Contemporary Politics

ISSN: 1356-9775 (Print) 1469-3631 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccpo20

Problems and contradictions of participatory

democracy: lessons from Latin America

Claudio Balderacchi

To cite this article: Claudio Balderacchi (2016) Problems and contradictions of participatory
democracy: lessons from Latin America, Contemporary Politics, 22:2, 164-177, DOI:
10.1080/13569775.2016.1153282

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1153282

Published online: 24 Mar 2016.

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 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS, 2016
VOL. 22, NO. 2, 164177
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2016.1153282

Problems and contradictions of participatory democracy:

lessons from Latin America
Claudio Balderacchi
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ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The participatory innovations of the last few decades, particularly in Problems; contradictions;
Latin America, seem to suggest that the establishment of more participatory democracy;
participatory democracies is possible. However, limitations have Latin America
characterized important participatory experiences. While the
Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan attempts to promote
popular participation have produced both positive and negative
effects, some of these participatory experiences limitations are
useful to highlight more general problems and contradictions that
seem to be inherently associated with the establishment of
participatory democracy in poorly functioning liberal democracies
and in exclusionary and unequal societies. This analysis suggests
that, paradoxically, the establishment of effective and inclusive
participatory institutions may be less feasible where participatory
mechanisms appear, at rst glance, as most needed and promising.

Thanks to the participatory innovations of the last few decades, the debate on participa-
tory democracy has gained new strength. While participatory democracy is not a novel
concept, recent political developments, particularly in Latin America, seem to suggest
that the establishment of more participatory democracies is possible. At the same time,
limitations have characterized important participatory experiences. After dening partici-
patory democracy, through the analysis of the limitations of important participatory exper-
iments in Latin America I examine more general problems and contradictions that seem to
be inherently associated with the establishment of participatory democracy in poorly func-
tioning liberal democracies and unequal and exclusionary societies. This analysis suggests
that, paradoxically, the democratic impact of participatory mechanisms may be limited
where participatory democracy appears, at rst glance, as most needed and most
promising.

Participatory democracy
Participatory democracy refers to a democratic political regime, where citizens take direct
participation in public decision-making. In a now classic attempt to shed light on the poss-
ible features of a more participatory democracy in modern societies and large national

CONTACT Claudio Balderacchi balderacchic@gmail.com

2016 Taylor & Francis
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 165

states, a few decades ago Barber (1984/2003) advocated the establishment of a more
advanced form of democracy based on the notion of unmediated self-government by
an engaged citizenry (p. 261). This, Barber (1984/2003, Ch. 10) argued, could be achieved,
starting from and modifying representative, liberal institutions through the introduction of
a diverse set of institutions, including referenda, neighbourhood assemblies, and elec-
tronic town meetings. Over time, the emergence of a number of different participatory
mechanisms in various developing countries has corroborated the idea that representa-
tive, liberal democracy can be transformed on more participatory grounds. Recently, on
the basis of participatory developments in Latin America, authors such as Arditi (2008)
and Wolff (2013) have discussed the features of a new, post-liberal version of democracy,
where liberal and participatory institutions co-exist.
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If, in line with Barber (1984/2003), democracy can be made more participatory through
a series of institutional reforms, it is then possible to conceive a continuum, where purely
representative and participatory democracy represent the two extremes.1 While a purely
participatory democracy is a political regime where citizens participate directly in any area
of public decision-making, in a purely representative democracy decision-making is the
exclusive prerogative of elected representatives. Through the introduction of participatory
mechanisms, venues where citizens take direct participation in public decision-making, a
democratic regime moves away from the representative extreme towards the participa-
tory one. Although today most democratic regimes fall closer to the representative demo-
cratic extreme, citizens occasionally take direct participation in public decision-making in
democracies commonly dened as representative, for example through popular refer-
enda. In more radical democratic experiences, more complex participatory mechanisms,
such as participatory budgeting, have co-existed with representative institutions.
According to the advocates of participatory democracy, moving towards the participa-
tory extreme through the introduction of participatory mechanisms can make the existing
political regime more democratic. In a well-known attempt to clarify the deepening of
democracy concept, Roberts (1998, p. 30, emphasis in original) noted that
the logic of deepening democracy is one of intensifying popular sovereignty in the political
sphere, that is, moving from hierarchical forms of elitist or bureaucratic control to forms of
popular self-determination by means of more direct participation in the decision-making
process or more effective mechanisms for holding elected representatives and public ofcials
accountable to their constituents.

