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Historical Society of Ghana

THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI: ANOTHER VIEW


Author(s): J. K. Fynn
Source: Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol. 15, No. 1 (JUNE 1974), pp. 1-
22
Published by: Historical Society of Ghana
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41406546
Accessed: 19-02-2017 03:55 UTC

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Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol XV (/)

THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI: ANOTHER VIEW

by J. K. Fynn

The falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it. . . The question
is how far it is life-furthering, life-preserving, species preserving, per-
haps species creating - Nietzsche. 1

Interpretation is the life blood of history. Those who subscribe to the


principle enunciated by the great German philosopher quoted above maintain
that periods of history must be viewed through the eyes of the historian's own
time, and that the historian must study the problems of the past as a key to
those of the present. Also, interpretation may be done from the relativist
standpoint or from that other standpoint which believes in the existence of
definite historical configurations and patterns created by the 'totalising and
synthesismg* character of human group consciousness and which therefore
only remains to be identified and characterised by the historian. All
these approaches bristle with problems: the propiiety of seleciing, from the
past, only those events which appear to have links (direct or indirect) with the
present, the weakness of the philosophical underpinnings of unbridled rela-
tivism (whether as to culture, temporal and spatial context or purpose), the
immense difficulty of recognising and achieving a concensus on the con-
figurations of the built-in patterns in events and, indeed, the propriety of
assuming the existence of such patterns from a non-relativist point of view.
Nevertheless, both forms of cognition must be guided by a conceptualisa-
tion which, informed by the structure of causality, is meticulous as to
delineation and selection of relevant facts and which, in its application,
solves more problems than it creates.
It is against this background that the two papers by Dr Kwame Arhin2
and Dr A. A. Iliasu,3 will be reviewed. Dr Arhin sees an imperfect spatial
correlation between Asante and other subject states and hastily assumes a
cause -effect relationship which does violence to or forces him to ignore well
attested facts. His approach is a peculiar blend of relativist and non-relati-
vist: he is forced (perhaps by some relativist notion) to transform the
correlation into a deliberate historical act and pattern which in its immuta-
bility and concreteness, had so far only remained to be discovered. Di
Iliasu, on the other hand, is frankly relativist: on the basis of, perhaps, an
emotional desire to demonstrate the political independence of Dagomba,
he interprets known evidence, omitting much that may conceivably weaken
his argument.

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In his article, Dr Arhin


writers that Asante emb
European demand for go
silks, beads, guns, gunpo
'the barbaric or nonsense
Ashanti wars represente
from the immediate Kum
with whom the Ashanti
Dr Arhin writes, 'whateve
of the Ashanti wars, the
the Akans in political su
that this notion sprang fr
human desire to create
contiguous areas with
human nature or of histo
The burden of Arhin's es
son for the Asante wars o
her ethnic boundaries. Hence the other conclusion: 'From the Kumasi
standpoint then, political ties with subject states weakened with spatial and
cutural distance. Provinces, more rigidly controlled, were seen as distant
parts of Ashanti, of Greater Ashanti, and the peoples as subjects of the Golden
Stool. Tributaries, more loosely controlled, were regarded as an economic
support for the creation of Greater Ashanti.' Moreover we are told that the
Provinces (i.e. conquered Akan states) differed markedly from the Tributaries
(non-Akan states such as Gonja and Dagomba) because the latter were not
involved in 'the cycle of revolts or rebellions', since there was no need to
'struggle for independence'. As for the third category, the Protectorates;
(i.e. Accra, Aowin, Ada, Elmina, Banda and Nzima) they were to be consi-
dered purely as 'allies'. The Asante presence was not very much felt there
and, like the Tributaries, these states were 'not involved in the unceasing
struggle for independence'.
In his article, which deals mainly with Asante's relations with Dagomba,
Dr A. A. Iliasu ignores Dr Arhin's inconsistencies with respect to Dagomba,
and endorses the latter' s contention that the Dagomba definitely formed no
part of the (Asante) empire'.4
Dr Iliasu writes, 'at no time did Dagbon fall within Asante's sphere of
control and that politico-economic symbiosis rather than conquest or tribu-
tary is the best description of Asante-Dagbon relationship'. He claims that
Asante never interfered in the internal affairs of Dagomba and that the Adamfo
appointed over Dagomba was 'at best Asante's own symbolic gesture to con-
firm the results of the military expedition against Dagbon'. Nor did the
reforms in Asante government initiated by Osei Kwadwo (1764-1777) have
any effect on Dagomba since the Asante neither appointed resident
commissioners nor roving ambassadors for that kingdom. Finally, Dr

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANT1 3

Iliasu rejects the view that the institution of the kambonse , a w


Dagomba army marked the beginning of a protectorate' rel
between Asante and Dagomba. The Dagomba merely invited Asan
tary advisers and war-lords to help them re-organize the Dagom
and to teach the Dagomba the use of guns and that was why the
'is so highly Akanized'.

The rise of Asante the pre-1100 background


We shall start by touching briefly on the political and economic s
in the Gold Coast which made possible the rise of Asante. It is
known that the fame and prosperity of the medieval Sudanese
depended in part, on their wealth in gold. This gold was repute
come from the Wangara country which is now identified with th
and Bure gold fields in the upper reaches of the Niger and Seneg
But there is evidence that the Gold Coast was one of the several sources
among others. It has been pointed out that the medieval western Sudanese
city of Jenne must have developed as a market primarily for southern traffic
and it is believed that Bi'u (Begho), lying in the modern Brong Ahafo
Region of Ghana, was the southern terminal of the Jenne trade route. 5
Another market town, Kafaba, was established on the Volta to serve as
the southern terminus for the trade with Hausaland. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, Kafaba was succeeded by Salaga in eastern Gonja.
By the early years of that century, long distance Akan traders travelled
to these northern markets and exchanged their gold, kola-nuts, ivory and
white sea salt for slaves, beads, cloths, shea-butter, and leather goods
brought by the peoples of the savanna lands. Thus the trade in the Akan
hinterland was dominated by the Mande, the Hausa, the Gonja and the
Mossi-Dagbane peoples.6
By the second half of the seventeenth century, Wassa, Twifo, Aowin,
Denkyera, Akyem and Akwamu had emerged as powerful states in the Akan
forests. The upheaval which followed the rise and consolidation of these
states created an unsettling atmosphere of apprehension which resulted in
the fleeing of peoples frcm the Akan country to all parts of the Gold Coast.
It was during this period that some Adanse and Amanse peoples who
later on constituted themselves the nucleus of the Asante Union moved
northwards.7 In moving northwards, the ancestors of the Adanse/Amanse
peoples took the line of least resistance because there were no powerful
states in that area to resist their advance. Thus it appears that a strong
element of self preservation must have entered into the calculations of the
'numerous enterprising or discontented families'8 who later created the
Asante state. For, the Asante ancestors either had to remain in Adanse or
Amanse to be politically and economically exploited by the rougher,
tougher military states being created in the neighbourhood or to move
northwards into comparative freedom.

