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1) G.R. No.

88694 January 11, 1993 duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint against him
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners, and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.
vs. Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a check which
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents. bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of "E.L. Woodworks,"
XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been
of P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene
The facts are not disputed. Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants
Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148). 1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter, 2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the 3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the 4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson was 5 costs.
informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile
registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance of
Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
one "Eugenio Baltao." On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand upon WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral damages
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's fees from
dishonored check. P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its other aspects.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)
thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, and Benjamin
business with Albenson. Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court erred in:
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against 1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious
Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code notwithstanding
affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is Article 2219 in relation to
circumstances were stated. Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . . .
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a 2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an unjust
business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by misdirection" and "was
Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed. therefore, actionable by itself," and which "became inordinately blatant and grossly
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was deprived of his basic right to notice and a
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given fair hearing in the so-called preliminary investigation . . . . "
Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, 3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and
was deemed to have waived his right. calculated", no evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping statement.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the Provincial 4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly and
Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an opportunity severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any 5. Awarding respondents —
dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has been accused of 5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of
having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check was not his. sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway 5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this
and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal of the connection merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a
information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 businessman, there being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected
is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.
preliminary investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said investigation. Fiscal 5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in the performance of his advised by counsel of their legal recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of damages to be made in favor of private
such an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6). respondent.
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious prosecution. Citing the Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of abuse of right. What
case ofMadera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent
absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed
his complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code. was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain check, and yielded the following results: from the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of was discovered that the President of Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one
one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe "Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks,
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao";
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. the check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private respondent demanding that he
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held make good the amount of the check. Counsel for private respondent wrote back and denied, among others,
responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related that private respondent ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued
to each other. As the eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21), the check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a warning to defendants to
combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it check the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private
has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to respondent wanted to clear himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have
conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.: Eugenio Baltao, Sr.,
articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72). Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao III (private respondent's son, who as it
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the principle of turned out later, was the issuer of the check). He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been business in the same building — Baltao Building — located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building. Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that
778 [1989]). the Eugenio Baltao who issued the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) wrote respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the complaint for violation of
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of BP Blg. 22.
the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
(Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals propitious by filing an action for damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to make good the amount of
is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to another may be made the means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an
basis for an award of damages. obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or
Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action
as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law
the bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus: could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not much difficulty in [1986]).
ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the admitted In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were ordered by and delivered
fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one
warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been dealing with Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos
(supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a case — a criminal case conducting business in the same building — he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that
no less — against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by
the Civil Code) cited by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra). respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right to complain. But that fiscal.
right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
pp. design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
44-45). charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently of each one, could be prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of
validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution
under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory damages, the records show that
Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a the same was based solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present
case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust
terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or
The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, [1991]). guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss — in business, trade,
stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements property, profession, job or occupation — and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and
aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not shown to exist. It is unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these
well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual damages in
probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs.
where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception rather than the general
suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary
Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]). damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. In the instant Moreover, in view of the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's
case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.
harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing
criminal complaint against private respondent. of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated Court, 155 SCRA 577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew
make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of the against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.
action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No.
and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.). 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private SO ORDERED.
respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or 2) G.R. No. 73642 September 1, 1989
reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages. RESTITUTO PALMA GIL and NESTOR PELAYO, petitioners,
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It is possible that with a vs.
more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that G.R. No. 73613-16 September 1, 1989.*
petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private respondent. Their RESTITUTO PALMA GIL and EUSEBIO G. PANTILLO, petitioners,
investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored vs.
check as the president of the debtor-corporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
the wrong individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be characterized as In a joint decision covering Criminal Case No. 9968, Criminal Case No. 9969, Criminal Case No. 9970 and
having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his Criminal Case No. 9971, the Sandiganbayan convicted Restituto Palma Gil of the crime of malversation
counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal (Criminal Case No. 9968); Restitute Palma Gil and Eusebio G. Pantillo of the crime of technical malversation
Mauro Castro upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of the (Criminal Case No. 9969); Restitute Palma Gil and Nestor Pelayo of the crime of falsification of public/
complaint. official document (Criminal Case No. 9970); and Restituto Palma Gil of violating section 3(h) of Republic Act
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 9970). The
the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, dispositive portion of the decision reads:
such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it WHEREFORE, the Court finds as follows:
erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning (1) The accused, Restitute Palma Gil y Basoc in Criminal Case No. 9968, guilty beyond reasonable
party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]). doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Government Property, punishable under
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstances
damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric in attendance, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12)
Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]). years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, 9,000 board feet relation thereto, and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
of yakal lumber worth P 53,100.00. In case of failure of restitution, said accused is ordered to pay to conspiring, confederating and helping one another diverted and applied a public fund under their
the municipality the sum of P 53,100.00, aside from costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered administration, which was appropriated for the Capital Improvement Program (CIP) of the
to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the value of the Municipality of Caraga in the fiscal year 1981, in the amount of P 78,000.00 to a public use, other
property embezzled; than that for which said fund was appropriated by law.
(2) The accused, Restituto Palma Gil y Basoc and Eusebio Pantillo y Galapo, in Criminal Case No. CONTRARY TO LAW (Rollo-73613-16, p. 50)
9969, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Technical Malversation Criminal Case No. 9970 — (People v. Restituto Palma Gil and Nestor Pelayo) —
punishable under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying That on or about the 8th day of July 1981, in the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, Philippines,
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences them each to ten percent (10 %) of the sum of the and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, public officers,
amount misapplied, considering that no damage or embarrassment to the public service has Restituto Palma Gil being the Municipal Mayor of Caraga, Davao Oriental, and Nestor Pelayo, being
resulted from such misapplication. Both accused are also ordered to pay their proportionate shares the Municipal Secretary of said municipality, taking advantage of their positions and in relation
of the costs. thereto, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspiring, confederating and helping
(3) The accused, Restituto Palma Gil y Basoc, Nestor Pelayo y Burgos, in Criminal Case No. 9970, one another caused the preparation and issuance of a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Falsification of Public/Official Caraga, Davao Oriental by making it appear that the Sangguniang Bayan had prepared a Resolution
Documents punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and there No. 47-81 approving and concurring the reversion and re-appropriation of the amount of P 78,000.00
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences them each to suffer an which fund was used for the Capital Improvement Program (CIP) of Caraga, Davao Oriental when
indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision they did not in fact so participate because in truth and in fact said SB Resolution No. 47-81 refers to
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to the appropriation of P l,000.00 from the Infrastructure Program of the Municipality of Caraga and said
pay a fine of P 2,000.00 each, plus their proportionate shares of the costs; and amount was a municipal aid to the BOA Primary School, Caraga, Davao Oriental.
(4) The accused, Restituto Palma Gil y Basoc in Criminal Case No. 9971, guilty beyond reasonable CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo-73613-16, pp. 50- 51)
doubt as principal of the crime of Violation of Sec. 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and there Criminal Case No. 9971 — (People v. Restituto Palma Gil) —
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate That on or about June to August, 1981, in the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, Philippines and
penalty ranging from three (3) years and one (1) day as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, he being
as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and to pay the costs. the Municipal Mayor of Caraga, Davao Oriental, taking advantage of his public position and in relation
The Tanodbayan is hereby directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine the thereto, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously directly or indirectly having financial or
existence of a probable cause with respect to Exhibits B, C, C-1 and 1, and to file the necessary pecuniary interest in the business contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
informations if so warranted. takes part in his official capacity as Mayor such as, in the hauling of 2,531 bags of cement and other
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Minister of Local Government and Community materials intended for various projects of the Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, by using his two
Development, New City Hall, Quezon City; the Provincial Governor and Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2) units of cargo trucks charging trucking fees thereof worth in the total sum of P 26,265.10 which
of Davao Oriental, Mati, Davao Oriental; and the Sangguniang Bayan, Caraga, Davao Oriental, for acts is (sic) prohibited by the Constitution or any existing laws, to the damage and prejudice of the
their informations and guidance." (Rollo-73613, pp. 131-133) government in the aforesaid sum of P 26,265.10.
