Hempel Vs Cydan Et Al-Complaint

Case 3:18-cv-00008 Document 1 Filed 01/05/18 Page 1 of 25
1 THE O’MARA LAW FIRM, P.C.

DAVID C. O’MARA
2 NEVADA BAR NO. 8599
311 East Liberty St.
3 Reno, Nevada 89501
775-323-1321
4 775-323-4082 (fax)
5 JOSHUA L. SEIFERT PLLC
Joshua L. Seifert, Esq.
6 Pro Hac Vice Application Pending
jseifert@seifertpllc.com
7
175 Varick Street
8 New York, NY 10014
(646) 460-0003
9
SLARSKEY LLC
10 David Slarskey, Esq.
Pro Hac Vice Application Pending
11
dslarskey@slarskey.com
12 800 Third Avenue, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10022
13 (212) 658-0661
14 Counsel for Plaintiffs
15
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
17 ADDISON HEMPEL, CASSIDY

HEMPEL, CHRISTINE HEMPEL, HUGH
18 HEMPEL, and SOLUTION
THERAPEUTICS, Case No.
19
Plaintiff,
20 COMPLAINT
vs.
21
CYDAN DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
22 CYDAN II, INC., VTESSE, INC., and DEMAND FOR JURY
SUCAMPO PHARMACEUTICALS,
23 INC., and DOES I-X and ROE
CORPORATIONS I-V, inclusive,
24
Defendants.
25
26
27
28 1
1 Addison Hempel, Cassidy Hempel, Christine Hempel, Hugh Hempel, and Solution Thera-
2 peutics (collectively, the “Hempels”), by their attorneys, and for their complaint against Defendants
3 Cydan Development, Inc. and Cydan II, Inc. (together, “Cydan”), Vtesse, Inc. (“Vtesse”) and
4 Sucampo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Sucampo”) (collectively, “Defendants”), allege as follows:
5 1. This dispute arises out of Cydan’s, Vtesse’s, and Sucampo’s breach of a confidentiali-
6 ty agreement with the Hempels, their misappropriation of the Hempels’ confidential business plans,
7 medical research, and clinical data, and their unjust enrichment. The Hempels dedicated their lives
8 and spent millions of dollars of their own capital and community donated funds to develop medical
9 treatments for an ultra-rare, genetic disease known as Niemann-Pick disease, Type C (“NPC”) that
10 afflicts their identical twin daughters. The Hempels planned to commercialize those treatments, and
11 pour the proceeds back into the NPC community, allowing those affected by NPC disease to control
12 the treatments, the development, and the pricing. Instead, Cydan, Vtesse, and Sucampo swooped in
13 to misappropriate the Hempels’ confidential information and trade secrets, developed a directly
14 competitive treatment, and sold it to an international pharmaceutical company for hundreds of mil-
15 lions of dollars. Cydan’s, Vtesse’s, and Sucampo’s misconduct robbed the NPC community of its
16 power to fund and control future developments in NPC treatments, and their ill-gotten gains must be
17 disgorged.
18 2. Addison and Cassidy Hempel (the “Hempel twins”) were born on January 23, 2004.
19 In 2007, they were diagnosed with NPC. NPC is an ultra-rare and fatal progressive neurological dis-
20 ease. Currently, there are approximately 500 known cases worldwide, and 100 known cases in the
21 United States. Addison and Cassidy Hempel are the only known identical twins in the world living
22 with NPC, making their medical information highly valuable. In all cases, the condition is fatal and
23 responsible for severe disability and premature death.
24 3. Spurred by their daughters’ diagnosis, the Hempels both left their employment and
25 invested approximately $3 million of their personal time and wealth, along with millions of dollars
26 in donations they raised and pro bono work they elicited from world-class physicians around the
27 world, to develop their own, privately-funded treatment for NPC.
28 2
1 4. The Hempels’ innovative translational drug research program met with immediate
2 success, resulting in unprecedented treatment approvals by the United States Food and Drug Admin-
3 istration (“FDA”) in 2009 and 2010 for the clinical use of 2-hydroxypropyl-β-
4 cyclodextrin (“HPβCD” or “cyclodextrin”), in treating NPC. These events drew international recog-
5 nition, and attention from the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), as the Hempels and their team
6 of physicians were approved by the FDA to begin treating their twin daughters with this promising
7 new therapeutic drug. In May 2010, the FDA granted “Orphan Drug Status” to the cyclodextrin mol-
8 ecule being developed by the Hempels, 2HPβCD, indicating its utility in treating humans and the
9 small patient population with NPC.
10 5. Treatments developed by the Hempels for NPC focused on three different drug deliv-
11 ery pathways: intravenous injections (i.e., bloodstream), intrathecal injections (i.e., lower spinal
12 cord), and intracerebral injections (i.e. directly into the brain). Beginning in 2011, the NIH funded
13 research and a clinical trial into intracerebral injections in NPC patients, while the Hempels pursued
14 the intravenous and intrathecal methods.
15 6. By the spring of 2013, the NIH’s Institutional Review Board (“NIH IRB”) and the
16 FDA placed the NIH’s intracerebral clinical trial on “clinical hold” because it was unsuccessful due
17 to brain infections in patients. Meanwhile, the FDA permitted the Hempels to continue pursuing both
18 the intravenous and intrathecal methods, which showed continuing success.
19 7. In late June 2013, with several more years of treatment data funded and collected by
20 the Hempels, Cydan—a venture capital-backed drug development incubator—approached the
21 Hempels about forming a joint venture to develop and commercialize a cyclodextrin treatment based
22 on the Hempels’ private research. This opportunity was particularly attractive for Cydan. The
23 Hempels had years of uniquely successful medical research related to NPC, and had developed a de-
24 tailed business plan to commercialize all their research and development. Moreover, because NPC is
25 an ultra-rare pediatric disease, successful development of a therapeutic drug treatment for NPC
26 would entitle the developer to a “Priority Review Voucher” from the FDA. A Priority Review
