HRM390 - S1 - Case Analysis

The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2013
Vol. 24, No. 6, 12021235, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2012.706816
Performance appraisal politics from appraisee perspective:

a study of antecedents in the Indian context
Amit Dhimana* and Sunil Kumar Maheshwarib
a
Department of Human Resource Management, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata,
India; bDepartment of Personnel and Industrial Relations, Indian Institute of Management
Ahmedabad, Ahmedabad, India
Appraisees perception of appraisal politics (APAP) is conceptualized to be formed by
three perceptual dimensions. First is appraisers manipulation of ratings to achieve
their self-serving ends such as own reputation, maintaining good relationships, building
in-groups, and handling dependency threats from appraisees. Second dimension
constitutes fellow appraisees upward influence behaviors to get higher ratings and
rewards. Third dimension relates to the outcome of appraisal, i.e. pay and promotion
decisions that can be discriminatory when performance is ignored. Such actions are
detrimental for good performers and performance culture. Drawing from the
organizational justice theories, it is proposed that APAP can be mitigated by those
appraisal-related structural (e.g. criteria), process (e.g. voice) and contextual antecedents
(e.g. relation with appraiser) that enhance appraisees perceived control, understanding,
and prediction of appraisal decision and process. These hypotheses were tested in the
Indian family-owned organizations. The data were collected using survey questionnaire
method from six organizations. Multivariate and structural equation modeling (SEM)
analyses revealed that overall APAP had significant negative correlation with downward
communication, and appraiserappraisee relations. Importantly, these are appraiser-
centric or appraiser-driven variables, thus implying appraisers criticality in influencing
perceptions. Post hoc SEM analysis revealed that communication processes (such as
feedback) mediated effect of structural variables (such as criteria relevance), implying
criticality of procedures over structural variables. The significance of communication
processes implemented by appraiser implies that understanding cultural context is
important when studying perceptual reactions such as APAP. Interestingly, post hoc
analysis revealed that downward communication mediated the effect of voice on APAP, a
result that may be idiosyncratic to the Indian cultural context. Specifically, higher
appraiserappraisee power distance in the Indian context may influence the perceived
relevance and utility of processes such as voice (e.g. appeal), which may put appraisee in a
slightly adversarial situation with appraiser. Further, higher paternalistic orientation may
make processes like downward communication more desired by appraisee because these
processes project superior as a guide and a coach, who is keen to handhold and support
their subordinates. The implications of these results for practitioners are discussed.
Keywords: India; performance appraisal; politics
Rational versus political view of performance appraisal

Employee performance appraisal (PA) is as much a political process as it is rational. Majority
of the PA research has focused on the issue of enhancing appraisal accuracy by improving
appraisal technology, and reducing appraisers inadvertent errors and biases (Ilgen,
Barnes-Farrell and McKellin 1993; Arvey and Murphy 1998; Levy and Williams 2004).
*Corresponding author. Email: amitdhiman@iimcal.ac.in
q 2013 Taylor & Francis

The International Journal of Human Resource Management 1203
This research did improve our understanding of different scales, formats, performance
criterion, cognitive processes, appraisal errors and biases, but it had limited influence on
advancing PA accuracy (Ilgen et al. 1993).
The research focused on appraisal accuracy is based on the premise that employee
appraisal is a rational and objective process. It also reflects an assumption that appraiser
being a rationalist is interested in searching and establishing objective reality. However,
Folger, Konovsky and Cropanzano (1992) argued that the assumptions underlying rational
approach in PA are unrealistic. Work arrangements do not furnish reliable and valid
performance information readily; undisputable rational appraisal criteria does not always
exist (Folger et al. 1992) and many times appraisers cannot and are not interested in
assessing performance accurately (Longenecker and Gioia 2000).
Appraisers are goal directed (Murphy and Cleveland 1995) and they manipulate ratings
upward or downward to fulfill these goals, which Longenecker and Gioia (2000)
termed as appraisal politics. Managers even term some of these actions as perfectly
legitimate (Longenecker and Gioia 2000). Appraisers consider PA as a part of their legitimate
administrative authority that has high potency in influencing their subordinates. Not only they
can use it as a powerful motivating, accountability and communication tool directed at
subordinates, but also send signals to outside audience, i.e. top management and other
departments, about their own or departments performance and power (Murphy and Cleveland
1995). On the other hand, appraisees see their rewards, e.g. pay raise and promotions, linked to
the appraisal rating. They aspire for higher ratings (Harris and Shaubroeck 1988). Thus
appraisers and appraisees may have differing self-interests and their interests might not be
served by brutally accurate ratings.
Thus rational or accuracy perspective alone cannot describe PA reality adequately, and
political perspective can better provide descriptive accounts of the actual PA decision
(Ferris and Judge 1991; Folger et al. 1992). Pfeffer differentiated rational and political
decision-making models on multiple dimensions. They concluded that rational decisions
follow from value-maximizing choice driven by overarching organizational goal consistent
within and across social actors. On the other hand, political decisions follow from bargaining
and interplay of differing interests of social actors. Therefore, rather than rational and
objective criteria determining the decision, it is the relative power of the various social actors
that provides both the sufficient and necessary way of resolving the decision (1981, p. 30).
The divergence in appraisers and appraisees PA goals is more salient than convergence.
For example, self-appraisals have consistently been found to be inflated relative to supervisor
and peer appraisals (Jawahar and Williams 1997), and so do not seem to advance the
objective of accuracy. However, from political perspective, self-appraisal is an important
process that facilitates discussion to resolve the difference in appraiser and appraisee
assessment. The political view posits that relative power of actors influences appraisal
decision (Folger et al. 1992). While appraiser carries formal authoritative appraisal and
reward power, appraisees attempt to counter it with covert or overt influence tactics directed
at the appraiser (Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson 1980), especially when the formal means of
influence such as voice are unavailable or ineffective (Dulebohn and Ferris 1999). Further,
PA decisions are characterized by contextual factors of ambiguity, uncertainty and
instrumentality, which motivate actors to indulge in politics (Ferris and Judge 1991). Thus
political model provides an appropriate perspective to study PA decision, and it may explain
variance in actual appraisal decision over and above that attributed to the accurate appraisal
of performance.
The current study applies the political perspective to PAs, identifies different dimensions
of appraisal politics and develops the concept based on extant literature. The study aims to
1204 A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
identify key appraisal-related structural, process, and contextual variables and investigate
their mitigating influence on politics afflicting the appraisal as perceived by the decision
recipient. The explanations for these influences are drawn from justice theories procedural,
informational and interpersonal (Colquitt 2001). Thus this research contributes to the
justicepolitics literature by studying the relative significance of these theoretical arguments
in influencing political perceptions related to appraisals. Politics has symbiotic relation with
formal and informal power that social actors leverage to attain their self-interests
(Pfeffer 1981; Folger et al. 1992). Inevitably, political perceptions will be influenced by such
cultural dimensions as dyadic power distance (Aryee, Chen and Budhwar 2004) and
relationship orientation (Varma, Pichler and Srinivas 2005) in a particular cultural context.
Therefore, it is important to understand the influence of culturally nuanced antecedents such as
upward- and downward-directed communication processes or appraiser appraisee
relationship, and compare their effects on political perceptions with the effect of relatively
culturally neutral structural antecedents such as criteria objectivity. This research aims to
explore these influences. This will be another key contribution to appraisal politics literature
because such an investigation has not been conducted in the past. This study was conducted in
the Indian family-run organizational context. This sociocultural context provides a setting
wherein the powerpolitics interplay is likely to be deeply embedded. The results will have
implications for the practice of managing the appraisal politics in the Indian cultural context.
Literature review and research gaps

The research literature on appraisal politics is fragmented with critical gaps. Therefore, to
organize literature review and hypotheses formulation, we will follow an operational model
given in Figure 1. The PA context of unmet rationality assumptions and high
instrumentality of administrative PA provides a fertile ground for the politics game played
by social actors involved. Facilitative cultural milieu, read high power distance and
paternalism, and family ownership in the organizations will only strengthen the context for
this political play. The justice literature provides the theoretical pasture for drawing the key
Cultural context
High power distance, paternalism,
relationship orientation
Family run organizations
PA Context
Unmet Rationality Assumptions Appraisal Politics
- Ambiguous, incomplete Appraiser & appraisees
performance information political manipulations
- Disagreement on criteria Pay and Promotion decisions
- Appraisers questionable
intention and capability to
do accurate appraisal
High PA Instrumentality
PA justice elements Decision recipients reactions

Procedural, Informational,
Interpersonal, & Distributive
justice elements in PA
Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

