Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR CLEARANCE REQUIRED; DISMISSAL, ILLEGAL IN CASE AT BAR. —
We find basis for the finding of the Regional Director that Valladolid was terminated without prior
clearance. JRM sent a memorandum to Valladolid on February 24, 1979 advising him of his
preventive suspension effective February 26, 1979 pending approval of the application for
clearance to dismiss him. The clearance application was filed on February 28, 1979. However,
even prior to that date, or on February 22, 1979, Valladolid had already filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal. This shows that Valladolid was indeed refused admittance on February 16,
1979 when he reported back to work, so that he was practically dismissed before he was
formally notified of his suspension leading to his dismissal, in violation of the requirement of
Section 3, Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. And as
provided in Section 2 of the same Rule, any dismissal without prior clearance shall be
"conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause."
SYNOPSIS
In a decision, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner San Miguel Corporation to immediately
reinstate respondent Rodolfo Calayag to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
other benefits but without back-wages. Calayag appealed from said decision for the purpose of
getting backwages but he did not apprise petitioner of this appeal. Petitioner only learned of the
appeal when it was served with a copy of the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) granting Calayag back-wages. Petitioners thus filed the instant petition
praying for the annulment of the NLRC's decisions and the dismissal of Calayag's complaint for
alleged illegal termination of employment.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the NLRC and affirmed that of the Labor Arbiter
holding that the NLRC erred in resolving the appeal without hearing petitioner, who was entitled
to present its side of the case.
SYLLABUS
||| (Manila Press, Inc. v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-52709, [June 24, 1983], 207 PHIL 747-750)
SYLLABUS
(East Asiatic Co., Ltd. v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-29068, [August 31, 1971],
148-B PHIL 401-430)
(Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78763, [July 12, 1989],
256 PHIL 735-742)
||| (Reno Foods, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116462, [October 18,
1995], 319 PHIL 500-510)
||| (Associated Labor Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 120450,
[February 10, 1999], 362 PHIL 322-331)
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Renato Felizardo was employed at respondent company as jet printer operator. He
was dismissed from employment for dishonesty and theft of company property for bringing out a
pair of boots, one (1) piece of aluminum container and fifteen (15) pieces of hamburger patties.
He and petitioner Union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and non-
payment of 13th month pay against respondent company. The Labor Arbiter found that with the
exception of the pair of boots, the articles which petitioner took were mere scrap, which were of
no value to the respondent company. The Labor Arbiter ruled that dismissal was too harsh a
penalty to be imposed on a first-time offender and that petitioner's unemployment for about
eleven (11) months was sufficient penalty for what he had done. Hence, the Labor Arbiter
ordered the reinstatement of petitioner without backwages. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint.
Hence, this petition. cTaDHS
The Supreme Court agreed with the Labor Arbiter that petitioner's dismissal would not be
proportionate to the gravity of the offense he had committed considering the value of the articles
he pilfered, and the fact that he had no previous derogatory record during his two (2) years of
employment. However, the Labor Arbiter was mistaken in regarding the articles taken to be
mere scraps and hence without value to the respondent company. They were of some value but
not enough to warrant dismissal. Moreover, it should also be taken into account that petitioner is
not a managerial or confidential employee in whom greater trust is placed by management and
from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. Hence, the Court held that
dismissal as a measure to protect the interests of respondent company is unwarranted.
Suspension would have sufficed. However, the Court was of the opinion that petitioner had
already served a reasonable period of suspension commensurate to the gravity of his offense.
Thus, it considered appropriate the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement of petitioner without
backwages.
