NATIONS AND J O U R N A L O F T H E A S S O C I AT I O N AS

NATIONALISM
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FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY

A N D N AT I O N A L I S M EN
Nations and Nationalism 18 (4), 2012, 643662.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00545.x

Diverse unity: creole contributions

to interethnic integration
in Guinea-Bissau*
CHRISTOPH KOHL
Research Group Integration and Conflict along the Upper Guinea Coast,
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany

ABSTRACT. The paper explores how creole categories of people who have consti-
tuted a small but influential minority in Guinea-Bissau for centuries contributed to a
countrywide, integrated national culture since the eve of independence in 1974. Since
independence, several cultural representations previously exclusive to creole commu-
nities have been driven by the nationalist independence movement and the early
postcolonial state transformed into representations of a new national culture, cross-
ing ethnic and religious boundaries. The fact that creole identity and culture had been
transethnic i.e. creole identity brings together individuals of heterogeneous cultural,
ethnic and geographic descent during the colonial period, has fostered in postcolo-
nial times the countrywide spread of previously exclusively creole cultural features.
I argue that this transethnicisation of creole cultural representations has unified
Bissau-Guineans across ethnic lines, causing a strong commitment with their nation
from below.

KEYWORDS: Guinea-Bissau, nation-building, creolization, language, carnival,

associativism

Cultural creolization is a historically specific form of cultural mixing

(cf. Knrr 2010a: 353; Stewart 2007: 7) and has contributed to an increasing
interethnic integration in postcolonial Guinea-Bissau. There are signs that this
process has substantially accounted for a nation-building from below. Ever
since Guinea-Bissau achieved independence in 1974, specific cultural represen-
tations previously exclusive to creole communities have started to transform
into representations of a new national culture, crossing ethnic and religious
boundaries. The fact that creole identities and culture in Guinea-Bissau are
transethnic i.e. they bring together individuals of heterogeneous cultural,
ethnic and geographic descent has fostered the countrywide spread of cul-
tural features previously restricted to creole communities.

* Acknowledgements: The author thanks Wilson Trajano Filho, Patrice Ladwig, Oliver Tappe and
two anonymous reviewers for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
644 Christoph Kohl

In this article creole is used as an analytical concept. Processes of cultural

creolization involve both ethnicization to varying degrees and indigeniza-
tion (cf. Knrr 2010b: 7334); in the course of creolization, old identity and
cultural boundaries are dissolved, recontextualized and replaced with new
ones. Ethnicization entails the emergence of a new common culture and ethnic
reference out of a pool of heterogeneous cultural and ethnic ancestries. The
indigenization of the new identity means that members of the emerging group
gradually develop a collective identification with their new home, identify
the new location as their homeland and perceive themselves as founders and
landlords of a certain locality (cf. Kopytoff 1987). Creolization can, on the one
hand, result in the formation of an ethnic group whose boundaries are some-
what consolidated and which are recognized as such by group members and
third parties, or, on the other hand, in the formation of weakly ethnicized
categories of identification or transethnic identities. Creolization can occur
both among dominant and oppressed groups (Knrr 2010b).
Contrary to Atlantic islands like Cape Verde and So Tom e Prncipe,
creolization in Guinea-Bissau occurred in an already populated area. I argue
that the spread of certain creole cultural representations beyond the creole
community across ethnic and religious boundaries has not only contributed to
interethnic integration but also to a strong commitment of Bissau-Guineans
with their nation. Scholars have repeatedly argued that the country is charac-
terized by a weak or even lack of national cohesion, pointing to the high degree
of ethnic and religious heterogeneity that prevails in Guinea-Bissau (cf. da
Conceio das Neves Silva 2002: 121; Lyon 1980: 1656; Ostheimer 2001).
Many scholars also pointed to conflicts that have prevailed in Guinea-
Bissau: during the independence war, the Portuguese tried to exploit anti
Cape Verdean feelings because Cape Verdeans figured prominently among the
ranks of the independence movement, African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which itself had to restrain internal divi-
sions (Dhada 1998: 586, 589; Keese 2007: 503, 5056). The coup of November
1980 in which the many high-ranking officials of (part-)Cape Verdean ancestry
were ousted with the help of Balanta soldiers was regarded as anti-Cape
Verdean by many observers (cf. Chabal 1983: 202; Padro Temudo 2008: 248).
Since then, various putsches and (alleged) coup attempts have shattered
Guinea-Bissau, culminating in a civil war in 199899 and prolonged conflicts
between parts of the reportedly Balanta-dominated army and leading state
representatives, some of them allegedly involved in narcotrafficking. Former
state president Kumba Yal has been repeatedly accused of manipulating and
exploiting ethnic ties in order to garner votes from the Balanta electorate
(Magalhes Ferreira 2004: 48; Nbrega 2003: 293). His recent conversion
to Islam can be interpreted in a similar way. I will show in this paper that a
process of nation-building from below can at least partly compensate for
these tensions prevailing in Bissau-Guinean society.
Guinea-Bissau is one of the smallest countries in West Africa, covering only
about 36 000 square kilometers and counting about 1.5 million inhabitants.

