Journal of Organizational Change Management

From threat-rigidity to flexibility - Toward a learning model of autogenic crisis in

organizations
Carole K. Barnett, Michael G. Pratt,
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JOCM
13,1
74
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Journal of Organizational Change
Management, Vol. 13 No. 1, 2000,
pp. 74-88. # MCB University
Press, 0953-4814
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
http://www.emerald-library.com
From threat-rigidity to
flexibility
Toward a learning model of autogenic
crisis in organizations
Carole K. Barnett
University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire, USA and
Michael G. Pratt
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
Keywords Crises, Flexibility, Organizational change, Organizational learning
Abstract Complementing prior research by Staw et al. (``Threat-rigidity effects in
organizational behavior: a multilevel analysis'', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 26
No. 4, 1981, pp. 501-24), the authors develop a new conceptual model of organizational change,
``autogenic crisis''. The authors' update of Staw et al.'s threat-rigidity model shows that top
managers may initiate strategic ``pre-adaptations'' to future crises, thereby using latent threat to
generate organizational flexibility, learning, renewal and, possibly, longer life.
Probably the great majority of organizations have the potential to work themselves into crises
and the processes which produce crises are substantially identical with the processes which
produce successes (Hedberg et al., 1976, cited in Starbuck et al., 1978, p. 114).
Crises often drive organizational change and there is mounting evidence that
some companies use them as a preemptive strategy (see Dumaine, 1993; Fink et
al., 1971; Huber and Glick, 1993; Hurst, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Huey, 1993;
Mitroff et al., 1992; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Pitta, 1993; Starbuck et al.,
1978; Tichy and Charan, 1995). This paper examines an unusual type of
organizational crisis, one that is strategically but prematurely initiated by top
management and which we have labeled ``autogenic crisis'' (following Drazin
and Sandelands, 1992). During this type of socially engineered exigency, top
leaders consciously and deliberately instigate organizational change by
alerting and alarming members about future (i.e. ``latent'') radical
environmental threats which have the potential to undermine organizational
(and individual) welfare. The response to an autogenic crisis involves opening
communication flows and decentralizing control processes; the result is greater
organizational flexibility and long-term viability. In short, we propose a
complement to the threat-rigidity thesis, having taken seriously Staw et al.'s
(1981, p. 520) call for examining the conditions under which restrictions in
The order of authorship does not convey significance of contribution. Authors collaborated
equally in the development of this manuscript. Please do not cite or quote without permission of
authors.
 information and constriction of control will prove functional or dysfunctional. Autogenic crisis
We suggest that understanding the unique properties of an autogenic crisis in organizations
helps to explain how threatened organizations may attain to a non-rigid,
functional short-term adaptation as well as to a long-term change process
involving organizational learning and renewal.

Crisis, threat, change and learning in organizations 75

It is generally recognized in the organizational literatures that a crisis is a
situation that seriously threatens an organization's survival (Nystrom and
Starbuck, 1984, p. 324) and typically originates in an organization's
environment (Starbuck et al., 1978, p. 112). That is, when a human system's
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repertoire of coping responses seems inadequate to resolve a threatening

