11/6/2017 The Bridge

(/)
Theory, Strategy, Context, and
Execution

Michael Trimble (/the-bridge/?author=59c074ddccc5c5311ec1a931) November 1, 2017 (/the-

bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution)

Military theory is a way of distilling the raw materials of history into a concentrated, potent form
that educates the strategist and commander. In this way, theory can serve as a starting point for
strategy. By examining ways in which the theories of Carl von Clausewitz and Giulio Douhet
affected strategies, warfighting, and outcomes, the would-be strategist can observe both the benefits
and limits of military theory. Conversely, there have been historical episodes in which theory held
little sway on strategy. Such a counterexample may further illuminate theorys role in strategy
development, for good or ill. While sound military theory is a good starting point for strategy,
context and execution matter. The positive impacts of theory upon strategy are often limited by the
context in which theoretical principles are applied, and by the commanders judgment and skill in
applying them.

Modern strategic theorist Professor Colin Gray believes theory is more than a mere starting point.
Theory, he says, moves the course of historyenables us to make decisions rationally[and] yields
meaning to our world.[1] Statecraft and war, he continues, rest inalienably upon theory.[2] Gray
has in mind Clausewitzs archetypal On Wara dense tome quoted by many but understood by few,
which aimed at the sweeping impact Gray describes. It is also a book that Clausewitz admitted in its

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 1/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
unrevised form constituted a formless mass.[3] Despite its density and formlessness, generations of
strategists and commanders have attempted to apply On War to strategy, with varying degrees of
success.

C L AU S E W I T Z , B I S M A RC K , A N D V O N M O LT K E

Not surprisingly, Clausewitzs intellectual and cultural

heirs, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and Field Marshal
Helmuth von Moltke, translated his principles into
successful strategy. Their judicious application of
theoretical principles to real-world strategy provides
perhaps the most convincing fulfillment of Grays
demands of military theory--that it enable decision-
makers to act rationally, thereby move the course of
history in the direction of their own interests. Yet their
success owes much to a favorable confluence of theory,
culture, and context.

No statesman ever adjusted war to policy with a

nicer judgment than Bismarck.[4]
German chancellor and Prime Minister Otto
von Bismarck (Encyclopedia Britannica) Clausewitz argues that war is not a departure from
politics but the continuation of policy by other means,
and that therefore, wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give
rise to them.[5] War cannot be separated from political purpose and constraints. As products of the
very Prussian military education system and state that Clausewitz helped create in the first few
decades of the 1800s, Bismarck and von Moltke shared a deep textual and cultural understanding of
On War. They employed his theory in the Wars of German Unification (1864 to 1871), judiciously
applying violent means to achieve political and territorial ends, with lasting strategic impact. Praising
Bismarck in overtly Clausewitzian terms, Sir Halford Mackinder asserts, No statesman ever
adjusted war to policy with a nicer judgment than Bismarck.[6] Mackinder, an original authority
on geopolitics, points out that each of Bismarcks three short wars concluded with treaties favorable
to Prussia, leading directly to a unified Germany. In accordance with Clausewitzs theory, Bismarck
managed von Moltkes military victories (means) to pursue the greater political strategy of
unification (ends).[7]

Bismarck and von Moltke owe much of their success to their understanding of another
Clausewitzian principle: that harmony of purpose must exist between statesman and general.
Clausewitz says that the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman
and commander have to make is to establishthe kind of war on which they are embarking, neither
mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.[8] Bismarck and
von Moltke harmonized their efforts while limiting the scope of each war so as not to exhaust
Prussias resources or ignite greater conflicts. In accordance with this fundamental principle of On
War, both Bismarck, the strategist-statesman, and von Moltke, the strategist-commander, effectively
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 2/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
calibrated the purpose and scope of their wars to the states political climate and available resources.
Von Moltke and Bismarck applied Clausewitzs theory with intellectual understanding and seasoned
judgment, significantly advancing Prussias power and interests. Later Germans read Clausewitz
narrowly or misinterpreted him, forging less successful strategies as a result.

