Section 1.
Non-delegability
RUBI, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a
slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in
every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of
state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political
existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be
considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to
compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to
resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a
failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other
measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no successful
result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in
order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by
him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now,
therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public
land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive
order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has
selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the
Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro,
pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative
Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon
conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with
section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the
executive order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of
Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by
the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of
articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed
the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was
taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly
approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor.
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same
Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-
Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial
governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to
take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read:
Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special
provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act
No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will
later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to
put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of
the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all
to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-
Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled
in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13,
1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of
1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the
evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites
and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it
has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the
means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work
with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various
times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious
memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings
were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was
resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided
and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived
of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are
obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our
kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such
forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would
not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is
ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because
the above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and
decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed
by the laws of this title.
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the
facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and
passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they
may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY
HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones.
Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in
the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect,
 and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may
cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,
VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the
or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones,"
express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided,
is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881,
however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent
reading as follows:
to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often
made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law
be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE
"INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of
the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors
and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should,
nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty
indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one
alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is
the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8,
1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip
IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one
following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES,
"MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to
live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found
that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of
troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless
men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and
provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also
some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we
desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby
order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-
mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys,
presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their
powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest.
As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to
separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory
recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force
therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which
living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp
the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the
protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized
and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely in
the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the
Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with
this most important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with
the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives
to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of
Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed
been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against,
thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things,
taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty
which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws
on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in
the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political
standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after
finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila,
the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the
Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting
of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an
 intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for
the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the
only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I
hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be
governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which
are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities
of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which
may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and
roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued
pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and
the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are
hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall
have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on,
with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of
the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the
necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet;
for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of
communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said
towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at
the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which
affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first
two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their
dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed
for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which
prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made
to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an
armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of
which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de
Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all
the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and
now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of
the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions
allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as
the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious
indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be
detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the
Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering
personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued
(aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary
submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands and
the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most
productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for
their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom
to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct,
protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by
the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the
authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages
offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of
constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of
these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the
good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families
in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes,
that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in
their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes
and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain
General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which,
in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of
such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses,
labors, and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment
shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military
headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the
zones where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the
successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and
cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the
authority of each.
 13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in
the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions
shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal
Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the
questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to
it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the
foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by
the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila,
No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the
best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later
expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of
these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic
Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a
legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the
Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The
Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine
Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law,
was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law
establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory
not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-
Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine
Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province
of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the
organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the
organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act
of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United
States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted
for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc,
Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No.
547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL
CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF
MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any
form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint
officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act
Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the
establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva
Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor
is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law
and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
 SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his
province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local
popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised to
this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of
Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be
organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act
Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits
of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the
same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the
order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September
twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and
1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn,
Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes
retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and
consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words
are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are
also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections
701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which
contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397,
1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394,
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917;
and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No.
1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative
Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in
giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian
religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial
corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code
and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor
Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of
Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300,
note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what
is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the
provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine
Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-
Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the
twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to
that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first
section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only
in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province,
Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine
Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not,
however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. (
Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of
their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is
predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the
Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of
selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as
the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States
Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the
People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide
a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the
Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253
charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to
non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a
tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who
surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the
following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal
marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated
within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General
Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a
member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called
upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had
these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30,
1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and
was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who
were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of
persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397,
to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands
which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which
will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the
question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the
designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the
Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious
belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own
advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization
to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed.
For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of
your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced
Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the
jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be
afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and
you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs
in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to
the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act.
(Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no
other better classification has as yet been made the present classification should be
allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the expressed in
the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold
that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of
Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos
and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point,
who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment
of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law
to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone
subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to
mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes
are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or
towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not
he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a
civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof
or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew
of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as
he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all
the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the
nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered
throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists
in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this
Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject
to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject
thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327,
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part
reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding
cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the
hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the
Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and
digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the
fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life
and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as
members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the
cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode
of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized
community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject
to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from
and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and
other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons
arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the
expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may
be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for
former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether
or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does
or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain
tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed
by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically
the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue,
and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice.
Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been
baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-
Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does
he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the
provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same
authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that
the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating
liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution
under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the
provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said
phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian
inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but
simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the
Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains,
beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of
the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the
common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to
establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without
dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the
expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion
of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741
of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to
members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident
intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null
and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P.
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the
Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes
that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive
Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands,
prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-
Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which
sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious
belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census
of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of
Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los
nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan,"
"negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos,
but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in
primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-
day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all
these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and
signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into
the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the
"ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not
advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic
people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for
community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently
in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government.
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by
the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the
Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to
be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-
Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how
the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the
neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly
contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and
proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution
which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the
position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in
Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both
before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been
an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American
towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the
States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory right
to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But
they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this
paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or
the State or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the
only mode in which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in
private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise.
With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were,
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of
the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These
Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the
United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often
their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has
always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over
these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.
it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress
could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission
of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent
charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the
fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing,
the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as
wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the
alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution
expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to
the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a
fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether
within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the
limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been
deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the
government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay
[1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907],
204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911],
221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35
L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an
Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be
necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of
judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This
was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of
Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly
belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some
time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith,
and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain
themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government;
that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the
United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the
General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the
relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused
the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment
by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the
Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the
Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the
court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of
Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian
country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon
the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is
wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to
know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be
upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and
has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before
a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of
authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military
department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the
United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more
fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground.
And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in
violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so
ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is
a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in
the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do
exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and
placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that,
when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and
for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the
United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere
to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists
for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this
power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has
abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney,
and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as
held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the
relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians.
Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs
shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the
President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out
to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view
of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not
broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people
concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of
the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of
special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364,
reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232
U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power
by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English,
and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of
'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an
attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs,
and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty,
and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long
continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants
according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative
action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low
grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the
government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There
can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The
failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to
Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place.
There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been
made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be
encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which
they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are
necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained
during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was
naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila,
made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer
to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The
Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities
and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens
of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in
a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-
Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the
non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized
Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are
induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health
throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate
their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-
Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable
relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in,
the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among
the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their
living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization.
Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon
their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to
understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into
fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the
Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and
abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life
with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and
objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political
equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See
Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-
called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in
reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the
non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for
advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and
foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the
moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and
complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the
provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of
the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates
advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude
upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making
depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing
nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by
bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and
to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method
was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing
situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same
class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these
few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that
the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men
are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are
citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are
Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and
Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain.
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will
leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code,
because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and
its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from
destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity
is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they
(the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying
the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State
but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting
in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of
their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything
they will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they
allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea
of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class
of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government
should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of
persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains
and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has
been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity
and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and
more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be
citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed
encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when
they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished
which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up
the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal
interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after
expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws
of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously
invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to
pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left
in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those
who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they
are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed
and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is
being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make
them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do
not work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other
places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact
that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual
property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants,
and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the
greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the
public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the
entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic
habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and
unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble
intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach
a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he
pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example
from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the
same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless
people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be
the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into
whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress
these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out
the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the
courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is
generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it
would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the
accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is
a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now
purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred
to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that
the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some
extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the
particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of
the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread
belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately
have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this
progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that
the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power.
But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there
exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-
Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been
effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people of the
Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal
before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich
and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The
public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the
Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case
is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving
consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that
"constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson
[1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the
effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty
in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the
Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.
So ordered.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead
to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume
towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord,
Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to
tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise
enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from
time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in
the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is
premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several
municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because the latter
have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions
intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-
Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the
provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected"
and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the
proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created
without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which
is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency
and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic
and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to
the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379,
has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive
orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate
any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required,
merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the
(Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever
the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be
divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice
of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict
the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts
so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby
affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular
Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section
does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such
claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a
mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of
the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201)
in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries
of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function"
(State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the
exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23
Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2a Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the
end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for
a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate
any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not
overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein
as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare
may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which
the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we
consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided that,
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by
executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the
change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The
opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or the conditions under which,
the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of
said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be
transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if
we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all
other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs.
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively,
as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine
laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the
specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and
have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power
to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transitupon national roads and streets. Upon the
other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No.
2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases
involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative
functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question
(Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly
characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community
in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative
powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain
territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or
vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of
the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or
conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and
designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof,
setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23
Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be
incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the
court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be
included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such
incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of
Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll
road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in
which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of
the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the
case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at
bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition"
submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no
inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative,"
provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress
small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the
policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the
scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the
validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be
any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a
total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special
duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative
bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A
better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely
legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.
With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of
checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided
by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long
as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance
which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty
imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may
be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any
of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control
denied to him by the Constitution.
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not
all the proper parties" referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have been
impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not
claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed
office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor
General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines,
its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local
officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in
the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It
is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the
President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that
the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of
doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in
audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case,
in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to. It is so ordered.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either
to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the
alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the
exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND CEBU
OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(COACVEA) respondents.
Michael L. Rama for petitioner.
Armando M. Alforque for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.;
The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by
the law it seeks to implement.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central
Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
covering the years 1986 to 1988. Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases as
follows:
ARTICLE IV SALARIES/RICE RATION
Section 1. The COMPANY agrees that for and during the three (3) year
effectivity of this AGREEMENT, it will grant to all regular covered
employees the following salary increases:
Salaries:
1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 P200 to each
covered employee.
IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS
PAY INCREASE SHALL BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY
MANDATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR ALLOWANCE
INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION,
DECREE OR PRESIDENT
2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to
each covered employee.
IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS
PAY INCREASE SHALL BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY DATED
GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR ALLOWANCE INCREASES
WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR
PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE DATE TO THE
NEXT INCREASE.
3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to
each covered employee.
IT IS HEREBY EXPRESSLY AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS
PAY INCREASE SHALL BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY
MANDATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR ALLOWANCE
INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION,
DECREE OR PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE
DATE TO THE NEXT INCREASE.
IF THE WAGE ADJUSTMENT OF ALLOWANCE INCREASES DECREED
BY LAW, LEGISLATION OR PRESIDENTIAL qqqEDICT IN ANY
PARTICULAR YEAR SHALL BE HIGHER THAN THE FOREGOING
INCREASES IN THAT PARTICULAR YEAR, THEN THE COMPANY
SHALL PAY THE DIFFERENCE.
On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, as
follows:
Sec. 2. The statutory minimum wage rates of workers and employees in the
private sector, whether agricultural or non-agricultural, shall be increased by
ten pesos (P10.00) per day, except non-agricultural workers and employees
outside Metro Manila who shall receive an increase of eleven pesos
(P11.00) per day: Provided, that those already receiving above the
minimum wage up to one hundred pesos (Pl 00.00 shall receive an increase
of ten pesos (Pl 0.00) per day. Excepted from the provisions of this Act are
domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another.
The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No.
6640. Section 8 thereof provides:
Section 8. Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective Agreements. No
wage increase shall be credited as compliance with the increase prescribed
herein unless expressly provided under valid individual written/collective
agreements; and, provided further, that such wage increase was granted in
anticipation of the legislated wage increase under the act. Such increases
shall not include anniversary wage increases provided on collective
agreements.
In sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary
wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.
Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of P200.00 under the CBA and added the
difference of P61.66 (rounded to P62.00) and P31.00 to the monthly salary and the 13th month
pay, respectively, of its employees from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6640 on December
14,1987 to February 15, 1988.
On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection
Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon
completion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, he
found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows:
1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of
two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages
above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate
amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P83,200.00); and
2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208
employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT
THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).
On April 7, 1988, respondent Assistant Regional Director, issued an Order instructing petitioner to
pay its 208 employees the aggregate amount of P 131,248.00, computed as follows:
Computation sheet of differentials due to COACO-Cebu Workers.
Salary Differentials:
a) From December 14/87 to February 15/88
= P200.00/mo x 2 months
= P400.00
= P400 x 208 employees (who are not receiving above P100/day as wages
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640)
=P 83,200.00
b) 13th month pay differentials of the year 1987:
= P231.00 x 208 employees (who are not receiving above P100/day as
wages before the effectivity of RA. No. 6640)
=P48,048.00
Total = P131,248.00
In sum, the Assistant Regional Director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of P200.00 in the
monthly salary and P 231.00 in the 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated.
Petitioner protested the Order of the Regional Director on the ground that the anniversary wage
increases under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase mandated by Republic Act
No. 6640. Hence, petitioner contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase
negotiated under the CBA, it was liable only for a salary differential of P 62.00 and a 13th month
pay differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the payment of the differentials constitutes full
compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. Apparently, the protest was not entertained. Petitioner
brought the case immediately to this Court without appealing the matter to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. On May 9,1988, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Assistant Regional Director from enforcing his Order dated April 7, 1988.1The thrust of the
argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to
the wage increase provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly
expands the provisions of the said law.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Public respondents aver that petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor
before going to court. It is fundamental that in a case where only pure questions of law are raised,
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot
be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders
involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot
decide such issues with finality.2 The questions raised in this petition are questions of law. Hence,
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be considered fatal to this petition.
As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which
prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective
bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract
from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640,
do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with
Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not
contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by
such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 3 Thus petitioner's
contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including
anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage
increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only
be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect.
The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said
law was enacted.
Petitioner therefor correctly credited its employees P62.00 for the differential of two (2) months
increase and P31.00 each for the differential in 13th month pay, after deducting the P200.00
anniversary wage increase for 1987 under the CBA. Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in
case any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law, legislation or presidential edict
in any particular year shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that particular year, then the
company (petitioner) shall pay the difference.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Assistant Regional
Director dated April 7, 1988 is modified in that petitioner is directed to pay its 208 employees so
entitled the amount of P62.00 each as salary differential for two (2) months and P31.00 as 13th
month pay differential in full compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640. Section 8 of
the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the
anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being
credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is
immediately executory.
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. (2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region
ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, X will become parts of Region IX.
Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental),
ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone
District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and (3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of
CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga Region XII.
City) petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR (4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of
REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR Region XII.
REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL (5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of
MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF Region IX.
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National
Treasurer, respondents.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become
part of Region IX.
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of
administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous
Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte,
Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing
Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then
for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order
President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question.
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and
cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in
The facts are as follows:
the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the
cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new
Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A.
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in
provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and remain in the existing administrative regions."
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi,
Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16,
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to
1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of
Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional
Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing
provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can
be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous
Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the
administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall effective delivery of field services of government
be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces agencies taking into consideration the formation of the
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority
determination, merge the existing regions.
necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not
include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include
October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory
Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 construction.