SYLLABUS
(Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Phils. v. Lariosa, G.R. No. L-70479, [February 27, 1987],
232 PHIL 201-207)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INVESTIGATION OF THEFT INCIDENT PRIOR TO DISMISSAL; DUE
PROCESS PROPERLY OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. — From the records, it is likewise clear
that Firestone did not act arbitrarily in terminating Lariosa's services. On the contrary, there are
transcripts to prove that an investigation of the incident was promptly conducted in the presence
of the employee concerned, the union president and the security guards who witnessed the
attempted asportation. Records also belie the allegation that Lariosa was shown his walking
papers on the very day of the incident. The letter of Ms. Villavicencio to Lariosa dated August 1,
1983 informing the latter of his dismissal effective August 2, 1983 conclusively shows that he
was discharged only on August 2, 1983, after an investigation was held to ventilate the truth
about the July 27 incident. Thus, we cannot agree with the NLRC's conclusion that even if
Firestone had found substantial proof of Lariosa's misconduct, it did not observe the statutory
requirements of due process.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEE DISMISSED FOR LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE NOT
ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES; PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY ALLOWED. — The
employer's obligation to give him workers just compensation and treatment carries with it the
corollary right to expect from the workers adequate work, diligence and good conduct. In view of
the foregoing, We rule that Firestone had valid grounds to dispense with the services of Lariosa
and that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering his reinstatement. However,
considering that Lariosa had worked with the company for eleven years with no known previous
bad record, the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served if he is paid full
separation pay but not reinstatement without backwages as decreed by the NLRC.
|||
||| (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization v. People's
Industrial and Commercial Corp., G.R. No. L-37687, [March 15, 1982], 198 PHIL 166-183)
SYNOPSIS
On review by certiorari, the Supreme Court held that petitioners do not merit dismissal as the
act of disaffiliation is not disloyalty to the union. Neither is the strike illegal where the union
believes that respondent company committed unfair labor practices and the circumstances
warranted such belief, although later such allegations were proven to be untrue.
SYLLABUS
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FORMATION OF NEW UNION IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF SELF-
ORGANIZATION. — The federation and the union are two different entities and it was the
federation which actively initiated the dismissal of the individual petitioners. A local union does
not owe its existence to the federation to which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation and continued existence to the will of its members. The
very essence of self-organization is for the workers to form a group for the effective
enhancement and protection of their common interests.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRIKE; WHEN IT MAY BE CONSIDERED LEGAL.— A strike may be
considered legal when the union believed that the respondent company committed unfair labor
acts and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith although subsequently such
allegation of unfair labor practices are found out as not true.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE STRIKING MEMBERS, UNDER THE FERRER
RULING AND UNDER THE PEPITO RULING; CASE AT BAR. — Where the strike of the union
was in response to what it was warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practice on
the part of the management, said strike following the Ferrer ruling (Ferrer, et al. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-242678, May 31,1966, 17 SCRA 532) did not result in the termination of the striking members'
status as employees and therefore, they are still entitled to reinstatement without backwages.
The Ferrer ruling was also upheld in Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Company of the Phil. Ltd.
(L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276). In the case of Pepito vs. Secretary of Labor, L-49418,
Feb. 29, 1980, the petitioner therein was separated for having been implicated in a pilferage
case by a co-employee but was later absolved from a charge, the Supreme Court thru Chief
Justice Fernando ruled that the cause for His dismissal was proved non-existent or false and
thus ordered his reinstatement with three years backwages, without deduction and qualification.
In the case at bar, following the Pepito ruling the Supreme Court held that petitioners are
entitled not only to reinstatement but also to three years backwages without deduction and
qualification. This is justified and proper since the strike was proved to be not illegal but was
induced in the honest belief that management had committed unfair labor practices and,
therefore, the cause of their dismissal from employment was non-existent.
SYLLABUS
(Sandigan Savings & Loan Bank, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
112877, [February 26, 1996], 324 PHIL 348-365)
||| (Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 97747, [March 31, 1993])
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORKER HIRED FOR SPECIFIC PROJECT AND DOES NOT BELONG TO
THE "WORK POOL," PROJECT EMPLOYEE. — Paraphrasing Rada v. NLRC, (205 SCRA 69
[1992]) it is clear that private respondent Mata is a project employee considering that he does
not belong to a "work pool" from which petitioner PNOC would draw workers for assignment to
other projects at its discretion. It is likewise apparent from the facts of the case that private
respondent Mata was utilized only for one particular project, the well-completion project which
was part of the exploration stage of the PNOC Bacon-Manito Geothermal Project. Hence,
private respondent Mata can be dismissed upon the termination of the project as there would be
no need for his services. We should not expect petitioner to continue on hiring private
respondent in the other phases of the project when his services will no longer be needed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY PROPER WHERE
REINSTATEMENT NO LONGER POSSIBLE. — Considering, however, that the Bacon-Manito
project has already been completed and is, presumably, now operating, reinstatement of private
respondent is impossible. He is, however, entitled to backwages and separation pay. For this
purpose, We adopt the Executive Labor Arbiter's computation as to how much backwages and
separation pay private respondent will get.
