Modern Cyprus 1878-1974 : an overview

Cyprus is a beautiful island which occupies an important strategic position in the Eastern
Mediterranean sea and Middle East. Foreign powers such as the Venetians, Ottoman Empire
including modern Turkey and Great Britain occupied the island of Aphrodite from the 15th-21st
centuries. All occupying powers imposed their own socio-economic, political and administrative
forms of government on the indigenous population. Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in
October 1915 as an incentive to join the Allied powers but King Constantine decided to remain
neutral during the First World War. Other attempts of union between Cyprus and Greece in 1931
and early 1950s failed. In April 1955 the Greek Cypriots waged a fierce struggle to liberate their
island from British Colonial rule. By 1960 Cyprus became an independent nation and also a
member of the United Nations and British Commonwealth of Nations. The post-1960 period
witnessed communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 and the illegal
occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey in July 1974. Our focus will be on Cyprus history of
the past 100 years which is a period characterized by great political upheaval.

1.The Treaty of San Stefano and Treaty of Berlin 1878

On January 27, 1878 the Russians and Turks signed an armistice at Adrianople (Edirne) to halt
their conflict. Finally the Russo-Turkish peace settlement was embodied in the Treaty of San
Stefano signed on March 3, 1878 where Bulgaria became an autonomous principality (Art 6)
with Montenegro (Art.2) , Romania (Art 5) and Serbia (Art 3) granted their independence from
Ottoman rule.

When Britain received a copy of the text of this treaty, she was horrified and raised objections to
it. Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, issued a circular on April 1, 1878 opposing Russian gains in
Batoum , Armenia, and Trebizond route and the creation of a new Bulgarian state. In the former
he declared:

the important harbour of Batoum, will make the will of the Russian Government
dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of
Armenia will place the population of that province under the immediate influence of the
Power which holds them; while the extensive European trade which now passes from
Trebizond to Persia will, in consequence of the concessions in Kurdistan will be able to
be arrested at the pleasure of the Russian Government by the prohibitory barriers of
their commercial system.1

On the latter, Bulgaria would greatly impact on the rest of SE Europe giving Russia a
preponderant influence in the Balkans. Salisbury continued

It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Slav majority a considerable mass

of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the

1
Sir Edward Hertslet, The map of Europe by Treaty; showing the various political and territorial changes Vol. 1V
1875-1891, published by Harrison & Sons, HMSO, London, p.2704
 prospect of absorption into a community alien to it not only in nationality but in political
tendency and in religious allegiance.2

To solve these differences a conference was convoked in Berlin under the chairmanship of
German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck playing the role of the honest broker.3

Salisbury was unhappy with the provisions in the Treaty of San Stefano in that Russian
evacuation would be conditional on the introduction of reforms.4 The Russian Foreign Minister
Gorchakov pointed out on April 13 that the treaty in Armenia was purely a defensive measure
whereby she had the right to look after its own security and was surprised at the British
suggestion that its trade and commercial interests would be imperiled with Erzeroum and
Trebizond (Trabzon) in Russian hands. Gorchakov announced that he would be prepared to
further discuss with the British on any points of disagreement at the conference of all the great
powers.5

In mid-April 1878 the British Government desired to enter into separate negotiations with the
Russians ahead of the Berlin Congress. The British Government offered that (1) the territory of
an independent Bulgaria should not extend south of the Balkan mountain chain, (2) If Russia
were to keep its Asiatic conquest, Britain must receive equivalent compensation to safeguard its
interests in Asia.6

The Russian Ambassador would approach his government regarding the British proposals. In
the meantime the international climate was unfavorable to Russia, as Austria-Hungary and
Britain kept up the pressure on Russia to make concessions. On May 24 Russian Ambassador
Shuvalov returned to London to discuss the British proposal with Salisbury signing a secret
Russo-British protocol which amended the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. What did this
mean?

