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Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana
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Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol XV (/)
by J. K. Fynn
The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. . . The question
is how far it is life-furthering, life-preserving, species preserving, per-
haps species creating - Nietzsche. 1
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2 J. . FYNN
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANT1 3
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 5
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTi 7
swift conquest of Aowin, they were quickly disillusioned for the Aow
up a spirited defence of their territory. A British report indicated t
Awawees have beaten the Ashantees who are returned to recreate new
and have sent to the Cufferoes [Twifo] to come to their assistance
Dutch also learnt from 'dependable sources' that the Aowin 'hav
rebuffed the Assantynse and the Wassase'. 19 However, by earl
Aowin resistance had been overcome and the English factor at
asked for increased supplies of muskets and gunpowder from C
Castle because 'the Ashantees and Warsaws have destroyed the Ca
lonians [N/ima] and Awawees and are now coming to trade with their
A few days later, the report was that 'Amancotjo [Amankwa Tia] and
[Gyetua] have come to an agreement with the Auwiens' and that t
had agreed to pay 300 bendas of gold as a token of their submi
report added that Amankwa Tia and Gyetua had decided 'to leave
thier people in Aowin to collect from all refugees in Aowin 2' engels
as tribute . . . '20
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Faced with the revolt of the Aowin, the desertion of the Wassa and the
treachery of Akwamu, the Asante decided to make overtures for an accommo-
dation with the Akyem. A Dutch report in 1718 noted that the two erstwhile
enemies had agreed to aid each other against Akwamu because they hac
realised that both had been 'so miserably and kna vishly duped by the Aquam
boes'.27 Indeed, between 1720 and 1742 the Asante and the Akyem livec
in peace and the latter was enabled to attack and defeat Akwamu in 1730.
The Akyem conquest of Akwamu in 1730 was described by contempo-
raries as the greatest revolution that had taken place on the Gold Coast sinc<
the Akwamu themselves destroyed the Ga kingdom in the late seventeentl
century. The Akwamu were expelled from their homeland and pushed aerosi
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 9
The Akyem defeat left the Asante the dominant political and economic
power in the Gold Coast hinterland. In addition, the Asantehene received
the ground rents for the European settlements at Accra and the neighbour-
hood. In May 1742, the Danes began to pay the Asante king 'thirty-two
rigsdaler for his overlordship [overherskab] and for the sake of trade from
himself and his subjects, in addition to an annual expensive present . . .' And
in 1757, the British paid 'Cuishee [Kwasi Obodum 1750-1764], king of
Ashantee his ground rent at 8 per month from 1 5 January, 1 756 - 1 5 Janu-
ary, 1757 in trade goods'.29
In the early 1720s therefore the Asante authorities decided to attack the
Aowin, the Nzima and the Wassa. Between 1721 and 1722, the Asante, the
Aowin and the Nzima fought many bloody battles which ended in the total
defeat of the Aowin and the Nzima. The Dutch reported that 'the gold rich
Awinse suffered its greatest defeat', and that large numbers of Aowin pri-
soners of war were sold as slaves at Elmina, Cape Coast and Anomabo. John
Atkins, a British naval officer, who was on the Nzima coast at that time,
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 1 1
irmies besieged Elmina and beleaguered the Dutch castle.37 In fact, the
precipitant withdrawal of the Asante army emboldened the Wassa t
extend ttie campaign to Twifo and to defeat king Kwadwo Abbetekyi an
his Twifos who had helped the Asante. In 1729, it was reported that th
Wassa, led by Ntsiful, had attacked 'the country of Cuifferoe which is th
key of Ashantee and the path by which trade is brought to the watersid
It was further stated that in appreciation of the protection offered him, the
Wassa king sold sixty war prisoners to the English and ordered his subjects t
trade with English merchants only, prohibiting any trade with the Dutc
'against whome (sic) he is very much incensed'. 38
The Wassa attack on Twifo provoked Opoku Ware to send down 10,000
troops to attack the Wassa. In a fiercely fought battle, the Wassa were
defeated. The Dutch Director General jubilantly wrote to his superiors in
Holland that 'at last the Asjantijn . . have defeated the notorious king
Warsaw, Intuffer, his whole country is ruined and he himself has fled to som
other country, so that this great obstacle which has given us so much troubl
and who was the cause of the decline of our trade has been removed . . .'3
