Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
on Audit and the results thereof
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government
Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations
from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development
Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from
the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify
the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on
non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening
under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings
of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.
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Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Separation of Powers
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua
et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935,
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been
filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion
of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a
resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs
and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC
can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory
of separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions
and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual
and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution
went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei
the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time
and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was
to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated
if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to
fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the
privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation,
does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power
to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member
of the National Assembly should be filed.
Carmen Planas vs Jose Gil
67 Phil. 62 Political Law Separation of Powers Rule of Non-
Interference
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of
Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government
officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following
morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President)
by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC
over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her
political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses
punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a
party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends
that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and
in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot
properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only
cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe
any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose
Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under
the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no
jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely
administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the
President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his
jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this
legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from
making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these
are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy
is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither
compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party
respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted
by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer
of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an
important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like
the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from
judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent
that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of
this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is
necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas
was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made
allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those
allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs Social Security System (1966)
16 SCRA 6 Labor Law Labor Standards Coverage of the Social
Security Act
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) is engaged in the business of
stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns,
maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. In 1959, it carried in
its payrolls temporary employees of 1,752 and 2,552 stevedores in the cities
of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectively, who were hired on rotation and on vessel-
by- vessel basis. They were paid daily with the understanding of being laid off
at the end of each day. On the average, each stevedore worked for 14 days
during the year. In October 1960, LSC petitioned to the SSS that the temporary
employees be exempt from SSS contributions on the ground that they work
only intermittently and are not in a position to maintain membership in the
Social Security System long enough to be fully entitled to the laws sickness,
disability, death and retirement benefits. And that the law could not have
intended them to be covered without enjoying the benefits of the program. SSS
however denied LSCs petition and it ordered LSC to pay back premiums. LSC
countered stating that the compulsory coverage of the SSS contributions only
covers permanent employees. LSC invoked Section 9 of the Social Security
Act as amended by Republic Act No. 1792 which states that an employee must
at least have been with the company for six months to be covered by the
compulsory coverage. LSC also invoked Sec. 8 of the same law which defines
employment covered by the Social Security Act and also provides exemption
therefrom. Paragraph 10 of that section would state that services by temporary
employees may be excluded by regulations of the Social Security
Commission. This is interpreted by LSC as a provision that Congress has
delegated to the Social Security Commission the issuance of regulations
bearing on the exemption of services performed by temporary employees from
social security coverage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the temporary employees are exempt from the
compulsory coverage.
HELD: No. The Social Security Act was amended by Republic Act No. 2658
on June 18, 1960. The amendment broadened the coverage of the Social
Security System, increased its benefits and liberalized the terms and
conditions for their enjoyment. Sections 9 and 10 were made to read as
follows:
SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. Coverage in the System shall be
compulsory upon all employees between the ages of sixteen and sixty,
inclusive, and their employers: . . .
SEC. 10. Effective date of coverage. Compulsory coverage of the
employer shall take effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the
employee on the date of his employment.
Eliminated was the six months service requirement. Without such
requirement, all employees regardless of tenure, such as the employees in
question, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS; except of
course those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social
Security Act. With such removal, it is the intent of Congress to broaden and
include temporary workers to the compulsory coverage. On the other hand, in
regards section 8, paragraph 10 being invoked by LSC, no such regulation has
been cited to buttress the claim for exemption. Perforce, no exemption could
be granted as there is no way of telling whether or not the employees in
question belong to a group or class designated by regulation of the Social
Security Commission as exempt.
Paz Garcia vs Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and
San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly
created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to
February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions
of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established
due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up
and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he
could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during
the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to
pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all
the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by
the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his
leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a
judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts
as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while
he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also
questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ,
a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty
as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence.
Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench,
eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a
judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being
detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection
with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the
principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate
of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said
three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional
precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him
for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and,
worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other
than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.
Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice
is discontinued.
