BPI vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court GR# L-66826, August 19, 1988

Facts: Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An
application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain
Leovigilda Dizon. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account of
the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable
to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from the
bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother
of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation
payable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?

Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping.
The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars
and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over
five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of
safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

TRIPLE-V FOOD SERVICES INC. vs. FILIPINO MERCHANTS INSURANCE

COMPANY, GR. No. 160554, February 21, 2005

FACTS: Mary Jo-Anne De Asis dined at petitioner's Kamayan Restaurant. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon
Model 1995 issued by her employer Crispa Textile Inc.. On said date, De Asis availed of the valet parking service of
petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner's valet counter. Afterwards, a certain Madridano, valet attendant,
noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants usually keep the keys
of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein
respondent Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. Having indemnified Crispa for the loss of the subject vehicle,
FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa's rights, filed
with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc. Petitioner claimed that the
complaint failed to adduce facts to support the allegations of recklessness and negligence committed in the safekeeping
and custody of the subject vehicle. Besides, when De Asis availed the free parking stab which contained a waiver of
petitioner’s liability in case of loss, she had thereby waived her rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Triple-V Food Services, Inc. is liable for the loss.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. In a contract of deposit, a person receives an object belonging to
another with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted even without any
consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary receives a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted
for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of
deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free
valet parking service.

CA Agro-Industrial vs CA, G.R. No. 90027 March 3, 1993

Facts
 Petitioner (through its President) purchased 2 parcels of land from spouses Pugao for P350 K with a downpayment of
P75 K.
 Per agreement, the land titles will be transferred upon full payment and will be placed in a safety deposit box (SBDB) of
any bank. Moreover, the same could be withdrawn only upon the joint signatures of a representative of the Petitioner
and the Pugaos upon full payment of the purchase price.
 Thereafter, Petitioner and spouses placed the titles in SDB of Respondent Security Bank and signed a lease contract
which substantially states that the Bank will not assume liability for the contents of the SDB.
 Subsequently, 2 renter's keys were given to the renters — one to the Petitioner and the other to the Pugaos. A guard
key remained in the possession of the Respondent Bank. The SDB can only be opened using these 2 keys
simultaneously.
 Afterwards, a certain Mrs. Ramos offered to buy from the Petitioner the 2 lots that would yield a profit of P285K.
 Mrs. Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the certificates of
title. Thus, Petitioner with the spouses went to Respondent Bank to retrieve the titles.
 However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the SDB yielded no such certificates.
 Because of the delay in the reconstitution of the title, Mrs. Ramos withdrew her earlier offer to purchase the lots; as a
consequence, the Petitioner allegedly failed to realize the expected profit of P285K.
 Hence, Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Respondent Bank.
 Lower courts ruled in favour of Respondent Bank. Thus, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the disputed contract is an ordinary contract of lease?
2. Whether or not the provisions of the cited contract are valid?
3. Whether or not Respondent Bank is liable for damages?

Ruling:
1. No. SC ruled that it is a special kind of deposit because:
 the full and absolute possession and control of the SDB was not given to the joint renters — the Petitioner and the
Pugaos.
 The guard key of the box remained with the Respondent Bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open
the box and vice versa.
 In this case, the said key had a duplicate which was made so that both renters could have access to the box.
 Moreover, the renting out of the SDBs is not independent from, but related to or in conjunction with, the principal
function of a contract of deposit the receiving in custody of funds, documents and other valuable objects for
safekeeping.

2. NO. SC opined that it is void.

 Generally, the Civil Code provides that the depositary (Respondent Bank) would be liable if, in performing its
obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or contravention of the tenor of the agreement.
 In the absence of any stipulation, the diligence of a good father of a family is to be observed.
 Hence, any stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the loss of the thing deposited on
account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being contrary to law and public policy (which is present in
the disputed contract)
 Said provisions are inconsistent with the Respondent Bank's responsibility as a depositary under Section 72(a) of
the General Banking Act.

3. NO. SC ruled that:

 no competent proof was presented to show that Respondent Bank was aware of the private agreement between
the Petitioner and the Pugaos that the Land titles were withdrawable from the SDB only upon both parties' joint
signatures,
 and that no evidence was submitted to reveal that the loss of the certificates of title was due to the fraud or
negligence of the Respondent Bank.
ASSOCIATED BANK (Now WESTMONT BANK) vs. TAN

FACTS:
Respondent Tan is a businessman and a regular depositor-creditor of the petitioner, Associated Bank. Sometime in
September 1990, he deposited a postdated check with the petitioner in the amount of P101,000 issued to him by a certain
Willy Cheng from Tarlac. The check was duly entered in his bank record. Allegedly, upon advice and instruction of
petitioner that theP101,000 check was already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, respondent, on the same date,
withdrew the sum of P240,000 from his account leaving a balance of P57,793.45. A day after, TAN deposited the amount
of P50,000 making his existing balance in the amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his business
partners. However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him alleging that the checks he issued bounced for
insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner to take positive steps regarding the matter for he has
adequate and sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless, petitioner did not bother nor offer
any apology regarding the incident. Respondent Tan filed a Complaint for Damages on December 19, 1990, with the RTC
against petitioner. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay damages and
attorney’s fees. Appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision. CA ruled that the bank should not have authorized
the withdrawal of the value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner has the right to debit the amount of the dishonored check from the account of respondent on the ground
that the check was withdrawn by respondent prior to its clearing

HELD:

The Petition has no merit.