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Diverse unity 645

The national census of 1991 distinguished 32 ethnic groups. Christianity,

Islam and local beliefs can be found. Major languages spoken are Kriol a
Portuguese-based creole language Fula, Balanta, Mandingo, Manjaco and
Pepel. Kriol is the countrys lingua franca, which competes with Wolof in
the northwestern part of the country and Fula in the East. Situated between
Senegal and Guinea, Guinea-Bissaus coastal areas are marked by riverine
lowlands, which Portuguese navigators first entered in the mid-fifteenth
century. Subsequently, Europeans identified the coast as suitable for establish-
ing settlements for trade between Europeans, Cape Verdeans and Africans.
Because of intermarriages between these people, there emerged creole commu-
nities that developed their own identity and distinct cultural representations.
To this day, at least two creole identities can be distinguished: firstly,
Bissau-Guinean Cape Verdeans (locally designated as cabo-verdianos), des-
cendants of migrants from the archipelago off the West African coast who were
primarily employed in the colonial bureaucracy and trade and whose ancestry
is culturally diverse (European traders, officials and clergymen as well as
African slaves); secondly, Kristons (the native term literally means Christians)
who adopted a pronounced transethnic character. Their identity is based on the
distinction between Kristons who were (at least formally) evangelized, on the
one hand, and non-Christian populations in the hinterland who followed
non-Christian beliefs, on the other. Thus, while identifying with various native
ethnic groups, individuals can simultaneously identify themselves as Kristons.
This duality implies that Kriston identity is relatively open and can be rather
conceived as a category of ethnic identification contrary to Bissau-Guinean
Cape Verdeans whose identity boundaries are more clearly defined and can be
therefore considered as an ethnic group (cf. Brubaker 2004).
It is difficult to estimate the number of creoles living in Guinea-Bissau
because no categories have been provided for them in national censuses.
While many of them may have enlisted in one of the residual categories
offered (without ethnic relationship, other ethnic groups, mixed and non-
specified), a lot of Kristons may have opted for one of the ethnic group
clusters because they also identify with ordinary ethnic groups. While the
number of Cape Verdeans living in Guinea-Bissau may not exceed 2,500
individuals, the number of people of Kriston background may be limited
to 8,0009,000. While creoles used to dominate society and economy until
the early twentieth century, the emerging colonial social status reward power
system opened up the possibilities of increasing ambivalence, manipulation
and transformation of creole culture and identity. Following Portugals
assimilationist colonial ideology, e.g. the authorities did not legally recognize
creole identities because they must have appeared as distorted, unnatural to
colonial administrators. Nevertheless, creole culture and identity continued in
everyday life (cf. Kohl 2009: 4266). Thus, whereas Cape Verdeans increas-
ingly segregated and were able to use their status as citizens to integrate into
colonial administration and economy, Kristons were increasingly marginal-
ized (Havik 2004: 354, 2007: 64). The integrative, extended family household

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
646 Christoph Kohl

units of the Kristons gradually ceased to be autonomous units and particularly

middle- and upper-class individuals redefined themselves as an elite group
(Trajano Filho 1998: 185). After independence, Cape Verdeans continued
to emphasize their distinctiveness and civilizedness, isolating and estrang-
ing themselves from other Bissau-Guineans whereas endogamy ceased to be
prevalent among Cape Verdeans. Their distinctiveness and their privileged
position in society, economy and bureaucracy have evoked much resentment
until today. By contrast, Kriston identity has de-creolized in many cases
accentuating instead the original, tribal ethnic identities, thus playing down
their distinctiveness (cf. also Cohen 1981: 19) while in other cases individuals
of Kriston origin have disclaimed any ethnic roots and stress their ethnic
detachment (cf. Kohl 2009: 656).
Both Cape Verdeans and individuals of Kriston origin have been socially
stratified and even today emphasize their heterogeneous origins, which can be
interpreted as a strategy to link themselves to other local ethnic groups and
their respective cultural traditions. Nowadays, love marriages across ethnic
lines appear to have become more frequent, at least in urban areas.
Since the early twentieth century, creoles have dominated the nationalist
movements in the Portuguese colony. After a war for national liberation,
Guinea-Bissau gained its independence in 1974, along with the emergence of a
left-wing autocratic political system. The regimes state ideology, based on a
strong appeal to national unity, proved to be a powerful unifier, since it had
been shaped by PAIGCs charismatic founding father and leader, Amlcar
Cabral himself a creole of Cape Verdean ancestry.
In what follows, I will start by analyzing the interconnectedness of post-
colonial nation-building, an integrated national culture and creole cultural
representations. The transethnic expansion of creole cultural features will be
exemplified by the expansion of the creole language Kriol, predominantly
female associations known as manjuandadis and carnival. The data summa-
rized in this essay were collected for my doctoral research project.1

1. Postcolonial nation-building

Creole identity plays an important role in the process of postcolonial nation-

building as the example of America shows: Anderson (1999: 47) points out that
the countries in the continental Americas that obtained their independence in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were, in fact, founded,
formed and led by creole pioneers. As in the America, creoles in other regions
who had ethnicized and indigenized to their new homes, thus developing
new, shared collective identities too have made crucial contributions not only
in constructing postcolonial nationhood but also in shaping both colonial and
postcolonial statehood.
Given the absence of ethnic and cultural homogeneity in most newly
independent African countries, popular as well as academic discourses have