C L AU S E W I T Z A N D H I T L E R

A later generation of Germans in Hitlers Third Reich attempted to apply Clausewitz in name only,
without truly understanding the theory. Clausewitz translator and historian Peter Paret writes that
Clausewitzs impact on various strategies and wars has been difficult to discern and even harder to
verify.[9] Specifically, there is some debate about how Clausewitzs principles affected the Third
Reich. From historian Peter Baldwins article, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, one can draw three
relevant conclusions.[10] First, elements of Clausewitzian thought infused the militaristic Nazi
culture, owing to Clausewitzs institutional contributions as a sort of founding father of the modern
Prussian military.[11] Second, Hitler quoted and referenced Clausewitz more than nearly any other
intellectual influence.[12] Yet Hitlers overt references must be qualified by the third, and perhaps
most important conclusion: Clausewitz qua Clausewitz was rarely present in Nazi strategy.[13]
Paradoxically, he was the least present in his true form when he was explicitly referenced. Instead, a
deranged, irrational Nazi strategy draped itself in a cape of legitimate theory, applying Clausewitzian
phrases without regard for context or good judgment.

A German soldier in the rubble of a factory during the Battle for Stalingrad, October 1942 {German Federal
Archives/Wikimedia)

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 3/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge

Instead of adjusting war to realistic political objectives and constraints, as Bismarck and von Moltke
had done, Hitler misappropriated Clausewitzs references to absolute war and maximum force, using
them out of context to justify his all-or-nothing strategy for German hegemony.[14] Clausewitz had
begun On War with Montesquieus political treatise The Spirit of the Laws in mind. On War was to
be a work of philosophy and theory, not a practical manual like the work of his peer Antoine-Henri
Jomini.[15] When Clausewitz discussed total war as wars ideal form, he meant it in a
philosophical sensethe extremes in scale and passion of Napoleonic warfare, which he had
witnessed first hand, carried to their logical conclusion.[16] In his dialectical fashion, Clausewitz
makes the theoretical function of absolute war clear by describing the political and physical
limitations that keep such a war from occurring. He further underscores this point by warning
statesmen and generals to make war with full awareness of these practical limitations.[17]

...VICTORY LEADS EASILY TO OVEREXTENSION, WHICH

LEADS TO DEFEAT.
Hitler, of course, defied these limitations, to the detriment of his strategy and overall war effort. The
limitations of resources, the soldiers will, and political will are all bound up in Clausewitzs
culminating point.[18] Every operation and war will reach a point where the maximum realistic
gains have been made within a states capabilities and will.[19] The culmination point illustrates that
every attack loses impetus as it progresses, both in the physical and moral sense.[20] Once
Bismarck had united Germany, he stopped waging wars.[21] This decision reflects Bismarcks
awareness of the culmination point, as well as his alignment of wars means with his rational political
ends. Passing Clausewitzs test for strategic success, he achieved great result with limited
means.[22] Hitler, on the other hand, admitted no knowledge of the culmination point, and
therefore expended unlimited means, only to achieve disastrous results. Strategic consultant Edward
Luttwak therefore uses Hitler to exemplify a principle he derived from Clausewitzs culmination
point: victory leads easily to overextension, which leads to defeat.[23]

In concluding Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, Baldwin states: Those who had power did not learn
from Clausewitz, but sewed his name like a fashionable label into their pirated, imitative intellectual
vestments.[24] The Nazis perverted the normal function of sound theory as a starting point for
strategy, instead wrapping a doomed strategy in stolen threads of a theory they failed to
comprehend. Had they employed Clausewitz with better understanding of the theory itself and
better judgment in application, their strategy may have benefitted greatly. Let us be grateful for their
error.

DOUHET AND THE RAF

Departing from this case of implicit influence and misappropriation, it may be valuable to examine a
case in which a military theory was explicitly and deliberately used as a starting point for strategy. In
doing so, it may further benefit us to take J.C. Slessors advice, thinking wider and using larger
maps than the map of central Europe to which we have so far been earthbound.[25] Historian

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 4/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
Michael Howard provides a neatly-packaged example: the British Royal Air Force explicitly and
deliberately employed Giulio Douhets early airpower theory in its strategy and preparations for
World War II.