problem, a state of crisis can be said to exist (Fink et al., 1971, p. 16). In
organizations, a crisis is a ``disruption that not only affects a system as a whole
but also has a threatening effect on its basic assumptions, its subjective sense
of self, its `existential core''' (Mitroff et al., 1992, pp. 244-5)[1]. Thus, a crisis is a
``frame breaker'' (Tushman et al., 1986) with emotional, cognitive and
behavioral dimensions that Hermann (1963; 1972) defined as a time-limited,
unanticipated threat to system survival. Although empirical support for the
``unanticipated threat[ening]'' aspect of crisis has been lacking, all of the above
definitions and descriptions of ``crisis'' converge on the notion of ``threat''. In
this regard, we endorse Staw et al.'s (1981, p. 512) assertion that ``threat is
probably the driving force behind most of the events that the term crisis
attempts to explain''. By ``threat'', we refer to ``an environmental event that has
impending negative or harmful consequences for the entity'' (Staw et al., 1981,
p. 502).
The threat-rigidity thesis holds that ``a threat to the vital interests of an
entity . . . will lead to forms of rigidity'' (Staw et al., 1981, p. 502). The rigidity
may be either adaptive or maladaptive, but emphasizing rigidity as the only
type of response to perceived threat results in a missed opportunity. That is, a
``threat always yields rigidity'' thesis precludes an opening to address needed
changes that only a crisis can make visible (see Fink et al., 1971; Mitroff et al.,
1992). Thus, a defensive reaction causes organizations to ``avoid at all cost the
double-loop learning[2] (Argyris and Schon, 1978) potential offered by crises''
(Mitroff et al., 1992, p. 252). In addition, ``defensive retreats'' from crises do not
provide the means for affecting short-term problem resolution (Fink et al., 1971,
p. 23). In part, rigidity effects have their source in organizational members'
information insufficiencies, confusion, incapacities for rapid response, desires
to avoid blame and misallocation of attention between internal and external
environments (see D'Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; Mitroff et al., 1992). Also
inherent in the rigidity reaction are excessive, dysfunctional levels of fear and
anxiety (Schein, 1987; 1993) as well as arousal and stress (Weick, 1985). In sum,
crises usually overwhelm organizations and their members' emotional,
cognitive and behavioral capacities.
 JOCM However, an alternative picture emerges from observations of organizations
13,1 undergoing ``autogenic'' crises. We suggest that it is the latent nature of the
threat involved in an autogenic crisis that provides an organization with the
opportunity for responding flexibly rather than rigidly. Latent threats generate
functional levels of fear, anxiety, arousal and stress which may motivate
organizational adaptation as well as longer-term change involving learning and
76 renewal. That is, we propose that a top manager's call for ``pre-adaptation'' to
future adversity (i.e. the latent threat) generates a highly functional bundle of
disconfirming data, anxiety and psychological safety that ``unfreezes'' the
human system and sets the stage for change through cognitive restructuring
and subsequent ``refreezing'' (Lewin, 1953; 1958; 1964; Pratt and Barnett, 1997;
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Schein, 1985; 1987; 1993). If and when short-term cognitive and behavioral
adjustments are sustained over time, the complete cycle of change in an
autogenic crisis involves unlearning, relearning and learning (see Hedberg,
1981) which taken together constitute organizational renewal. To the extent
that renewal processes become institutionalized, it follows that organizational
lifetimes will be lengthened. In sum, the notion of autogenic crisis suggests that
a seemingly life-threatening organizational crisis may ironically result in
increased organizational vitality and longevity. In the end, crisis breeds
stability.
The unlearning process enables the long-term development of new
responses and mental maps. Parallel to Lewin's (1953; 1958; 1964) and
Schein's (1985; 1987; 1993) frameworks, Hedberg's (1981, p. 18) conceptualization
of unlearning encompasses three distinct modes of operation. The first involves
disconfirmation or disassembly of existing world views so that the perceiving
individual or organization no longer knows what is perceived. The second
mode involves the disconfirmation of connections between stimuli and
responses so that an individual or organization no longer knows what
responses to make to identified stimuli. The third mode involves
disconfirmation of connections between responses, so that a person or
organization no longer knows how to assemble responses to new situations.
Relearning is accomplished by making new connections between stimuli and
responses and modifying cognitive maps. In this way, the ``pre-adaptation'' to
latent threat that occurs during an autogenic crisis can be conceived as a phase
in a longer-term change process that would be appropriately described as
organizational learning. We define organizational learning as a process
through which knowledge about action-outcome relationships develops and
may then modify collective behavior (Barnett, 1994).