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Diverse unity 647

contested that these heterogeneous societies constitute real nations (Knrr

2010a: 360).
Ideologues of nationalism were convinced that political, national and
cultural entities (state = nation = people) are congruent (Gellner 1998: 1;
Hobsbawm 1999: 223). Nationalists regarded language as crucial. The eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries were the golden age of intellectuals, lexicogra-
phers, teachers and clergymen who transcribed and standardized vernaculars.
This led to a separation of languages in Europe. These new national languages
supplanted former transnational languages like Latin. Another result was the
supersession of competing languages (such as Gaelic) (cf. Anderson 1999:
6782), which also underlines the potential for conflict provoked by national-
ism. Thus, the emerging nation-states, via their state bureaucracies, schooling
systems and national labor markets, gradually forged nations out of diverse
human capital (Eriksen 2002: 102). The outcome was in many cases a con-
gruence of linguistic and political boundaries, as in Scandinavia, e.g. while
it would have been impossible a hundred and fifty years ago to state exactly
where Norwegian dialects merged into Swedish dialects, this linguistic bound-
ary is now more clear-cut and follows the political one (Eriksen 2002: 1023).
Whereas from the nationalists perspective, each nation possessed its own
national language, from an analytical point of view, a shared language does
not necessarily imply a common identity, as the examples of Spanish-speaking
Latin America (Anderson 1999) or of former Yugoslavia (Eriksen 2002: 389)
illustrate. These cases also demonstrate the limits of language-based nation-
alism and the counter-projects it may provoke.
Following the nationalist conviction that genuine nations are character-
ized by the congruency of political, national and cultural entities, African
nations have been, consequently, sometimes dismissed as artificial nations (cf.
Hill 2005: 1478, 151; Kersting 2009: 7; Young 2007: 241). As Kersting (2009:
8) notes, however, despite cultural and ethnic diversity, African citizens appear
to largely accept the concepts of both nation and state these days a view that
has been confirmed by my own research in Guinea-Bissau.
What has happened on the ground? African colonies that had been quite
arbitrarily demarcated and seized only a few decades before they achieved
independence turned into arenas of rising nationalism after 1945. The national
question was raised by numerically small groups of local elites that drew on the
Western concept of independent nationhood (and statehood) (Hobsbawm
1999: 137). Middle-class politicians like Amlcar Cabral created powerful and
ubiquitous ideologies for their independent states-to-be, appealing for national
unity despite ethnic and religious plurality. Political leaders, such as Samora
Machel in Mozambique, attempted to erase traditional ethnicity and replace
it with the modern concept of nationalism (Lonsdale 1996: 1001; Young
2007: 241). Sekou Tour of Guinea hoped that harmful ethnic rivalries would
be eradicated by nationalism (Kersting 2009: 9). In theory, nation-building was
thought to be an inevitable teleological end point towards progress (cf. Berman
1998: 3078; Vail 1989: 23). Many scholars have underlined the important

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
648 Christoph Kohl

contribution of creoles in the achievement of independence and the construc-

tion of postcolonial nation- and statehood in Guinea-Bissau (Chabal 1981;
Chilcote 1972; Dhada 1993; Duarte Silva 1997; Forrest 1992; Galli and Jones
1987; Havik 2004; Keese 2007; Mendy 1994; Mendy 2006; Rudebeck 1974;
Trajano Filho 1993, 2005, 2010; Wick 2006; etc.). Consequently, creoles can be
considered, to be the founding fathers of modern nationhood. This view was
facilitated by the fact that creole groups not only perceived themselves as
indigenized firstcomers to specific localities but also were generally regarded as
a small nation on their own, for they united a plurality of ancestral ethnic
identities.
Most African colonies were marked by high degrees of ethnic and cultural
diversity. Nationalist movements advocated independence and sought to over-
come ethnic divisions. One pivotal means to unify the population was to create
a distinctive, integrated national culture, which was often formed only ex post
i.e. after the foundation of the respective nation-state (cf. Gellner 1998: 2;
Hobsbawm 1999: 71, 934). It has to be borne in mind that the postcolonial
state often only pursued or accomplished the creation of a national culture
already prepared by its colonial predecessor. For this purpose, after achieving
independence, nationalists supported only those cultural representations
that seemed to be suitable and appropriate for fostering national integration
by promoting a common national culture. In Guinea under Sekou Tour, e.g.
party and state patronized a specific, opinion-forming music genre since the
1940s (Bender 2000: 918). The African state thus often played a pivotal role
in fostering postcolonial nationhood from below.
Sometimes, this process happened under creole auspices. In Guinea-Bissau,
creole representations were able to play an outstanding role in this regard.
Here, creole features served the conceptualization of postcolonial nationhood
in an ethnically heterogeneous society: after independence both manjuandadis
and carnival were employed by the creole-led (both Cape Verdeans and Kris-
tons) PAIGC to foster an integrated national culture. Creole representations
are often characterized by the fact that they are not exclusive to a specific ethnic
group but rather shared by various creole subcategories. This also occurs
because creole culture conversely integrates elements of different ethnic and
cultural sources:
Because elements of the given local, ethnic cultures constitute integrated parts of many
local creole cultures in ethnically heterogeneous societies today, local populations can
find parts of their own (ethnic) culture reflected in them and thus may feel both ethnically
(with regard to their ethnic share) as well as transethnically connected with the creole
culture while maintaining their own respective ethnic identities. (Knrr 2008: 134)
For this reason, it became possible for the newly independent Bissau-Guinean
state to promote the ideology and agenda of the ruling party by employing
creole cultural representations. This integrative feature of creole culture was
supported by the indigenization of creole groups in the Bissau-Guinean case,
which prevented creoles and creole culture from being regarded as alien
elements.