PA structural and process antecedents that can mitigate appraisal politicking and associated
perceptions.
Longenecker, Gioia and Sims (1987) described appraisal politics as constituting
appraisers manipulations of ratings. Subsequently, Longenecker and colleagues conducted a
series of interview-based studies to investigate antecedents and organizational consequences
of appraisers political behavior (Longenecker and Goff 1992; Gioia and Longenecker 1994;
Longenecker and Gioia 2000). The first serious shortcoming in these studies is the complete
absence of any reference to the appraisees political behavior while conceptualizing appraisal
politics. Second is the ambiguity about the respondents perspective. Except for the first
study by Longenecker et al. (1987), none of the other studies makes it clear whether the
respondents expressed their opinion as an appraiser or as an appraisee. A few follow-up
studies in the positivist tradition, including development of perception of appraisers
political behavior scale (Tziner, Latham, Price and Haccoun 1996) and investigation of its
antecedents (Tziner 1999; Poon 2004) were also saddled with same shortcomings.
Appraisal politics in this research refers to the manipulative actions by appraisers
and appraisees to influence ratings to achieve their self-serving PA goals. Although a few
conceptual papers have included both components in discussing appraisal politics
(e.g. Ferris and Judge 1991; Kozlowski, Chao and Morrison 1998), there has been no further
development of the concept and no empirical study in which both have been considered as
dimensions of appraisal politics. Therefore, we consider both appraisers and appraisees
PA-related political behavior as two dimensions of appraisal politics in this study.
Compared to the appraisers political behavior, the empirical literature on
appraisees/subordinates political behavior is more extensive. This literature draws from
two contiguous research streams on influence behaviors influence tactics (e.g. Kipnis et al.
1980) and impression management (e.g. Wayne and Liden 1995). There is support for impact
of upward influence behavior on PA rating (Judge and Ferris 1993; Wayne and Liden 1995;
Wayne, Liden, Graf and Ferris 1997; Dulebohn and Ferris 1999), promotions (Thacker and
Wayne 1995; Wayne et al. 1997), salary level and raise (Gould and Penley 1984; Wayne et al.
1997), and career success (Judge and Bretz 1994). PA is the process driving above decisions.
The political manipulation undermines organizational goals and performance,
compromises pay for performance plans, inhibits executive development and spreads
appraisal politicking (Gioia and Longenecker 1994; Longenecker and Gioia 2000). Therefore,
it is important to identify and study critical antecedents of appraisal politics. This research area
is neglected in both appraisers political behavior and appraisees political behavior literature.
In case of appraisers politics, the qualitative studies conducted by Longenecker and
colleagues identified important PA factors that can mitigate appraisers politics. These include
clarifying performance goals and standards, linking performance and rewards, ongoing
feedback, structuring PA exercise, seriously conducting PA at the top, sensitizing managers
about negative consequences of manipulations and training managers to conduct PA (Gioia
and Longenecker 1994; Longenecker and Gioia 2000). Further, Tziner (1999) found that
appraisers PA-related self-efficacy negatively influenced appraisees perception of
appraisers political behavior. However, there is a lack of systematic empirical investigation
of these factors. Exceptions are the studies by Taylor, Masterson, Renard, Harrison and Carroll
(1994), and Taylor, Masterson, Renard and Tracy (1998), which investigated the effects of
certain PA system elements on appraisers tendency to distort appraisal ratings. The PA
elements included voice, appeal and transparency. A few experimental studies have found that
appraisers accountability to appraisees in the form of face-to-face feedback and self-
appraisals resulted in rating inflation (Klimoski and Inks 1990), while accountability to neutral
authority resulted in more accurate ratings (Mero and Motowidlo 1995; Curtis, Harvey and
Ravden 2005). But these studies constituted student subjects, and it cannot be inferred whether
rating distortions were deliberate and hence political. In case of appraisees political behavior,
personality factors of self-monitoring (Fandt and Ferris 1990) and Machiavellianism (Pandey
1981), and situational factors of appraisees accountability to superiors (Tetlock, Skitka and
Boettger 1989), and accountabilitys interaction with ambiguity (Fandt and Ferris 1990) have
been shown to influence appraisees political behavior.
Context of the study: Indian family-run organizations

Nature of human resource management (HRM) is culture specific (Budhwar and Khatri
2001). This research investigates appraisal politics in the Indian cultural context. While at
the macro-level social, cultural, economic and political factors strongly influence Indian
HRM policies and practices (Budhwar and Sparrow 2002), at micro-level social contacts,
caste, relationships and politics strongly influence Indian HRM policies and practices
(Sparrow and Budhwar 1997). Past studies have shown that Indians in general are more
compliant and dependent on superiors, respect power, and are caste conscious and clan
oriented (Tayeb 1987; Amba-Rao, Petrcik, Jatinder and Thomas 2000). The emphasis is
on collectivism family and group affiliations take precedence over performance
(Kanungo and Mendonca 1994; Budhwar and Khatri 2001). These findings match the
characterization of Indian culture by Hofstede and Bond (1988) and Brodbeck, Chhokar
and House (2007) as high on power distance and medium on collectivism.
Further, in many Indian organizations HRM practices, including appraisals and
promotions, continue to be ad hoc and are easily manipulated by employers (Venkata Ratnam
1995; Sparrow and Budhwar 1997; Saini and Budhwar 2004). In private sector organizations
in India, decisions related to promotions, transfers and benefits are influenced by social
contacts and personalized relationships (Dutta 1997). However, recent evidence suggests that
in the past decade or so, many Indian organizations have adopted structured, progressive
and innovative HRM practices in view of economic liberalization (Agarwala 2003;
Budhwar, Luthar and Bhatnagar 2006; Som 2008; Budhwar and Bhatnagar 2009). Varma and
Budhwar (2012) reported that increasing influence of MNCs in Indian economy has resulted
in Indian businesses revising and upgrading their performance management systems. Despite
these developments, Indian organizations provide rich context where in-groups are very
important and politics play an important role in affecting pay and promotion decisions
(Gopalan and Rivera 1997). Varma et al. (2005) compared American and Indian appraisers,
and found that Indian appraisers inflated ratings of low performers more based on their affect
for appraisee. Also, Indian firms in the public and private sectors tend to communicate with
employees mainly through immediate superior rather than through any other formal channel
(Budhwar and Boyne 2004). The paternalistic nature of the culture continues to influence
PMS, . . . employees rely on their supervisors to take care of them (Varma and Budhwar
2012). Therefore, the Indian cultural context of high power distance, paternalism and
relationship orientation provides a rich context to study appraisal politics (refer Figure 1).
The Indian cultural ethos as portrayed above is nowhere more strongly evident than in the
Indian family-run organizations. In general, the extant literature on family businesses show
that, irrespective of cultural context, the family ownership and management has an influence
on the type of governance mechanisms. Owing to the allegiance of managers to the owner
family by way of blood relation or otherwise, the agency issues are far less serious compared
to non-family firms (Pollak 1985; Steier 2003). Further, the stewardship theory explains the
presence of strong commitment, emotional bond and long-term view among the owner
managers who work toward firms success (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997;
Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). The evidence is strong for relative non-existence of strict
governance and monitoring mechanisms such as formal PAs in family-owned and managed
firms, especially when managers belong to the promoter family or are close to it (Reid and
Adams 2001; De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik 2006). Loyalty to the family-mandated norms and
values at the cost of professional HRM practices become the norm of governance framework
in such firms (Chow 2004). However, as the firm grows in size and complexity, the evidence
suggests that even family-run firms adopt professional HRM practices to address issues such
as agency problem similar to those encountered by non-family-run firms (Kim and Gao
2010). Nonetheless, association and proximity to ownermanagers remain important factors
governing the superiorsubordinate interaction. The predominant relationship-based and
compliance-based interactions informed by family/promoter values influence processes and
decisions such as PA and the associated perceptions (Som 2010). In Indian business context,
family-run organization with concentrated ownership of 48% average promoter shareholding
is the dominant form of corporatization (Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav 2008).
Therefore, investigation of PA politics in family-run organizations in India provides a rich
and relevant context for the study.
Appraisal politics
Consistent with the past literature (Ferris and Judge 1991; Kozlowski et al. 1998;
Longenecker and Gioia 2000), appraisal politics in this research refers to the manipulative
actions taken by appraisers and appraisees to influence ratings to achieve their self-serving PA
goals. Therefore, we consider both appraisers and appraisees PA-related political behavior
as two dimensions of appraisal politics. Specifically, we adopt Longenecker and Gioias
definition of appraisal politics as appraisers politics, i.e. superiors deliberate manipulations
of employee ratings to enhance or protect self or department interest (2000, p. 17). It needs to
be emphasized here that appraisers use their legitimate power to appraise and reward. They
pursue following goals through PA rating: task performance goals (motivate subordinates),
interpersonal goals (maintain good relations with appraisee) and personal goals, e.g. own or
departments reputation (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). Specifically, appraisers try to avoid
confrontation with subordinates, avoid written record of poor appraisee performance, hide
poor department performance, shock appraisees to improve, favor appraisee they like or who
is powerful, and send message to appraisee to leave organization or improve (Klimoski and
Inks 1990; Gioia and Longenecker 1994). Appraisers fulfill these goals by inflating or
deflating the performance ratings while ignoring employees actual performance.
Longenecker and Gioia (2000) argued that whenever short-term ramifications of accurate
ratings are negative for appraiser, temptations to manipulate ratings to lessen negative impact
are strong.
Appraisees try to influence their supervisors for favorable assessment by using upward
influence tactics such as ingratiation, entitlements and exchange (Kipnis et al. 1980). On the
basis of the definition of political influence by Kipnis et al. (1980), appraisees political
behavior is defined as upward influence tactics employed by appraisee directed at appraiser
to obtain higher performance ratings and rewards. Past research in influence tactics and
impression management streams has found that following tactics are used more frequently in
upward direction and are relevant in appraisal context: supervisor-focused tactics (e.g.
ingratiation), job-focused tactics, exchange, upward appeal and coalitions (Schriesheim and
Hinkin 1990; Yukl and Tracey 1992; Wayne and Liden 1995). From appraisees perspective,
these tactics have a positive influence on decisions such as PA rating (e.g. Dulebohn and
Ferris 1999) and promotions (e.g. Thacker and Wayne 1995). These tactics may either
constitute overt use of expert, referent, or coercive power (French and Raven 1959) or covet
use of subtle influence such as ingratiation.
The third dimension we have conceptualized as constituting appraisal politics is pay and
promotion decisions. Within organizations, pay and promotion decisions, the outcome of PA,
are one of the most political decisions in nature (Ferris and Kacmar 1992). And because pay
and promotion decisions are mainly linked to appraisal ratings, their discriminatory nature
also constitutes appraisal politics. Here discriminatory means pay raise and promotion
decisions ignoring performance. Though appraisers rating and recommendations will have
large influence on pay and promotion decisions, sometimes appraisers ratings may not have a
close and visible relation with the final rewards. This happens when reviewer or some top
management committee changes these decisions. And these changes may be discriminatory,
driven by political motives. For example, top management tends to favor those departments
that have more clout at the top. Thus, discrimination can happen at both the appraiser level and
higher levels. Invariably such discriminatory decisions are justified on the basis of some PA or
reward policy (Kozlowski et al. 1998). One such policy that is often abused is the bell curve
norm for distribution of ratings that appraisers are required to follow for their department or
section. Often a reviewer committee may change original rating recommendations for a
department on the pretext of bringing rating distribution closer to bell curve norms. These
changes are often opaque and driven by political motives. This was borne out by the informal
discussions first author had with the respondents during the pilot studies. In such cases
appraiser may not be blamed for playing politics but policies might be blamed.
The above-discussed three dimensions are consistent with the three dimensions of
organizational politics supervisors political behavior, co-workers political behavior, and
application of pay and promotion policies (Ferris and Kacmar 1992). Appraisal politics is a
subset of organizational politics.
Appraisal politics is an amorphous concept and therefore it might be perceived differently
by different stakeholders based on their distinct goals. Therefore, this research has focused on
the perceptions of appraisal politics as perceived by appraisee. The focus is on appraisees
perceptions because being the decision recipients, they have higher instrumental stake in the
decision than appraisers, and so they experience appraisal politics more acutely.
Appraisees perception of appraisal politics (APAP) are formed based on appraiser behavior,
co-workers behavior and application of pay and promotion policies. From an appraisees
perspective, APAP is defined as perceptions about those appraiser actions (rating ignoring
performance criteria), fellow appraisees actions (upward influence behaviors to get
higher ratings/rewards) and appraisal-linked discriminatory pay and promotion decisions
(ignoring performance criteria) that are aimed at achieving appraisers and fellow
appraisees self-serving ends, and which may affect appraisees own appraisal rating/
rewards interests.
Performance in the context of PA is typically appraisees achievements on a priori set
criteria, standards and goals during the appraisal period (Folger et al. 1992). Self-serving ends
constitute appraiser goals1 such as enhancing own or departmental reputation, maintaining
good relationships, building in-groups and handling dependency threats2; and appraisees goal
of getting ratings higher or at least at par with what they think they deserve.
Antidote to APAP: due process appraisal