||| (Big Five Products Workers Union-CLP v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-17600,
[July 31, 1963], 118 PHIL 575-582)
SYLLABUS
||| (National Mines and Allied Workers' Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
L-59596, [November 19, 1982], 204 PHIL 268-276)
SYNOPSIS
After petitioner union had filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations, respondent company falsely charged four union members with falsification and
"temporarily laid off" the chairman of the union's board of directors. When the petition for
certification election was granted and a date was set for the holding thereof, respondent
company applied for clearance to close its business operations. Then respondent company
informed its workers that a gradual transfer of business from the old premises to a new site one
kilometer away would be effected, but no order regarding the transfer was issued to the
workers. When petitioners reported for work at the old site, they were refused entry by the
guards. When they reported to the new site, they were given no work and no assignments, and
were thereafter dismissed for insubordination and abandonment of duties. Consequently,
petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice before respondent National Labor Relations
Commission against respondent company which in turn filed a counter-complaint for
abandonment of work. In the meantime, the certification election was held wherein a convincing
majority of workers voted for a "non-union status" of the company. Respondent company did not
push through its threat to stop its operations. In spite of the facts of the case, the Labor Arbiter
ruled that respondent company is not guilty of unfair labor practice and the individual petitioners
not guilty of abandonment of work but merely of refusal to report to their assignments. Hence,
he ordered reinstatement of individual petitioners without backwages. Respondent Commission
fully agreed with the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this petition.
On review, the Supreme Court, granting the petition and setting aside the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, ordered respondent company to reinstate individual petitioners with full backwages and
without any loss of seniority rights. The Court held that respondent Commission committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming in its entirety the inconsistent and illogical ruling of the
Labor Arbiter as derogatory to the rights of the workers and the protection given them by the
Constitution and statutes.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER WHO IS GUILTY THEREOF GENERALLY REQUIRED TO
REINSTATE WORKERS WITH FULL BACKWAGES. — It is the established rule that an
employer who commits an unfair labor practice may be required to reinstate with full backwages
the workers affected by such act. (Compania Maritima v. United Seamen's Union, 104 Ins Phil.
7; Talisay Silay Milling Co v. CIR, 106 Phil. 1081; Velez v. PAV Watchmen's Union, 107 Phil.
689; Phil. Sugar Institute v. CIR, et at., 109 Phil. 452; Big Five Products Workers Union v. CIR,
8 SCRA 559; MD Transit & Taxi Co. v. De Guzman, 7 SCRA 726).
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent was employed as Master of the petitioner's vessel for a period of six months.
He was able to work only for two months because he was recalled by petitioners for transfer to
another vessel. Despite several follow-ups, private respondent was, however, not redeployed.