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Diverse unity 649

Following Knrr (2010b: 7389), processes of cultural integration across

ethnic boundaries involve the evolution of new, shared cultural features and
the transcendence of identities without leading to the emergence of a new and
common ethnic identity. Instead, the original ethnic identities stay intact. This
approach emphasizes the social constructedness of such identities.
Postcolonial processes of cultural, interethnic integration that may result
in the creation of an integrated national culture cutting across ethnic bounda-
ries do not necessarily proceed smoothly and undisputed. Rather, they can
provoke counter-reactions from those creole groups who regard themselves as
the founders and therefore the original owners of the cultural representations
in question. In such a situation, the donor groups often use the essentialist
argument to support their claim over the representations, thereby seeking to
separate their genuine representations from the false counterparts that have
resulted from cultural integration processes (Eriksen 2007: 174; Knrr 2008:
45, 134). This implies that the donor ethnic groups might continue to regard
specific cultural representations as their own ethnic markers, even as they
come to be recognized as expressions of an integrated national culture and are
no longer associated with a specific ethnic group.
Although independent nationhood is linked to statehood, in the case of
Africa, both of these concepts should always be analytically separated. Despite
their widespread dissatisfaction with the contemporary functioning of their
state, citizens are nevertheless committed to their nation. Thus, while they
complain about the state, its public institutions, politicians and government
officials, on the one hand, they can remain absolutely loyal to their nation, on
the other.
Thus, it can be noted that creole identity and creoles played significant roles
in postcolonial nation- and state-building processes. In a number of countries,
as members of the middle class, they prominently figured in nationalist move-
ments calling for independence, thus advocating national ideologies that
stressed national unity without rejecting ethnic diversity. Already on the eve of
decolonization, nationalist movements had started to employ certain cultural
features that not only served to connect to the masses but also transcended
ethnic diversity. Creole representations proved to be well suited to transcend
ethnic particularities because they were not associated with specific ethnic
groups but integrated cultural elements from different sources instead. Hence,
creole groups resembled small nations in themselves. The independent nation-
state managed to make an essential contribution to the idea of the nation
(cf. Knrr 2010a), unlike the European model, where nation-building usually
preceded state-building.

2. Kriol

The present status of Kriol as Guinea-Bissaus lingua franca is best repre-

sented by the number of its speakers. According to the last census conducted

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650 Christoph Kohl

in 1991, the total number of Kriol speakers (who spoke Kriol as a first, second,
third or fourth language) added up to 51% of the population in that year,
while Portuguese, Guinea-Bissaus official language, was spoken by only
about 10% of the population (Instituto Nacional de Estatstica e Censo 1996,
vol. I; table 6.5A, B, C, D). My own observations in Bissau and various
locations in the countryside, however, suggest that Kriol is continuing to gain
ground and may be at present understood by about 80% of Bissau-Guineans,
leaving especially elderly generations in remote rural areas. For the time being,
Kriol predominantly remains the most prevalent language for interpersonal
verbal communication.
The origins of the creole language that is currently spoken in Guinea-
Bissau and the Senegalese Casamance can be traced back to the sixteenth
century. Its development over a long period of time was intimately connected
with the foundation and development of trade settlements (do Couto 1994:
1734; Roug 1986: 2933). Historical evidence suggests that by and large,
Kriol continued to be limited to the few trading posts that were nominally
controlled by the Portuguese in the mid- to late nineteenth century. After
the turn of the penultimate century, Kriol was propagated further inland
by Cape Verdeans who relocated to the countrys interior. This caused the
creole vernacular to spread to Guinea-Bissaus hinterland (Havik 2007:
589).
At the same time, the colonial authorities began to devaluate and legally
suppress Kriol, which they regarded as a badly and incorrectly spoken Portu-
guese (do Couto 1994: 54), although they never became powerful enough to
enforce this policy. A law passed in 1917 criticized the constant use of crioulo
in public administration and schools, as if it were the national language.
Under this mandate, only the Portuguese language could be used in public
administration and the education system (Portaria no. 38 of 9 February 1917,
in Boletim Oficial da Guin, 6: 41). These endeavors to stamp out Kriol did not
meet with success. The colonial authorities knew about this reality, and the
1940s saw the emergence of many debates and contentions that sought
to distinguish between Kriol of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verdean creole
language, presumably on the basis of racist considerations as part of the
colonial ideology that favored Cape Verdeans over Africans (Kristons).
Apparently, the colonial administration feared that its over-restrictive meas-
ures may have completely alienated vast sections of the population from
colonial rule (Havik 2007: 612). Only in the mid-1950s did the representatives
of the colonial state and media begin to recognize the crucial role played by
Kriol as an interethnic means of communication (Havik 2007: 62; Teixeira da
Mota 1954, vol. I, 22733).
In the early 1920s Kriol was predominantly restricted to the commercial
settlements centers of creole culture and was hardly understood in the
countryside. Only after the 1930s did it spread more rapidly, coincident with
the expansion of colonial rule and infrastructure, which caused many people to
migrate to the cities (Carreira 1984: 1223).

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Diverse unity 651

The emergence of nationalist movements in the 1950s was strongly con-

nected with urbanized speakers of Kriol. When the war of independence broke
out in the early 1960s, Kriol served as a crucial means of popular mobilization.
During the war, Kriol was employed as the training language for recruits as
well as the communication medium in the fast-spreading basic primary schools
run by the PAIGC in the liberated zones of Guinea-Bissau. Moreover, the
PAIGC also started to broadcast messages, propaganda and its ideology
in Kriol on Liberation Radio at that time (Carreira 1984: 1223; do Couto
1994: 59; Embal 2008: 105; Pinto Bull 1989: 78, 1169). Thus, reinforced by
the war of independence, Kriol became even more widespread as a kind of
interethnic lingua franca.
However, it was only after 1974 that Kriol manifested its full importance.
Through its use, the different ethnic groups could bridge the linguistic diversity
prevalent in Guinea-Bissau, being conducive to the project of nation-building.
In this way, Kriol was transformed from a commercial language to a language
of resistance, liberation and national integration. Lopes (1988: 2301) there-
fore went so far as to interpret Kriol as representing a socio-linguistic concept
of independence. Although independent Guinea-Bissau made Portuguese its
official language, Kriol was declared the national language that was spoken
all over the countrys territory (Scantamburlo 1999: 16). Given Guinea-
Bissaus membership in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries
and the countrys dependency from Portugal (especially in terms of politics,
education and development cooperation), there seems to be a pressure to
retain the official status of Portuguese.
As my own observations in the rural Eastern and Southern part of
Guinea-Bissau and in some of the islands indicate, Kriol is at present under-
stood by people throughout the country, independent of their ethnic affilia-
tions. The radio stations that are active throughout Guinea-Bissau employ
Kriol as the preferred communication medium. Because Bissau attracts a
significant number of people from the countryside who commute between
their new and old homes, the capital can be perceived as a primary platform
for the spread of Kriol. Although Portuguese is supposed to be the official
language of instruction, teachers from all over Guinea-Bissau frequently use
Kriol during school lessons. Whereas Portuguese is predominantly used in
print media, as written office language, and in official speeches by politicians,
Kriol is spoken at home, at workplaces and in public spheres, including the
national parliament. All this makes Kriol not only a language of unity and
interethnic communication but also a means of business, practical commu-
nication at work, and personal contact in almost any local community
(Santo Vaz de Almeida 1991: 3).
Even though a shared language does not inevitably entail a common
identity as the examples of Ibero-America and the former Yugoslavia show,
a common language facilitates social interaction and communication across
cultural boundaries. In Guinea-Bissau, the orthographic standardization of
Kriol following the European example (cf. Anderson 1999: 6782) has not