The four informations filed by the Tanodbayan charged the above- mentioned persons, all public officers at CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo-73613-16, pp. 51- 52)
the time of the alleged commission of the offenses as follows: By agreement of the parties, separate hearings were held subject to the condition that the testimony of a
Criminal Case No. 9968 (People v. Restituto Palma Gil)- witness called to the stand by either the prosecution or the defense would pertain to any one or two or three
That on or about December 3, 1980, in the municipality of Caraga, Province of Davao Oriental, or all of the four (4) cases.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty as charged. The Sandiganbayan's joint
officer, he being the Municipal Mayor of said municipality, officially received eighty (80) cubic meters decision in these cases is now the subject matter of these consolidated petitions filed by all the accused.
of yakal logs by means of a Deed of Donation executed by Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc., to The petitioners assign the following errors:
the Municipality of Caraga, for the construction of Lugusan, Binogtuan, Nanaingan and Cuta bridges, A
of said municipality and as such, accountable for such government property, taking advantage of his THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING MAYOR PALMA GIL OF
public position, with grave abuse of confidence and in relation thereto, did then and there, wilfully, MALVERSATION IN G.R. NO. 73613 BY RELYING ON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF
unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate or embezzle or consent or through abandonment or HIS CLAIM THAT HE SUPPLIED THE LUMBER USED TO BUILD A CUTA BRIDGE
negligence, permit any other person to take such government property with an equivalent value in the RATHER THAN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND (P l77,000.00) PESOS, Philippine B
Currency, which he appropriated and converted to his personal use and benefit, to the damage and THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING MAYOR PALMA GIL AND
prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount. TREASURER PANTILLO IN G.R. NO. 73614 OF TECHNICAL MALVERSATION
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo-73613-16, p. 49) DESPITE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT INCLUSION OF PROJECTS IN
Criminal Case No. 9969-(People v. Restituto Palma Gil and Eusebio Pantillo)- THE CIP, OR CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, IS EQUIVALENT TO
That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1981, in the municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, Philippines APPROPRIATING BY LAW OR ORDINANCE A SPECIFIC PUBLIC FUND TO A
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, public officers, SPECIFIC PUBLIC USE AS REQUIRED IN ARTICLE 220 OF THE REVISED PENAL
namely, Restituto Palma Gil, a Municipal Mayor of Caraga, Davao Oriental and Eusebio G. Pantillo, a CODE. IN ANY EVENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN OVERLOOKED THE SIGNIFICANT
Municipal Treasurer of said municipality and as such, taking advantage of their public positions and in FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUE THAT (1) USE OF P 78,000.00 FROM THE CIP FOR
OTHER MUNICIPAL PROJECTS WAS MADE PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE AND THE facilitated the donation, the mayor "had a wide discretion in the use of the logs." (p. 81, Rollo- G.R. No.
CONSEQUENT DISBURSEMENTS WERE APPROVED BY THE PROVINCIAL 73642). Thus, the excess lumber, after the completion of repairs on Nanaingan bridge, was used in the
AUDITOR, AND (2) THAT THE CIP PROJECTS WERE EVENTUALLY ACCOMPLISHED. following municipal projects: 1) municipal high school building; 2) mini grandstand; 3) shade house; 4) part of
C the public market; and 5) 9,000 board feet were used to replace the quantity of lumber which the mayor had
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING MAYOR PALMA GIL AND NESTOR earlier purchased and advanced for the construction of the Cuta bridge, the high school building, the shade
PELAYO IN G.R. NO. 73615 AND 73642 OF FALSIFICATION OF SANGGUNIANG house, and the public market.
BAYAN RESOLUTION NO. 47-81 WHEN IT OVERLOOKED MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE The Sandiganbayan concedes that part of the donated logs were indeed used in the aforesaid projects.
IN EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE. However, it did not give credence to the mayor's allegation that he had earlier advanced 9,000 board feet for
D the construction of the Cuta bridge and the other municipal projects. The court said:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONVICTING MAYOR PALMA GIL IN G.R. NO. . . . [T]he excess lumber, after the construction of Nanaingan Bridge in 1981 was disposed of as
73616 OF VIOLATING R.A. 3019, SEC. 3 (H) BY NOT PROPERLY APPRECIATING follows: he took 9,000 board feet as replacement of the lumber used in Cuta Bridge which he paid
UNDISPUTED FACTS CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE SHOWING THAT THE for, and the rest were used in municipal projects like the mini grandstand, high school building,
ACCUSED DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION, OR SHARE IN shade house and partly in the public market. Which means that Mayor Palma Gil must be held
THE BENEFITS THEREOF CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED DECISIONS guilty of malversation of 9,000 board feet of yakal lumber. It does not matter if he really bought the
PARTICULARLY IN LIM YHI LUYA V. COURT OF APPEALS, 78 O.G. NO. 25, PP. 3208- lumber used in the construction of Cuta Bridge or not because no proof was introduced during the
3233 AND INSTEAD RELIED ON WEAK AND INCOMPLETE CIRCUMSTANTIAL trial to that effect, other than his say so (sic). What is clear and convincing is the testimony of
EVIDENCE. prosecution witness Luis Madanlo to the effect that in August or September, 1980, he and several
E others were hired by Mayor Palma Gil to handsaw logs into lumber of which 9,000 board feet were
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALL THE CASES IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER transported to Cuta through the Ministry of Public Highways trucks for the construction of the Cuta
THAT THE PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE Bridge. (See t.s.n., July 23,1985, pp. 8-9).
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PUBLIC PROJECTS INVOLVED IN THE ABSENCE OF GAIN Also clear and convincing is the testimony of prosecution witness Juan Ferrando who swore that he
OR BENEFIT DERIVED BY MAYOR PALMA GIL IN THE HAULING CONTRACT sent a written complaint to the District Forester of the Bureau of Forest Development stationed at
SUBJECT OF G.R. NO. 73616, WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. (pp. 15- 17, Lumbajon, Bagangon, Davao Oriental, about illegal cutting of yakal timber at Sacuan ,Manurigao,
Petitioners' Brief) Caraga, during March and April, 1980, by Luis Madanlo and another person, these two having been
The assigned errors submitted in G.R. Nos. 73613-16 are substantially the same as those submitted in G.R. hired by Mayor Palma Gil to handsaw the said logs for use in the construction of Cuta Bridge. The
No. 73642. The petitions clearly indicate that the petitioners question the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan written complaint was dated October 6,1980. (See Exhibit FF). This complaint was followed by a
insofar as its appreciation of the facts is concerned. telegram from the said witness on December 22, 1980 complaining about the inaction of the same
Under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 in relation to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, the district forester and his men. (See Exhibit GG).
factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are generally binding upon this Court. This general rule is, however, Thus, the evidence adduced in Criminal Case No. 9968 is: that the Cuta Bridge was constructed in
subject to some exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on June or July, 1980 with the use of 9,000 board feet of yakal lumber which were cut from the public
speculation, surmise and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave forests at Sacuan Manurigao Caraga, Davao Oriental, and that 9,000 board feet of yakal lumber
abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts are were appropriated by Mayor Palma Gil out of the donation which he received for the municipality
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and 6) the findings of fact of the from the Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc., for which he is answerable under Article 217 of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record. (Cesar v. Sandiganbayan, 134 SCRA Revised Penal Code. Considering that the price of yakal lumber in Caraga at the time was P 5.90
105 [1985]) per board feet, the 9,000 board feet which Mayor Palma Gil misappropriated is P 53,100.00 for
The petitioners contend that these cases fall under the exception to the general rule because the which he must be condemned under paragraph 4 of the aforesaid provision of the Revised Penal
Sandiganbayan's findings are contrary to the established facts and it has overlooked matters of substance in Code. (Rollo-73642, pp. 106-108)
the evaluation of the evidence. We rule that the testimonies of Luis Madanlo and Juan Ferrando did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the
G.R. No. 73613 (Criminal Case No. 9968) guilt of the mayor. In fact, their testimonies even bolster the mayor's defense. Thus, Madanlo's testimony to
It is not disputed that 80 cubic meters of yakal logs were donated by the Consolidated Plywood Industries, the effect that he was hired and paid by the mayor to handsaw logs into lumber intended for the Cuta bridge
Inc. to the municipality of Caraga as evidenced by a deed of donation dated December 31, 1980 (Exhibit gave credence to the mayor's stand that he advanced his own money to construct Cuta bridge. This
"L"); that Mayor Restituto Palma Gil by virtue of Resolution No. 122-80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the procedure is not at all unusual because according to Teodoro Palma Gil, a former governor and a former
municipality accepted the donation and that the logs were deposited in the mayor's premises. assemblyman of Davao Oriental, a "municipal mayor may commence a municipal project without a
The logs were intended "for use as bridge materials of the Lugusan, Binogtuan, Nanaingan and Cuta Bridge" previously approved appropriation, even using his own personal funds which he reimbursed later out of
as stated in the deed of donation. funds appropriated, subject to rules and regulations of accounting." (p. 93, Rollo, G.R. No. 73642) The
The evidence on record shows that the donated logs were not used in the Cuta bridge as construction on mayor's testimony that before he made the replacement, he first consulted Governor Rabat and was told to
this bridge was already completed in July 1980 before the donation of logs for the purpose could materialize. use the expense in any project of the town was not rebutted. Futhermore, the mayor, a businessman was
None of the logs were used in the Lugusan and the Binogtuan bridges because there was no program of considered one of the richest in the town and could well afford to advance his own money for municipal
work on the former bridge while the latter bridge is semi-concrete in nature. It was only in the repair of projects.
Nanaingan bridge wherein part of the donated logs were used. Instead, the resulting excess lumber was As regards Ferrando's complaints of illegal cutting of yakal against the mayor which he filed with the District
used in other municipal projects. The petitioners felt that no irregularities were committed in using the Forester of the Bureau of Forest Development, suffice it to state that, by Ferrando's own admission, no
donated logs on other pressing projects since according to then Governor Rabat of Davao Oriental who action was taken against the mayor. Considering the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to
the accused in criminal cases, we assume that no action was taken in the illegal cutting case because there Improvement Program (CIP) funds to fund new projects. Although it is a standard operating procedure that
was no sufficient basis for such action. This belies the credence given to the alleged source of the logs as copies of all resolutions of theSangguniang Bayan must be forwarded to the Provincial Secretary, this is not
testified by Ferrando. conclusive proof that copies of resolutions not found in the custody of the Provincial Secretary are non-
All these factors tend to show that the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the charge of existent. This is a matter of procedure taken after the passage of the resolution by the Sangguniang Bayan.
malversation against the mayor. The mayor satisfactorily explained that the donated logs were disposed of The point of query must be whether or not the Sanggunian Bayan really passed such a reversion Resolution.
to construct municipal projects. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove otherwise. This, it The Sangguniang Bayan was then composed of the mayor, the vice-mayor, Sangguniang Bayan members,
failed to do. There is absolutely no showing that the petitioners sold the excess lumber or used it for private the president of the association of barangay captains and the president of the Kabataang Barangay.
purposes or otherwise profited from the same. On the contrary, he fully accounted for the lumber because Exhibit B, which is a certified true copy of Resolution No. 4781 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Caraga
the municipal projects where it was used were actually constructed. approved the recommendation of the Municipal Development Committee embodied in the committee's
As pointed out by the petitioners, complainant Juan Ferrando himself credited the accused with having Resolution No. 1-81 to divert P 78,000.00 of Community Improvement Program (CIP) funds to other projects
constructed bridges and making land transportation possible between Caraga and the provincial capital of namely: mini- grandstand, shade house and part of the municipal park. It appears that except for Randy
Mati, Davao Oriental. When Davao Oriental was still part of Davao province, Caraga was accessible only by Cosme, the president of the Kabataang Barangay all members of the Sangguniang Bayan were present.
ferry service. After 1967, roads and bridges had to be started. The Sandiganbayan summarized the The evidence also shows that all except Vice-Mayor Bantayan admit that the reversion Resolution was taken
testimony on this point as follows: up and passed during the regular session on July 8, 1981.
As mayor, he has constructed buildings and other infrastructure projects for the The Vice-Mayor who testified for the prosecution stated that he came to know of the existence of the
Municipality of Caraga, like the Cuta Bridge which was accomplished in July, 1980; the resolution reverting P 78,000.00 during the month of August, 1981, yet he did not take any action; that in the
Binogtuan Bridge which was finished in 1982-83; the Nanaingan Bridge in 1981-82; the same month municipal secretary Nestor Pelayo approached him at his residence and requested him to sign
Lugusan Bridge in 1983-84; the concreting of Balanta and Osmena Streets in the town an already prepared resolution which appeared to have been taken up on July 8,1981 with him (Bantayan)
proper; the construction of a two- storey building for the municipal high school, the mini as the sponsor and which pertained to the P 78,000.00 reversion of municipal funds; that he did not agree
grandstand with basketball court, the mini-shade house and the extension of the park. with the proposition so he refused to sign the resolution; and that Exhibit C, a copy of a resolution
(Rollo of G.R. Nos. 73613-16, p. 95) appropriating P l,000.00 for the Boa Primary School is the resolution which was actually taken up and
It is true that all that is needed to find a public officer guilty of malversation is a failure to produce funds or approved on July 8, 1981 and which was numbered Resolution 47-81.
property for which he is accountable, on demand. However, if the funds or property were validly used for Far from making him a star witness for conviction, the statements made by Vice-Mayor Bantayan cast doubt
public purposes naturally they can no longer be produced. on his credibility. If he knew as early as August 1981, the falsification of the Resolution why then did he not
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it shall be prima facie evidence of take action against his political opponent? Why did he wait for a private citizen in the person of Fernando to
malversation when a public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property for investigate the matter? Furthermore, his statement that he was approached by Municipal Secretary Pelayo
which he is chargeable on demand by any duly authorized officer. That presumption of guilt is as regards the reversion Resolution must be totally discredited because Resolutions of the Sangguniang
founded on human experience and is valid. Albores v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 604) Bayan are signed by only two persons: the secretary who certifies to its correctness and the presiding officer
In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession who attests thereto. When this particular resolution was adopted, the presiding officer was the mayor who
public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession and that was then present during the session.