27 Voucher is transferable, and may be used to expedite the FDA review of any other drug, particularly
28 3
1 those with wider indications of use, effectively accelerating the FDA approval process by two to
2 three years. Priority Review Vouchers have sold for as much as $350 million.
3 8. In September 2013, the Hempels entered into a confidentiality agreement with Cydan
4 that prohibited Cydan from using the Hempels confidential information for any purpose other than
5 consideration of a possible joint venture. Pursuant to that confidentiality agreement, the Hempels
6 shared virtually everything they had developed over the previous four years with Cydan: among oth-
7 er things, their commercialization plan, their industry contacts, their confidential medical research,
8 treatment results and patient data, and their FDA submissions. For months thereafter, the parties dis-
9 cussed and developed their joint venture.
10 9. In the spring of 2014, Cydan broke off its communications with the Hempels, without
11 explanation. Without the Hempels’ knowledge, Cydan formed an affiliate, Vtesse, which was dedi-
12 cated to developing intrathecal cyclodextrin injections for NPC—the very treatment path the
13 Hempels had been pursuing for several years. Upon information and belief, Cydan incorporated the
14 Hempels’ confidential information and trade secrets into Vtesse’s research and commercial efforts.
15 Cydan placed its executives—the same executives who had negotiated and signed the confidentiality
16 agreement with the Hempels on behalf Cydan—on Vtesse’s board of directors. And Vtesse enlisted
17 intramural and extramural NIH researchers who also had the same access to the Hempels’ confiden-
18 tial drug development information and medical data and began working with them to develop the
19 identical treatments the Hempels had been developing.
20 10. On January 6, 2016, Vtesse announced that the FDA had granted “Breakthrough
21 Therapy” status to Vtesse’s cyclodextrin drug, VTS-270, which is a 2HPβCD molecule virtually
22 identical to the molecule the Hempels’ had been developing. Breakthrough Therapy status enables
23 the FDA to grant priority review for drug candidates, where preliminary clinical trials indicate that
24 the therapy may offer substantial treatment advantages over existing options for patients with serious
25 or life-threatening diseases. Upon information and belief, Vtesse would not have obtained Break-
26 through Therapy status for its drug, VTS-270, without the Hempels’ confidential business, patient
27 and research and development data.
28 4
1 11. In April 2017, Vtesse announced that it had been acquired by Sucampo Pharmaceuti-
2 cals for $200 million. Sucampo’s valuation of Vtesse was based upon the expected approval of cy-
3 clodextrin for the treatment of NPC, and the expected Priority Review Voucher that would be grant-
4 ed to Vtesse.
5 12. With this action, the Hempels seek remedies from Cydan, Vtesse, and Sucampo, in-
6 cluding compensation for Cydan’s breach of the parties’ confidentiality agreement, misappropriation
7 of the Hempels’ confidential information, and unjust enrichment associated with the approval of
8 VTS-270, the sale of Vtesse to Sucampo, and proceeds realized from sales of VTS-270.
9 PARTIES
10 13. Plaintiffs Addison, Cassidy, Christine, and Hugh Hempel are natural persons domi-
11 ciled in Reno, Nevada.
12 14. Plaintiff Solution Therapeutics, Inc., is an entity wholly-owned by the Hempels,
13 which is headquartered at the Hempels home in Reno, Nevada.
14 15. Defendant Cydan Development, Inc. (“Cydan Development”) is a corporation orga-
15 nized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its primary place of business at 700 Technology
16 Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
17 16. Defendant Cydan II, Inc. (“Cydan II”) is a corporation organized under the laws of
18 the State of Delaware, with its primary place of business at 700 Technology Square, Cambridge,
19 Massachusetts. Upon information and belief, Cydan II is an affiliate or successor of Cydan Devel-
20 opment, which was organized by to continue Cydan Development’s mission.
21 17. Defendant Vtesse is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware,
22 with its primary place of business at 805 King Farm Blvd., Rockville, Maryland. Upon information
23 and belief, Vtesse is wholly-owned by Sucampo.
24 18. Defendant Sucampo is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Dela-
25 ware, with its primary place of business at 805 King Farm Blvd., Rockville Maryland. Upon infor-
26 mation and belief, Sucampo is the successor in interest to all of Vtesses’s assets and liabilities.
27
28 5
1 19. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, partnership, associa-
2 tion, or otherwise of Defendants named as Does I-X, and Roe Corporations I-V, inclusive, are un-
3 known to Plaintiff at this time. Plaintiffs such Defendants by fictitious name and will ask leave of the
4 Court to amend this Complaint when their identities are ascertained.
5 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6 20. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
7 1332(a)(2) because the Hempels are citizens of the State of Nevada, and Defendants are all citizens
8 of the states of Delaware, Maryland, and/or Massachusetts. The Court also has subject matter juris-
9 diction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c).
10 21. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substan-
11 tial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the District. The Hempels re-
12 side, or are headquartered, in this District, and the situs of the confidential material misappropriated
13 by Defendants is with the Hempels, who are domiciled in this District.
14 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
15 A. Background on Niemann-Pick Disease, Type C
16 22. As described by the National Institutes of Health:1