Russia promised not to create a large Bulgaria and to withdraw some of its troops from Western
Armenia.7 Article 7 of the protocol altered the requirements of San Stefano whereby Russia and
Britain would be jointly responsible in Western Armenia. Article 10 mentioned that the Alashkert
Valley and Bayazid would be returned to Turkey as this was important transit point for
commerce with Persia and because of their significance to Turkey.8

After the signing of the protocol Britain was still concerned with the political situation in Asiatic
Turkey. Britain was not prepared to go to war with Russia but Salisbury instructed Ambassador
Layard in Constantinople to impress on the Sultan that Britain could not guarantee the security
of the Ottoman Empire, if she did not receive solid guarantees of reforms for Christians and

2
Ibid., p.2703
3
Walker Ibid., p.112
4
Walker Ibid., p.115
5
Kirakossian, op cit., p.71; Turkey no.27 (1878) Further correspondence respecting the Preliminary Treaty of
Peace between Russia and Turkey signed at San Stefano (C-1995) , pp.9-10
6
Kirakossian, op cit., p.71
7
Ibid., p.72
8
Ibid., p.72
other subjects of the Empire.9 Britain was attempting to control the Ottoman government by
placing some of its troops near Asia Minor and Syria with Cyprus being an indispensable part of
its strategy. The British Ambassador was instructed to tell the Sultan that British control of
Cyprus would ensure the territorial sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Layard sent a draft of an
Anglo-Turkish agreement on Cyprus for discussion with the Turkish Government. After
discussion between Layard and Abdul Hamid the agreement was signed on June 4 1878. It is
worth noting that the Grand Vizier opposed this agreement. 10

The Cyprus convention stated:-

If Batum, Ardahan, Kars or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt
shall be made at any time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his
Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England
engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by the force of arms.
In return, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary
reforms, to be agreed upon the later between the two powers, into the government, and
for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories.11

Article 1 of the Cyprus convention stated Britain would come to the assistance of the Sultan. If
Russia were to occupy Batum, Ardahan, Kars or any of the Sultans possessions in Asiatic
Turkey that were kept under the Sultans domination according to the final peace treaty.12 In
return Turkey would carry out administrative reforms as agreed between the two governments
to protect and guarantee the lives of the Christian population; it also assumed that Sultan would
offer better government. The Sultan agreed to a British occupation of Cyprus.13

General Simmons prepared a memorandum on July 26, 1878 outlining the British War Office
views on the object of the Cyprus convention. In his communication, he raises some serious
concerns about the projection of Russian power and influence in Asia Minor and neighboring
regions. If Russia got a foothold in Asia Minor, Syria and Persia by direct or indirect means, she
would be in a strong military position to project her power down to the Gulf of Alexandretta and
Eastern Mediterranean, thus threatening British interests in Egypt, Suez Canal and India.

Once consolidating her power, Russia would then become the mistress of the Straits and
Bosphorus by closing the Black Sea [to]ships of other powers and thus threatening British
commercial interests in the regions lying between the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

9
Ibid., p.73
10
CJ Lowe, The Relunctant Imperialists: British foreign policy 1878-1902 Vol.2, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1967, pp.4-5; Kirakossian., op cit., p.73;The text of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and
Turkey (Russian aggressions in Asia; reforms and protection of Christians in Turkey in Asia; occupation and
administration of Cyprus by England) was signed in Constantinople on June 4, 1878 is in British and Foreign State
papers, Vol.69 (1877-78), pp.744-6.
11
Walker, op cit., p.114
12
Kirakossian , op cit., p.74
13
Ibid., p.74
If a Russo-Turkish conflict occurred in Asia Minor, Britain would likely be drawn into the fray.
Control of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus would be crucial for the operation of the British Royal
Navy in the Black Sea, thus giving it the ability to interdict and destroy vital Russian military
communications in Asia Minor.

Other measures considered were the construction of roads and railways in Asia Minor that
would greatly facilitate speedy troop movements and military supplies close to the theatre of
war. It was also proposed to train the native population organized in sufficient strength to
oppose the progress of Russian arms in the elevated region of Armenia. The tone of Simmons
memorandum shows that Britain was prepared to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire
against a Russian attack. No mention is made requiring Abdul Hamid to introduce administrative
reforms in the Armenian provinces.14

2. The offer of Cyprus to Greece October 1915 and Paris Peace Conference 1919

During the First World when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in October 1914,
Great Britain annexed Cyprus which now became a British colony. With the British war effort
bogged down on the Western front and at Gallipoli, she looked towards opening up a new front
in the Balkans. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos invited Anglo-French troops to land
in Salonika in early October 1915 to go to the assistance of Serbia. Venizelos was very keen for
Greece to join the Entente powers-Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy. This action brought
Venizelos into direct conflict with King Constantine who dismissed him from office. Alexander
Zaimis was appointed prime minister to oversee King Constantines neutral foreign policy.

Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in October on the condition that she went to the assistance of
Serbia. Under the terms of the Greek-Serbian Treaty 1913, Greece was obliged to aid her ally
against a Bulgarian attack. King Constantine refused to come to Serbia's aid "claiming that the
Treaty did not apply to a war in which Serbia was not only attacked by Bulgaria but a Great
Power (Germany)". 15 Zaimis consulted with the King and his cabinet colleagues before officially
responding to the British offer. His response was that Greece wished to maintain its neutrality
and even the offer of Cyprus did not offer her many advantages either. The Greek-Cypriots
were greatly disappointed to learn of the Greek Governments refusal to accept the British offer.
There was nothing they could do in the present circumstances because of the war. It was also
hoped that Britain would cede Cyprus to Greece in the future which would make enosis a reality.
Unfortunately Cyprus was divided along Venizelist and Constantinist lines thus relegating any
notions of enosis into the background.16

14
CJ Lowe , op cit., pp.5-7
15
Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, vol. 3, Odhams, London, 1938, p. 864

16
Robert Holland & Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes : Struggling for mastery in the Eastern
Mediterranean 1850-1960, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006 , pp.178-9
The abdication of King Constantine in June 1917 signalled the return of Venizelos to power who
immediately entered the war on the side of the Entente. For many Greek- Cypriots, the armistice
of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918 offered the hope that the issue of enosis might be taken
up by Eleftherios Venizelos at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. In order to bolster their
position for enosis, a Greek-Cypriot delegation headed by Archbishop Kyrillos 111 headed for
London and Paris.17

On February 3, 1919 Venizelos outlined Greeces territorial claims before the Council of Ten
(British Empire, US, France, Italy and Japan). On Cyprus , he stated:

It might be asked why no specific claim had been put forward to the island of Cyprus. He
had not done so for various reasons, the most important of these being that he was
convinced that the British Government would at the end of war be sufficiently
magnanimous to surrender Cyprus to Greece.18

Venizelos believed that Britain would make a gesture of surrendering the island to Greece but
his idea was one borne out of hope rather than insistence. On the other hand, Venizelos was
more interested in achieving his nations territorial gains in Asia Minor, Northern Epirus,Thrace ,
the Dodecanese, Imbros, Tenedos, Kastelorizo and Rhodes.19 George Georghallides succinctly
describes Venizelos ambivalence over Cyprus that the main task of Greece was to liberate the
bulk of the long-suffering Greek communities living in near Asia Minor coast and in Thrace and
to consolidate the Greek occupation of the Greek islands. 20

The Cypriot delegation visited London in the hope of convincing British officials of their desire to
be united with Greece. On February 5, 1919 the Times of London reported that the Cypriot
delegation met with the Colonial secretary Lord Milner to discuss the future of Cyprus. During
the meeting Milner stated that he knew very little about Cyprus but understood the islands
historical importance. He appreciated the aspirations of the Cypriots for union with Greece but
would consider their case.21 The British Foreign Office made it very clear to the Cypriot
deputation that we do not intend to cede Cyprus to Greece and nothing is to be gained by
pretending that we do.22 Milners response appears somewhat insincere whereas the foreign
office had already made its decision of keeping the island under British control.

On July 21, 1919 the Cyprus delegations letter was published in the Times where they
continued to argue for union with Greece. They appreciated the benefits of British administration
but the Cypriots demanded enosis with Greece based on strong ties of bloodtheir language
and religion. The Cypriots argued that their island was not as important strategically as the
British might have thought. Any future British interest in Cyprus could easily be concluded

17
Holland and Markides, p.179
18
US Dept of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, Vol.3
1919, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, p.861. Hereafter cited as FRUS PPC
19
FRUS PPC Vol.3., pp.859-61; Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, University of Michigan Press, 1999, p.72
20
Quoted in Holland and Markides, p.180
21
Future of Cyprus.Deputation to Lord Milner, The Times , February 5, 1919, p.8
22
Holland and Markides, p.181
between Greece and Britain. The Muslim minority would have its rights fully respected and
would have nothing to fear from a Greek administration. Examples were cited of their co-
religionists in Crete, Thessaly and Macedonia who enjoyed the benefits and privileges of Greek
citizenship where they were employed in the Greek civil service, they also elected mayors and
deputies to the Chamber.23 The British remained unmoved by the Cypriots call for union with
Greece.