The political perspective provides the necessary and sufficient condition for resolving
conflicts that arise in appraisal decisions. However, the specter of unfettered exercise of
power and influence by appraisers and fellow appraisees is normatively unacceptable.
Empirically too, Longenecker and Goff (1992) found that high appraisal politics cause
dissatisfaction with the appraisals and hurt organizations performance culture.
Therefore, Folger et al. (1992) proposed a due process perspective of PA, focusing on
the objective of fair decision-making and constraining the unbridled use of power and
influence by social actors. As per this perspective, PA can be viewed as a dispute over
performance rating and allocation of rewards, a view shared with the political perspective.
Due process perspective is an extension of political view but the two diverge primarily
on the mechanisms to resolve disputes. The political view posits that power inevitably
dictates the outcomes of decisions, whereas the due process view highlights a mechanism
[legal procedures ] for imposing constraints on exercise of power (Folger et al. 1992,
p. 160), i.e. societys inclusion of legal procedures to resolve disputes (p. 139). The central
proposition of this study brings together the two perspectives and posits that in the presence
of due process elements, the political manipulations by social actors are mitigated.
Extending the due process view to appraisals, Folger et al. (1992) delineated its three
essential features in the context of PA. First, adequate notice constitutes advance publication
and explanation of PA objectives and standards; appraisees inputs into formulation of
objectives and standards; and regular and timely feedback to the appraisee. Adequate notice
implies that individuals can be held responsible for adhering to norms/laws only when these
norms are published and communicated to them. Second, fair hearing constitutes appraisers
familiarity with appraisees performance, a precondition for admissibility of their PA
evidence; consideration of appraisees viewpoint about their performance or self-appraisal;
and an opportunity for appraisee to interpret, rebut or support PA evidence. Lastly, judgment
based on evidence requires maintenance of judicial integrity through accountability; provision
of appeal; explanation and discussion of decision-making process and decisions; and valid
criteria and use of best measurement technology available (Taylor et al. 1994). There is
empirical support for favorable influence of some or all due process elements in mitigating
appraisers need to distort rating (Taylor et al. 1998), and in positively influencing appraisees
perceived system fairness, perceived accuracy and their organizational commitment
(Greenberg 1986; Folger and Konovsky 1989; Agarwala 2003). Therefore, the due process PA
elements will mitigate appraisees appraisal politics perceptions.
Due process appraisals and procedural justice explanation

The due process elements in appraisal will mitigate appraisees political perceptions by
enhancing their perception of control on appraisal decision or on different stages of process,
their understanding of decision-making process, and predictability of decision by ensuring
consistent application of performance standards and process. These psychological effects act
as antidotes to appraisees political perceptions in the appraisal context, which is often
characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty and high instrumentality for social actors involved,
features conducive to political play (Ferris and Judge 1991).
The explanation of the psychological effects of due process, i.e. control, understanding,
and predictability of appraisal decision and process, on political perceptions comes from
organizational justice theories. Politics and justice are closely related but distinct concepts,
and are negatively related (Dulebohn and Ferris 1999; Andrews and Kacmar 2001;
Aryee et al. 2004).
Various elements of due process PA form appraisees perceptions of procedural and
interactional justice (Folger et al. 1992). Thibaut and Walker (1978) proposed the
instrumental control model of procedural justice. According to the proponents of this model,
individuals seek decision and/or process control as they see this control instrumental in
obtaining outcomes they desire. Therefore, perception of control enhances procedural justice
perceptions and mitigates political perceptions. The control perceptions are formed by
processes of self-appraisal and opportunity to rebut appraisers evidence (both fair-hearing
elements), and appeal and accountability for maintaining integrity of PA process and decision
(both elements of judgment based on evidence). However, elements providing control also
have non-instrumental effects on procedural justice perceptions. As an alternative explanation
of procedural justice, Lind and Tyler (1988) posited the group value/relational model of
procedural justice. According to this view, the due process elements take value in and of
themselves, a manifestation of organizational process values, and not only because these
achieve certain outcomes. These processes indicate to appraisees that they have been treated
fairly, as implementation of the processes reaffirms appraisees status in the
group. Specifically, in the group value model, Tyler (1989) identified three criteria of
procedural fairnessneutrality of the procedures followed, interpersonal treatment, and the
visible unbiasedness and justification provided for decisions. In subsequent developments in
justice literature, the explanation for decision and process (judgment based on evidence
element) provided by decision-maker to the recipient has been defined as informational justice
(Colquitt 2001). The communication of performance standards and policies, regular feedback
and decision explanation provide appraisees information that enhances their understanding
and predictability of appraisal decision. This information and understanding reduce
appraisees need to indulge in political behavior (Dulebohn and Ferris 1999), and by building
accountability pressure on appraisers also reduces their scope of distorting rating decisions
(Taylor et al. 1998). Both factors contribute to reduction in appraisees political perceptions.
Group value model also posited that appraisees will perceive positive working relation with
those appraisers who implement due processes such as self-appraisals effectively.
Lastly, the interpersonal treatment meted out by decision-maker has been segregated in
justice literature as interpersonal justice (Bies and Moag 1986; Colquitt 2001). The adherence
to due processes and sensitive interpersonal treatment by appraiser signify to appraisee a
superior working relationship and an assurance that their appraisal will not be manipulated.
Therefore, perception of procedural or decision control, understanding and predictability
derived from fair procedures, and/or perception of social support in the form of good relations
with decision-maker will act as antidotes to APAP.
Antecedents of APAP
The elements delineated in the previous section as constituting due process appraisal along
three dimensions of adequate notice, fair hearing and judgment based on evidence have been
categorized in this study as communication processes and structural elements. Specifically,
following elements constitute upward communication opportunities or voice for apppraisee:
inputs in setting objectives, standards and goals or participative performance planning;
opportunity to question appraisers evidence or self-appraisals; and appeal against
unfavorable decisions. Voice primarily provides appraisees a perceived process and decision
control. And the elements representing communication in the downward direction to help
appraisees understand and predict their appraisals better are termed as downward
communication. It constitutes following elements: clear communication of PA policies,
objectives and standards; effective performance feedback; and communication of final PA
decision. Other due process elements such as objective and valid criteria, and appraisers
accountability to maintain judicial integrity, represent PA structural features. These structural
variables also enforce Leventhals (1980) normative rules of fair procedures consistency,
bias suppression and accuracy. In this study, these process and structural variables are
hypothesized to be the key antecedents influencing APAP.
Voice and perceptions of appraisal politics