17 Niemann-Pick disease (NP) refers to a group of inherited metabol-
ic disorders known as lipid storage diseases. Lipids (fatty materials
18 such as waxes, fatty acids, oils, and cholesterol) and proteins are
19 usually broken down into smaller components to provide energy
for the body. In Niemann-Pick disease, harmful quantities of lipids
20 accumulate in the brain, spleen, liver, lungs, and bone marrow.
Neurological symptoms may include ataxia (lack of muscle control
21 during voluntary movements such as walking), loss of muscle tone,
brain degeneration, increased sensitivity to touch, spasticity (stiff
22 muscles and awkward movement), and slurred speech. Other
23 symptoms may include feeding and swallowing difficulties, eye
paralysis, learning problems, and an enlarged liver and spleen.
24 There may be clouding of the cornea and a characteristic cherry-
red halo develops around the center of the retina.
25
26
1
https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Niemann-Pick-Disease-Information-Page, visited
27 Dec. 31, 2017.
28 6
1 23. There are three different variations of Niemann-Pick disease—Types A, B, and C. As

2 it pertains to this action, Niemann-Pick disease, Type C, or NPC, may appear “early in life or devel-
3 op in the teen or adult years,” and is “caused by a lack of the NPC1 or NPC2 proteins.”
4 (Id.) “Affected individuals may have extensive brain damage that can cause an inability to look up
5 and down, difficulty in walking and swallowing, and progressive loss of vision and hearing. There
6 may be moderate enlargement of the spleen and liver.” And patients frequently experience psycho-
7 sis, dementia, hearing loss, bipolar disorder, and depression. NPC has often been referred to as
8 “Childhood Alzheimer’s.”
9 24. The life expectancy of person with NPC varies. “[S]ome individuals die in childhood
10 while others who appear to be less severely affected can live into adulthood.” (Id.) There is, howev-
11 er, currently no cure for NPC. Treatment is supportive. Children usually die from infection or pro-
12 gressive neurological loss.
13 B. After Addison and Cassidy are Diagnosed with NPC,
The Hempel Family Dedicates Their Lives to Organizing
14 and Funding Private Research to Develop an Approved Treatment and Cure
15 25. Addison and Cassidy Hempel are identical twin girls. They were born on January 23,
16 2004.
17 26. In 2005, the Hempel twins developed what appeared to be a severe case of mononu-
18 cleosis. After a year and a half of testing at major pediatric medical hospitals including Stanford and
19 UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital Oakland, the Hempel twins were diagnosed with NPC in 2007.
20 27. With no approved FDA treatments for NPC, the Hempels quickly assumed a role as
21 rare disease advocates and benefactors for NPC research.
22 28. Following the Hempel twins’ diagnoses in 2007, for example, the Hempels met with
23 Dr. Christopher Austin, a senior research director at the National Human Genome Research Institute
24 (“NHGRI”) of the NIH, to discuss possibilities for drug investigation. They began raising money for
25 NPC research, and generated millions in research dollars including funds that supported NHGRI.
26 The Hempels built upon organizing efforts with other parents of NPC patients, to collect (for exam-
27 ple) human biological samples from NPC children, for use in treatment and research efforts. And the
28 7
1 Hempels dedicated significant amounts of their personal wealth, time, and energy to the research ef-
2 fort. Since 2007, they have invested more than $3 million to research efforts, which includes their
3 personal time, and collected millions more in donations and in-kind contributions.
4 29. As they became immersed in NPC research efforts, the Hempels found a community
5 of medical and research investigators highly interested in NPC, in part because of potential connec-
6 tions between NPC as an ultra-rare genetic disease and its connection to Alzheimer’s Disease and
7 cholesterol diseases, and the hypothesis in medical science community that successful treatments for
8 NPC could lead to insights and treatments for these more common diseases. In addition, the
9 Hempel’s later learned of the connection between the NPC1 gene and Ebola and HIV viruses, put-
10 ting this obscure disease at center stage in numerous medical research fields.
11 30. In late 2007, Dr. Benny Liu, M.D., et al., published the first research paper suggesting
12 that cyclodextrin, i.e., 2HPβCD, could be used to treat NPC.
13 31. Upon learning of the Liu publication, the Hempels decided to pursue cyclodextrin
14 treatments for their twin daughters.
15 32. The Hempels and their team of doctors, scientists, and advisors developed and pub-
16 lished the first human cyclodextrin treatment protocols for intravenous and intrathecal cyclodextrin
17 therapy, which were all approved by the FDA.
18 33. On November 25, 2008, Dr. Caroline Hastings, UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital
19 Oakland, filed Individual Investigational New Drug Applications (“I-IND”) and the first human
20 treatment protocols with the FDA to treat the Hempel twins with intravenous cyclodextrin.
21 34. On March 18, 2009, the FDA approved I-IND treatment of cyclodextrin for the
22 Hempel twins.
23 35. On May 16, 2010, the FDA granted “Orphan Drug Status” to 2HPβCD for the treat-
24 ment of NPC. The designation was assigned to Dr. Caroline Hastings, the physician sponsor of the
25 Hempel twins’ I-INDs.
26 36. On September 23, 2010, UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital Oakland announced that
27 the FDA granted clearance to administer intrathecal cyclodextrin into the Hempel twins’ spinal
28 8
1 cords. This was the first time intrathecal cyclodextrin was delivered directly to the brain of any hu-
2 man patient—via the spinal cord—in an attempt to arrest a progressive and fatal neurological condi-
3 tion. At that time, the Hempel twins began a “combination treatment” regime of weekly intravenous
4 injections and semi-monthly intrathecal cyclodextrin treatments.
5 37. Over the course of 2011, the NIH began its own clinical trials of cyclodextrin treat-
6 ments, through its National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (“NCATS”) and National
7 Institute of Child Health and Human Development divisions (“NICHD”). The Hempels fully cooper-
8 ated with NIH efforts per their requests, with the understanding that the NIH investigations were not
9 in competition with the Hempels’ own research and clinical development efforts.
10 38. Indeed, whereas the Hempels and their medical research team were focused on intra-
11 venous and intrathecal treatments with cyclodextrin, the NIH focused on intracerebral treatments,
12 i.e., delivery of cyclodextrin directly into the brain through the scalp.
13 39. The NIH’s intracerebral cyclodextrin clinical trial ultimately failed after less than a
14 handful of NPC patients were treated due to infections introduced in the brain through an implanted
15 port. The NIH’s intracerebral clinical trial was terminated by both the NIH NICHD division and the
16 FDA on or about April or May 2013.
17 40. Meanwhile, the Hempels’ intravenous and intrathecal cyclodextrin treatment program
18 met with great success.
19 C. Cydan Misappropriates the Hempels’ Business Idea and Confidential
Information in Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement and Its Fiduciary Duties
20
41. With the success of their intrathecal cyclodextrin injections, the Hempels continued to
21
develop a business idea called Solution Therapeutics in 2011. The Hempels’ concept was to obtain
22
FDA approval for their intravenous and intrathecal cyclodextrin treatments, and ultimately receive a
23
Priority Review Voucher that they could sell to a pharmaceutical company. They intended to use the
24
money they earned from the sale of the Priority Review Voucher to fund future research in NPC and
25
ensure that NPC treatments were reasonably priced for those in the community.
26
27
28 9