Accordingly, Roberts (1998, p. 29) viewed democracy as a continuous variable, an elastic

and dynamic phenomenon that contracts or expands over time in accordance with the
extent of popular control over collective decision making. Following Robertss (1998) de-
nition, then, when the deepening of democracy occurs, movements towards the participa-
tory extreme in the representativeparticipatory continuum tend to coincide with
democratic advances in a continuum, where one extreme represents non-democratic
regimes and the other perfectly democratic regimes. The democratic extreme may be
viewed, following Dahl (1971, p. 2), as a political system one of the characteristics of
which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.
While participatory mechanisms do have the potential to advance liberal democratic
regimes towards the Dahlian ideal type of democracy, what is described in Robertss
(1998, p. 30) denition as more direct participation in the decision-making process
 166 C. BALDERACCHI

does not always lead to more democratic regimes and hence to the deepening of democ-
racy. Participatory mechanisms may prove ineffective, be subject to the manipulation of
ruling elites, or be neglected by the vast majority of the population. In these cases, far
from promoting democratic advances, the transfer of functions from representative to par-
ticipatory institutions is likely to move the existing political regimes away from the Dahlian
ideal type of democracy. Predominantly participatory rather than representative political
regimes that is different positioning on the representativeparticipatory continuum
may then be viewed as alternative strategies to maximize levels of democracy, with no
strategy being superior to another a priori.
While the establishment of participatory mechanisms does not necessarily produce
democratic advances, among their most important features participatory institutions
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seem to have the potential to provide marginalized and excluded segments of society
the opportunity to express their preferences and participate in public decision-making
(see e.g. Pateman, 2012, pp. 1112; Pogrebinschi, 2013, pp. 1517). Accordingly, the intro-
duction of participatory mechanism appears as particularly promising in contexts charac-
terized by endemic exclusion, socio-economic inequality, and where ineffective liberal
democratic institutions fail to effectively translate popular preferences in public
decision-making. Because they may represent the solution to longstanding and seemingly
intractable problems, under similar conditions participatory mechanisms would seem to
bear the highest potential to deepen democracy. Unfortunately, as discussed below, in
similar contexts participatory mechanisms may face irresolvable problems and contradic-
tions, thus greatly limiting the potential of participatory democracy.
Because of the relevance of these contexts, the analysis of problems and contradictions
associated with the establishment of participatory mechanisms in poorly functioning
liberal democracies and unequal and exclusionary societies contributes to a further under-
standing of the feasibility and democratic potential of participatory democracy. These
questions are particularly important in light of the increasing diffusion of participatory
institutions in Latin America and beyond.

Latin Americas participatory wave: participatory experiences in Bolivia,

Ecuador, and Venezuela
Important participatory experiences have originated in Latin America. After the seminal,
successful experience of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory
experiments have diffused in the region both at the local and national levels. Participatory
budgeting has represented one of the most distinctive participatory experiences in the
region, with important examples in Brazil and beyond. Despite the signicance of leftist
parties in its trajectory, particularly the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), over time participatory
budgeting has transcended its leftist character, becoming an important mechanism for
both the advocates of liberal and radical democratic approaches (Goldfrank, 2007).
Locally initiated participatory reforms have represented some of the most innovative
political experiences in the region, showing that participatory reforms are not unrealistic
and can bring about signicant democratic benets. However, because of their local
origins, these reforms have been by denition circumscribed to specic geographical
contexts. Accordingly, their potential to move existing political regimes to a more
participatory type of democracy has been limited.2 Interestingly, according to Goldfrank
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 167

