Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jill Aitoro
Executive Editor
crucial for transatlantic coordination and mutual NATO and the EU have achieved a great deal
defense. We also plan to create a new command since signing our joint declaration on NATO-EU
focused on military mobility – to speed up the cooperation at the Warsaw Summit. We are al-
movement of military forces and equipment with- ready implementing a wide range of measures
in Europe. across many areas, including maritime, exercises,
Military mobility is key to effective and credible defense industry and research, defense capabili-
collective defense. NATO has been working on ties, and hybrid and cyber defense measures. In
this for several years to remove legal hindrances 2018, we will continue to explore what more we
to crossing borders. But we also need to address can do together, in particular to support the fight
infrastructure requirements – military-grade against terrorism.
roads, bridges, railroads, tunnels, ports and On the ground, NATO is ramping up its efforts to
airfields – and optimum means of transportation. provide training and assistance to Iraq in multiple
This requires close cooperation with national gov- areas, including counter-improvised explosive de-
ernments and with the European Union. I expect vices and demining, military medicine, and reform
military mobility to become a flagship achieve- of the country’s security institutions. In 2017, we
ment for enhanced NATO-EU cooperation. launched an in-country training initiative, deploy-
Meanwhile, the EU’s role in European defense ing a team to Baghdad to facilitate NATO’s train-
is set to increase. I welcome the launch of the ing and capacity-building programs to support
Permanent Structured Cooperation, in which 23 Iraq’s fight against terrorism and instability. This
EU member states agreed to cooperate on de- effort will grow in 2018.
fense and security policy. This has the potential Our mission in Afghanistan remains NATO’s larg-
to help drive increased defense spending, provide est. And we have agreed to increase its size from
new capabilities and improve burden-sharing around 13,000 to 16,000 in the coming months.
within the alliance. But we need to keep in mind Our troops are there to train, advise and assist
three points to ensure that NATO and EU defense Afghan security forces, to help them fight inter-
efforts are complementary. national terrorism, including ISIL, and to stabilize
First, we need coherence when it comes to their own country. Our decades of experience,
development of capabilities. We must avoid the from the Balkans to Afghanistan, have taught us
same nations having two sets of requirements for that one of our best weapons in the generational
the kind of capabilities they should develop. Sec- fight against terrorism is training local forces and
ond, we need to be sure that European forces and building the capacity of local institutions. And
capabilities are also available to NATO to avoid this will remain a focus for us in the next year.
competition. And third, we need the fullest pos- NATO is the most successful alliance in history
sible involvement of non-EU NATO allies in the because it has adapted as the world has changed.
consultations and in the process. This is critical As we continue to adapt in 2018, NATO allies
because, after Brexit, 80 percent of NATO defense are committed to spending more and better on
spending will come from non-EU allies, and three defense, improving burden-sharing among allies,
of the NATO battlegroups deployed to Eastern strengthening our transatlantic bond and preserv-
Europe will be led by non-EU allies. ing the peace for future generations. DN
the U.S. record in many parts of the globe. That tations – Russian losses in Syria have not led to
success can be ascribed to several key factors. any negative domestic repercussions for the Putin
First, Russia has managed to foster a very pro- administration.
ductive symbiosis between its expeditionary The West tends to ignore the success of the
forces and Syrian government troops. It has taken Russian military intervention in Syria, and pays
effective steps to rebuild the fighting ability of little attention to the various aspects of Russian
the Syrian Army. The revitalized Syrian units military activity in that country. Clearly, this is
were often bolstered by a small but highly capa- not a pleasant topic for the Western political and
ble contingent of Russian support personnel and military observers whose predictions that Putin
elite Spetsnaz troops. Even more importantly, would get bogged down in Syria have proved
high-ranking Russian officers were not limited to wrong. Nevertheless, the victorious Russian
advisory roles. They led Syrian troops on many military campaign has major implications for the
important stretches of the front, bringing in future course of the Russian military machine.
much-needed military experience and expertise. At just over two years, the campaign in Syria has
Many of the key Syrian units are led by Russian not been very long, but almost all senior Russian
generals. The 5th Volunteer Assault Corps, which military commanders have been involved in it on
has been the Syrian Army’s main assault unit over a rotational basis. According to a November 2017
the past 12 months, is equipped with Russian statement by the chief of the Russian General
hardware and formed and led by Russian com- Staff, Army Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, “all the com-
manders, who also hand-picked the unit’s Syrian manders of the military districts, combined-ser-
personnel. This approach may lack political cor- vices armies, and Air Force and Air Defense
rectness, but it has proved highly effective. armies, as well as almost all divisional command-
Second, Russia has managed to obviate the need ers, and more than half of the commanders of
for deploying large numbers of troops on the combined-services brigades and regiments” have
ground by bringing in private military companies. had a stint in Syria. All these officers have gained
These companies consist of well-paid mercenar- valuable, real-life experience of complex mod-
ies, most of whom are retired Russian service- ern warfare in a remote theater, in a campaign
men. The difference from the similar practice where air power and high-precision weapons
in the United States is that the Russian private have played a major role, and where complex
military companies are not relegated to support- supply and logistics challenges have been largely
ing roles. They are used as highly capable assault resolved.