1 42. The Hempels meticulously developed the Solution Therapeutics plan over the next
2 two years: they employed researchers, they compiled a library of medical data on their daughters,
3 which was wholly unique, they made confidential FDA filing, and they built industry relationships.
4 And they needed a financial partner to push the concept over the finish line.
5 43. On June 28, 2013, Chris Adams of Cydan contacted Hugh Hempel through LinkedIn
6 regarding a potential collaboration regarding the Hempels’ efforts to commercialize an intrathecal
7 injection of cyclodextrin to treat NPC.
8 44. Over the subsequent months, the parties developed a special relationship of trust and
9 confidence as they pursued a joint venture.
10 45. In furtherance of that special relationship, on September 12, 2013, the Hempels dis-
11 closed their confidential business plan for Solution Therapeutics (the “Business Plan”) to Cydan.
12 The Business Plan included a soup to nuts proposal for Solution Therapeutics, describing in detail a
13 business model predicated on five years of successful medical research of cyclodextrin that would
14 culminate in receipt of a Priority Review Voucher.
15 46. With their Business Plan, the Hempels gave Cydan an accelerated, clear, and risk-
16 reduced path forward. They delivered to Cydan a complete package that helped to convince Cydan
17 to move forward expeditiously with dramatically reduced due diligence.
18 47. The Business Plan suggested that the proceeds from Solution Therapeutics should be
19 distributed 50% to investors and 50% to non-profit efforts to fund additional treatments for the dis-
20 ease and to support families impacted by NPC.
21 48. In response to the Business Plan, the then-CEO of Cydan, Cristina Csimma, wrote by
22 email: “the work you have done is truly amazing.”
23 49. On September 13, 2013, Hugh Hempel met with Cydan for an in-person meeting to
24 discuss Solution Therapeutics.
25 50. The next day, Deborah Geraghty of Cydan sent a follow-up email to the Hempels, re-
26 questing a non-disclosure agreement for execution, and “access to your ‘server’ where you have data
27
28 10
1 and other background available for our review,” along with help from the Hempels in “[f]acilitating
2 an introduction to [Dr.] Daniel Ory at [Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis].”
3 51. Later that day, Hugh Hempel sent Cydan the “Agreement for Mutual Exchange of
4 Confidential Information” between Solution Therapeutics, Inc., and Cydan Development, Inc. (the
5 “NDA”), which was governed by Nevada law, along with links to all of the medical research and
6 data the family had compiled, including their numerous FDA filings regarding intrathecal and other
7 treatment routes of administration their team developed over several years.
8 52. The Confidentiality Agreement provided that Solution Therapeutics and Cydan De-
9 velopment “desire to enter into discussions regarding use of cyclodextrin as a therapeutic agent (the
10 ‘Agreement’) for the treatment of Niemann Pick Type C, Alzheimer’s Disease and/or Atherosclero-
11 sis (the ‘Subject Matter’) in order to determine the feasibility of entering into a business relationship
12 between the parties (the ‘Stated Purpose’).”
13 53. The Confidentiality Agreement defined the Hempels’ Confidential Information as
14 “any non-public information of [Solution Therapeutics], including without limitation, that relating to
15 current and planned drug and biologic delivery systems and agents, medical or diagnostic treatments
16 involving such systems and agents, business plans and financial and/or marketing information.”
17 54. The Confidentiality Agreement further stated, “Each party agrees to use the Confi-
18 dential Information of the other party solely for the Stated Purpose and for no other purpose whatso-
19 ever.”
20 55. The term of the Confidentiality Agreement was one year, i.e., until September 2014.
21 Cydan could not use any of the Hempels’ Confidential Information for any purpose for an additional
22 year after the term of the Confidentiality Agreement, i.e., until September 2015.
23 56. On September 17, 2013, Cydan returned a fully-executed copy of the Confidentiality
24 Agreement, signed by Cristina Csimma.
25 57. Thereafter, the Hempels provided Cydan with virtually everything they had devel-
26 oped over the previous five years. They gave Cydan the password to their online database that con-
27 tained, among other things, all information related to their daughters’ treatments with cyclodextrin,
28 11
1 their FDA applications and annual reports, and all other confidential information and trade secrets
2 the Hempels had compiled and created in relation to Solution Therapeutics.
3 58. Specifically, the Hempels provided Cydan with relationships, business ideas, patient
4 and treatment data, technology and intellectual property, and supporting documentary and human
5 knowhow.
6 59. Regarding relationships, the Hempels introduced Cydan to Drs. Daniel Ory, Steven
7 Walkley, Lajos Szente, Caroline Hastings, and Benny Liu, who were the preeminent NPC medical
8 and clinical researchers. The Hempels also introduced Cydan to key members of Johnson & Johnson
9 and the NIH, which ultimately helped to facilitate a faster path for FDA rare disease fast track desig-
10 nations.
11 60. Regarding the Hempels’ business idea, the Hempels included the concept of Priority
12 Review Vouchers, which was relatively misunderstood at the time, even by experienced venture cap-
13 ital and pharma executives at Cydan. The Hempels explained the multiple routes of administration
14 for cyclodextrin—intravenous, intrathecal, and intracerebral—and why the intrathecal method they
15 had championed was promising.
16 61. The Hempels also explained the potential additional indications for cyclodextrin,
17 from Atherosclerosis to HIV.
18 62. Regarding patient data, the Hempels supplied Cydan with extensive medical data and
19 results from the intrathecal cyclodextrin treatments on Addison and Cassidy. That data included
20 changes in their hearing, changes in their tau protein levels, pharmacokinetic studies, and urine sam-
21 ples. All of that highly confidential data established that the intrathecal injections of cyclodextrin
22 were promising treatment for NPC.
23 63. Regarding technology and intellectual property, the Hempels provided drug formula-
24 tions, study design elements and other high proprietary data developed with Johnson & Johnson and
25 their subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceutical. The Hempels had developed an alliance with Johnson &
26 Johnson to enable the production of 2HPβCD, the cyclodextrin molecule used by the Hempels’ clin-
27 ical researchers in the Hempel twins.
28 12
1 64. Over the subsequent months, Cydan and the Hempels continued to collaborate on
2 their joint venture and advance the Hempels’ plan for Solution Therapeutics. Their main point of
3 contact was Ms. Geraghty, with whom they built a strong business relationship and friendship.
4 65. On January 16, 2014, Cydan emailed the Hempels to say that they were moving for-
5 ward with the Solution Therapeutics project.
6 66. On or about February 14, 2014, Chris Adams of Cydan and Hugh Hempel had a con-
7 ference call to discuss the next steps.
8 67. Suddenly, in the late spring of 2014, communications with Cydan ceased. The
9 Hempels believed that Cydan had decided not to proceed with the Solution Therapeutics concept.
10 68. Around that same time, Ms. Geraghty abruptly left Cydan with no explanation.
11 69. Without the Hempels knowledge, Cydan breached its contractual and fiduciary obli-
12 gations to the Hempels and misappropriated their business idea and trade secrets for its own profit.
13 Upon information and belief, Cydan terminated Ms. Geraghty to prevent her from disclosing its mis-
14 conduct.
15 70. Unknown to the Hempels, Cydan surreptitiously spun out, formed, and incorporated
16 Vtesse on May 20, 2014, just eight months after signing the Confidentiality Agreement with the