(2007, p. 96), the critique of participatory budgetings excessively local focus and limited
impact has been part of a more general, orthodox leftist critique viewing participatory
budgeting as an anti-revolutionary instrument. Over time, more comprehensive participa-
tory reforms have been established in the region. While, in some cases, participatory bud-
geting was promoted from the national level such as in Peru, more comprehensive
participatory initiatives have appeared in Latin America, including the Citizen Power Coun-
cils in Nicaragua, the National Public Policy Conferences in Brazil, and, ultimately, the con-
stitutionally sanctioned participatory reforms in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.
The participatory experiences in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have represented
some of the most ambitious projects in the region. In each of these countries, the goal
of establishing more participatory democracies was included in new constitutions that
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were adopted following radical leftist forces rise to power. In Venezuela, the electoral tri-
umphs of Chvez resulted in the 1999 Bolivarian constitution which, among its objectives,
includes the goal of creating a democratic, participatory and protagonistic, multiethnic
and pluricultural society.3 In the 2009 Bolivian constitution, the constitutional text refers
to a participatory, representative, and communitarian4 model of democracy (art.11),
while Ecuadors 2008 constitution afrms the protagonistic role of citizens in decision-
making (art. 95).5 Though not always meeting expectations and promises, these pioneer-
ing constitutional projects to deepen democracy have often been viewed as a point of
reference in the pursuit of different models of democracy, representing crucial passages
in the regions participatory wave.
While the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan attempts to promote popular partici-
pation have produced both positive and negative effects, some of these participatory
experiences limitations are useful to highlight more general, possibly irresolvable, contra-
dictions of participatory democracy. In a previous comparative study (Balderacchi, 2015), I
examined the conditions explaining variation in the democratic performance of central
participatory mechanisms in these countries, underlining the ability of the National Coor-
dinator for Change (CONALCAM) to produce autonomous, though not fully open, partici-
pation in Bolivia, as opposed to the Communal Councils (CCs) in Venezuela and the
Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS) in Ecuador. As observed in
this analysis (Balderacchi, 2015), far from producing autonomous participation, the
CPCCS and the CCs have appeared as manipulative instruments in the hands of the gov-
ernment. Drawing on some of this analysis ndings and on more recent examples, in the
next sections I show that important problems and limitations affecting participatory mech-
anisms may be associated with the attempt to establish these institutions in ineffective
liberal democracies and in contexts characterized by signicant exclusion and inequality.
The objective of this study is not to provide an assessment and a comprehensive analysis
of the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan participatory projects, or to elaborate a theory
aimed at the identication of the conditions explaining variation in participatory mechan-
isms performance.6 Rather, in light of the signicance of the these participatory experi-
ences, the objective of this study is to highlight important paradoxes associated with
participatory democracy, showing that the democratic impact of participatory mechan-
isms may be limited where most needed and where participatory institutions are generally
viewed as particularly promising. First, I address problems exacerbated by the malfunc-
tioning of liberal institutions. Then, I discuss participatory mechanisms limitations in exclu-
sionary and unequal societies.
 168 C. BALDERACCHI

Participatory mechanisms in poorly functioning liberal democracies

Participatory aws in Ecuador and Venezuela
In light of their potential to incorporate traditionally excluded groups, the abundance of
participatory mechanisms in a region notoriously marred by exclusion and inequality
such as Latin America is not surprising. A number of authors (Cameron, Hershberg, &
Sharpe, 2012a; Cameron & Sharpe, 2012; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Peruzzotti & Selee,
2009; Pogrebinschi, 2013) have examined the connection between the emergence of par-
ticipatory institutions and the existence of awed liberal democratic institutions in the
region. For example, while according to Levitsky and Roberts (2011) the crisis of existing
democratic institutions in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela was crucial in the emergence of
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leftist governments proposing to radically transform the political system on a more parti-
cipatory basis, Cameron and Sharpe (2012, p. 234) note that frustration with representa-
tive institutions increases the demand for more direct forms of participation. The books
edited by Cameron, Hershberg, and Sharpe (2012b) and Selee and Peruzzotti (2009)
have addressed the crucial question of the impact of participatory institutions in the
region. Though recognizing the risks associated with participatory mechanisms and refus-
ing to evaluate them primarily vis--vis representative democracy, in the introduction of
the rst of these books Cameron et al. (2012a, p. 2) underline the potential of these mech-
anisms to cure the dysfunctionalities of representative institutions, noting that the groups
that participate are often ones that have been historically excluded not only by traditional
patron-client and authoritarian institutions but by electoral, representative democracy as
well. Similarly, while acknowledging possible negative consequences, Peruzzotti and
Selee (2009) highlight the potentially benecial impact of participatory experiments on
representation.
While the connection between the emergence of participatory mechanisms and the
dissatisfaction for low quality liberal democracies seems evident, at least in Latin
America, can participatory mechanisms represent effective solutions to the malfunction-
ing of liberal democratic institutions? Viewing participatory mechanisms as possible sol-
utions to the aws of liberal democracy is appealing and has merit. Participatory
mechanisms can certainly help citizens convey their demands and inuence local or
national politics. However, the democratic impact of participatory mechanisms does
not seem to be independent from the quality of liberal representative institutions, a
problem that can signicantly limit the democratic potential of participatory insti-
tutions.7 Far from being independent, the quality of core liberal institutions appears
as a crucial factor to ensure the democratic functioning of participatory mechanisms.
Stressing the importance of liberal, representative institutions for the performance of
participatory institutions rather than the corrective effect of the latter, in his analysis
of municipal health councils in Brazil, Schnleitner (2006) underlines the importance
of reforming constitutional rules in Brazil to curb clientelism and hence facilitate parti-
cipatory institutions democratic functions. At the same time, Schnleitner (2006, p. 58)
highlights the importance of representative, aggregative institutions such as program-
matic political parties to avoid an authoritarian or clientelistic backlash. Similarly,
Melo (2009) questions the curative ability of participatory budgeting without reforming
representative institutions.
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 169