The current dilemma

The paradoxical nature of organizational crises is suggested by the epigraph at
the start of this paper. On the one hand, crisis may produce a threat-rigidity
effect (Staw et al., 1981) that restricts opportunities for organizational
development or survival. Such a model is depicted in Figure 1.
 On the other hand, crisis can stimulate organizational experimentation Autogenic crisis
(Mitroff et al., 1992; Ocasio, 1993; Starbuck et al., 1978) that may result in in organizations
adaptation, learning, improvement (March, 1991; Sitkin, 1992; Weick, 1965;
1984; 1991) and longevity. Staw et al. (1981) were interested in discovering
the conditions under which threat-rigidity effects would be functional vs
maladaptive in crisis-ridden organizations. We shift the focus from rigidity to
flexibility and ask: how, why and when may crises generate flexibility (change) 77
vs rigidity (fixedness) in organizations?
The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of this problem by
articulating a conceptual framework of autogenic crisis that shows self-
induced, anticipatory exigent states as facilitators of the flexibility required
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when adversity would have emanated from a radical change in the

environment. First, we outline the need for a theory of autogenic crisis by
illustrating how several companies have dealt with unparalleled, rapid,
environmental change in an anticipatory manner. Second, we develop a model
for how the autogenic crisis process generates information and expands the
bases of organizational control. Finally, we consider some of the implications of
the autogenic crisis phenomenon for theory development as well as for
managerial practice.

Case illustrations of autogenic crisis in organizations

Success heightens organizational complacency (Starbuck, 1983); and successful
organizations are those that can evade crises (Starbuck et al., 1978). However,
some successful companies fear complacency and encourage, rather than
evade, crisis. For example, General Electric, Motorola and NAC Re[3] are highly
distinctive organizations, yet have similarly altered their vitality by initiating
autogenic crises. The following profiles of these three firms reflect ways in
which some forms of crisis may spark organizational flexibility and growth (cf.
Tichy and Sherman, 1993) rather than induce rigidity and decline (Staw et al.,
1981).

Motorola, Inc.
In 1983, following a year of 15 per cent growth ($500 million), Motorola
Chairman and CEO Bob Galvin shocked and confused his top 153 officers by
asking them to consider aggressively modifying organizational structure that

Restriction of
Information

Environmental Threat Response

Change Rigidity

Constriction of Figure 1.
Control Threat-rigidity model
 JOCM is, to change from a multi-layered matrix organization to self-contained
13,1 business units with accompanying reorientations in all organizational
processes and performance. With 75,000 employees, 90 different products
dispersed throughout six product groups and operations in 15 foreign countries
as well as the USA, Galvin's challenge amounted to a call for revolution. Senior
managers had expected praise and applause for the prior year's performance,
78 not a charge for organizational transformation.
Because of Motorola's apparent success, Galvin alone saw that the firm's
level of ability to be responsive to changing customer needs ``could prove fatal
in the coming global competitive crisis'' [emphasis added] (Gentile and Jick,
1987, p. 1). In retrospect, ``Motorola was becoming too bureaucratic, too slow
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and too ponderous to meet the competitive threats that had already done so
much damage to other American companies'' (Miraglia, 1990, p. 1). Galvin's
ambition was to reposition the company for renewed competitiveness. Rather
than wait for the environment to dictate corporate destiny, he decided to incite
a crisis that top management could immediately cultivate and from which
Motorola might derive long-term benefit.

NAC Re
Similarly, NAC Re, a small reinsurance company, decided to radically
restructure itself at the same time as it was experiencing tremendous success.
Founded in 1985, the company grew from the position of a marginal player in
the reinsurance industry to one of the top 15 firms within six years. Forbes had
even listed NAC Re among the ``200 best small companies in America'' in 1991.
Although CEO Ron Bornhuetter was pleased with his company's growth, he
was nevertheless uneasy. His concern was that initial success had led his
executives to become ``too comfortable'', and consequently unprepared to
handle the rapid rate of industry change that he foresaw in the coming decade.
To transform his company, Bornhuetter embarked on a radical
organizational change effort:
. functional ``turfs'' were staffed with cross-functional teams;
. key strategic planning and decision making, once almost exclusively the
domain of the CEO and his COO, was pushed down to the vice-
presidents and their assistants; and
. executives originally hired for their technical competence were expected
to develop their interpersonal managerial skills if they wanted to keep
their positions in the company (Pratt, 1993a). The changes sent shock
waves throughout the company. However, Bornhuetter felt that if the
company did not change soon, ``the cornerstones of yesterday's success
could become the headstones of tomorrow'' (Pratt, 1993a, p. 2).