17 Hempels. Vtesse and Cydan were affiliates because they were under control of the same investors.
18 Vtesse engaged Cydan to provide due diligence and start-up activities.
19 71. Vtesse was virtually identical to the Hempels’ proposal for Solution Therapeutics. It
20 was a biotech start-up dedicated to developing intrathecal cyclodextrin injections for NPC patients.
21 Vtesse’s business model and research focus were precisely what the Hempels had proposed, and
22 Vtesse was founded at least in part on the years of intrathecal cyclodextrin treatment data that Cydan
23 had misappropriated from the Hempels.
24 72. Indeed, Cristina Csimma and Chris Adams—Cydan executives who had reviewed the
25 Hempels’ Solution Therapeutics plans and the Hempels research and medical data and who had as-
26 sured the Hempels that Cydan was going forward with the Solution Therapeutics joint venture—
27 were directors of Vtesse.
28 13
1 73. Just eight months after forming, Vtesse publicly announced on January 7, 2015, that it
2 had been spun out from Cydan and had received financing to conduct a clinical program for VTS-
3 270—a formulation of 2HPβCD—for NPC, and to discover and pre-clinically evaluate additional
4 novel drugs for NPC.
5 74. The January 7, 2015, announcement was the first time the Hempels had ever heard of
6 Vtesse. Vtesse’s announcement about its directive paralleled the proposal the Hempels had made to
7 Cydan just one-year earlier.
8 D. Vtesse Also Misappropriates the Hempels’ Data Through Other Channels
9 75. Vtesse not only misappropriated the Hempels’ Confidential Information and trade se-
10 crets directly from Cydan, but also indirectly through those researchers who had access to the
11 Hempels’ Confidential Information and trade secrets via their relationships with the NIH. Vtesse
12 systematically vacuumed up all work based upon the Hempels’ data from every possible resource.
13 Below are three instances that the Hempels have discovered of Vtesse’s efforts to misappropriate
14 their trade secrets.
15 76. First, when it announced it had received financing to conduct a clinical program for
16 cyclodextrin, Vtesse simultaneously announced had entered into a “Cooperative Research and De-
17 velopment Agreement” (“CRADA”) with NIH/NCATS to work together on research and developing
18 intrathecal injections of cyclodextrin.
19 77. Upon information and belief, Vtesse entered into the CRADA with NIH/NCATS be-
20 cause Vtesse knew the NIH/NCATS had access to all of the data the Hempels had compiled and con-
21 fidentially disclosed to the FDA and NIH regarding the treating their twin daughters intrathecally
22 with cyclodextrin. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that, in the seven months between May 20, 2014 to
23 January 7, 2015, Vtesse could have been prepared to enter into the CRADA with NIH without the
24 underlying work/plans that the Hempels had disclosed to Cydan.
25 78. Second, in September 2013, Dr. Caroline Hastings granted Dr. Elizabeth Berry-
26 Kravis of Rush University Medical Center a Right of Reference (“ROR”) to the Hempels intrathecal
27
28 14
1 clinical data and FDA approved treatment protocols, including their data related to semi-monthly
2 dosing.
3 79. Three years later, on September 2, 2016, Vtesse announced a breakthrough and that,
4 in the Phase 2/3 part of the VTS-270 clinical trial, the frequency of the dosing was going to change
5 from monthly to semi-monthly. That “breakthrough” was premised on intrathecal research by the
6 Hempels and Dr. Berry-Kravis.
7 80. Thus, Vtesse had only achieved its “breakthrough” by misappropriating the Hempels’
8 data subject to the confidentiality and use restrictions of the ROR applicable to Dr. Berry-Kravis.
9 81. Third, Cydan misappropriated the Hempels data through its relationship with Dr.
10 Daniel Ory. At Cydan’s request, the Hempels introduced Cydan to Dr. Ory in the fall of 2013.
11 Thereafter, Cydan placed Dr. Ory on Vtesse’s scientific board of advisors. Upon information and
12 belief, Dr. Ory disclosed the Hempels’ confidential data to Vtesse for purpose of advancing its VTS-
13 270 clinical trials.
14 82. More specifically, as set forth above, beginning in 2011, the Hempels began cooperat-
15 ing with the NIH so that the NIH could pursue development of intracerebral treatments, in parallel to
16 the Hempels’ development of intravenous and intrathecal treatments.
17 83. Because the Hempels were several years further along in their research and develop-
18 ment to the NIH, the NIH requested a ROR to the Hempels’ data, to supplement its research on an
19 intracerebral cyclodextrin treatment. The NIH specifically assured the Hempels verbally and in writ-
20 ing that its clinical study was not competing with the Hempels’ intravenous and intrathecal research
21 and clinical efforts.
22 84. By the spring of 2013, the NIH had come to the conclusion that the intracerebral
23 treatment in NPC patients were unsuccessful due to infections and therefore the trial was placed on
24 clinical hold by both the NIH IRB and FDA.
25 85. Dr. Daniel Ory was directly involved with the failed intracerebral clinical trial at the
26 NIH. In an email dated May 7, 2013, Dr. Ory acknowledged that the intracerebral treatment had
27 failed and proposed that the NIH research group might switch to a clinical trial using intrathecal
28 15
1 treatments—in direct competition with the Hempels’ efforts. Dr. Ory was concerned, however, that
2 switching from intracerebral to intrathecal treatments would cause a huge setback, and could cause
3 problems for the NIH team in the patient community because the NIH team would be perceived as
4 starting over. Dr. Ory said it would take years to recreate the Hempels’ intrathecal medical data, and
5 said he hoped Dr. John McKew, an NIH/NCATS Director, could “engage FDA through back chan-
6 nels” to either accelerate FDA approval of the planned change to intrathecal delivery and/or gain ac-
7 cess to the Hempels’ intrathecal treatment data.
8 86. Dr. Ory explained to his colleagues at the NIH that the only way for the study to get
9 back on track quickly was if he had access to the Hempels’ data. He said he hoped to “capitaliz[e] on
10 the [Hempels’] single use IND experience with [intrathecal] and try to advance the dose selection
11 (200 mg/300 mg/400 mg). While starting at 50 mg would allow us to compare IT and ICV directly,
12 the community—and Jonathan [i.e., a member of the patient community]—will view this as starting
13 the trial over again. If the FDA would allow [us] to start at a higher do[se], based on the single use
14 IND experience, this has two benefits. First, it will likely accelerate the collection of data (positive
15 biochemical response) that are needed to plan the Phase 2 design. This may not satisfy all the fami-
16 lies, but it might allow Jonathan and others who are contemplating to justify staying the course. Se-
17 cond, it would show to the community that we are partnering with them by incorporating their expe-
18 rience in the trial design (i.e., FDA allowing us to start at 200 mg rather than 50 mg).”
19 87. Dr. McKew replied: “Can you summarize the doses the kids have taken so far via
20 IT?” Dr. Forbes Porter of the NIH/NCATS answered: “The information we had on the [Hempel]
21 twins was initially 175 mg and then increased to 350 mg every two weeks.”
22 88. Upon information and belief, Dr. Ory and/or the NIH team, successfully accessed
23 those “back channels” at the FDA to gain access to the Hempels’ data and/or accelerate FDA ap-
24 proval of the planned change to intrathecal cyclodextrin delivery. The NIH team did not spend years
25 compiling sufficient intrathecal clinical data. Instead, they leveraged and then utilized the Hempels
26 data to satisfy the FDA and various hospitals’ Internal Review Boards. Consequently, just four
27 months after saying he needed the Hempels data, the NIH launched a study September 21, 2013,
28 16
1 studying intrathecal treatments of NPC1 at higher dosage levels: “Intrathecal 2-hydroxypropyl-β-