A signicant problem associated with weak liberal institutions is that the absence of
strong checks and balances seems to be conducive to the manipulation of participatory
institutions, particularly manipulations aimed at the consolidation of the power of the gov-
ernment. As recognized by Cameron et al. (2012a, pp. 67) themselves, certainly aware of
the risks associated with participatory mechanisms, absent appropriate institutional safe-
guards, popular participation in decision making may also come into conict with the pro-
tection of rights and interests of minorities, including those of economic elites. Reporting
Panizzas (2005, 2007) concerns over participatory democracys prospects and proneness
to manipulations in the absence of a liberal framework, De la Torre (2010, p. 152) under-
lines how a similar scenario provides leaders with the opportunity to set the table for the
topics that can be debated and the limits to the discussions. Among the possible draw-
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backs of participatory initiatives when not complemented by strong liberal institutions,

referring to the Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan cases De la Torre (2010, p. 203)
warned of the possibility of authoritarian plebiscitary acclamation and the clientelist redis-
tribution of resources for political support.
The analysis of important participatory institutions such as the CCs in Venezuela and the
CPCCS and popular referenda in Ecuador provides good examples of the problems associ-
ated with the establishment of participatory mechanisms in the absence of effective
checks and balances. The Venezuelan Community Councils are neighbourhood-level
councils, where citizens participate in the elaboration and implementation of projects
for the community. Though not without merits, from a democratic standpoint a crucial
problem of the CCs has had to do with the ability of the Ministry for the Communes
and Social Movements to grant or deny ofcial recognition to citizens trying to constitute
a CC. This requirement has provided the government with the opportunity to exclude
undesired participants, exert control over these institutions, and hence gradually
replace, through ad hoc legislative measures, democratically elected representative insti-
tutions with participatory mechanisms under government control (Balderacchi, 2015).
Despite a dubiously democratic institutional design and, specically, the governments
inuence over the ofcial recognition of the CCs, the existence of strong and autonomous
checks and balances could have greatly limited the governments manipulative project. In
particular, an independent judiciary could have proved an effective instrument to sanction
discriminatory rejections of the CCs ofcial recognition, thus providing excluded citizens
with an instrument to participate and hence limit the control of the government over the
CCs. Unfortunately, the independence of the judiciary branch has been traditionally weak
in Venezuela, both before and after Chvezs rise to power. While underlining the exist-
ence of rampant corruption and political meddling associated with the Venezuelan judi-
ciary well before Chvezs rise to power (p. 10), Human Rights Watch (2012) has
highlighted the progressive and systematic attempts of Chavista governments to take
control of the judiciary. Through the appointments of additional judges, including close
political allies, the government has taken control of the Supreme Court and, as a conse-
quence, of the appointment and removal of lower court judges, leading to consistent
pro-government ruling and to a scenario where judges, including Supreme Courts presi-
dent, have explicitly supported the governments mission (Human Rights, 2012, pp. 1016).
In a context such as the Venezuelan one, the absence of an independent judiciary and a
clear separation of powers, before and after Chvezs rise to power, have greatly limited
 170 C. BALDERACCHI