(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a
Region IX. restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this
reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the
apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not valid under
 the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance
appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative
districts in provinces and cities.1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative
Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and
prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of
Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines.
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the
President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good
government and responsive national government, including but not limited
to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning implementation, and
review functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in
decision-making process;

Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of
(1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions,
administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the activities, and programs;
exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
(d) Further development of as standardized as
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate
the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not organizational structures;
to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the
regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
(e) Further development of the regionalization
process; and
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as
merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas
v. Comelec,2 and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments (f) Further rationalization of the functions of and
and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, administrative relationships among government
respectively, of the Constitution. entities.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the
to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to continuing authority of the President to reorganize
provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies,
Binangonan,3 in which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National
sustained on the ground that Government, including all government owned or
controlled corporations as well as the entire range of
the powers, functions, authorities, administrative
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these
provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.
all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and
centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only
prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the 2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:
legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or
The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and
regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an units of the National Government, as well as expand,
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it. amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers,
functions and authorities, including, with respect to
government-owned or controlled corporations, their
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant
cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as aspects of their charters.
necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.
g. Take such other related actions as may be
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides: necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of
this Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners
contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event,
whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's
discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and
cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region
or did not vote in favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center
of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for
their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of
the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government,
including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose
was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government."4 The Commission on
Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan
not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to
Congress within forty days after the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any
reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress.5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which
divided the country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved
and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in
1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional
organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555
transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to
merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of
the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed
in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [seeArt. X, 4 of the
Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes."7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as
"administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed
in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in
the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize
the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social
and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public
business."12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance
with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those
regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was
to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No.
6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical
rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the
reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A.
No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional
autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy
"shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No.
96673 claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened
the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain
political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated
regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No.
429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate
in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the
President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown
by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X
and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said
Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all
formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said
plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region
XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5)
Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi
and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities
voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15
The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and
cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region,
they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the
lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another
except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present
part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division
or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people
residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that
administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes,
not for political representation.

Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which
voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that
the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It
is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No.
429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative
regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical
features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4)
land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-
economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to
Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been
by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere
"groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no
basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the
contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other
infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the
transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or
expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed
and upon a more adequate record than that presented by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of
which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government
itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct
the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices
thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the
meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders
and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not
more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or
corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of
this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws
inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the
application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended
by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the
prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing
of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the
Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should
be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the
sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty
of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July
30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that
the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first
published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes
the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1
authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting
in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules
and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the
promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions
or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define
what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act
also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to
issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of
this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they
shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-
General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying
out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus
issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and
or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative
and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, power.
if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is
sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers
are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and
law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature property shall be equal and reasonable.
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all
Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding.
deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it It was there held
delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In
other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic
Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The settled to require either argument or citation of authority.
Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto
itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There
rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into
is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define
effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation
crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime,
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of
power, is unconstitutional and void.
the law.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-
187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest
and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to
their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of
charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of
the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the State.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal
and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the
law shall be, which would not be allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an
authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in
pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon
the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no
authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no
other power.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a
public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate.
The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee &
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws
1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.
could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were
required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro,
if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud
(220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional.
The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any
violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated
terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the
proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the
Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power;
but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow
person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control
is altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring
upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.
None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had
legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give
to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by
the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could
be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by
Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove
and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were
making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made
themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a
forest reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from
harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the
property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power.
It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public
corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had
the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature
could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and
reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of
legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire
insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it
legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed
out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may
be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in
like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes,
or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain
closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the
president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer
arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance,
to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated;
second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the
 village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere
administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it
shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact
or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance
by its terms gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his
own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative
discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations
were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a
peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the
price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of
a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the
defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being
as follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila
price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling
expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their
deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the
maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price
as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the
necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial
treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with,
and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry,
for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in
other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the
other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have
a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power
to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-
General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize
him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and
not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be
the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it
is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are
many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range
in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price
for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos
per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again,
it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine
Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products. Any
law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is not
general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle,
the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs,
chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature of
things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an
unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No.
2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the
Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation,
without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In
other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was
and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how
long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not
specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,
palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was
made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized
the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the
proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which
worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question
here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such
matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty
and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the
wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of
the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We
make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of government,
under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the
power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be
delegated under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with
government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred
under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same
reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at
any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the
Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial
power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may
be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price
at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States
had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it
is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all
the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government
itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this
case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to
one of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have
any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this
court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be
construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or
nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive,
under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be
found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to
legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote
of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the
manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the
Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and
make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act
unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the
remaining portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R.
CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No.
91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates
of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm
by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed
that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by
the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for
reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on
August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he
was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer
Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to
the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they
could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their
complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto,
complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an
alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer,
also for confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N.
Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of
the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's
license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses
and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a
memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic
District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his
own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned
decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle
License Plates and dated February 28, 1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the
removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan
Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach
the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar
(as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor
vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.
Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by
police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is,
according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and
motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate
COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that
it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2
thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application,
approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-
making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because
the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself
said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance,
which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance
could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the
measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of
examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early
resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity.
A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention
that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or
controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or
act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled
principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional
circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of
confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More
importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and
the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that
one policeman who confiscated a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and
said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top."
Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including
Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it
and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the
Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as
expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where
Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.)
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the
instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
(Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued
separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental
question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same
reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the
petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question
whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can
be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the decision in the
cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed
is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
(Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition
for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan
Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are
considered co-petitioners and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of
Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No.
102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the
Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has
recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing
them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate
proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the
public, the important substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific
authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the
basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed
that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to
alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of
traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures,
it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it.
What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the
discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient
standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus
"prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that
the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case
at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question
we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the
particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and
consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not
pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses
for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions
of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila
Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines
and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic
laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and
under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the
Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws
over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan
Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or
revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan
Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or
certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or
revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for
their records update.
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed
within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00
for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's
license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth
offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher
penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating
the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring
driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their
branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall
endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the
filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an
unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and
corresponding surcharges.
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees,
orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The
Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself.
Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it
to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of
traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan
Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue
and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what
is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us,
the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is
the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the
Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of
Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify
the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance
clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not
require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the
same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land
Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58
of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the
provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of
P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application;
 Section 3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act
496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made
by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the
subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penalty for
its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words,
Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner
additional conditions.
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses
for traffic violations within the said area.

The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to
a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government.
But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a
laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise
of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated
to a local ordinance.

We affirm.

To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances

amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of
marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize
carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to
deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The
list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances
disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country
with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and
shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that
may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in
the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed
there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged
enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose
such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to
the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner, vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL
and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the
term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set aside
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September
8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge and granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19, 1976 2 denying the motions for
reconsideration filed by the parties therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school
officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case
No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial
on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with
the further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section
32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an undated order
received by the counsel for private respondents on October 20,1975, the motion for
reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of
Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the
ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional
for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left
to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was
related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously
transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge
Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further
proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March
15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. 10 On August
2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended
petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in
substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall
outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower
court's decision but the same was limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both motions for
reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19, 1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of
law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.
4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the constitutionality of
the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of the jurisdictional
issue raised in this petition.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with,
restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by
this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of
the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from
P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or
term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the
penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment,
although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific term of
imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is
vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In
every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this
doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have
enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislative enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the imposable
but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate
and should be rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by
statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the
offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has consistently
overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.
(Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs.
Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96
Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our
Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is
appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or
character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and apply to
punishments which never existed in America, or which
public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete
(15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted
at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the
like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to
the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, 17 where an
"excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation for
executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case
in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared
unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the
legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes,
bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are
advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or
reduction of the penalty...
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree
of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await
appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has
as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in question
should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the legislative
department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine
the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of
legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
is concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is
also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period
of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or
amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such
instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power
or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the
application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously
overlooked is his own reference to penalties "between designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of
separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers
of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The
second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer
of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of
agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that
when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is
exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of
fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the
penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the
discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It
is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed
within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well
constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The
courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the
benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-
delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is
hereby, declared unconstitutional.

It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment,
as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth
mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby
a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial
acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and
cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and
independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise
declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said
Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment.
Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with
imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as
imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24