General Electric
As incoming Chairman and CEO of General Electric (GE) in 1981, John F.
Welch Jr quickly recognized that he had inherited ``a Byzantine bureaucracy''
 (Bartlett and Elderkin, 1991, p. 3). To GE's 402,000 employees, their $24,959 Autogenic crisis
billion in revenues ($1,515 billion net income) were cause for celebration (Tichy in organizations
and Sherman, 1993, p. 261). But to Welch, this was a catalyst for extensive
changes in the size, structure, staffing and formal responsibility of the
corporate staff groups as well as for transforming the whole process of
management (Bartlett and Elderkin, 1991, p. 4).
Welch realized that key markets were growing more slowly, technology was 79
moving faster and world competition was intensifying. Because he believed
that the bureaucracy could circumvent incremental change, he championed
quantum change admonishing his managers to be number one or number two
in their businesses or else to fix, close, or sell them. Between 1981 and 1988,
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over 100,000 positions were eliminated and management layers were removed
to facilitate GE businesses' becoming ``faster-acting'' and more competitive
(Tichy and Sherman, 1993, p. 261). The old GE system with its divisions, SBUs,
groups and sectors was designed to produce meticulous, calculated, highly
polished work that was right for the 1970s, a growing handicap in the 1980s
and would have been ``a ticket to the boneyard in the 1990s'' (Bartlett and
Elderkin, 1991, p. 8).
In sum, the experiences of Motorola, NAC Re and General Electric offer
preliminary evidence of flexible adaptive and learning processes under
conditions of anticipated radical environmental threat and crisis. This is an
alternative to the rigidity response that was emphasized by Staw et al. (1981,
p. 519):
. . . depending on the source of threat, response rigidities can serve to either reduce or
intensify the threat. The net results, of course, can be either a functional adaptation to the
environment or a maladaptive cycle of threat-rigidity effects.

Rigidity either functional or maladaptive is not the only type of response

that organizations may have when faced with threats and crises. The autogenic
crisis model offers an alternative picture of organizational coping. We propose
that under conditions of autogenic crisis, unrestricted information processing
and decentralized control processes will result, mainly because the source of
external threat:
(1) is buffered through an internal agent;
(2) is latent rather than existent; and
(3) is sufficiently distant in time-future to allow for short-term adaptation
and longer-term learning.
We provide further details about the autogenic crisis concept hereafter.

Building a framework of self-generated crisis in organizations

To elaborate a model of autogenic crisis in organizations, we will refer to
the Motorola, NAC Re and General Electric case examples as well as the
existing literatures in several fields. Our conceptual framework builds upon
prior research on crisis in organizations (Fink et al., 1971; Hermann, 1963;
 JOCM Lanzara, 1983; Mitroff et al., 1992; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Shrivastava
13,1 et al., 1988; Starbuck et al., 1978), environmental-organizational relationships
(Starbuck, 1976) and the management of change (Bolman and Deal, 1991;
Cameron et al., 1988; Kilmann et al., 1988; Kimberly and Quinn, 1984; Levy
and Merry, 1986; Pettigrew, 1987; Tichy, 1983; Van de Ven and Poole,
1988). However, our theoretical research differs from earlier work by others. We
80 focus on anticipated, internally imposed crisis as opposed to unanticipated,
externally emergent crisis. Specifically, we concentrate on organizational
crisis that is consciously and deliberately provoked by top leaders (autogenic,
self-generated) in anticipation of ``real'' external threats in the future.
The threat-rigidity model is represented in Figure 1 and provides the point
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of departure for our model of autogenic crisis. The general thesis explored in
the threat-rigidity model is that threat to the survival of an entity will lead to
forms of rigidity (Staw et al., 1981, p. 502). Moreover, Staw et al. (1981) argued
that these ``threat-rigidity effects'' can be organizationally maladaptive. For
example, ``when adversity results from a radical change in the environment, it
may be dysfunctional for an organization to tighten controls and press [for]
efficiency'' (Staw et al., 1981, p. 519).
We propose that conspicuously different dynamics evolve when external
crisis is deliberately, proactively and ``internally'' precipitated by top managers.
Figure 2 summarizes the dynamics of a ``threat-flexibility'' framework which
provides a counterargument to the original threat-rigidity thesis. Specifically,
the framework in Figure 2 suggests that flexibility may occur under crisis
conditions when top managers:
(1) lead a response to latent rather than existent threats;
(2) encourage generating knowledge rather than restricting information;
and
(3) promote decentralizing rather than constricting control.

