FORTUN vs. QUINSAYAS, et. al.

FACTS:

Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused in the Maguindanao
Massacre.

Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for misleading the prosecution and trial
court under the rules and muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject
matter of the case.

Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media group for active
dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court on confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.

The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint. It
would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment
complaint to the members of the media.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt in violation of Section 18, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant and as a lawyer in the disbarment case against Atty. Fortun.

As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, she disseminated copies of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes contempt
of court.
BELEN vs. COMILANG

FACTS:

Judge Belen rendered a Decision finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court
and for payment of P20,000.00 as penalty. Comilangs motion for reconsideration was denied. State
Prosecutor Comilang filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary

The CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO). Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order
requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear on
September 26, 2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt of court.

In his Compliance, State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CAs injunctive writ and manifested that he was
waiving his appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him.

Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order directing State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his defiance of
the subpoena and why he should not be cited for indirect contempt and for issuance of subpoenas to
Comilang

State Prosecutor Comilang moved to quash the subpoenas for having been issued without jurisdiction and
in defiance to the lawful order of the CA, and for the inhibition of Judge Belen. Judge Belen denied the
motion to quash subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his
failure to obey a duly served subpoena.

State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of
authority, and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt
citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA.

The Court resolved the administrative case finding Judge Belen guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law, and meting upon him the penalty of dismissal from service.

State Prosecutor Comilang also filed before the CA a petition to cite Judge Belen in contempt of court nd
averred that by issuing the Orders, Judge Belen openly defied the CAs injunctive writ.

The CA found Judge Belen guilty of indirect contempt for his disobedience of or resistance to lawful court
orders as sanctioned in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Judge Belen moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Hence, Judge Belen filed petition
for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Judge Belen asserts that he was deprived of
his right to due process because the CA proceeded to rule on the petition for contempt without
considering his Comment thereon.

ISSUE:

Did CA err in holding Judge Belen guilty for indirect contempt?

RULING:

Yes. The Court found that his conviction for indirect contempt was procedurally defective because
he was not afforded an opportunity to rebut the contempt charges against him.

Under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the following procedural requisites must be
satisfied before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) there must be an order requiring
the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt; (2) the respondent must be given
the opportunity to comment on the charge against him; and (3) there must be a hearing and the court
must investigate the charge and consider respondents answer. Of these requisites, the law accords
utmost importance to the third as it embodies ones right to due process. Hence, it is essential that the
alleged contempt be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his
defenses.

The conclusive declaration in A.M. RTJ-10-2216 that Judge Belens disobedience to the CAs injunctive writ
constitutes indirect contempt of court cannot serve as a basis for the Court to be indifferent to or ignore
the obvious violation of his right to be heard, state his defenses and explain his side. The power to punish
for contempt is not limitless; it must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation,
and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.

The CA unjustifiably ignored the Judge Belens Comment. It failed to dutifully afford Judge Belen his right
to be heard. Such failure consists of a serious procedural defect that effectively nullifies the indirect
contempt proceedings.
DIGITAL vs. CANTOS

FACTS:

Digital Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise to install, operate
and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines on February 17, 1994.

Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayors Permit, they were informed that their business operation would
be restrained should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes on or before October 5, 1998. The
company failed to pay hence they were given a Cease and Desist Order enjoining them from further
operating its business. As case was filed for the annulment of the order, the RTC ruled in favor of the
company stating that the order is without basis, and further that the company is only liable to pay real
property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. In June 2002,
Jessie Cantos, Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, issued seven Warrants of Levy certifying that several real
properties of the company are delinquent in the payment of real property tax. Therefore, the properties
would be sold at a public auction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is double jeopardy.

HELD:

The company contends that the rule on double jeopardy will not bar it from pursuing its appeal
because this is not a criminal case and respondent is not tried as an accused. The Court does not agree.
Contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of court partakes of the nature of a
criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. In
fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings
may be taken as in criminal cases. The Court has held that an alleged contemnor should be accorded the
same rights as that of an accused. Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent
amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution. Be that as it may, respondent is not
guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity.

It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct which

tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner,
to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court
which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation."
MERDEGIA VS VELOSO

FACTS:
Atty. Adaza was the counsel for Thomas Merdegia for a case wherein Justice Veloso was the
presiding justice. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Velosos partiality during
the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled
Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice
Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against
Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for
assisting his client, especially when he so believes in the merits of his clients case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Adaza can be held for contempt of court?

HELD:

Yes.

The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos
bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the
motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy
would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The
settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal
and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that, when
read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is merely an
attempt to malign the administration of justice. It has been noted that in several other occasions, Atty.
Adaza had filed several motions for inhibition against judges for merely ruling negatively as to his clients
causes.

In one case, we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file
administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the
judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes
indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts
constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable
for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates
the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for
contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be
informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side. While
the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding cannot
substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. Jurisprudence describes a
contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature, while a disciplinary proceeding against an erring
lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Contempt proceedings and
disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the
procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are
governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a
frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to
pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The
respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the
institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.