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Having left their homela


territory already occupied
peoples were the Domaa,
Fiam's people. The new im
had to struggle with the o
settle. It seems to me, then
derations which brought
neighbouring Akan/Guan
emergence of the Asante ki
The Adanse/Amanse peop
area of great economic and
of Kumasi, astride the nor
of some considerable imp
of Kumasi, the capital of
intended to supersede the
these peoples had been lo
Tafo and the Domaa were
of the southern end of the
The creation of the Asante state was the work of Osei Tutu and the
celebrated priest, Anokye. The names of these two men are so great in
Asante that even today all laws and customs are attributed to them. They
provided the nascent Asante Union with a national capital, a national festival,
a constitution, a new military organisation and the Golden Stool which to
this day remains the greatest symbol of Asante national unity.

Asante- Denky era wars


The new Asante state was soon called upon to settle affairs with Den-
kyera. Some versions of Asante tradition state that the various states which
formed the nucleus of the Asante Union were formerly under Denkyera poli-
tical over-lordship and that Osei Tutu himself served his political apprentice-
ship at the Denkyera court.
The Denkyera, however, were bad rulers. The Denkyera authorities
appear to have been primarily occupied with ruthless exploitation of the
conquered states. Large sums of money were extorted from the subject
peoples. This money was mainly used in buying muskets, powder and shot
which enabled the Denkyera to pursue a policy of expansion and to suppress
internal revolt.

The subject peoples who defaulted or delayed in the payment of their


tributes were quickly visited by Denkyera armies. Finally, troublesome
dependencies had to send members of their royal families to the Denkyera
court to learn court etiquette but in reality as an earnest of their intention to
be of good behaviour.9
The Denkyera government of the subject peoples therefore was not
calculated to promote unity and a sense of national identity. The subject

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 5

peoples never identified themselves with the objectives and aspiratio


Denkyera state.
Apart from this, the Denkyera also tried to monopolise the g
and kola resources in the Gold Coast interior and they tried to
restrictions on inland traders who wanted to have direct access to t
In 1701, the Dutch noted that 'the Dinkirase have since long been
like to their neighbours. They have ruined the Akannists, the
[Twifo], the Wassase and the Awinse [Aowin]'. And Bosman com
'Dinkira, elevated by its great riches and power became so arrogant,
on all other Negroes with a contemptible eye, esteeming them no m
its slaves; which rendered her the object of their common hatred'. *
By the early 1690s it was generally known on the coast that D
subject peoples were on the point of revolt and that Asante, whi
ported by the Akwamu, was expected to lead the revolt. What p
matters was a preposterous demand which the Denkyera made on th
It is said that Ntim Gyakari, the Denkyerahene, sent envoys t
demanding a large basinful of gold dust together with some of t
the Asante chiefs as tribute. The Asante refused and prepared f
A Dutch report of 1699 states that 'the Dinkira and Assiente d
which I referred to in my last [letter] of November, 1698, are not y
and that 'the Akims have already for about four months fruitlessly
field against Aguamboe'. In fact, during this period, the Wassa,
the Akany and the Aowin 'closed all the passes to the beach in o
off the supply of arms and ammunition to the Dinkirase'. And
the battle of Feyiase, the Asante, the Aowin, the Wassa, the Aka
Akwamu completely routed the Denkyera who were assisted by
Bosman claims that 'above a hundred thousand men were killed
that a great cabocier of Akim, with all his men, were cut off'. 12
It is clear, then, that the battle of Feyiase which brought 'th
Pride of Dinkira in Ashes', 1 may be accounted for as a struggle f
economic and commercial supremacy in the Gold Coast interior
Asante, Akwamu, Denkyera, Akyem, Wassa, Twifo, Akany and. Aow
But the break up of Denkyera political power, though it enab
to become the dominant force in the hinterland of the western
did not mean that Aowin, Twifo, Wassa and Akany automatic
part of Asante. As we have already indicated, the co-operation of th
wih Asante had been born out of their joint opposition to Denkyer
cal rule. Aowin, Wassa and Twifo had a long tradition of politic
nomic independence before Denkyera domination and they mus
garded the battle of Feyiase as the dawn of their own liberation. In
evidence is that these southern states, including Denkyera, were de
to maintain not only their political independence but also their
interest in the inland trade. As early as 1706, Jan Landman, the Du
at Axim noted that he was unable to send envoys to Asante because

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nant of the Dinkirase are


bands'; in October, it wa
on the coast for a long tim
the ways very unsafe by
the ways except with arm
opening and closing of
hands . . . ' Yet, the Twif
'robbed, killed and plund
the highways'. 1 5
Now, since Asante had
of a military occupation
fore dicided on a policy
against the Denkyera, th
commanded by Amankw
Wassa force commanded
days fighting, the Denkye
residue of the D'Ingurase
tributary to the Asjantijn a
The Asante and the Wa
between 1712-1715, the T
The Twifohene, Commom
sought refuge in Cabes
in absentia and installed
envoy in Twifo told Acaf
in a projected war against
answer charges. The Twif
The Asante and their all
reasons. Firstly, the Asan
exercised over the trade ro
on the Nzima coast. Seco
agree that Aowin was ri
political control over Aow
Indeed, William Butler, t
motive of the war was sa
gold'. Thirdly, by 1715, A
begun the conquest of t
of Asante were conducted
tical and economic intere
early years of the eighteen
place of refuge for rebel
cause to flee from Asant
achieve their objectives w
asylum in Aowin instead o
For political, economic
Wassa invaded Aowin in