Voice is one of the main procedural justice factors that straddles across complete PA process.
In the PA context, voice measures appraisees assessment of degree and effectiveness of
various forms of opportunities to put forth ones view point during various PA stages (Folger
et al. 1992). Past research shows that voice in different PA stages influences employee
reactions. Cawley, Keeping and Levy (1998) and Korsgaard and Roberson (1995) showed
positive effect of appraisal participation, such as participative goal-setting and self-appraisal
on appraisees reactions such as fairness and trust in management. Cooper, Dyck and Flohrich
(1992) found that participation in fair reward distribution rule development enhanced
respondents productivity more than the fair reward itself. Appeal represents Leventhals
(1980) criterion of correctability of decisions and is an essential feature of procedural justice.
Appeal provision can have a deterrent effect on appraiser, because they also foresee negative
outcomes for themselves in case of an appeal to a third party (Lewin and Peterson 1999).
Voice gives process and/or decision control, affects understanding of process and helps in
prediction of outcomes to some extent. This control also mitigates the appraisees perceptions
about influence of co-workers PA political tactics. Partial decision control also mitigates
perceptions that PA-determined rewards are manipulated. Appraisees will perceive positive
working relation with those appraisers who implement voice processes such as self-appraisals
effectively. Voice mechanisms such as self-appraisals and appeal force appraisers to build up
justification for their assessment. And when appraisers have to justify it to appraisees
themselves, it is likely to reduce appraisees APAP. Thus, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Perception of effective voice in PA process will be negatively related
with APAP.
Downward communication and perceptions of appraisal politics

Downward communication is the other key process factor present during different PA stages.
It is defined as a measure of appraisees assessment of degree and effectiveness of various
forms of communication directed toward them and which enhances their knowledge related to
various aspects of PA system and process. Downward communication processes increase
appraisees PA process/decision understanding and its predictability. If organizations clearly
lay down and communicate appraisal policies and procedures, it reduces ambiguity about the
PA process and related pay and promotion decisions. Levy and Williams (1998) found
positive effect of appraisees perceived PA system knowledge on favorable appraisee
reactions. However, it is the effective and unbiased implementation of processes, such as
feedback and decision explanation, that has a large influence on appraisees understanding and
positive perceptions (Colquitt and Chertkoff 2002; Rosen, Levy and Hall 2006). Therefore,
appraisers role assumes criticality because they are the primary implementers of these
processes. Feedback and decision explanation put accountability pressure on appraiser to
justify their judgment to appraisees (Klimoski and Inks 1990). This leads to generation of more
data-based evidence that is likely to convince appraisees that their appraisal has not been
manipulated. Further, feedback backed by performance data is likely to have higher
performance improvement value, which is associated with positive appraisee reactions
(Russell and Goode 1988).
Colquitt and Chertkoffs (2002) meta-analysis found that in case of unfavorable and
unexpected outcomes, decision explanation has a positive effect on procedural justice
perception and task motivation. Since downward communication processes enhance the
transparency and appraisees understanding of the decision process, they are less likely to
believe that co-workers influence tactics will be effective. Clarity of procedures, frequent
feedback and decision explanation procedures increase appraisees confidence that reward
decisions based on PA will not be manipulated. Effective implementation of these processes
enhances appraisees confidence that they have been treated fairly (Greenberg 1986) and it
improves their interpersonal and informational justice perceptions. Therefore it is
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2: Perception of effective downward communication in PA process will be
negatively related with APAP.
Appraisers PA accountability
Appraisers accountability for following the appraisal process is one of the structural factors
considered in this study. Appraisers should not only follow the due process administrative
procedures, but they should also implement them without deliberate bias or politics. The due
process procedures suppress political manipulations, but are not enough unless appraiser is
made accountable to an appropriate authority for applying these procedures.
Appraisers accountability is defined as appraisees belief about appraisers need to justify or
defend rating decision to a neutral authority, which has potential reward and sanctions power
affecting appraisers, and where such rewards and sanctions are perceived as contingent on
accountability conditions. (adapted from Frink and Klimoski 1998)
Past research shows that decision-makers indulge in more effortful thinking and data analysis
when they are accountable to an unbiased authority a judge whose views are unknown, who
is interested in accuracy, who is interested in procedures rather than specific outcomes, who is
reasonably well-informed and who has reward/sanction power (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).
In case of PA, such an unbiased authority could be appraisers superior who functions as
appraisal reviewer, or an appraisal review committee. In the presence of such accountability
conditions, appraisees will view the process procedurally fair and less influenced by
appraisers politics. But it is essential that appraisee perceives the authority as neutral. Such
accountability measures indirectly influence appraisees perception of control on the PA
decisions. They tend to believe that appraiser will not be able to manipulate ratings much,
otherwise he/she may not be able to defend it in front of neutral authority. Further, appraisees
are likely to believe that such an answerable appraiser will be less influenced by co-workers
political behavior. Finally, if appraisees perceive authority as neutral, they are less likely to
believe that appraisal-based reward decisions, which the authority may strongly influence,
will be politically determined. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Appraisees perception of appraisers accountability for conducting fair
PA to neutral authority will be negatively related with APAP.
Criteria relevance
The performance criteria reliability, validity and objectivity issues are not only critical for
appraisal accuracy, but also influence appraisees perceptions (Tziner and Kopelman
2002). We define a construct: criteria relevance as appraisees perception that the criteria
used to assess their performance are valid, measure critical dimensions of their job and
are objective. This is another due process structural element hypothesized to be critical
for influencing political perceptions. A belief that the assessment criteria measure critical
dimensions of the actual job performance quite closely will have a positive effect on
appraisees perceptions. For example, Huffman and Lisa (2000) showed that making
adjustments for territory difficulty increases perceptions of PA fairness and usefulness
among salespeople. Also, past research on goal-setting has proved that goal specificity or
objectivity positively influences performance (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).
A valid instrument signals to the appraisees that it is performance that is considered for
appraisal rating rather than other non-performance factors. This reduces their tendency to
influence rating using methods such as ingratiation. Similarly, it will be difficult for the
appraisers to distort ratings in such a case, because it can be questioned and rebutted by
appraisee and others. Further, appraisal-based rewards cannot be arbitrarily delinked from
well-established criteria and performance on it. Relevant criteria will increase appraisees
perceived control, understanding, and prediction of PA process and decision. A valid
instrument helps in implementing procedural fairness norms of consistency, bias suppression
and accuracy. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4: Appraisal criteria relevance will be negatively related to APAP.
Appraiser appraisee relations

Appraisees relation with appraiser is another factor that will have large influence on
appraisees PA perceptions. If the relations are perceived to be not good, then appraisee is
unlikely to believe that appraiser is going to safeguard appraisees PA interests. The appraisee
will make relational judgment on the basis of appraisers adherence to due processes, which
reaffirms to appraisee their group status, and on the basis of interpersonal treatment meted out
by appraiser, also known as interactional justice (Colquitt 2001). Empirically, it has been
found that good relation with supervisor has positive effect on subordinates fairness
perceptions (Dulebohn and Ferris 1999) and performance rating (Lefkowitz 2000). Quality of
appraiserappraisee relation is defined as appraisees perception about the quality of
working relationship they share with their appraiser, and the quality of interpersonal
treatment they get from appraiser. Leung, Su and Morris (2001) found empirically that
people who received negative feedback with good interpersonal treatment accepted the
feedback positively. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 5: Quality of appraiser appraisee relation will be negatively related with
APAP.
Control variables
Distributive Justice
The distributive justice perceptions were controlled in the study to investigate the
independent influence of procedural, structural and interpersonal variables on APAP. Equity
theory (Adams 1963; Homans 1974) forms the basis of distributive justice and is considered
to be met when recipients perception of ratio of their work-related outcomes to their work
inputs compares favorably with significant others. There is a strong evidence that favorable
outcomes produce positive reactions (Lind and Tyler 1988; Folger and Konovsky 1989).
Further, some of the demographic variables such as appraisees age, qualification and
experience were also controlled.
Method
Levy and Williams (2004) in their review categorized antecedents affecting appraiser and
appraisee behavior as proximal structural (e.g. performance dimensions or criteria, purpose)
and process variables (e.g. feedback), and distal organizational variables (e.g. organizational
culture, performance). The unit of analysis in this study is appraisal of an individual

appraisee, and it investigates key proximal appraisal process and structural antecedents
influencing appraisees perceptions about appraisers and their peers behavior. The distal
variables, predominantly organizational level, are not studied because these will be affecting
appraiser and appraisee behavior mainly through proximal variables (Levy and Williams
2004). However, to strengthen the external validity, the study broadly controlled the
organizational- and industrial-level distal factors. These controls could have been adhered to
by collecting data from one large organization, but we could not get access to one large
organization that could have fulfilled our sample-size requirements.
The data collection was restricted to the family-owned and run medium-sized private-
sector Indian organizations in manufacturing. Indian manufacturing sector has far lesser
attrition rates compared to service sector because of comparatively lesser employee
demand, which implies that appraisal instrumentality for rewards is higher and the probable
political manipulations will be more manifest in such contexts (Ferris and Judge 1991).
Also, the sectoral choice ensured some commonality across organizations in the nature of
job classes (e.g. maintenance, production, support functions), another contextual factor that
may influence APAP. Third, only Indian-owned private-sector organizations were
considered, and multinational organizations were not approached. This constraint ensured
that only organizations in the Indian cultural settings were included. Culture in multinational
subsidiaries is influenced by parent organizations work culture and policies. Further, only
those companies that were profitable in the past 3 years were approached to participate;
resource scarcity for rewards linked to appraisal may lead to more politics (Bhatnagar 1992).
Though we had tried to target a well-defined population, we conducted ANOVA on the
means of APAP and other independent variables to test for any distinct groupings in the six
organizations from where we collected data. No significantly distinct groupings were found,
implying that the six sample organizations belong to same population, and therefore we
could combine data from the six organizations for further analysis.
The data were collected using survey method and the questionnaire had 60 items. Thus
the sample size needed for analysis ranged from 240 to 600 as per the recommendations
for exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Hinkin 1995). We collected 407
data points from six organizations. The details of six organizations are given in Table 1.
The authors requested 24 organizations to participate in the project. These organizations
were selected from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy database with profiles similar to
the desired one. Of these, 11 showed interest in participating in the project. These
organizations were asked to provide information about the employee turnover and the PA
design elements. It was necessary that in the participating organizations, there is some degree
of homogeneity in existence of the formal appraisal elements (including administrative
purpose, goal-setting, self-appraisal, feedback and appeal). Though past research has found
considerable gap between a written policy and what gets implemented, participants can
respond to what is at least prescribed. We also excluded those organizations where turnover
was greater than 5% and where, in the past 3 years, any major change has been made in the
appraisal system. This procedure yielded seven organizations from where we expected to
collect requisite number of responses. The main data were collected in the six organizations
between November and February. The data collection timing ensured that the effects of last
years PA outcomes on responses were minimized. This control was necessary because
evidence exists that last appraisals outcome favorability confounds respondents perceptions
(Murali 1994).
Since individual appraisee is the unit of analysis, data collection involved appraisees
self-reports on the antecedent variables and appraisal politics perceptions. Same method has
Table 1. Participating organizations profile (all monetary figures in Rs crores).
Sales turnover Eligible PAT Promoters