the democratic potential of the Bolivarian participatory reforms, favouring the manipulation
of popular participation.
Similarly, an independent judiciary could have hindered the apparently manipulative
use of the CPCCS in Ecuador. Among various functions, the CPCCS organizes public com-
petitions (concursos) for the selection of key state ofcials. In line with the Citizen Revolu-
tions participatory rhetoric, ordinary citizens take active participation in the selection
process, for example through Citizen Committees. As suggested, for example, by the
appointment of a previous minister of Correa to the ofce of Prosecutor General (Fiscal
General), in a process undermining the separation of powers, through these participatory
concursos the government has seemed to take control of important state institutions,
including the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Fiscal General (Balderacchi, 2015).
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Lawsuits pointing to irregularities and abuses were led during the CPCCS public compe-
titions (see El Comercio, 2011; La Hora, 2011; Radio Sucre, 2011), but they could not effec-
tively undermine the governments apparently manipulative use of the CPCCS.
Like in Venezuela, participatory mechanisms were established in the context of dubious
judicial independence. Before Correas rise to power, under the government of Lucio
Gutirrez, the Congress removed members of the Constitutional and the Supreme Court
on dubious legal grounds. Political interferences continued after Correas election in
2006 when, in the context of an institutional clash revolving around Correas proposal
of a Constituent Assembly, the president of the Supreme Electoral Court and nine
judges of the Constitutional Court were removed by an anti- and a pro-government leg-
islative body, respectively (Conaghan, 2008, pp. 5152). Moreover, as noted by De la Torre
(2013, p. 38), taking advantage of a referendum in 2011, Correa staffed the courts with his
loyal followers.
The importance of liberal institutions, particularly the principle of the separation of
powers, for a correct, democratic functioning of participatory mechanisms emerges also
from the recent Yasuni National Park question in Ecuador. The majority of the signatures
gathered by Yasunidos, an environmental group, to hold a referendum over the govern-
ments decision to exploit the Yasuni National Parks oil reserves were invalidated by the
CNE, thus blocking the referendum. While the process sparked accusations from both the
government and the Yasunidos, the latter questioned the CNEs independence, describing
its decisions as inspired by Correa to avoid an electoral defeat (Latin American Weekly
Report, 2014). Although Yasunidos accusations represent only a partial point of view,
De la Torre (2013, p. 38) denes the then president of the CNE as a close Correa ally. More-
over, a technical analysis completed by academics from two Ecuadorian universities
suggests that a signicantly higher number of signatures sufcient to promote the refer-
endum should have been counted as valid (El Comercio, 2014).
Interestingly, Correa has relied on referenda to pursue important goals when a positive
electoral outcome was expected, for example to promote the controversial Communi-
cation Law, a law that its critics view as limiting press freedom. Eventually approved in
June 2013 by the National Assembly, the approval of this law was promoted during the
2011 referendum (Consulta Popular). While Yasunidos accusations represent only a side
of the dispute, the Yasuni controversy shows how a clear separation of powers is important
to avoid a possible, selective use of referenda and hence the manipulation of participatory
mechanisms. More recently, the CNE has blocked the attempts of two members of the
opposition Patriotic Society Party and Compromiso Ecuador to collect signatures to
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 171

promote a referendum on the government-sponsored proposal to abolish term limits for

elected ofcials, including the President. In response to the CNEs decision, Guillermo
Lasso, leader of Compromiso Ecuador and presidential candidate in the 2013 elections,
accused the CNE of lacking impartiality and independence from the government (Creo.
com.ec, 2014). Notably, a recent poll by Cedatos (2015) indicates that 79.80% is favourable
to the idea of organizing a popular referendum (Consulta Popular) on the removal of term
limits for the presidency.