3. The riots of October 1931

The Cypriots complained that the British exploited them for financial gain. However the islands
budget was in deficit coupled with falling commodity prices necessitating a reduction of
government expenditure. The only available remedy was to raise taxes in order to achieve a
budget surplus for which Greek members of the Colonial Legislative Council werent prepared to
do. 24

A crowd had gathered outside the Commercial Club in Nicosia on October 21, 1931 to hear the
news that members of the Legislative Council had resigned over the budget. Speeches made
inside the club criticized the injustices of British rule and shouts for enosis with Greece could be
heard outside in the street. Crowd increased from a few hundred to a few thousand. A priest
mounted the makeshift platform and declared a revolution was to be underway. A Greek flag
was flung which the priest kissed symbolizing the Cypriots demands for enosis with mother
Greece. They were continual cries To Government House, To Government House where
protestors saw this building as a symbol of British rule.

Police learnt that a large number of demonstrators was approaching Government House, so
additional police was placed at the entrance to stop them from entering the Governors
residence. The protestors broke through the police line where they shouted enosis and
demanded Governor Storrs to come out and hear them. Storrs was prepared to listen to their
grievances, so as long as they maintained a respectful distance by inviting one or two of their
leaders. However the situation turned nasty when some demonstrators started throwing bricks
which smashed windows and someone got on top of the roof of Government House unfurling
the Greek flag. Storrs issued instructions that force should be used to disperse the crowd.

Additional police reinforcements were brought to stop the stone-throwing demonstrators who
had smashed many windows of Government House and even telephone equipment had been
destroyed. The Colonial Secretarys car along with some abandoned police cars had been
torched. Unfortunately the fire spread to Government House which eventually was engulfed in
flames.

23
Letter to the editor, The Times, July 21, 1919, p.8
24
The following references Robert F. Holland, Britain and the revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, Oxford University
Press, 1998, pp.1-4; Robert Holland & Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes : Struggling for mastery in the
Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006,pp.186-7; British Command Paper,
Cmd.4045 Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931, HMSO, London, 1932, pp.1-43; National Archives of Australia,
[NAA], Canbera, ACT, Series A981 item GREEC17, LLO Note Greece: Agitation in Greece in favour of the
annexation of Cyprus to Greece, November 20, 1931
The Riot Act was read in English and Greek ordering the demonstrators to disperse, they
refused to listen. Police fired a volley of shots resulting in 7 men being wounded and two
collapsed to the ground. The rifle volley had caught the crowd by surprise who scattered into
the streets of Nicosia. However this did not save Government House.

Storrs was worried that this rebellion might spread to other parts of the island. A curfew was
proclaimed on October 22 with notices plastered on walls in both Greek and English in Nicosia.
However troubles broke out in Larnaca, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Limassol and Paphos that
continued until early November. Storrs took the drastic step of deporting the ringleaders George
Hajipavlou, Dionysios Kykkotis, Theofanis Tsangarides, Theofanis Theodotou, Theodoris
Kolokassidis and the two bishops of Kition and Kyrenia to Malta barring them from returning to
Cyprus. He believed that such a measure would defuse the political tensions on the island.

There was a permanent garrison in Cyprus consisting of three officers and 123 men stationed in
the Troodos Mountains which was immediately summoned to Nicosia. Storrs telegraphed for
additional British troops from Egypt to be dispatched by air and also the Commander-in-Chief of
the Mediterranean fleet to send an aircraft carrier. British troop and naval reinforcements from
outside began to arrive and slowly established some semblance of law and order on the island.
RAF airplanes flew over Cypriot villages to keep a watchful eye on the situation from the air.

At the end of the demonstrations, some 30 people were wounded and six Greeks killed. More
than 2,000 rioters were convicted who served sentences of varying periods. A reparations
Impost law levied fines of 34,315 on towns and villages held to be collectively responsible for
seditious actions. The idea of collectively punishing towns and villages for disloyal action was
unjust and could only harm the relations between the British and Greek- Cypriots.