Organization no. Participating units Product (2005 2006) Responses (2005 2006) shareholdingb
1. Manufacturing unit at Greater Noida DVD, CDs, etc. 1724.8 76 4.66 16.4%
2. Manufacturing unit Bangalore Steam/gas turbines 1198 70 131.5 36.25%
3. Manufacturing unit Mumbaia Precision auto components 300 63 3 NA*
4. Manufacturing unit Mumbai Tires 1747 63 0.37 43.18%
Manufacturing unit Nashik Tires 77
5. Manufacturing unit Matoda Pharmaceuticals 629 58 46 NA
a b
Not a public-listed company; promoter and promoter group.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management
1215
been adopted by many studies (e.g. Harrell-Cook, Ferris and Dulebohn 1999) testing similar
model and hypotheses in the context of organizational politics. In all, 523 questionnaires were
distributed in six participating organizations, and 407 acceptable questionnaires were used
for testing hypotheses. The target respondents were employees in the junior, middle and
senior management levels in the organizations. Typically, they had work experience of 23,
37 and .8 years, respectively. There were negligible number of female employees in these
organizations, and therefore 99% respondents were males. The average age of the
respondents was 39 years (SD 7.70) and the average experience was 15 years (SD 8). To
be eligible for the study, the respondents must have undergone a minimum two complete
cycles of PA in the current organization. This much time was considered necessary for the
employees to understand PA political dynamics in their organization.
The first author visited all the organizations and with the help of HR department
coordinator distributed the survey instrument to the eligible respondents at their work places.
To ensure random selection of respondents, the author selected alternate names from a list of
eligible respondents arranged in the order of their date of joining. The author explained the
objective of the research to the respondents individually or in groups and asked them to return
the filled up questionnaire the next day in a sealed envelope. The confidentiality was further
enhanced by keeping the disclosure of self-information in the questionnaire voluntary.
Measures
Three key variables in the study APAP, downward communication and voice were
measured as second-order factors of equally weighted components discussed in the
hypotheses. Most of the other variables were measured with scales used in the previous
studies. Few items were modified, based on preliminary face and content validation
exercise and pilot test. Moreover, new items were included for co-workers PA political
behavior and appraisers accountability. The sources of scales and their reported reliability
values are given in Table 2.
The final scales were subject to factor analysis using varimax rotation. The results are
given in Tables 3 and 4.
The scales were further subjected to CFA using structural equation modeling (SEM) as
discussed by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). The fit indices indicated moderate-to-good
fit3 for these constructs. The reliability values for all scales (refer Table 2) are greater than
minimum acceptable value of a 0.70 recommended by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994).
Common method bias

As both independent and dependent variables were reported by the same source, there is a
possibility of common method bias affecting the results. We tested for the extent of common
method variance problem by conducting the exploratory factor analysis on all items and
applying quartimax rotation. This method ensures that variables load as much as possible on
one general factor, by minimizing their loading on other factors. Thus, if the data are
afflicted with common method problem, expectation is that one general factor would emerge
with all dependent and independent variable items loading on that factor (Nunnally and
Bernstein 1994). But this did not happen because we got nine distinct factors (we assumed a
factor as distinct if loading of all items was .0.5), including one general factor. Importantly,
the three dimensions of APAP loaded on three distinct factors, and none on the general
factor. The general factor consisted of voice (excluding appeal), downward communication,
appraisal accountability and criteria relevance, all due process elements. Thus, we were
confident that common method does not have large effect on the data.
Table 2. Questionnaire item sources and its properties.
Variable Items Cronbach a Source
APAP
Appraisers politics 6 ; 0.80 Adapted from Poon (2004) and Tziner et al. (1996)
Co-workers use of PBs 4 New scale
Pay and promotion politics 4 0.87 0.91 Kacmar and Ferris (1991), four adapted.
Downward communication
Communication/clarity 8 0.89 William and Levy (1992) adapted
of PA policies, stds., etc.
Effective feedback 24 New, 0.65 Two new for frequency adapted from Dobbins, Cardy and Platz-Vieno (1990);
4 for improvement value from Russell and Goode (1988).
Communication of decision 6 Colquitt (2001) 3, 2 from Dulebohn and Ferris (1999) and 1 new.
Voice
Participative planning 5 New scale Greller (1978) adapted.
Self-appraisals 3 New scale Greller (1978) adapted.
Fair appeal system 5 New scale
Criterion relevance 33 0.83 Three items for validity Taylor et al. (1998) and 3 for objectivity Snell (1992) adapted.
Appraisers accountability 3 0.91 Frink and Ferris (1998) adapted 2 and 1 new
Appraiser appraisee relation 4 0.94 Adapted from Colquitt (2001) interactional justice scale, and Wayne and Ferris (1990),
quality of sup relationship scales
Distributive Justice 4 0.93 Colquitt 2001
1217
Table 3. Results of factor analysis of antecedent.
1218
Factor
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Downward communication
Communication/clarity of PA policies and standards
I understand the performance appraisal system being used in my organization 0.76
My appraiser and I agree on the criteria used for my performance appraisal 0.72
I understand the objectives of the present performance appraisal system 0.81
I have good understanding of how the performance appraisal system works 0.79
I understand how my last performance appraisal rating was determined 0.69
I know the criteria used by my appraiser to evaluate my performance 0.70
I understand the standards of performance my appraiser expects 0.68
My organization clearly communicates to me the objectives of the performance appraisal system 0.63
Effective feedback
My performance was frequently reviewed during the appraisal period 0.64
I was given performance feedback regularly during the appraisal period 0.67
Performance feedback focuses on how I can improve my performance 0.76
My last performance feedback increased my understanding of the job 0.71
My last performance feedback gave me a good idea of how well I am doing in my job 0.70
I think performance feedback helped me learn to do a better job 0.65
PA decision explanation
My appraiser gave me adequate explanation about the appraisal (rating) decision 0.70
My appraiser was open/sincere in communicating appraisal (rating) decision to me 0.74
My appraiser thoroughly explained the procedures used to arrive at appraisal 0.70
A. Dhiman and S.K. Maheshwari
(rating) decision to me
My appraiser listened to the reasons I gave for the performance 0.68
My appraiser gave me opportunity to ask questions 0.67
about appraisal (rating) decision
The explanations regarding the appraisal (rating) decision were reasonable 0.59
Voice
Self-appraisals
I had detailed discussion with my appraiser on my self-appraisal 0.68
My appraiser seriously considered my self-appraisal 0.73
My self-appraisal influenced the final rating I received 0.66
Participative performance planning
My appraiser asked for my inputs on setting performance targets 0.77
My inputs influenced my performance targets 0.76
I had detailed discussion with my appraiser on setting of my performance targets 0.71
Fair appeal system
There exist avenues to appeal against appraisal (rating) decision 0.77
I can make an appeal about the appraisal decision 0.81
Appeals against appraisal decision are seriously considered 0.86
Appeals against appraisal decision are handled fairly 0.82
There are no negative consequences for appraisee of making an appeal 0.63
Criteria relevance
The criteria used to appraise my performance closely measures what I do on my job 0.56
The criteria used to appraise my performance measures things which are important for my job 0.56
The criteria used to appraise my performance comprehensively measures what I do on my job 0.55
In my job, performance standards are objective 0.78
In my job, objective criteria exists to appraise my performance 0.76
In my job, appraisal criteria are quantifiable 0.68
Appraiserappraisee relation
My appraiser treats me with kindness and consideration 0.75
My appraiser and I enjoy working together 0.85
I get along well with my appraiser 0.88
I have good working relationship with my appraiser 0.87
I trust my appraiser 0.73
Appraisers accountability
My appraiser is answerable to superiors for following appraisal procedures diligently 0.77
My appraiser is required to justify appraisal recommendations to superiors 0.77
Any lapses in conducting appraisals is seriously viewed by superiors 0.74
Here top management treats performance appraisals seriously 0.65
Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalisation.
Rotation converged in seven iterations.
1219
Table 4. Results of factor analysis of APAP components.
Factor
Item 1 2 3
Perception of appraisal politics
Appraiser politics
To pay back personal favors done by appraisees, 0.77
my appraiser gives higher appraisal ratings
Appraiser-appraisee personal relationship 0.74
determines appraisal rating
To teach rebellious/ disobedient appraisee a lesson, 0.65
my appraiser gives low appraisal ratings
My appraiser avoids giving low appraisal ratings to those 0.71
who have good relations with top management
My appraiser gives higher appraisal ratings to those 0.64
appraisees who are difficult to replace if they leave organization
Pay and promotion politics
In my organization reward (pay and promotion) policies are 0.41 0.30 0.56
politically applied
In my organization rewards come to hard workersw 0.85
In my organization rewards go to top performersw 0.85
Co-worker politics
My colleagues often use their relations with top management 0.71 0.32
(higher than their appraiser) to gain higher rewards/ratings.
My colleagues often bargain benefits (e.g. an expert promising 0.68
to stay back if given higher ratings) with appraisers to gain
higher rewards/ ratings
My colleagues often take others support (e.g. colleagues, union) 0.73
for their claims of higher rewards/ ratings
My colleagues often try to make impressions on appraiser 0.83
(e.g. flattery, blindly agreeing to their opinions) to gain
higher rewards/ratings
My colleagues often try to get close to appraiser to gain 0.85
higher rewards/ratings
My colleagues often try to project themselves as good performers 0.76
(e.g. claiming disproportionate contribution) to gain higher rewards/ratings
Analysis
Zero-order correlation provided preliminary support to the hypotheses by revealing strength
and direction of the bivariate relations. The main hypotheses testing involved two-stage
multivariate analysis (MVA) multiple and hierarchical regression. Latter was used because
possible hierarchical causal order among the independent variables might hide direct effects
in the multivariate regression. The hierarchical model was tested for data fit using SEM.
Amos Basic, version 7.0, was used for testing the SEM model. The SEM analyses revealed
interesting results apart from validating hierarchical regression-based hypotheses.
Results
The means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability values are given in Table 5.
The bivariate correlation values reveal that most of the relations are significant at p , 0.05.
The signs are also in the expected direction. Therefore, all hypotheses are supported on the
basis of the bivariate correlation results. We also found that across six organizations, the signs
of bivariate results were consistent. However, the controlled demographic variables age,
qualification, level and experience did not show significant bivariate effects and were
Table 5. Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Standard deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Appraisee age 260 38.08 7.7
Appraisee qualification 257 2.87 0.69 20.09
Appraisee level 245 2 0.59 0.31** 0.20**
Appraisees total experience 262 15.3 7.66 0.94** 2 0.15* 0.31**
Appraisers PA politics 406 3.27 1.33 20.14* 0.001 2 0.17* 2 0.09 0.89
Pay/promotion politics 404 3.56 1.36 20.14* 0.04 2 0.06 2 0.13* 0.47** 0.75
Co-worker politics 407 3.7 1.37 20.11 0.08 2 0.04 2 0.08 0.60** 0.49** 0.9
Appraisal politics perceptions 407 3.51 1.12 20.16** 0.05 2 0.11 2 0.12 0.83** 0.79** 0.85** 0.92
Downward communication 407 4.52 1.28 0.16* 0.01 0.12 0.12 2 0.50** 2 0.53** 2 0.44** 2 0.59** 0.92
Voice 400 3.84 1.18 0.12* 2 0.08 0.04 0.09 2 0.33** 2 0.43** 2 0.32** 2 0.44** 0.67** 0.91
Criteria relevance 399 4.75 1.19 0.15* 0 0.11 0.14* 2 0.39** 2 0.49** 2 0.42** 2 0.53** 0.67** 0.52** 0.9
Distributive justice 397 4.24 1.66 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.04 2 0.36** 2 0.57** 2 0.39** 2 0.54** 0.63** 0.53** 0.52** 0.95
Appraiser appraisee relations 397 5.23 1.23 0.08 0 0.12 0.09 2 0.44** 2 0.40** 2 0.34** 2 0.47** 0.53** 0.35** 0.53** 0.44** 0.93
Appraiser accountability 397 4.72 1.27 0.18** 0.02 0.11 0.15* 2 0.41** 2 0.48** 2 0.36** 2 0.50** 0.65** 0.51** 0.59** 0.54** 0.54** 0.89
Note: Cronbach alpha along the diagonal.