Paradoxes and the risk of moving too far

Underlining the absence of an independent judiciary and a clear separation of powers
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in Ecuador and Venezuela is not to say that the manipulation of participatory mechan-
isms would have not taken place in their presence. However, stronger liberal insti-
tutions could have limited them. Similarly, participatory mechanisms are not
inevitably bound to be manipulated in the absence of strong liberal institutions, but
their absence appears as a facilitating condition. If the weakness of liberal institutions
can facilitate the manipulation of participatory mechanisms and affect their functioning,
then participatory mechanisms potential to solve the aws of weak liberal democracies
is limited. In other words, without the support of those same institutions whose aws
they are trying to compensate, participatory mechanisms may prove ineffective and
even counterproductive. Though not raising concerns regarding democratic stability
such as in Ecuador and, especially, Venezuela, the Brazilian participatory experiences
seem to conrm liberal institutions importance. Melos (2009) analysis of participatory
budgeting in Brazil suggests that, in the absence of reforms addressing representative
institutions aws, participatory mechanisms may produce negative effects. Primarily
worried with the atomization of politics and the negative impact of clientelism, Schn-
leitner (2006) comes to similar conclusions, noting that reforms of existing representa-
tive institutions in Brazil, particularly to limit clientelism, are needed to ensure the
correct functioning of participatory institutions and should therefore precede participa-
tory reforms.
While the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan cases underline the importance of checks and
balances rather than the aspects highlighted by Schnleitner (2006), the examples con-
sidered in these countries corroborate the idea that establishing participatory mechanisms
in a context of poorly functioning liberal institutions may be particularly risky for demo-
cratic stability. To be sure, as noted by Pogrebinschi (2013, p. 18), not all democracies
should follow the liberal paradigm and alternative models of democracy may represent
valid, feasible alternatives. For example, through the description of a number of possible
deviations from liberal canons, Wolff (2013) illustrates how liberal democracies can attenu-
ate their liberal features and hence evolve into post-liberal democratic regimes. However,
though not a necessary condition, in light of the considerations outlined above, effective
liberal institutions, particularly checks and balances, should be viewed as a critical, highly
desirable condition for more participatory or even less liberal democratic models.8 Unfor-
tunately, this creates the important paradox that participatory mechanisms are less likely
to produce autonomous and inclusive popular participation in public decision-making
where particularly needed, that is where liberal democratic institutions fail to perform
their democratic functions.
 172 C. BALDERACCHI

Besides shedding light on an important paradox, the impact of core liberal institutions
on participatory mechanisms then provides further insights to the more general question
of how to move beyond liberal democracy. In particular, it suggests that the constitutive
elements of liberal democracy should not be disregarded on the basis of alternative
notions of democracy and that excessive deviations from the liberal model, particularly
from the principle of the separation of powers, can affect, rather than promote more par-
ticipatory models of democracy. According to Ellner (2010), as demonstrated by the Vene-
zuelan case, evaluations of the democratic performance of a political system may vary
dramatically depending on the adoption of liberal rather than radical democratic stan-
dards, with the latter privileging majority rule and the direct participation of the people
in decision making over checks and balances and the separation of powers. While
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Ellner (2010, p. 93) himself acknowledges the importance of checks and balances to
prevent negative phenomena such as corruption, a signicant problem associated with
such an approach is that, as noted above, the performance of participatory mechanisms
is not independent from the quality of checks and balances and hence its liberal insti-
tutions. In a similar vein, according to Mainwaring (2012, pp. 959960), constitutive
elements of liberal democracy are necessary elements of any type of democracy and
make it possible for diverse groups, including lower class groups, to politically
empower themselves and to press their claims for greater equality and social justice.
With respect to the caveat of avoiding excessive deviations from liberal standards, some
of the possible post-liberal deviations described by Wolff (2013) for example the election
of judges or efforts to extend the reach of democratic institutions to those parts of the
state apparatus and to non-state spheres that are seen, in the liberal model, as domains
of technical or private decision-making (p. 39) may jeopardize judicial independence
or more generally checks and balances and, hence, as demonstrated by the pathological
aspects of the Community Councils in Venezuela and the CPCCS in Ecuador, affect parti-
cipatory mechanisms ability to serve the goals of participatory democracy.9 In short, diver-
ging from the liberal model towards a post-liberal democracy is possible and may be
benecial. However, beyond a certain point, deviations from liberal standards may
prove counterproductive and jeopardize the goals of both liberal and participatory
democracy.

