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CO-OWNERSHIP

1) Definition

Pardell vs. Bartolome [L-4656 November 18, 1912]


Facts: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the
existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de
Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial authorization or even extra judicial
agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a
house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes
Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon,
Ilocos Sur.

Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring and returning to them one
half of the total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned properties.
However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the plaintiff her share of the said
properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for
their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.

Issue: Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said property

Held: No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was
a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owner’s right of
use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at
bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented
Vicenta from utilizing the same.

Basa v aguilar
DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA

When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, Article 448 governs in case real
property (like a house) encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith exists.

FACTS:

The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu
City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square
meters (which is about the size of a typical Starbux café)

Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the
plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the
house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiff’s adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then
requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the portion of
defendant’s house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price of
the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, and not
that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house
encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family home, hence
they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.

ISSUE:

w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that used to be co-owned, but was
subdivided.

HELD:

The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448
therefore governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence,
the plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options

> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after indemnifying the Defendants; or
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home rested. ( or they can rent it)

Petitioners: Delia Bailon-Casilao, Luz Paulino-Ang, Emma Paulino-Ybanez, Nilda Paulino-Tolentino,


and Sabina Bailon
Respondents: CA and Celestino Afable
Ponente: Cortes, J.
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or not said
petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their present action.
There is a parcel of land in the names of the Bailons (Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and
Delia) as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.
o Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, (Nenita being represented in this case by her children)
o Bernabe went to China and had not been heard from since
It appears that Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato Delgado.
Rosalia alone, then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana Aresgado de Lanuza.
o On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado land which the Delgado had earlier acquired from Rosalia
and Gaudencio.
Husband John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana, sold the two
parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions
of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is.
o It appears that the land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas,
mother of the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon, then in that of Donato Delgado, then in Ponciana
de Lanuza's name, and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr.
The petitioners in this case, the Bailons, filed a case for recovery of property against Celestino Afable.
In his answer, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and said that
the Bailons are guilty of laches.
LC declared Afable co-owner because he validly bought 2/6 of the land (the shares of Rosalia and
Gaudencio)
CA affirmed. Prescription does not apply against the Bailons because they are co-owners of the original
sellers. But, an action to recover may be barred by laches.
o CA held the Bailons guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint

Issue: Applicability of the doctrine of laches


Ratio:
Initially, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in
common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is
required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in NCC 493:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership
SC has already ruled in other cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
o By virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio, which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable,
Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
o However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.

Re: Proper action


The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession but
the division of the common property
Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the buyers are legitimate possessors in
joint ownership of the common property claimed

Re: Prescription
Here, prescription cannot be invoked.
Pursuant to NCC 494, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
In Budiong v. Bondoc , SC has interpreted that provision to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For NCC 494 explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in
favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Also, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express pr ovision of Act
No. 496 that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession” is applicable.
Prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the Bailons who remain the registered owners of the
parcel of land.
d2015member

Re: Argument of Bailons that as to the children who represent their deceased mother, Nenita, prescription lies
It is argued, that as to the children who are not the registered co-owners but merely represent their
deceased mother, prescription lies. (citing Pasion v. Pasion: "the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can only be
invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that 'one who is not the registered owner of a
parcel of land cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim.'
Reliance on the previous case is wrong.
o The ruling there applies only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers.
The reason for that is: if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing
against the owner’s hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent

Re: Laches
Laches is also unavailing as a shield against the action of petitioners Bailon.
o There are 4 basic elements of laches
1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
2) Delay in asserting the corporations complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;
3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and,
4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
to be barred
o First and last elements are present.
o Second and third elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights.
o However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches.
o It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under
whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit.
o This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
o The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
While there was delay in asserting the Bailon’s rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of
the sale nor with any opportunity to bring a suit.
o In the first place, the Bailons had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister.
o In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit because they were kept in the dark
about the transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia returned that she found out about the
sales and immediately, she and her siblings filed the present action for recovery of property.
The third element of laches is absent.
o There was no lack of knowledge
o It is actually Afable who is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-
owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special
authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
A person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and
to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such inquiry.
Also, petitioners Bailon are relatives of his wife. As a gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the
Bailons who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even
before the sale.
o In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence, he is deemed to have bought the lot at
his own risk.
o Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.

