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g DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS AREA EXTENT GET-8591

Various regulatory agencies throughout the world have increased their emphasis on eval-
uating the “hazardous area” created by the potential leakage of flammable fluids (liquids
and gases). The General Electric Power Systems (GEPS) Product Safety group has
reviewed NFPA 70, NFPA 497, API/RP 500, API/RP 505, EN 60079-10 (equivalent to IEC
79-10), and other related sources (such as EU Directive 94/9/EC and EU Directive
1999/92/EC) regarding hazardous areas and methods to determine the extent. GEPS
uses a third approach based upon a newly created, robust computer modeling program,
which like the above listed approaches uses sound engineering judgment.
One consistent item of guidance in all the documents is for the use of sound engineering
judgment in evaluating potential hazardous areas. This confirms the opinion that blind
application of the information in the documents may yield results that are less than opti-
mum.

The NFPA Approach


The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 497 and American Petroleum Institute
(API) Recommended Practice (RP) 500 documents use “standardized” areas presented as
drawings of equipment and/or systems containing various types of flammable materials as
the primary method of hazardous area definition. If the actual situation is not accurately
reflected by the drawing, the actual hazardous extent could easily be quite different from
the diagram.
To allow evaluation of “non-standard” situations, the API/RP 500 document provides alter-
native methods of estimation. One approach relates fluid temperature and vapor pressure
to release “categories” that are then compared to release rates to select a range of hazard
extents for each matrix combination. Other approaches are more subjective. Although
several approaches are offered, they all fall back on tabulated ranges defined through non-
computational methods. There is a significant difference between the estimated minimum
and maximum extent for several of the defined situations.
It should be noted that NFPA 497 Paragraph 1-2.3 explicitly states:
“This recommended practice is intended as a guide and should be applied with sound engi-
neering judgment. Where all factors are properly evaluated, a consistent area classification
scheme can be developed.”
The need to use due diligence in evaluating the extent of hazardous areas is further rein-
forced in Paragraph 3-4.6:

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DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS AREA EXTENT

“The volume of combustible material released is of extreme importance in deter-


mining the extent of a hazardous area, and it is this consideration that necessi-
tates the greatest application of sound engineering judgement.”

API/RP 500 contains similar language to emphasize the importance of “sound engineering
judgement” when evaluating the existence and extent of hazardous areas.

IEC 79-10 Approach


International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) document 79-10 defines an approach
that is primarily based on calculated parameters. The assessment starts by estimating the
potential leak rates using any method desired by the analyst. Most analysts will use an
approximation method drawn from documents such as IP 15; “Area Classification Code for
Petroleum Installations”, Institute of Petroleum, London. The analyst has the option to
employ fluid dynamic calculations of the leak source to improve the accuracy of the results.
The approach uses a somewhat subjective matrix approach to define the class of the poten-
tially hazardous area in terms of type of leak source and likelihood of leak and integrates
that with a mathematical estimate of the ventilation quality. This evaluation of ventilation
quality includes the existence of enclosures and other obstacles to ventilation and the
impact of any forced ventilation. The final step is to calculate the extent of the hazardous
area. The approach used is based on the principle of “displacement” and mixing. That is,
how much air is required to dilute the leaked fuel to a “safe” concentration. The factor
used to define “safe” is based on finding the area ventilation equivalent to “outdoor” or
not. The numerical evaluation of ventilation quality done previously is used to bias “non-
outdoor” hazardous areas to assure a closer harmony with the actual conditions.
The IEC 79-10 also suggests that diligence on the part of the analyst is needed to go
beyond mere rote compliance with the document:
“The practice of area classification involves a knowledge of the behavior of flammable gases
and liquids when they are released from containment, and sound engineering judgment based
on experience of the performance of items of plant equipment under specified conditions.”

The GEPS Approach


GEPS undertook the task of developing a single approach to hazardous areas that is consis-
tent with the above documents, one that employs “sound engineering judgment” in defin-
ing the hazardous area. The selected approach is based on that suggested by A.W. Cox,
F.P. Lees and M.L. Ang in their report “Classification of Hazardous Locations”, Institution

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DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS AREA EXTENT

of Chemical Engineers, 1990. Cox, Lees and others have conducted extensive research
into the leak history of the chemical, oil and gas industries. This research provides insight
into both potential leak sizes as a function of the component and rate of leak occurrence
for those various components. From this information, realistic estimations are possible
regarding the potential of a given component to leak and the “worst credible” manner of
leak that would be associated with the component. This information when combined with
established fluid dynamic principles allows the development of computer models that will
quickly estimate:
■ the likelihood of a component leaking
■ the quantity of fluid emitted by a given leak source
■ the likely hazardous range of a leaked flammable fluid (gas or liquid)