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTi 7

swift conquest of Aowin, they were quickly disillusioned for the Aow
up a spirited defence of their territory. A British report indicated t
Awawees have beaten the Ashantees who are returned to recreate new
and have sent to the Cufferoes [Twifo] to come to their assistance
Dutch also learnt from 'dependable sources' that the Aowin 'hav
rebuffed the Assantynse and the Wassase'. 19 However, by earl
Aowin resistance had been overcome and the English factor at
asked for increased supplies of muskets and gunpowder from C
Castle because 'the Ashantees and Warsaws have destroyed the Ca
lonians [N/ima] and Awawees and are now coming to trade with their
A few days later, the report was that 'Amancotjo [Amankwa Tia] and
[Gyetua] have come to an agreement with the Auwiens' and that t
had agreed to pay 300 bendas of gold as a token of their submi
report added that Amankwa Tia and Gyetua had decided 'to leave
thier people in Aowin to collect from all refugees in Aowin 2' engels
as tribute . . . '20

Asante-Akyem hostility 1700-1742


It has been indicated that Akyem supported Denkyera in th
war with Asante between 1698-1701. In 1702, a combined Akyem
kyera force inflicted a crushing defeat on the Asante and Ado, the A
hene, who was campaigning in the lower Volta area had to return
forced marches. Indeed in the early years of the eighteenth cen
available evidence indicates that the Akyem were deter
reverse the Asante gains at Feyiase. For instance, in 1711, th
provided asylum to the king of Denkyera and a handful of his s
who 'withdrew themselves from subordination to Asjantijn
with all they held dear to Akim'. In 1712, the Akyem declared their
for the deposed king of Twifo, Commomore, who had sought
Cabes Terra and promised to go to the aid of the people of Cabes Ter
were attacked by the Asante. In fact, by the end of 1715, it was kno
coast that the Omanhene of Akyem Kotoku, Ofosuhene Ape
Ofori,the Okyenhene, were determined to fight Asante.21
The expected Asante-Akyem war took place in 1717. The Asan
defeated and Osei Tutu, the founder of the Asante state, was among
dead. His death threw Asante into confusion and in the ensuing
the veteran Asante war-lord, Amankwa Tia, was killed. In Octo
it was learnt at Axim that the 'Asjantese are very much at variance
themselves, that Aman Coya [Amankwa Tia] had died there; an
country was in great confusion'.22
The Asante debacle on the Pra had serious repercussions in the
provinces. Aowin and Twifo wreaked vengeance on Asante. In 17
stated that 'the districts situated further to windward are patiently
to see if the Asjantijn will be defeated when they will throw thems

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the fugitives and get booty


of Asante an opportunity
and politics. Thus while Asa
into Kumasi and sacked th
the Aowin army numbered
a considerable booty inclu
report added that the Aow
back 'much gold and conte
The Wassa too lost their c
cessor decided to end Was
with the southern states.
Twifo were said to have req
and then jointly attack the
the same year, van Naerse
the Wassa 'think that the A
ple are providing themsel
they will leave their coun
gave further details. He d
gone to Ouwien probably
up resistance against the As
Aowin to (') settle the d
compensation for the hav
during the invasion of
action against Asante.
Furthermore, it was also said that the defeat of the Asante on the Pra
was due to the perfidious conduct of the Akwamu. According to a Dutch
report, Akonno, the Akwamuhene, suggested to the Asante that a section o
the Asante army should pass through Akwamu to attack the Akyem where
they would least expect it. Akonno then informed the Akyem of the line the
Asante must take. As a result, the Asante army was surprised and surroun-
ded, the troops were unable to procure food and soon smallpox broke
out in the camp. The Akyem then attacked vigorously and inflicted heav>
losses.26

Faced with the revolt of the Aowin, the desertion of the Wassa and the
treachery of Akwamu, the Asante decided to make overtures for an accommo-
dation with the Akyem. A Dutch report in 1718 noted that the two erstwhile
enemies had agreed to aid each other against Akwamu because they hac
realised that both had been 'so miserably and kna vishly duped by the Aquam
boes'.27 Indeed, between 1720 and 1742 the Asante and the Akyem livec
in peace and the latter was enabled to attack and defeat Akwamu in 1730.
The Akyem conquest of Akwamu in 1730 was described by contempo-
raries as the greatest revolution that had taken place on the Gold Coast sinc<
the Akwamu themselves destroyed the Ga kingdom in the late seventeentl
century. The Akwamu were expelled from their homeland and pushed aerosi

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 9

the river Volta where the present Akwamu capital, Akwamufie


near the Volta gorge. The Akyem Kotoku gained control ove
Akwamu towns and villages while the greater part of western A
to Akyem Abuakwa. The Akyem Abuakwa also created the
state of Akuapem, the majority of whose original inhabitant
and Kyerepong-spe aking peoples. Ofori Dua, a younger brot
Panin (d.1727) was enstooled Omanhene of the new state
kings also received the ground rents for the European fort
the neighbouring beaches, and thereby secured a permanent, re
of purchasing muskets and powder which were essential for Ak
and economic expansion.
This rapid build-up of Akyem power greatly alarmed the
throughout the late 1730s there were speculations that the
attack Akyem. The expected invasion of Akyem, however,
1742. After several engagements, the Asante emerged victori
had succeeded Frimpong Manso as Kotokuhene, Ba Kwante, t
and Owusu Akyem Tenten, the heir apparent to the Abuakw
all slain.28.

The Akyem defeat left the Asante the dominant political and economic
power in the Gold Coast hinterland. In addition, the Asantehene received
the ground rents for the European settlements at Accra and the neighbour-
hood. In May 1742, the Danes began to pay the Asante king 'thirty-two
rigsdaler for his overlordship [overherskab] and for the sake of trade from
himself and his subjects, in addition to an annual expensive present . . .' And
in 1757, the British paid 'Cuishee [Kwasi Obodum 1750-1764], king of
Ashantee his ground rent at 8 per month from 1 5 January, 1 756 - 1 5 Janu-
ary, 1757 in trade goods'.29

Asante-Wassa conflicts 1724-1752


We have already noted that one of the results of the Asante debacle at
the Pra in 1717 was a reversal of Wassa policy towards Asante. The Wassa
recognized that their political, economic and commercial interests were
bound up with the southern states and so they entered into an alliance with
the Aowin and the Nzima to (a) maintain their political independence,
(b) maintain a middleman interest in the inland trade and (c) to check the
northward flow of muskets to Asante.