2.) Specific Rights of Co-Owners

MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY

Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was originally owned by one Julain Melencio who died before the
1905, leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the
land. Contract of lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for the establishment of a rice mill
with necessary buildings for warehouses and quarters for employees. Document evidencing lease
acknowledged but never recorded with the Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession of the land and erected
the mill and other necessary buildings. lease was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who transferred it to Uy Eng Jui &
Co.(unregistered partnership); until the lease finally came to Dy Tiao Lay. Land was registered under the
Torrens system in 1913 but the lease was not mentioned in the title, though it was mentioned that one house
and 3 warehouses were owned by Yap Kui Chin. 1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition
of parts of the inheritance. After Mrs. Macapagal, wife of one the heirs of Julian, Ramon, demanded an
increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to P300/mo., she was informed by Dy Tiao Lay that a written lease
existed and that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled to an extension of the lease at the original rental.
Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and in such case the lease was executed without their consent
and was thus void.

The power of the majority (of co-owners of an indivisible property) would be confied to decisions touching the
management and enjoyment of the common property and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease
of 12 years w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded and which can be performed only by owners
of the property leased. Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee
(constituting a sundering of the ownership which transcends mere management) then the part owners
representing the greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease the property for a
period longer than 6 years w/o the consent of all co-owners. In this case, the fact that the lease was for 20
years amounted to an act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere act of management, thus necessitation the
consent of ALL co-owners.

G.R. No. L-3404 ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs.ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO
ARANETA, INC., defendants-
FACTS: In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason
Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc,
Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion

The share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title
No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three co-owners
agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later
divided among them.

Before, during and after the execution of this contract , Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-
fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time
he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J.
Antonio Araneta because of alleged breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" and abuse of
powers granted to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property
held in common be partitioned. Later, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking
the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents
collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered
said property.

The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., one of the
co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-
defendant.however the court dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff
appealed from that decision.

Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void
or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta
acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of
subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., that the defendant
company has violated the terms of the contract by not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the
schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the necessary improvements into the land and
in not delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly
paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code

RULING:

ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand
the partition of the thing held in common.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.

We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract far
from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community,
precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the
parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in
the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to the main
object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document, the parties thereto practically and substantially
entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-
ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.

Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition
insisted upon the appellant.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to
costs.

ARCELONA V CA
Doctrine: SC stressed that when the IAC and the SC affirmed the RTC decision, they were not given the
occasion to rule on the issue of the TC’s jurisdiction over the persons of the indispensable parties as they are
limited by the issues raised before them. Thus substantial justice requires that SC be allowed to nullify the RTC
decision for lack of jurisdiction even if previously affirmed by them.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
1. Petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. 6
siblings are co-owners some of which live abroad (3 in the Philippines and 3 abroad).
2. A lease contract was executed over the fishpond between Tandoc and Olanday (siblings in the
Philippines). Upon termination of the lease, the premises were surrendered to Olanday by the caretaker
of the lessee.
3. Three days after, respondent Farnacio instituted a case for peaceful possession against Olanday
intended to maintain himself as tenant of the fishpond.
4. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Farnacio.
5. Olanday then elevated the decision to the IAC which affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
6. On appeal, the SC sustained the IAC decision after remand of the case to the court of origin, private
respondent was placed in possession of the entire property.
7. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment against private respondent and the
implementing sheriff.
8. Dissatisfied with the CA resolution, a petition for review was filed with the SC.
9. Note: the 3 Arcelona sisters who were abroad were not impleaded as indispensable parties, only the
other sisters (Olanday) were impleaded.