Storrs appreciated the goodwill of the large Moslem population and other minorities towards the
Government never wavered throughout the disturbances. There was no suggestion that the
demonstrations had been premeditated or prearranged. The serious troublemakers were
roughs and students where respectable citizens either kept out of the way, in order to avoid
the stigma of disloyalty, cheered for union. According to Storrs, the idea of union may not have
had the support with some sections of the Greek-Cypriot community who probably prospered
under British rule.

The Greek press fully supported the Greek-Cypriots action for enosis and criticized the actions
of the British troops on the island. In a speech to the Greek parliament on November 18, Prime
Minister Eleftherios Venizelos criticized the stance of the Greek press towards the British
administration in Cyprus and British Government. Whilst he sympathized with the position of the
Greek-Cypriots, he would not allow organizations to use Greek soil for insurrection in Cyprus. It
was up to Britain to decide whether to keep Cyprus or not and its responsibility to help the
Cypriots realize their aspirations. Venizelos disapproved of the Greek-Cypriot demonstrations of
October 1931 and wished to maintain friendly relations with Britain. He continued to display his
ambivalence towards the Cyprus question.
4. The struggle for independence 1955-60

Britain considered Cyprus a purely domestic concern whereas the Greek Government viewed it
as an international problem. The involvement of Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek-
Cypriots, was crucial to any solution on Cyprus. On January 15, 1950 plebiscite the
overwhelming majority of Greek-Cypriots voted for union with Greece. The Turkish-Cypriots
did not participate in the plebiscite. Britain rejected the result of the 1950 plebiscite.

The Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Government wanted the retention of British sovereignty on
the island in order to forestall any attempts of enosis on the part of the Greek Cypriots. In 1957
Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, was quoted in the Turkish press as stating that
Turkey would welcome " partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem, but could never allow the
union of Cyprus with Greece." He also mentioned that Turkey's relations with Britain were
absolutely perfect."

The United Nations General Assembly was the forum where the parties could argue their case
regarding Cyprus. It should be noted that from 1952-54 the Greek representatives to the United
Nations, Alexis Kyrou and Christian X Palamas wanted the Cyprus issue to be resolved directly
with Britain. However Britain was not interested. In the end Greece would bring Cyprus question
to the United Nations for debate.

On September 24, 1954 Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, told the U.N General
Assembly that his country opposed " the inscription of [Cyprus as] an interference in a matter of
domestic jurisdiction." He cited Article 2(7) of the U.N Charter which stated that nothing
contained in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in such a matter."
Britain regarded Cyprus as a strategic necessity to us if we are to discharge our treaty
obligations." All through the U.N debates, the British argued that Cyprus was a domestic and not
an international issue as claimed by the Greeks.

At the heart of the Cyprus issue was Anglo-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations who Britain
needed to find some workable solution that would take into the account the interests of Greece
and Turkey and the two communities on the island. In September 1955 the three parties' -Britain,
Greece and Turkey- met in London to discuss the Cyprus issue. Britain based its case on three
important issues. Firstly British title to Cyprus was recognized under the Treaty of Lausanne
(1923); secondly, that Cyprus was considered pivotal in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle
Eastern defence systems. Britain required possession and use of the whole island and its
facilities" and; finally internal self -government had to be the first aim."
While the Greeks favored self-determination, they were prepared to accept the decision of the
Cypriot people. They believed that self-government should be based on the percentages of the
racial groups in the population."

The Turks argued that Cyprus was a "domestic British issue." They wanted British sovereignty
and the status quo to be maintained on the island. If the status of Cyprus changed, then Turkey
should regain it. They also stated that when self-government was established, that the concept of
majorities and minorities should be ignored and that the two groups be accorded full equality.
The Conference ended in failure.

The Greeks worked sideways using some of the British Commonwealth nations such as
Australia to persuade Britain to alter its stance regarding Cyprus. In fact, the Greek Ministers ,
Lambros and Christodoulou in Canberra urged the Australian Government to persuade Britain to
moderate its policy on Cyprus. Australia listened and noted the Greek requests on self-
determination but supported the British position through the period of 1947-57. For example on
November 5, 1954 Lambros approached the Department of External Affairs in Canberra by
stating that the British Labor and Liberal Parties and certain individuals in the Conservative
Party supported the idea of self-determination for Cyprus. He hoped that Australia would
approach Britain "in the interests of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Australia was, by
history, vitally interested in the Eastern Mediterranean." Australia had no intention of
approaching Britain over the Cyprus issue.