In the early 1720s therefore the Asante authorities decided to attack the
Aowin, the Nzima and the Wassa. Between 1721 and 1722, the Asante, the
Aowin and the Nzima fought many bloody battles which ended in the total
defeat of the Aowin and the Nzima. The Dutch reported that 'the gold rich
Awinse suffered its greatest defeat', and that large numbers of Aowin pri-
soners of war were sold as slaves at Elmina, Cape Coast and Anomabo. John
Atkins, a British naval officer, who was on the Nzima coast at that time,

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referred to these conflicts


Nzima and her followers wh
After the defeat of the
intended to extend the cam
cease hostilities because
the a
an invasion of Asante. 3 1 B
the Wassa who were now rul
reported that 4he king of
In a series of severe contes
king retired to Tepesia to
envoys to fort Hollandia at
women' to be allowed into th
ever accorded Ntsiful and hi
cove and told +he Wassa k
Tokoe and the Ashantee
promising him that the Fa
same day 'a large canoe pas
Dikjeshoold [Dixcove] to gi
In the meantime, some A
ported by an Asante conti
Wassa king escaped with a
there to Quasje Mintim wish
allowed to pitch his camp i
receive the Asante army. 3 4
On May 4, 1726, an Asan
told the Dutch factor ther
Asantehene to wage war on b
it was disclosed that Opoku
men under the joint comm
'Saijtoe [Osei Tutu] the dec
[Apraku]'. These troops in
Aowin and Twifo. 3 5

Since the Fante were dete


the Dutch suspected the W
Dutch Director-General Pie
be supplied with arms an
with an abundant supply of
their allies were enabled to
villages in that country Th
and thence to Asebu where
to await the Ashantee and m
Since the Asante were not i
Wassa and Fante who were
withdrew to Twifo. As soo

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 1 1

irmies besieged Elmina and beleaguered the Dutch castle.37 In fact, the
precipitant withdrawal of the Asante army emboldened the Wassa t
extend ttie campaign to Twifo and to defeat king Kwadwo Abbetekyi an
his Twifos who had helped the Asante. In 1729, it was reported that th
Wassa, led by Ntsiful, had attacked 'the country of Cuifferoe which is th
key of Ashantee and the path by which trade is brought to the watersid
It was further stated that in appreciation of the protection offered him, the
Wassa king sold sixty war prisoners to the English and ordered his subjects t
trade with English merchants only, prohibiting any trade with the Dutc
'against whome (sic) he is very much incensed'. 38
The Wassa attack on Twifo provoked Opoku Ware to send down 10,000
troops to attack the Wassa. In a fiercely fought battle, the Wassa were
defeated. The Dutch Director General jubilantly wrote to his superiors in
Holland that 'at last the Asjantijn . . have defeated the notorious king
Warsaw, Intuffer, his whole country is ruined and he himself has fled to som
other country, so that this great obstacle which has given us so much troubl
and who was the cause of the decline of our trade has been removed . . .'3
Intsiful, described as 'a wary old negro', in fact proved a hard nut to
crack. He depopulated his country, moved closer to the Fante and Ahant
borders, and founded a new Wassa state called Fiase. In their new homeland,
the Wassa occupied 'certain impregnable passages' so that all inland trader
were completely barred from the west coast. Furthermore, Intsiful Asa
entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with 'the kings and chief
of all the coastal states from Cape Appolonia to the Rio Volta' to preven
guns and gunpowder from reaching Asante. He died in 1752, two years
after the death of Opoku Ware.40

Asante- Fante relations


Asante's relations with the coastal Fante throughout the eighteenth and
the early years of the nineteenth century clearly demonstrated the mix
motives underlying the Asante wars of conquest and expansion. The Fant
like the Asante responded to the new economic demands arising out of t
European contact and from the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
embarked upon a policy of military expansion aimed at gaining politic
control of the older coastal states of Abrem, Eguafo, Fetu, Asebu and Agona.
By 1750, the Fante controlled the stretch of the coast from the mouth of th
river Pra to the borders of the Ga kingdom. These Fante people were ver
active in the Gold Coast trade and it become a cardinal principle underlying
Fanti policy to maintain a lucrative middleman position in the inland trade.
They realised that this entailed the preservation of the territorial integrity
of their state and they particularly sought to regulate the northward move-
ment of guns and gunpowder. This naturally angered the Asante who n
only wanted to buy European goods cheaply but also needed guns and gu
powder in appreciable quantities. Thus, soon after the Akyem were defeated

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12 J. . FYNN

in 1742, the Dane Roemer r


vasion of the Fante country
the Ashan ees when they we
trade'.41 Indeed, to achieve
measures which were provoc
First of all, to ensure that t
with the Europeans, the Fant
the Asante and the Europea
it was said that 'every judicio
in this trade must well kno
in the world will never prev
through their country . . . '
too politic and too powerfu
their own trade to market
Fante, in fact, set up a numb
trade with the inland peopl
'markets have been settled
Warsaws, Akims, Ashantee
course between Ashantee and
Apart from these comme
Asante's internal affairs. Thi
tary and moral support to
Asante authority and ( b ) ha
already noted the support an
during the reign of Intsifu
there was the possibility of
chiefs met at A bora and d
to be discouraged by the loss
they were, without making
tees.'44 And it was largely du
Fante gave the rebellious st
it possible for these states to
1746 to 1764. According to
nations which lay between
Ware's] people could not com
nations west of Fantes agre
invitation from the Accras
Akuapem. By this move, th
Asante dependencies for, acc
red among Akras were settle
should the Fante-Accra coa
Akuapem, there was the lik
replacing Asante dominatio
As for giving protection to
that it was the Fante decis