ISSUES:

(1) May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or
over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of due process, aside from extrinsic fraud?-YES
(2) May extraneous matters, not found in the records of the original case, be used in voiding or defending
the validity of such final judgment?-NO
(3) Will an independent action for annulment of the decision of the regional trial court (which was affirmed
both by the CA and the SC) filed before the CA prosper, or is intervention before the court of origin the
only remedy? - YES
RATIO:
1. Fraud is not only the ground to attack a final and executory judgment. According to the SC in the
Makabingkil case there are three ways to attack a judgment.
a. First, by petition for relief under R38 when judgment has been taken against the party through
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which case the petition must be filed w/in 60d
after petitioner learns of judgment but not more than 6 months after entry of judgment.
b. Second is direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment on the ground of
extrinsic fraud.
c. Third is either a direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void
upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals.
2. Thus, Macabingkildid not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void where mere
inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-
compliance with due process of law.
3. SC stressed that when the IAC and the SC affirmed the RTC decision, they were not given the
occasion to rule on the issue of the TC’s jurisdiction over the persons of the indispensable parties as
they are limited by the issues raised before them. Thus substantial justice requires that SC be allowed
to nullify the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction even if previously affirmed by them.
4. On the second issue, SC held that the CA erred in annulling or declaring null the decision in
considering extraneous matters. In an action to declare a judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction
over the parties or subject matter, only evidence found in the records of the case can justify the
annulment of the said judgment.
5. On the third issue, SC stated that intervention is not the only remedy to assail a void final judgment.
6. A direct action is available in assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic fraud, while a direct or a
collateral action may be used to show lack of jurisdiction.
7. In any event, jurisprudence upholds the soundness of an independent action to declare as null and void
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction as in this case.

ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN- Co-ownership & Ejectment

A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners as
plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action should be
dismissed.

FACTS:

A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito
Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He
then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his
father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they
vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the
said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The
only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominador’s name was when their parents were in
need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in favor of
Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelito’s filiation and the settlement of the estate are
conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, her
legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the
possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew
and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus he
cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:

NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador. Since
he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot. Upon her
death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.

Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may
bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining all the
co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of
the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
POSSESSION

C. TERMINATION

RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of
all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

FACTS:

Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage
of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such.

Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio
Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.


Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under
color of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of
all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of
a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the
claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to
the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 16666. November 16, 1920. ]
JESUS VAÑO, Applicant-Appellant, v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-
appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PROPERTY; REGISTRATION; TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. — V attempts to obtain title to a tract


of land containing a little over 3,793 hectares. It is shown that within the perimeter of the land are
approximately 686 hectares of forest land and four logging trails in the nature of highways. It is admitted,
however, that approximately 1,060 hectares have been under cultivation for many years and that certain other
portions have been used by the claimant for pasturage. Held: That with the elimination of the forest land and
the logging trails, the applicant can secure title on submission of proper plans to the land of which he is in
actual possession.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. — The doctrine of constructive possession announced in
Ramos v. Director of Lands ([1918], 39 Phil., 175), cannot be successfully advanced where the claimant is not
holding the land under color of title.

DECISION
All, that applicant desires by these proceedings is to obtain title to a tract of land containing a little over 3,793
hectares, including within its boundaries four municipalities and constituting a not inconsiderable part of the
entire Province of Bohol. Certainly a modest hope which, however, was thwarted by the oppositions entered by
the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Bohol, denying the registration of the land, with costs against the applicant, without prejudice. Applicant
appeals.

To prove title, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land by the applicant and his
predecessors in interest since 1882, interrupted by the revolution, is relied upon. Included within the perimeter
of the tract are approximately 685 hectares of forest land and four logging trails in the nature of highways.
These portions should, without question, be eliminated from the claim.

The Government concedes, however, that approximately 1,060 hectares are under cultivation and that certain
other portions have been used by the claimant for pasturage. (See Exhibits A, 1, and 2.) But the doctrine of
constructive possession announced in Ramos v. Director of Lands ([1918], 39 Phil., 175) cannot be
successfully advanced, for the claimant is not holding the land under color of title. To the tracts, of which
applicant is in actual possession, he can secure title, on submission of proper plans.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street and Villamor, JJ., concur.

LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Possession

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession, however, possession is not gained by mere nominal
CLAIM.

FACTS:
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, containing an area of around 24,000,000
hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of an
application. This application states that Lasam’s predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the land
since time immemorial. However, the property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and the
property sought to be registered is 24,000,000 hectares.
Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the same parcel described in another
Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated the property based on what the possessor at that
time pointed out to him; he based his study mostly on hearsay. According to the applicant, before his
occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares were cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the
doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession).

Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.

ISSUE:

Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by law?
Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land considering that the area possessed is only 2 hectares?

HELD:

First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application because the identity o the land was not clearly
established.

Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is
lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the doctrine
of constructive possession, the said application is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to
observe that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion of land actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes
of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession, possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The mere planting of a sign or
a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-5793 August 27, 1953

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALBERTO ESTOISTA, Defendant-Appellant.

Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal
possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of
the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from that sentence raising
factual legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up after the submission of the briefs,
has to do with the objection that the penalty - from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines - provided by
Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the facts. The firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in his possession was a rifle
and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same
house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered with cogon
grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house,
the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima a laborer of the family who was setting a trap
for wild chicken and whose presence was not perceived by the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the time of the
accidental killing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the accident, February 10, 1949, his son told him that there were
wild chickens on the plantation "scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them; that Bruno
told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over to Alberto who is a "sharp-shooter"
and "shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the young man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto
when the latter fired and accidentally wounded their servant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I told my father about the said wild
rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it." chanrobles
virtual law library

Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son's statements at the Constabulary
headquarters on the same morning of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the justice of the peace soon
after.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went to hunt for wild rooster;" that "later on my son Alberto came
to inform me that he had accidentally hit our laborer;" Queried "who was with Alberto when he went out
hunting," Bruno replied, " He was alone."chanrobles virtual law library

On his part, the defendant declared on the same occasion that Diragon Dima, after being shot, requested to be
taken to his (Dima's) house; that as the accused was able to carry the wounded man only about 50 meters,
Dima asked the defendant to call Bruno "who was in the house" - which Alberto did. To the question who his
companion was when he shot at a rooster, Alberto said, "I was alone."chanrobles virtual law library

There is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained anything but the truth, especially that
part regarding Bruno's whereabouts when the defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent, the
affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary headquarters, there is no hint of
any undue pressure brought to bear upon either of them, and, above all, they stood to gain nothing from the
statement that the accused was unaccompanied. In contrast, Bruno's testimony in court was interested, given
with his son's acquittal in view. And especially is the father's veracity in court to be distrusted because by
Alberto's unsolicited admission, he had been in the habit of going out hunting in other places and for target
practices, and because by Bruno's unwitting admission, his son, who had no gun of his own, is a sharpshooter
and shoots better.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the plantation with his father's gun, the
next question that presents itself is: Does this evidence support conviction as a matter of law?chanrobles
virtual law library

In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by defense counsel, it was held that carrying a gun by order
of the owner does not constitute illegal possession of firearm. The facts in that case were that a shotgun and
nine cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to possess them, were seized
by the police from Samson while walking in the town of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the
shotgun in hunting that day and, as he was coming along on horseback, sent Samson on
ahead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, in it pertinent provision is
directed against any person who possesses any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this
connection is the meaning of the word "possesses."chanrobles virtual law library

It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense as to include "carries" and "holds." This
has to be to is the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public
security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing
whatever. "Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the guilt
or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in the United States, where the right to bear arms for defense
is ensured by the federal and many state constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely
restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so has been
upheld.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to United States vs. Samson, supra, as authority for
the appellant's plea for acquittal. The implied holding in that case that the intention to possess is an essential
element of a violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the weapon to the
exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only intention to own but also intention to use. From the
very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition control or dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder
regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential factor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition, and
opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule
laid down by United States courts - rule which we here adopt - is that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless
possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this
kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to
another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; C.J.,
22)chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or carrying of his father's gun was not incidental,
casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only
purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal consequences.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the case at bar and the Samson case. Although
Samson had physical control of his employer's shotgun and cartridges, his possession thereof was
undoubtedly harmless and innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full view of the
people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson carried the gun solely in obedience
to its owner's order or request without any inferable intention to use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that
even in the United States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of defense is guaranteed,
possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of authority considered a violation of similar
statutes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from
5 to 10 years for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent
conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property, person,
and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying and
use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If
imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the
law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not
to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are
like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make
a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. De la Cruz, 92 Phil., 906.)chanrobles virtual law library