Hence, private respondent, averring that he was dismissed without just cause nor due process,
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of the salaries and allowances owing to
the unexpired portion of his contract. Petitioners denied private respondent's allegations. It
insisted that the letter-petition allegedly signed by certain officers and crewmembers of the
vessel charging private respondent with acts of dishonesty and embezzlement of company
funds, warrant the penalty of dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
all found the dismissal of private respondent illegal and declared him entitled to three months
salary. cDaEAS
The Supreme Court held that an employer can terminate the services of an employee only for
valid and just causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In the
present case, the Court found that the petitioners utterly failed to establish by convincing
evidence private respondent's culpability. The acts allegedly complained of in the letter-petition
were not substantiated at all. No original of the letter-petition allegedly submitted to them by
crewmembers of the vessel was ever produced by petitioners. A condemnation of dishonesty
and disloyalty cannot arise from suspicions spawned by speculative inferences. Moreover, the
Court found that the manner of dismissal by petitioners of private respondent was devoid of due
process. Petitioners failed to furnish private respondent with the required written notices before
he was dismissed. Hence, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, but with
modification ordering the petitioners to pay private respondent his salaries for four months
representing the unexpired portion of his employment contract.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE; EMPLOYEE'S BREACH OF DUTY
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. — Petitioners' submission, that
private respondent was dismissed because of loss of trust and confidence, is quite belated. This
issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Moreover, loss of trust or breach of
confidence must have some basis, and without said basis cannot be successfully invoked as a
ground for dismissal. Otherwise put, there must be some breach of duty on the part of the
employee and the same must be supported by substantial evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED VOID IF REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS WERE NOT
OBSERVED. — Not only must the reasons for dismissing an employee be substantiated, the
manner of his dismissal must be in accordance with governing rules and regulations. Otherwise
the termination itself would be grossly defective, and illegal. This means that the requirements
of due process must be observed. The employer is required to furnish the concerned employee
with two written notices before his dismissal: (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice of
the employer's decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory; otherwise the order of
dismissal is void.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; 'TWO-NOTICE RULE'; REQUIRED NOTICE MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IN
EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF CLEAR AND EXISTING DANGER TO THE SAFETY OF THE
CREW OR VESSEL. — Note that under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the
"two-notice rule" is indicated. An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against
him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed,
then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is
only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that
the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to
the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED ILLEGAL ABSENT DUE PROCESS; CASE AT BAR. — Nothing
on record supports petitioners' allegations that the giving of a notice to private respondent
posed a clear and present danger to crew and vessel. He who invokes an exemption from a rule
must by convincing and credible evidence show why the exemption should apply to him. On this
score, petitioners failed to adduce pertinent evidence. Further, nothing on record shows that the
Master, who replaced private respondent, or any other officer of M/V Rita V or of petitioners,
submitted "a complete report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies,
and any other documents" supporting a finding of clear and existing danger to the ship and the
company. Hence, we are constrained to agree that the manner of dismissal by petitioners of
private respondent was devoid of due process, hence illegal.
6. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, SECTION 10 THEREOF; MONEY CLAIM; AN ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO HIS UNPAID SALARIES FOR THE UNEXPIRED
PORTION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. — In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs.
NLRC, involving Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, we held: [W]e cannot subscribe to the
view that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec.
10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into
play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more.
This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words
"salaries . . . for three months." To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled
to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard
and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the
well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken
that every part or word thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to know
the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. It is not disputed that private respondent's employment contract in
the instant case was for six (6) months. Hence, we see no reason to disregard the ruling in
Marsaman that private respondent should be paid his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract.
||| (Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira, G.R. No. 144314 *, [November 21, 2002], 440 PHIL 906-923)
||| (Supercars, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 74151-54, [April 10, 1989],
253 PHIL 652-659)
||| (Pilipinas Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101372, [November 13,
1992], 290 PHIL 244-252)
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Jardine Davies, Inc. was engaged in general trading which include the exclusive
distributorship of "Union 76" lubricating oil which was manufactured by Unoco Philippines, Inc.
The private respondent Virgilio Reyes was its former sales representative. However, there were
reports that "Union 76" lubricating oil was being illegally manufactured, blended, packed and
distributed. The said report was confirmed by a private investigator who reported further that it
was being undertaken by the private respondent. A Search Warrant was secured by petitioner
which led to the seizure of the alleged fake items found in the apartment complex occupied by
private respondent. This eventually resulted to the dismissal from employment of private
respondent since he committed serious misconduct inimical to the interest of the petitioner.
Meantime, all the materials seized by virtue of a petition filed by private respondent's younger
brother, Donato Reyes, being the legal tenant of the apartment and all the materials seized are
legally claimed by him. By reason thereof, private respondent sued petitioner for illegal
dismissal. But the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission reversed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. TcHEaI
The Court ruled that there was no factual basis for petitioner's distrust of private respondent as
evidenced by the subsequent judicial order releasing the articles seized during the search. As it
appears on record, the trial court believed the explanation of Donato Reyes, brother of private
respondent, that he was the lessee of the aforesaid apartment. Besides, the court declared that
the owner of the confiscated goods was Donato Reyes, and there was no proof that the
mentioned articles belonged to private respondent. In sum, the Court held that public
respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner failed to duly prove that
the dismissal of private respondent was justified on account of loss of trust and confidence.