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 1 3

Aputei, who were fleeing from Asante justice which formed the casu
for the Asante-Fante war of 1807. Indeed, in the middle of the nine
century, a British Governor remarked that 'the refuge given to run
slaves and pawns under the British forts proved the source of the gr
irritation and annoyance to native kings and chiefs . . . M7
Another source of irritation to the Asante was Fante propensity to i
Akan customary laws and practices. For instance, it was a fundamental d
matic etiquette, observed by all the Akan states, not to harm or kill env
or persons employed in the political service. Yet, in 1766, the Fante exec
a messenger from a relative of the Asantehene who was staying at Anom
as a hostage because the Asante envoy attempted to smuggle 'a quarter ba
of gun powder' to Asante contrary to 'a law' by the Fante prohibiti
sale of guns, gun-powder, iron bars, lead and shot to Asante tr
Governor Gilbert Petrie noted that wherever the news of this deed was
'It spread terror and dismay', because nothing less was expected to f
'than an immediate Rupture with the king of Ashantee to whom such an
of violence was the highest insult that could be off. red'. Petrie pointed
that it was a long standing custom among the peoples of the Gold Coast
'the persons not only of Tie Ties [court criers] or heralds, messenger
Hostages, but of all those who belong or accompany them are held sacred
injury done to any of them is considered to affect the Honour of those
represent or are sent from'. The murder of such persons therefore was
regarded as 'a challenge and a mark of defiance' and the state whose
or herald had been brutally executed was in duty and honour boun
avenge his death.48
It is clear from this brief outline, then, that for political, comm
and other reasons, the Asante would wish to conquer the Fante states
eighteenth century. This wish materialised in the early years of the
teenth century.

Asante and the lower Volta area


In the south-east Gold Coast, Asante imperial interests were wat
over by the Akwamu and the Anlo, Asante's political and commercial
'The people of Akwamu', wrote P. Dachse, 'were always openly or sec
allies of Ashantees, and through Akwamu, and Augnla [Anlo] Asha
maintains its connection with Dahomey'.49 Indeed after 1750 when A
traders could not use the trade routes through the Fante country, they re
to the longer, more circuitous but safer routes along the Kwahu scarp, a
the Afram plains and so into Akwamu. There, they were escorted
European forts at Prampram, Great Ningo, Ponni, Ada and Accra by Akw
sharp shooters and middlemen. In fact, it was only in the early 1790s, w
Akwamu could not maintain law and order in the lower Volta area, b
of its preoccupation with the Krepis, and there was the possibility of
mean intervention, that Osei Kwame (1777-1798) decided to despatch

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14 J. . FYNN

troops t the area. For, it


influence in the lower Volte
But this Asante army was
opposition.50

Asante and the nrth-ivest

In the north-west of Asante lived the Bono peoples. The Brong country
was not only rich in gold, ivory and kola nuts but also it was here that probably
the Akan developed their skills in gold smithing and other specialised craft
production such as gold weights and balances. In this area too were esta-
blished the early markets where the Akan were on record as having exchanged
their gold, kola nuts and ivory for slaves, cloths and other products with
traders from Mandeland. It is therefore quite clear that the Asante conquest
of Tkyiman, Gyaman and the other Bono states was explicable in both poli-
tical and economic terms.

Gyaman was obviously conquered because of its gold fields and trade. A
tribute of 18,000 ounces of gold dust per annum was imposed and the gold
trade was diverted to Kumasi away from the north-west and the north. 5 1
The area was still ruled by Gyaman kings though Kumasi appears to have
influenced the selection of the king.52 Gyaman tradition asserts that the
Bantamahene was the Adamfo of the Gyaman king and that the Gyaman paid
tribute through the Bantama stool. For the period up to 1819, Gyaman
appears to have been loosely controlled', for there is only one reference to a
possible Asante official in Gyaman, and this was by no means a clear ref-
erence.53

But after the serious revolt ofAdinkira in 1818, the Asante decided to
exercise tight control over Gyaman in order to protect its imperial interests.
These interests involved continuing the flow of gold from the Gyaman gold
fields to Kumasi; the stopping of disturbances among the western Gonja divi-
sions, and the prevention of the very dangerous alliance of the north-west
and the south-west which had been a recurrent theme in eighteenth century
Asante history.
Asante troops were stationed at Amanaha on the Assin river and
elswhere to prevent any communication with the south-wst. A representa-
tive of the Asantehene was made jointly responsible with the new Zanzan
king for all Gyaman.54 A road was constructed between Kumasi and Bon-
tuku to ensure more direct control and another road was built running from
Kintampo through Buipe to Jenne and Segu on the middle N iger to cut Kong
off from the trade route.55 In short, Gyaman, an Akan state, was vital 4for
the economic support of Greater Ashanti' after 1817, and the Asante made
costly and determined efforts to secure it.
We know from Asante traditional and European sources that Tekyiman
was conquered by subterfuge. Opoku Ware used Bafo Pim, his paternal
uncle, and the Nkoronzas to defeat that old Akan state. From then on

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 15

Nkoranza served as a base for Asante expansion further north


west. 5 From there, Asante forces moved into the gold-beari
Batida, eastern Gonja nd Kraky and inflicted a crushing def
Dagomba. Economically, Nkoranza was the main Asante divisio
the iiorth-western trade rout through the 'desert of Ghofan' to B
was strategically placed to control relations with west and central
Bono f Atebubu, Abease, Kintampo, Dagomba and Mamprussi.
in fact, remained firm in the troubled years of the early nineteen
and was the area chosen by Osei Kwame t resettle the Muslim com
in the empire. Its importance was underlined after 1874 whe
assisted in the subjugation of Gyaman and in the defeat of Worasa.

Asante and the north-east

In the north-east, Asante motives were similar to those in the no


Dupuis has written that the north-east trade route 'is mainly the tr
and alliance, and this, which is the most beaten road in Africa; the
travel without scruple, but mostly in the society of Muslims to
[Eastern Gonja] Ghamba [Gambaga in Mamprusi], Yahn
and other parts of Dagwumba'.57
Salaga definitely played a crucial role in Asa nte policy. It was a
town which emerged on the border between the forest and the
country beyond which Asante armies lost some of their effect
town was easier for Asante to control for at Yeji, on the Volta
south of Salaga, Asante had a crossing and a convenient place t
southward movement of the Mossi or Hausa into the kola belt.
thus strategically placed for the exercise of direct Asante control
In the eighteenth century, as gold was directed to Kumasi
north-west, some of it was resold at Salaga. But the real importanc
was as a market for kola nuts for which the Hausa and Mossi
travelled to Gonja. But economically, the Asante were vulnerab
Gonja, the Dagomba and the Mamprussi were strategically we
control the movements of the Mossi and Hausa traders to and f
Asante's trade in this area therefore depended to a large extent on
will of the northern peoples and Asante's commercial objectives in
amounted to a domination of the northern trade routes. This w
her by virtue of her geographical position to (a) tap the human
resources of the north and (b) control the northward movement of
With this object in view, the Asante rigidly controlled Sala
Akan town. There was an Asante resident there in charge of trade
large Asante trading community. Also the approach roads on the A
of ihe Volta were controlled by a body of troops stationed at Ejura
bubu. The strict nature of Asante contro! was clearly resented by t
so, after the Asante defeat by the British, in 1874, the Gonja r
massacred many of the Asante residents.58