2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 25

With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited
to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in
determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against
private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296,
as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than
P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently,
Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and
ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by
everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself
honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)
French statesman and economist
Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits these are
the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337)1 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of
which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The
petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived
constitutional infirmities in its passage.
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments
notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No.
9337 is not unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705,
and Senate Bill No. 1950.
House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee
on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which
Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the
bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading.
House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep.
Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother
bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on
February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on
March 7, 2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration
House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while
Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M.
Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was
approved by the Senate on second and third reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555,
House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and
conference," recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and
with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was
transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A.
No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.5 When said date came, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary
restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a
little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at
about 5 oclock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on television
and on radio. Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%.
Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding
in domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that theyll have to pay would have to go
up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per our own understanding
of the law, thats not true. Its not true that the e-vat law necessarily increased prices by 10%
uniformly isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Its not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the
Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : Thats correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the elimination
of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the VAT as to
petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10% to
cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would
probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into exact figures I am just trying to
deliver a point that different industries, different products, different services are hit differently. So
its not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Youre right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present
imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as
a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to increase the fares by 10% at best
7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day,
were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And thats one reason among many others this Court
had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation. Thats why we added as an
issue in this case, even if its tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion
in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of
an across the board increase of 10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the
Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should
be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of
each service, of each company, isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So thats one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the
clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means of
a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this Court. . . . 6
The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and
use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of
its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
G.R. No. 168207
On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise
assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate
to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners also
contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being
satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as
it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is
ambiguous because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the
conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are
unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the VAT rate, which is
supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the
GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the
Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a
bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 168461
Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association
of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable
goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT
components, exceeds One Million Pesos (1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input
tax to be credited against the output tax; and
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its
political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final
withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under
Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of
properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive,
excessive, and confiscatory.
Petitioners argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to
petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be
claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not
be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend
that like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed
of, and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there
is no profit or value-added.
Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the
creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital
equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and
substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI,
Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to
output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager
margins the petitioners make.
G.R. No. 168463
Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed
this petition for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in
violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass
on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and
3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121,
125,7 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI,
Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
G.R. No. 168730
On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the
creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes
they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated
for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these
establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI,
Section 28(1) of the Constitution.
RESPONDENTS COMMENT
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents. Preliminarily,
respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.
Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA
630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the
bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate
concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard to the issue of undue delegation of
legislative power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no
discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions
provided therein arise.
Respondents also refute petitioners argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70%
limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of
capital goods exceeding 1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government
agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle
on progressive taxation, among others.
Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the governments fiscal reform
agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt
the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth.
ISSUES
The Court defined the issues, as follows:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the
NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC;
and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
RULING OF THE COURT
As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-
added tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its
nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease
of goods or properties and services.8 Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or
services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer, 9 with the seller acting merely as a tax
collector.10 The burden of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-
consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or
business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else.11 Examples are
individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.12
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in
a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost
deduction method" and was payable only by the original sellers. The single-stage system was
subsequently modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method" was
used to determine the value-added tax payable.13 Under the "tax credit method," an entity can
credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its
purchases, inputs and imports.14
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the
VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using
the "tax credit method."15
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law, 16 R.A. No. 8241 or the
Improved VAT Law,17 R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,18 and finally, the presently
beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act.
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
I.
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee
Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee
exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No.
9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against
the output tax; and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of
taxes in addition to the value-added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any
legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it would
be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with
decency, deliberation, and order."19 Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides
that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to this inherent
constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules
of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as
follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference
committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere
to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they
materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latters
appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
...
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report
prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the
same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the
provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee
of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The President shall
designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the approval of the
Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the
members of each House panel, voting separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled
version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to
the report.
...
"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure."21 (Emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege
irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting
provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to the Farias case,22 the present petitions also
raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on matters regarding
Congress compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and
inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the
discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business
expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it
addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded
disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of
Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal
its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the branch of government.
details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing
legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the of Finance,23 the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the
bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this
remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress. question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house." 24 To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
In the recent case of Farias vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be
Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
declining therein petitioners plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed
in said case was Congresss creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the
records of said committees proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court
both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the
submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other,
passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act. reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements
were as follows:
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:
House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed Provides for 12% VAT on Provides for 12% VAT in Provides for a single rate of
are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Courts consistent adherence every sale of goods or general on sales of goods or 10% VAT on sale of goods
to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the properties (amending Sec. properties and reduced rates or properties (amending
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on for sale of certain locally Sec. 106 of NIRC), 10%
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the importation of goods manufactured goods and VAT on sale of services
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. (amending Sec. 107 of petroleum products and raw including sale of electricity
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. NIRC); and 12% VAT on materials to be used in the by generation companies,
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in sale of services and use or manufacture thereof (amending transmission and distribution
its favor.The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.: lease of properties Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT companies, and use or lease
(amending Sec. 108 of on importation of goods and of properties (amending
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the NIRC) reduced rates for certain Sec. 108 of NIRC)
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply imported products including
with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional petroleum products (amending
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12%
VAT on sale of services and
courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
use or lease of properties and a
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
 reduced rate for certain Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral
services including power Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions by making the following changes:
generation (amending Sec. 108
of NIRC)
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap
No similar provision Provides that the VAT imposed Provides that the VAT in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with
on power generation and on the imposed on sales of 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the
sale of petroleum products shall electricity by generation present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax
be absorbed by generation companies and services of collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%,
companies or sellers, transmission companies and or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1%, when
respectively, and shall not be distribution companies, as the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to
passed on to consumers well as those of franchise 12% effective January 1, 2006.
grantees of electric utilities
shall not apply to residential
2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both
end-users. VAT shall be the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT
absorbed by generation, imposed on sale of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral
transmission, and Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report
distribution companies. any no pass-on provision.
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax No similar provision Provides that the input tax
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the
credit for capital goods on credit for capital goods on
Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a
which a VAT has been paid which a VAT has been paid
limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it
shall be equally distributed shall be equally distributed
crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of
over 5 years or the over 5 years or the
computing the same by providing thus:
depreciable life of such depreciable life of such
capital goods; the input tax capital goods; the input tax
credit for goods and credit for goods and services (A) Creditable Input Tax. . . .
services other than capital other than capital goods
goods shall not exceed 5% shall not exceed 90% of the
of the total amount of such output VAT. ...
goods and services; and for
persons engaged in retail Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or
trading of goods, the business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly
allowable input tax credit over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate
shall not exceed 11% of the acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million
total amount of goods Pesos (1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good
purchased. is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise taxes over such shorter period: . . .
No similar provision No similar provision Provided for amendments to several
NIRC provisions regarding corporate
(B) Excess franchise
income, percentage, Output orand
Input Tax. If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the
excise
taxes input tax, the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the
output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED
that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED,
to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may
generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers, as at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . .
proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax,
on to consumers, as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be
franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such
limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise
amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some
and excise taxes should be amended.
changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.

There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and
Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the
Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile"
and "harmonize."25 To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on
disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for
it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the original
provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted
by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted
by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the
rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still
totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the
Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that no
sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated on.
The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And lets keep it plain and simple. Lets not confuse
the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and in this
two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking
of the Senate is basically simple, lets keep the VAT simple.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really
enjoyed the support of either House."27
With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral
Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on
such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee
was totally within the intent of both houses to put a cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of
Representatives, one of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and
administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ." and "[b]y
introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major leakage that has
placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage."28
As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in
Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference
committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were
germane to subjects of the provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In
the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado29 and Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance,30 the Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference
committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House.
Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the
Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any
basis.31 (Emphasis supplied)
B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-
Amendment Rule"
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add
or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is
in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time
in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.32 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective
houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment.
Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one
house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of
Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said
bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by
the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive . . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
Origination of Revenue Bills "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because
a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only
corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
provisions, to wit: substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to
"concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the
Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own
119 Tax on franchises version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels ...
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills,
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach
Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections enactment of such laws.33 (Emphasis supplied)
106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only
to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC
which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the House bills are not Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in
Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
The argument does not hold water. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on
the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not
been touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated:
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that
initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax.
Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950
proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments
to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not
dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the
House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of
solving the countrys serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be
strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be
easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be
operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to
significant expenditure savings have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a
credible package of revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and
control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis
supplied)

The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:
held, thus:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged
that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a
balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem
poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of
our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance
given our present conditions.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is
to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and
control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house
bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of
national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide
for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing
the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The
sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on corporation
were included is worth quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise 64.3 billion in
additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum
products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only 48.7 billion amount is from the
VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab 10.5 billion- will be picked by
corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the
consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the
burden of the consumer?
The corporate worlds equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35
percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise 10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back,
not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency
provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal
medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their
sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the
tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will
be there to share the burden.35
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made
on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills
which is to raise revenues for the government.
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to
the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on
consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax
and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they
would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these
sections to soften the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:
However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on bunker
fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.
For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the
VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as
diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.
...
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what
was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT,
so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of VAT.36
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are
necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and
purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit, among others.
Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
I.
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend
in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from
10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power
to tax.
The assailed provisions read as follows:
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter
or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods.
(A) In General. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a
value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of
Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and
other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from
customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the
quantity or volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus
excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of
services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after
any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %). (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate
is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not
within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the government.
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise
imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President
the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability,
responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass
to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively
nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the
acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by
the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create
the conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent.
On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the
imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an
unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without representation. They submit
that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may
not even give his recommendation. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided
in the law on what basis and as to how he will make his recommendation. They claim,
nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside
by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.37 A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has
been delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such
as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another.39
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the
Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative
power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete
law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and
to determine the expediency of its enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be
justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear
that the power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one appertaining exclusively to the
legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of
its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.
It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.42 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.43 Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. 44
In People vs. Vera,45 the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the
concept and extent of delegation of power in this wise:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands
of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of
the legislature.
...
The true distinction, says Judge Ranney, is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot
be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
...
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the
hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. In
Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may
delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain
facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the
apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on
account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern
industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional
Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United
States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative
agencies: The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may
determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon
the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence
of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its
duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action
is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken.
What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public
policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done
according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a
declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the
contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may
designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of
future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when
the specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).46
In Edu vs. Ericta,47 the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can
be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).48
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine
certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute
is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies
or limitations on their authority.49 While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be
left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.50
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of
legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty
of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the
legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform.
Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence
of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing
such information is proper.51 The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government
does not require that Congress find for itself
every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed
determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to
particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate. 52
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections
4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation
of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the
fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion.53 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. 54
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded
by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion
by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when
the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based
on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or
conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that
the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the Secretary of Finance by
mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners
Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase "upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the
submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance
can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.
When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means
that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive.
The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is "subject to
the direction of the President."55
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the
President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the
event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.56 The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to
properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality
in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of
Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the
findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or
the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance,
by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate
must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible.57 Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.58
As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same
deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress
chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task
being to interpret the law.59
The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not
deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations
which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not
fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities,
justice and law will be short-lived.
B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax
Burden
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and
additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on
any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested provisions, is ambiguous because it does not
state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original 10% if the rates are no longer satisfied.
Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the
applicable VAT rate from year to year.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions
set forth therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of
the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the
President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT collection goes below the
24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year does not exceed 1%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or
limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that
only Congress may tread upon.60
Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the
Court finds none, petitioners argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for
petitioners fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself does not provide that the rate
should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present.
The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no
occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of
judicial addition or subtraction.61
Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the
President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be
based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There is
another condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:
1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%
The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP is
less than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT or
that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax collection. Therefore, there is no value to
increase it to 12% because such action will also be ineffectual.
2. Natl Govt Deficit/GDP >1.5%
The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal condition
of government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a balanced
budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a
relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need
to increase the VAT rate.62
That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection
does not render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was
passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need
for a raise in revenue.
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by
Adam Smith in his Canons of Taxation (1776), as:
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the
people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. 63
It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures
and their variations.64
The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe.
During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly
depicted the countrys gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:
First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position
where 90 percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we
currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. Thats interest plus amortization of our debt. So clearly,
this is not a sustainable situation. Thats the first fact.
The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries
that borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately
equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a sustainable situation.
The third thing that Id like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is not
as benign as what it used to be the past five years.
What do I mean by that?
In the past five years, weve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically global
growth and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a rapid
increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of the world. And, therefore, our ability to
borrow at reasonable prices is going to be challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is our
ability to access the financial markets.
When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is
now, at least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that
raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can then convince them to improve our
ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on us because the interest rates
have gone up. In fact, just within this room, we tried to access the market for a billion dollars
because for this year alone, the Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount,
we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We
were trying to access last week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not
accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not very good.
So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end
our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in
what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest
and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And
the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our
revenue base.65
The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable
catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the states economic dilemma is not
for the Court to judge. In the Farias case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments
raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
pronouncing that:
. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious
conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.66
In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the
executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation."67
II.
Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their
argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property
without due process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering
that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.68
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the
amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that
the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: "
Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax
due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of
good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a
VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable
goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to register under the law.
Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that
may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be
credited against the output tax.
Petitioners argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output
tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that
the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable.
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a businesss books of accounts and
remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which
provides that "if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters." In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent
that such input taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may
be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes.
The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners
exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-
sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given
quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be
credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or
that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).
Therefore, petitioners argument must be rejected.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the
70% limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in
effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which
violates the principle that tax collection and revenue should be for public purposes and
expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when
he buys goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In
computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the
input taxes that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess,
which has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or
credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the taxpayers option.70
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person
can credit his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In laymans term, the value-
added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be credited up
to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention
of any tax collection because the person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a
seller, and the seller will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for
the payment of the tax is the seller.71 What only needs to be done is for the person/taxpayer to
apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his output taxes.
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes
the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process
of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons
have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which
were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested
by virtue of such rights.72
Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are
not recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible
from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax
on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation of
goods and services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was introduced.73 This was
adopted by the Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),74 and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No.
8424).75 The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by law,
a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 110. Tax Credits.
(A) Creditable Input Tax.
Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade
or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread
evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate
acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds One million
pesos (1,000,000.00): Provided, however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is
less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread
over such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services, lease or
use of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon
payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input
tax on purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost of 1 Million pesos,
exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a delay in the crediting of the input
tax. Petitioners argument is without basis because the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of
his privilege to credit the input tax.
It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in this
case amounts to a 4-year interest-free loan to the government.76 In the same breath, Congress
also justified its move by saying that the provision was designed to raise an annual revenue of
22.6 billion.77 The legislature also dispelled the fear that the provision will fend off foreign
investments, saying that foreign investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing
the case of China, where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not
deterred.78 Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this involves
executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government
for taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC,
reads:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs)
shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods and services which are
subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and
withhold a final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof:
Provided, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident
owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For
purposes of this Section, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the
withholding agent.
The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following
the end of the month the withholding was made.
Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more
simplified VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted as a withholding
agent with respect to their payments for goods and services.
Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be
withheld -- 3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services
supplied by contractors other than by public works contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for
services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on payment for the lease or use of
properties or property rights to nonresident owners. Under the present Section 114(C), these
different rates, except for the 10% on lease or property rights payment to nonresidents, were
deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is applied.
The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as
opposed to creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): "final value-added tax at
the rate of five percent (5%)."
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997),
the concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:
SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax. Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax
withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due
from the payee on the said income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor
as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of
underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent.
(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld on
certain income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the payee
on said income. Taxes withheld on income payments covered by the expanded withholding tax
(referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and compensation income (referred to in Sec.
2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable in nature.
As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are
subject to a 5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This
represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The other 5% effectively accounts for the standard
input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the actual input VAT directly or attributable to the
taxable transaction.79
The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended
to treat differently taxable transactions with the government. 80 This is supported by the fact that
under the old provision, the 5% tax withheld by the government remains creditable against the tax
liability of the seller or contractor, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods from
sellers and services rendered by contractors which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in
Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of
three percent (3%) of the gross payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross
receipts for services rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall
be creditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor: Provided, however,
That in the case of government public works contractors, the withholding rate shall be eight and
one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That the payment for lease or use of properties or
property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the
time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be
considered as the withholding agent.
The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following
the end of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits Congresss
intention to treat transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been shown that
the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax has been unreasonably narrowed, there is no
reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the only ones
subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the government.
Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue
Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the
BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross payments, the excess may
form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is
treated as income.81
Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government
gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.
Petitioners stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not
engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain.
Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life
in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
Whats more, petitioners contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or value-
added. It need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a
business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It cannot be overstressed that a
business is created precisely for profit.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances."83
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.84
Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of
input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not
based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in
the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection. Petitioners alleged distinctions are based on
variables that bear different consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield varying
end results depending on ones profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what
the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from all others in these same particulars.85
Petitioners brought to the Courts attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R.
Osmea III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by
Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by increasing
the same to 90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is
arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations.
Until Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the
70% limitation stays.
B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall
be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the
rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times.86
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all
goods and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties,
importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections
also provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70%
limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital
goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of
uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only
demands uniformity within the particular class.87
R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0%
or 10% (or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts
not exceeding 1,500,000.00.88Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their original
state are still not subject to the tax,89 thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain
accessible. As was stated in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs.
Tan:90
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by
persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding 200,000.00.
Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from
the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other
necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower
and within the reach of the general public.
It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and
unduly favors those with high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize
the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under Section 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on
VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual sales and/or
receipts not exceeding 1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses
that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the
tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products91 and natural gas92 were
reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers was removed. 93 Power producers are now exempt
from paying franchise tax.94
Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to
distribute the burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now
subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous 32%.95 Intercorporate dividends of non-resident
foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the
corporations domicile was increased to 20%.96 The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore.97 Even the sale by an artist of
his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would
otherwise rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is
equitable.
C. Progressivity of Taxation
Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive.
It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences.
Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayers ability to pay. This principle was
also lifted from Adam Smiths Canons of Taxation, and it states:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as
nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.
Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person
affected.98
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle
of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the
consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of
income. In
other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The
disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that
the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten
by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats
away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit
margins that is always hardest hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the
VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus:
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that direct taxes are .
. . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized. (E.
FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise,
sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with
the proclamation of Art. VIII, 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, 28
(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.

Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the
case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero
rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting
exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4 amending 103 of the NIRC)99

CONCLUSION

It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a
first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning
a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the
law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional
simply because of its yokes.

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the
judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature
may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions. . . .

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies
for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the
powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial
interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous
regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and
that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by
the ballot box.100

The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things
considered, there is no raison d'tre for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No.
9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality
of herein decision.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ
REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as
SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject
matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage
may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a
multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast
to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed
master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in
trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of
refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents. 6 In a
more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later
discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest
form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of
the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator
approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that
the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be
distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each
House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution
made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the
area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary,
"with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item
hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator
participation broadened from the areas of fund release and realignment to
the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the
public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing
projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of
projects selected by Members of Congress, they being the representatives
of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount each
legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill
prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications.
Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public
Works Act.17 In the 1960s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and
the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man
controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the
Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government
Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving
lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving 500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in
turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional
Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public
works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or
non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of
Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form
of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund"
 which were created with lump-sum appropriations of 480 Million and 240
Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the
Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar
funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of
2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the
approval of the President, to be released directly to the implementing
agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the
amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by
1992, Representatives were receiving 12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving 18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft
projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of
CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first
time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-
President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated 12.5 Million each in
CDF funds, Senators, 18 Million each, and the Vice-President, 20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on
project identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In
addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was
directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the
funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned, were
directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from
their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the
Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the
case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the
House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be
submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that
the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis
for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be
disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the
required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that the
publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed
for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at
that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly
fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or
"CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda.37 It has
been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of
executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus
harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are
the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio
Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School
Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the
legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3)
separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the
"Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a
special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of
Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund"
(PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with
the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly
stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel
benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of
the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely
contained a single special provision ordering the release of the funds
directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single
provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express
authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the
Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the
DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the
aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission,
respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund
priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda of the national
government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It
also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
 project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005
GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In
similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into
the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to
the specific amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their
participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be
funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the
DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned
Member of Congress61anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal
participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the
implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose,
the law stated that "the amount of at least 250 Million of the 500 Million
allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be
made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of
public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to
NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was
in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued
Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007),
amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the
Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68(the
implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an
NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount
to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the
201170 PDAF Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts
allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives
were given 70 Million each, broken down into 40 Million for "hard
projects" and 30 Million for "soft projects"; while 200 Million was given to
each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a 100 Million allocation
each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of
funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education,
Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government,
Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and
Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category
as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has
not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for
realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of
projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list,
standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list
requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual
legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were
included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the
Vice-President, which was pegged at 200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had
been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district,
endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests
for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the terms usage has
expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section
880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the
need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government
efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy
resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep
Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been
currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title
IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983.
More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993
on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the
"Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid
on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were SOP
(standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to
a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging,
rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other
sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines
and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration
of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional
initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including 3.6 Billion for a Congressman,
sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF
as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any
pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was
dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some 10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer
than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the
ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was
diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-
year audit investigation99covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit
was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these
funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies
and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to 8.374 Billion in PDAF and 32.664 Billion
in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases
that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly,
the Co As findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of
legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of
sponsoring members of the Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount
appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these
having been turned over to the government.
Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the
latters endorsement and without considering their mandated functions,
administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the
implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the
proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any
appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred
seventy two (772) projects amount to 6.156 Billion were either found
questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to
liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of
goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with
law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least 900 Million
from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According
to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA
is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice
Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara
Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S.
Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of
the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and
from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben
M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed
an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon,
in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court
order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and
all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x
from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals,
and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with
the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited
to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition
dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon
S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of
Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the
Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and
Communication and the National Economic Development Authority. 111 The Nepomuceno Petition
was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases;
(b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO
(September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or
any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to
Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD
910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases
for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment
(Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting
with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013
TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply
to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a)
on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas
Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica
Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by
the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the
issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor
General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM
and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to,
among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral
Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until
October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main
issues for the Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated
August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No.
164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel
System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to
the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the
Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are
the most important119and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy
in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that
respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a
repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point
is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the
Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor
General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act,
correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the
PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the
President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that
started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the
power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of
Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if
the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the
PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take
judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-
blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty .
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you
stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been
repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a
law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and
academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability
and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have
been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional
character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
governments own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of
the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims as not merely theorized,
speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by
the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v.
CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed
PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in
these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the
CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office
in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic
Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their
way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for
the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the
government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with
constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation
and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a
"PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious
iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that
"the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the
Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar
questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at
this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 139applies when there is found,
among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"
or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are
in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to
the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution
at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one
which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of
the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v.
Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on
the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of
doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably
cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts
avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the
endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are
erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each
great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot
heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National
Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of
the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairpersons
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems
failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-
discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient
locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or
simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the
applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits
in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004
PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire
"Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits in that petitioners therein failed to
present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to
the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or
"pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court
up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF
Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case."
Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP
cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the
facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought
to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e.,
the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners
posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects
and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power,
since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal
and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment
thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the
Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two,
the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and,
three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of
post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only
those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of
the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As
may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said
identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a
form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which
should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion
in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable
for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give
that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid,
would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and
current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon
its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate
raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that
such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively overturned
Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality
and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define
the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as
they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and
Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with
unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert
that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated
through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad
discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to
spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d)
projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country
and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich patronage
benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the
Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the
Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,
are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears
under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment
measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of
these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164belongs the power
to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, 165 belongs the
power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, 166 belongs
the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has
no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe
the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that
the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by
co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct
that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may
interfere impermissibly with the others performance of its constitutionally assigned
function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function
that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments
functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a
function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the
phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly
includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and
release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches
of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. 175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which
go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other
appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members,
should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the
same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made
by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes
to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as
not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with
details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held
that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates
the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however,
that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and
balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1wphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013
PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is
designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or,
particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the
CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield
over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to
exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and
not if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated
since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he
"retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators proposals. 182 They maintain that the Court, in
Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and
identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such,
they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the
Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program
menus187 have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects
they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed
from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision
4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from
past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the
identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special
Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and
submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as
the representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3
clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project
identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the
case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that
legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees
is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds
shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is
contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that
"any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing
agency, as the case may be ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which
authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government,
Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and
Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the
allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the
concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another,
authorized to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents
reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the
contrary, respondents through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the
PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual
legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is
no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented
without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific
examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a
SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a
question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in
the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he
cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in
that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as
all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper
phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years
has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress,
if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by
my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional
compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been
using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is
surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013
PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since
1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special
Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal
measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else
the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively
exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it
is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise
embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-
grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-
making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of
the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of
delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation,
which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a
personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2)
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that
the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct
does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in
Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President
for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature,
the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive
an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is
essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will
be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government,
but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive
must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined
to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts
will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they
will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to
prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify
the executive branchs role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check
upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the
community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper
"item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations,
pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of
the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 210 the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation
of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
(Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may
be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and
not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified
singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to
be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the
President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing
Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations
which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may
be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each
percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to
be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid
appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting
practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in
which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the
Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally
square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on
singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that
Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a
singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such
appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates
a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President
may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either
vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it
may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in
effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies
the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto
power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that
"Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process
which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum
appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of 24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that
the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-
enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces
the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire 24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of 24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not
readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would
aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the
adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting
system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an
excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter
is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends. 218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its
Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a
direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them
"from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an
effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they
add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful,
to well, accelerate the decisions of senators."220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public
office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government
should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution
which embodies the parameters of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact
accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds
may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in
Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223 or (b)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The
fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a
matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.
Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed
based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article
and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members
of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not,
by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline
for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on
this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2
and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government
Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated
as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and peoples
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to
empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and
effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl
Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of
local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the
development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its
strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their
resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by
the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and
inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of
the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution. 229 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also
a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this
pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national
development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his
August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino
mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which
is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system
which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court
observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same
amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President
who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make
equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the
effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already
legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and
social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy
caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in
the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-
driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district,
but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of
the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms
of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the
substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by
PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,
as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section
8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the
creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund
incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to
the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and
Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being
used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the
word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious
recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may
be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave: 242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated
purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the
intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must
be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To
reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and
allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation
made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from
service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus,
discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall
form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,
the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that
(a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and
receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to
be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a
specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent
share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than 150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a
legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it
contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the
2013 PDAF Article is not the 24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-
enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made
by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation
of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the
funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of
ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the
purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-
making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent
rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case
law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient
standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may
be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the
government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for
non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own
position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the
completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the
same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it
must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds
would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and
intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of
PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on
the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social
Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the
second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying
framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools,
bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as well as economic and
residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard
of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court
did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that
the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a)
"the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or
activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork
Use Report). Petitioners prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for
mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly,
its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be
enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the
right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant
has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions
of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform
the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November
29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus
actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF
Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or
administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the
documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor
has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any
official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes
that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure
that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally
important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be
furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public,
access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to
reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents
should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless
allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians
reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS,
subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours
of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to,
proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executives Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is
generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court
itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept
of released funds. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release
of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8
dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the
implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and
disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that
said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of
the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does
not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance
of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and
unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the
implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the
reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that
this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10,
2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of
converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this
Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently
enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be
resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the
Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the
time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in
DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds
covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as
defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose
indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific
laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct
and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual
release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance
of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the
statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to
obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the
treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes
after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-
disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects covered by
the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs
issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have
been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only
covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of
this Decisions promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF
Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds
should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding
special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality
of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel
provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or
not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is
an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our
history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount,
insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment
authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of
powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power
; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process,
denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of
congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect
of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally
impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers,
to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the
President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to
other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-
delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional
methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any
system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or
effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally
endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the
optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous
public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the
Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After
all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire
2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws,
such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively organized into committees to
intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision
of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard
test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the
year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya
Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social
Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which
are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs)
but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby
ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while
the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby
DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of
Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds
subject of these cases. Petitioners access to official documents already available and of public
record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to
the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial
is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these
cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of
the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the
bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SECTION 3: IMPOSITION OF OTHER QUALIFICATIONS in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent
portions of the said resolution read as follows:

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),respondents. WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. -
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's
undergo a mandatory drug test.
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will
and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug
know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which
those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
be elected x x x.
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
office[:]

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the
public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations,
drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a
ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; SEC. 3. x x x

xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective
offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law
Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the
campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said
drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. -
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under
Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December
23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators
in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered
political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.
And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by
said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of
petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna
failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their
separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 3 But even with the presence of
an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the
constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge
it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non -
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative
power?
Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is
hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any
norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As
early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government,
like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments,
however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each
of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it
cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in
the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws
or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require
a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper,
be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso
that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug -
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision
does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying
factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded
plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory
command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that
the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the
assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition,
the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well
being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This
statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of
dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent
is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random
testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are
clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act
may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the
Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such
application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that
the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the
certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the
Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board.
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally
discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section
15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological,
and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically
impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a
depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of
the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be
the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random
drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court -
decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in
their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's
athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program
after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not
shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have
less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves
to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not
invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6)
there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and
14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a
drug test for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a
member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test
and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and
14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said
court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of
the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the
Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need
to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have
the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To
be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that
threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually
end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in
motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow
from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner
SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause,
is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping,
and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without
elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings
on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The
US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a
citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and
seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while
there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted
search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C.
Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. 29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. 30 And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis
of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged
law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
"narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect
as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law
specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know"
basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus
protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is
substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines.
And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with
their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law
public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The
Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue
delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision
in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of
secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students,
the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and
with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all
cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the
DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and
Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the
law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall
always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where
the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In
the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to
delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation,
has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification
for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the
drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent
to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and
to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
Section 5: A. Apportionment
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates
the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province.
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion
of Tolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves
the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative
districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo,
San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
created as a result of such conversion shall continue
to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected
representatives of the original districts out of which
said new provinces or districts were created until their
own representatives shall have been elected in the
next regular congressional elections and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of
the Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third
District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in
the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it
promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the municipality
of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of
municipalities, the composition of the five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:

The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, First District: Population Registered
Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga. Voters
(1990) (1994)

The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba. 1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, 4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
Matagob, Merida, and Palompon. 5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, 8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959. 7 Second District: Population Registered
Voters
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, (1990) (1994)
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories
comprised therein." 1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the 3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. It provides: 4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into 7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the 8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the sub- 9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
provinces and the original provinces directly affected. 10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC 11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
simultaneously with the national elections following 12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
the effectivity of this code. The new legislative districts 13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
 said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall
TOTAL 272,167 156,462 comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.

Third District: Population Registered In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
Voters equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues
(1990) (1994) that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor
General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649 opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415 Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916 Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48 parameters of the Constitution.
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474 We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.

TOTAL 214,499 125,763
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the
constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative
Fourth District: Population Registered district to another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent
Voters COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white
(1990) (1994) in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this
provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of
its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140 Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493 the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889 Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474 Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of
Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
TOTAL 269,347 155,995 Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
Fifth District: Population Registered provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
Voters
(1990) (1994)
xxx xxx xxx
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923 adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401 Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713 population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247 Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
TOTAL 309,148 181,242 paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To
diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters
be transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C.
Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished
municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2)
the Batasang Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to
resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the
1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of
Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should be
made.14Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1)
allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower the COMELEC to make the
apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the options were discussed by Commissioners
Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is
recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of
amendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed
amendment. Also, the chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said
that he was proposing a vote first by the Chamber on the concept of
whether the election is by province and cities on the one hand, or by
legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple formulation which
reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION THE
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the
proposed amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the
apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal
would also provide for a mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after
the first election, which will in effect embody what the Commission had
approved, reading as follows: "Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so
that all the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the
Commission will allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph
(4) and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5),
what would be left would only be the following: "Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating
specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND
UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES,
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila
Area, to the provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities
comprising each of the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the
COMELEC to make the actual apportionment on the basis of the number of
seats provided for and allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is
recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to
COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful
practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words,
gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical
deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the circumstances
to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time
because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared
the report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner
Aquino in this respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and
cities for the purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent
power or in the legislative power. And I would feel very uncertain about THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if
delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the constitutional he so desires.
offices created under this Constitution. We have the assurance of
Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the Legislative,
that even given the very short time remaining in the life of this Commission, MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
there is no reason why we cannot complete the work of reapportionment on
the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has already MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply
thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional only to the first election after the enactment of the Constitution?
Commission.

MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding election; on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first
Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable election.
approach that is available to this Commission.

MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide reapportion.
say:

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the
apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there
arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution the
propose that the Commission should now decide what body should make reapportionment based on the COMELEC study and between the approval
the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should it be the of the Constitution and the first election the COMELEC no longer has the
COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act accordingly on power to change that even a bit.
the basis of the decision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I Davide?
believe the Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this
matter and they are ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact,
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
apportioned the whole country into various districts based on the
recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if
this body would wish to apportion the whole country by district itself, then I MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed
believe we have the time to do it because the Committee on the Legislative apportionment and considering the fact that there will be a corresponding
is ready with that particular report which need only to be appended to the reduction to 183 seats, would there be instances representation of under
Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of the Committee on non-representation?
the Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to give that
information so that the people here would be guided accordingly when they
vote. MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the
Commission that there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will
come out to be one for every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some

questions. MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.

MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting.
This was also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think
we have had some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand, there MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the amendment as
suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. So may I ask
Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into
a motion so we can vote on that first as an amendment to the amendment. MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the
reapportionment legislative districts.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is

recognized. MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the
apportionment of the legislative districts instead of the proposal that
COMELEC be given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion
or the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of
Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner
Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to
move that the COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the
Commission that will be mandated.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.

MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the
amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed
amendment which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
Thank you.

MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to

be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the
appear as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the reapportionment.
Constitution where we mandate a Commission that will become functus
officio to have the authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that
VOTING
authority until after the ratification of the new Constitution.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner
Sarmiento say?
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for
the approval of this proposed amendment.
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his
hand.)
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is
approved.
recognized.

Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
adopt that motion?
empowered the COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made."
The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the
Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section
2, the Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments
on the apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of
amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on
minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we
may have forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which
ought to be included in one district. That we shall consider a minor
amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it
be possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another
district and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning,
that there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it
may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still
in the territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the
correct name of a particular municipality because of changes made by the
interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There
were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be
up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain
district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the
data regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and the new municipality, but still actually
these are within the geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot
do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna,
they cannot put that in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did
not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No.
2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought
about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts
of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at
this time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with
Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section."
In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself
make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC
to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the
Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of
the province of Leyte.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA
ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The Case
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Antecedents
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative
districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos 1 and the municipalities of
Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law,
amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time
the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later
converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was
223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute
that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will
be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."3
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold
of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress
use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom of the
standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional requirement]."4
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."5 The only issue here is whether the City of
Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not,
then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of
Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification states that the population of
"Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification further states that it was
"issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with
the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of
Bulacan."6
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is
without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,
intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city
whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election"7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of
every year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 1358 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population sizes Pursuant to Section
7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local Government Code.
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it has collected
and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size will be based on actual population
census counts; while for the intercensal years, the certification will be made on the
basis of a set of demographic projections or estimates declared official by the National
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the census reference
date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal population estimates will be as
of middle of every year.
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within
which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official
low and high population projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population size may be
issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and the city or municipality
for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census,
during offcensus years, approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct
must be under the technical supervision of NSO from planning to data processing.
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued
by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications
based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator
or his designated certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he
certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that
the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared
official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos "will be
254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections
shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director
Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic
projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the
NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000
is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per
year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of
Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007. 9 Based
on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August
2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1
August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.10
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030
by the year 2010." Based on the Certifications own growth rate assumption, the population of
Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no
published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions
and provinces.11
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent
Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This projection
issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135
(The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states:
xxx
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the
true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high
population projections.
xxx
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on
projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based
on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise
the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.
There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a
population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of means to comply with the population
requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions
calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of
the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the
checking function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.13
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts."14 Compliance
with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the "aim
of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts."15
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba.
Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51,
and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same
grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati,
thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted
into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and
the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by
the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by
the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply
the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that,
the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of
respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to
the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of
fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land
areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared
to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
 Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is
beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not
an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that
the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in
the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The
manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving
as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of
the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could
not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must
indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of
the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati
and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new
election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the
House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a
new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular,
petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay,
who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-
year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that
said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor
Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X
of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
 Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized
city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that
shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and
Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo
which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we
ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any
kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In
fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at
least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case
of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of
the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does
not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all
its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
 B. Party List System
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
The Case
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru
its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public
proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution.
i. Total party-list votes 15,283,659
already
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
canvassed/tabulated
(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(Senior Citizens).
ii. Total party-list votes 1,337,032
remaining uncanvassed/
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment untabulated (i.e. canvass
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a deferred)
petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-
604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, iii. Maximum party-list votes 102,430
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the (based on 100%
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party- outcome) from areas not
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or yet submitted for canvass
coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans). (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City;
Pantar, Lanao del Norte;
and Pagalungan,
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Maguindanao)
Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
Maximum Total Party-List 16,723,121
The Facts Votes

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC.
BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections,
namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the
required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list 2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
ballots have been completely canvassed;
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three 4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES 6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, A TEACHER
COALITION RECEIVED Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.

1 BUHAY 1,163,218 7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730 8 Alagad ALAGAD

3 CIBAC 760,260 9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

4 GABRIELA 610,451 10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

5 APEC 538,971 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

6 A TEACHER 476,036 12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

7 AKBAYAN 470,872 13 Abono ABONO

8 ALAGAD 423,076
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which
9 BUTIL 405,052 may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes
cast under the Party-List System.
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361 The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results.
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194 The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is
hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings
14 ABONO 337,046 therein moot and academic.

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),
against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of
Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the
parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at
least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election
laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties.
We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC
Resolution No. 07-72:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board
of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total = party relative to total votes for
number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat Total votes for party-list system party-list system
each;

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National additional seats:
Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on
the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received
but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
by the first party
coalition[s] are as follows:
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Party-List Projected total number of votes Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
1 BUHAY 1,178,747 Less than 4% No additional seat
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718
1,178,747
5 APEC 622,489 = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674 which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

8 ALAGAD 423,190 WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165 Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
12 ARC 375,846 first party
13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest
number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it
the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated Party List Percentage Additional Seat
in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system CIBAC 1.28 1
of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional
seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans; GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans, is:
A TEACHER 0.83 0
 This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
AKBAYAN 0.78 0 by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT).
ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0 Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0 Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041
(PL)], which reads:
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0 Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election
Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as
the Commission on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or
coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes,
should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12
Party List Additional Seats of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list
representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
BUHAY 2
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in
GABRIELA 1 accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in
APEC 1 the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were
allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in
the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many
may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats
under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases. Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy
hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007,
which reads as follows:
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the
Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC
Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-
88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.11
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),
against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of
Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC
proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat
under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak
Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:

Party-List No. of Seat(s) I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
1.1 Buhay 3 promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
1.2 Bayan Muna 2

1.3 CIBAC 2 A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

1.4 Gabriela 2
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1.5 APEC 2
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First
1.6 A Teacher 1
Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.
1.7 Akbayan 1
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and
1.8 Alagad 1 another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
1.9 Butil 1
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1 under RA 7941;
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for
1.12 ARC 1 under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

1.13 Abono 1
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
1.14 AGAP 1 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with
1.15 AMIN 1 the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable
case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation
and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17
 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least
four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The
House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not
deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats
available to legislative districts Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the
Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente
V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall
tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them
according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against
the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-
list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum
(2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall
have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total
the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes,
and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original
2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from
being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for
the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but
accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only.
The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list
seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited
to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to
lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes garnered during the elections.27 26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party 28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO
Garnered Garnered
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD coalitions receiving at45,624
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
43,062
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA Table 2. The first 20 36,512

party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over
the total votes for the party-list.28
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
 be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
Votes Garnered over Total of R.A. No. 7941.
language
Rank Party Votes Garnered Guaranteed Seat
Votes for Party-List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% We rule that, 1 in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% Section 11(b) 1 of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% when the number
1 of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% permissive ceiling
1 that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
impossible for
percent threshold is present.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% We therefore 1 strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% threshold presents
1 an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party,
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% sectoral or group
1 interests in the House of Representatives."30

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
In determining
7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1.1 The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
Total 17 votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
total
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% shall
0 be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-
percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats. have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is
the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and
of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus: 22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1

Votes 25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1

Additional
Garnered over (B) plus (C), Applying the
Guaranteed Seat Seats
Votes Total Votes for in whole three
SENIORseat
Rank Party (First Round) (Second 26 213,058 1.34% 0 1
Garnered Party List, in integers cap
CITIZENS
(B) Round)
% (D) (E)
(C)
(A) 27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 28 N.A.

VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 29 N.A.

ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 30 N.A.

BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1
KASANGGA
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1
COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO 36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 Total N.A. 17

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2
representatives from N.A.
the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 seat, in2no case to exceed
N.A. a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 in the party-list
participate N.A. elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly
bear this out, thus:
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they
can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it
will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat
sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I
see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so
that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to
many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus
for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties
can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge
both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system
is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will
enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated
with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where
labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the
Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party,
meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set
in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral
representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the
majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond
that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that
major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk
wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee
"wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It
is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives
to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of
a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted
to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution
of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall
be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are
disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November
2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and
19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from
this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-
PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were
able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only
the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for
his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall
not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its
framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to
avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making
the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that
they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were
the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and
other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include
other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included
which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in
the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated
citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the
Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought
to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are
no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a
sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote.
In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be
represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This
can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party
in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented
in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does not
have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party and count the votes
and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be
for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum
that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a
list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the
minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the
votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent
of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at
least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these
parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000
nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So,
they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form
a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those
are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the
same time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these
groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not
be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party
list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than
sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have
to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be
sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned
can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they
can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the
seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela
Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it
will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat
sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor
leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of
sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really
organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may
submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the
COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this
matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties
in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang
Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list
representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further
the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when
it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in
1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise that the
party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was
further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates
from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding.
Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta
group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be
expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral
parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The
party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both
these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that
national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious
reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system
fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period,
there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of
at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the
other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct
from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not
represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
"marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and
concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No.
7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and
hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section
2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which
will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House
of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific
implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations
or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all
the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that
are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean
one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is
below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented"
are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination
Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized
and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and
ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing
in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the
national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to
major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the
party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed
by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the
requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when
it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even
through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress"
from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the
1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections
only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral
wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the
House of Representatives.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must
either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution
to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of
enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be
elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list
elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice xxxx
in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
system.

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or religious purposes;
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector
represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in
party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system." (3) It is a foreign party or organization;

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
 (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise
do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In
BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-
list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-
political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such
experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now
impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of
party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in
Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord
with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to
the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who
lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized
along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
Section 6: A. Residence qualification:
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO
ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The
mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to
prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-
No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same
day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing
of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or
before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District
of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing
a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner
filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's
opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a
bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another
legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent
for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in
an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of
2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in
SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of
March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two
primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the
lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should
subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that
her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although
she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention
was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to
allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She
never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering
in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
"residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of
the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case,
the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence
in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended
to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate,
of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to
allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in
her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24,
1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show
the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited
period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement
of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294;
Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case,
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was
not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is
pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her
affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959,
after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a
letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks
her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned
such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In
the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how
one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there
by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident
of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she
spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect
that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show
that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in
 Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the
First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of
the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed
out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct
No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter
Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to
her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had
been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring
her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should
the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to
the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was
annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of
the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues
may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home",
"a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used
to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place
 of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept
(of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in
election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what
significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in
the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence
in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however,
be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995
maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions
if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever
had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as
the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in
other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot
may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself
from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as
voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or
lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not
forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in
a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in
election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she
and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as
a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic
of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for
the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know
what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place
in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-
establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do
not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban,
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when
her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should
be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can
the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952.
For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article
110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence
upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla
de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a
pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is
Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question
of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without
actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay
there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or
to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the
Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her
domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either
husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by
the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same
as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England,
could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against
the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases
as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far
as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a
wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure
to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then
in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the
ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp.
1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and
control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that
order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing
which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile
in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in
the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between
the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose
her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice"
was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought
the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte.
. . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her
brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to
the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a
state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual
residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific
situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one
during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the
wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to
this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec.
17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either
to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what
he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this
court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often

determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the
law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute

containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting
the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the
mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose
of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case,
the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering
a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies
in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments
merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide
a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over

the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO
BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed
through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect
to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a
winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do
harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino
provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS.,
PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years
and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed
to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge.1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito
A. Aquino2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was
docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner
stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be
elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case.4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease
contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor
Feliciano dated April 28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the
Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6,
1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied
for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five
hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained
thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to
complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati,
but to suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he
obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Representative of the
Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the
immediate implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the
Commission is likewise directed to inform the parties by the fastest means
available of this Order, and to calendar the hearing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, PICC Press
Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to
Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he
manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of
the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en
banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with
the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the
aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the
issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on
May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared
ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May
8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent
should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission
on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates, who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2,
1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's
raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND
ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS,
SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE
EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
B WINNER.15
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION,
SAID JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE
ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE
PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE
HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX
"C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED
AGAIN, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS
JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS
THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE
MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE
FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE
YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH
WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE
ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS
TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE
REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS
DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE
IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A
SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED
BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS
SUBSTITUTE
 I Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run
for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC
committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his
proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We
disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House
of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an
election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or
the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of
office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of
the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P.
881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the
election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the
question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed
to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his
obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the
evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section
7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition
to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78
of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established
not just residence but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should
be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year
prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning
of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress
continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember
that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was
an attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular
members of the National Assembly are concerned,
the proposed section merely provides, among others,
and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a
period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p.
87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7,
page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
 Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that the provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning
as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in
law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with
the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless
defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period
of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident
for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of
Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11,
1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the
time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times
during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease
contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period
of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention
was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila
or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the
fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring
his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and
positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above,
the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of
residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the
COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative,
by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid
lease agreement cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and
positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the
Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should
be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A
new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC
did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because
of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for
public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he
has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This
he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the
Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher
number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified
candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral
process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The
result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly
entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of
the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly
voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended
the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the
playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either
a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the
other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a
disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate
believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible
or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the
next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said
case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of
his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be
considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and
nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in
the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in
the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who
lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the
portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that
no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
35
However, in Santos v. Comelec we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of
invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of
the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito
v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo
v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared
elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo
v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for
the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate
for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case
of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a
petition to deny due course to the certificate of
candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that
the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a
bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted
for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor.Her votes was
counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected
position who is voted for and who obtains the highest
number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the
eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as
provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis
supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in
the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking
to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not
deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by
then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the
resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality
(Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the
private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained
only the second highest number of votes in the
election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos
v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided
in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as
stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and
Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their
votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official
leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA
435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case,
which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been
disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in
effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious,
the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without
any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo
was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise
of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out
to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner
Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo
(as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No.
105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another
shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the
winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates
because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure
American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number
that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer"
could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated
candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the
second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the
equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-
evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a
shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the
runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast
where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein
petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on
the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the
district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a
government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in
government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for
running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR.,
EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM,
SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of
6 May 19981 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC),
declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for
representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections, and the Decision of 29 May 19982 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.1wphi1.nt
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year
and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito,
Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and
assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO,
contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered
voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations,
private respondents presented the following evidence:
1. Annex "A" the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the
Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as
December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks
election for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of
Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex "B" Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating
respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex "C" Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15,
1997;
4. Annex "D" Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial &
Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G.
Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of
the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan
Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito
Engcong on September 5, 1997, while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan
Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita Letigio
on September 8, 1997.
5. Annex "E" The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name
of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;
6. Annex "F" Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998
addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of
Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community
Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid
under Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex "G" Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd
District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election
Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth
date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in the constituency where I seek to
be elected immediately preceding the election" as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is
a registered voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex "H" a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS
DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and
received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating
among others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala
Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter" and "that for
business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred and conducts his business
and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;"
9. Annex "I" Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF CANCELLATION OF THE
VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to
on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. 4
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the
said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex "1" Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and
respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex "2" Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale
executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal,
namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex "3" True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725
captioned as "In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct No.
4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus-
Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors
of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents." The dispositive portion of which
reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara,
in District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of
Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December 1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to
an honest mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of
petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precint No. 4400-A of
Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel,
Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voter's
registration records of the petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election
Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are
obviously qualified to excercise their respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex "4" Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of
Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30,
1997.
5. Annex "5" Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of
applications for registration approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997,
showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both
under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees without VRR
numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex "6" same as Annex "5"
7. Annex "6-a" Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex "I", Petition);
8. Annex "7" Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504
dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Sarangani;
9. Annex "7-a" Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election
Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters
of District III, Quezon City. Their registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the
possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex "8" Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the
circumstances and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna
Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to
before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged personal
knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex "8-e" A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-five (55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani,
declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a permanent
resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;
13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997,
BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,
14. Annex "10" The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and
circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending
Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and "G-2" and "H" his
CTC No. 111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes "1", "2", "4",
"5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except Annex "H".5
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack
of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement for the
position sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex
"B", Petition] and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon
City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay
incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District
of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the
office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No.
4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the
one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the
constituency where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter
as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification to run for the position
of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.6
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not
yet become final and executory.7
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers,8shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998,
which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the
present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the
main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the
Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the
instant petition.9
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate
receiving the second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to
Intervene.10 INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in
Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to
proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner
as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole
world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.12
The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said
jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include,
among others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as
to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's
qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency
requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in
character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion
proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction
are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings
may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or
exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all
matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the
list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the
proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.13 In this sense, it does not operate as a
bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.14 Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the
voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in
any other election.15
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar16 we ruled that:
. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has
become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein
contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and intricate matter of citizenship
may be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding
as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court
had granted appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that
she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been left
open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara,
Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a
resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited
only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer
of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election
Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only effect of the
decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record
from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place
the record in the inactive file.18
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither
herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The
Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be
excluded from the Voter's List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against
DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a
basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the
first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of
action.19 In the present case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case
of Nuval v. Guray, et al., 20 the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment
rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the election
list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action
in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except
when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or the circuit judge, in which
case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have
concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter
of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said
municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the election list of said municipality.
The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a
registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray,
as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two
cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of
Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was
the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while
in the present que warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his
exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist,
then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the
six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the
present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is that Norberto Guray has not the one
year's legal residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither
does there exist therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity
of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case
of the petition for excluision and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of
parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.22 "Domicile" is a
question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must
be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one
residence or domicile at a time.23
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos
Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a
new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until
a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period
of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in
January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he
had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence"
simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily
presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home.28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved
and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact
of physical presence without intention.29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter
how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting
is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in
this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election
franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence.31The fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in
assisting to determine the status of his domicile.32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over
which he had no control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of
the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21,
and 22.33
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that
be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his
previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997,34 and that he applied for transfer of
registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997,35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the
district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental
law.36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.37
The Third Issue.
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of
merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code,
has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such
jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is
rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives
the highest number of votes38 and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.39
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 40
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate.41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his
oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of
DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was
issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying
DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the
House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has
jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.42
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.
After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the
province of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest
number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may
not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.43 In every election, the
people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be
given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place.44
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.45 To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the
mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a
field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.46
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. 47
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails
entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred48 from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of
the person who has obtained a plurality of votes49 and does not entitle the candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to
make a choice and the election is a nullity.50 To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to
take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the
electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.51
INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be
sustained. INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case52 to wit: if the
electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is
misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an
ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered
before the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than
the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be
voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring
him ineligible has not yet attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have
been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply
their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.53
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the
COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are
hereby AFFIRMED.1
B. Citizenship qualification:

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in
making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district
of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,
Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17,
Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p.
401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as
a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear
and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision
or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The
Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for
remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch
or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.
(See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of
powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because
of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less
exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many
legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-
manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the
part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
 ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status
and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace
were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place
of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and
home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this
time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in
the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when
the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two
by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it
also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of
the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after
January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of
who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by
adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written
book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate
Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it
seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting
the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to
the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be
a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they
become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over
the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal.
. . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with
an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who
elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be
a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age
is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election
of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has
always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does
not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are
frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court
will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in
Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of
choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about
Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would
not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because
of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship
after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not
be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct
action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest.
How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote
the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and
obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this
matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of
its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up
to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected
any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality
of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error.
There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent
thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond
the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired
his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph
4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will
not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the
Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under
the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an
inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section
4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not
in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent
failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to
the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November
28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention;
by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos,
Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to
the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the
1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989,
pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a
bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil.
817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established,
the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection
of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,
when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the
report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The
petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having
been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of
the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the
qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on
the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we
disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of
a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be
the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano
v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door
apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence.
(TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar,
he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents.
Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were
still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that
a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate
meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
(see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his
studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in
Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese,
Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our
country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the
private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege
which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh
an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to
acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive,
affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more
humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
Section 7: A. Term and tenure
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District
of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January
1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on
Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second
District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in
Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an
administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls
pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any
elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act
itself by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House
 of Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and
will not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and
addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken
on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in
Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments
due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by
other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his
district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House
of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be
summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in
an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as
among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a
very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the
contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the
Roll of Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that
respondents acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman.
Neither can it be justified as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary
renunciation of office as only the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot
be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding
another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of
Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in
this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,
'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act
of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of
office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in
Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned
therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of
Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which
carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation
which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They
further maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not
involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
 Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the
one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, sub-provincial,
city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place
after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be
considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless
his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors, members of
various sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the
moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and
Vice-President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881)
elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the
provision seems to be different I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing
or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and just
adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly be
the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating
it. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who
belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However,
because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local
offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that
these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already
obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor
or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply
with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we
believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be
given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as
stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the
ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of
power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we
have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the
1935 Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the
people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers?
This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the
Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in
the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as
part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself
out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to
deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or
abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if
you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years
to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that
he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon
him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than
anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public
officials. It is not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it
is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and
inserted this new chapter on accountability.
 Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it
for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not
want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was
elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of
better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact
that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for
which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public
officers not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because
under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers
must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the
reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or
elective public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected,
should be considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of
Public Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished
by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76
Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term.
The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly
recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs.
Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a
vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely
conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but
simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for
in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.
This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment.
To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does
not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in
construing a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative
terms as plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the
power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command.
This maxim expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative
intent where such intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to
abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
 Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new
merely resigning at any given time on the second term. election or appointment can restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
MR. MAAMBONG:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
abandonment and resignation? vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. ...
MR. DAVIDE:
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
It is more general, more embracing. permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of
candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the Article VI of the Constitution.
elective office presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in
Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by
MR. RONO: respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of
Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is
administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal
own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an
tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections communicated
intention to relinquish his office.
to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional
governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
MR. TOLENTINO: unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to
do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of
the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the
Yes ... transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
MR. RONO: judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for
the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations
MR. TOLENTINO: and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public
policy may dictate on his office.
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office
which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
definite.
Section 10: A. Salaries
MR. RONO:

Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree
with the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing
of the certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention;
it's already there.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this
Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE
VELASCO, respondents.

The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and
organized under the laws of the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and
taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto
by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials
from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic
Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor
General, was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.

Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be P40,000.00
each; that of the Senators and members of the House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each
(thereby increasing their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the
Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the Constitution). The section expressly
provided that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act provides "that the salary increase of the President
of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the
effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act
No. 4642) contained the following items for the House of Representatives:

SPEAKER

1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to

December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30,
1966 . . . P29,129.00
MEMBERS
2. One hundred three Members of the House of Representatives at P7,200
from July 1 to December 29, 1965 and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to
June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P 16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . . 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of
the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134, approved
just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the
Constitution, as amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances,
and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the
case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such,
increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in
the approval of Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of
the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30,
1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written protest from petitioners (Petition,
Annex "A"), along the lines summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the Solicitor
General to secure a judicial construction of the law involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General
evaded the issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the Secretary of
Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General
endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or
before January, 1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as former
Acting Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in
audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation Act
in force; hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of personality of petitioners to institute the
action, for lack of showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the House should be
joined parties defendant. On the merits, the answer alleges that the protested action is in
conformity with the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of the Lower House are
concerned, for they were elected in 1965, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their
stand, in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives
who approved the increase suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them,
regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the Solicitor General, as their counsel, need
not give pause. As taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs.
Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary
of Public Works L-10405, December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December
24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965).
Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual capacity as such, sue to enjoin an
unlawful expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House of Congress as parties
defendants, suffice it to say that since the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents'
passing in audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives' increased salaries, and
not the collection or receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or proper
parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to the main issue: Does Section 14,
Art. VI, of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also
that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the
increased compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after
the expiration of the term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the
non-expiration of the terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of
the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to the legislators yielding to
the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase
becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly
felt" (Taada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single
unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the
fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite
the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined
with the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in
the application of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office
of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure (whether Senators or
Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the
enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility therefor is
not apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as reported by Aruego (Framing of
the Constitution, Vol. 1, p. 296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, before it was decided that the Legislature should be bicameral in
form, initially recommended that the increase in the compensation of legislators should not take
effect until the expiration of the term of office of all members of the Legislature that approved the
increase. The report of the committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their services an annual
compensation of four thousand pesos including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and from their respective
residences when attending sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise fixed
by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the terms of office of all the Members of the Legislature that
approved such increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final choice of a unicameral legislature,
was carried over and made more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take effect until after the expiration of
the term of office of the Members of the National Assembly who may be elected subsequent to
the approval of such increase. (Aruego, 1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved and enacted, Article VI, section
5, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments to our fundamental law, the
limitation assumed its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not
been altered. From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934
Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of
the full term of all members of the Legislature that approved the higher compensation, whether
the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent, as far as possible, the
influence of self-interest in its adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that if the framers of the 1940
amendments to the Constitution had intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the
Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the increase, they would have just used
the expression "term of all the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the members
of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction without a difference, since the Senate and
the House together constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason for specifying
the component chambers was rather the desire to emphasize the transition from a unicameral to
a bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the words "of the" before "House" in the
provision being considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it
could have employed the shorter expression "of the Senate and the House". It was grammatically
correct to refer to "the members of the Senate and (the members) of the House", because the
members of the Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members of the Senate and
the House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of office of the Senators, as well as
that of the Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the "terms" (in
the plural) "of the members of the Senate and of the House", instead of using "term" in the
singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already considered. As
previously observed, the use of the singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the
provision in question the Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single unit, and
this conclusion is reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration of the full term of
ALL the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of the Senators before the effectivity
of the increased compensation would subject the present members of the House of
Representatives to the same restrictions as under the Constitution prior to its amendment. It may
well be wondered whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the 1940
constitutional amendments. For under either the original limitation or the present one, as
amended, as maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before an
increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately following an election, two
assemblymen's terms, of 3 years each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the
increase could become operative, because the original Constitution required that the new
emolument should operate only after expiration of the term of assemblymen
elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5), and an assemblyman's term was
then 3 years only. Under the Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since Senators
hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were approved by the legislature on its last
session just prior to an election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original
restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving assemblymen the full 3-year term
of their successors must be added. Once again an identical period must elapse under the 1940
amendment: because one-third of the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a
given election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen elected in, say, 1935 were to
approve an increase of pay in the 1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after
the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected in 1938; i.e., the increase
would not be payable until December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present
Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of Senators elected in
1963, the same would not be collectible until December 30, 1969, since the said Senators' term
would expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original Constitution) were to approve the
increase in compensation, not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new
compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four years later, since the term of
assemblymen elected in November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the increase) would
end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is approved in the 1965 sessions
immediately preceding the elections in November of that year, the higher compensation would be
operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years later, because the most recently elected
members of the Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in November of 1963,
and their term would not expire until December 30, 1969.

This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the original and the amended
constitution can not be just due to accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the
Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been maintained unaltered. But whether
designed or not, it shows how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of the
present House to await the expiration of the term of the Senators, who concurred in approving the
increase in compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under the Constitution as
originally written.

The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to discourage the approval of
increases of compensation just before an election by legislators who can anticipate their
reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution should not be nullified by resorting
to technical and involved interpretation of the constitutional mandate.

In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by
Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until
December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes
the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void. NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME
CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to authorize
the disbursement of the increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI,
section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from
approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House of Representatives, before
December 30, 1969. No costs.
Section 11: A. Privilege of speech and debate
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums
of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a
privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication;
and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member
of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication
falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress
used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious
that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly
elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow
me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital
information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1wph1.t
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.
The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to
"have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" the letter says are
"available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2
AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND.
To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS
to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel
Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt.
Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of
CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence
network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools
of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to
talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary
Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt
to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to
his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression
that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no
further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to
future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President
and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech
challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the
AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the
Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be
a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office;
(5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various
intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they
were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong
to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be
returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular
Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano
should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup
d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein
alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen.
Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that
defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon
which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the
alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not
think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover
damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law,
under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2)
high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to
public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but
these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and
can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that
they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the
"planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that
plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be
"tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

B. Privilege from Arrest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-

appellant.

This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and
unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may
be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on
human dignity. No legal system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic
consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.1

Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral
depravity, when committed against a minor.2

In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution.3

In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious
evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below twelve
(12) years of age. As narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and
repulsive. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as
a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by
several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most
unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted by
the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much that they knowingly re-elected
him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.

Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old

commercial sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words of
accused-appellant, "he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image transmogrified
into that of a dastardly, ogre, out to get his slimy hands on innocent and nave girls to satiate his
lustful desires."4 This Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accused-appellants claim that he
suffered "invidiously discriminatory treatment." Regarding the above allegation, the Court has
ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the case did not result in a mistrial; the
records show that the accused had ample and free opportunity to adduce his defenses.
This is an appeal from the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts
of statutory rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and
96-1993, for six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the
Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-
1997, and 96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of
lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for
acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The
accusatory portion of said informations for the crime of statutory rape state:
In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year
old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE
defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year
old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year
old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE
defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will,
with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
For acts of lasciviousness, the informations8 under which accused-appellant was convicted were
identical except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996; June 15, 1996; June 16,
1996; June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year
old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz
Towers, Makati City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress and fondle said
complainant's face, lips, neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her
nipples and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina, place
himself on top of her, then insert his penis in between her thighs until
ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the
different dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00
respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the
trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) main
witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as
Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive of submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twenty-
six (26) witnesses. Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of
submarkings. The records of the case are extremely voluminous.
The Peoples version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and almond-
shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of
Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting
boarders at his house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who
was also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned
Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along with
Simplicio whenever he delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was
offered by Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun
her ordeal as one of the girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office
located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a
talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn
become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio
answered, "10. She is going to be 11 on May 11." Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows
how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me."
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the mid-
thighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant
further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant
cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help
Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and
"Eat Bulaga."
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyns movie career.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would
have to live with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went
home, accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.
The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room
1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio discussed the contract and his
plan to finance Rosilyns studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn,
Shandro and Simplicio left.
The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her
acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyns contract to his lawyer, who
was also present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards the
elevator, accused-appellant approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accused-
appellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom,
Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside.
After a while, accused-appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He
walked towards Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in
and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio
replied, "Halik lang naman."
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant
came in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed
the word, "Dakak." In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he
wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it
herself, but accused-appellant answered, "Daddy mo naman ako." Accused-appellant then took
off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, "Huwag
po." Again, accused-appellant told her, "After all, I am your Daddy." Accused-appellant then
removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the lamp
and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, "Tama na po."
Accused-appellant stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-
appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over
and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed
Rosilyns shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns body,
he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body,
dried her with a towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and told
her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-
appellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When
accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her
legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn
P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the
Ritz Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to
Simplicio what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz
Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not have
sexual intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the
Ritz Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyns clothes and dressed her
with the same long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat
beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her
breasts, and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own
clothes, placed his penis between Rosilyns thighs and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated
on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her and told her to sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he
rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her
hair. While accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he
caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-
appellant ate breakfast. He gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the
condominium unit. On their way home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to
insert his penis into her vagina, she should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They found
accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach accused-
appellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with a long
T-shirt on which was printed a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption,
"Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy." They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay
beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs. He positioned
himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held his penis, and poked and
pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ.
Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer
around but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody
touching her private parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath,
then went off to school with Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00
oclock in the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked
and again put on her the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while,
accused-appellant knelt beside Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting
motions until he ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her
and fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep. When she woke
up, she found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio
Delantar, when the latter came to pick her up.
On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant
took photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled down thereby exposing
her breasts. He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without
showing her pubis, and finally, while straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by
accused-appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody
caressing her breasts and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to
wait for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with
the long white shirt similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant
kissed her lips and inserted his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to
sleep.
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled
her breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away.
After bathing her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As
soon as Simplicio arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was
waiting in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes, including her panties, and dressed her with
a long T-shirt similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed
Rosilyn on the lips, inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made
Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He inserted his
finger in her vagina and mounted himself between her legs with his hands rested on her sides.
After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed and pressed his penis against her vagina. Accused-
appellant made thrusting motions, which caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told
her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did
not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to
Simplicio when he came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accused-
appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two did not
return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their
boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn
statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against
accused-appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The
examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical
with pinkish brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out.
Abdomen is flat and soft
GENITAL
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
disclosed an elastic, fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock
position and deep healed laceration at 8 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers
moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin
sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is
firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.9
During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was
his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellants
Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the province
on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges
against him to a small group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his
political opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined
to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine
Airlines (PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in Dipolog until June 18, 1996.
He submitted in evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,10 showing that he was on board Flight PR
165; the said flights passengers manifest,11 where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR appears; and
photographs showing accused-appellants constituents welcoming his arrival and showing
accused-appellant talking with former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal Empainado.
Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from
Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Upon arrival and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence
known as "Barangay House" in Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night
there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in
the house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together with some friends, he
visited the Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the
"Barangay House" in Taguilon.
On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his
political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the afternoon. In the evening, he
went home and slept in the "Barangay House."
On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in the
"Barangay House."
On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The
blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo Laput.
On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering District of Dapitan
City. After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon, Dapitan City.
He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an
instance when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a conference called by the
President of the Philippines.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL from
Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private plane to Dipolog, where he
stayed until the President of the Philippines arrived.
To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and
not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These occurred once during the
first week of May 1996, at accused-appellants Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio Delantar
were introduced to him by Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he interviewed
Rosilyn, and later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of Rosilyn into the
show business.
Dominadors admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to
interviewing her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His testimony made no
mention of any sexual encounter with Rosilyn.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as
principal in the two (2) counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these
cases.
2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.
2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the
cases.
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993,
the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused,
ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness
defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5
(b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared
CONVICTED in each of these cases;
4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:
4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight
(8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium
period, as maximum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum;
4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the
cases;
5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998,
the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused,
ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore,
on the ground of reasonable doubt, the accused in these cases is hereby
ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, CONSIDERING THE
ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THE CLAIMED INCIDENTS
ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.
E.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED
AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.13
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with
utmost caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than moral certainty
beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim
herself that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on destroying the
veracity of private complainants testimony, the errors assigned by accused-appellant, particularly
the first three, are focused on the issue of credibility.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-
1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that
the trial court sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted
her stories and the rest of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-
appellant urges the application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in part,
false in everything).14
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and
is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.15 Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas,16 citing
People v. Li Bun Juan,17 this Court held that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the
testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other
facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted
with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:
"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts
are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept
some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what
seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth Even
when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem
worthy of belief." (p. 945)18
Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's
assignment of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence.
Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the
assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not
believe Rosilyn when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims
especially those who are young and immature deserve full credence (People v.
Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that "no woman would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be
perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished." (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate
spontaneously in detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this regard
was firm, candid, clear and straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the
intense and rigid cross-examination made by the defense counsel.19
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and
lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on
cross and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, "Ano
po?", "Parang po," "Medyo po," and "Sa tingin ko po."
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and
lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and
natural words customary of children of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant
as uttered by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of
child witnesses like her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may
have given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do
not in any way detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested
and subjected to lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind
that even the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At
times, far from eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute
signs of veracity.20
Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the
five (5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the interviews and case study
conducted by the representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the
following documents:
(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros
A. Carrasco of the Pasay City Police;
(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI
Agents Cynthia L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;
(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;
(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.
It must be stressed that "rape" is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which
could not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who
could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits
and consequently disclose with proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that
under the contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present
case where there was no exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of
the victims vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably do, that
there must be the fullest penetration of the victims vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.
In People v. Campuhan,21 we ruled that rape is consummated "by the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis." There need not be full
and complete penetration of the victims vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no
showing that the foregoing technicalities of rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those
occasions that she was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers, she
could not therefore be expected to intelligibly declare that accused-appellants act of pressing his
sex organ against her labia without full entry of the vaginal canal amounted to rape.
In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the courts
mention of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:
Q: You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina,
your back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did
he do?
A: He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa
ari ko." (Italics supplied)
Q: And, after doing that: "Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko"; what else did he
do?
A: After that, "Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari
ko." (underscoring supplied)
(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full
penetration of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be
proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female
organ. (People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA
535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393). "Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips
of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction." (People vs. Galimba, G.R. No.
111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530). Hence,
with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused pressed against ("idiniin") and pointed
to ("itinutok") Rosilyns vagina his sexual organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of
rape were consummated.22
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyns purpose in executing the affidavits on August
22 and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio Delantar, not accused-
appellant. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an
exhaustive narration of the sexual abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the
said complaint.
Additionally, Rosilyns statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned
mainly the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her to narrate the details of
her sexual encounter with accused-appellant.
As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings
with Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological repercussions of the
sexual abuse on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a
consequence thereof. Thus, the documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be
relied upon to reveal every minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.
At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyns testimony, if at all they
existed, cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyns declarations on the witness stand. The
consistent ruling of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness
and her testimonies given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the former.23
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn
gave the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because that was the name
given to her by the person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant
claims, was merely picked up by Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on
accused-appellants office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador "Jun"
Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt on his culpability. It was Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos who
allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak office. In advancement of this theory,
accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total of 16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for
identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. In the same vein,
accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial characteristics
given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of Dominador "Jun"
Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state that
he has a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and
unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification during the trial
cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-
appellant as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was
introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellants office. Verily, a persons
identity does not depend solely on his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of a
crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing his name. Similarly, the Court, in People v.
Vasquez,24 ruled that:
It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by
face [the witness] acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out
the name that matched [appellants] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally
identified accused-appellant as their assailant.
Even in the case of People v. Timon,25 relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his
identification, this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court identification of accused-
appellant was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it.
In light of the foregoing, Rosilyns failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures
shown to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified identification of accused-
appellant in open court. The same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which,
incidentally, resembles accused-appellant. As noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his
brother Dominador Jalosjos have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch
looks like Dominador, it logically follows that the same drawing would definitely look like accused-
appellant.
Likewise, Rosilyns failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state that
he has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of accused-appellants
identification. At a young age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 year-
old person. As to accused-appellants mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that
said mole is not so distinctive as to capture Rosilyns attention and memory. When she was
asked to give additional information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a
"prominent belly." This, to our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature that would naturally
catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like Rosilyn.
In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words "idinikit," "itinutok," and "idiniin-
diin," which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to her vagina with his genitals,
do not constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did not actually
see accused-appellants penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed that Rosilyn
declared that accused-appellants semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex organ.
Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that,
assuming that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyns external genitals, the same is not enough
to establish the crime of rape.
True, in People v. Campuhan,26 we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge," means that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the
entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum. We further elucidated that:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are
visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen,
the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that
becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer
is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex
surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with
hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not
have any hairs but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is
the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis
of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing
of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.27
In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went
beyond "strafing of the citadel of passion" or "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," as
depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed into "bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is
invasion enough,"28 there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition.
When the accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs, unfetteredly
touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be
naturally wide open and ready for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie the
hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant that his penis or that of someone who looked like him,
would under the circumstances merely touch or brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The
inevitable contact between accused-appellants penis, and at the very least, the labia of the
pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part
of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.The childs narration of the rape sequence is
revealing. The act of "idinikit-dikit niya" was followed by "itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya." The
"idiniin-diin niya" was succeeded by "Masakit po." Pain inside her "ari" is indicative of
consummated penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the
appellants room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the
complainants testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close
together --- which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not difficult, for the accused-
appellant to attempt penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accused-appellant
herein perpetrated the sexual abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint, totally
distinguishes the instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even
submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then
was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting his penis with his one hand, while touching,
poking and pressing the same against Rosilyn's vagina, would surely result in even the slightest
contact between the labia of the pudendum and accused-appellant's sex organ.
Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged
sexual assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience that accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from
fully consummating the sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the
same light, the defense likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-
appellant contented himself with rubbing his penis clipped between her thighs until he reached
orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to
gratifying ones basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too intricate for the
defense to prescribe certain forms of conduct. Even the word "perverse" is not entirely precise, as
what may be perverse to one may not be to another. Using a child of tender years who could
even pass as ones granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may
be utterly nauseating and repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive celebration of
salacious fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant may have found a distinct and
complete sexual gratification in such kind of libidinous stunts and maneuvers.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn
for fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his
previous agreement with his "suking bugaw," Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no
penetration, otherwise the latter would demand a higher price. This may be the reason why
Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant
inserts his penis into her sex organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accused-
appellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt Simplicio to
demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of
prostitution.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her
thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should be noted that this
portion of Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of
lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event, granting that it occurred during the twin
instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not
preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accused-
appellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn
unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And
even if she did not actually see accused-appellants penis go inside her, surely she could have
felt whether it was his penis or just his finger.
We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the
time the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of Rosilyn that she was then
eleven years old, the prosecution presented the following documents:
(1) Rosilyns birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;31
 (2) Rosilyns baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;32
(3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11,
1985 to Librada Telen as the mother;33
(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;34
(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and
her parents (Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number (39-10-71);35
(6) Record of admission showing her parents patient number (39-10-71) and
confinement at the Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985.36
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birth
certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11,
1997.37 However, it appears that the said decision has been annulled and set aside by the Court
of Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was appealed to this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 140305. Pending the final
outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed valid and can be invoked
as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time she was
abused by accused-appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainants age in the records.
Rosilyns Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,38 we
ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence that can help
establish the age of the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents
of similar nature, can be presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr.
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her
date of birth was May 11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records,
admissible as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyns testimony as
to her age.
Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:
Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
especially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,39 the Court laid down the requisites for the application
of the foregoing rule, thus:
(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not necessary
that it be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature of the office should render
the book indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to be kept. Thus,
official registers, though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes of
discharging official duties, are admissible.40
Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or
records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof.41 It is not necessary to
show that the person making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order
that the entry may be admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in
order that public business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the
hearsay rule.42
Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766,43 mandates
hospitals to report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth, among others, of
babies born under their care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00
nor more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6)
months, or both, in the discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to
the local civil registrar.
Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of
the Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where the fact of birth, name of
the mother and other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live Births
of the hospital, are considered entries in official record, being indispensable to and appropriate
modes of recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries with the local
civil registrar, in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person
who actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante, the records custodian
of the hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the
record itself or by a certified copy or the legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the
person who made those entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that
the entries testified to by Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were
accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.
The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates
of Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by unbiased and disinterested
persons under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have attended the
preparation of the birth and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are
sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn
are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of birth, was correctly
disregarded by the trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed by
Rosilyn against him was the direct cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that
Simplicio falsely testified in the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.
Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito Intruzo
because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as to the circumstances of
Rosilyns birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that Rosilyns
appearance belie her claim that she was born on May 11, 1985.
In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2,
and July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and 96-1997, respectively),
the trial court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was
able to prove that accused-appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at the
time the lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established
that accused-appellant flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly
committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that
she felt somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing
those lecherous acts as she was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise
acquitted in these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22,
1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as the rape perpetrated on
June 18, 1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A
careful review of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did
not give any testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly,
therefore, the trial court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which cannot
prevail over his positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.
As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996,
accused-appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the same because
he flew to Dipolog on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellants flight was
at 9:40 a.m. The possibility, therefore, of accused-appellants having performed the lascivious
acts on the victim before he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove
the physical impossibility of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996,
when the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who
for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x . (Emphasis supplied.)
In People v. Optana,44 the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,45 explained the elements of
the offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other
sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group. Under RA 7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or
condition."
"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of a person.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast,
inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all constitute
lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly
convicted accused-appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him
with the above-described lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the victim is
below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his
finger into the complainants vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it
indicates state policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies
the crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her
parents, can prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth
and contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.
Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court
correctly imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15) years, six (6) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of reclusion
temporal medium, pursuant to our ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.46 Notwithstanding that R.A.
7610 is a special law, accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code.47However, the trial court erroneously fixed the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium
period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,48 we held that the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, for violation of Article III,
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve
years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was
penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates
the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes
that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent
consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years
old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force
and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of
struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate
nor absolve the accused from liability.49
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was
only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of
any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of
accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with
eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court
for each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 should be increased
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.50 On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of statutory rape was correct.
In People v. Lor,51 citing the cases of People v. Victor,52 and People v. Gementiza,53 we held that
the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil indemnity
is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as
moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion.54 Hence, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the
offended party another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape and acts of
lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, is AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992,
and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness
in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced
to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12)
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral damages for each
count of acts of lasciviousness is increased to P50,000.00.

Section 14: A. Prohibitions

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,

JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO,
MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.

A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are
being given and made:

a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were
elected as Directors:

Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius Edgardo P. Reyes
Enrique M. Belo Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado Rafael R.
Recto

Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly
counted.

c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent
SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was
maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for
P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election
as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and
was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership
of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel
for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as
counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would
be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the
latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the
Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any
court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where
he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining
the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of
his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the
protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit
had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the
case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in
the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within
the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-
corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave

to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.