forces, and their personnel are often embedded The availability of these experienced com-
with Syrian units to augment those units’ fight- manders, a record of a successful and victorious
ing ability. This approach has proved very useful military campaign, and the lessons learned from
both militarily and politically, as it minimizes the using air power, modern technology and special
political cost of direct military intervention. The operations forces will provide a major boost to
Russian public has proved completely indifferent the Russian military machine for years to come.
to reports of the losses suffered by the mercenary Additionally, the confidence gained by the Rus-
companies, rightly believing that “these people sian military in Syria may steer Russian foreign
are highly paid, and knew what they were getting and military policy toward a more assertive and
into.” As a result – and contrary to Western expec- interventionist course. DN
pable of producing the weapon systems it needs, for a cooperation boost with new prospects.
and secondly complementarity, in the sense that Our country is an open field for the development
there should be a significant cooperation between of entrepreneurial activities in all sectors of the
the defense industries of the NATO member coun- economy, particularly in the defense industry. We
tries, ensuring the transfer of know-how and the have strong indicative examples of successful
compatibility of systems. cooperation in aeronautics, joint production of
One of the issues we have to solve is the re- ammunition, and so on.
lationship between the defense industry of the The territory of Greece is the gateway to a large
major countries and the small and medium-sized area within which the developing markets of the
enterprises of the smaller countries. It seems that Balkans, Black Sea, Middle East and North Africa
cooperation is the only way to prevent alteration are located. Each investment in Greece has an
of the industrial infrastructure of the smaller efficiency multiplier that gives a significant dy-
countries. namic.
A cooperation that will take into account the Particularly, in the defense investments sector,
geopolitics, the particularities and traditional our ultimate goal is to render Greece – at an in-
capacities of each country, historical ties, and dustrial level- a center for the support of the U.S.’
so on. Joint programs and support funds are the and other of our allies’ weapon systems in the
necessary incentives to achieve all objectives as Southeastern Europe, the wider area of Middle
well as autonomy, complementarity and sustain- East and North Africa.
ability. It is certain that within a decade we will In this direction, the Ministry of National
be faced with a new division of labor. It is equally Defence constantly tries to establish an out-
certain that countries that will rapidly develop ward-looking and competitive domestic industry.
new technologies, both for civilian and military Activities such as industrial days, seminars in
purposes, will increase their participation in this Athens and Thessaloniki in order to facilitate the
new division of labor. engagement and cooperation of Greek and Amer-
Greece, a pillar of geopolitical stability, in an ican companies, show that there is an open field
unstable environment, incorporates very serious- ahead with great prospects and challenges.
ly all these new elements, into the development We already have before us Greece after the cri-
of its strategy. Our goal is to move on to a stable sis. The future is full of new prospects and great
growth model, investor-friendly and socially just. opportunities. The new investment environment
The United States recognizes the critical role of in Greece is open to cooperation. In this context,
Greece in the wider region. Traditional ties, com- it is important to get to know Greece better, to
mon goals and long-term cooperation on a trans- put on to the wide range of its productive poten-
national and business level, are the solid ground tial and business opportunities. DN
to the region and the overall stability in Europe. PESCO. The European Union must work more
The cooperation with Finland is a fundamental closely on issues such as cyberthreats, hybrid
platform in our defense strategy. We have tak- warfare and international crisis management.
en necessary steps, as two military non-aligned Intergovernmental cooperation is vital to improve
countries, to give our armed forces the tools to our mutual interests while respecting national
cooperate in case of crisis or war. The bilater- sovereignty of all. Capability building must also
al statement of intent with the United States is continue, through the European Defence In-
an important expression of common interest dustrial Development Fund aimed at fostering
and mutual commitment. We have joined the innovation and competitiveness for our defense
British-led Joint Expeditionary Force and will industries.
continue to work closely with the U.K. NATO Cooperation must, however, take into consider-
has recently renewed our partnership within the ation the specific character of the security and de-
Enhanced Opportunities Program. NATO-coop- fense policy of all member states. To ensure max-
eration is a priority, especially on information imum competition and quality, it is important that
sharing and military exercises. such programs are open to third parties, including
Sweden's current surface-to-air Hawk missile all European-based companies and even those
(Robot system 97) is a system that will be re- that are not European-owned. The lack of such an
placed. The Swedish Defence Materiel Adminis- arrangement would put member states like Swe-
tration will now begin the analysis and process den at an unfair disadvantage, in turn risking the
with regards to acquiring the Patriot air and transatlantic link and regional cohesion.