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652 Christoph Kohl

been affected, just as Kriol has neither been declared an official language nor
an official medium of instruction. In this regard, Guinea-Bissau resembles the
case of Mauritius, among others, where the language of the former colonial
power (English) is an official language but nobodys mother tongue and there-
fore conceived as supra-ethnic compromise (Eriksen 2002: 116). Although
this process was different from other, especially European settings and not
initiated and enforced by the Bissau-Guinean state but instead largely from
below, the existence of a common language as only one factor can, as in
the case of Guinea-Bissau, contribute to a gradual emergence of a shared
national consciousness (cf. Eriksen 2002: 1023).
The spread of Kriol was apparently fostered by the fact that creoles (Kris-
tons and especially Cape Verdeans), who originally spoke varieties of Kriol,
are still not regarded as normal, native ethnic groups, according to various
informants, including both urban and rural dwellers of different ethnic
affiliations as well as creoles themselves. From that perspective, they are
regarded as mixtures, given their diverse ethnic, cultural and geographic
origins. From the analytical point of view, Kriol was, in fact, spoken by
various ethnic groups in the commercial settlements that were united under
the Kriston umbrella. Thus, Kriol bears only a weak ethnic reference. I was
neither able to observe any kind of contestation nor politicization of the
expansion of Kriol and the languages status as lingua franca during my
stays in Guinea-Bissau. At present, intellectual organizations similar to the
Crolit movement in the French Antilles emphasizing the unique history
and culture of the French Antilles and striving for the valorization of the
local French Creole variety in the cultural and education sectors at the
expense of the dominant, official French language (cf. Gallagher 2007) do
not exist in Guinea-Bissau.
The spread of Kriol and its increasing number of speakers have also
influenced the language itself. Kriol has been significantly affected by two
major developments in recent years. On the one hand, a Portugalized Kriol
has resulted from the ongoing process of linguistic de-creolization. For the
last couple of decades, this variant which is primarily spoken by people
with access to education has tended to become increasingly similar to Por-
tuguese. On the other hand, the substantial numbers of people who grew up
speaking their local African mother tongues and who use Kriol only as a
vernacular contribute to the simplification of the creole language (do Couto
1994: 545).
Hence, as I was able to witness repeatedly during my field research in
Guinea-Bissau, Kriol has indeed turned into an interethnic means of commu-
nication. However, especially in bigger, multilingual agglomerations such as
Bissau and Bafat, for instance, Kriol is even supplanting native languages
like Balanta, Fula, Mandingo, etc., as means of communication within fami-
lies and among members of the same ethnic group. While most people con-
tinue to be fluent in several languages, only a limited number of people have a
basic knowledge of their native language.

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Diverse unity 653

While Kriol is the mother tongue of creoles, it also has become the native
language of a growing proportion of the non-creole population in urbanized
areas across social layers, thus mirroring cases like Mauritius (Eriksen 2007:
1567). As such, Guinea-Bissau contrasts with the Gambia or the Senegalese
Casamance, for instance, where creole languages have lost significance over
the past decades and cannot be considered as linguae francae.

3. Manjuandadi associations

Trajano Filho (1998: 399405), in pioneering research on the associations

known as the manjuandadis, has already characterized this institution as one
that is based on the principles of mutual assistance and sociability, providing
mutual aid and support. Members foster friendly relations with each other
by having fun together, drinking, eating and chatting among themselves (for
detailed ethnographic depictions of various kinds of manjuandadis in both
historical and contemporary perspectives, see Kohl 2009: 11958).
The origins of manjuandadis can be traced back to both African and
European cultural forms (Trajano Filho 1998: 335): historical evidence
suggests that they have their roots in African age-set organizations, on the
one hand, and Christian lay brotherhoods (cf. Lahon 2001), on the other. At
present, Bissau-Guineans use the word manjuandadi to refer to both system-
atically organized permanent associations and loosely organized mostly ad hoc
networks of extended family members, neighbors, coworkers and friends. In
both cases, the participants are known as manjuas, a term that is usually used
to refer to individuals of similar ages.
Some of the organized manjuandadis enjoy an excellent reputation for their
music. As such, they can be easily distinguished by external observers because
of their participants attention-grabbing, colorful, identical printed dresses,
which the members wear on festive occasions. As a result, third parties often
associate musical shows, singing, dancing and the wearing of identical cos-
tumes with the manjuandadis. Organized manjuandadis possess an executive
committee, composed of a rainha (queen), rei (king) and other charges. It sits
apart from the ordinary members, who are called soldados (soldiers). All
members are obliged to pay membership fees and make special contributions
on the occasion of members weddings, funerals, etc. (Trajano Filho 1998: 368,
3719).
Until the mid-twentieth century, manjuandadis associations were exclusive
to Kriston communities. They started to spread throughout the country at the
time of independence, a process that was encouraged by both the single-party
PAIGC and the independent state. Independence also signified their gradual
transformation into organizations that were supposed to support the politics
of the postcolonial state (cf. Trajano Filho 1998: 402). All women were sup-
posed to join the partys womens wing, the Democratic Womens Union of
Guinea (UDEMU) that declared to struggle for their emancipation (Galli and
Jones 1987: 84).