Intsiful, described as 'a wary old negro', in fact proved a hard nut to
crack. He depopulated his country, moved closer to the Fante and Ahant
borders, and founded a new Wassa state called Fiase. In their new homeland,
the Wassa occupied 'certain impregnable passages' so that all inland trader
were completely barred from the west coast. Furthermore, Intsiful Asa
entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with 'the kings and chief
of all the coastal states from Cape Appolonia to the Rio Volta' to preven
guns and gunpowder from reaching Asante. He died in 1752, two years
after the death of Opoku Ware.40
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 1 3
Aputei, who were fleeing from Asante justice which formed the casu
for the Asante-Fante war of 1807. Indeed, in the middle of the nine
century, a British Governor remarked that 'the refuge given to run
slaves and pawns under the British forts proved the source of the gr
irritation and annoyance to native kings and chiefs . . . M7
Another source of irritation to the Asante was Fante propensity to i
Akan customary laws and practices. For instance, it was a fundamental d
matic etiquette, observed by all the Akan states, not to harm or kill env
or persons employed in the political service. Yet, in 1766, the Fante exec
a messenger from a relative of the Asantehene who was staying at Anom
as a hostage because the Asante envoy attempted to smuggle 'a quarter ba
of gun powder' to Asante contrary to 'a law' by the Fante prohibiti
sale of guns, gun-powder, iron bars, lead and shot to Asante tr
Governor Gilbert Petrie noted that wherever the news of this deed was
'It spread terror and dismay', because nothing less was expected to f
'than an immediate Rupture with the king of Ashantee to whom such an
of violence was the highest insult that could be off. red'. Petrie pointed
that it was a long standing custom among the peoples of the Gold Coast
'the persons not only of Tie Ties [court criers] or heralds, messenger
Hostages, but of all those who belong or accompany them are held sacred
injury done to any of them is considered to affect the Honour of those
represent or are sent from'. The murder of such persons therefore was
regarded as 'a challenge and a mark of defiance' and the state whose
or herald had been brutally executed was in duty and honour boun
avenge his death.48
It is clear from this brief outline, then, that for political, comm
and other reasons, the Asante would wish to conquer the Fante states
eighteenth century. This wish materialised in the early years of the
teenth century.
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14 J. . FYNN
In the north-west of Asante lived the Bono peoples. The Brong country
was not only rich in gold, ivory and kola nuts but also it was here that probably
the Akan developed their skills in gold smithing and other specialised craft
production such as gold weights and balances. In this area too were esta-
blished the early markets where the Akan were on record as having exchanged
their gold, kola nuts and ivory for slaves, cloths and other products with
traders from Mandeland. It is therefore quite clear that the Asante conquest
of Tkyiman, Gyaman and the other Bono states was explicable in both poli-
tical and economic terms.
Gyaman was obviously conquered because of its gold fields and trade. A
tribute of 18,000 ounces of gold dust per annum was imposed and the gold
trade was diverted to Kumasi away from the north-west and the north. 5 1
The area was still ruled by Gyaman kings though Kumasi appears to have
influenced the selection of the king.52 Gyaman tradition asserts that the
Bantamahene was the Adamfo of the Gyaman king and that the Gyaman paid
tribute through the Bantama stool. For the period up to 1819, Gyaman
appears to have been loosely controlled', for there is only one reference to a
possible Asante official in Gyaman, and this was by no means a clear ref-
erence.53
But after the serious revolt ofAdinkira in 1818, the Asante decided to
exercise tight control over Gyaman in order to protect its imperial interests.
These interests involved continuing the flow of gold from the Gyaman gold
fields to Kumasi; the stopping of disturbances among the western Gonja divi-
sions, and the prevention of the very dangerous alliance of the north-west
and the south-west which had been a recurrent theme in eighteenth century
Asante history.
Asante troops were stationed at Amanaha on the Assin river and
elswhere to prevent any communication with the south-wst. A representa-
tive of the Asantehene was made jointly responsible with the new Zanzan
king for all Gyaman.54 A road was constructed between Kumasi and Bon-
tuku to ensure more direct control and another road was built running from
Kintampo through Buipe to Jenne and Segu on the middle N iger to cut Kong
off from the trade route.55 In short, Gyaman, an Akan state, was vital 4for
the economic support of Greater Ashanti' after 1817, and the Asante made
costly and determined efforts to secure it.
