CARLOS ALONZO vs.
IAC and TECLA PADUA FACTS:
G.R. No. 72873 May 27, 1987
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
STATUTES; INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN
CONSONANCE WITH JUSTICE. — As has been aptly
observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning
of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in
its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. Thus, we
interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and
we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in
a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE READ ACCORDING TO ITS
SPIRIT AND INTENT. — While we admittedly may not
legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in
such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may
not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth"
but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker’s
will. "The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is
within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter;
and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within
the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers."cralaw
virtua1aw library
3. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; PACTO DE RETRO SALE;
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE ADOPTED IN CASE
AT BAR. — In arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The
said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In
fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are
doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. The co-heirs in
this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either
that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents
under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred
his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of
P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22,
1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the
same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with
their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs,
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua,
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right
of redemption claimed by her brother.
The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground
that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty
days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there
was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
(actual notice) of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that
the notice required by the said article was written notice and
that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
ISSUE:
Correct interpretation and application of the pertinent
law as invoked (Art. 1623)
RULING:
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the
Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there
was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-
heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to
only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the
30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 1
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because facts.
of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose
language. What we do instead is find a balance between
a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as
materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary
the law is obeyed.
possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act
of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before
date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it
redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really was already too late.
necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of
sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
the sales although no notice in writing was given them.
And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period
began and ended during the 14 years between the sales
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua their right of redemption.
in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years
after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners
extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there
was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the
notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this
case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in
writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private

respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made
by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring
written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the
obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance,
thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose
is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was
sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed
of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running
and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time
during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other
words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
redemption had already been extinguished because the period
for its exercise had already expired.

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with

laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential
that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which
he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as
should have induced inquiry, and the means of
ascertaining the truth were readily available upon

CIVIL PROCEDURE AGUSTIN, E. P. | 2

 KAREN SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing
four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen
Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a
dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able
to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial
court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees
amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of
Bartelli with the China Banking Corp but the latter refused
arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD
1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983
or at a time when the country’s economy was in a shambles;
when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this
was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities
of the present times show that the country has recovered
economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies
those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good
when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects
producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby
required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil
case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the
favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and
her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that
the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is
not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process
of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The
intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before
us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who
argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the
CIVIL PROCEDURE
latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit
made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the country and,
therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a
short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient,
he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused
Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here?
Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment
of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting
the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit
of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and
victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal
tyranny.
____________________________________________________
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all
Americans are good, and in her gesture of kindness by teaching
his alleged niece the Filipino language requested by the
American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment,
and that she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli.
Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4)
days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and
avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received
a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the
amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could
alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she
had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time;
and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the
money, could not, however get the award of damages because
of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she
and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision.
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 3
 PHIL CARPET MNFG CORP vs. TAGMAYON
G.R. No. 191475 December 11, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is
a corporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the
business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.
Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but
were affected by petitioner’s retrenchment and voluntary
retirement programs.
Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s decision to
terminate their employment, respondents filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal.
PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the
services of respondents being a necessary management
prerogative. Petitioners also stressed that respondents belatedly
filed their complaint as they allowed almost three years to pass
making the principle of laches applicable. Considering that
respondents accepted their separation pay and voluntarily
executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked
the principle of estoppel on the part of respondents to question
their separation from the service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and
Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not dismissed from
employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired from
employment to take advantage of the company’s program.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA
found no flaw in respondents’ termination as they voluntarily
opted to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a
contractual basis then regularized, terminated from employment
and were paid separation benefits. In view of respondents’
belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such action
is a mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to
collect more money, taking advantage of the 2006 Supreme
Court decision.
It has been repeatedly held by the Court that:
Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based
on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts
of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no
arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of
procedure. We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "JUSTICE
OUTSIDE LEGALITY," this is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit
legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they
should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year]
statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by
laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches
earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law.
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one
based on an injury to the complainants’ rights which should be
brought within four years from the time of their dismissal
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Respondents’
complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal
was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot,
therefore, be invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied
only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction,
for the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice
provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

sustained the LA decision. In addition to the LA ratiocination, the
NLRC emphasized the application of the principle of laches for
respondents’ inaction for an unreasonable period.