**p , 0.01 (two-tailed); *p , 0.05 (two-tailed).
1221
Table 6. Regression of APAP on antecedents.
Antecedents B(t)
(Constant) (30.78)
Voice 2 0.002 (0.04)
Downward communication 2 0.27**(24.2)
Appraiser accountability 2 0.09* (2 1.68)
Criteria relevance 2 0.12** (2 2.27)
Appraiser appraisee relations 2 0.092** (2 2.04)
Distributive justice 2 0.20 **(2 3.96)
Note: n 407.
**p , 0.05; *p , 0.10.
inconsistent in signs across six organizations. These results for demographics are similar to
what was reported by Kacmar and Baron (1999) for perceptions of organizational politics in a
meta-analysis. The demographic variables were ignored in the MVA because of weak and
inconsistent effects and missing data (average reported data 65%). However, distributive
justice variable was included in the regression analysis to control for the influence of outcome
equity perceptions of earlier appraisals. The results of multivariate regression are presented in
Table 6.
The regression model explained moderate level of variance in APAP with R 2adj 0.417
(F 49.4, p , 0.001). Following variables showed strong effect size at p , 0.05: downward
communication, criteria relevance, appraiserappraisee relations and control variable
distributive justice. Appraisal accountability was significant at p , 0.10. Therefore, all
hypotheses were strongly or partially supported, except for voice hypothesis.
Post hoc analysis: hierarchical order among variable categories

Multiple regression analysis did not support hypotheses for voice and appraisal accountability
at p , 0.05, compared to what was revealed by the bivariate correlations. Since antecedents
belong to distinct categories structural, process and interpersonal a possible hierarchical
causal order among the antecedents may hide their direct effects. The PA process model by
Landy and Farr (1980) indicates the possible hierarchical order as follows: PA structural
variables, PA process variables and interpersonal relation variables.
The PA structural variables will influence the effective implementation of PA processes
and appraisers behavior. For example, appraiser can give objective and useful feedback only
when the criteria are relevant. Further, effects of PA communication processes will be
perceived through the lens of appraisees relations with appraiser, because appraiser is the
main driver of these processes. So appraiserappraisee relations come last in the hierarchical
order. It is not that the reciprocal effects will not exist, but the likelihood is lesser logically.
This ordering can also be viewed as a series of multiple-mediation relations because of the
explanatory power of the mediators of the antecedentsAPAP relations.
Hierarchical regression unraveled the possible direct effects hidden because of the
hierarchical order. The variables were entered in the following order: control variable
distributive justice, PA structural variables accountability and criteria relevance, PA
process variables downward communication and voice, and interpersonal relations
variable. The results for b, DR 2, and test of its significance for four models, are presented
in Table 7.
The results show strong support for the hierarchical order because DR 2 is significant for
all additions of categories. Also, in all the models all added variables are significant at
Table 7. Hierarchical regression results for antecedents APAP.
Models
Antecedents 1 2 3 4
Distributive justice 20.52** 2 0.29** 2 0.21** 20.20**
Appraisers accountability 2 0.20** 2 0.12** 20.09*
Criteria relevance 2 0.25** 2 0.15** 20.12**
Downward communication 2 0.29** 20.27**
Voice 2 0.01 20.002
Appraiser appraisee relations 20.12**
DR 2 0.28 0.102 0.031 0.007
(Significance of DF) 0 0 0 0.015
Note: n 407.
**p , 0.05; *p , 0.10.
p , 0.05 except for voice in Model 3. Therefore, hierarchical regression shows strong
support for Hypotheses 25, but not for Hypothesis 1 related to voice.
Multiple mediation and SEM tests

Though hierarchical regression provided the test of hypotheses, we tested the hierarchical
order for its statistical robustness by using mediation tests and SEM. It was conducted not
only to validate the hierarchical regression-based hypotheses testing, but also to unravel
interesting mediating relations. We expected that appraiserappraisee relationship will
partially mediate relation between communication process variables and APAP. According
to group value/relation model of procedural justice, non-instrumental influence of
communication processes on fairness perceptions is through the lens of appraisees
relationship with appraiser (Lind and Tyler 1988). Then we also expected that process
variables will partially mediate effect of criteria relevance on APAP (Landy and Farr 1980).
When the criteria are objective and relevant, it makes processes such as feedback and self-
appraisal more effective. Also, appraisers will be perceived more accountable if they have to
implement communication processes and there exist appeal mechanisms. However, we did
not expect the influence of structural factors on APAP to be mediated by appraiserappraisee
relations. These factors are more policy and job related, and will not influence appraisees
perception about relations. Based on the above discussion, following model was tested for
multiple-mediation relations4 (Figure 2).
The results of mediation tests are given in Table 8.
The downward communication mediated the effect of voice on APAP and only
partially mediated the effect of criteria relevance and appraisers accountability on APAP.
There was no mediation of process variables effect by appraiser appraisee relation.
Though we presumed that the hierarchical order is correct, this assumption was further
checked for data fit by using SEM. The first SEM model included all significant direct
relations of antecedents and APAP found in the hierarchical regression and the mediation
relations mentioned significant in Table 8. The first SEM model was modified for relations
with modification index . 4 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black 1998). The final model
(Figure 3) including only the significant relations ( p , 0.05) was tested.
The fit statistics for final model, x 2/DOF 2.06 (cut off 3), AGFI 0.76
(cut off 0.90), RMSEA 0.05 (cut off 0.05), indicate a moderate fit. Therefore, the
inferences based on the model are reasonably robust. SEM results reveal that significant
STRUCTURAL PROCESS INTERPERSONAL

FACTORS FACTORS FACTOR
Criteria
relevance Downward
communication
Appraiser-
appraisee
APAP
relations
Voice
Appraisers
accountability
Figure 2. Post hoc analysis: expected mediation relations.
predictors of APAP include downward communication and appraiserappraisee relations.