2 cyclodextrin decreases neurological disease progression in Niemann-Pick disease, type C1: a non-
3 randomised, open-label, phase 1-2 trial.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28803710. As he
4 said in his May 7, 2013, email, Dr. Ory was able to dose patients at 50, 200, 300, or 400 mg per
5 month, rather than just 50mg. Upon information and belief, the FDA only permitted Dr. Ory’s team
6 to inject patients with 200, 300, and 400 mg per month because Dr. Ory had wrongfully accessed
7 and/or referenced the Hempels’ intrathecal data.
8 89. The Hempels had no knowledge of Dr. Ory’s and the NIH team’s use of their in-
9 trathecal data. Rather, because Dr. Ory shared their common goal of improving treatments for NPC,
10 the Hempels introduced him to Cydan at Cydan’s request.

11 90. Vtesse then misappropriated Dr. Ory’s and the NIHs access to, and knowledge of, the
12 Hempels’ intrathecal injection data for their own uses.
13 91. On October 15, 2017, Dr. Ory was the lead author on a study published in the Lancet
14 detailing the NIHs intrathecal clinical trial. That paper revealed that Vtesse had funded members of
15 the NIH team including Drs. Ory and Berry-Kravis through various grants. Moreover, Dr. Ory and
16 NIH employees including Dr. Forbes Porter had sat on Vtesse’s board of scientific advisors the en-
17 tire time.
18 E. Cydan, Vtesse, and Sucampo Capitalize on their Misappropriation
of the Hempels’ Confidential Information and Trade Secrets
19
92. On January 6, 2016, Vtesse announced that the FDA had granted Breakthrough Ther-
20
apy designation status to VTS-270, which is Vtesse’s name for its 2HPβCD drug for treatment of
21
NPC. Both the FDA and the European Medicines Agency had previously granted Orphan Drug sta-
22
tus to VTS-270.
23
93. Three months later, on April 3, 2017, Sucampo announced it had acquired Vtesse
24
from Cydan for upfront consideration of $200 million. Upon information and belief, Sucampo ac-
25
quired all of Vtesse’s assets and liabilities. As the successor entity, Sucampo is fully liable for
26
Vtesse’s misconduct.
27
28 17
1 94. On December 26, 2017, Mallinckrodt plc, a global specialty pharmaceutical compa-
2 ny, announced that it had entered into an agreement to acquire Sucampo, including its two commer-
3 cial assets and its two development assets, one of which is VTS-270. The total transaction value is
4 approximately $1.2 billion.
5 95. Because of these various and repeated violations of confidentiality agreements and
6 misappropriation of the Hempels’ trade secrets, Cydan, Vtesse, and Sucampo were enriched by hun-
7 dreds of millions of dollars and obtained exclusive control over a vital treatment for NPC sufferers.
8 Because of Cydan’s, Vtesse’s, and Sucampo’s misconduct, the Hempels and the NPC community
9 not only lost out on their share of the proceeds, which they would have used to finance future NPC
10 research, but they also effectively lost control of the future of cyclodextrin research, and the ability
11 to ensure fair product pricing for NPC patients. In short, Cydan, Vtesse, and Sucampo had not only
12 misappropriated the Hempels’ Confidential Information and trade secrets, but also the NPC commu-
13 nity’s autonomy.
14
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
15 BREACH OF CONTRACT (AGAINST CYDAN)
16 96. The Hempels repeat and reallege each and every one of the foregoing allegations as
17 though fully set forth herein.
18 97. The Hempels and Cydan entered into the Confidentiality Agreement on or about Sep-
19 tember 13, 2013.
20 98. The Confidentiality Agreement prohibited Cydan from using any information dis-
21 closed by the Hempels for any purpose except for the consideration of a joint venture.
22 99. Cydan could not use the Confidential Information for the term of one year, plus an
23 additional year. Thus, Cydan could not use the Confidential Information for any purpose other than
24 exploring a joint venture with the Hempels prior to September 15, 2015.
25 100. The Hempels performed their obligations under the Confidentiality Agreement.
26 101. In breach of the Confidentiality Agreement, Cydan used the Hempels’ Confidential
27 Information and trade secrets for their own purpose, creating Vtesse in May 2014, entering into the
28 18
1 CRADA with the NIH in January 2015, getting FDA approval to use of VTS-270, obtaining a rare
2 pediatric disease designation that put it in line to receive a Priority Review Voucher, and selling
3 Vtesse for $200 million to Sucampo.
4 102. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ breach of the Confidentiality Agree-
5 ment, the Hempels have been irreparably harmed and Defendants must disgorge their profits.
6 103. Defendants’ breach of the Confidentiality Agreement was with reckless, willful, or
7 callous disregard for the Hempels’ rights and with malice, fraud, or oppression toward them, thereby
8 entitling the Hempels to an award of punitive damages in accordance with proof at trial.
9
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
10 BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (AGAINST CYDAN)
13 105. Cydan was the Hempels’ joint venturer. The Hempels reposed special trust in and
14 confidence in Cydan. This relationship developed from their first communications with Chris Adams
15 of Cydan (and later Vtesse) in June 2013, and over the subsequent months when the parties worked
16 together toward a common goal of creating a start-up dedicated to developing cyclodextrin treat-
17 ments for NPC. That special relationship was initiated by Cydan. Moreover, by that special relation-
18 ship, Cydan gained control over the Hempels’ Business Plan, Confidential Information, and trade
19 secrets. That special relationship was codified in the Confidentiality Agreement, which prohibited
20 Cydan from using the Hempels’ Confidential Information for its own benefit.
21 106. By creating and fostering this relationship of trust, Cydan had a fiduciary duty of
22 care, loyalty, and good faith to the Hempels.
23 107. Cydan violated its fiduciary duties when it used the Hempels’ Confidential Infor-
24 mation for its own profit without the Hempels’ permission and to the Hempels’ detriment.
25 108. There were no intervening causes that prevented the Hempels from participating in
26 the joint venture with Cydan, or from otherwise reaping their share of the proceeds.
27
28 19
1 109. As the direct and proximate cause of the Cydan’s breach of its fiduciary duties, the
2 Hempels has been damaged and Cydan has been unjustly enriched and must disgorge all profits in an
3 amount to be determined at trial.
4 110. Cydan acted with reckless, willful, or callous disregard for the Hempels’ rights and
5 with malice, fraud, or oppression toward the Hempels, thereby entitling the Hempels to an award of
6 punitive damages in accordance with proof at trial.
7
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
8 UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AGAINST VTESSE AND SUCAMPO)