Hence, private respondent's dismissal was found illegal and petitioner was ordered to pay
private respondent backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
SYLLABUS
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DOES NOT INCLUDE INQUIRY
AS TO CORRECTNESS OF EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE. — Resort to judicial review of the
decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission by way of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. It does not include an
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the basis of the labor
agency in reaching its conclusion. Neither is it for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence,
re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute findings of fact for those of an
administrative body which has gained expertise in its specialized field. Arguably, there may
even be an error in judgment. This, however, is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID., PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOT REQUIRED. —
Likewise, it must be noted that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to dismiss an
employee on the ground of loss of confidence. It is sufficient that there is some basis for such
loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the
employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST ARISE FROM PARTICULAR PROVEN FACTS. — This Court,
however, has repeatedly stressed that the right of an employer to dismiss employees on
account of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily and without showing
just cause, so as not to render the employee's constitutional right to security of tenure nugatory.
Thus, although the dropping of a criminal charge for an employee's alleged misconduct does
not bar his dismissal, and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to justify the same,
still the basis thereof must be clearly and convincingly established. Besides, for loss of
confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, such loss of confidence must arise from particular
proven facts. In other words, this ground must be founded on facts established by the employer
who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon
which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly made to rest; otherwise the dismissal will
be rendered illegal.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, private
respondent was suspended and eventually dismissed for allegedly committing fraudulent acts
and unfairly competing with petitioner. To justify its administrative action, petitioner somehow
gave credence to the surveillance report implicating private respondent in the illegal
manufacture, blending, packing and distribution of petitioner's products. Petitioner likewise
relied on the result of the search on the apartment reportedly leased by private respondent from
which alleged counterfeit "Union 76" oil products were seized. Unfortunately, these could not be
deemed sufficient basis for petitioner to lose its trust and confidence on private respondent so
as to justify the latter's dismissal.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES STARTING FROM MARCH 21, 1989
ARE ENTITLED TO FULL BACKWAGES. — It must be emphasized, though, that jurisprudence
distinguishes between employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6715 on March 21, 1989, and those whose illegal dismissals were effected after such date.
Thus, employees illegally dismissed prior to March 21, 1989, are entitled to backwages up to
three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally dismissed after are
granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY
IF REINSTATEMENT IS NO LONGER VIABLE. — In addition to backwages, illegally dismissed
employees are entitled to either reinstatement, if feasible, or separation pay, if reinstatement is
no longer viable. In our view, the circumstances obtaining in this case would not warrant the
reinstatement of the private respondent. Antagonism and imputations of criminal act caused a
severe strain in the relationship between petitioner and private respondent, not to mention the
considerable length of time private respondent has been out of petitioner's employ. Thus, a
more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month's
pay for every year of service with petitioner, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year. In the computation of separation pay, the three-year period
wherein backwages are awarded must be included. cdphil
||| (Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 76272, [July 28,
1999], 370 PHIL 310-322)
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Admittedly, the encashment of the checks in question is a
violation of Policy No. 014 of said hotel. But as found by the Labor Arbiter, it was established
that: (a) complainant was not motivated by bad faith; (b) Policy No. 014 is not strictly or
consistently enforced but has been relaxed repeatedly to meet business exigencies; and (c)
complainant's encashment of the checks in question was not only with the knowledge but with
clearance from her superiors who are more knowledgeable as to the circumstances under which
the enforcement of the same may be relaxed. Verily, complainant was placed under most
difficult circumstances and she deserves the full protection of the law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE REGULATES RIGHT OF EMPLOYER; LABOR PROVISIONS ARE
INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF THE EXERCISE OF LABOR RIGHTS. — The right of employer
to freely select or discharge his employees is regulated by the State, because the preservation
of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the preservation of the
corporate profit (Euro-Linea, Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 156 SCRA 78 [1987]). In addition, security of
tenure is a right of paramount value guaranteed by the Constitution and should not be denied on
mere speculation (Tolentino v. NLRC, 152 SCRA 717 [1987]). Protection to labor and social
justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws and rules and regulations are
interpreted in favor of the exercise of labor rights (Euro-Linea, Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, supra).