The real issue here is not so much the right of petitioner to debit respondent’s account but, rather, the manner in which it
exercised such right. Banks are granted by law the right to debit the value of a dishonored check from a depositor’s
account but they must do so with the highest degree of care, so as not to prejudice the depositor unduly. The degree of
diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship
with their depositors is concerned. In this case, petitioner did not treat respondent’s account with the highest degree of
care. Respondent withdrew his money upon the advice of petitioner that his money was already cleared. It is petitioner’s
premature authorization of the withdrawal that caused the respondent’s account balance to fall to insufficient levels, and
the subsequent dishonor of his own checks for lack of funds.

YHT REALTY CORP. VS. CA

FACTS:

On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box as it
was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips.

McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he
placed in two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five
Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in another
envelope; two (2) other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2) bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side
by side inside the safety deposit box.

After returning to Manila, he checked out of Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived in
Australia, he discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of Five Thousand US
Dollars (US$5,000). He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box
upon his return to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his lawyer which resulted to the filing of a complaint for damages on 3
December 1990 against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of McLoughlin's
money which was discovered on 16 April 1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners are liable for the loss of McLoughlin's money

RULING:

Petitioners are liable.

Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty of negligence, are
liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code
provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also,
this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting
and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer Thus, given the fact that the
loss of McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to open
the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as
owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.

The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity
presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court
found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling,
thus:

Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not
liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the
responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.

Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they allow
Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any
cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents
of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees.

The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal
property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers,
except as it may proceed from any force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper from
liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through
an irresistible force to qualify the same as force majeure.

SERRANO vs CENTRAL BANK

Facts: Serrano had P350K worth of time deposits in Overseas Bank of Manila. He made a series of encashment
but was not successful. He filed a case against Overseas Bank & he also included the Central Bank so that the latter may
also be jointly and severally liable. Serrano argued that the CB failed to supervise the acts of Overseas Bank and protect the
interests of its depositors by virtue of constructive trust.
Issue: W/N the Central Bank is liable?

Ruling: No. There is no breach of trust from a bank’s failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. Bank deposits are
in the nature of irregular deposits. All kinds of bank deposits are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on
loans Art.1980. In reality the depositor is the creditor while the bank is the debtor. Failure of the respondent bank to honor
the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor.

GUINGONA vs. CITY FISCAL OF MANILA

Facts:

From March 1979 to March 1981, Clement David made several investments with the National Savings and Loan
Association. On March 21, 1981, the bank was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral. Upon David’s request,
petitioners Guingona and Martin issued a joint promissory note, absorbing the obligations of the bank. On July 17, 1981,
they divided the indebtedness. David filed a complaint for estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related
regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Petitioners filed the
herein petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the public respondents to proceed with the preliminary investigation on the ground that
the petitioners’ obligation is civil in nature.

Issue:

(1) Whether the contract between NSLA and David is a contract of depositor a contract of loan, which answer determines
whether the City Fiscal has the jurisdiction to file a case for estafa

(2) Whether there was a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364

Held:

(1) When private respondent David invested his money on nine. and savings deposits with the aforesaid bank, the contract
that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. Hence, the relationship
between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently,
the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make
use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While
the Bank has the obligation to return theamount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver the same
money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through
misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability
over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.

But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent David would
constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal liability
was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners
Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of
the original contractual obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation
between the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and
private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of
private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a debtor.
Moreover, while it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal
liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that
petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to
private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981 with the Office of the
City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Fiscal. Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal liability would be avoided but there will still be a civil
liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the assumed obligation.

(2) Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated the request of the Nation Savings and loan Association in order to clear the
bank draft through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account. Immediately after the bank draft was
cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and Loan Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized
by the bank for its operations. It is safe to assume that the U.S. dollars were converted first into Philippine pesos before
they were accepted and deposited in Nation Savings and Loan Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed
the ordinary course of the business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the transaction was
regular and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that
they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they
investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents should be restrained from further
proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of
justice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO PORRAS

Facts: On 7 November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor's Office filed before RTC in Dumangas, Iloilo, 112 cases of Qualified Theft against
respondents Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who were the Cashier and Bookkeeper, respectively, of private complainant Rural Bank of
Pototan, Inc. It was alleged in the information that Teresita Puig and Romeo Porras took away P15,000 without the consent of the owner Bank to the
prejudice and damage of the bank. The RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of the information ruling that the real parties in interest are the
depositors-clients and not the bank because the bank does not acquire ownership of the money deposited in it. Hence petitioner Rural Bank went
directly to the court via petition for certiorari. Petitioner explains that under Article 1980 of the New Civil Code, "fixed, savings, and current deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loans." Corollary thereto, Article 1953 of the same Code
provides that "a person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor
an equal amount of the same kind and quality." Thus, it posits that the depositors who place their money with the bank are considered creditors of
the bank. The bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients, making the money taken by respondents as belonging to the bank.

Issue: Whether or not the Bank acquired ownership of the money deposited in it to be able to hold the respondents liable for qualified theft which
requires that there must be taking of the money without the consent of the owners.

Held: The petition is meritorious. Banks where monies are deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very clear not only from the express
provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and
debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:
 Article 1953.A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to
pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
 Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning loan.
In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, the Court has firmly established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits
therein, and the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has
consistently considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of
the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft. In summary, the Bank
acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of the
Bank due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy positions of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all the essential elements
constituting the crime of Qualified Theft.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated 30 January 2006 and 9 June
2006 of the RTC dismissing Criminal cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.