Participatory mechanisms and the incorporation of the enemy in unequal

and exclusionary societies
The previous section has highlighted participatory mechanisms problems in low quality
liberal democracies. As shown in this section, the analysis of the Bolivian, Ecuadorian,
and Venezuelan participatory experiences suggests that important, apparently inherent,
problems seem to undermine the potential of participatory mechanisms also in unequal
and exclusionary societies.
The Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan participatory experiences present both differ-
ences and similarities. In Bolivia, one of the most important participatory venues has been
the CONALCAM, an unofcial institution where the executive and social movements col-
laborate in the elaboration of public policies and the government of the country.
Although, among these countries participatory experiences, only in Bolivia participatory
mechanisms such as the CONALCAM have led to largely autonomous participation,
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 173

similar to the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan experiences they have not been open to the
whole population, restricting access to political allies (Balderacchi, 2015). In fact, the
Morales government has not yet seriously engaged in the creation of comprehensive par-
ticipatory venues where individuals can participate on the basis of universal, objective
criteria.
Rather than accidental, the failure to create fully open participatory mechanisms in each
of these otherwise different experiences may have been inuenced by the nature of the
opposition. While the tendency of segments of the opposition to engage in dubiously
democratic or blatantly undemocratic practices in each of these countries including
an attempted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and the 2008 protests against Morales in
Bolivia does not explain variation between these participatory experiences outcomes,
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particularly the presence or absence of government-dominated participatory institutions

(see Balderacchi, 2015), it highlights a hardly resolvable dilemma. Specically, how to open
participatory mechanisms to an enemy unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment and its participatory project and hence likely to take advantage of their partici-
pation in public decision-making to unravel participatory democracy? In an interview
with the author, a member of the Bolivian government outlined the risk that opposition
civil society groups could take advantage of participatory channels to undermine the revo-
lutionary process (interview, May 2011, La Paz, Bolivia). Similar perceptions, particularly in
contexts characterized by signicant polarization and dubiously democratic opposition
actors, can discourage the creation of fully open mechanisms. As shown by Bay-Meyer
(2013) in her analysis of the Nicaraguan Citizen Power Councils, political divisions may
produce exclusionary practices and in turn further polarization, thus raising concerns
about participatory mechanisms performance in low-income, politically divided countries
with weak state capacity.10
The question of how to open participatory mechanisms to dubiously democratic socio-
political forces is important in the construction of participatory democracy. A comprehen-
sive participatory democracy can emerge only when participatory venues are open to the
whole population. However, in contexts characterized by signicant polarization and the
unwillingness of the opposition to recognize transformative, participatory projects as legit-
imate, it is reasonable to expect governments, even when truly committed to participatory
democracy, to refrain from opening participatory mechanisms to the whole population.
Unfortunately, high polarization and the existence of opposition forces unwilling to fully
accept the outcome of electoral contests seem to be recurrent where participatory mech-
anisms are more needed, that is in countries characterized by the traditional socio-econ-
omic and political exclusion of signicant social groups. With respect to socio-economic
exclusion, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006, pp. 3738) note that by increasing the
costs associated with redistribution, in a democracy greater inequality increases the desir-
ability of undemocratic paths for elites. Similarly, Boix (2003, p. 10) observes that in the
context of lower income inequality the relative costs of tolerating a mass democracy
decline for the holders of the most productive assets. More recently Reenock, Bernhard,
and Sobek (2007) have suggested that basic needs deprivation in the presence of econ-
omic development is likely to produce social conict and the rejection of democracy by
elites.
The concern of an authoritarian reaction to participatory mechanisms is highlighted by
Goldfrank (2011, p. 266) who notes that recent participatory mechanisms have often failed
 174 C. BALDERACCHI

to combine, besides other characteristics, inclusiveness and some degree of decision-making

power. Goldfrank (2011, p. 266) advances the concern that the attempts to design and
implement participatory institutions that combine these features will lead to violent reactions
from previously entrenched political forces who are willing to save representative democracy
from too much citizen participation by destroying democracy altogether. While Goldfranks
concerns focus on possible violent reactions from conservative or traditional political forces,
the Andean cases seem to suggest that the decision of the government to open participatory
mechanisms to the whole population may be hindered by concerns regarding the potential
inltration of the enemy into participatory mechanisms to unravel participatory democracy.
Participatory mechanisms can indeed provide opposition forces with the opportunity to re-
organize and access some decision-making power. For example, without the tight control of
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the government, in certain areas neighbourhood-level councils such as the Community