The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The
judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However,
considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh
and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of
Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months. the
appellant will pay the costs of both instances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

The constitutionality if Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the penalty therein provided, was carefully
considered. In branding imprisonment for five years too harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in
mind that six months was commensurate and just for the appellant's offense, taking into consideration his
intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it infringes the constitutional prohibition against the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." (24 C.J.S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive, " "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community." (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and
the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as
applied to appellant's and similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the
extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds
of the Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was
raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as
possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that
some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for
the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's conviction under Republic Act No. 4 likewise had received close
attention and study. There is no need on our part to add anything to what has been said, except to point out for
clarification that the references to defendant's previous uses of his father's gun and the fatal consequences of
his last use of it, were made simply to emphasize that his possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual,
incidental, or harmless. His previous conduct was relevant in determining his motive and intention, and to
disprove the claim that his father followed his son so as not to lose control of the firearm. It was far from the
thought of the court to condemn the appellant for acts with which he had not been charged or of which he had
been pronounced innocent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance with section 1 of the Republic Act No. 4, which
reads:

SECTION 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-six, is hereby further amended to read as follows:chanrobles virtual law
library

SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. - Any person
who manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition
therefor, or instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition
in violation of any provision of sections eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and six, inclusive, of
this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than a
year and one day nor more than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the court. If the article illegally
possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun, submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb,
artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall
not be less than five years nor more than ten years. A conviction under this section shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the prohibited article or articles to the Philippine Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition on the part of any person whose business or employment does not deal with such instrument or
implement shall be prima facie proof that such article is intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition.

This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or carried are to be confiscated only if they
belong to the defendant, nor is such intention deducible from the language of the act. We are inclined to, and
do, believe that, except perhaps where the lawful owner was innocent of, or without fault in, the use of his
property by another, confiscation accords with the legislative intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

We can foresee the objection that such legislation deprives one of his property without due process of law. The
answer to this is that ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right protected by the Constitution.
Above the right to own property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty - the police power of the state to protect
its citizens and to provide for the safety and good order of society. (16 C.J.S., 539, 540.) pursuant to the
exercise of police power, the right to private property may be limited, restricted and impaired so as to promote
the general welfare, public order and safety. (Id., 611.) The power of the legislature to prohibit the possession
of deadly weapon carries with it the power to provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully
used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

20. Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals| G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot
from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the
alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to
her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application
for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (‘married to Resitiuta’) as the
owner of the land.

A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with the
consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract having expired, Restituta filed for
unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal
Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan
Queto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land with the
house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto
constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards Restituta
sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment
of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.

The respondent court’s decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to the reformation of the
Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of
Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents
was valid hence a paraphernal property.

HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a
valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a
valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the transfer
was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) cannot be
sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of
the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or
consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru
onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had
paraphernal funds of her own).

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986


THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
o possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan
o land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership
to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
o ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES


2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1. YES

 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
o it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Jus possessionis, jus possidendi; good faith and bad faith

The Chapter on Possession (jus possessionis, not jus possidendi) in the Civil Code refers to a possessor other
than the owner. The difference between a builder (or possessor) in good faith and one in bad faith is that the
former is not aware of the defect or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition while the latter is aware of such
defect or flaw (Art. 526, Civil Code). But in either case there is a flaw or defect. In the present case, there is no
such flaw or defect because it is Tan Queto himself (not somebody else) who is the owner of the property.

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