The U.S. 8th Air Force attacks Marienburg, Germany in 1943. (Pinteret)

Douhets book Command of the Air argued that future wars would be primarily fought by aircraft.
[26] Specifically, he envisioned unstoppable bombers from the belligerent states rapidly laying waste
to opponents aerodromes, industries, and major cities with incendiary and chemical bombs.[27]
This vision of future warfare took hold in policy circles and popular culture in the 1920s and 1930s,
leading Britain to build a strategy and an independent air force premised on strategic bombing as a
rapid war-winning instrument in its own right.[28] However, a failure to account for contextual
factors of technology undermined Douhets theory and the ensuing RAF strategy.[29] It was
popularly believed that the bomber would always get through.[30] In fact, technological advances
in radar, electronic warfare, and interceptor aircraft, combined with RAF bombers limited payloads
and poor accuracy, led to an aerial war of attrition.[31] The bomber forces heavy losses throughout
the war and the technological cycle of measure-countermeasure made strategic bombing more
difficult, and far less effective, than it had been in theory.

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 5/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
Douhets theory remained a good starting point for strategy. He had correctly anticipated the critical
role of aerial bombardment in modern war, and as bombers and later missiles overcame many of the
technological limitations and countermeasures described above, his work would gain new renown in
the missile age.[32] In the meantime, however, the RAF (with the help of the U.S. Army Air Forces)
had to compensate for limitations of theory and strategy with strength and will in execution. Instead
of the rapid, decisive exchange Douhet had envisioned, the allied bomber forces endured years of
deadly, brute-force battle, only securing a Douhetian command of the air in the last two years of
the war.[33] It credits the will of their leaders and commanders, and even more so the courage of the
crews themselves, that the bomber offensive did eventually contribute to the destruction of the
opposing force and overall victory.

GRANT

Finally, if we consider Luttwaks observation

that the realm of military theory and strategy
is pervaded by a paradoxical logic, perhaps we
can learn something useful about theorys
relationship to strategy by observing a strategy
crafted and employed without the benefit of
theory.[34] Everett Dolman states that no sense
can be made of the world without theory.
[35] Dr. Harold Winton, however, argues
against this position in his analysis of Civil War
general Ulysses S. Grant. Sense can be made of
the world, and of war, without theory. For
Grant, to do so required courage and superior General Ulysses S Grant at Cold Harbor (Edgar Guy
resources. From these two, Grant derived the Fawx/Wikimedia)

ability to take bold risks, survive, and adapt,

even if some risks led to tactical defeats.[36] Essentially, where sound theory might have provided a
starting point for a more efficient campaign, Grant substituted boldness and superior resources, and
learned the rest on the job.

Grant lacked the benefits of theory. Military strategy and theory had not figured significantly in his
education at West Point, which maintained an engineering focus at the time. Nor did Grant engage
in serious professional reading during his career.[37] Nevertheless, between 1861 and 1863, Grant
amassed a series of significant victories from Fort Donelson, to Shiloh, to Vicksburg, and thereby
gained the trust of his commander in chief.[38] It follows that his successful strategy must have
resulted from understanding of context, and his superior judgment. In fact, Winton does indeed
highlight Grants intense powers of observation and reflection, along with his calm demeanor,
successful delegation, and use of reservesin essence, his perception and judgment.[39] Meanwhile,
historian Arthur Conger emphasizes that Grant brought the full might of Union resources to bear on
the Confederacya strategy with deep contextual understanding, divined during execution, that
J.F.C. Fuller elevates to visionary significance.[40] At this point, a would-be strategist might be
tempted to avoid theory altogether, hoping that he, like Grant, can depend upon his own natural
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 6/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
genius. To that reader, the following should be explained: not only did Grant perceive his
circumstances accurately, but those circumstances heavily favored him versus his Confederate
opponents.

Grant enjoyed the complete political and material support of his political master Abraham Lincoln,
who constrained him only to seek out and do battle with the enemy.[41] Therefore, his courage,
self-confidence, and natural genius were free to roam and create on the battlefield, in liberty of
bloody handwith conscience wide as hell.[42] Focused solely on military victory, Grants strategy
was whatever emerged; even von Moltke would have envied such simple purpose and operational
freedom.[43] Due to these contextual elements, and his good fortune in surviving many battles, he
had the luxury of learning on the job, formulating strategy as his campaign progressed. In short, the
specific context that enabled Grant to succeed without a sound theoretical foundation was rare. It is
possible to achieve a sound strategy without theory, but it is not likely, especially in todays uncertain
and complex political environments. While Grant is an interesting case, he provides a poor example
for contemporary practitioners.

