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Acop vs Piraso

52 Phil 660

The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:

1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in the Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.

The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as follows:

The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could
make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been
written in that dialect.

Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that:

"No will, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it
be written in the language or dialect known by the testator," etc. Nor can be presumed to know the
dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even if such a
presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly contradicted and destroyed.

Ibarle vs Po
92 Phil 721

Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the former having died on June 6,
1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving
spouse Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy, alleging among other things,
that she needed money for the support of her children and spouses Canoy sold the same to the plaintiff
Bienvenido A. Ebarle. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina, after her appointment as
guardian of her children by this court sold one-half of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po,
defendant in the instant case, which portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses.

Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:

The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance,
whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance
because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death.

When Catalina sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows
that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.

Lorenzo vs Posadas
64 Phil 353

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