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16 J. , FYNN

Asante and Dagomba


Contrary to the assertions
controlled by the Asante in
to satisfy the increased Euro
source for military recruitm
Fante. 59 Bowdich states tha
dary of Ashantee authority'
of Dagomba, was held to penet
Dagomba, as a tributary sta
cotton cloths and 200 silk c
indicates that because the D
Asante exercised over them,
the early years of the 1780s t
In 1781, the Biitish reported
formerly subjects of the king
actions the Duncoes have ha
true that it is difficult to k
'Donee', 'Donkos', etc., are all
(pl. nnonko or ndonkofo ). Rat
to a man or woman, other t
the express purpose of maki
loosely used to describe all the
Gold Coast

anti mind is summed up in the fact of his beari


referred to these tribal marks and stated that the
by 'their faces'.62 Bowdich however clearly ide
Dagomba and the neighbouring peoples when h
country people of Dagwumba have three light cu
three below, with one horizontal under the eye, th
continued cuts, the people of Mose [Mossi] three ve
under the eye . . . of Marrowa [Frafra] all over t
intricate patterns'.63 Also, according to some versio
the Dagomba revolted against Asante dominatio
Ziblim Bandanda, who was a contemporary of O
in the light of the available evidence, it is quite
rialism was certainly not mere profitable raidin
but rather an attempt at control of a political a
which Asante was a part. But, the Asante were ce
of Mazzini and so it is clearly out of place to t
frontiers conforming with ethnic boundaries in an
the second half of the nineteenth century.
Secondly, it is strange that none of the Asant
Osei Kwadwo and Osei Bonsu, to name just a few
explain their conduct with respect to the Asante w
observers, ever mentioned the wish to bring togeth

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 17

motive for waging wars of conquest. Osei Bonsu, who person


attack on the Fante in 1807, gave the reasons for his conduct
inimitable way. Trade is what the white men want and trade is wh
But the Fantees rob and cheat my people. They stand between
the Ashantee trader of his just profit. The whitemen are also impo
by these people. Our gold is sent down pure, but they mix it with
If you will confide in me, I will make the trade flourish'.65 Th
Osei Bonsu was concerned what he resented most was the form
which the Fante exercised over the trade routes, and it should be r
that he spoke for all his predecessors.
Thirdly, Dr Arhin's conclusions fail to account for the 'rig
which Asante exercised over Gonja, a state which i > spatially
culturally different vis-a-vis Asante. Gonja received roving am
did a number of the conquered Akan states and Owusu Nkwa
Adamfo of the Wasipewura supervised quite closely affairs in D
in 1817, a dispute between two Gonja chiefs, the Alfaiwura and a s
Kpembewura, was settled in the king's court at Kumasi.
Fourthly, it seems a clear distortion of historical facts to su
'the struggle for independence' or 'the cycle of rebellions' was con
'Provinces' (i.e. the Akan subject states) and that the so-called 'Prot
(Nzima, Elmina, Banda and Ada) and the 'Tributaries' (Gonja/D
tamely accepted Asante impositions. It is on record that Nzima
'a loosely controlled' protectorate which was 'properly to be co
ally' joined the southern states in throwing off Asante domination
ber of occasions. We have already referred to the alliance whic
under Intsiful Asare, entered into with all the states from Cap
to the mouth of the river Volta with the sole purpose of chec
expansionism. In 1766, the Fante also entered into 'an alliance o
defensive with the Warsaws [Wassa] and Tufferoes [Twifo] to whic
[Amiherel king of Appolonia [Nzima] has acceded' in order to
Asante. John Hippisley the Governor of Cape Coast Castle, b
his alliance would last because the very existence of the mem
depended upon it. And there is no evidence that Elmina was
Asante protection in spite of the fact that the Dutch used them t
Asante interests in the Fante country on several occasions.66
It seems to me that a fundamental cause of the incessant re
part of the subject states whether Akan or non-Akan was the
rapacity and dishonesty of Asante officials. Their high-handed
orbitant demands were sources of irritation and annoyance to the
peoples. Three such officials stayed at Osu in 1808 to the cha
Danes at Christiansborg Castle. They were 'sent down from their
to remedy all disorders, however, they fail to fulfil this mission,
contrary, do incredible harm and injury to the inhabitants wi
the forts or others preventing it'. 67

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18 J. . FYNN

Also, Tando, the Asante re


conjunction with' Atta Wusu
he moved 'in great pomp, n
taffeta hammock, covered w
flatterers who even wiped
Cruickshank, for eighteen yea
government of the province
course of oppression and spo
As for Dr Iliasu, his thesis
was indicative of Dagomba not
for a number of reasons. Firs
rather than tribute to the As
in Coomassie were sent as par
others to Ashantee.' 70

Secondly, the Adamfo appoin


cance but, like all the other A
interests of the Dagomba king
quite closely affairs in Dagom
trol of the Asante empire was
indicates that control was tigh
or non-Akan, as and when t
no resident commissioners o
the Asante felt it was unneces
traditional Gonja-Dagomba h
trade route and this was effec
policies were not pursued in Y
'who acted as a kind of consul
traders, served as 'the eyes
seems to me that Asante w
vassal and show little intere
neighbours, as long as the D
on her south-western frontie
tions in eastern and central
Finally, it is my contention
the 1770s was part of Asant
marked the beginning of an
it is in keeping with Asante m
Dagomba with military adv
army and (c) teach the Dagom
that would have amounted to
throat' of the Asante. It must
to control the northward mov
because they realised that the
the surest way of maintaining