In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA

refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was
instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by
law which is four years. It stressed that said principle cannot be
invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in rendering its disputed decision and

resolution, the court a quo has decided a question of
substance not in accord with law and/or established
jurisprudence.

RULING:

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.

CIVIL PROCEDURE AGUSTIN, E. P. | 4

 ARMAND NOCUM and PDI vs. LUCIO TAN
G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
FACTS:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a
news article.
ALPAP and UMALI filed their joint answer, dated October 31,
1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no
cause of action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff
Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It appeared that the
complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, RTC issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing
the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper
venue.
Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking for reconsideration of
the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. The
amended complaint alleged that "This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati" and that "This caricature
was printed and first published in the City of Makati".
The lower court admitted the amended complaint and dismissed
the Order of Dismissal.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision and filed two petitions for
certiorari which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over
the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for
damages.
The court of appeals erred in ruling (1) that the lower
court had jurisdiction over the case (on the basis of the
original complaint) notwithstanding the fact that the
lower court had earlier dismissed the original complaint
for its failure to confer jurisdiction upon thje court; and
(2) that the amended complaint was properly allowed or
admitted because the lower court was "never divested"
of jurisdiction over the case.
The court of appeals erred in not ruling that the original
complaint of respondent was amended purposely to
confer upon the lower court jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the
RTC of the place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and
first published; or (2) where the complainant, if a private person,
resides; or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds
office. They argue that since the original complaint only
contained the office address of respondent and not the latter’s
actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news
reports were printed and first published, the original complaint,
by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer
jurisdiction on the lower court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on
the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at
bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed
before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which
is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically
designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former
colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated
jurisdiction and venue as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or
tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of
procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court
and the subject matter; venue, a relation between
plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent;
and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred
by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended
Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and
first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question
of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would
neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s
failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the
lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s
failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court
the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly
laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar ,15 this Court construed the term
"jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed or
"venue."
In Escribano v. Avila,16 pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363, 17 we
laid down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and
civil actions in written defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at
the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the
city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside
of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held
AGUSTIN, E. P. | 5
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place
of residence at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the
offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has
always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first
published.
We further restated the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private
person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court
over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to
trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a
jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their
access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast,
in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it
being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over the case because respondent failed to allege the place
where the libelous articles were printed and first published would
have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The
failure of the original complaint to contain such information
would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue
which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is
not to be because the case before us is a civil action where
venue is not jurisdictional.

The casescited by petitioners are not applicable here. These

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
cases involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction
on courts over which they originally had none. This is not true in
the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the filing of the original
complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it
dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The amendment
merely laid down the proper venue of the case.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside

of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.

We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:

We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the

complaint was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower
court, where originally it had none. The amendment was merely
to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-
established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction,
except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly
laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be
procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases,
venue may be waived.

Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper

venue, the lower court had jurisdiction over the case.
Apparently, the herein petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by
filing their answers to the complaint, albeit, questioning the
propriety of venue, instead of a motion to dismiss.

We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court

was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face,
failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the
place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may
still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was
admitted, in view of the court a quo’s jurisdiction, of which it
was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and
without any grave abuse of discretion.

It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS

arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather

CIVIL PROCEDURE AGUSTIN, E. P. | 6

 STEEL CORP vs. MAFRE INSULAR INSURANCE
G.R. No. 201199 October 16, 2013

CIVIL PROCEDURE AGUSTIN, E. P. | 7

MANUEL ARANETA vs. COMMONWEALTH INSURANCE
G.R. No. L-11584 April 28, 1958

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; COURTS OF CONCURRENT

OR COORDINATE JURISDICTION CANNOT INTERFERE
WITH EACH OTHER’S JUDGMENTS BY INJUNCTION. — It
is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court
has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. The various
branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense
coordinate courts and to allow them to interfere with each
other’s judgments or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead
to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of
justice.

2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ERRORS OF JUDGMENT,

HOW CORRECTED. — Where the court has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject-matter, and the court commits errors
of judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction, said errors are
mere errors of judgment, correctible and reviewable only by
appeal, and if no appeal is taken, the decision, erroneous or not,
becomes final and executory, and is valid and binding upon the
parties (Vicente v. Lucas, 95 Phil., 716; Daquis v. Bustos, 60 Off.
Gaz., No. 5, 1964).

CIVIL PROCEDURE AGUSTIN, E. P. | 8