HcISTE
5. ID.; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER; FINDINGS OF
FACTS THEREOF ARE CONCLUSIVE ON SUPREME COURT. — It has been ruled time and
again that finding of facts of the Labor Arbiters is conclusive on the Supreme Court if supported
by substantial evidence (Reyes v. Philippine Duplication, Inc., 109 SCRA 489 [1981]).
||| (Llosa-Tan v. Silahis International Hotel, G.R. No. 77457, [February 5, 1990], 260 PHIL 787-
796)
SYLLABUS
||| (Talaga Barangay Water Service Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 94803, [March 16, 1992], 283 PHIL 1105-1113)
SYNOPSIS
In L-18461, decided by this Court of February 10, 1967, petitioner Company was adjudged to
reinstate without back wages its striking employees (members of respondent union). It filed a
Motion for Clarification of the decision informing the Court that it cannot accommodate and
reinstate all the strikers on account of this automation and modernization of its plant. This
motion was denied. Meanwhile, in the court a quo, the respondents filed motions for the
issuance of an order directing the petitioner to accept in its employ its member-strikers and to
pay back wages from the time they presented themselves to work until reinstatement. Petitioner
filed its opposition thereto. Subsequently however, the court a quo, in three separate orders,
directed the union-member-strikers to report for work and the petitioner-company to accept
them back. Some reported for work; others ignored the order; a few were told to rest until fit for
work while others who were found with tuberculosis were given their compensation pay. In still
another order, dated December 28, 1973, the lower court ordered the petitioner to pay back
wages. The motion for reconsideration having been denied in a resolution en banc dated July
31, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition for review raising as errors the Industrial Court's
order for the payment of back wages to the strikers; the extension of time within which those
who failed to report for work to ask for reinstatement; and for an award of back wages to those
found unfit to work.
The Supreme Court held that the court a quo exceeded its authority and amended the judgment
in L-18461 when it issued the questioned orders. It set aside the order of December 28, 1973
and the resolution en banc of July 31, 1974 and directed petitioner to immediately reinstate
strikers formerly found unfit for work because of tuberculosis and other illness upon presentation
of a certificate of their physical fitness for work by a government physician.
SYLLABUS
||| (Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co., G.R. No. L-39174, L-39186, [May
7, 1976], 162 PHIL 895-896)
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DENIAL THEREOF WHERE
STRIKERS IN CASE AT BAR WERE AUTOMATICALLY DISMISSED ON A MERE FINDINGS
OF ILLEGALITY OF STRIKE ASCERTAINED THROUGH AN IRREGULAR PROCEDURE. — A
mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be automatically followed by wholesale
dismissal of the strikers from their employment. What is more, the finding of the illegality of the
strike by respondent Minister of Labor and Employment is predicated on the evidence
ascertained through an irregular procedure conducted under the semblance of summary
methods and speedy disposition of labor disputes involving striking employees. While it is true
that administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidities of
procedure, it is equally well-settled in this jurisdiction that avoidance of such technicalities of law
or procedure in ascertaining objectively the facts in each case should not, however, cause a
denial of due process. The relative freedom of the labor arbiter from the rigidities of procedure
cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs.
Court of Industrial Relations that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process. As clearly pointed out in Free
Employees and Workers Association (FEWA) vs. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court,
speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated, thus: "That the Court of Industrial Relations is only
quasi-judicial in character, and not bound by strict rules of evidence, does not mean that it can
dispense with any and all rules, even the most substantial, and those shown by experience to
be essential in arriving at the truth, . . . for the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony,
the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights
are asserted or defended." The principle of due process furnishes a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order to impress it with the stamp of validity. Fidelity to
such standard must of necessity be the overriding concern of government agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions. Although a speedy administration of action implies a speedy trial, speed
is not the chief objective of a trial. Respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of
procedural due process equally apply in proceedings before administrative agencies with quasi-
judicial powers. For, the statutory grant of power to use summary procedures should heighten a
concern for due process, for judicial perspective in administrative decision-making, and for
maintaining the vision which led to the creation of the administrative office. We see no cogent
reason to deviate from the aforecited principles of law enunciated by this Court in earlier cases.