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 19

ihe fact that the Kambonse were initially recruited from 'slaves an
acephalous tribes of Grunshie' argues for a deliberate Asante p
rupt the traditional 'stratification which existed for the purpose o
in Dagomba. In other words, the Kambonse was 'so highly
because the Asante deliberately created a wing of musketeers
and led by Asante war-lords and military advisers, in the Dag
as counterpoise to the Dagomba chiefs and princes who const
cavalry wing and who wielded swords and cudgels.
To conclude, it is clear from the available evidence that the ori
Asante wars of conquest and expansion cannot be explained aw
of any simple theory or hypothesis which ignores obvious hist
It seems to me that the confusion that has developed largely stem
tempts to find an ultimate purpose in Asante policy towards th
states. But, then, this tends to produce a static view of the Asante
takes little or no account of other factors which characterise empi
such as fluctuations of power, adaptation of aims to new and
situations, and the part which chance and opportunism play in thi
Nor does it serve any useful purpose to look for hard and fast
Asante history. The states which Asante had to deal with were
nuclear centres of power which exhibited divergencies in the degree
the farther one went from the centre. Indeed, what can be said ab
conquered states was that the institutions which held metropol
together: the Golden Stool, the Great Oath of Asante, the kin
festival etc., had no political message for them. The Akyem, th
Fanti, the Denkyera, the Twifo, the Bono, the Nzima, the Dagom
Gonja all regarded the Asantehene as a harsh and distant overlord.
coupled with the irresponsible actions of Asante officials, ensur
quent bids for freedom whenever the opportunity offered itself.
Also, it is my view that in seeking to account for the origi
Asante wars of conquest and expansion, we should direct our a
what Bowdich, in another context, calls 'the necessities and de
Ashantee government.' Asante priorities especially in an econ
geographical context, must be recognised. This makes it possib
reject both the view of Asante control of the conquered states as a
phenomenon and the academic efforts to create a typology of depe
Asante in the northern and southern provinces of the empire.
Finally, it seems to me that the historian whose job it is to mas
understand the past with a view to understanding the present, mu
that his facts are accurate. He must seek to bring into the picture
or knowable facts which are relevant to the theme on which he is
to the interpretation proposed. For, history, contrary to the a
Froude, is not 'a child's box of letters with which we can spell a
please.' Historical facts therefore cannot, and should not, be t

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20 J. . FN

NOTES

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil ch.I. as cited in E. H. Carr, What is History
(Harmondsworth, 1964) p.27.
2 Kwame Arhin, 'The Structure of Greater Ashanti 1700-1824*/. Afr. Hist viii, (1967),
pp.65-85.
3 A. A. Iliasu, 'Asante's Relations with Dagomba 1740-1874* Ghana Social Science
Journal 1972). pp. 54-62
4 Arhin does not appear to be clear in his own mind what the Asante-Dagomba
relationship was. On p.76 of his article he lists the Dagomba among the Asante tribu-
taries. But on the next page he states that Dagomba definitely formed no part of the
empire.
5 J. D. Fage, 'Ancient Ghana: A Review of the Evidence* Tr. Hist . Soc. of Ghana , iii,
(1957), pp.96-9. I. Wilks, 'The Northern Factor in Ashanti History' J. Afr . Hist., ii,
(1961) pp.25-34.
6 West Indische Compagnie (WIC) 743. Caerte des Landschaps Vande Goudkust in
Guinea. Moure 25 December, 1629. (Leupen Collection). Jack Goody 'The Mande
and the Akan Hinterland' in The Historian in Tropical Africa ed. J. Vansina, R.
Mauny, L. V. Thomas (London, 1964) pp.202-23.
7 For the beginnings of the Asante Kingdom, see, for example. C.C. Reindorf, The
History of the Gold Coast and Asante , Basel, 1895; Sir Francis Fuller. A Vanished
Dynasty; Ashanti , London, 1921; R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution
(Oxford, 1929) chs. xvi-xxviii. W. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana London, 1958;
J. K. Fynn, Asante and its Neighbours c. 1700- 1807 London, 1971.
8 T. E. Bowdich. Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (London, 1819) p.229.
9 The early sojourn of Osei Tutu at the Denkyera court may, perhaps, be viewed m this
light.
10 WIC. 97, Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 30 May, 1701. W. Bosman, A New and
Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea , (London, 1705, 4th ed. Frank Cass,
1967) p.3.
11 Rattray, Law and Constitution . For another version for the occasion for war, see,
Bosman, Description , pp.76-77.
12 WIC. 97. Jan van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 1 March, 1699 andl 6 Nov. 1701. Bosman,
Description p.76.
13 Bosman, Description p.77.
14 WIC. 99. Jan Landman, Axim, 28 July, 28 October, 1706.
15 WIC. 124. Minutes of Council, Elmina, 28 Oct. 1707. Public Record Office London,
T 70/1464. Baillie's Commenda Diary entry for 6 April, 1715.
16 WIC. 99. Jan Landman, Axim, 28 July, 28 October 1706.
17 WIC. 122. Articles of Agreement with Accafo Headchief of the Jufferse, Elmina,
30 July, 1713. WIC. 102. H. Haring, Elmina, 4 March, 1714. WIC. 103. Jan Land-
man, Komenda, 12 October, 1715.
18 J. K. Kumah. 'The Rise and Fall of Denkyera, 1600-1730' (M.A. Thesis, Institute of
African Studies, Legon, 1965) p.28. Fynn, Asante , pp.42-3. 'Socco' is Begho or Bi'u
in the modern Brong-Ahafo Region of Ghana.
19 T70/1464 Baillie's Commenda Diary entry for 29 September, 1715; HBKG. 82
W. Butler, Axim to H. Haring. Elmina, 8 Oct, 1715.
20 NBKG. 82. Jan Visbeek, Cormantyn, to H. Haring, Elmina, 12 July, 1712; Jan van
Alzen, Senya Bereku, to H. Haring. 6 September, 1712. Kumah, 'Denkyera', pp.84-5.
21 NBKG. 82, Jan Visbeek, Cormantyn, to H. Haring 12 July, 1712; Jan van Alzen,
Senya Bereku, to H. Haring, 6 Sept. 1712. Kumah, 'Denkyera', pp.84-85. Fynn,
Asante .
22 NBKG. 85, Jan van Naersen, Axim, 12 Oct. 1718. Fynn, Asante p.47.
23 WIC. 103. Engelgraaf Roberts, Elmina, 4 March 1718.
24 NBKG. 84. H. Blenke, Axim 9 March 1718. NBKG. 85. Van Munnikhoven, Axim
20 April, 1718. The figure of 20,000 is probably an exaggeration. But some versions
of Asante tradition say that Asante loss was considerable. See Fuller, Vanished
Dynasty , pp.26-27 and Reindorf. History . pp.8 1-82.