11 112. Upon information and belief, Cydan received approximately $200 million from the
12 sale of Vtesse, in large part because of the Hempels’ efforts. Mallinckrodt is buying Sucampo for
13 $1.2 billion, a significant portion of which is due to the value of VTS-270, the potential revenue
14 generated thereby, and the potential entitlement to a Priority Review Voucher.
15 113. Vtesse’s and Sucampo’s use of the Hempels’ Confidential Information is not gov-
16 erned by the terms of any agreement.
17 114. Vtesse and Sucampo inequitably used the Hempels’ Confidential Information.
18 115. The Hempels’ efforts directly enriched Vtesse and Sucampo to the Hempels’ detri-
19 ment.
20 116. It would be inequitable to permit Vtesse and Sucampo to retain the benefits of the
21 Hempels’ efforts.
22 117. As the direct and proximate cause of Vtesse’s and Sucampo’s malfeasance, they have
23 been unjustly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial, and such amount must be disgorged to
24 the Hempels.
25
26
27
28 20
1 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE (AGAINST VTESSE AND SUCAMPO)
2
5 119. The Hempels had a valid contract (i.e., the Confidentiality Agreement) or economic
6 expectancy with Cydan.
7 120. Vtesse, by means of its affiliate relationship with Cydan and the direct knowledge of
8 individuals associated with both Cydan and Vtesse, knew about the contract and economic expectan-
9 cy between the Hempels and Cydan.
10 121. Vtesse intended to interfere the Hempels’ contract or economic expectancy.