``Real'' threat vs latent threat

While many existent or ``real'' threats involve widely visible and immediate cost
or loss, typically, top managers alone perceive a potential crisis and its impact
on the organization. Therefore we use the term ``latent threat'' to emphasize that
autogenic crises:

Generation of
Knowledge

Environmental Threat Response

Change Flexibility

Figure 2. Expansion of
Threat-flexibility model Control
 (1) are initially conspicuous primarily to top managers or leaders; and Autogenic crisis
(2) represent conditions that will not be evident in the near term. in organizations
We suggest that managers who initiate autogenic crises are able to ``manage
the beforemath: the consequences of events that have not yet occurred. This is
managing in the future perfect tense'' (Davis, 1987, p. 8).
To illustrate, in 1991, NAC Re's Bornhuetter identified the next decade as the 81
period in which the upheaval in the reinsurance market would unfold.
Similarly, even before becoming CEO, Welch in 1977 foresaw the need for
radical structural changes over the course of the 1980s in order to prepare GE
for the competitive environment of the 1990s. And in 1983, upon returning from
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an extensive Asian tour, Motorola's CEO, Galvin, recognized the growing

threat from Japanese manufacturers, arguing ``we haven't even begun to
compete internationally yet'' (Gentile and Jick, 1987, p. 1).
Even though these executives based organizational change on latent threats,
it is important to emphasize that the dangers inherent in autogenic crises are no
less authentic than the dangers accompanying ``real'' external threats. For
example, at GE, Welch's anticipatory initiatives still resulted in a reduction of
the total number of employees from 402,000 in 1980 to 298,000 in 1990 despite
a more than doubling of sales (Bartlett and Elderkin, 1991, p. 4).

Restricted information vs knowledge generation

The Staw et al. (1981) threat-rigidity model assumes that, when threat is
external to the organization, threat detection leads to increased information
seeking to confirm the ``reality'' of the crisis. After onset, increased
centralization results in overloading information channels as well as
simplifying and reducing information. Organizational decision-makers tend to
depend on old knowledge based on past experience and they seek fewer sources
of information. Once a policy has been formulated to cope with the crisis, a
search for information to support policy choices reintensifies. Paradoxically,
throughout the ebb and flow of information gathering as shown in Figure 3, the
number of new alternatives introduced to the organization may be relatively
low.
In contrast, we propose that when threat is anticipatory and its awareness is
generated by a top-level internal agent, there will be an increasingly monotonic
relationship between search activity and new ideas over time. This relationship
is shown in Figure 4 and it is consistent with Sullivan and Nonaka's (1986,
p. 130) finding that:
Specifically, senior [Japanese] managers are said to manage so that the organization will
purposefully experience and consider as many phenomena as possible. The resulting deluge
of information, vague pronouncements and options will create much uncertainty in the
organization regarding its goals, norms, strategies, etc. The reduction of that uncertainty is
the task of the junior managers . . . The more uncertainty there is, the more reduction of it
there can be and the greater the likelihood of productivity [and] effectiveness. The key to
success, therefore, is the initial creation of data and the recognition of uncertainty. This is the
task that senior Japanese executives are said to carry out so well.
 JOCM HIGH