he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. An accountable public Pedro Benogsudan, the then municipal development coordinator of the municipality of Caraga also testified
officer may be convicted even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only that he was present during the Sangguniang Bayan session held on July 8, 1981 but no reversion resolution
evidence is that there is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain was passed. This testimony should not be given credence as against the positive statements of the
satisfactorily. (De Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337 [1982])." (Bacasnot v. Sandiganbayan, 155 presiding officer and the members considering that he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
SCRA 379, 382-383 [1987]) (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, Vice-Mayor Bantayan who was actually present during the session did not confirm Benogsudan's
There being a satisfactory explanation of the shortage, the presumption of guilt disappears. presence. On the other hand, the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan were one in saying that
G.R. NOS. 73614,73615, and 73642 Benogsudan was not present during the session. It was explained by the mayor that members of the
(Criminal Cases Nos. 9969 and 9970) Municipal Development Committee of which Benogsudan is a member may attend the session of the
In convicting Mayor Palma Gil and Municipal Treasurer Eusebio G. Pantillo of the crime of technical Sangguniang Bayan if they are required by the mayor or if they ask permission from the mayor. In this
malversation and Mayor Palma Gil and Municipal Secretary Nestor Pelayo of the crime of falsification of particular session, Benogsudan never asked permission to attend the session. Neither was he required to
document, the Sandiganbayan relied on the supposed several flaws in the claims of the defense which attend the session.
engendered in the mind of the Court serious doubts as to the truth of the testimonies of the witnesses. Another factor which negates Benogsudan's credibility is the fact that he also claimed that the Municipal
This is incorrect. Development Committee never met on July 3, 1981 and, therefore, never passed Resolution No. 1-81,
The well-entrenched principle is that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the which paved the way for the enactment of the reversion Resolution. Significantly, even the prosecution does
weakness of the defense. Following this principle, we find, on the contrary, that there are flaws in the not believe him because no charges for the falsification of this Resolution were filed against the members of
evidence of the prosecution which engender reasonable doubt in our minds as to the culpability of the the committee namely, Kagawad Pedro de Guzman, Municipal Treasurer Pantillo, the Secretary of the
petitioners. Committee, Mr. Adelito Lozano and Mayor Palma Gil who is the Chairman. In fact, in the complaint filed by
We next take up the falsification charge against Mayor Palma Gil and Municipal Secretary Nestor Pelayo. Ferrando against the petitioners with the Tanodbayan, he never questioned the validity of Resolution 1-81 of
In this regard, the court relied heavily on complainant Fernando's testimony to the effect that he was not able the Municipal Development Committee which recommended the reversion of P 78,000.00 CIP funds to other
to secure from the provincial secretary a copy of Resolution 47-81, the reversion resolution and the alleged municipal projects. He stated:
refusal of the municipal secretary to give him a copy of the subject Resolution. These facts even if true are xxx xxx xxx
not convincing proof of the nonexistence of Resolution 47-81 which reverts P 78,000.00 of Capital
4) On July 3, 1981, the Municipal Development Committee of the Municipality of Caraga G.R. NO. 73616-CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9971
approved Resolution No. 1-81 reverting the appropriations for the CIP projects mentioned In finding the mayor guilty of violating section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act No. 3019, as
in paragraph 3 hereof and re-appropriated the amounts as follows . . . . (Exhibit 2, p. 2) amended) the Sandiganbayan dwelt on circumstances which convinced the court that the mayor is guilty as
As regards the prosecution's insistence that Resolution No. 47-81 refers to the appropriation of P l,000.00 charged.
municipal aid to the Boa Primary School, and not the reversion resolution as was indicated in a copy of The record shows that to prove the mayor's violation of the Anti- Graft Law, the prosecution presented the
Resolution No. 47-81 which Ferrando secured from the provincial secretary, municipal secretary Pelayo testimonies of Cayetano Iturralde and Rogelio Bacalla:
explained: 1) during the month of July, 1981, copies of the resolutions taken up in the July 8, 1981 session Cayetano Iturralde executed an affidavit, Exhibit R, the contents of which he affirmed except as to
of the Sangguniang Bayanwere distributed to the different officers like the municipal treasurer, the provincial paragraph 10 thereof which he clarified by executing a supplemental affidavit, Exhibit R-1 before he
auditor and the provincial secretary; 2) the assignment of the number to resolutions of the Sangguniang came to Manila to testify in the instant cases. In Exhibit R, he declared that he is the operator of the
Bayan is done when the minutes of the session are transcribed by the clerk; 3) he assigned said numbers of CMI Trucking with one (1) cargo truck under "TH" denomination; that sometime in June, 1981, Mayor
the resolutions previously passed; 4) that when the barangay captain of Boa asked for a copy of the Palma Gil's driver by the name of Roger approached him with the information that the said mayor is
resolution appropriating P l,000.00 for his school, he discovered that there were two (2) resolutions bearing awarding to him a contract to haul cement and other materials intended for Caraga; that he told
the same number, that is 47-81 which is the reversion resolution and the Boa resolution, hence in order to Roger he could not accept the contract because he has only one (1) unit which he is using for
distinguish one from the other, he added "A" to the latter resolution and placed his initial "P" after it, but he previous contracts; that Roger informed him that the two (2) cargo trucks of Mayor Palma Gil may be
did not alter the contents thereof. used by him; that he agreed and Mayor Palma Gil's two (2) cargo trucks were used to haul lumber,
These two resolutions were adopted in the July 8, 1981 session of the Sangguniang Bayan as reflected in G.I. corrugated iron sheets, cement, nails, round bars, M.T., Drums, diesel oil and hardware, wherein
the minutes of the session (Exhibit 1). Hence, the municipal secretary's explanations as regards the same trucking fees in the amount of P16,577.10 were paid by the government after he issued the waybills
number (47-81) designating the two (2) resolutions appear plausible and satisfactory. Apparently, this for said cargoes; that the payments were collected by Mayor Palma Gil through Roger who gave the
confusion resulting from two resolutions having the same number became known and was taken advantage information that the Mayor needed the money for certain obligations; that there are many more
of by some persons to file a complaint for falsification against the mayor and the municipal secretary. cargoes for the municipality of Caraga which needed hauling, to which he consented provided
Anent the technical malversation charge, the Sandiganbayan said: quarterly taxes in the amount of P 800.00 be paid by the Mayor; and that more cargoes were hauled
. . . [W]ith the falsified Resolution which, in effect, is void ab initio, accused Mayor with the use of Mayor Palma Gil's cargo trucks wherein the sum of P 9,688.00 was paid by the
Restituto Palma Gil, in confederation with accused treasurer, Eusebio G. Pantillo, without Ministry of Public Highways in trucking fees which he himself collected and deposited with the
authority of law, and taking advantage of their positions, diverted and applied CIP funds of Philippine National Bank, and after deducting Ms travel expenses, he issued a cheek for P 9,617.56
the Municipality of Caraga in the amount of P 78,000.00 to a public use, other than that for payable to Monte Chavez Shell Marketing who is a creditor of Mayor Palma Gil.
which said fund was appropriated by law. In Exhibit R-1, Cayetano Iturralde stated that the transactions concerning the use of Mayor Restituto
The Court is satisfied that Mayor Palma Gil advanced amounts for the construction of the Palma Gil's cargo trucks were negotiated by Rogelio Bacalla, alias 'Roger', who is Mayor Palma Gil's
mini grandstand, shade house and part of the municipal park although the total of said driver, and not by the mayor himself.