11 122. Vtesse intentionally and wrongfully pursued the Hempels’ business plan in develop-
12 ing cyclodextrin, and to the exclusion of the Hempels’ contractual rights of confidentiality and their
13 economic interest in a joint venture with Cydan.
14 123. Vtesse actually interfered with the Hempels’ contractual rights an economic expec-
15 tancy, by obtaining and misappropriating the Hempels’ Confidential Information and trade secrets,
16 and by pursuing the Hempels’ Business Plan to success, to the exclusion of the Hempels’ interests.
17 124. Vtesse’s interference with the Hempels’ interests and economic expectancy was im-
18 proper, because it was pursued by means of wrongful conduct, i.e., the misappropriation of the
19 Hempels’ Confidential Information and trade secrets.
20 125. As the successor in interest to Vtesse’s liabilities, Sucampo is liable for Vtesse’s tor-
21 tious interference.
22 126. The Hempels’ have been damaged and irreparably injured as a result of Vtesse’s con-
23 duct, in an amount to be determined at trial, as a result of Vtesse’s interference with the Hempels’
24 contractual rights and economic interests with Cydan.
25
26
27
28 21
1 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

CONVERSION (AGAINST VTESSE AND SUCAMPO)
2
5 128. The Hempels had a proprietary right in their Confidential Information that they dis-
6 closed to Cydan.
7 129. Vtesse and Sucampo asserted wrongfully exerted dominion over the Hempel’s Confi-
8 dential Information in a manner that was inconsistent with the Hempels’ title, by using the Hempel’s
9 Confidential Information for their own purposes in violation of contract and law.
10 130. As the direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ malfeasance, they have been unjust-
11 ly enriched in an amount to be determined at trial, and such amount must be disgorged to the
12 Hempels.
13
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
14 VIOLATION OF THE NEVADA UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT,
NRS 600A.010 ET. SEQ. (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)
15
18 132. The Hempels possessed viable trade secrets, including, but not limited to, their Busi-
19 ness Plan, their Confidential Information, formulas, data compilations, devices, methods, techniques,
20 systems, processes, procedures, the years of medical data they had compiled from the intravenous
21 and intrathecal cyclodextrin treatments on their daughters, and their FDA submissions, which are
22 extremely confidential and derive independent economic value from not being generally known to,
23 and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other persons who can ob-
24 tain commercial or economic value from their disclosure or use.
25 133. The Hempels took adequate measures and maintained the foregoing information and
26 technology as trade secrets, which secrecy was guarded and not readily available to others.
27
28 22
1 134. Defendants intentionally, and with reason to believe that their actions would cause in-
2 jury to the Hempels, misappropriated and exploited the trade secret information through use, disclo-
3 sure, or non-disclosure of the use of the trade secret for Defendants’ own use and personal gain.
4 135. The misappropriation is wrongful because it was made in breach of an expressed or
5 implied contract, and because Defendants had a duty not to disclose the trade secrets.
6 136. The Hempels have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Otherwise,
7 Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their misappropriation and must disgorge their ill-gotten
8 profits.
9 137. Defendants acted with reckless, willful, or callous disregard for the Hempels’ rights
10 and with malice, fraud, or oppression toward them, thereby entitling the Hempels to an award of
11 double damages and/or disgorgement and punitive damages in accordance with proof at trial.
12
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13 VIOLATION OF THE DEFENSE OF TRADE SECRETS ACT,
18 U.S.C. § 1836 (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)
14
17 139. The Hempels possessed viable trade secrets, including, but not limited to, their Busi-
18 ness Plan, their Confidential Information, formulas, data compilations, devices, methods, techniques,
19 systems, processes, procedures, the years of medical data they had compiled from the intravenous
20 and intrathecal cyclodextrin treatments on their daughters, and their FDA submissions, which are
21 extremely confidential and derive independent economic value from not being generally known to,
22 and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other persons who can ob-
23 tain commercial or economic value from their disclosure or use.
24 140. The Hempels took adequate measures and maintained the foregoing information and
25 technology as trade secrets, which secrecy was guarded and not readily available to others.
26
27
28 23
1 141. Defendants intentionally, and with reason to believe that their actions would cause in-
2 jury to the Hempels, misappropriated and exploited the trade secret information through use, disclo-
3 sure, or non-disclosure of the use of the trade secret for Defendants’ own use and personal gain.
4 142. The misappropriation is wrongful because it was made in breach of an expressed or
5 implied contract, and because Defendants had a duty not to disclose the trade secrets.
6 143. The Hempels have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Otherwise,
7 Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their misappropriation and must disgorge their ill-gotten
8 profits.
10 and with malice, fraud, or oppression toward them, thereby entitling the Hempels to an award of
11 double damages and/or disgorgement and punitive damages in accordance with proof at trial.
12
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
13 CIVIL CONSPIRACY (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)
16 146. Upon information and belief, Cydan and Vtesse agreed and conspired among them-
17 selves to deprive the Hempels of the value of their efforts.
18 147. Cydan and Vtesse wrongfully misappropriated the Hempels’ Confidential Infor-
19 mation and trade secrets for their mutual profit and benefit.
20 148. Cydan and Vtesse directly profited by the unlawful acts of their co-conspirators.
21 149. As the successor in interest to Vtesse’s liabilities, Sucampo is liable for Vtesse’s un-
22 lawful conduct as a co-conspirator.
23 150. As a direct and proximate cause of the unlawful acts by Cydan and Vtesse, the
24 Hempels have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.
26 and with malice, fraud, or oppression toward the Hempels, thereby entitling the Hempels to an award
27 of punitive damages in accordance with proof at trial.
28 24
1 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

2 152. The Hempels hereby demand a trial by jury on all claims and issues to triable.
3 WHEREFORE, the Hempels respectfully request entry of judgment after a jury trial:
4 1. awarding the Hempels damages and/or disgorgement in an amount to be determined
5 at trial, but no less than $100,000,000;
6 2. awarding the Hempels double damages and/or disgorgement in an amount to be de-
7 termined at trial;
8 3. awarding the Hempels punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
9 4. awarding the Hempels pre-judgment interest on any recovery;
10 5. awarding the Hempels their costs and disbursements, including attorney’s, account-
11 ant’s, and expert witness’s fees; and granting the Hempels such other and further relief as the Court
12 deems just and proper.
13 DATED: January 5, 2018. THE O’MARA LAW FIRM, P.C.
14
15 /s/ David C. O’Mara
DAVID C. O’MARA
16
JOSHUA L. SEIFERT PLLC
17 Joshua L. Seifert, Esq.
18 jseifert@seifertpllc.com
175 Varick Street
19 New York, NY 10014
(646) 460-0003
20
SLARSKEY LLC
21 David Slarskey, Esq.
22 dslarskey@slarskey.com
800 Third Avenue, 18th Floor
23 JOSHUA L. SEIFERT PLLC
24
25
26
27
28 25
Case 3:18-cv-00008 Document 1-1 Filed 01/05/18 Page 1 of 1

Hempel Vs Cydan Et Al-Complaint

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hempel Vs Cydan Et Al-Complaint

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 3:18-cv-00008 Document 1 Filed 01/05/18 Page 1 of 25

1 THE O’MARA LAW FIRM, P.C.

17 ADDISON HEMPEL, CASSIDY

16 22. As described by the National Institutes of Health:1

1 23. There are three different variations of Niemann-Pick disease—Types A, B, and C. As

1 studying intrathecal treatments of NPC1 at higher dosage levels: “Intrathecal 2-hydroxypropyl-β-

10 the Hempels introduced him to Cydan at Cydan’s request.

10 though fully set forth herein.

1 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

10 121. Vtesse intended to interfere the Hempels’ contract or economic expectancy.

1 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

1 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

You might also like