SAN DIEGO v NOMBRE

Facts:
Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. As such, he leased one of the properties of the
estate—a fishpond—to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for 3 years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.
The transaction was done without previous authority or approval of the Court. A year after, Nombre was removed as administrator,
and was replaced by one Sofronio Campillanos. Escalanlar was cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to
the newly appointed administrator.
Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion for authority to execute a lease contract over the fishpond, in favor of petitioner
Moises San Diego, for 5 years with yearly rental of P5,000. Escalanlar was not notified of the said motion. Nombre, on the other hand,
opposed to the motion, pointing out that the fishpond was leased by him to Escalandar for 3 years. He alleged that the validity of the
lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator must be recognized unless declared void in a separate action.
The lower court declared the contract in favor of Escanlar null and void for want of judicial authority and that San Diego offered
better lease conditions than Escanlar. In light of this, Escanlar agreed to increase the rental to P5,000 after the termination of his
original contract. However, the trial judge stated that such contract was fraudulent and executed in bad faith because Nombre was
removed as administrator and the rentals of the property was inadequate.
However, on appeal, the CA ruled: No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant lease of property placed
under his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Art. 1647, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of
Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the period of lease, there is no need for special
authority unless the contract is to be recorded in the Registry. Rule 85, Sec. 3 of the ROC authorizes a judicial administrator to
administer the estate of the deceased not disposed by will, for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all
acts of administration without special authority of the Court; such as the leasing the property. And where the lease has been formally
entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the
administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.
On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that Art. 1878(8) limits the right of a judicial administrator to lease the real property
without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds 1 year. The lease in favor of Escalanlar, being 3 years and without court
approval, is therefore void.

Issue:
W/N the provisions on Agency should apply in this case. (NO)
Held:

The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the court. He is not
only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a
bond. These circumstances are not required in agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which law gives the
principal in limiting the powers and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be through agreements.
Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.
Romualdez vs Tiglao

FACTS:
Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao and his sureties (including Felisa Tiglao) in 1960 for the payment of unpaid rentals for
the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. CFI Rizal decided in favor of Romualdez adjudging Tiglao et al liable for 22k.

A writ of attachment was issued but the judgment was not satisfied. Romualdez sought the revival of the judgment in 1970. When this
was files, Felisa was already dead; therefore, her estate was made a defendant represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning
Tiglao-Naguiat. Maningning filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that under Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, "No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator.” The lower court
nevertheless granted the revival.

An appeal is taken by the estate of Felisa.

ISSUE:
Whether the action for revival was proper instead of presenting the claim in the Special Proceeding in the settlement of Felisa’s estate

HELD:
The action for revival was proper.

The present action is one for the recovery of a sum of money so that it is barred by Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court and that the
remedy of Romualdez et al is to present their claim in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The original judgment, which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five
years (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first
revived by action. This is precisely why Romualdez et al have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa
Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded
can be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Doctrine/s:
A judgment which became stale must first be revived before it can be presented as a claim against the estate.

Exception to Sec. 1 of Rule 87: When no administrator has been appointed yet and the ten-year period for enforcing a judgment is
about to expire.