13,1

Rate of a
82 Information
Key
Seeking
b a = threat detection
b = after threat onset
c = after policy decision
has been made
Figure 3.
Threat-rigidity effects
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Number of new ideas

on information seeking
and generation of new LOW
ideas
Time

Similar to the dynamics of the threat-rigidity model, bringing the latent threat
inherent in an autogenic crisis into awareness prompts increased information
seeking to confirm ``reality''. However, top managers protect information
channels from overload by mandating decentralized problem solving and
decision making. After strategic choices are made, information seeking
continues to increase in order to intentionally improve policy action rather than
simply support it. Experimentation and new alternatives proliferate during
search and information gathering processes. For example, during NAC Re's
corporate ``shake-up'', Bornhuetter empowered cross-functional ``process teams''
to explore and initiate new policies to continuously transform and improve
how the company served its major constituencies. Team members were
encouraged to look beyond practices in the reinsurance industry for insights
(Pratt, 1993b).

HIGH

Rate of c
Information
Seeking
Key
b a = threat detection
b = after threat onset
c = after policy decision
Figure 4. has been made
Threat-flexibility effects
on information seeking a Number of new ideas
and generation of
new ideas LOW
Time
 Constriction vs expansion of control Autogenic crisis
Under conditions of external organizational threat, Staw et al.'s (1981, p. 513) in organizations
model predicts an ``increased centralization of authority, more extensive
formalization and standardization of procedures''. Furthermore, important
decisions are believed to be made at progressively higher hierarchical levels.
The underlying assumption is that authority must be concentrated at the
highest levels of the organization in order to minimize the chance of error or 83
loss.
In contrast, authority and accountability for change in the case of autogenic
crisis are shared throughout the organization, although they begin at the top
level. Bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 1966) and improvisation (Weick, 1992; 1995) are
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preferable to formalization managers use any resources available to

accomplish tasks in novel or different ways (e.g. recombining existing
subroutines into different patterns). The philosophy that animates autogenic
crisis fosters empowerment, risk-taking and creativity. To illustrate, GE's CEO
Welch eliminated nine levels of management during the 1980s in order to build
leaner, more market-conscious businesses. Welch explained:
When you take out layers, you change the exposure of the managers who remain. They sit
right in the sun . . . This way you have no choice but to let people flex their muscles, to let
them grow and mature (Bartlett and Elderkin, 1991, p. 3).

Consequences: rigidity vs flexibility in response

The cornerstone of the autogenic crisis model is that latent threat leads to
flexibility. As we have illustrated, top leaders may induce radical
organizational change that generates an increased flow of managerial
communications, expanded search and knowledge creation activities on an
organization-wide basis, decentralization of authority and greater levels of
informal problem solving and decision making.
The net result is a form of organization that is more organic and capable of
using latent threat to generate and/or improve flexibility. In the three
organizations illustrated in this paper, such flexibility was evidenced in
decreased cycle times, greater responsiveness to customers' needs and a
capacity to create their preferences, more efficient use of capital resources,
increased personal accountability and authority, more rapid problem solving
and decision making and greater levels of improvement and innovation
(Bartlett and Elderkin, 1991; Gentile and Jick, 1987; Pratt, 1993a; 1993b).