A M E TA P H O R , A N D C O N C LU S I O N

Dolman describes theory as the filter through which our mind perceives the world, through which
it organizes thought.[44] His image of a filter, which restricts the flow of fluid and removes particles
from a suspension, is ironic given his view of strategy, which he says should always aim to broaden
perspectives and increase options.[45] How is one to craft an ever-expanding strategy using a tool
that restricts and removes? I prefer the more comprehensive metaphor of an old-fashioned pot still.
This metaphor illustrates the value of theory as expressed by J.F.C. Fuller. Without distillation, you
have only a large mash of ingredients in a giant potthe raw data of history. But we dont want
mash. We want whiskey.

As Fuller put it, We want truth. We require not merely a chronology of past events, but means of
analyzing their tendencies.[46] The process of historical study and reflection stresses and condenses
the historical mash, drawing out potent, essential elements. These elements are collected as
theoretical principles, ideally potent and simpleakin to the clear, extremely high-proof output of
the still. The process is not finished; the powerful, difficult-to-digest theory should be barreled in
context, then aged and systematically tested before finally it can be packaged, at the right time, by
people with who understand itinto strategy. This metaphor illustrates the essential role of theory
as described by Clausewitz: theory is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with
the subject; applied to experience, in our case, to military historyit leads to a thorough familiarity
with it.[47]

WITHOUT DISTILL ATION, YOU HAVE ONLY A L ARGE MASH

OF INGREDIENTS IN A GIANT POTTHE RAW DATA OF
HISTORY. BUT WE DONT WANT MASH. WE WANT WHISKEY.
Gray says that theory enables us to make decisions rationally; I would say that theory constitutes a
set of assumptions, based on history, that may enable strategists and commanders to make decisions
rationally, if applied judiciously, in context. Mine is a highly-couched argument, and intentionally

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 7/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
so; this is the reason that theory can be no more than a starting point. If applied with thorough
familiarity and good judgment, as Bismarck and von Moltke applied Clausewitz, then military
theory is an excellent starting point, which leads to a successful strategy and a beneficial military
effort. If applied with a limited or selective reading, absent of reflection, or in poor relation to
context, military theory can contribute to a deeply flawed strategy. Theorys ability to educate the
strategist therefore depends on the potential and will of the strategist to be educateda theorem
which touches upon the subject of military genius, a subject for discussion in another chapteror
over a glass of whiskey.

Michael Trimble (https://twitter.com/michaelmtrimble) is an officer in the US Air Force and a student at

the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. He has served in multiple
assignments and operational deployments as an instructor pilot in the C-130J Super Hercules. The
conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are his alone and do not reflect the official position of the
U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Have a response or an idea for your own article? Follow the logo below, and you too can contribute to The
Bridge:

(mailto:submissions@thestrategybridge.org)

Enjoy what you just read? Please help spread the word to new readers by sharing it on social media.

Header Image: "17th Lancers Advancing into Battle" by David Cartwright (National Army Museum
(https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/17th-lancers-advancing-into-battle-182577))

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 8/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge

N OT E S :

[1] Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (https://smile.amazon.com/Strategy-
Bridge-Theory-Practice/dp/0198779127)(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8.

[2] Gray, Strategy Bridge, 8.

[3] Carl von Clausewitz, On War (https://smile.amazon.com/War-Indexed-Carl-von-

Clausewitz/dp/0691018545), ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 69.

[4] Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (https://smile.amazon.com/Democratic-

Ideals-Reality-Reconstruction-Honourable/dp/B000FFZ09G) (1919; repr., Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1996), 13.

[5] Clausewitz, On War, 87-88.

[6] Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 13.

[7] Clausewitz, On War, 143.

[8] Clausewitz, On War, 88.

[9] Peter Paret, Clausewitz, in Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(https://smile.amazon.com/Makers-Modern-Strategy-Machiavelli-Nuclear/dp/0691027641)
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 213.

[10] P.M. Baldwin, "Clausewitz in Nazi Germany,"

(http://www.jstor.org.aufric.idm.oclc.org/stable/260614) Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 1
(1981): 5-26.

[11] Baldwin, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, 10.

[12] Baldwin, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, 11.

[13] Baldwin, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, 18.