amounts was not revealed. And although the diverted amount was paid to him to Cross-examined on the two (2) affidavits which was agreed upon by the parties as his direct
reimburse him for his expenses, we are willing to concede that the crime he committed in testimony, Cayetano Iturralde declared thus: that he never had any direct contract with Mayor Palma
confederation with the accused Eusebio Pantillo, who knew all along that Resolution No. Gil in connection with the use of the latter's cargo trucks; that he never gave any amount to Mayor
1-81 of the Municipal Development Committee is non-existent, (Accused Eusebio Pantillo Palma Gil but to the gasoline station and the receipts were handed to Roger; that during the hauling
is a member of the Committee) is technical malversation under the provisions of Article operations, he was the one referred to as truck operator; that the check in payment of the first hauling
220 of the Revised Penal Code." (Rollo-73642, pp. 120-121) operation was not withdrawn by him; that Mayor Palma Gil's trucks were used for about three
We reiterate our finding regarding the existence of Resolution No. 1-81 of the Municipal Development months; and that he presumed that Roger had authority to use the trucks because previous to the
Committee which recommended the reversion of P 78,000.00 of CIP funds earlier set aside for the hauling, he had occasion to pass by Mayor Palma Gil's house and he was informed by the Mayor that
construction of a guest house and market layout and initial improvement for other projects namely-a mini the trucks were entrusted to Roger.
grandstand, multi-purpose shade house and park stage expansion. Rogelio Bacalla is a driver by occupation. As of April, 1981, he was a driver of an ISUZU cargo truck
Governor Rabat testified on the nature of CIP funds as follows: 1) that what is programmed is not always bearing Plate No. T-RD-904 which is one (1) of two (2) cargo trucks of RPG Trucking owned and
implemented as changes may be made depending on circumstances; 2) that appropriations for one project operated by Mayor Restituto Palma Gil. The driver of the other truck which is a HINO was Eliseo
may be re-appropriated or directed to other projects upon the passage of the proper resolution by Gania. He and Eliseo Gania are paid on a percentage basis: 25% of the net income of the truck in
the Sangguniang Bayan. case the charterer is a private person, and 30% if the hauling is for the government. Government
The Sangguniang Bayan through Resolution No. 47-81 approved the recommendation to divert P 78,000.00 hauling contracts are entered into by Mayor Palma Gil, owner of the trucking business. One such
of CIP funds to other projects. The Sangguniang Bayan found that the mayor actually advanced his personal contract was sometime in April 23,1981, wherein Mayor Palma Gil was authorized by the Property
money to begin these other projects which were completed and that the reverted CIP funds were used to Custodian of the Office of the Highway District Engineer at Mati, Davao Oriental to withdraw 1,320
reimburse the mayor for some of his expenses. bags of cement from the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. in Davao City for use in the
Under these circumstances, we find no legal basis to convict the mayor and the municipal treasurer of concreting of San Salvador Street, Caraga, Davao Oriental (See Exhibit 10). In fulfillment of the
technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. contract, he made six (6) trips to Davao City during the month of May, 1981 carrying each time 200
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code provides that for technical malversation to exist it is necessary that bags of cement. Gate passes, like Exhibits Y, Y-1 and Y-2 were issued by the Property Custodian,
public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or Mr. Benjamin C. Ongteco, and at the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc., Delivery Receipts and
ordinance. In this instant case, this requirement is not present because as explained by Governor Rabat, Withdrawal Slips like Exhibits Z ,Z-1, Z-2 and Z-3 are signed by him. The government paid P l,600.00
CIP funds by nature are not earmarked for a particular project but are for community improvement purposes.
for every load of 200 bags which was collected by Mayor Palma Gil, owner of the cargo trucks, immediately before the town fiesta on July 16, 1981. In the light of the evidence in these cases, we agree
through his checker, Teody Selerio. with the petitioners that the Sandiganbayan overlooked matters of substance which engender reasonable
He ceased to be a driver of Mayor Palma Gil when he received a note (See Exhibit BB) dated May 2, doubt as to the guilt of the petitioners.
1982 ordering him to hand over the Isuzu truck to Rolly Tumandao. In obedience to the note, he WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are GRANTED. The decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan in
delivered the truck to Rolly Tumandao who signed a receipt for it on May 4, 1982 (See Exhibit AA). Criminal Cases Nos. 9968, 9969, 9970 and 9971 finding the petitioners guilty as charged is hereby SET
And to prove that he was a driver of Mayor Palma Gil, there is a certification addressed to him as ASIDE and reversed. A new judgment is rendered. ACQUITTING the petitioners of the offenses charged
driver of RPG Trucking, informing him that Teodorico Selerio has been reinstated as checker (See against them on grounds of reasonable doubt with costs de officio.
Exhibit CC)." (pp. 67-70, G.R. No. 73642) SO ORDERED.
The mayor was convicted for violating section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law, to wit: 3) G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers.-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are DUYAN, petitioners,
hereby declared to be unlawful: vs.
xxx xxx xxx ARTEMIO CABANSAG, respondent.
. . . (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he Decision1dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution 2 dated October 28, 2003, dismissing petitioners' appeal
is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. and affirming with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated August 10, 1994 rendered in
This section contemplates actual intervention in the transaction in which the accused has financial or Civil Case No. Q-91-10541.
pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach. (See Trieste Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 508 The facts of the case are as follows:
[1986]) This does not appear clearly in the instant case. The contract to haul cement and other materials Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October 1991. According to
was given to Iturralde not by the mayor but by Roger Bacalla. Nowhere in the testimony of Roger Bacalla did respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan
he categorically state that the mayor authorized him to award the contract to Iturralde. Iturralde, on the other Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the
hand, repeatedly stated that he never had direct contact with the mayor as regards the contract and that it Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del
was Bacalla who told him that the mayor awarded the contract to him I turralde only assumed the authority Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he
of Bacalla on the belief that the mayor entrusted his cargo truck to Bacalla. leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed
On the other hand, petitioner Palma Gil admitted that he gave one of his cargo trucks to Bacalla for the against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent
latter's use in his charcoal business on condition that Bacalla should maintain the truck and haul, free of suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.3
charge, the products of his farm. He testified that he used his trucks to carry on his private business before Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf
he became mayor; and that he sent a checker to check on Bacalla's business transactions and for fear that of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of
his truck may be apprehended by the TRAFCON because said truck was only for private use, he got back an 800-square meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided
the truck. However, he denied 1) Bacalla's claim of having hauled the government cement from Davao City into two parts. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale,
to Caraga with the use of his trucks and with him (the mayor) "receiving" a certain percentage from the with the agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is
parcels or from the payment received by Bacalla; 2) having any arrangement with any cement factory in covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed
Davao City or the office of the district engineer in Mati for the hauling of cement allotted to Caraga; and 3) that respondent is only renting the property which he occupies.4
having any account with any Shell gasoline station in Davao City. After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in favor of
Considering the defense testimony and Iturralde's testimony that he never directly had any transaction with respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
the mayor as regards the hauling contract plus Bacalla's unexplained silence on whether or not he was WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of the
authorized by the mayor to transact business with Iturralde, there arise reasonable doubts as to the mayor's plaintiff and hereby orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
culpability for violating section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. 1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;
One important factor overlooked by the respondent court in appraising the testimonies of prosecution and 2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
defense witnesses is the political or partisan motivation behind the filing of charges. While political 3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and
differences may prod some persons to reveal the commission of offenses which may, otherwise, remain 4. to pay the costs.