GEPS contracted with the Atkins consulting firm, London, UK to develop a robust comput-
er modeling program that would combine fluid dynamic equations with ground rules
developed from the industry experience surveys to provide a realistic estimation of poten-
tial hazardous areas. The ground rules incorporated into the model logic select the “worst
credible” piping leak scenarios as deduced from the historical experience. This establishes
the area of the leak sources for the follow-on calculations.
The calculations for leak rate use classic fluid dynamic equations for flow considering fluid
properties (density, viscosity, etc.) for the type of fluid (liquid OR gas) compensated for
temperature of the fluid and the surrounding atmosphere and system operating pressure.
The leak rate is calculated by presuming a circular hole of an area equivalent to the esti-
mated leak area of the source. This is a conservative approach as a circular hole has the
highest predicted leak rate of any geometric opening.
Once the leak source is evaluated, the computer program uses a dispersion model that has
been calibrated with Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and the commercial
“Aeroplume” software. The accuracy of the model has been validated by comparison with
historical empirical data of leaking fuels. The model accounts for the fluid properties plus
the momentum imparted by the pressure differential at the leak source, assuring the maxi-
mum potential hazardous area extent is estimated.
Estimating the hazardous area starts with a survey of all leak sources. For each category of
leak source (type component, component size, and failure mode leading to leakage) the
leak rate and free air hazardous range is calculated. This establishes the “outdoor” extent
associated with each leak source. If an enclosure is involved, GEPS assumes that the extent
will be to the walls of the enclosure regardless of the ventilation capability. IEC 79-10
allows declassification of interior areas based on estimated hazardous range if ventilation is
adequate; however, CFD studies of our equipment enclosures reveals the potential for

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DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS AREA EXTENT

pockets of gas buildup well away from the leak sources. Therefore, GE takes the conserva-
tive position that the entire enclosure is considered a hazardous area.

In Comparison
Comparing the results obtained from the GEPS computer model with the hazardous areas
suggested by NFPA/API or IEC 79-10 shows the model is consistent with or conservative in
nearly all cases where the conditions of the area are close. Those cases in which the GEPS
model is less restrictive are limited to attempting to use NFPA/API pressurized system dia-
grams and methods or IEC methods with low pressure systems. At high pressure or with
larger leak sources, the GEPS model generally suggests a hazardous area that is larger than
reflected by the other methods. A detailed comparison of the results obtained by the vari-
ous methods is included at Attachment 1.

Summary
The NFPA/API and IEC 79-10 approaches to hazardous area definition provide a degree of
safety from fire/explosion incidents in areas subject to leakage of flammable fluids. The
technology now available to the sophisticated analyst allows methods that enhance the pre-
cision of the hazardous area evaluation. The use of these improved analytical tools follows
the spirit and intent of the previous approaches and applies “sound engineering judg-
ment” to achieve a realistic result that retains an appropriate level of conservatism.

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DETERMINATION OF HAZARDOUS AREA EXTENT

ATTACHMENT 1
Sample Problems Comparing
FLAVIC Tool with NFPA 497
and API/RP 500 and IEC 79-10
Hazardous Area Estimates

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The following conditions are analyzed for both Natural Gas and Hydrogen at ambient
temperature:
Pressure: 25 PSIa
100 PSIa
500 PSIa
2000 PSIa
“Common” 0.25 mm2 (Leakage from Valve Stems and small bore –
Hole Sizes: “NPT” / “Compression” connections)
2.5 mm2 (Minor leakage from flange gaskets – common
leak)
25 mm2 (Major leakage from flange gaskets – Credible
maximum leak source in most instances)
250 mm2 and larger (Leakage from a pipe crack –
typically limited to flex hose installations)
All estimates based on an outdoor location (full natural ventilation) with dilution of the
gas to the 50% of Lower Explosive Limit concentration.
“Hand” Calculations for the Class I, Division 2 / Zone 2 hazardous area extent given a
Natural Gas leak through a 25 mm2 hole with a 100 PSIa supply pressure. Presumes the
leak is from a pipe that is 0.2 meters above grade. Temperature is 21°C.