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THE STRUCTURE OF GREATER ASHANTI 21

25 Kumah, 4Denkyira' p.92. NBKG. 85, van Naersen, Axim, 19 Septembe


Oct. 1718.
26 NBKG. 82. van Naersen, Accra, to H. Haring, Elmina, 30 Oct. 1717. NBKG. 84
Engelgraaff Robertsz, Elmina, 4 March, 1718.
27 Ibid, van Naersen, Axim 12 Oct. 1718.
28 For further information on the Akyem-Akwamu war see, I. Wilks, "The Rise and Fall
of a West African Empire : Akwamu 1650-1750* (M.A. Thesis, University of Wales,
1959) Fynn, Asante pp67-71.
29 VGK. Day Book kept at Christiansborg Castle, entry by Governor Billesen, 21 July,
1744. Fynn, Asante, p.76 fn.l.
30 WIC. 105. W. Butler, Elmina, 1 Nov. 1721 and 8 May, 1722. John Atkins, A Voyage
to Guinea , Brasil, and the West Indies (London, 1737) p. 188. He believed that the
Asante attacked and defeated the Nzima because the Asante 'had been provoked by
the frequent depredations and panyars of the Appolonians*. Tanyarring' was a device
whereby a creditor enforced payment from a defaulting debtor by seizing persons in
any way connected with him.
31 On the Asante-Tekyiman war, see, for example, Fynn, Asante pp.61 -62. The Tekyi-
man were defeated in 1722/23.
32 WIC. 106. Pieter Valckenier, Elmina, 16 Jan., 1726. Furley Collections (FC) Letter
from Van Munnikhoven, Axim, 11 March, 1726. 'Pepesia' is the modern Dompim
Pepesaa. It appears it was originally an Aowin town see K. Y. Daaku, Oral Traditions
of Wassa Fiase (Institute of African Studies, Legon, 1973).
33 FC. Letters from Butri and Takoradi dd. 31 March, and 1 April, 1726,
34 Ibid. Letter from Takoradi dd. 25 April, 1726 'Poho' and 'Quasji Mintin' are readily
recognisable as the modern Mpoho and Kwesi Mintim.
35 Ibid. This is the first mention of Osei Tutu by name in the records known to the writer.
36 F.C. Valckenier's letters to Kromantse, Senya Bereku and Accra dd. 26 May, 1726;
Ibid. Letters from Moure dd. 28 May, and 10 June, 1726.
37 Ibid. Letter from Maes, Shama, 24 June 1726.
38^i T70/4, Braithwaite and Cruickshank, Cape Coast Castle, to Royal African Company,
30 June. 1729.
39 A. Van Dantzig, Dutch Documents Relating to the Cold Coast and the Slave Coast , pt. II
1710-1740. (Legon, 1971) p.170 WIC. 109. Jan Pranger, Elmina, 30 Oct. 1730 and
11 March, 1731.
40 Fynn Asante . p.66.
41 L. F. Roemer, Tilforladelig Efterretning , Negotien paa Kysten Guinea (Copenhagen,
1760) dd.218-22.
42 T70/1536. Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 1778. T70/33 Copy of letter
for Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 26 Jan. 1789.
43 T70/3. William Mutter, Cape Coast Castle, 27 May, 1764.
44 T70/30 Diary or Narrative of 'Transactions with the Fantees from death of Intuffero,
king of Warsaw', 23 Sept., 1753.
45 See, for example, Fynn, Asante ch. 4. Roemer, Tilforladelig EJterretning , pp.21 8-22.
46 Reindorf, History, p. 169; see also VGK. The Guinea Journal No. 796. Richter,
Schio ning and Wriesberg, Accra, 17 April, 1806
47 CO 96/58 Richard Pine to the Duke of Newcastle, Cape Coast, 10 Dec. 1 862. For an
eyewitness account of the Asante-Fante war of 1807 see Henry Meredith, An Account
of the Gold Coast of Africa (London, 1812).
48 T70/31 Gilbert Petrie, Cape Coast Castle, 13 July, 1766 and 28 August, 1767.
49 P. Dachse, Die Guld Kuste (Bremen, 1882) p. 95 as cited in N. E. Painter, Relations
between Dahomey and the Gold Coast: 1680-1881' (Institute of African Studies,
Legon, May 1966) pp. 7-8.
50 See Fynn, Asante Ch. 6.
51 J. Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee (London, 1824) pt 2. App. lviii.
52 T. C. MacCaskie, 'The Reality of Asante power m the North . Paper read at the Dept.
of History Seminar, Legon Dec. 1968.

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22 J. . FYNN

53 E. A. Agyeman, 'Gyaman:
Institute of African Studtes, L
54 MacCaskie, 'Asante Power'.
55 Dupuis, Journal, p. cviii.
56 Fynn, Asante , p.62 For traditional accounts of the episode, see. for example, Reindorf,
History pp. 71-73 and Fuller, Vanished Dynasty pp. 27-28.
57 Dupuis, Journal pp. xxviii and cviii.
58 For a useful summary of Asante's relations with the northern provinces, see, for
example, Jack Goody, The Akan and the North' Ghana Notes and Queries ix (1966),
pp 18-24 and MacCaskie, 'Asante Power'
59 It is significant that the slave trade increased tremendously throughout the 1770s
when Asante invaded the north. See, for example, T70/32. R. Miles, Cape Coast
Castle, 15 April 1777 and 20 Nov. 1777.
60 Bowdich, Mission, pp. 179ff.
61 T70/32 Richard Miles, Cape Coast Castle, 31 Jan. and 21 June, 1778. Ibid. John
Roberts and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 8 Oct. 1780. CO 267/20 copy of a letter
from Governor and Council, Cape Coast Castle, 3 Feb. 1781. Author's emphasis.
62 Rattray Law and Constitution p. 35. Roemer Tilforladelig Efterretning p.316. Meredith,
Account p. 217 also notes that there was 'a remote inland people who went under
the appelation of Duncoes, a name given by the Fantees to men whose country is
not known or who come a long way from the interior . . . '
63 Bowdich, Mission , pp. 182-83. '
64 This piece of information was given to me in 1964 by Pro
65 CO 2/1 1/116 A Narrative of the Proceedings at Coom
of course, Kumasi.

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