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654 Christoph Kohl

Because the first two leaders of UDEMU were familiar with Kriston culture
and manjuandadis in particular (cf. Urdang 1979: 2678, 2756), it seemed only
logical to use manjuandadis for mass mobilization (cf. Trajano Filho 1998: 319,
402). When UDEMU would invite manjuandadis for gatherings, the associa-
tions were requested to communicate political messages and slogans of the
PAIGC and UDEMU via their songs. UDEMU also intended to mobilize
women from Muslim communities. That is when Muslim manjuandadis
emerged, as I learned from the manjuandadis Jamanodiata in Bissau and
Vizinhos Unidos in Bafat. They were neither organized according to age sets
nor concerned with the Christian heritage. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the
manjuandadis began to be confronted by profound challenges that threatened
their survival. On the one hand, many former leaders of the Kriston manjuan-
dadis were passing away and the number of manjuandadis decreased because of
the diminishing popular support, various informants explained. On the other
hand, the eventual introduction of multiparty democracy and the accompa-
nying withdrawal of the state stripped UDEMU and PAIGC of their monopo-
listic character. Indirectly, this development also affected the manjuandadis,
which had thrived on the support of the one-party state.
For the last time, the manjuandadis aligned in 1994 unanimously with
UDEMU in order to campaign for the PAIGC and state president Vieira in
Guinea-Bissaus first-ever free elections (Koudawo 1994: 36, 1996: 85). Before
the elections, the manjuandadis supporting the PAIGC had founded the
strategic platform Association of Mandjuandades of the Autonomous Sector of
Bissau (AMSAB) in 1993. AMSAB was supposedly a free association but was
patronized by the wife of the state president and chairman of the PAIGC
(Koudawo 1994: 189, 1996: 87).
In view of the aforesaid challenges that confronted the manjuandadis in
the mid-1990s, these associations had to find new sources of funding because
of the collapse of the one-party state and worsening economic conditions
since the late 1980s. In these circumstances, the strategies that were finally
employed by the manjuandadis led to their commodification and renewed
politicization. Looking for new partners and sources of funding, the man-
juandadis established ties with other political parties apart from the PAIGC,
lent themselves to prosperous non-governmental organizations in order to
communicate their agendas and began to market their music effectively with
the help of radio stations and cultural activists. By the end of the 1990s, there
was a revival of the manjuandadi music, initiating new dynamics and publicity
and resulting in the new foundation of a multitude of manjuandadis all over
the country.
Because of the rapid spread of Kriol in the past decades, the term man-
juandadi has been adopted by the population in the countrys interior. These
people have attached the notion to their own age-set groups and other repre-
sentations that are based on the principles of sociability and solidarity. Such
formal or informal institutions can be found not only in the capital and in
towns like Gab and Bafat but also in villages in the countryside, thus also

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
Diverse unity 655

including regions that are dominated by Islam. Transitions can be seamless.

Hence, in reality, it may not be possible to clearly and analytically distinguish
between manjuandadis and other similar associations. This process indicates
not only a manjuandadization of functions but also shows that manjuandadis
are becoming a sign of an emergent integrated national culture. The nation-
alization of manjuandadis has been occurring despite a general distinction of
Christian from Muslim manjuandadis. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s, the vast
majority of manjuandadis (86%) were multiethnic in their membership (Abreu
Borges Domingues 2000: 4667).
The main difference between Christian and Muslim manjuandadis concerns
a drum called tina. Leading cultural activists some of them descendants
from Kriston families who work closely together with Christian associations
opined that because they do not play the tina, Muslim manjuandadis cannot be
regarded as authentic manjuandadis. This assertion is rejected by Muslim
manjuandadi activists. Different from masonic lodges in Sierra Leone (Cohen
1981: 105), a covert exclusion of non-creole potential members from manjuan-
dadis does not seem to take place. However, an exclusion of Muslim groups
exists: for instance, when the annual manjuandadi festival took place in
Bolama in early December 2006, Muslim manjuandadis had not been invited.
As in previous years, only organized manjuandadis from one of the former
trading posts were invited, while extra activities included a public interview
with the eldest inhabitant of Bolama a former center of creole culture in
order to recount aspects of the towns past. The festival organizers were
makers of a weekly manjuandadi radio broadcast aired by the public radio
station. Some of them were linked to Kriston culture and other cultural
activists. As in other contexts, the radio makers denied Muslim manjuandadis
the recognition as authentic. Similar convictions may have played a role
when leading manjuandadi activists from Bissau founded a new manjuandadi
umbrella organization in 2007 that explicitly ruled out the membership for
groups that did not play the tina.
My research suggests that this rejection can be perceived as an essentialist
counter-movement against further changes in the manjuandadi institution
brought about by strangers, i.e. non-creoles. In contrast to the colonial past
when manjuandadis used to be reserved for creoles in the former trade settle-
ments, nowadays individuals of Kristons origin have to compete with man-
juandadi organizations, especially the Muslim ones that they may conceive as
a threat to their creole heritage. At the same time, radio makers, cultural
activists and members of certain Christian manjuandadis attempt to attribute
a superior status to specific manjuandadis that fulfill certain prerequisites (such
as use of the tina and provenance from one of the former trade settlements).
From an analytical perspective, the distinction of Christian from Muslim
manjuandadis appears to set aside the fact that most groups are composed
of multireligious memberships (Trajano Filho 2010: 241). The attempts to
exclude Muslim manjuandadis appear to be largely confined to the cultural
sphere although the cases of AMSAB and the post-independent foundation of