Emigdio Bondoc vs Marciano Pineda
01 SCRA 792 Political Law HRET Removal of a Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in
the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the
Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the
winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr.
who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader)
that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the
election. This resulted to Camasuras expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then
moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that
a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in
the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening
of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman
Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before
the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because Camasuras removal is an official act of Congress
and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the
said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without
encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof,
HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made,
members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest
involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw
their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already
become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to
change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because
his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a
valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of
Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming
from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due
process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro
were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence
from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in
Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain
plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be
of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but
was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he
escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on
behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of
the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they
had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes
undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their
liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine
of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to
execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial
governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to
give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a
literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to
degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to
religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives
of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace
and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down
where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists
a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Vera
65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal
Protection Probation Law
Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him
by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed
for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was
set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution
opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the
Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have
no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because
under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to
be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a
province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated
probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act
4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal
protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative
of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a province chooses
to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will
not, then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative
of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power
because it gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply
the probation law however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be
followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the
executives power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing
for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to
grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by
HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution,
representing the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot
question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used
the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the
validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized
representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie
against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There
is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were
given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So
if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within
said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it
shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards
have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state
as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards
follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily
according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power
of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within
the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president
to commute penalties.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and
Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33
municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil
action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated
for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional.
He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3
of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues:
If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios
were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt
from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios
to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any
such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare
may require which would mean that the President may exercise such
power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace
the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed
by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is
essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
executive).
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs Blas Ople
137 SCRA 117 Political Law Delegation of Power
Administrative Bodies Manner of Election and Selection of
Representatives
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the
National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the
agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million
workers all over the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is
the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors
are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from
Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees
to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of
Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because
it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and
appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned
the acts of BlasOple, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations
provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since there are
no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the
said law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left
him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such
nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20 day
period of nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to question
the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of Ople. Because
of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of
Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is
intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is
involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence
intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the
recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The
argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power
is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not
even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with clarity in Article
III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and
scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said
provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by
merely writing a letter coursed through respondent, and their nominees should
have been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May
30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople
which in effect stated that they were not submitting any nomination and
informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had
no one to blame but themselves. And the law cannot be declared
unconstitutional on such ground.
 United States vs Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and
approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding
of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act,
in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published
on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold.
On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6 th of August 1919. On
August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he
committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex
post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation
of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance,
it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a
Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted which gave broad powers to the
VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale
of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation
of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the
movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be
taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable
to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its
discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said
PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied
with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through
the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not
being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or
discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited
period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction
and control of the [VRB].
Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor
108 SCRA 757 Political Law Delegation of Power Completeness
Test
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone
Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company.
Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the
issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the
provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of power
by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion
to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively
granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the
Minister of Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no
ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the
Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle
and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. But as to
whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to
be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual
determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it
set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being
limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative
Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and
operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications
services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later
known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However,
Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed
PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently,
PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to
continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it
however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC
based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz)
assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC,
empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide
the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is
an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers
of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546,
providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO
196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred
that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission
to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is
limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable
feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is
the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature
in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been
established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the
absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard
which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done
without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate
imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
People of the Philippines vs Jacob Rosenthal
68 Phil. 328 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative
Bodies Public Interest as Sufficient Test
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the
ORO Oil Company. Later, Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling
their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were
merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections
2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind
or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular
Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay
the required tax of twenty-pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of
the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein
provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to
the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the
Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or
corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership,
association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that
such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are
entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that
said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it
is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal
from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty
days to the Secretary of Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or
rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in
which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the
sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative
powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal
Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient
standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding
the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit
to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association
or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act,
and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law,
means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when
the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand,
the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is
expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public
interest.
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public
against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of
blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil
wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, the SC
held that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the
Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance
or cancellation of certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid
because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It
is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare
without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the
requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the
contrary. . .
United States vs Aniceto Barrias
11 Phil. 327 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of
Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats).
The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is
to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a
lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a
violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered
ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the
information against Barrias, it was alleged that the imposable penalty against
him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court this
was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending
shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the
discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is
entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided
a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange
was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty
different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so,
then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate
penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State
has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative
has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which
alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector
cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias
 Social Justice Society vs
should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No.
1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is
$25.00.

Dangerous Drugs Board

570 SCRA 410 Political Law Qualifications of a Senator or a
Congress Representative
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs
Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office
with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a
senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks
(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that
they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum
of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and
be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever
limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC
cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in
the Constitution.
Rogelio Bagabuyo vs
Commission on
Elections
573 SCRA 290 Political Law Local Government
Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in
2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed
(RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio
Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from
enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite
which he averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371
merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant
to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality,
or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan
de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment
of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city
council members citywide for its population of approximately
500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two
congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys
population. This easily means better access to their congressman
since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.