Discussion and conclusions

In this paper, we have described an alternative and complementary view of
organizational adaptation and learning in the face of adversity that
updates Staw et al.'s (1981) original threat-rigidity thesis. At the heart of our
exploration of autogenic crises in organizations is support for the notion that
not all threats are created equal. Staw et al. (1981) proposed that some threats
tend to produce a ``negative-rigidity'' effect and others result in a ``positive-
rigidity'' effect, but we posit that other types of threats will produce a flexibility
 JOCM effect. In short, a key issue determining rigidity vs flexibility effects in crisis-
13,1 induced organizational change is the source of the threat. We suggest that
there exists a class of latent threats that can be strategically confronted and
managed to generate response flexibility engendering organizational
adaptation, learning, renewal and enhanced longevity. This follows from the
extensive research that has been conducted on ``crisis-prone'' vs ``crisis-
84 prepared'' organizations (see Pauchant and Mitroff, 1988; Mitroff et al., 1989).
The flexible response to organizational crisis was overlooked in Staw et al.'s
(1981) threat-rigidity thesis that predicted that threat will lead to forms of
rigidity either adaptive or dysfunctional. Thus, future research needs to
systematically investigate the sources of threat in crisis situations in order to
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predict when organizational responses will involve flexibility and/or rigidity

effects as well as whether the latter will be functional or dysfunctional in
nature.
We must also consider that there may be a dark side to managing latent
threats and crises in organizations. Change may cause people to feel
incompetent, needy, powerless, confused, conflicted and grieving (Bolman and
Deal, 1991, p. 397). For autogenic crisis to be successful, it must by definition
involve high levels of risk and anxiety. Paradoxically, anxiety may both trigger
change and stunt it (Hirschhorn and Young, 1993; Schein, 1993, p. 89). Thus, a
delicate balance must be struck both a challenging and yet psychologically
safe environment must be cultivated if organizational change through
anticipatory crisis is to be successful. Or, as Pratt and Barnett (1997) discuss in
their treatment of individual transformation, organizational leaders may wish
to create a state of ``safe ambivalence'' to successfully transform the energy of
crisis into learning that increases functionality. In addition, individual
differences must be carefully assessed and managed some people might
experience autogenic crises as exhilarating, while others might find them
personally and/or professionally debilitating. Subsequent inquiries must
explore the occurrence of stress, burnout, fear and dissatisfaction in companies
that, like Motorola, General Electric and NAC Re, stimulate crises in advance of
any evidence of ``real'' environmental threat.
Finally, our preliminary conceptual model of autogenic crisis provides an
integrative alternative to more deterministic perspectives on organizing in that
it allows for a balance between organizational initiative and environmental
inevitability. For example, organizations may enact their environments (Daft
and Weick, 1984) as illustrated in the three cases described above. In this way,
they reduce the potential for some unanticipated, externally generated crises
and threats that might originate in the future. Thus, the conceptual model
presented in this paper suggests one possible though paradoxical resolution
to the debate about ``internal vs external'' theories of organizational change (see
Van de Ven and Poole, 1988). That is, ``autogenic crises'' constitute adaptation
and learning processes based on the flexibility to manage the consequences of
 environmental events that have not yet occurred. To manage organizations this Autogenic crisis
way in the future-perfect tense can change the future in a way that enables in organizations
organizations to have more of it.

Notes
1. In this way, crises may be argued to influence an organization's ``identity'' or what
members feel is central, enduring and distinctive about their organization (Albert and 85
Whetten, 1985).
2. Single-loop learning is collaborative inquiry aimed at error detection and correction
through changing strategies and assumptions within a constant framework of
performance norms. It is geared toward effectiveness. Double-loop learning is
collaborative inquiry that takes the form of a restructuring of organizational norms as
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well as associated strategies and assumptions. Deutero-learning (or ``learning to learn'') is

characterized by organizational members engaging in either single- or double-loop learning
as they gain insight about previous contexts for learning. They use reflection and inquiry
into previous episodes of organizational learning or nonlearning. Discovering what
facilitated or inhibited learning, they invent new learning strategies, produce them and
evaluate and generalize what they have produced. Encoded in individual images and
maps, the results are reflected in organizational learning practice. Deutero-learning
involves participants in learning about organizational learning.
3. Our selection of these companies as case illustrations was dictated by our field experiences
and the available literature. Although there may be other organizations that have initiated
radical change during times of success (cf. Dumaine, 1993), we found substantial
documentation only on General Electric, Motorola and NAC Re.

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