We know from Asante traditional and European sources that Tekyiman
was conquered by subterfuge. Opoku Ware used Bafo Pim, his paternal
uncle, and the Nkoronzas to defeat that old Akan state. From then on
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 15
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 17
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 19
ihe fact that the Kambonse were initially recruited from 'slaves an
acephalous tribes of Grunshie' argues for a deliberate Asante p
rupt the traditional 'stratification which existed for the purpose o
in Dagomba. In other words, the Kambonse was 'so highly
because the Asante deliberately created a wing of musketeers
and led by Asante war-lords and military advisers, in the Dag
as counterpoise to the Dagomba chiefs and princes who const
cavalry wing and who wielded swords and cudgels.
To conclude, it is clear from the available evidence that the ori
Asante wars of conquest and expansion cannot be explained aw
of any simple theory or hypothesis which ignores obvious hist
It seems to me that the confusion that has developed largely stem
tempts to find an ultimate purpose in Asante policy towards th
states. But, then, this tends to produce a static view of the Asante
takes little or no account of other factors which characterise empi
such as fluctuations of power, adaptation of aims to new and
situations, and the part which chance and opportunism play in thi
Nor does it serve any useful purpose to look for hard and fast
Asante history. The states which Asante had to deal with were
nuclear centres of power which exhibited divergencies in the degree
the farther one went from the centre. Indeed, what can be said ab
conquered states was that the institutions which held metropol
together: the Golden Stool, the Great Oath of Asante, the kin
festival etc., had no political message for them. The Akyem, th
Fanti, the Denkyera, the Twifo, the Bono, the Nzima, the Dagom
Gonja all regarded the Asantehene as a harsh and distant overlord.
coupled with the irresponsible actions of Asante officials, ensur
quent bids for freedom whenever the opportunity offered itself.
Also, it is my view that in seeking to account for the origi
Asante wars of conquest and expansion, we should direct our a
what Bowdich, in another context, calls 'the necessities and de
Ashantee government.' Asante priorities especially in an econ
geographical context, must be recognised. This makes it possib
reject both the view of Asante control of the conquered states as a
phenomenon and the academic efforts to create a typology of depe
Asante in the northern and southern provinces of the empire.
Finally, it seems to me that the historian whose job it is to mas
understand the past with a view to understanding the present, mu
that his facts are accurate. He must seek to bring into the picture
or knowable facts which are relevant to the theme on which he is
to the interpretation proposed. For, history, contrary to the a
Froude, is not 'a child's box of letters with which we can spell a
please.' Historical facts therefore cannot, and should not, be t
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20 J. . FN
NOTES
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil ch.I. as cited in E. H. Carr, What is History
(Harmondsworth, 1964) p.27.
2 Kwame Arhin, 'The Structure of Greater Ashanti 1700-1824*/. Afr. Hist viii, (1967),
pp.65-85.
3 A. A. Iliasu, 'Asante's Relations with Dagomba 1740-1874* Ghana Social Science
Journal 1972). pp. 54-62
4 Arhin does not appear to be clear in his own mind what the Asante-Dagomba
relationship was. On p.76 of his article he lists the Dagomba among the Asante tribu-
taries. But on the next page he states that Dagomba definitely formed no part of the
empire.
5 J. D. Fage, 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence* Tr. Hist . Soc. of Ghana , iii,
(1957), pp.96-9. I. Wilks, 'The Northern Factor in Ashanti History' J. Afr . Hist., ii,
(1961) pp.25-34.
6 West Indische Compagnie (WIC) 743. Caerte des Landschaps Vande Goudkust in
Guinea. Moure 25 December, 1629. (Leupen Collection). Jack Goody 'The Mande
and the Akan Hinterland' in The Historian in Tropical Africa ed. J. Vansina, R.
Mauny, L. V. Thomas (London, 1964) pp.202-23.
7 For the beginnings of the Asante Kingdom, see, for example. C.C. Reindorf, The
History of the Gold Coast and Asante , Basel, 1895; Sir Francis Fuller. A Vanished
Dynasty; Ashanti , London, 1921; R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution
(Oxford, 1929) chs. xvi-xxviii. W. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana London, 1958;
J. K. Fynn, Asante and its Neighbours c. 1700- 1807 London, 1971.
8 T. E. Bowdich. Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (London, 1819) p.229.
9 The early sojourn of Osei Tutu at the Denkyera court may, perhaps, be viewed m this
light.