From the appraisees perspective, the two are more appraiser driven. Criteria relevance and
appraisers accountability, the other two significant antecedents in the multivariate regression,
did not emerge significant ( p , 0.05). SEM also supported the mediation relations found in
the mediation tests.
Discussion
Appraisers criticality in influencing perceptions
Multivariate regression revealed that the following antecedents influenced APAP
significantly: appraiserappraisee relations (b 20.12, p , 0.05), downward communi-
cation (b 20.27, p , 0.01), criteria relevance (b 20.12, p , 0.05) and appraisers
accountability (b 20.09, p , 0.1). The results show that the PA communication process
variables such as downward communication, structural variables such as criteria relevance
and accountability and interpersonal variables, all have significant direct influence on APAP.
These belong to different variable categories supporting the basic premise that PA structural,
process and interpersonal factors influence political perceptions. However, SEM test
revealed that only appraiser-centric antecedents downward communication and appraiser
appraisee relations have a significant direct influence on APAP. The other appraiser-centric
process, voice, had insignificant relation with APAP.
A closer look at the components of downward communication reveals that these
processes are spread over different stages of the appraisal cycle. Communication/clarity of
PA policies may be spread over the complete cycle; feedback is intermittently spread over
the cycle, more so near the end; and PA decision explanation happens toward the end. This
spread across the PA cycle is critical in reinforcing the appraisees perceptions. Appraiser
drives the downward communication processes, especially the latter two. Therefore,
appraisee is likely to believe that the appraiser who delivers useful feedback and justifies and
explains appraisal decision and process will not manipulate rating much. It also gives
appraisees an opportunity to highlight their achievements. Regular feedback brings the
Table 8. Results of multiple mediation tests for antecedents APAP relations.
Control variables Predictor Mediator(s) Results
Voice Downward communication Appraiser appraisee relation No mediation
Downward communication Voice Appraiser appraisee relation No mediation
Criteria relevance Voice Downward communication Only downward communication mediates
Appraiser accountability Appraiser appraisee relation
Criteria relevance Voice Appraiser accountability Downward communication Partial mediation only
Appraiser accountability Voice Criteria relevance Downward communication Partial mediation only
1225
STRUCTURAL PROCESS INTERPERSONAL

FACTORS FACTORS FACTORS
0.06
Criteria Downward
relevance 0.09 communication
0.49**
0.06
Appraisers Appraiser-
APAP
accountability appraisee
0.8** relations
0.17**
Voice
0.13*
Figure 3. Final antecedents APAP structural equation model.

Note: **p , 0.01; *p , 0.1.
appraisers viewpoint about individual appraisees performance in the open early in the
process, which appraiser may find difficult to drastically change later on at the time of
appraisal (Klimoski and Inks 1990). Thus regular feedback not only helps appraisee
understand his/her performance issues, do course-correction and predict their appraisal, but it
also curbs appraisers tendency to manipulate ratings (Taylor et al. 1994). Decision
explanation also enhances appraisees understanding of the decision and the process. It also
brings accountability pressure on appraiser to justify the decision to appraisee (Curtis et al.
2005). Thus these factors enhance appraisees perceptions of control, understanding and
predictability of PA decision. These results corroborate the informational justice explanation
(Greenberg 1986; Colquitt 2001), and the instrumental control model explanation of
procedural justice (Thibaut and Walker 1978). The results also imply that information and
understanding lends semblance of indirect power to appraisee to question appraisers actions
and curb appraisers unfettered self-interested pursuit of political goals.
Appraisees perceive the appraisal process through the lens of their relationship with
appraiser. If the appraisee perceives good relations with the appraiser, then the appraisee is
unlikely to believe that the appraiser will manipulate ratings to hurt appraisees interests.
Further, in such cases appraisees are less likely to believe that co-workers influence tactics
will hurt their interest. Informal discussions with respondents revealed that frequent work-
related interactions with their appraisers improved working relations. Therefore, good
appraiserappraisee relations may bring about more transparency and vice versa, possibly
mitigating appraisees political perceptions. This is in line with the findings of interpersonal
justice model that fairness evaluations are determined more by the relational quality with
authority figure than the outcomes (Tyler 1994; Dulebohn and Ferris 1999). From politics
power perspective, good relation always conveys a sense of influence power appraisees can
have on their appraiser, and which gives them an advantage over their peers.
Surprisingly in SEM analysis, appraiser appraisee relations did not mediate

communication variables effect (Figure 2). The non-mediation, though not supporting the
group-value explanation of procedural justice, may be explained by very strong direct effects
of downward communication. The result may be in line with the non-instrumental effects of
such communication processes, where these procedures assume a value in and of themselves,
so much so that their influence on fairness perceptions is independent of interpersonal
relations. Thus the significant effects of downward communication and appraiserappraisee
relation, variables closely related to appraisers actions, are explained, respectively, by the
informational and the interpersonal justice models (Bies and Moag 1986; Colquitt 2001).
According to these models, relationship with groups authority figure and considerate
treatment meted out to appraisee at work place, and the justification of decisions derived from
explanation enhance the fairness perceptions. Therefore, this study demonstrates the key role
appraiser plays in influencing appraisees perceptions.
The significance of appraiser-centric variables in influencing political perceptions might
be unique to the Indian cultural context in which the study was carried out. The paternalistic
orientation of Indian managers, employees expectation of nurturant managerial behavior, and
the importance of relations in decisions such as PA in Indian context have been well
established in the extant literature (Sinha 1984; Gopalan and Rivera 1997; Varma et al. 2005;
Brodbeck et al. 2007; Varma and Budhwar 2012). Moreover, this research was conducted in
the Indian family-run organizations. The role of appraisers and the significance of personal
relationships and loyalty in HR decisions such as appraisals assume more importance in
family-run businesses in India (Som 2010).
Cultural compatibility of PA practices: mediation of voice by downward communication

The MVA, multiple-mediation analysis and SEM analysis revealed that the voice processes
did not have significant direct influence on APAP, but an indirect influence through
downward communication processes. Past research in different cultural contexts has revealed
significant influence of voice on employees PA-related perceptions such as justice
(Greenberg 1986; Korsgaard and Roberson 1995). We argue that the contrasting result in the
current study might be a reflection of the cultural idiosyncrasy. Indian work culture is
paternalistic, hierarchical and is characterized by high power distance (Amba-Rao et al. 2000;
Brodbeck et al. 2007). Though in recent years Indian organizations have adopted progressive
HRM policies (Agarwala 2003; Budhwar et al. 2006; Som 2008; Budhwar and Bhatnagar
2009), they may not be ready yet to completely forsake the ad hoc and relationship-driven
approach toward HRM, which has characterized them for long (Venkata Ratnam 1995;
Sparrow and Budhwar 1997). Therefore, Indian work ethos may discourage voice, especially
processes such as self-appraisals and appeal, which may result in direct superiorsubordinate
confrontation. A situation of conflict might be concomitant to these processes in the form of
appraisee questioning the appraisers judgment. This conflict is functional and desirable, but
in high power distance and relationship-oriented cultures such as India, appraisees might be
wary of even such conflict, lest it leads to serious repercussions for their career. Moreover it
might particularly be true of Indian family-run businesses where extant literature shows that
loyalty and compliance are the valued traits (Som 2010).
However, the paternalistic work ethos may encourage processes such as downward
communication, because these project superior as a guide, a coach, who is keen to handhold
and support their subordinates. This also follows from the characterization and evidence in
support of predominant nurturant task leadership style of Indian managers in managing their
subordinates (Sinha 1984). Therefore, implementation of downward communication
processes such as feedback and decision explanation by appraiser may mitigate appraisees
perceptions that they are being discriminated in the appraisal. Varma et al. (2005)
demonstrated that superiorsubordinate relations play a greater role in the appraisal decision
in the Indian context compared to the American context. Further, mediation of voice effect by
downward communication implies that appraisees may not like to enter into a conflict or
argument with the appraiser, unless they perceive their appraisers as kind and helping. It was
found during informal discussion with the respondents in this study that appraisees raise their
appeal/complaint only with their appraiser, and that too when they perceive the appraiser
approachable and considerate. This behavior will be accentuated in Indian family-run
businesses where compliance may be more valued than conflict (Som 2010). This suggests
that the cultural contingences may make certain practices more relevant than the others.
Alternatively, the result can also be explained by the two models: procedural justice
control model (Thibaut and Walker 1978) and group value model (Lind and Tyler 1988).
Tyler (1989) demonstrated that in case of milder disputes such as appraisals, the group
value/relational model of procedural justice better explained the decision recipients justice
evaluations than the instrumental control model. Voice represents processes which provide
more decision control, and downward communication influences appraisees perceptions of
their relation with appraiser and their group status. Though this is another plausible
explanation, the SEM analysis in the study did not show any enhancement of appraiser
appraisee relationship because of downward communication. Therefore, these alternative
arguments need to be tested in future research in different cultural contexts and decision
situations.
Criticality of PA processes vis-a-vis structure