hidden, it is also true that partisan considerations may taint the testimonies of witnesses who want to put SO ORDERED.5
down a political opponent at all costs. Evidence pro and con should, therefore, be more carefully weighed Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19, 2002
against each other. As pointed out by Mayor Palma Gil, he ran under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance affirmed the RTC Decision with modification, thus:
against the chosen KBL candidate. The vice-mayor whom he charges with active interest in his being WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
convicted and who would become mayor in his stead is a KBL stalwart. Obviously, the petitioner was not in decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is
the good graces of the powers that be at the time. Ferrando, who filed the charges as a taxpayer interested heretofore AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendants-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and
in the proper disbursement of public funds was shown to be a delinquent taxpayer. severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is further
The petitioners state that funds for construction projects in distant municipalities like Caraga are slow in ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's
coming. Therefore, local officials have to be more resourceful and should show more initiative. The bridges, fees.
mini-grandstand, shade house, and stage park had to be rushed because Governor Rabat and the SO ORDERED.6
wholeSangguniang Panlalawigan were going to hold a session with the Sangguniang Bayan of Caraga
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994 rendered by the after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an action for reconveyance of real that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of
property and cancellation of TCT No. 281115 with damages, filed by Nala against spouses Gomez.7 the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith
Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners)8 with the following assignment of errors: or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the
a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert her property.
rights and interest over the property. Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole intention
b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and
Appeals in the case for reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima Nala and her sleepless nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction between
children over a certain parcel of land, a portion of which is subject of the present case. damages and injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which
c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any basis. 9 results from the injury.14Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
Atty. Del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was denied by the Court harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
per its Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829. injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.15
the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when the Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She
demand letters were sent. What she was aware of was the fact that spouses Gomez were managing the had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by
rentals on the property by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. 16 Thus, whatever damages are
spouses Gomez failed to remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the property, it was then that Nala suffered by respondent should be borne solely by him.
decided to procure the services of legal counsel to protect their rights over the property. Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the property has
Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 91- already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision dated March 8, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV
8821 without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside said RTC Decision and ordered No. 49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property
reconveyance of the property to Nala and her children in a Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA- to petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in
G.R. CV No. 49163. Petitioners also argue that respondent did not substantiate his claim for damages. its Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27, 2005.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution dated
under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's October 28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are NULLIFIED. Civil Case
complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which No. Q-91-10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
provides: Costs against respondent.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act SO ORDERED.
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. 4) G.R. No. L-19671 July 26, 1966
The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff and appellant,
but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform vs.
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants and appellees.
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or Not satisfied with the decision of this Court, promulgated on 29 November 1965, in the above-entitled case,
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escaño, respectively, move for its
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in reconsideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom said defendant married in the United States, has
good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised filed, upon leave previously granted, a memorandum in intervention.
only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures
to injure another.[10] to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the
the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of
prejudicing or injuring another.11 alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is of affection involves the performance of a positive act.
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. 12 Bad faith, on the other hand, The prayer of appellant Tenchavez in his motion for reconsideration to increase the damages against
does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and Vicenta (P25,000 for damages and attorney's fees were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision) should,
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that likewise, be denied, all factors and circumstances in the case having been duly considered in the main
partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies decision.
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.13 In seeking a reexamination of the decision, defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño, in turn, urges a comparison
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, between the two marriages, stating, in plainer terms, that the Tenchavez-Escano marriage was no more
acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground than a ceremony, and a faulty one at that, while the Moran-Escaño marriage fits the concept of a marriage
for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that as a social institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and
respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust blessed by three children. She concludes that, since the second marriage is the better one, it deserves the
imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only laws recognition and protection over the other. This is a dangerous proposition: it legalizes a continuing
polygamy by permitting a spouse to just drop at pleasure her consort for another in as many jurisdictions as Intervenor reiterates that recognition of Vicenta's divorce in Nevada is a more enlightened view. The
would grant divorce on the excuse that the new marriage is better than the previous one; and, instead of argument should be addressed in the legislature. As the case presently stands, the public policy of this
fitting the concept of marriage as a social institution, the proposition altogether does away with the social forum is clearly adverse to such recognition, as was extensively discussed in the decision. The principle is
aspects of marriage in favor of its being a matter of private contract and personal adventure. well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they
The said appellee claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage contravene public policy (Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law, p. 232).
with Tenchavez. On this point, our main decision limited itself to the statement, "On 10 September 1954, It is thoroughly established as a broad general rule that foreign law or rights based therein will not be given
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. P-2)", without stating that papal dispensation was effect or enforced if opposed to the settled public policy of the forum. (15 C.J.S. 853)
actually granted, the reason being that Vicenta's claim that dispensation was granted was not indubitable, SEC. 6. Limitations. — In the recognition and enforcement of foreign laws the Courts are slow to
and her counsel, during the trial in the lower court, did not make good his promise to submit the document overrule the positive law of the forum, and they will never give effect to a foreign law where to do so
evidencing the papal dispensation; in fact, no such document appears on record. The Church's disavowal of would prejudice the state's own rights or the rights of its citizens or where the enforcement of the
the marriage, not being sufficiently established, it cannot be considered. Vicenta's belated appeal to Canon foreign law would contravene the positive policy of the law of the forum whether or not that policy is
law, after she had sought and failed to obtain annulment in the civil courts, and after she had flaunted its reflected in statutory enactments. (11 Am. Jur., 300-301).
principles by obtaining absolute divorce, does not, and can not, sound convincing. Particularly when account A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is
is taken of the circumstances that she obtained the Nevada divorce in 1950 and only sought ecclesiastical recognized as valid in every country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law. Cottington's Case,
release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. 2 Swan St. 326, note; Roach vs. Garvan, I Ves St. 157; Harvey vs. Farnie, LR 8 App. Cas. 43;
The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escaño is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform Cheely vs. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701 [28:298]. (Hilton vs. Guyot 159 U.S. 113, 167; 40 L. Ed. 95, 110)
her wifely duties, her denial of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration (Emphasis supplied)
of cases where moral damages may lie. The argument is untenable. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including It is, therefore, error for the intervenor to ask that "private international law — rather than Philippine civil law
her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful — should decide the instant case", as if the two branches of the law contradicted one another.
infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" In a consolidated paper (intervenor's rejoinder and appellee Vicenta Escaño's supplemental motion for
(Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages. Neither the case reconsideration), the issue is raised that "the Supreme Court cannot reverse the decision of the lower court
of Ventanilla vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 January 1961 (which was a suit filed by a client against his lawyer for dismissing the complaint nor sentence Vicenta Escaño to pay damages, without resolving the question of
failure to perfect an appeal on time), nor the case of Malonzo vs. Galang, L-13851, 27 July 1960 (wherein lack of jurisdiction over her person".
the precise ruling was that moral damages may not be recovered for a clearly unfounded civil action or A resolution by the Supreme Court of the issue of jurisdiction over the person of appellee Vicenta Escaño,
proceeding), now invoked by the said defendant-appellee, is in point. and which was disallowed by the court below, was unnecessary because the matter was not properly
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been brought to us for resolution, either on appeal or by special remedy which could have been availed of by the
added to Article 106. Appellee obviously mistakes our grant of damages as an effect of legal separation. It appellee when the lower court, on 1 June 1957, overruled her challenge to its jurisdiction. Neither was the
was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article alleged error of the lower court put in issue in her brief as appellee, as it was incumbent upon her to do
2176) expressly cited. (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852). Not affecting the jurisdiction over
Appellee-movant commits a similar mistake by citing Arroyo vs. Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, and Ramirez-Cuaderno the subject matter, the court properly ignored the point (Rev. Rule 51, section 7).
