TUNA PROCESSING, INC. v. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.

GR No. 185582
29 Feb 2012

Re: Jurisdiction of courts as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

Petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business
in the Philippines,A licensor entered into a MOA and respondent/licensee entered into
a MOA, and later a Supplemental MOA. Due to a series of events not mentioned in the
petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and
correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for
arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, United States and won the case against respondent.

ISSUE:

Does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal
capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004?

HELD:

YES. Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing
party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise
only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the
party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award. Pertinent provisions of
the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution likewise support this
position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign arbitration
may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.
On the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not
because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act
No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.
DE ASIS v. CA
GR No. 127578
February 15, 1999

Re: Future legitime and support as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to
provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on
withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said
minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually
agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will
not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against
the alleged father, this time as the minors legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed
maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the
obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and
putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE: Is the minor barred from filing an action for support?

HELD:

NO. The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was
in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With
respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the
child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that
existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter
which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true
that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the
parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration
is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence,
the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no
force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
VAZQUEZ v. AGRAVA
GR No. 32219
25 Feb 1999

Re: Grounds for Legal Separation as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

This case is about the dismissal of a legal separation case by reason of a notice of
dismissal and on the ground that "the suit is between members of the same family and
no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made." Consuelo Madrigal and
Luis Vazquez were married on March 19, 1952. They are childless. On March 23, 1970
Vazquez filed against his wife with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Can the parties validly agree on a compromise over the civil action of legal
separation?

HELD:

NO. No compromise can be made upon a ground for legal separation (Art. 2035[3],
Civil Code), and consequently, it would not be necessary or proper to allege that
efforts had been made to compromise the case and that such efforts were fruitless.
CHAVEZ v. PCGG
GR No. 130716
9 Dec 1998

Re: Criminal Liability as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental Agreements with
regards to the ill-gotten wealth cases against their family. The same was filed with
Sandiganbayan. Chavez then filed petition with SC to enforce a constitutional right
against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been acting within the
bounds of its authority. SC decided the case on 09 December 1998. However, the
siblings did not file motion for reconsideration until the deadline for such lapsed. They
instead filed 1) a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the
Attached Partial Motion for Reconsideration . . . and (2) Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, contending that their exclusion from the case violated their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Movants pray that the
proceedings before the anti-graft court be allowed to take their due course, consistent
with the principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.

ISSUE:

Was the compromise agreement entered into between the government (PCGG) and
the Marcoses valid and enforceable?

HELD:

No. Criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the
principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the
Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who
provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-
gotten wealth case. Any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense
does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the
criminal liability of the malefactor. 55 While a compromise in civil suits is expressly
authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The
authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant
criminal immunity was confered on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by
EO No. 14-A.
BARCO v. CA
GR No. 120587
20 Jan 2004

Re: Civil Status of Persons as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

Junes birth certificate listed Francisco Maravilla as the father, and Maravilla as the
childs surname.3 Nadina signed the birth certificate shortly after it was
accomplished. Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her child
was Armando Gustilo. Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries
in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June. Therein, she alleged that she had been
living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco since February of 1977, and that
Gustilo was the real father of June.8She claimed that she did not allow Francisco to
have any sexual congress with her within the first 20 days of the three hundred days
preceding the birth of June. She prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Makati be
directed to correct the birth certificate of June to the effect that the latters full name
be made "June Salvacion C. Gustilo," and that the name of her father be changed
from "Francisco Maravilla" to "Armando Gustilo. Nadina also pointed out that the Makati
intestate court had approved a compromise agreement wherein the parties had
agreed that the only heirs of the decedent Armando are "the surviving spouse, Nadina
G. Gustilo, the daughter, June Salvacion G. Gustilo, the son, Jose Vicente Gustilo III, and
another daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo."

ISSUE:

Will Nadinas petition prosper?

HELD:

No. The compromise agreement was subsequently voided on petition by Jose Vicente
to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the Civil Code prohibited compromise as
to the civil status of persons. Substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule
108. Any further attempt to limit the scope of application of Rule 108 runs against the
wall of judicial precedent cemented by legislative affirmation.
MINDORO LUMBER & HARDWARE v. BACAY
GR No. 158753
8 June 2005

Re: Libor disputes as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

The private respondents executed a Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal

(Joint Affidavit of Withdrawal of Complaint), declaring therein that by virtue of the
amount each of them received (which amount was either P3,000.00 or P6,000.00 per
employee), they were withdrawing their claim against Mindoro Lumber. Their counsel
then filed a motion to dismiss. The private respondents said that Bacay persuaded them
to execute the JAWC. They were then withdrawing the said JAWC for the amount was
grossly disproportionate to their entitlement under the law, and were authorizing Lanot,
the new president, to pursue their claim. Lanot then filed a motion before the DOLE-RO,
praying that the employees be paid the amounts due to each of them, and that the
said JAWC be declared null and void. The RD dismissed the case while the DOLE-Sec
granted it and remanded the case to the DOLE-RO which issued writ of execution.

ISSUE:

Was the compromise agreement entered between the parties valid, bereft the
assistance/presence of the BLR or the DOLE-RD?

HELD:

NO. The assistance of the BLR or the regional office of the DOLE in the execution of a
compromise settlement is a basic requirement;20 without it, there can be no valid
compromise settlement. In this case, the petitioner admits that the purported
compromise settlement was executed by the private respondents without such
required assistance. The closest form of assistance adverted to by the petitioner in this
case was that of Bacays counsel when the latter appeared before the Office of the
Regional Director to file the following: the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sakdal executed by the private respondents; a Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Bacay withdrawing the complaint; and the Motion to Dismiss. Such assistance,
however, is not the "assistance" required by Article 227. As such, the Sama-samang
Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal executed by the respondents cannot qualify as a
valid compromise settlement.
Maquilan v. Maquilan
GR No. 155409
8 June 2007

Re: Validity of Marriage as non-compromiseable

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar
coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was
having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a
case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both
accused were convicted of the crime charged.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the
said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion
was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualifies her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Is the compromise agreement entered into by spouses, one of whom was convicted of
adultery, giving the convicted spouse a share in the conjugal property, valid and legal?

HELD:

YES. Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties
and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those
that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.

Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a

circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.