Picart v.

Smith

Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning.
Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had
gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body
across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse
died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done

Held:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person
who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was
his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had
no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question,
there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At
about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side
of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the
opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his
attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No.
713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims
were injured and were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of
his wife and co-plaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved
from the complaint.

The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on
said judgment.

ISSUE:

1. WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages

2. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages proper

1. Injuries sutained by Lilius

2. for injuries sustained by wife and child
3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on interest to
be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.

1. YES

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion
that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company alone, for
not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by
of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad;
and, on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his
post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in
supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family,
which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent
selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the
discharge of their duties.

2.

a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by Lilius
relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way
of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result of
his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wifes
services in his business, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into
foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services formed part
of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of
the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness and had to
employ a translator to act in her stead.

b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the language of the court, which saw her at
the trial young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused by the
lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her
left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk, and
taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to her for
patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into consideration
the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her face
and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely,
continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all
of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
common law consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society and conjugal companionship,
as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under consideration.

Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands rights is to count on his wifes
assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society
and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become mans equal in all
the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the
duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect
indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such
services. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing
the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order
that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely
personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is
necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person
obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue
rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing

NOTES:

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person
liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary
that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the accident.

It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and child,
driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances and conditions
of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing
persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of
the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was
because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the crossing
in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing about it
beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the impending danger, was two short
blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the
accident had already become inevitable.

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving
while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
(MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the
soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the
deceased in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and
attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation.

The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that
effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the
concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous

HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.

NO

The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great
respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial
judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the
witness stand.

But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation
to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that MRC was
guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the
existence of negligence.

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States v.
Barias. Cooley formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions.
Thus: Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:

The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers
injury.

There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus:

Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.

To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must
necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be
fastened on MRC had not arisen.

Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the
peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be
that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS
CORPORATION

FACTS: The Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co Inc (CIFECI) and Philippine Motors Corporation
(PMC) are domestic corporations. Cranston was the representative of CIFECI in the City of Manila
and the latter was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the
fishing trade in the Philippine Islands.

Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a
crude oil burner. He accordingly repaired to the office of the PMC and had a conference with
Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job. As a result of the aforesaid interview, Quest, in
company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at anchor in the Pasig River, and the
work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under the supervision of
Quest.

Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing
necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor. After this appliance had
been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel. The next problem was to introduce into
the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. For this purpose
a temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of
tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank.
Owing to this fact the fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the engine
compartment.

In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that
the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower
part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quests attention, but he appeared to
think lightly of the matter.

After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into the bay
for a trial run. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again
had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. A moment later a back fire occurred in the
cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the
carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew
were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and
their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk.

An action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by CIFECI for the purpose of recovering from the
PMC the sum of P11,350, with interest and costs.

Upon hearing the cause the trial court gave judgment in favor of CIFECI to recover the sum of
P9,850, with interest.. From this judgment PMC appealed.

ISSUE:

1. WON the lower court erred in its decision

2. WON the action should be considered stale

HELD: The judgment appealed from, awarding damages to CIFECI must be affirmed

1. NO. A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable
to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that
the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent
to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The
proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For
this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the
carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person
skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other
words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The
burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no
sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quests carelessness or lack of
skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest
was free from blame.

2. NO. This action was instituted about two years after the accident in question had occured, and
after Quest had ceased to be manager of the defendant corporation and had gone back to the United
States. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered
stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the statute
of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked.

NOTES:

The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the
Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a bailee
and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from
responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. We are unable to
accede to this point of view. Certainly, Quest was not in charge of the navigation of the boat on
this trial run. His employment contemplated the installation of new parts in the engine only, and it
seems rather strained to hold that the defendant corporation had thereby become bailee of the boat.
As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owners yard, or a mechanic who repairs a
coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by
the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is
usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such possession
and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem to be
incompatible with the situation now under consideration. But though defendant cannot be held
liable in the supposition that the burden of proof had not been sustained by it in disproving the
negligence of its manager, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear
preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting therefrom are
chargeable to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest.

RCPI vs.CA et al

FACTS: A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI). The condolence telegram was
correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However, the condolence message as
communicated and delivered to the addressees was typewritten on a Happy Birthday card and
placed inside a Christmasgram envelope. The RCPIs defense is that it ran out of social forms
and envelope for condolence telegrams.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which was affirmed in toto
by the CA. RCPI now submits assignment of errors regarding the award of damages and attorneys
fees against it.

ISSUE: WON RCPI is liable for breach of contract and negligence as decided by the 2 courts

HELD: , the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto

YES

The SC fully agrees with the appellate courts endorsement of the trial courts conclusion that
RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is
engaged in a business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of
diligence expected of it in the performance of its obligation.

One of RCPIs main arguments is that despite the fact that there was error in the social form and
envelope used, it asserts that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or damage
on private respondents:

In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to convey
a message of sorrow and sympathy. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that message of
condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such acts of
carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense, they
depict a bizarre presentation of the senders feelings.

The findings of the respondent court are persuasive.

. . . When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social condolence telegram, defendant
did not inform the plaintiff of the exhaustion of such social condolence forms. Defendant-appellant
accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order and received the corresponding
compensation therefor. . Gross negligence or carelessness can be attributed to defendant-
appellant in not supplying its various stations with such sufficient and adequate social condolence
forms when it held out to the public the availability of such social condolence forms and
accepted for a fee the transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are no such
forms as testified to by its Material Control Manager and entering into a contract for the
transmission of messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad faith, fraud or
malice. . . .

Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send his
message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of the message is
typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form
with the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and delivered
in an envelope matching the purpose of the occasion and the words and intent of the message. The
sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for one in the ordinary form.

It is clear, therefore, that when the message was being prepared, it committed a breach of contract
as well as gross negligence. It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message in the
ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private respondents.

NOTES:
It was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment
and distress to respondent Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for three days at a hospital.
The petitioner argues that a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the actual proof that damages had been suffered
and evidence of the actual amount. In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal relation of
the illness suffered by Mr. Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But that is a question
of fact. The findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court concur in favor of the
private respondents. We are bound by such findingsthat is the general rule well-established by a
long line of cases. Nothing has been shown to convince us to justify the relaxation of this rule in
the petitioners favor. On the contrary, these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record.