Councils in Venezuela could have provided opposition forces with the opportunity to pene-
trate local communities and hence an effective instrument to develop consensus at the local
level. Both problems, the unwillingness to open participatory mechanisms to avoid the inl-
tration of polarized opponents into public decision-making and possible violent reactions
from the opposition, represent signicant obstacles to the establishment of an effective par-
ticipatory democracy, especially in contexts where participatory mechanisms are particularly
needed to address historical inequities.
Interestingly, while the problems discussed above question the feasibility of participatory
mechanisms open to the whole population, the establishment of participatory mechanisms
open to only certain segments of the population may further undermine the creation of an
inclusionary participatory democracy. Certainly, it could be argued that participatory mech-
anisms open to only certain segments of the population may represent initial, though imper-
fect, steps towards a fully open and better functioning participatory democracy. However, in
addition to the fact that exclusionary practices within participatory institutions may produce
further polarization (see Bay-Meyer, 2013, p. 394), Walker and Williams (2010) highlight a con-
siderable problem associated with the potentially radicalizing effect of rank and les
demands on leaders. As observed by Walker and Williams (2010, p. 499), because public par-
ticipation may complicate the elites attempts to compromise, public participation and elite
consensus may prove irreconcilable objectives. Accordingly, rather than initial, perfectible
steps, partially open participatory venues may prove signicant obstacles on the way
towards a comprehensive participatory democracy.
In short, the establishment of comprehensive participatory mechanisms may prove
highly problematic in unequal and exclusionary societies, thus undermining the demo-
cratic potential of participatory democracy.

Conclusions
This study has highlighted an important paradox. Participatory mechanisms are often
viewed as possible solutions to the problems of liberal representative institutions and
are generally praised for their potential to include traditionally marginalized and excluded
sectors of society. However, problems and contradictions in poorly functioning liberal
democracies and unequal and exclusionary societies suggests that, paradoxically, the
establishment of effective, inclusive participatory institutions may be less feasible where
participatory mechanisms appear as most needed and promising.
 CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 175

This study contributes to a more complete understanding of the democratic potential

of participatory mechanisms, help shed light on their functioning in salient contexts, and
provides further insights to the debate on the relationship between liberal and participa-
tory institutions. To be sure, participatory mechanisms are not inevitably bound to failure
in the contexts examined and, by no means, this study is intended as a manifesto against
participatory democracy. However, a better understanding of participatory mechanisms
performance in salient contexts is required in order to get a better grasp of the democratic
potential of participatory (or more participatory) democracy, especially in a historical
phase characterized by their increasing diffusion.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that, according to Barber (1984/2003, p. 263), the institutions he proposes
should not be introduced individually but, rather, through a comprehensive reform. For an
attempt to place Latin American countries on a similar continuum and for an analysis of
the balance between participation and representation in a number of Latin American
countries, see Cameron and Sharpe (2012, pp. 241245).
2. On the limited impact of local participatory initiatives in Brazil, see Pogrebinschi and Samuels
(2014, pp. 317318).
3. Authors translation of una sociedad democrtica, participativa y protagnica, multitnica y
pluricultural. Retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Constitutions/Venezuela/vigente.html.
4. Authors translation of participativa, representativa y comunitaria. Retrieved December 19,
2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Bolivia/bolivia09.html.
5. Ecuadors constitution retrieved December 19, 2014, from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/
Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html.
6. I pursue these objectives in the aforementioned Balderacchi (2015).
7. In line with some of the weaknesses of liberal democracy reviewed by Peruzzotti and Selee
(2009, pp. 23), liberal democratic institutions can be viewed as strong and effective when
elections are complemented by a clear separation of powers and a system of checks and bal-
ances largely able to impartially and effectively enforce the rule of law.
8. More drastically, in his analysis of the left in Latin America, Panizza (2005, p. 730) observes that
leftist forces should recognize that new forms of political participation can only be built on the
foundations of strong representative institutions.
9. Wolff (2013, p. 38) himself recognizes the question of judicial independence from popular
control as a signicant source of controversy in the debate on liberal and post-liberal
models of democracy.
10. In particular, Bay-Meyer (2013, p. 421) raises concerns over restrictions in the distribution of
public goods and social services.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Any mistakes
or omissions are mine.

Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.
 176 C. BALDERACCHI

Notes on contributor
Claudio Balderacchi completed his PhD in the Department of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of Florida. He then served as an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Florida Center
for Latin American Studies.

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