IBMCs unfulfilled
obligation to pay; whereas the case for Mandamus with Damages was an action to compel the
Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte to issue a final bill of sale in respondents favor, which
arose from the Provincial Treasurers refusal to issue the final bill of sale.

Obviously, the mandamus case was neither included in the Compromise Agreement nor should
it be deemed included in it because the said case did not arise in connection with the cause or
causes of action which led to the filing of the three (3) civil actions. Moreover, the said case was
not based on the claims and counterclaims pleaded in said civil actions.
 Right of Redemption

Matilde S. Palicte v Hon. Jose O. Ramolete

G.R. No. L-55076, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 132
Case No.: 311

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the CFI of Cebu declaring the
deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the petitioners
motion that the Registrar of Deeds be directed to transfer the owners duplicate of title from
Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Owners Duplicate Certificate of Title.

On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued
on February 5, 1979 by the respondent Judge. These properties belong to Don Filemon Sotto.
Matilde S. Palicte, one of the heirs of the late Don Sotto redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves,
four lots for the sum of P60,000. A deed of redemption was executed by Deputy Provincial
Sheriff. Subsequently, petitioner moved for the transfer to her name the four lots covered by the
deed of redemption.

The motion was opposed by the private respondents on the ground that
movant/petitioner is not one of those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Lower court ruled that the deed of redemption is null and void, thus, the motion of
Palicte was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of redemption under Sec. 29,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner may validly exercise the right of redemption.

Property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. Further, successor-in-interest
includes (a) one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption; (b) one
to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption;
one; (c) one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law; (d) one or more
joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold; and (e) the wife as regards her
husbands homestead by reason of the fact some portion of her husbands title passes to her. In
the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Sotto whose estate was levied
upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs,
hence, she qualifies as a successor-in-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

 JURISDICTION

RIVERA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA

G.R. No. L-43057, February 25, 1935
Case No.: 314

Facts:

The herein petitioner Manuel Rivera brought civil case No. 6641 in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija to foreclose a mortgage constituted in his favor by said Jacinto Rupac. On November
22, 1933, judgment was rendered in said case ordering the mortgagor, Jacinto Rupac, to pay to
the mortgagee, Manuel Rivera, the sum of P700 with legal interest thereon and costs, within
three months from said date, and directing, upon the defendant's failure to pay, the sale of the
two parcels of land in question which, according to the certificate of sale, are not registered
under the Torrens system. As the mortgagor failed to comply with the judgment, the provincial
sheriff of Nueva Ecija, on July 30, 1934, sold said two parcels of land to Manuel Rivera, as the
highest bidder, for the sum of P300.

On August 10, 1934, said mortgagee and purchaser, Manuel Rivera, filed a motion praying for
the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession against the mortgagor,
Jacinto Rupac.

In an order of August 31, 1934, the respondent Court of First Instance, then presided by Judge
Sabino Padilla, confirmed said sale but refused to issue the writ of possession prayed for,
believing that it had no jurisdiction to order the sheriff to place the mortgagee and purchaser in
possession of said two parcels of land.

Issue:

Whether there is no jurisdiction to order the sheriff to place the mortgagee and purchaser in
possession of said two parcels of land.

Held:

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the court which has
jurisdiction over a foreclosure suit also has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser at public auction of the property mortgaged without the necessity of an
independent action when the mortgagor continues in the possession thereof after confirmation
of the sale by final decree.

Wherefore, the remedy prayed for is granted and the judge presiding the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija is ordered to issue a writ addressed to the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija
directing him to place the herein petitioner and purchaser at public auction, Mariano Rivera, in
possession of the two parcels of land in question, with costs against the respondent Jacinto
Rupac.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SANAO MARKETING CORPORATION, SPOUSES AMADO A.
SANAO and SOLEDAD F. SANAO and SPOUSES WILLIAM (Willy) F. SANAO and HELEN
SANAO and the COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005
Case No.: 318

FACTS:

In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and Soledad F.
Sanao and the spouses William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all respondents herein), as
joint and solidary debtors, obtained a loan in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos
(P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a real estate mortgage of several parcels of land
situated in the municipalities of Pili, Tigaon and Camaligan, all of Camarines Sur, and Naga City.
The contract expressly provided that the mortgage shall be governed by the provisions of Act
No. 3135, as amended.The pertinent portions of said contract provide that:

If at any time the Mortgagors fail or refuse to pay the obligation herein secured, or any of
the amortization of such indebtedness when due, or to comply with any of the conditions and
stipulations herein agreed, or shall during the time this mortgage is in force, institute insolvency
proceedings or be involuntarily declared insolvent, or shall use the proceeds of this loan for
purposes other than those specified herein, or if the mortgage cannot be recorded in or the
Mortgagors fail to register the same with the corresponding Registry of Deeds, then all the
obligations of the Mortgagors secured by this mortgage and all the amortization thereof shall
immediately become due, payable and defaulted and the Mortgagee may immediately foreclose
this mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance
with Act No. 3135, asamended, and P.D. 385. For the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, the
Mortgagors hereby appoint the Mortgagee their Attorney-in-Fact to sell the properties
mortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite
and necessary to accomplish said purpose and to appoint its substitute as Attorney-in-Fact with
the same powers as above specified. In case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagors hereby
consent to the appointment of the Mortgagee or of any of its employees as receiver, without any
bond, to take charge of the mortgaged properties at once, and to hold possession of the same
and the rents, benefits and profits derived from the mortgaged properties before the sale, less
costs and expenses of the receivership.