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656 Christoph Kohl

UDEMU manjuandadis have shown that politics may interfere in manjuandadi

affairs. Rather than manipulating manjuandadis and their members along
ethnic lines, however, the PAIGC intended to mobilize women irrespective of
ethnic and religious affiliations for its political projects. Further research
should focus on what extent manjuandadis become involved in politics in
parliamentary and presidential elections campaigns, primarily those not affili-
ated with UDEMU.
In his seminal and influential texts on the Kriol of Sierra Leone Abner
Cohen (1971, 1981) portrayed Masonic lodges as an important mechanism by
which the powerful creole elite covertly reproduced themselves. Although
manjuandadis can be socially mixed, women generally outweighing men, they
do not seem to be unlike masonic lodges instrumentalist elite networks. I
have neither found that manjuandadis facilitate the establishment of informal
and clientelist links to high-ups nor that promotion in the civil service and
elsewhere are cooked within these groups. Membership cannot be considered
as a privilege or reward, and secrecy is not important. As I showed, innumer-
able formal and informal groups exist that are referred to as manjuandadis
throughout the country, the majority of them without creole members. Even
those groups that were identified as authentic, Christian manjuandadis by
activists do not seem to match the picture of elite creole organizations and
have many members of non-creole ancestry. Similarly, I was not able to detect
any kind of pressure to join manjuandadis (cf. Cohen 1981: 1090). In fact, no
constraints are defined for membership in manjuandadis.
In contrast to associations that are limited to specific ethnic groups such
as the socits of the Mancanha, e.g. (Jao 1992: 656) manjuandadis in most
cases have multiethnic memberships, contributing to interethnic integration. If
some manjuandadis are dominated by members of a certain ethnic group, this
is because in the town and city quarters, individuals of the same ethnic groups
often dwell together and the manjuandadis membership is often composed of
neighbors, friends and extended families who reside close to each other. While
the early postcolonial state used manjuandadis to mass-mobilize the popula-
tion, they are at present not regarded as mere political instruments, in part
because manjuandadis both as an institution and as a term have undergone
diversification for the past two or three decades.

4. Carnival

What began as a creole cultural representation has more recently been trans-
formed into a mass event that has spread beyond the boundaries of the few
former trade settlements. Formerly a loosely organized festivity, around 1980,
carnival turned into a state-run competition. It was only much later, after the
state and its ruling party had partly withdrawn from its organization, that
carnival became a nationwide celebration. Today, carnival enjoys such mass
popularity that it is even staged in remote areas.

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
Diverse unity 657

An early account of carnival in Guinea-Bissau dates from 1888 (telegram

dated 20 February 1888, Arquivo Histrico Ultramarino, Fundo da Guin,
Livro 102). According to this account, carnival served as a platform to criticize
colonial policies and politics. Moreover, it shows that carnival was closely
associated with urban, creole settings at the time, including both Kristons
and Cape Verdeans (carnival has been also celebrated in Cape Verde for a long
time), leading repeatedly to constraints by the colonial state. Following
Guinea-Bissaus independence in 1974, the organization of carnival entered
a new stage, characterized by the politicization of carnival by the state. The
post-independence, one-party state reorganized carnival as a competitive event
under its aegis in the late 1970s. Interestingly, carnival which is actually
characterized by anti-structure, disorder, critique and resistance was trans-
formed into a ritual of structure and order. Hence, carnival was turned into an
instrument to mass-mobilize the population and to communicate agendas and
slogans on behalf of the state and its ruling party. Against this background,
carnival eventually managed to spread all over the country, reaching new
sections of the population in both ethnic and geographical terms.
The party-run youth organization African Amlcar Cabral Youth (JAAC)
was mainly responsible for the post-independence revival and reshaping of
carnival. Founded in 197374, JAACs objective was to enlist the youths
participation in the commemoration and construction of both the party and
the state (Andreini and Lambert 1978: 434, 901; Galli and Jones 1987: 84).
Despite this, JAACs influence fell far short of UDEMUs reach, mainly
because of the fact that most of the organizations activities were centered in
the capital (Galli and Jones 1987: 84). The takeover of the central carnival
organization by the General Directorate of Culture in 1984 marked an impor-
tant step toward the wider spread of carnival.
JAACs organization committee arranged for a parade passing through
Bissaus city center. A jury, situated along the itinerary, is responsible for
selecting the winners for three events: best group performance, best mask and
carnival queen; these winners are then awarded prizes. Every year, there is a
new official theme for the carnival. The public administration generated new
sources of income by issuing licenses to those who wish to take pictures of the
carnival or set up sales stalls for drinks and food along streets that are highly
frequented for weeks before and after the carnival. Moreover, the authorities
have introduced participation fees for those wishing to compete (Sig 1995:
124).
The concentration of carnival festivities in Bissau after 1974 popularized
the festivity among a large group of migrants from the hinterland, for the
population of the capital had grown tremendously during and after the war of
independence. These people, mostly young men and women, continued to stay
in contact with their rural kin and thereby transported the idea of the carnival
to the countryside. In this way, carnival became popular in the countryside
independent of the official carnival contests that had been organized by the
state since the 1980s and 1990s. The areas where carnival became popular