Britain tried two initiatives to resolve the Cyprus dispute. From November 1955 to January 1956
Lord Harding, the Governor of Cyprus and Archbishop Makarios met to discuss the political
future of Cyprus. The main question for the British was whether Makarios condemned the use of
violence in Cyprus. The British considered the Archbishop's slippery tactics pos[ing] a delicate
problem as regards termination of the talks." It should be noted that EOKA, (Ethniki Organose
Kyprion Agoniston), [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters] was viewed as security threat by
the British authorities on Cyprus. EOKA waged a fierce guerilla campaign against Britain from
April 1955 till Cyprus won its independence in 1960. With Harding-Makarios negotiations failing
to achieve their stated objective, the British exiled the Archbishop to the Seychelles islands in the
Indian Ocean.

Another British initiative was to introduce a constitution paving the way towards self-
government. Britain promised to dispatch a constitutional commissioner who would frame a
liberal and democratic Constitution in consultation with representatives of all sections of opinion
[in Cyprus]." In December 1956 Lord Radcliffes constitutional proposals provided for a 36
member Legislative Assembly based on a proportional representation of the Greek and Turkish
communities and Britain would be responsible for defence, external affairs and internal security
would remain completely under the control of H.M.G acting through the Governor." The new
constitution aimed at striking a fair balance over the rights of the two communities.

Greece rejected the Radcliffe proposals on the grounds that they are neither democratic or
liberal. Turkey on the other hand was not really enthusiastic about the proposals but has agreed
to give them a chance of success.

In 1957 two important developments occurred regarding the Cyprus issue. Britains decision to
release Makarios was a calculated risk the wisdom or otherwise of which will become apparent
only in the light of future events." The Colonial Office stated that the final decision to release
Makarios was with the full support of Sir John Harding" and recognised that any future
discussions regarding self-government would also involve Makarios as one the representatives of
the Greek-Cypriots.

At the heart of these negotiations would involve the Radcliffe Constitution and the Cypriots were
concerned of the reserve powers held by the Governor. The Colonial Office also was interested
in the strategic importance of Cyprus that it was necessary for Britain to retain the whole island.
They concluded this affected the question of partition, of which there are a number of
supporters in Whitehall...[and] considered partition an unsatisfactory and impractical solution."

Makarios outlined some of his views on future negotiations regarding Cyprus. He was ready to
discuss self-government as a first step towards self-determination" but had rejected the Radcliffe
plan as a basis of discussion, describing [it] as outdated." Makarios was reluctant to have the
Turkish Cypriots participate in the negotiations on an equal footing.

With the Cyprus issue at an impasse, Britain was keen to find a solution that would be acceptable
to all sides. This was the crux to the whole Cyprus problem. It was envisaged " that international
influences would be brought to bear on Greece and Turkey (e.g. by the United States and other
N.A.T.O Powers) to persuade them to accept a compromise solution."

In August 1957 Britain made another attempt to hold a conference with the Greeks and Turks to
discuss the Cyprus question. The British told the Greeks that it did not want a repetition of
failure of 1955 Conference, and had tried to convince the Greeks that its proposal was a serious
one not merely a device to forestall discussion at General Assembly." The idea for a conference
never materialized.

On February 19, 1959 leaders of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities represented by Archbishop Makarios and Dr Kuchuk met at Lancaster
House in London to express their sincere appreciation that a solution had been concluded on
Cyprus future. All the parties had a responsibility to ensure that peace and harmony would
prevail thus allowing the two ethnic communities to forge their future in the new Republic of
Cyprus. Greece and Turkey raised had no objections as to whether Cyprus would seek
membership of the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom believed it was the right of the Cypriot
people to determine whether wanted associated with the Commonwealth and of course such a
matter would also be of prime interest for other Commonwealth nations.25

In Zurich a basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, a Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus and
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey and Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and
Cyprus was agreed by the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. It is interesting that Greek and
Turkish Cypriots leaders had not been invited to Zurich. Cyprus was to become a republic with

25
Cmnd.680 Conference on Cyprus, Final Statements at the closing plenary session at Lancaster House, February
19, 1959, pp.1-7
the Greek and Turkish communities electing their officials through universal suffrage. The
President and Vice President of the Republic would be elected for a term of five years.
Executive authority would be vested in the President and Vice President who both could appoint
a Council of Ministers consisting of 7 Greeks and 3 Turks. Legislative authority would be vested
in a House of Representatives elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage in
proportion of 70% for the Greek and 30% for the Turkish communities. A Constitutional Court
composed of one Turk, one Greek and a neutral judge nominated jointly by the President and
Vice President to resolve any constitutional issues.

A Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus and United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey would ensure
the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new state of Cyprus. Article 3
stipulated that in the event of any breach of the provisions of the present treaty, Greece, the
United Kingdom and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view of making
representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far
as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established
by the present Treaty.26 Britain also ensured that she retained the right to maintain two bases on
Akrotiri and Dhekelia. This article left the door open for any of the three guaranteeing powers to
take independent action in the advent of a crisis on Cyprus.

The republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were to conclude a military alliance Article 4
mentioned that the Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect
directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
Furthermore a Tripartite headquarters was to be established in Cyprus to ensure the defence of
the island. Greek and Turkish army officers would be responsible for training the Cypriot army.
Under the provisions of this treaty Greece would be allowed 950 officers, non commissioned
officers and soldiers and Turkey 650 officers, non commissioned officers. The command of the
tripartite headquarters would be on a rotational basis with each Cypriot, Greek and Turkish
General officer appointed by the Greek and Turkish Governments and President and Vice
President of Cyprus for a period of one year.27

This paved the way for Cyprus independence from British rule and to develop a constitution that
would allow executive, legislative and judicial functions of government to function smoothly in
the new republic.

5 The 1974 Coup

The Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios demanded the removal of 650 Greek
officers of the National Guard from Cyprus leaving only a small number of 50 men. These Greek
officers took their instructions directly from Athens. Some of these officers had links with the

26
Cmnd.679 Conference on Cyprus . Documents signed and initialed at Lancaster House, February 19, 1959,
HMSO, London, pp.1-15
27
Ibid., p.11
outlawed guerilla EOKA-B group who tried to achieve enosis by military means. In early May,
1974 a large cache of weapons was stolen from a National Guard camp at Paphos presumably
involving Greek-Cypriot cadets. Makarios was outraged by this action and decided to assert his
authority over the army. He wanted to ensure that these Greek-Cypriot cadets were banned and
that the Cypriot government would exercise its prerogative over the selection of cadets for
officer training. These cadets originally had been refused selection by the Cypriot Government.
The Greek Commander of the National Guard, General Dinissis visited Athens in June to
convey Makarios demands to the Greek Government.

In early July, 1974 Makarios relations with Athens were very tense as the Cypriot President
accused the Greek Government of using subversive methods to undermine the authority of the
Cypriot government. He believed that Greeks were planning to overthrow him and impose
military rule. Makarios disliked military regimes but understood where power lay under
President Papadopoulos. With the removal of Papadopoulos from power in late 1973, the new
Greek military leaders distrusted Makarios who visited many communist countries and who
made too many concessions to Cyprus large communist party.

The Greek Junta along with elements of the National Guard in Cyprus staged a coup on July 16,
1974 which lead to the overthrow of Makarios and the installation of Nikos Sampson as the
President of Cyprus. Sampson announced the stated goals of the regime. Some of these included:
restoring law and order, the staging of free and honest elections in the near future, solving of the
Cypriot problem through reinforced intercommunal talks and foreign policy based on
friendship and cooperation with all nations:Cyprus will remain non-aligned

The western powers and even the Soviet Union were outraged with Sampson becoming president
and supported Makarios as the legitimate leader of Cyprus. Britain drew the attention to both the
Greek and Turkish Governments that under Art.3 of the Treaty of Guarantee 1960 that the three
powers (United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey) were responsible to uphold the independence and
territorial integrity of Cyprus. The British Government asked that the Greeks to withdraw the
650 officers from the island and give a clear statement respecting Cyprus independence.

On the other hand, Turkey requested joint action with Britain under Art 3 while at same
preserving its own independent action under the 1960 treaty. The Turkish Prime Minister ,
Bulent Ecevit put his nations forces on full alert and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash told
his community not to become involved in inter-feuding among the Greeks. Ankara viewed the
established of a military regime in Cyprus with some trepidation. The coup gave Turkey the
pretext it needed to invade on July 20, 1974 leading to a partition of Cyprus into a Greek and
Turkish part.28

28
Cyprus: background to the coup July 19, 1974 (Australian Archives)