vs. Cuaderno, L-20043, 28 November 1964, to support her argument that moral damages did not attach to SEC. 7. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
her failure to render consortium because the sanction therefor is spontaneous mutual affection, and not any subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in
legal mandate or court order. The Arroyo case did rule that "it is not within the province of courts of this the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other", errors.
but it referred to physically coercive means, the Court declaring that — At any rate,
We are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may ... .When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the
be entered to compel prostitution of the purely personal right of consortism. (Cas cit., p. 60) plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts
(Emphasis supplied) may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the
liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, ... . (1 Moran 411, 1963 Ed., citing
(Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254)
there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other The award of damages, in the present case, was merely incidental to the petition for legal separation. For all
obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old these reasons, and because she filed a counterclaim against plaintiff (Rec. App. pp. 205-206), Vicenta
maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". should be deemed to have withdrawn the objection to the lower court's jurisdiction over her person, even
For analogous reasons, the arguments advanced against the award of attorney's fees must be rejected as though she had stated in the counterclaim that she was not waiving her special defense of lack of
devoid of merit. jurisdiction.1äwphï1.ñët
Contrary to intervenor Moran's contention, the decision did not impair appellee's constitutional liberty of It is urged that the actions for legal separation and for quasi-delict have prescribed: the first, because it was
abode and freedom of locomotion, as, in fact, Vicenta Escaño did exercise these rights, and even abused not filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and,
them by stating in her application for a passport that she was "single", the better to facilitate her flight from the second, because it was not filed within four years since the Tenchavez-Escaño marriage in 1948.
the wrongs she had committed against her husband. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country The argument on both points is untenable.
and seek divorce in a diverse forum is one thing, and the recognition to be accorded to the divorce decree The action for legal separation was filed on 31 May 1956. Although in a letter, under date of 10 December
thus obtained is quite another; and the two should not be confused. 1954, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed plaintiff Tenchavez that "According to information, she
(appellee) secured a decree of divorce on October 21, 1950 ... and married an American citizen, Russel Leo demand, and that whether he shall do so or not is left wholly to his choice. Davis vs. Hedges, L.R. 6
Moran, on September 13, 1954", there is no satisfactory and convincing evidence as to the time when Q.B. 687; Mondel vs. Steel, 8 Mees. & W. 858, 872; O'Connor vs. Varney, 10 Gray, 231. This
plaintiff Tenchavez, received the said letter; nor was she duty-bound to act immediately upon hearsay single fact shows that the defendant, if he elects to sue upon his claim in the action against him,
information. Since prescription is an affirmative defense, the burden lay on the defendant to clearly prove it, assumes the position of an actor and must take the consequence. The right to do so is of modern
and her proof on it was inadequate. growth, and is merely a convenience that saves bringing another suit, not a necessity of the
On the argument about the action on tort having prescribed, the basis thereof is erroneous: the marriage defense. (Emphasis supplied)
was not the cause of appellee's wrongful conduct. Her denial of cohabitation, refusal to The reason for the rule is manifest. The courts can not look with favor upon a party adopting not merely
render consortium and desertion of her husband started right after their wedding but such wrongs have inconsistent, but actually contradictory, positions in one and the same suit, claiming that a court has no
continued ever since. She never stopped her wrongdoings to her husband, so that the period of limitation jurisdiction to render judgment against it, but has such jurisdiction to give to give a decision in its favor
has never been completed. (Dailey vs. Kennedy, 64 Mich. 208, 31 N.W. 125; Harvey vs. Bishop, 171 Okla. 497, 43 Pac. 2d, 48;
Finally, we see no point in discussing the question of appellee Escaño's criminal intent, since nothing in the Haverstick vs. Southern P. Co. (Calif.) 37 Pac. 2d, 146).
main decision was designed or intended to prejudge or rule on the criminal aspect of the case, if any, or any Another reason, equally valid, is that if such defendant shall ask for any relief other than that
of its constituent elements. It is to be noted that in this civil case only a preponderance of evidence is addressed to his plea, he is seeking to gain an unconscionable advantage over his adversary,
required, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. While much could be said as to the circumstances whereby, if the determination be in his favor, he may avail himself of it while if it be against him, he
surrounding the divorce of the appellee, we prefer to abstain from so doing in order not to influence in any may fall back upon his plea of lack of jurisdiction of the person. (Olcese vs. Justice's Court, 156
way the criminal case, should any be instituted. Calif. 82, 103 Pac. 318).
For the reasons above cited, all motions for reconsideration are hereby denied. True, Escaño made a reservation of her former plea when she fled her counterclaim; but such reservation
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur. did not remove the obnoxious contradictory positions she assumed.
R E S O L UT I O N Secondly, appellee Vicente Escaño not only adopted inconsistently positions in the court below but
September 14, 1966 abandoned all pretense that court's lack of jurisdiction over her person upon appeal to this Court. She made
REYES, J.B.L., J.: no reference whatever to that question in her brief as appellee. Coupled with her previous demand for
Their first motion for reconsideration having been denied, Vicenta Escaño and Russel Leo Moran, through affirmative relief, Vicente's silence on appeal only confirms her waiver of the point. Her excuse it that, the
counsel, have filed a second motion for reconsideration. lower court having ruled in her favor, she could not very well assign as error the overruling of her plea of
It is first averred that this Court's decision contradicts the doctrine laid down in Banco Español Filipino vs. non-jurisdiction. That excuse is unserviceable; for this Court has repeatedly held (and it is now well settled)
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem the relief must be confined to the res, and that an appellee can make counter assignments of error for the purpose of sustaining the appealed
the Court cannot lawfully render a personal judgment. judgement, altho it is not allowed to ask that the same be reversed or modified (Bunge Corp. vs. Camenforte
Movant's own quotation from that decision demonstrates the diffirence in the facts between the case at bar Co., 91 Phil. 861, and cases cited therein; Cabrera vs. Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas, 75 Phil. 780; Pineda
and the authority cited. For their own excerpt shows that the rule now invoked was laid down for instances & Ampil vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930; David vs. De la Cruz, L-11656, April 18, 1958). Having failed to do so,
where the defendant never submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. We said then: this Court had every reason to consider the issue of jurisdiction abandoned, and appellee's belated attempts
If, however, the defendant is a non-resident, and remaining beyond the range of the personal to resurrect it, by alleging an imaginary error on our part, are pointless and vain. The same thing can be said
process of the court refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the of her effort to escape the jurisdiction she had invoked in her counterclaim by not appealing its rejection by
person at all. ... (Cas. Cit. p. 930) the trial court. At most, it amounts to equivocal conduct that can not revive the inconsistent claim of non-
The defendant Palanca, in 37 Phil. 921, so much refused to come in voluntarily that he was declared in jurisdiction, abandoned by her seeking affirmative relief.
default. Was this the case of Vicenta Escaño? The records show on their face that it was not. While she Wherefore, the second motion for reconsideration is denied.
objected to the jurisdiction of the Court over her person, she also filed an answer with a counterclaim asking Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
for an award of damages against plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez. Instead of "refusing to come in voluntarily", Regala, JJ., took no part
as Palanca did (in 37 Phil. 921), Escaño took the offensive and asked the Court for a remedy, a judgment 5) G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
against her opponent; and this after the court below overruled her objection that she was not within its CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
jurisdiction. In asking the Court for affirmative relief, Escaño submitted to its jurisdiction. In the United States, vs.
whence our adjective law finds its sources, the Federal Supreme Court has rules (Merchant's Heat & Light ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Co. vs. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 51 Law Ed. 488): Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
We assume that the defendant lost no rights by pleading to the merits, as required, after saving its exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses
rights.Harkness vs. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 25 L. ed. 237; Southern P. Co. vs. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, of litigation.