The study revealed that downward communication emerged as the most influential variable.
It also partially mediated the influence of criteria relevance and appraisers accountability,
the PA structural variables. These results demonstrate the criticality of PA processes vis-a-vis
structure. The effective implementation of communication processes translates a well-
designed PA system into a successful and acceptable system. These processes are primarily
implemented by appraiser. Factor analysis on APAP items revealed that the appraiser-centric
factors, i.e. appraisers PA politics and co-workers politics directed at appraiser, explain
almost 53% of variance, and pay and promotion politics factor explain only 9% of variance.
Therefore, the political perceptions are formed more by appraiser-centric politicking and less
by discriminatory reward outcomes and associated policies factor. The higher weight of
appraiser-centric factors in forming perceptions might be unique to Indian cultural ethos of
relational orientation and high power distance. Thus the larger influence of appraiser-driven
processes on APAP is understandable in this study. Giles and Mossholder (1990) also
found that satisfaction from appraiser-controlled review session is related more to the
supervisor-controlled process factors goal-setting, participation and criticism than to
the structural factors.
Again, since appraiser is the key implementer of these processes, in contexts such as
India, these results may be more valid. A process that ensures interpersonal and informational
fairness is more critical in shaping appraisees perceptions than the structural accountability
of appraiser.
Implications for theory and practice

Past research called for studying PA decision and process from the political perspective
(e.g. Ferris and Judge 1991; Folger et al. 1992; Levy and Williams 2004). Folger et al. (1992)
argued that political perspective provides a more realistic framework to study appraisal
decision compared to test or rational perspective. This is because of the unrealistic
assumptions underlying the rational perspective. Due to the inherent ambiguity,
accountability and high instrumentality in appraisal decision (Ferris and Judge 1991), the
social actors indulge in political play to safeguard their self-interest.
However, unfettered exercise of power and politics is damaging for performance
culture and performers (Longenecker and Gioia 1992). Folger et al. (1992) argued that the
power play and politics need to be curbed and proposed due process perspective, which
can constraint the political behavior. Current research combines the political and due
process perspectives. The studies carried out by Taylor et al. (1994), and Taylor et al.
(1998) are the only studies that take this integrated view in appraisal context. They found
that due process PA mitigates appraisers tendency to distort rating.
This research expands the concept of appraisal politics and provides a preliminary-level
scale for measuring it. To reiterate, extant research has studied appraisers rating
manipulation or appraisers politics (e.g. Longenecker 1989) independently of appraisees
upward influence tactics or impression management attempts to get higher ratings and
rewards (e.g. Judge and Bretz 1994). There has been a mention of the need to integrate the two
streams (e.g. Ferris and Judge 1991), and this study makes an attempt at it.
Although much of the political manipulation in appraisal is directly in control of
appraisers, their actions are influenced by subordinates as well as their superiors and fellow
managers in other departments. Thus three dimensions used to measure APAP are interrelated,
but these can also work independently. The appraiser may be interested in using appraisal
politically, although subordinates may not indulge in the influence tactics themselves and vice
versa. Similarly, pay and promotion decisions in the organization may be discriminatory, but
the appraiser may not be. For example, top managements favor for certain levels or
departments is a situation not in control of an appraiser. However, appraisers PA decisions
influence the pay and promotion decisions the most. The three dimensional conceptualization
is in line with the developments in the organizational politics literature (Ferris, Russ and Fandt
1989; Kacmar and Baron 1999).
Appraisal politics perceptions differ according to different perspectives (Longenecker
and Gioia 1992), and current research studies it from the appraisees perspective. Past research
has largely ignored the appraisees perspective, though being the decision and reward
recipients their perceptions are critical. This study identifies important appraisal process, and
structural and interpersonal antecedents that mitigate appraisees appraisal politics
perceptions. This is another gap in the appraisal politics literature that this study tries to fulfill.
This research also brings closer the politics and organizational justice literature in the
context of PAs, advancing the extant work in this direction (e.g. Dulebohn and Ferris 1999;
Aryee et al. 2004). The results suggest that procedural, interpersonal and informational justice
elements in appraisal system are all important in shaping appraisees political perceptions.
However, the study suggests that the interpersonal fairness elements including relationship
with authority figure, and informational fairness elements involving downward communi-
cation such as feedback and justification are more critical in shaping perceptions than
procedural control elements such as appraisers accountability and voice.
The significance of appraiser-related variables in influencing perceptions may reflect the
Indian cultural idiosyncrasy. The high power distance and relationship-driven decision
processes unique to Indian cultural setting might make the role of decision-maker more
prominent than other cultures where these influences are weaker. The surprising results for
voice vis-a-vis downward communication might also be a result unique to Indian managers
unique nurturant task-oriented leadership style. These results might have been accentuated in
the family business context. These results are important contributions of this study and need to
be tested in comparative cultural contexts and decision situations.
From practitioners perspective, this study demonstrates that communication process
variables are important for the success of appraisal system. The influence of structural
elements is mediated by downward communication process elements. Therefore, for the
success of any appraisal system, it is imperative that these processes are implemented
properly. The research also demonstrates the criticality of the appraiser vis-a-vis appraisal
system design or structure in influencing appraisees perceptions. Therefore, organizations
need to train appraisers in processes such as feedback, and provide them supportive
environment for implementation of these processes. In cross-cultural context, managers need
to be aware of cultural idiosyncrasies before implementing any best practice. Specifically in
the Indian context, superiorsubordinate relationships assume high importance, and power
distance may influence differently the effectiveness of certain processes such as voice and
downward communication.
Limitations and future directions

There are certain limitations of the current study which need to be addressed in future
investigations. APAP scale is a new scale and it needs to be retested to establish its
statistical properties further. However, the scale showed robust statistical properties in the
pilot and main studies. Then there is a possibility of common method influencing the results,
because same respondents filled the questionnaire for the independent and the dependent
variables at the same time. However, we ruled out its effect as explained in the method section.
Then social desirability might have influenced responses to some extent, especially in case of
sensitive items such as appraisers own political behavior. In future studies these aspects can
be improved upon. Further, in future studies the data could be collected from one large
organization only rather than from multiple organizations. This may help in controlling many
extraneous factors in the context, though in this study we successfully ensured that the data
from six organizations represent the same population. This study investigated political
perceptions only from the appraisees perspective, but the appraisers are also important
stakeholders in the appraisal process. Therefore, there is a need to conduct similar study from
the appraisers perspective as well.
Conclusion
Overall the research has contributed to the understanding and development of the concept of
appraisal politics. It has also contributed a scale to measure APAP, which needs to be further
validated. The research revealed the importance of appraisers in implementing the appraisal
processes. These processes emerged as more significant predictors of perceptions compared
to the structural variables. Comparison of means for structural and process variables shows
that respondents reported significantly lower values for latter. Thus, organizations need to
focus on processes such as downward communication and train appraisers for these
processes. However, they also need to ensure that appraisees can see clear relation between
appraisal and rewards, otherwise appraisals will continue to be neglected by the managers.
Further, research proved that the human resource practices are contextual, and researchers
and practitioners need to take cultural factors into account while studying and designing these
systems. This research also combined two perspectives on PA political and justice, as
suggested by Folger et al. (1992). Only Taylor et al. (1998) had taken this integrated view in
the appraisal context. Lastly, SEM test supported the unexplored part of the appraisal process
model by Landy and Farr (1980).
Notes
1. These goals are inferred from the analysis of 25 items in the appraisers political consideration
in PA scale developed by Tziner et al. (1996).
2. Appraisers are dependent on their appraisees for their own outcomes, e.g. departments task
performance, appraisers own rewards, etc. These dependencies arise because of many reasons
such as appraisees rare work expertise, appraisees political connections, etc. Such appraisees
exploit this dependence to get concessions from appraisers in the form of higher ratings, e.g.
expert threatening to leave if not given higher salary, etc. Appraisers comply with appraisees
demands to safeguard their own interest. They face such situation when appraisees use hard
tactics upward appeal, exchange and coalition.
3. Cut off values are chi square/dof 3.0; AGFI. 0.90; CFI.0.95; RMSEA, 0.60 (Hair et al.
1998).
4. The multiple mediation tests were conducted using Preacher and Hayes (2006) macro. The tests
were multiple-mediation tests because we could test whether the process variables voice and
downward communication jointly mediated the influence of structural variable criteria
relevance after controlling for other structural variable appraiser accountability. Thus,
spurious mediation effects were controlled.
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The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 2013

Vol. 24, No. 6, 12021235, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2012.706816

Performance appraisal politics from appraisee perspective:

Rational versus political view of performance appraisal

*Corresponding author. Email: amitdhiman@iimcal.ac.in

q 2013 Taylor & Francis

Literature review and research gaps

PA justice elements Decision recipients reactions

Figure 1. Theoretical framework.

Context of the study: Indian family-run organizations

Antidote to APAP: due process appraisal

Due process appraisals and procedural justice explanation

Voice and perceptions of appraisal politics

Downward communication and perceptions of appraisal politics

Appraiser appraisee relations

culture, performance). The unit of analysis in this study is appraisal of an individual

Sales turnover Eligible PAT Promoters

Common method bias

Table 4. Results of factor analysis of APAP components.

Note: Cronbach alpha along the diagonal.

Table 6. Regression of APAP on antecedents.

Post hoc analysis: hierarchical order among variable categories

Table 7. Hierarchical regression results for antecedents APAP.

Multiple mediation and SEM tests

STRUCTURAL PROCESS INTERPERSONAL

Figure 2. Post hoc analysis: expected mediation relations.

predictors of APAP include downward communication and appraiserappraisee relations.

STRUCTURAL PROCESS INTERPERSONAL

Figure 3. Final antecedents APAP structural equation model.

Surprisingly in SEM analysis, appraiser appraisee relations did not mediate

Cultural compatibility of PA practices: mediation of voice by downward communication

Criticality of PA processes vis-a-vis structure

Implications for theory and practice

Limitations and future directions

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