The requirements of procedural due process were not observed in the instant case. Petitioners
were not afforded full opportunity to be heard to warrant a drastic consequence like outright
dismissal from employment. Procedural due process, requires a hearing before condemnation,
with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after
such inquiry.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOOD FAITH OF WORKERS IN STAGING STRIKE IN VIOLATION OF STRIKE
BAN, AND NO-STRIKE CLAUSE OF CBA AND LACK OF NOTICE-TO-STRIKE
CATEGORIZES ACTION AS PREMATURE. — Even on the assumption that the illegality of the
strike is predicated on its being a violation of the ban or prohibition of strikes in export-oriented
industries, lack of notice-to-strike, and as a violation of the no-strike clause of the CBA, still, the
automatic finding of the illegality of the strike finds no automotive support in the light of the
attendant circumstances. As this Court held in Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Cement Workers
Union, a strike staged by the workers, inspired by good faith, does not automatically make the
same illegal. In Ferrer vs. Court of Industrial Relations, the belief of the strikers that the
management was committing unfair labor practice was properly considered in declaring an
otherwise premature strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the Labor Court for the
reinstatement without backwages of said employees. In the instant case, it is not disputed that,
indeed, the Company did not pay the salaries of the workers for one and a half mouths, more or
less. Such act of the Company broke the patience of the workers and those who depended on
them for support and daily subsistence. On the other hand, the act of the workers in demanding
a valid grievance for the payment of their salaries is inspired by their honest belief that the
Company was committing acts inimical to their interests relative to wages which, basically, is a
violation of the CBA existing between the parties. At the very least, respondent Minister of Labor
and Employment should have viewed the strike as premature following the cases of Cebu
Portland Cement Co., Ferrer and Shell Oil Workers Union. The ruling laid down in the three
aforecited cases was reiterated in Almira vs. B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc., a 1974 case, that the
strike should have been viewed with a little less disapproval and even if declared illegal, need
not have been attended with such a drastic consequence as termination of employment
relationship. This is so because, according to the Court, of the security of tenure provision under
the Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERIOUS ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN CASE
AT BAR. — In view however of the pronouncement in Shell Oil Workers' Union vs. Shell
company of the Phils., Ltd., supra, that if the existence of force (acts of violence) while the strike
lasts is not pervasive and widespread, nor consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter
of policy, responsibility for serious acts of violence should be individual and not collective, We
deem it proper under the circumstances that the charges of serious acts of violence imputed
against the herein petitioners (10 workers) must be heard anew affording the petitioners all the
opportunity to air their side in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. Pending
further proceedings and/or hearing of the serious acts of violence imputed against the
petitioners, the Company should reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges.
||| (Bacus v. Ople, G.R. No. L-56856, [October 23, 1984], 217 PHIL 670-690)
Verily, respondent who was illegally dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 8
However, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not warrant the reinstatement
of respondent. Aside from the fact that antagonism caused a severe strain in the parties'
employer-employee relationship, petitioner company has "completely ceased its tire
manufacturing and marketing operations effective November 11, 1994," as evidenced by its
Notice of Indefinite Suspension of Manufacturing Operations dated November 10, 1994 9 to
the Securities and Exchange Commission and its Application for Business Retirement dated
February 22, 1996 10 filed with the Business Permits & Licensing Office of the City of
Muntinlupa. Thus, a more equitable disposition would be an award of separation pay
equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher, (with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year),
11 in addition to his full backwages, allowances and other benefits. 12
||| (Philtread Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Vicente, G.R. No. 142759, [November 10, 2004], 484 PHIL
543-551)
Having been constructively dismissed, Escudero was correctly found entitled to backwages and
attorney's fees by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. Under Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended, employees who have been illegally terminated from employment are
entitled to the twin reliefs of reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to the payment of
full back wages 41 corresponding to the period from their illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. 42 Reinstatement is a restoration to the state from which one has been removed
or separated, 43 while the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income
that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal. 44 Proper where reinstatement is not
advisable or feasible as when antagonism already caused a severe strain in the relationship
between the employer and the employee, 45 separation pay may also be awarded where, as
here,, reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties or when the
employee decides not to be reinstated anymore. 46 |||
(Tan Brothers Corp. of Basilan City v. Escudero, G.R. No. 188711, [July 3, 2013], 713 PHIL
392-405)
||| (Coca-Cola Salesforce Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 116637,
[April 21, 1995], 313 PHIL 612-619)