FLAVIC output:
Fuel Leak Rate: 30.0 grams/Sec
Hazardous Range: 1.3 meters for a “free jet” condition
Hazardous Range: 2.2 meters for a “wall jet” condition (along the ground)

NFPA 497, Figure 3-8.7 (Moderate or High Pressure):


Fuel Leak Rate: Not estimated
Hazardous Range: 4.6 meters

API RP-500, Figure 104:


Fuel Leak Rate: Not estimated
Hazardous Range: 3 meters

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API RP-500, Figure D-2 (Category 1 material, release rate 50 to 100 gallons per minute –
from FLAVIC)
Fuel Leak Rate: Not estimated
Hazardous Range: 15.2 to 30.4 meters

IEC 79-10
Flow Leak Rate: Although the IEC 79-10 method uses leak rate, it does
NOT provide a method for calculating flow. Since
FLAVIC uses classic orifice flow calculations, use FLAV-
IC flow rate here then follow IEC method: 0.03 kg/s

Critical Volume =
Vz =
f• ( )
dV
dt min

Where: C0

f = efficiency of ventilation; 1 = ideal (same as open air),


5 = impeded
C0 = number of fresh air changes per second, (for outdoor,
0.03/s is the accepted value)

(dV/dt)min = (dG/dt)max × Ta
k × LEL × 293
With:
(dG/dt)max = Gas Release (kg/s) = 0.03
Ta = Ambient temperature (°K) = 294.15
k = Safety Factor for “Secondary” release = 0.5
LEL = Lower Explosive Limit (mass/volume) = 0.0295 kg/m3
(equivalent to 4,24% by volume)
(dV/dt)min = (0.030 × 294.15)/(0.5 × 0.0295 x 293) = 2.04
Vz = (1 × 2.04)/0.03 = 68.05 m3
Hazardous Range = radius of a sphere encompassing
Vz = (3 × Vz/(4 × Pi))^0.333
= (3 × 68.05/4 × Pi))^0.333 = 2.53 m

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Hazardous Range RESULTS (meters)

FLAVIC NFPA 497 API RP-500 API RP-500 IEC


Natural Gas Free Wall Fig. 3-8.7 Fig. 104 Fig. D2 79-10

0.25 mm, 25 PSIa 0.07 0.14 BROC * 3 1.5 – 7.6 0.3


100 PSIa 0.1 0.2 4.6 3 1.5 – 7.6 0.5
500 PSIa 0.3 0.5 4.6 7.5 7.6-15.2 0.9
2000 PSIa 0.5 0.9 4.6 7.5 7.6-15.2 1.4
2.5 mm, 25 PSIa 0.2 0.5 BROC * 3 7.6-15.2 0.7
100 PSIa 0.4 0.6 4.6 3 7.6-15.2 1.1
500 PSIa 0.8 1.4 4.6 7.5 7.6-15.2 1.9
2000 PSIa 1.7 2.9 4.6 7.5 BROC * 3.0
25 mm, 25 PSIa 0.8 1.5 BROC * 3 7.6-15.2 1.5
100 PSIa 1.3 2.2 4.6 3 15.2 – 30.4 2.5
500 PSIa 2.7 4.6 4.6 7.5 BROC * 4.1
2000 PSIa 5.4 9.3 4.6 7.5 BROC * 6.6
250 mm, 25 PSIa 2.5 4.7 BROC * 3 BROC * 3.3
100 PSIa 3.8 6.4 4.6 3 BROC * 5.2
500 PSIa 8.4 14.4 4.6 7.5 BROC * 8.9
2000 PSIa 17.0 29.5 4.6 7.5 BROC * 14.1

FLAVIC NFPA 497 API RP-500 API RP-500 IEC


Hydrogen Free Wall Fig. 3-8.7 Fig. 104 Fig. D2** 79-10
0.25 mm, 25 PSIa 0.16 0.32 4.6 3 1.5 – 7.6 0.5
100 PSIa 0.3 0.6 4.6 3 7.6-15.2 0.8
500 PSIa 0.8 1.4 4.6 7.5 7.6-15.2 1.3
2000 PSIa 1.5 2.9 4.6 7.5 7.6-15.2 2.0
2.5 mm, 25 PSIa 0.5 1.0 4.6 3 7.6-15.2 1.0
100 PSIa 1.1 2.0 4.6 3 7.6-15.2 1.6
500 PSIa 2.4 4.5 4.6 7.5 15.2-30.4 2.7
2000 PSIa 4.9 9.2 4.6 7.5 BROC * 4.4
25 mm, 25 PSIa 1.7 3.3 4.6 3 7.6-15.2 2.1
100 PSIa 3.4 6.4 4.6 3 BROC * 3.5
500 PSIa 7.6 14.4 4.6 7.5 BROC * 5.9
2000 PSIa 15.4 29.2 4.6 7.5 BROC * 9.4
250 mm, 25 PSIa 5.3 10.4 4.6 3 BROC * 4.7
100 PSIa 10.7 20.3 4.6 3 BROC * 7.4
500 PSIa 24.0 45.5 4.6 7.5 BROC * 12.7
2000 PSIa 48.7 92.5 4.6 7.5 BROC * 20.2

* Beyond Range of Chart


** Figure D2 does not include Hydrogen in the list of materials, but “Category 1” is representative

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