For failure of respondents to fully pay the loan upon its maturity, PNB caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage through a certain Atty. Marvel C. Clavecilla (Atty.
Clavecilla), a notary public for and in the City of Naga. The Notice of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure
Sale announced that the sale of 13 titles consisting of 14 parcels of land located in Camarines
Sur and Naga City is scheduled on 22 March 1999 at nine oclock in the morning or soon
thereafter, at the entrance of the Municipal Court of Pili, Camarines Sur. This notice was
published in the 7, 14 and 21 February 1999 issues of the VoxBikol- a weekly tabloid published
every Sunday and circulated in the Bicol region and continents with Bicol communities.

On 26 April 2000, respondents Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed a
complaintwith the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, against PNB, the Register of Deeds of the City of
Naga and the Province of Camarines Sur, and Atty. Clavecilla, for the court to declare the
Provisional Certificate of Sale and the auction and foreclosure proceedingsnull and void.

With regard to the variance of the venues of the auction sale as published in VoxBikol
and as recorded in the Provisional Certificate of Sale, PNB asserted that there was no violation of
Act No. 3135 or of the terms of the real estate mortgage contract, as the sale of the mortgaged
properties located in Camarines Sur were held in Naga City which is well within the territorial
jurisdiction of said province.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of herein respondents. The Court of Appeals
rendered a litany of lapses that the notary public committed in the conduct of the foreclosure
proceedings which in its estimation had effectively undermined the soundness of the
foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Provisional Certificate of Sale,
upon which the issuance of the writ of possession was based, is fatally infirm, and that
consequently, the writ of possession was not validly issued as the procedural requirements for
its issuance were not satisfied.

Thus, the Court of Appeals declared null and void the two assailed orders of the RTC of
Pili for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Aggrieved by the Decision, PNB filed the instant petition, arguing in the main that in
nullifying the orders of the RTC of Pili, the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings as the issuance of writs of possession is purely ministerial
on the part of the trial court.

Respondents also reiterate that the PNB in the conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings did not comply with Administrative Order No. 3 and Administrative Circular No. 3-
98, and that the notice of publication was not sufficient to justify the execution of the Provisional
Certificate of Sale.

Traversing the alleged procedural errors, PNB in its Replyraise the following arguments:

ISSUES:

Whether the present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued either.

RULING:

Yes it provides SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may
petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing
bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage
or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath
and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the
property is registered, or in special proceedings in case of property registered under the
Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of
any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall,
upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one
hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Under the above-quoted provision, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a
writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property
covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.

Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board amply demonstrates Mrs. Domitila A.
Amons authority to sign and verify the instant petition. PNB likewise was not obligated to
disclose the alluded case pending before the Court of Appeals as it was not initiated by the bank
and, more importantly, the subject matter and the properties involved therein are altogether
different. It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its
rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned
 WRIT OF POSSESSION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. SPS. HOMOBONO AND LUZDELDIA TARAMPI
G.R. No. 174988, December 10, 2008
Case No.: 321

Facts:

Spouses Homobono and Lusdeldia Tarampi (Spouses Tarampi) obtained loans from the Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI), which were secured by real estate mortgages over a parcel of land.
Spouses Tarampi failed to comply with their obligation, prompting BPI to institute
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. During the auction, BPI was the highest bidder and a
Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. The same was registered and annotated on the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the said parcel of land.Since the one-year redemption
period expired without Spouses Tarampi redeeming the mortgage, BPI executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation. A new TCT was issued in favor of BPI. In the meantime, Spouses Tarampi filed an
action for annulment of the real estate mortgages. BPI, on the other hand, filed a Petition for
Writ of Possession over the property including all improvements thereon which was granted by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Spouses Tarampi
alleging therein that a writ cannot be issued on the ground that there is a pending action
concerning the validity of the mortgages. The RTC ordered the suspension of issuance of writ of
possession.On appeal, the Court of Appeals, held that since BPI is now the registered owner of
the property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right; and that any question
regarding the validity of the mortgages or their foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title in the buyers name, following
the debtor-mortgagors failure to redeem the mortgages.

Issue:

Whether or not the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the case
for annulment of mortgages

Held:

In the case at bar, Spouses Tarampi failed to redeem the mortgages within the reglementary
period, hence, ownership of the property covered thereby was consolidatedin the name of BPI
who had in fact been issued a new TCT. Issuance of a writ of possession thus became a
ministerial duty of the court.