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
658 Christoph Kohl

included Bula (Rambout Barcelos et al. 2006: 189), Canchungo (Pink 2001:
106), Bafat and, more recently, in Bedanda, thus including areas influenced
by Islam. An illuminating example is Geba, once a vibrating trading post and
center of creole culture that fell into oblivion in the late nineteenth century. In
Geba, carnival was revived in 2007, with celebrations lasting for a whole week.
The carnival celebrations were organized by a young man who had grown up
in the village and who was supported by children and adolescents from differ-
ent ethnic groups in Geba. Many participants attended school in Bissau or
Bafat and used to return to Geba only during the weekends or on holidays.
The carnivalists were mostly dressed in workaday clothes, although many girls
had dressed up in club wear. The highest point of the evening was a disco party
organized in Gebas school.
In the period following the introduction of multiparty democracy in the
early 1990s, carnival was able to shake off the states paternalistic intervention
and partially renew its critical attitude toward the state and politics, continu-
ing to spread throughout the country. In comparison with the official carni-
val contest held in Bissaus city center, the carnival at the regional, quarter
and sectoral levels appeared to be even more multifaceted, underscoring the
commercial and promotional character of the Bissau festival. These differences
likewise highlighted the integrative, interethnic character of carnival. In this
way, carnival has remained a festivity that promotes sociability and convivi-
ality among people at the community level, irrespective of their ethnic affilia-
tions and beyond the sphere of official contests, thereby creating a sense of
unity in diversity.
Carnivalists sometimes switch ethnically: during the 2007 Bissau carnival
contest, I was able to observe several groups composed of children and ado-
lescents. These young urban residents collectively disguised themselves as
different tribal people, carrying signs that bore the name of the respective
ethnic groups they represented. Various informants to whom I spoke later
asserted that these carnivalists did not necessarily belong to that particular
ethnic group in reality and were rather trying to portray the ethnic and cultural
diversity of Guinea-Bissau.
The nationalization of carnival a process that has not yet been completed
as the festivity continues to spread has been significantly facilitated by its
multilayered character. The congruency of different meanings represented in
carnival depends on the participants or observers individual cultural back-
grounds. People of different origins, therefore, are able to retrieve their respec-
tive cultures through carnivalesque performances. Despite, or more correctly,
because of these different meanings, carnival has managed to create a common
identity among its participants as well as observers. People of diverse ethnic
affiliations are attracted to carnival, a cultural representation that was pro-
moted by the nation-state in a move to implicitly advocate national unity.
Ironically, as with the manjuandadis, the very same states weakening control
over the nation since the 1980s appears to have contributed to the nationwide
expansion of carnival.

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
Diverse unity 659

5. Conclusion

On the whole, it appears that the PAIGC and the emerging postcolonial
one-party state laid the foundation for the countrywide proliferation of for-
merly creole cultural features. What was originally conceptualized as a top-
down strategy by the one-party state to mobilize the masses soon gave way
to a bottom-up, self-running development that has contributed to intereth-
nic interaction and thus national integration from below. These cultural
representations have spread across ethnic and religious boundaries since
independence and, in this way, have made substantial contributions to the
creole project for an independent, integrated Bissau-Guinean nationhood.
The fact that Kriol, manjuandadis and carnival had originally not been iden-
tified with a specific ethnic group was certainly conducive to this process of
increasing interethnic interaction at the grassroots level that added to the
development of the idea of the nation. This was because although cultural
features like Kriol, manjuandadis and carnival had been originally associated
with the Kristons and Bissau-Guinean Cape Verdeans, respectively, espe-
cially the transethnic Kriston identity encompassed various ordinary ethnic
identities. Similarly, Cape Verdean identity continues to be popularly iden-
tified as non-natural (but not as alien), because Bissau-Guineans regularly
point to the artificial emergence of Cape Verdeans from culturally, ethni-
cally and geographically diverse ancestries. Thus the strong national con-
sciousness prevailing among Bissau-Guineans is significantly owed to the
nationwide appropriation of formerly creole cultural features, encompassing
various ethnic and religious groups. Hence, postcolonial interethnic integra-
tion and nation-building may proceed even in settings that are characterized
by ethnic diversity.
As the examples of both manjuandadis and carnival show, individuals of
various ethnic backgrounds can identify themselves with these cultural repre-
sentations because they do not only satisfy general human needs such as
sociability, solidarity and pleasure, but also leave room for the integration
of multifaceted cultural forms that stem from different ethnic groups. Kriol
plays an important role in this regard for it has served given its weak ethnic
reference as a connector between individuals of different ethnic background
and facilitated the integration of various associative manifestations under the
manjuandadi-umbrella. It remains to be seen, however, to which extent these
representations can counter more fragmenting forces in Bissau-Guinean
society, on the one hand, and if manjuandadis can resist politicization and
internal divisions, on the other.
The Bissau-Guinean case illustrates that ethnic identities are not necessarily
subnational identities. On the contrary, creole culture and identity are able to
transcend these supposedly fixed and clearly delineated boundaries, given their
transethnic character. In other words, creole culture is able to embrace other
ethnic identities, attesting to the dominance of the creole project of the Bissau-
Guinean nation not only in the political but also in the socio-cultural sphere,

The author(s) 2012. Nations and Nationalism ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2012
660 Christoph Kohl

as exemplified by the postcolonial cultural integration hence interethnic

expansion of creole representations.

Note

1 My PhD thesis was based on socio-anthropological fieldwork in various regions of

Guinea-Bissau including Bissau and the interior from April 2006 to May 2007.

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