missile defense system. Acquiring such a system As a non-permanent member of the UN Security
with active defense measures and with the flexi- Council, Sweden has broad engagement in the
bility to meet today’s wide range of challenges in UN. Safeguarding respect for international law
the air-defense domain is in line with the Swedish and national sovereignty is an integral part of
defense bill and current needs. Swedish defense and security policy. Sweden’s
We will continue to upgrade our military capa- national defense strategy is strictly in line with
bilities and tie close cooperation both bilaterally international law, by means of the United Nations
and multilaterally with UN, NATO, NORDEFCO Charter, with a defensive character and with the
and the EU. right to self-protection.
Intensified defense and security cooperation These are times of uncertainty. The security
in the European Union remains critical and we challenges are more complex than ever and our
welcome the Permanent Structured Cooperation, response must therefore be multi-faceted. DN
may seem mundane. However, the command of the financial burden for our common defense.
structure is a key instrument in generating and This situation is not tenable. In order to ensure
fielding the alliance’s collective fighting power. the long-term viability of NATO, all nations must
NATO’s legitimacy and credibility depends upon a stand by our commitments to make the necessary
robust and relevant command structure. This will investments in our defenses.
be an important and very concrete deliverable for The upcoming summit is an opportunity to step
the next summit. back and contemplate the true value of NATO.
Secondly, NATO needs to pay more attention The alliance is a unique construct. No other orga-
to the maritime domain. Maritime areas will be nization has a standing joint command structure,
increasingly contested in the future, and NATO available high-end military forces and a standing
must be prepared to uphold the rule of law and decision-making apparatus. NATO is a political
safeguard our interests at sea. The alliance needs as well as a military organization. And it is an
to improve its competence and ability to operate alliance that is founded upon a common set of
in high-intensity maritime environments. That values. These are the values that bind us together
includes the ability to operate our forces in areas as liberal, democratic nations. Now more than
where potential adversaries may try to deny entry ever, NATO must hold true to and safeguard these
or freedom of movement. NATO must strengthen values.
our maritime profile. This will be a key point for The U.S. has on numerous occasions made it
discussion leading up to the next summit. clear that it stands by its commitments to its
Thirdly, NATO must review and adapt our deci- NATO allies. This is also demonstrated through
sion-making processes. The complex threats and action. U.S. investments in European security
challenges that we face have one thing in com- through the European Deterrence Initiative is a
mon: Threats and attacks will emerge and occur clear example.
with little to no warning time. That means that In an increasingly uncertain world, the value of
decisions must be made swiftly. That is a chal- stable and strong alliance relationships increas-
lenge for a consensus-based organization such es. The transatlantic security relationship – as
as NATO, with 29 member states. However, we manifested through the NATO alliance – is an
must address this. We risk being at an asymmetric unmatched and powerful force for stability and
decision-making disadvantage vis-à-vis potential security. At its core, this is NATO’s historical mis-
adversaries that are able to take quicker and more sion: ensuring peace, freedom, stability and pros-
effective strategic decisions. This could signifi- perity for our people. NATO has been successful
cantly undermine our collective security. in this endeavor because we have been able to
At the summit, there will be a frank and honest adapt. NATO needs to continue to adapt, as it has
discussion on burden-sharing. The U.S. admin- since its inception in 1949. This is the enduring
istration has rightly pointed out that the United task of the heads of state and government that
States shoulders a disproportionally large share will convene in Brussels next summer. DN
can States and the Conference of Defense Min- ty. The foundation will be able to promote suc-
isters of the Americas. By working with member cessful public-private partnerships and implement
states’ defense ministries and subregional defense innovative programs that generate sustainable,
mechanisms, the IADB is able to provide military result-driven outcomes. It is committed to en-
expertise, reinforcing their mandates and sup- suring multisectoral collaboration in its ongoing
porting its charter and objectives. efforts on cybersecurity, disaster management,
While the potential to support the regional transparent military procurement, climate change
community is great, it does not come without and security, veterans’ affairs, and other critical
challenges. As with all international diplomatic issues in the defense arena.