36 L. ed. 943, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44. But by setting up its counterclaim the defendant became a Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts
plaintiff in its turn, invoked the jurisdiction of the court in same action, and, by invoking, submitted to alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
it. It is true that the counterclaim seems to have arisen wholly out of the same transaction that the After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an
plaintiff sued upon, and so to have been in recoupment rather than in set-off proper. But, even at unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral
common law, since the doctrine has been developed, a demand in recoupment is recognized as a damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status,
cross demand, as distinguished from a defense. Therefore, although there has been a difference of deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the
opinion as to whether a defendant, by pleading it, is concluded by the judgment from bringing a complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
subsequent suit for the residue of his claim a judgment in his favor being impossible at common Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of
law, the authorities agree that he is not concluded by the judgment if he does not plead his cross law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection
the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family
married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's of the new Civil Code.
father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs
who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with against appellee.
each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal 6) G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then vs.
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and
Lolita continued nonetheless. serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B España Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note Dear Bet —
on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads: Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date scandal.
on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m. Paquing
Reply But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
Love NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is PAPA LOVE .
no news or trace of her whereabouts. PAKING
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides: Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, attorney's fees; and the costs.
good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for
affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the
of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to
Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an
against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man." Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8,
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed
and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the
When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good
and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having 7) G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; vs.
Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.) HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented
standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his
1959). protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment
to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to
reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
Code the provisions that would have it so. defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or attorney's fees.
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
latter for the damage." cause of action.
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of
trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next origin to proceed with the case.
day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
never returned and was never heard from again. permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733,
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs.
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is We find this appeal meritorious.
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated. But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." proposed Civil Code the following rule:
The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly "ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a damage."
reasonable award. An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
affirmed, with costs. becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
JJ.,concur. grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action. would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that — FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, 8) G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her vs.
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123). COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
And in American Jurisprudence we find: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the The facts are as follows:
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662) documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows: cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be which petitioner had filed against her husband.
served with summons; Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered
1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff; judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
tender feelings; properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made
people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
him; There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent,
protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
plaintiff; appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked
confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959; as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore,
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this
pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of
righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, dismissing private respondent's complaint.
1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
his promises. things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:" 2
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS
that: PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
.... TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIANpetitioners,
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial vs.
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO
said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT.
date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital
of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City,respondents.
of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally
admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have YAP, J.:
been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages
malpractice. for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice. plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of
does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question. the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for
papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
effective again. confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable simply Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the
proceeding." 5 guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente,
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on
marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel,
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
SO ORDERED. suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur. liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of
9) G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988 action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture
and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their 8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower 9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
court stated, "After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and 10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit." the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to
filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, defendants, to wit:
the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the 1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren 2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3,
Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino. 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding modified.
in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside
preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9,
or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration. ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows: and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo (1) Freedom of religion;
de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan (2) Freedom of speech;
Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented (5) Freedom of suffrage;
by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within (7) of law;
the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against (8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
said plaintiffs. (9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, (10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, unreasonable searches and seizures;
Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to (11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs (12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for (13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. to law;
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its (14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress
order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 of grievances;
had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' (15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court (16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
resolved: (17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and witness in behalf;
Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit; (18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit: forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make
1. Gen Fabian Ver such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
2. Col. Fidel Singson (19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr. unconstitutional; and
5. Col. Galileo Montanar (20) Freedom of access to the courts.
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F.
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), 2d 755).
and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from
adjudicated. Suit.3
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General
strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances
than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot
and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are
must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring
compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.
faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding
certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2 to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion"
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January
officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist
official duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that — terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law
may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9). Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
"that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out
violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect." their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions
General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and
communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will
and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle
of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or
counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages. We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the
of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial
petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
public officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for
threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of
v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819). altering the title of their action."
xxx xxx xxx We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized 3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text: searches and seizures;
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises 4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of 5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a
the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and
inhuman treatment. illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
and academic. complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of rights.
respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated? Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The indirectly, responsible for its violation.
doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no
officers of the military and their subordinates. cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba.
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to
his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human motion to dismiss?
rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs,
by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido;
of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel
joint tortfeasors. for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And
Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers
alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez,
some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
jurisprudence. In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in
violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to
others — take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention; complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a
contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against
some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.
legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated Separate Opinions
November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents. The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members
SO ORDERED. of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño- manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may
Aquino, JJ., concur. be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result. The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by
Padilla, J., took no part. petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle
Separate Opinions of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public officers or employees, or members transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to
of the military or police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of
manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code. the tortfeasor.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages filed in the court below by The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws,
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is
of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end
transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his duty to justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1
properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded
being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we
the tortfeasor. stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a government of laws, stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and
existence of the government be imperilled following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit
is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a
contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto —
to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end unless it was caned for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or
justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution." 1 repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the operations of the dreaded Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have infutrated
secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police
stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The Supreme Court officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely
stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C.
and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and access
person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the
unless it was caned for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the NPA which have infutrated ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been created
the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police and organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against
officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely all such violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups.
condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law. 10) G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government under President Corazon C. MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
Aquino after her assumption of office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and access vs.
to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and
government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively
ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been created
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a pleasing 4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation
platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any expenses.
public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for damages. Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally against
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In SO ORDERED.
their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villa THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE
Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT
any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the MERCHANDISE.
necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and two (2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER
other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF
scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and CONFISCATION.
embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2 During its pendency, RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE We affirm.
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private provides:
respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose shall be
of business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
returned were of inferior quality. cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus: describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants, This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but
ordering the latter jointly and severally: are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search can only be undertaken
per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully paid; under the following circumstance:
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched
items not returned; for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and P15,000.00 offense, without a search warrant.
for and as exemplary damages; and We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods.
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items
Costs against the defendants. and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced
SO ORDERED. by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private
Decision with modification, thus: respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners
modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows: and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages
defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally; in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause
cancel her application for distributor's license; for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8 These facts and
complaint was filed) until it is fully paid; circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure.
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of P30,000.00, Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair
for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of P15,000.00, for and as competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
exemplary damages; and
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant
conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents. (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers
violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners. conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional the trial court's query — posed in its decision now under consideration — as to why the
rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus: PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner)
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or corporation. 12
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages. to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
xxx xxx xxx liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation which even
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and
unreasonable searches and seizures. refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
xxx xxx xxx Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged. privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED
xxx xxx xxx MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT
(6) Illegal search; PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. PARAPHERNALIA.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been ABSTRACT:
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend
or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon
xxx xxx xxx proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge, or such other
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to
the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public be used as evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. Orders
officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. 14
faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling
to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private
of a tort. (emphasis supplied) respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant.
responsible, viz: And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery
of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs.
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that
xxx xxx xxx petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of
be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. Respondent Cruz declared:
in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am doing
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. business with borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the raiding team
xxx xxx xxx and they even stepped on some of the pants and dresses on display for sale. All
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I was trembling
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied) Respondent Lugatiman testified:
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people
private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for damages.19
Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court: I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like that
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees' what I have been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by uniformed
(respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition soldiers. Many people were around and the more the confiscation was made in a
scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even those not wrapped
dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that
morning.20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. 21 It will
also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection
extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX
PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the
unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of
SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof. 22 Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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