[14] Clausewitz, On War, 605; and, Baldwin, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, 13-15.

[15] Paret, Clausewitz, 187-188.

[16] Clausewitz, On War, 75-77

[17] Clausewitz, On War, 78-85.

[18] Clausewitz, On War, 528, 566-573.

[19] Clausewitz, On War, 528, 566-573.

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 9/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
[20] Clausewitz, On War, 71, 528.

[21] Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 13.

[22] Clausewitz, On War, 573.

[23] Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (https://smile.amazon.com/Strategy-
Logic-Peace-Revised-Enlarged/dp/0674007034) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001),
80-81.

[24] Baldwin, Clausewitz in Nazi Germany, 22.

[25] J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (https://smile.amazon.com/Power-Armies-John-Cotesworth-

Slessor/dp/081735610X) (1936; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 204.

[26] Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (https://smile.amazon.com/Command-Air-Giulio-

Douhet/dp/1782664084), trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air
Force History, 1983), 28-29, 128-129.

[27] Douhet, Command of the Air, 10, 23-25, 34-35, 55.

[28] Michael Howard, War in European History (https://smile.amazon.com/War-European-History-

Michael-Howard/dp/0199546193), 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 129.

[29] Howard, War in European History, 129-130; and, Luttwak, Strategy, 89-90 (on the vertical
effect of technology on strategy).

[30] Howard, War in European History, 130.

[31] Luttwak, Strategy, 27-28.

[32] Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (https://smile.amazon.com/Strategy-Missile-Age-

Bernard-Brodie/dp/0833042246), new RAND ed. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007),
402.

[33] Howard, War in European History, 130.

[34] Luttwak, Strategy, 2.

[35] Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age
(https://smile.amazon.com/Pure-Strategy-Principle-Information-History/dp/0714684988)2nd ed.
(London, UK: Routledge, 2011), 12.

[36] Harold R. Winton, An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession, Journal
of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6, (2011): 866-870.

[37] Winton, Imperfect Jewel, 866-867.

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 10/12
11/6/2017 The Bridge
[38] Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime
(https://smile.amazon.com/Supreme-Command-Soldiers-Statesmen-Leadership/dp/1400034043) (New
York, NY: Anchor Books, 2002), 43-45.

[39] Winton, Imperfect Jewel, 870.

[40] Winton, Imperfect Jewel, 869.

[41] Clausewitz, On War, 89; and, Abraham Lincoln, letter to Grant, 30 April 1864, in Cohen,
Supreme Command, 15.

[42] Clausewitz, On War, 86, 89, 101, 112; and, William Shakespeare, The Life of King Henry V,
Act 3, Scene 3.

[43] Dolman, Pure Strategy, 20.

[44] Dolman, Pure Strategy, 12.

[45] Dolman, Pure Strategy, 9, 12, 18.

[46] Col J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War

(http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/FoundationsofScienceofWar.pdf ) (1926; repr.,
Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 21.

[47] Clausewitz, On War, 141.

[48] Gray, Strategy Bridge, 8

Tagged: Clausewitz (/the-bridge/?tag=Clausewitz), Douhet (/the-bridge/?

tag=Douhet), Colin Gray (/the-bridge/?tag=Colin+Gray), Bismarck (/the-
bridge/?tag=Bismarck), Moltke (/the-bridge/?tag=Moltke)

4 Likes Share

Newer Post Older Post

Typos on the Skin of Men: The Coalition Disruption in the Trinity (/the-
Provisional Authority in Iraq (/the- bridge/2017/10/31/disruption-in-the-trinity)
bridge/2017/11/2/typos-on-the-skin-of-men-
the-coalition-provisional-authority-in-iraq)

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 11/12
 11/6/2017 The Bridge

D O N AT E ( H T T P S : / / T H E S T R AT E G Y B R I D G E . O RG / D O N AT E / )
R S S ( H T T P : / / F E E D S . F E E D B U R N E R . CO M / S T R AT E G Y _ B R I D G E )

S U B M I S S I O N S @ T H E S T R AT E G Y B R I D G E . O RG ( M A I LTO : S U B M I S S I O N S @ T H E S T R AT E G Y B R I D G E . O RG )

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/1/theory-strategy-context-and-execution?utm_source=The+Bridge&utm_campaign=cb1a99965e-RS 12/12