efforts, the need for consensus and unity among Other ways the IADB can be strengthened is
member states is ever present. Improved coop- by focusing on value-added initiatives. While the
eration across the Americas can lead to more IADB has a multitude of potential tasks, a better
productive and proactive efforts and will ensure job must be done to analyze and focus on tasks
that the IADB is not complacently reactive with that will demonstrate the relevance and capabili-
its mandated tasks. Cooperation among countries ties of the IADB. Key areas to focus on should be
is as important as cooperation within countries. reinforcing the educational programs offered by
A lack of strong advocates of the IADB within the Inter-American Defense College and holding
government institutions can serve to highlight the seminars, professional development activities
difference of perspectives between foreign and and conferences on topics relevant to the Orga-
defense ministries, rather than uniting them. nization of American States and other institu-
Finally, there is a need for reform and an in- tions. We should also improve confidence and
crease in resources. The IADB should be uniting security-building measures in order to update the
its leadership on a common purpose to create IADB’s database and reports. This will allow the
a cohesive vision that will support a long-term IADB to provide better analysis and consultation
strategy, which will demonstrate the IADB’s value for both member states and the Organization of
proposition and progress in advancing hemispher- American States.
ic defense and security cooperation. A decrease The IADB is an incredible multilateral defense
in annual financial contributions from the Organi- organization with a long history of serving the
zation of American States has left the IADB strug- security interests of the hemisphere. Given the
gling to deliver professional, quality services and security challenges of Latin America and the
to fully address the needs of its member states. Caribbean, the IADB should be seen as an essen-
In part, we are already working to address some tial institution in our inter-American system and
of these challenges by creating the Inter-American should be utilized to foster collaboration and
Defense Foundation, a recognized nonprofit enti- support among nations. DN
erational inputs from the EU Military Staff. Once of the fund also relies to a large extent on the
collected, the information will be assessed by the EDA, both in the research and capability do-
EDA in a comprehensive CARD analysis report mains. The research window of the fund will use
to be discussed with member states, followed by the lessons learned from the ongoing Pilot Project
a final report to ministers. Lessons learned from and the Preparatory Action on Defence Research,
the trial run will be incorporated into the first full both managed and implemented by the EDA (with
CARD cycle scheduled to take place from 2019 to a European Commission mandate). Regarding
2020. the fund’s capability window, the EDA is already
Directly linked to CARD is PESCO. As of No- called to play a key, upstream role in program-
vember, 23 EU member states notified their ming the work plan of the European Defence
intention to participate on Nov. 13, and more may Industrial Development Programme. The role will
join, which is an unprecedented and historic step involve strong synergies with the agency’s prioriti-
toward European defense. Here, too, the EDA is zation support role in PESCO and CARD, closing
to act as a secretariat with a supporting role at the circle.
various levels. First, in close cooperation with the The EDA is indispensable to carrying forward all
EU Military Staff, it will serve as a platform where three initiatives (CARD, PESCO and EDF). This
PESCO nations can identify, assess and consol- was recognized by EU defense ministers at their
idate possible projects; the agency can notably meeting on Nov. 13 when they explicitly encour-
provide a view on contemplated projects’ impacts aged the agency “to further support the coherent
on the capability landscape. Second, the EDA will development of the European capability land-
support the practical PESCO project implemen- scape, considering also the link between CARD,
tation. This role is particularly well-suited to the PESCO and the European Defence Fund.” In their
agency, as the two-layer approach envisaged for 2018 guidelines for the EDA, adopted on the same
PESCO is similar to the project governance struc- day, ministers also supported “the reinforcement
ture in the EDA: Member states have full control of the Agency as the intergovernmental platform
of the project content, with the agency serving of choice within the EU institutional framework,
participating nations as a facilitator and service supporting Member States in capability develop-
provider. Thirdly, the EDA will play a leading ment serving the EU level of ambition.”
role in the annual assessment of PESCO nations' At a time when the institutional framework for
contributions and respect of the binding commit- EU defense cooperation is being reshaped, such
ments undertaken. recognition by ministers is encouraging, as it con-
A third cornerstone of the future of European firms the central role and place the agency must
defense is the EDF. Closely intertwined with have in European defense in the future. We are
CARD and PESCO, the practical implementation committed and ready to take up this challenge. DN
ness. For us, however, we believe our role is part defense procurement, modular solutions based
of a much larger set of challenges. One where on open software models and solutions that are
we are being asked by our customers to not just “pre-integrated” to take some of the cost and time
innovate, but innovate affordably. To build solu- challenges off the plate of the primes who have
tions in support of key aerospace and defense overall platform responsibility.
applications and help the primes and DoD deliv- Mercury Systems is clearly investing in its own
er these solutions on time, with modularity, and strategy and in our collective future – hence the
as part of open systems architectures. Today, title of this article. We, along with all other tier
after years of halting progress, the trends of the 2 as well as tier 3 suppliers, are part of a much
past twenty years are finally gaining momentum. bigger and more important challenge where our
Innovations like open systems, new models of collective success is in everyone’s interest. DN