10 WIC. 97, Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 30 May, 1701. W. Bosman, A New and
Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea , (London, 1705, 4th ed. Frank Cass,
1967) p.3.
11 Rattray, Law and Constitution . For another version for the occasion for war, see,
Bosman, Description , pp.76-77.
12 WIC. 97. Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 1 March, 1699 andl 6 Nov. 1701. Bosman,
Description p.76.
13 Bosman, Description p.77.
14 WIC. 99. Jan Landman, Axim, 28 July, 28 October, 1706.
15 WIC. 124. Minutes of Council, Elmina, 28 Oct. 1707. Public Record Office London,
T 70/1464. Baillie's Commenda Diary entry for 6 April, 1715.
16 WIC. 99. Jan Landman, Axim, 28 July, 28 October 1706.
17 WIC. 122. Articles of Agreement with Accafo Headchief of the Jufferse, Elmina,
30 July, 1713. WIC. 102. H. Haring, Elmina, 4 March, 1714. WIC. 103. Jan Land-
man, Komenda, 12 October, 1715.
18 J. K. Kumah. 'The Rise and Fall of Denkyera, 1600-1730' (M.A. Thesis, Institute of
African Studies, Legon, 1965) p.28. Fynn, Asante , pp.42-3. 'Socco' is Begho or Bi'u
in the modern Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana.
19 T70/1464 Baillie's Commenda Diary entry for 29 September, 1715; HBKG. 82
W. Butler, Axim to H. Haring. Elmina, 8 Oct, 1715.
20 NBKG. 82. Jan Visbeek, Cormantyn, to H. Haring, Elmina, 12 July, 1712; Jan van
Alzen, Senya Bereku, to H. Haring. 6 September, 1712. Kumah, 'Denkyera', pp.84-5.
21 NBKG. 82, Jan Visbeek, Cormantyn, to H. Haring 12 July, 1712; Jan van Alzen,
Senya Bereku, to H. Haring, 6 Sept. 1712. Kumah, 'Denkyera', pp.84-85. Fynn,
Asante .
22 NBKG. 85, Jan van Naersen, Axim, 12 Oct. 1718. Fynn, Asante p.47.
23 WIC. 103. Engelgraaf Roberts, Elmina, 4 March 1718.
24 NBKG. 84. H. Blenke, Axim 9 March 1718. NBKG. 85. Van Munnikhoven, Axim
20 April, 1718. The figure of 20,000 is probably an exaggeration. But some versions
of Asante tradition say that Asante loss was considerable. See Fuller, Vanished
Dynasty , pp.26-27 and Reindorf. History . pp.8 1-82.
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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 21
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22 J. . FYNN
53 E. A. Agyeman, 'Gyaman:
Institute of African Studtes, L
54 MacCaskie, 'Asante Power'.
55 Dupuis, Journal, p. cviii.
56 Fynn, Asante , p.62 For traditional accounts of the episode, see. for example, Reindorf,
History pp. 71-73 and Fuller, Vanished Dynasty pp. 27-28.
57 Dupuis, Journal pp. xxviii and cviii.
58 For a useful summary of Asante's relations with the northern provinces, see, for
example, Jack Goody, The Akan and the North' Ghana Notes and Queries ix (1966),
pp 18-24 and MacCaskie, 'Asante Power'
59 It is significant that the slave trade increased tremendously throughout the 1770s
when Asante invaded the north. See, for example, T70/32. R. Miles, Cape Coast
Castle, 15 April 1777 and 20 Nov. 1777.
60 Bowdich, Mission, pp. 179ff.
61 T70/32 Richard Miles, Cape Coast Castle, 31 Jan. and 21 June, 1778. Ibid. John
Roberts and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 8 Oct. 1780. CO 267/20 copy of a letter
from Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 3 Feb. 1781. Author's emphasis.
62 Rattray Law and Constitution p. 35. Roemer Tilforladelig Efterretning p.316. Meredith,
Account p. 217 also notes that there was 'a remote inland people who went under
the appelation of Duncoes, a name given by the Fantees to men whose country is
not known or who come a long way from the interior . . . '
63 Bowdich, Mission , pp. 182-83. '
64 This piece of information was given to me in 1964 by Pro
65 CO 2/1 1/116 A Narrative of the Proceedings at Coom
of course, Kumasi.
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